My field of research is Political Economy. I use game theory and empirical methods to study how institutions and strategic considerations shape collective decision-making in courts, legislatures, and elections.
One of the main lines of my theoretical research is the study of Power and Bargaining in Collective Bodies. I have studied the determinants of the power of leaders in organizations, the role of intermediaries in legislative bargaining, and whether competition between principals for influence over a group can be detrimental to its members. I am also interested -- and have written about -- electoral competition and political agency. My empirical work builds on the Structural Estimation approach. A key theme of my work in this area has been to understand how groups incorporate information about the relative merits of the alternatives under consideration into their decision-making process. My current empirical research focuses on the estimation of dynamic games in Congress and elections.
I teach Game Theory and its applications to Political Economy for graduate and undergraduate students.