

The Evolution of the Immigration Debate: A Study of Party Positions over the Last Half-Century

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Abstract

Immigration is one of the most contentious issues across contemporary democracies, but this wasn't always the case. How has this development come about and what are its main features? We study how immigration evolved in the political debate in Western Europe over the last half century by creating and analyzing a comprehensive new dataset of all immigration-related appeals (numbering over 10,000) made in pre-election manifestos by major parties. Our account focuses on three central debates. First, contra to perceived wisdom, we find no evidence of polarization between Left and Right. Instead, we document a striking co-movement. Second, we find only modest support for the argument that the success of anti-immigrant parties significantly shapes centrist party positioning on immigration. Finally, we show that the claim that cultural issues have overtaken the debate is misguided. The prominence of cultural appeals has varied over time, but the economic dimension has remained more prevalent.

1. Introduction

Few topics nowadays generate as much heated and passionate debate as the issue of immigration. From Marine Le Pen's ascendance as a leading candidate for France's presidency, through the stunning victory of the "Leave" camp in the Brexit referendum, to Donald Trump's campaign promise to "Build a Wall," the immigration issue is inescapable in contemporary electoral politics across advanced democracies. Yet this has not always been the case. In fact, for many years, the issue was largely absent from national politics (Freeman 1995; Messina 1989). Silence didn't prevail because immigration was a marginal phenomenon. To the contrary: For more than half a century, countries across Western Europe have been destinations for millions of migrants. How can we understand the evolution of the immigration debate? How have political parties responded to immigration across countries and over the decades?

One perspective, common among critics on the Far-Right, holds that mainstream parties are almost indistinguishable: The centrist establishment has either ignored the issue of immigration and associated voter concerns altogether, or, if they have addressed it, the Center-Left and the Center-Right are said to have adopted positions that are highly similar to one another. The nativist French *Front National* (FN) perfectly summarizes this critique when it calls on voters to abandon centrist parties: "The Left and the Right are the same thing. It is the citizens and voters who will remake the composition of the Left and the Right."¹ The FN's claims aside, convergence towards similar positions would also be consistent with classic Downsian understandings of party competition.

Yet, some scholars offer a very different account, contending that immigration and the debates over multiculturalism it has spawned have in fact polarized the political landscape. By this account, center-left and center-right parties not only address these issues; they also increasingly differentiate their programs along the immigration dimension. This polarization could be hastened if immigration is more and more framed as a cultural issue that threatens to tear at the national social fabric. The Left emerges as a defender of immigration and multiculturalism, while the Right is critical of both. This cultural turn then allows immigration to become a salient

¹ This statement was made by Louis Aliot, the FN's vice president. See <http://www.lejdd.fr/Election-presidentielle-2012/Depeches/Louis-Aliot-La-gauche-et-la-droite-c-est-la-meme-chose-505921>.

cleavage around which parties – and voters – sort themselves (Höglinger et al. 2014; Kriesi et al. 2008). Though plausible, we currently do not know whether centrist parties have indeed increasingly addressed the cultural dimension and, if so, whether they have adopted divergent stances.

Finally, there is little consensus about how anti-immigrant parties (henceforth AIP's) shape centrist party positioning on immigration. Some posit that it takes strong AIP's to push mainstream parties to address immigration in the first place. AIP's may also compel parties to move their platforms in a more nativist direction to fend off a populist challenge. Alternatively, centrist parties could chart their own course and not be swayed by a rising Far-Right.²

There is thus substantial disagreement about how major European parties have positioned themselves when approaching immigration, whether the cultural dimension has taken precedence in the political debate, and what role the Far-Right has played in structuring the immigration issue during election campaigns. Yet notably, there is very limited evidence to date that allows us to systematically evaluate these clashing accounts. Though scholars have made much progress on questions of how and why native attitudes towards immigration vary (e.g, Ford 2011; Hainmueller Hopkins 2014; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Wright 2011), as well as on explaining policies regulating the flow and integration of migrants (e.g., Burgoon 2014; Goodman 2014; Maxwell 2012; Messina 2007; Wright and Bloemraad 2012) we know considerably less about how political parties in different countries have addressed immigration over the long run. Since political parties are crucial actors in shaping public opinion, the terms of the debate, and the policies that ultimately follow, this is a significant omission.

