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Princeton University

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Undergraduate Studies

B.A. in Economics, with Highest Honors,
The University of Hong Kong, 2012

Graduate Studies

PH.D. candidate in Economics,
Princeton University, 2012 to present
Thesis Title: "Essays on Updating and Revising Beliefs"
Expected Completion Date: June 2017

M.A. in Economics,
Princeton University, 2014

References

Professor Faruk Gul (Chair)
Department of Economics
Princeton University
(609) 258-4009, fgul@princeton.edu

Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Department of Economics
Princeton University
(609) 258-4017, pesendor@princeton.edu

Professor Dilip Abreu
Department of Economics
Princeton University
(609) 258-4021, dabreu@princeton.edu

Teaching and Research Fields

Primary Fields:	Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory
Secondary Fields:	Behavioral Economics

Research Experience

Jan 2016–Aug 2016	Research Assistant for Professor Stephen Morris
Jun 2014–Aug 2015	Research Assistant for Professors Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Jun 2013–Jun 2015	Research Assistant for Professor Dilip Abreu
Jun 2014–Aug 2014	Research Assistant for Professor Gregory Chow
Jan 2014–Jun 2014	Research Assistant for Professor Wei Xiong
Aug 2011–Jun 2012	Research Assistant for Professor Wing Suen

Teaching Experience

Spring 2015, 2016	ECO 363, Corporate Finance (Undergraduate)
	Teaching Assistant for Professor Yuliy Sannikov
Fall 2015	ECO 464, Corporate Restructuring (Graduate)
	Teaching Assistant for Professor O. Griffith Sexton
Spring 2015	WWS 300, Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate)
	Teaching Assistant for Professor Robert Willig

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2016	Charlotte Elizabeth Procter Fellowship
2016	Goldfeld Summer Fellowship
2012-present	University Graduate Fellowship
2012-2016	William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Grant
2010	Ronald Hsia Prize in Economics
2009–2012	HKU Foundation Scholarship for Outstanding Mainland Students

Job Market Paper

Pseudo-Bayesian Updating:

We propose an axiomatic framework for belief revision when new information is of the form "event A is more likely than event B." Our decision maker need not have beliefs about the joint distribution of the signal she will receive and the payoff-relevant states. With the *pseudo-Bayesian* updating rule that we propose, the decision maker behaves as if she selects her posterior by minimizing Kullback-Leibler divergence (or, maximizing relative entropy) subject to the constraint that A is more likely than B. The two axioms that yield the representation are *exchangeability* and *conservatism*. Exchangeability is the requirement that the order in which the information arrives does not matter whenever the different pieces of information neither reinforce nor contradict each other. Conservatism requires the decision maker to adjust her beliefs no more than is necessary to accommodate the new information. We show that pseudo-Bayesian agents are susceptible to recency bias and honest persuasion. We also show that the beliefs of pseudo-Bayesian agents communicating within a network will converge but that they may disagree in the limit even if the network is strongly connected.

Research Papers

Representativeness and Similarity:

I provide a framework for analyzing a range of well-documented non-Bayesian behaviors including base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy and disjunction fallacy. The model that I propose formally links the concept of similarity in theoretical psychology with belief updating. I follow Kahneman and Tversky (1974) and assume that when attempting to respond to the question "How likely is A given B?", people mistakenly respond to the question "How representative is A of B (i.e. how similar are A and B)?" With a similarity-based updating rule the conditional probability of $A \cup C$ given B might be less than the conditional probability of A given B if $B \cap C = \emptyset$, simply because the pair of events $A \cup C$ and B differ more from each other. The axioms that I propose yield a Cobb-Douglas weighted geometric mean of $P(A|B)$ and $P(B|A)$ as the behavioral conditional probability of A given B, where P is the correct subjective probability and $P(\cdot|\cdot)$ is the Bayesian conditional of P. That is, I provide a model of behavioral decision makers who confuse these two conditional probabilities but have correct unconditional beliefs. This combination of correct priors and incorrect updating occurs often since in many experiments subjects are explicitly given the relevant prior probabilities.

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