



The Sixth Annual Princeton Workshop on Global Governance

“Challenging Multilateralism and the Liberal Order: What Stance Should the United States Take?”

May 13-14, 2016

This workshop is the sixth in what is now an almost annual series on global governance co-sponsored by the Project on the Future of Multilateralism (WWS) at Princeton University, the Global Summitry Project at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, The International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations and the Stanley Foundation. This year the Workshop sponsors welcomes a new partner – The Brookings Institution. The Workshop this year will take place at Whig Hall in Princeton University beginning at 9.30 on Friday, May 13th and ending at lunchtime (1:00) on Saturday May 14th. As in previous years, discussants in each panel will be asked to initiate the session with brief (maximum 7-8 minute) opening remarks followed by free-flowing discussion among all the invited participants.

Over the last number of years, this Workshop has brought together academicians, international and national officials and policy experts. The goal of the Workshop is to explore the evolving state of global governance and global order. While the Workshop has shifted from a more academic to a more policy approach and back, the Princeton Workshop has always sought to expose and explore the current state of global institutions, policy, the growing variety of actors and their global governance arrangements and finally an evaluation of the state of global order.

This year we believe will be no different. The examination comes in several parts. There are two themes in particular we hope to explore. The first theme examines the challenges presented to a wider multilateral governance approach. New powers have emerged; war and

instability rage especially in the Middle East; and geopolitics has heightened tensions - from the Ukraine to the South China Sea -and in so doing possibly undermined stability of the global order.

The second theme examines the role of the United States in the contemporary global order. Since the end of the first Clinton Administration the United States has described itself, starting with Bill Clinton himself, as the “indispensable power”. Many have suggested the same since then. As Clinton himself described:

When our national security interests are threatened we will act with others when we can, but alone if we must. We will use diplomacy when we can, but force if we must.

On balance over the recent administrations, save possibly the current Obama second administration, the United States has leaned increasingly to the use of military force as the primary instrument of global leadership. Effective multilateralism has been scarce. We now await a new US administration. What foreign policy approaches would be best for US leadership to exercise?

Day One: Friday, May 13th

Whig Hall

From 9.30: Coffee

10.00 - 10.15: Opening Remarks

John Ikenberry (Princeton University)

10:15– 11:45: Panel One: Measuring Progress in Multilateralism

How do we assess today’s multilateralism? The arrangements and actors in the global order have broadened dramatically. We have states, intergovernmental organizations, transgovernmental networks and non-state actors (NSAs) including NGOs, private corporations and individuals. Policy making in global governance includes complex regimes that have emerged especially, but not only, in climate change. Another example, for instance, was the recent Nuclear Security Summit. Rather than a top down approaches alone we witness a variety of bottom up and top down approaches. This was especially apparent in the commitments by national actors at COP21. Is the voluntary process of Paris really better than a broad multilateral rules-based approach? What functions can we expect the UNSC to perform in an era of greater geopolitical competition? What can we expect of the Informals like the G20? Is the ICJ case on the South China Sea a win for the rules-based order? Or does the international legal approach carry with it unintended consequences? How do we reach the medium to long-term objectives in the liberal order?

Chair: Keith Porter (The Stanley Foundation)

Invited Panel Members:

Martha Finnemore (George Washington University)

Suzanne Fry (National Intelligence Council)

Michael Levi (Council on Foreign Relations)

Anne-Marie Slaughter (New America)

11.45 - 12.00: Break

12.00 – 13.30: Panel Two: Assessing Alternative Global Orders

We have discussed whether there are alternative visions of global order for some time. Global governance, however, may now be entering a 'moment of clarification'. If one looks at the UNGA speeches last year, there are striking differences as to how world leaders see the organization of the global order. Many emerging powers like China, Brazil and India favor a rather traditional 'spheres of influence' arrangement and there is much insistence on national sovereignty. Many of the established powers including the United States, Germany and Japan hew to a more universal model. Can we identify the various visions of global order governance and their consequences for global governance? Which approaches are likely to enhance stability in the global order? Which approaches are more likely to generate tension and conflict?

Chair: Jennifer Smyser (The Stanley Foundation)

Invited Panel Members:

Amitav Acharya (American University)

Lyle Goldstein (U.S. Naval War College)

Mihaela Papa (Tufts University)

Tom Wright (Brookings Institution)

13.30 – 14.30: Lunch (by invitation only)

14.30 – 16.00: Panel Three: - The Crisis of European Integration – Co-sponsored with the European Union Program of Princeton University

Europe arguably has a claim to being *the* battleground for the future of multilateralism and collaborative governance. The hope of further integration (the European Project) – economic policy, finance, collective leadership and the free movement of peoples – bumps up against significant domestic constraint and demands for sovereignty. Great Britain approaches a referendum on continued EU membership. In Eastern and Central Europe there is reason to be concerned about the erosion of democracy and the return of a soft authoritarianism. And we have interference from an unfriendly outside power – Russia. What lessons can we draw from Europe for multilateralism, the pooling of sovereignty, and transnational governance? What will a more fractured and closed Europe mean for global governance and the global order?