Key questions consequently remain open, and in our account of the evolution of the immigration debate we focus on three of them: First, is the positioning of centrist parties in terms of salience, substance, and sentiment best characterized by convergence or polarization? Second, what are the main elements of the immigration debate, and, specifically, what is the role of cultural vs. economic concerns? And, third, how do anti-immigrant parties influence mainstream party positioning on immigration?

² See Section 2 for sources.

Answers to these questions are crucial to our understanding of immigration’s impact on party systems, but data constraints have made it very difficult to carry out systematic cross-country studies covering the long run and a variety of countries. Specifically, though scholars have been able to draw on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to investigate party positions on a range of topics, the matter of immigration – let alone the diverse issue clusters that are associated with it – is not part of the CMP.³ We therefore undertook a large-scale translation and coding project covering hundreds of general election manifestos. We developed a coding scheme comprising 30 issue categories that fall within the broader immigration umbrella and then identified, translated and classified all immigration-related pre-election statements made by major parties (and, where applicable, anti-immigrant parties) in 12 Western European countries in their manifestos going as far back as the 1960s. By assembling a comprehensive dataset on parties’ immigration positions, we are able to document how parties have wrestled with immigration over a long period of time and across countries.

Our central findings are as follows: First, we find few signs of polarization and more support for the claim that parties are converging. Centrist parties have parallel trajectories when it comes to changes in the salience of immigration in their manifestos. They were largely silent during the initial decades of mass settlement, but the issue has grown in salience since then and today comprises a significant share of party platforms. Furthermore, over the decades the Left and the Right increasingly address similar aspects of the immigration debate, and they begin to also mirror one another in terms of the stances they take. While the Left used to be less likely than the Right to discuss immigration in negative terms, in more recent years this difference has lessened. Far from polarizing, centrist parties’ treatment of the immigration issue is much closer to converging on key aspects of the debate.

Second, when discussing immigration and its repercussions, parties have not privileged cultural over material concerns. The relative salience of economic issues declined somewhat over the decades, but economic matters have always been more prominent in the immigration debate than has attention to national identity and culture. The “cultural turn” is therefore not readily apparent

³ The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which estimates parties’ policy positions by asking country specialists, does include two relevant policy areas: immigration policy and multiculturalism, beginning in 1999. As we detail below, our data go back to the 1960s and disaggregate “immigration” into 30 categories.

in mainstream party manifestos. Rather, in addition to economic issues, questions pertaining to asylum and refugees as well as to immigration policy itself dominate.

Finally, we observe these trends whether or not elections feature successful anti-immigrant parties. While there is some evidence that a powerful AIP is associated with centrist parties raising the salience of immigration in the next election, this effect weakens once we account for the inflow of immigrants and time trends. We also cannot support the claim that strong AIP's cause centrist parties to adopt a more negative stance or that they have a substantial impact on the types of issues that these parties discuss. On the whole, we conclude that the relationship between AIP's and centrist parties' approach to immigration in their election programs is modest.

This study makes several contributions. First, it offers the most wide-ranging and fine-grained study of party approaches to immigration to date. As we elaborate below, we cover over five decades of elections across 12 countries and present the most detailed disaggregation of immigration-related issue categories that is currently available. Second, relying on these data, our paper can assess how the immigration debate, as carried out by political parties during elections, has evolved over time and cross-nationally. An understanding of this dynamic is currently missing. As Europe confronts its largest migrant influx in decades and electorates are seeking alternatives to established parties and policy frameworks, it is particularly pertinent to take stock of how this debate has unfolded.

Third, in doing so, the analysis allows us to adjudicate between competing claims in the literature pertaining to the question of how party competition plays out with regards to the immigration issue. Moving beyond single-country cases or an examination of multiple countries over a short period of time, our investigation permits us to better evaluate opposing arguments about salience, substantive focus and party positioning. This evidence in turn produces novel insights about the way parties tackle one of the most pressing issues of our day.

