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Undergraduate Studies

B.A., Economics with High Honors,
Yonsei University, Magna Cum Laude, 2011

Graduate Studies

Princeton University, 2011 to present
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
Thesis Title: "Essays in Endogenous Managerial Ability and Distortions"
Expected Completion Date: June 2017

M.A. Economics, Princeton University, 2013

References

Professor Richard Rogerson
Department of Economics
Princeton University
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Professor Ben Moll
Department of Economics
Princeton University
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Mark Aguiar
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Teaching and Research Fields

Primary Fields Macroeconomics
Secondary Fields Development Economics

Teaching Experience

Spring 2014 Econ 332, Economics of Health and Health Care
Teaching assistant for Professor Uwe E. Reinhardt

Fall 2014	Econ 101, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Elizabeth Bogan
Spring 2015	Econ 101, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Princeton University Course Organizer for Professor Alan Blinder
Fall 2015	Econ 101, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Elizabeth Bogan
Spring 2016	Econ 101, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Alan Blinder
Fall 2016	Econ 101, Introduction to Macroeconomics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Elizabeth Bogan Econ 353, International Monetary Economics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Iqbal Zaidi

Job Market Paper

“Endogenous Managerial Ability and Financial Friction”

Abstract: The misallocation literature has focused on distortions that affect the allocation of resources across production units with a given productivity/human capital distribution. Under this setup, policies that shift resources away from more productive units to less productive units lead to aggregate productivity loss. With endogenous investment in human capital, the adverse effect of these policies is even more pronounced since those policies discourage investment in human capital in addition to causing misallocation of resources across existing production units. However, I find that with endogenous human capital investment, credit constraints in the Lucas span of control model can lead to a higher measured TFP than in the constraint-free economy. Credit constraints encourage entry into entrepreneurship, reduce the size of firms, and increase investment in human capital. Consequently, TFP is non-monotonic in the credit constraint. When the credit constraint is not too tight, accumulation of human capital offsets the fall in TFP caused by misallocation and, occasionally, even overpowers it so as to increase aggregate measured TFP. Although measured TFP does not decrease significantly—and possibly even increases—under modest credit constraints, its adverse impact on physical capital accumulation and actual consumption is still large. In fact, the adverse effects on these variables are amplified when human capital investment decisions are endogenous.

Research Papers

“Endogenous Managerial Ability and Progressive Taxation”

Abstract: Compared to proportional taxation that raises the same tax revenue, progressive taxation distorts the economy more severely. Under Lucas' span of control model with endogenous managerial ability, distortion manifests in two ways: first, agents' investments in managerial ability are distorted; second, resources are misallocated across heterogeneous firms. The more progressive is taxation, the less incentive agents have to invest in their managerial ability. This follows because higher managerial ability implies higher profit, which induces higher tax rates. Thus, compared to a proportional tax regime that raises the same tax revenue, under progressive taxation, agents invest less in their managerial ability and the distribution of income is less dispersed. In addition, the equilibrium values of TFP, total output, employment share of large firms are distorted relative to their values under proportional taxation. Hence, progressive taxation improves equality in the economy in exchange for efficiency.