Chair: Tom Wright (The Brookings Institution)

Invited Panel Members:

James Goldgeier (American University)

Miles Kahler (American University)

Sophie Meunier (Princeton University)

Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton University)

Ulrich Speck (Transatlantic Academy)

16.00 – 16.30: Break

16.30 – 18.00: Panel Four: A Divided Global Economic Order?

Is there a consensus on the future of the global economy? Early in the G20s existence, there were sharp divisions between a German-led austerity model and a U.S. led neo-Keynesianism. While that division has faded, economic crises remain, especially in Greece but throughout the periphery. Now, the BRICS are in economic trouble, or at least some, and a number of these emerging powers are fighting crises at home. Look at South Africa and Brazil. Yet there have been collaborative advances: The United States has finally approved the IMF reforms; the IMF has approved the inclusion of the Chinese renminbi in the SDR; and some progress has been

made in financial reforms since the 2008 global financial crisis. But is it sufficient? Meanwhile, the use of financial power as a geopolitical weapon has led some to question whether the global financial system is too tilted in the west's favor. Russia is actively seeking allies to create parallel economic infrastructures to avoid the consequences perhaps of sanctions. The US may have misjudged and mishandled the creation of the AIIB but questions remain around China's economic diplomacy. Do all these developments add up to significant divergence in the global economic order? Or is it possible, even likely to maintain and strengthen a single global economic order that all major powers can have confidence in?

Chair: Alan Alexandroff (Munk School)

Invited Panel Members:

Dan Drezner (Tufts University)

Harold James (Princeton University/IMF)

Kathleen McNamara (Georgetown University)

Mark Sobel (Treasury Dept/IMF)

19:00: Drinks, Prospect House (by invitation only)

19:30: Dinner and the Keynote Remarks

Jake Sullivan (Yale University) (by invitation only)

Day Two: Saturday, May 14th

Whig Hall

8:00 – 9:00 – Breakfast

9:00 – 10:30: Panel Five: The Middle East: Is a Multilateral Cooperation Strategy Possible?

Those strategists who favor intensified US engagement in the Middle East tend to agree that the focus of such an effort must be a diplomatic initiative to end the region's civil wars. Meanwhile the civil war(s) continue and outside intervention grows, whether it is in Syria, Iraq or Yemen. What form should diplomacy take? What is the supporting role of military power? What can the multilateral community, including the UNSC and the regional powers do to mitigate the spreading conflict? Is there any collective action that can be taken to dampen the humanitarian crisis that threatens Syria and extends in fact far beyond. Are current alliances

and borders appropriate to a sustainable regional order? Is such a strategy even likely to succeed and if not should the west, and its allies be looking at ways of retrenchment and managing the symptoms of the region's conflicts?

Chair: Bruce Jones (Brookings Institution)

Invited Panel Members:

Suzanne DiMaggio (New America)

Matthew Spence (Yale University)

Jake Sullivan (Yale University)

Tamara Wittes (Brookings Institution)

10.30 – 11.00: coffee break

11:00 – 13:00: Panel Six: US Grand Strategy: What's Possible? What's Likely?

Since 1991, successive administrations have argued that China, Russia, and other non-western powers, Brazil, India, etc. would eventually be drawn into the liberal order converging with the west and integrating into the global order. They would, as suggested specifically for China, that these powers would become 'responsible stakeholders'. John has argued that a liberal order is likely not just because of US power but also because of deeper shifts in the international system. These deeper shifts provide all countries with incentives to support the international order. Many experts and policy makers now argue however that convergence has failed and instead we have a dramatic divergence—in models of governance and in foreign policy objectives. If so, what adjustments can/should the US make? Should the next administration accept the reality of geopolitical competition and build a global order accordingly; or should it, can it, forge ahead with an amended form of the responsible stakeholder approach creating a stable global order on the basis of greater collaboration and collective global governance.

Chair: Stewart Patrick (Council on Foreign Relations)

Invited Panel Members:

Alan Alexandroff (Munk School)

Deborah Avant (University of Denver)

David Gordon (Eurasia Group)

Bruce Jones (Brookings Institution)

John Ikenberry (Princeton University)

13.00 - 13.15: Closing Remarks from the Partners