Finally, our new dataset can enhance future work on the politics of immigration. Up to now, scholars who wanted to include a measure of parties' immigration policy positions (as an outcome of interest or as a control variable), were either prevented from doing so or resorted to

inadequate proxies. Our data, which we make publicly available, considerably broadens the scope of feasible research projects. The analyses we present here provide examples of the types of insights one can glean from these data. Yet the high level of detail and degree of disaggregation of categories will provide researchers with a great deal of flexibility in answering a wide range of questions about the way immigration and the many debates it has generated have developed as political issues over the years.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first review existing research about immigration policy positions by political parties, focusing on the salience and substance of these positions and on the purported impact of AIP's. We next introduce our dataset, explain the coding protocol, and discuss how our approach differs from earlier work. This section is followed by a presentation of the results. We conclude by placing our findings in the scholarly context and by outlining promising avenues for future work that can build on this study's main findings.

2. Existing Research on the Politicization of Immigration in Europe

In 2014, over 50 million residents living in Western European countries were born abroad.⁴ Immigration has had a major impact on societies and politics across Europe, but what is less clear is how parties have approached this topic during elections. To be sure, existing research has addressed the dimensions that we are interested in – namely, salience, substance, sentiment, and the role of anti-immigrant parties. But it has mostly tackled only one of these at a time and has covered shorter time periods and fewer countries.

Beginning with the salience of the immigration issue, it is important to recognize that immigration and its repercussions do not align neatly along partisan lines. For example, whereas the free flow of labor fits with the Right's traditional appreciation for open markets, the cultural diversity that is inherent in such flows does not mesh well with its desire to preserve the ethno-cultural heritage of nation states. The Left may be more comfortable with cultural pluralism, but

⁴ These data are taken from the OCED's International Migration Database.

it has to grapple with the fact that an inflow of workers can lower the wages of the native working class and potentially put strains on the welfare state.⁵

In light of these cross-pressures, it would not be surprising if parties chose to shun the issue. Indeed, previous research has argued that because centrist parties have little to gain from drawing attention to immigration – especially if it occurred on their watch – they have “often engaged in a conspiracy of silence on immigration-related issues” (Messina 2007, 75). Case studies of France, Germany, and Britain suggest that deliberate issue avoidance by mainstream parties was common.⁶ This silence is significant, not only because of the substantial scale of immigration and its many social and economic consequences, but also because it creates a vacuum that anti-immigrant movements can exploit. Below we examine whether this pattern of issue avoidance holds across a wide set of countries and also identify whether and when centrist party pre-election manifestos begin to grapple with the immigration issue.

In addition to tracing the salience of immigration, an understanding of how immigration has shaped party systems requires us to know how major parties have positioned themselves on this topic.⁷ If parties diverge in substance and sentiment, immigration and the set of concerns it raises can restructure the political space. Some therefore maintain that immigration has become a crucial part of a second dimension of European politics, supplanting conventional class politics among many voters (Beramendi et al. 2015; Hellwig 2014; Kriesi et al. 2008). Similar to earlier developments concerning race in the United States, immigration can transform electoral coalitions. If major parties offer competing visions, immigration can trigger realignments across the party system. Yet, if major parties converge, voters who are dissatisfied with the mainstream’s message may seek comfort in parties that offer different and perhaps more extreme platforms, potentially leading to a growing fragmentation of the vote.⁸

⁵ On the cross-cutting nature of immigration, see Odmalm (2014) and Odmalm and Bale (2015). On the partisan struggle to respond to immigration's impact on the welfare state see Burgoon (2012).

⁶ See, for example, Messina (1989, 2007) and Freeman (1995).

⁷ van der Brug et al. (2015) also point out that when explaining politicization, salience and position-taking have to be considered jointly.

⁸ See, e.g., Ford and Goodwin (2014), Golder (2016), and Meguid (2008) on how mainstream party positioning can affect the rise of far-right parties.

Do parties converge or diverge when it comes to their treatment of immigration? Here we observe notable disagreements. Studying 18 Western European parties over three decades and relying on the CMP, Alonso and da Fonesca argue that polarization between the Left and the Right has been taking place and conclude that “convergence of immigration positions is not widespread” (2011, 880). To arrive at this conclusion the authors select CMP proxy categories (i.e., multiculturalism, law and order, national way of life, and underprivileged minority groups), and they base this selection on how far-right parties have framed immigration. Investigating transnational and national party manifestos at European Parliament elections, Duncan and Van Hecke (2008) also claim that partisan ideological fault lines run through the immigration dimension. This interpretation is based on measures that are provided by the Euromanifestos Project (EMP) as well as by the CMP.⁹ Likewise, Akkerman (2015), analyzing party manifestos in seven Western European countries from 1989-2011 and using an original and more fine-grained coding scheme, finds evidence of increasing partisan polarization.

