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### *Episteme and Techne in the Statesman*

What does it mean for the Statesman to be a practitioner of an *episteme* or a *techne*? Before beginning the diarsis in the first part of the dialogue, the Eleatic Guest asks Young Socrates if, after all, the Statesman is someone who has an *episteme*—Young Socrates readily assents, but we should ask ourselves what hangs on his answer. And, we should ask ourselves why he uses these *two* terms—he readily interchanges *techne* and *episteme* from time to time—instead of sticking to just one.

I will begin the presentation by looking briefly at what these terms mean outside of Plato: *techne* is the very old concept of a specialized, full-time profession, a rational practice that a member of the lower-class did to make money and something learned either from a family member or a paid teacher who practiced the very same *techne*. *Episteme* can denote the same kinds of fields—we know from inscriptions doctors could be hailed for their *episteme* just as well as their *techne*—but was really a term of art in the Socratic circle (Wolfsdorf 2017) and quite a bit less marked as low-class. *Episteme* can also be construed as a component of *techne*.

I take it that the *Statesman* has both *episteme* and a *techne*; I will defend my view that *techne* and *episteme* can be distinguished in this dialogue (*episteme* alone being associated with *doxa* and a sort of transcendental knowledge), although in the diarsis proper *episteme* mainly operates as synecdoche for *techne*, making them seem synonymous. This is quite common phenomenon in the Platonic dialogues (indeed, many terms, including *phronesis* and *sophia* can be used apparently synonymously with *episteme*, yet it would be a mistake to infer that they are precise synonyms).

In the *Statesman*, we can see how the concepts of *techne* and *episteme* are deployed. I'll focus on three important moments in the dialogue. The first two show the importance of characterizing the statesman's knowledge as *episteme*; and the last one is a puzzle raised by this idea. The first moment regards rationality: this is an important theme raised by the idea of relative measurement. The second moment regards specialization: this is important because Plato uses the idea that the statesman has an *episteme* to criticize democratic politics.

At the end, I will turn to a controversial idea: the relationship between *episteme* and virtue in Plato. A problem comes up at 293a-e, where the doctor and statesman are compared, and both are said to act in their proper role when they act *both* according to their art and justice. While it is not surprising that the doctor's *episteme* is not sufficient for virtue, here it looks like the statesman's *episteme* is not either – which seems odd both from the perspective of other dialogues, which regularly assigned the role of determining how to *justly* use the products of other crafts to this very *episteme*, and from the perspective of this dialogue. Surely the kingly *episteme*, if it

knows anything, knows what the good is. This puzzle highlights what's at stake, and what's still unexplained, by characterizing the Statesman's knowledge as a *techne/episteme*.