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PERSONAL INFORMATION	Date of Birth: October 16, 1989 Male, US Citizen, Canadian Citizen		
EDUCATION	Ph.D. Candidate in Economics Princeton University, 2011 to present Thesis Title: "Essays in Development Economics" Expected Completion Date: June 2017 M.A. Economics Princeton University, 2013 Field Exams: Development Economics, Microeconomic Theory B.A. Mathematics, Economics <i>Magna Cum Laude</i> Macalester College, 2011		
REFERENCES	Professor Tom Vogl Department of Economics Princeton University +1 (609) 258 7392 tvogl@princeton.edu	Professor Ilyana Kuziemko Department of Economics Princeton University +1 (609) 258 8276 kuziemko@princeton.edu	Professor Sylvain Chassang Department of Economics New York University +1 (917) 267 7584 +33 (638) 292 996 chassang@nyu.edu
RESEARCH FIELDS	Primary Fields: Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics Secondary Fields: Health Economics		

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	<p>2016 WWS 302/ECO 359, International Development, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Alicia Adsera Junior Independent Work, Princeton University</p> <p>2015, 2016 ECO 370, American Economic History, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professors Hank Farber & Ilyana Kuziemko</p> <p>2014 ECO 300, Intermediate Microeconomics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Elizabeth Bogan ECO 385, Ethics & Economics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Sylvain Chassang</p> <p>2013, 2014 ECO 324, Law & Economics, Princeton University Teaching assistant for Professor Thomas Leonard</p>
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HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS	<p>2016 Towbes Prize for Outstanding Teaching, Princeton University</p> <p>2013-15 William Dietrich Economic Theory Center Summer Grant, Princeton University</p> <p>2011 Elaine Gartner Pilon Award for Outstanding Academic Achievement in Economics, Macalester College</p>
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JOB MARKET PAPER	<p>“Lifecycle Fertility and the Impact of Family Planning Programs: Evidence from Southern Africa” <i>with Ishita Rajani</i></p>
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Abstract: The impact of family planning programs on fertility in developing countries is contested, with empirical evidence finding negative effects on completed fertility but no consistent effect on short-run fertility. Using a lifecycle model of fertility control choice, we theoretically and empirically show that differential responses of short-run and completed fertility are consistent with a single behavioral response to improved contraceptive access — a shifting of births earlier in the lifecycle due to improved control over fertility outcomes. Women without access to modern contraceptives use traditional methods to delay wanted births because of a precautionary motive to avoid exceeding their target fertility; improved contraceptive access relaxes this precautionary motive and can increase short-run, but not completed, fertility. Using a difference-in-difference design that exploits the legalization of injectables in Zambia, we show that an expansion of the type and availability of modern contraceptives increases use of injectables and modern contraceptives by 350% and 50%, respectively; decreases use of traditional fertility control methods such as unsafe abortions, coital infrequency, and postpartum behaviors; and increases short-run fertility by 10%. Consistent with the predictions of our model, completed fertility does not increase and short-run fertility increases are confined to rural women 20–45. Our results confirm that improved control over unwanted pregnancies can produce the divergent fertility responses found in the literature and suggest that access to modern contraceptives is welfare-improving for women, despite having counterintuitive implications for fertility.

CURRENT
RESEARCH

“Contraceptive Choice Over the Lifecycle”

with Ishita Rajani

Abstract: Despite a large literature studying contraceptive use in sub-Saharan Africa, little attention has been paid to how women’s contraceptive choices vary over their lifecycle. Using all DHS contraceptive calendar information collected post-1990 in sub-Saharan Africa, we provide descriptive evidence that: 1) condoms are used almost exclusively by unmarried adolescent women; 2) pills and injectables are the dominant method choice for women during prime childbearing years; and 3) female sterilization and hormonal implants are used primarily by women at the end of their fertile years. These choices are consistent with different motivations for using modern contraceptives at different ages: preventing STI transmission for young, single women with multiple sex partners; improving control over birth spacing for married women during peak fertile years; and limiting future births for older women exiting childbearing. Our results suggest that the set of contraceptives women view as substitutes at a given age is smaller than the set of available modern contraceptives.

“Self-signaling and the Demand for Commitment Savings Devices”

Abstract: Take-up of commitment savings devices remains low, even amongst individuals exhibiting both time-inconsistent preferences and a desire for higher savings. I adapt the self-signaling framework of Benabou and Tirole (2004) to propose an explanation for this phenomenon. High and low willpower agents with self-reputation concerns trade-off a desire to forestall future temptation spending with a desire to maintain the belief that they have high willpower. In equilibrium, low willpower agents attempt to mimic high willpower agents: when high willpower agents refrain from using the commitment savings device, low willpower agents (who ex-ante prefer to use the device) refrain as well. I show that a social planner may optimally choose to provide commitment savings devices that bundle different types of agents in order to overcome the adverse self-signaling effects that reduce demand for these devices. I further show that a monopolist can successfully provide bundled devices but competitive markets cannot, suggesting an avenue for government intervention into savings markets.

RESEARCH
EXPERIENCE

Spring 2013 Research Assistant for Professor Dilip Abreu