These accounts of divergence are difficult to square with arguments that emphasize the pressures pushing the Left to adopt less immigrant-friendly positions in an effort to fight off competition from a more anti-immigrant Right (Bale 2014). Similarly, scholars of immigration policy have noted that these policies increasingly align across industrialized countries (Cornelius et al. 1994). Some have claimed that economic, legal, and even moral constraints limit the types of immigration policies that national actors, including parties, can pursue.¹⁰ According to these logics, we should observe relative convergence on immigration platforms across party families.

This lack of consensus could be the result of varying methodologies. Scholars have drawn on various types of evidence, ranging from detailed country case studies to aggregated CMP proxies, and they have examined different countries and time periods. Additionally, there is little consistency with respect to the policy positions that are being investigated. Immigration is bound up with a multitude of issues, each of which can gain or lose prominence and also produce distinct distributional or cultural consequences that benefit some parties’ supporters more than

⁹ The authors’ study of transnational programs begins in 1989 and ends in 2004, but it is confined to the period 1999-2004 for national party programs. The CMP does not include an immigration category, but the EMP does.

¹⁰ Freeman (1995), Hollified (1992) and Joppke (1999) highlight different aspects of this general argument. See Schain (2009) for a critique.

others. Partisan approaches might therefore be quite differentiated, and studies that aggregate across categories could miss this variation.

For instance, several authors have noted that the distinction between *immigration policy* (i.e., whether or not to accept new migrants) and *integration policy* (i.e., policies directed at immigrant-origin residents) is critical (Duncan and Van Hecke 2008; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav 2004). Givens and Luedtke (2005), for example, analyze immigration and integration laws in France, Germany and the UK from 1990 to 2002 and posit that the Left is more favorable than the Right on matters of integration, but find evidence of convergence when it comes to immigration policy. As this brief discussion suggests, assessments about convergence or divergence require a careful differentiation across a host of immigration-related policy dimensions, a task that has been constrained by limited data availability.

In addition, a further point of contention relates to the role of anti-immigrant parties in prompting mainstream parties to address immigration in the first place and in sharpening their tone when they do so. Bale (2008) rejects the notion that it takes vocal AIP's to break centrist parties' "conspiracy of silence" and argues that a focus on such parties cannot explain why center-right parties in France, Germany, and the Netherlands took a public and harder stance when they did. Akkerman (2015) also concludes that the impact of the Far-Right has been overstated.

Yet, others challenge these interpretations. Examining party positions (as measured in expert surveys) in 11 West European countries between 1990 and 2004, van Spanje (2010) finds that the electoral success of anti-immigration parties does influence the positions of other parties.¹¹ Relying mainly on France's experience with the *Front National*, Schain (2006) also makes the case that whenever the Radical Right has scored successes, mainstream parties have coopted aspects of its program. Studying Austria, France, Germany, and Italy in the 1980s and 1990s, Minkenberg (2001) posits that the impact of AIP's tends to be limited to generating more conservative cultural policies on the Right. However, others conclude that center-right parties will shift towards stricter immigration policy positions even in the absence of a successful radical right party, in the hopes of peeling away working class voters from the Left (cf. Mudde 2013, 8). By implication, some contend that whether or not social democratic parties adopt a tougher

¹¹ van Spanje (2010) notes that this "contagion" effect is especially strong among opposition parties.

stance depends less on the presence of strong AIP's and more on the extent to which center-right parties embrace anti-immigrant positions. Bale et al. (2010) make this point on the basis of comparative case studies of Austria, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway.¹²

As this short review indicates, existing research on Western European parties' immigration-related positions has not arrived at a consensus when it comes to matters of salience, content, sentiment, and the impact of AIP's. It remains difficult to adjudicate between competing claims because scholars employ different issue definitions, methodologies, time periods, and countries. In the next section we detail our approach, which seeks to overcome many of these limitations.

3. Empirical Approach and Data

The analyses we present below build on a major data collection effort of immigration-related party statements. Given its importance for evaluating the significance of the paper's findings, we discuss the data generation process in some detail. Our aim is to study how parties have discussed immigration in their appeals to voters over time, and to do so we code how they address this topic in their general election manifestos. To clarify our data's strengths and limitations, we briefly describe existing approaches and contrast them with the approach we advance in this study.

Existing Approaches

Comparative politics scholars typically rely on the Comparative Manifestos Project when they want to assess the salience of issues across countries. This project classifies manifesto text into one of over fifty categories. Its datasets have been widely used and are a key resource for scholars who want to study party positions over time and across countries.

Yet, the impressive CMP enterprise does not have an immigration category.¹³ Instead, the CMP classifies party appeals relating to immigration into other categories which do not indicate that

¹² The authors also note that the degree of internal disunity within social democratic parties as well as competitors on the left will influence positions.

¹³ The CMP started coding immigration as a separate category from 2006 onwards, but only for newly entered countries not included in this analysis.

immigration is an issue at stake.¹⁴ One approach has therefore been to use several CMP categories as proxies for the immigration issue, assuming that most references falling into those categories are indeed related to immigration.¹⁵ However, references to issues such as policing or crime prevention (coded in the CMP under “law and order”), or to national symbols and holidays (coded under “national way of life”), often have very little (or nothing) to do with immigration. Indeed, examining all sentences from a set of countries and parties that were coded in the CMP project under the “law and order” category, we found that only 4 percent directly discussed immigration.¹⁶ Even allowing for indirect references to the immigration topic in those sentences, it is apparent that measures of immigration’s role in party manifestos based on the proxy approach are problematic.

A second, more recent and nuanced, approach has been to apply original coding schemes to manifestos (Akkerman 2015; Odmalm 2014; Ruedin et al. 2013). Akkerman (2015), for example, studies manifestos of seven European countries over two decades by identifying eight different policy fields, each of which falls under “immigration” or “integration”. Another relevant and insightful study is that by Ruedin and colleagues (2013). Covering six European countries between 1992 and 2002, coders first identify immigration-related sentences with a keyword-based search and then classify whether statements belong to “immigration” or “civic integration.” These larger groupings are then subdivided into five sub-issues each, and coders also determine parties’ position on a given issue.¹⁷

Together, these studies represent substantial progress over earlier research.¹⁸ We build on these efforts by investigating more differentiated issue dimension for far longer time periods and a larger set of countries.

¹⁴ For example, if a sentence calls for reducing welfare benefits to immigrants, it is coded under the “welfare state limitation” category, with no indication of the link to immigration.

¹⁵ For example, Alonso and da Fonseca use the following CMP categories: (1) Multiculturalism: negative and positive; (2) National way of life: positive; (3) Law and order; (4) Underprivileged minority groups.

¹⁶ See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the limitations of using complete CMP categories as proxies.

¹⁷ Additionally, coders decide whether parties express a preference for the status quo or for change and what actors and groups would be affected by the proposed change.

¹⁸ See also Ruedin (2013) who compares different methodologies for measuring the immigration positions of Swiss political parties from 1995 to 2011.

Finally, some have looked at other sources, such as media coverage or actions of non-party political actors, to learn about the use of immigration as an electoral issue (e.g., Helbling 2014; van de Brug et al. 2015). These studies have generated valuable insights on the ways in which immigration is politicized, and future research can examine how these alternative sources match up with the ones we study here. For our purposes, however, general election manifestos provide a corpus that is uniquely suitable as they: (a) closely tie to the phenomenon of interest, i.e., the way parties address the immigration issue in their official statements (Klingemann et al. 1994); (b) cover an extended time period that most other sources (including expert surveys) do not;¹⁹ (c) provide a comparable and consistent metric that can be used within and across countries; and (d) support a transparent and replicable data-generating process. Of course, these advantages also come with some limitations, on which we expand later in the section.

Our Approach

This study analyzes the long-run evolution of the immigration debate by testing several key hypotheses put forth in the literature. To do so, we devised an original protocol for coding all immigration-related appeals made by parties in their pre-election manifestos. With the assistance of the CMP team and the Political Documents Archive, we collected all available manifestos from 12 Western European countries, starting from the early 1960s until today.²⁰ The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Due to resource constraints presented by reading manifestos and translating and coding relevant sentences, we limited the effort to three parties in each election: the largest center-left party, the largest center-right party, and (where applicable) the largest anti-immigrant party.²¹ For each manifesto, one (in some cases, two) coder read the entire manifesto; recorded any reference made to immigrants or immigration; translated each sentence; and then classified sentences into

¹⁹ For a discussion of the quality and reliability of expert surveys vis-à-vis CMP codings, see Benoit and Laver (2006).

²⁰ We are grateful for the generous cooperation of the CMP team (see Volkens et al. 2014), and we thank the Political Documents Archive for providing additional data (see Benoit et al. 2009).

²¹ In some cases, mainly when the difference in vote shares between two center-left or center-right parties was relatively small or in the case of regional differences (i.e., Belgium), we included more than one party of each type. See the Appendix for a full list of coded party-election-years.

categories based on our protocol. The categories were derived from our assessment of what seemed *ex ante* as the logical groupings based on the relevant literature and our knowledge of the subject matter. Furthermore, pilot testing the initial coding scheme on a sample of manifestos suggested the need for several additional distinctions.

The resulting codebook includes 30 categories. As Table 1 shows, they address a host of issues, including several categories dealing with the entry and exit of immigrants; the economic rationales for and impacts of immigration; issues pertaining to culture and national identity; tolerance and racism; or law and order (see the Appendix for a more detailed explanation and coding rules). Depending on the specific question at hand, the coding scheme allows us to focus on certain narrow categories (e.g. immigration's impact on the welfare system, natives' wages) or aggregate several of them into broader dimensions (e.g., an economic dimension). In the analyses below, we do both.

In considering the rationales behind our categories, one guiding principle was that no two categories should always go together. For example, though many references pertaining to “Islam” will be about “Religion” (e.g., the training of imams), many others will simply reference Muslim immigrants without making religious aspects salient (e.g., the economic integration of Muslims).

After completing the original testing, and with the aim of improving reliability and consistency, we had two well-trained coders go through each of the sentences and carry out an independent coding of all immigration-related sentences. Finally, throughout this process we ourselves continuously reviewed instances in which coding was difficult or guidelines remained ambiguous and revised the coding protocol so as to maximize consistency and clarity.

Sentences that dealt with more than one aspect of immigration were coded as falling into more than one category. For example, the sentence “Immigrants are frequently unemployed and are therefore a burden on our welfare state” includes a reference to “economic integration” and to the “welfare state.” Table 2 provides an example of how we calculated issue salience in light of multiple references.

Beyond classifying each sentence to appropriate categories, the coders also assessed its sentiment (negative, positive, neutral). Positive statements refer to: 1) immigrants' having a positive impact on a given issue/area; 2) increasing immigration; or 3) enacting policies that favor immigrants. Negative statements refer to the opposite. Neutral statements either include no indication of a policy preference or evaluation, or they balance negative with positive assessments. In total, our dataset consists of 10,944 sentences referring to immigration, obtained from a total of 423 general election manifestos.²²

Potential Limitations

Our approach offers a number of significant advantages, especially with regards to scope and breadth. Nonetheless, it also has potential drawbacks that warrant discussion. The first potential critique is our emphasis on establishing broad patterns; in some cases focusing on aggregate shifts may lead us to lose sight of possible national differences. Having spent a great deal of time poring over country-specific data, we recognize this critique as valid. Indeed, to mitigate the problem, in some of the analyses below we do discuss and present country-level variation. However, though our data lends itself to studying single countries in depth, the chief objective of this initial study is to investigate, in broad terms, how the immigration debate unfolded in Western Europe over the last five decades. As such, we make claims that seek to best describe overall trends, even at the cost of sacrificing some country-specific nuance. In future work, scholars can of course make use of the fine-grained nature of our data to examine specific countries in depth.

A second issue is that of inference. While we strive to introduce rich new data on how parties discuss immigration, the analysis is still vulnerable to the limitations of observational work. Nonetheless, this issue is less relevant for a study of this type, as our aim is not to tease out a precise causal account of the ways in which salience, substance, and policy stances vary across parties or countries. Instead, the goal is to capture the key patterns and dynamics that cover a wide range of countries and years, and the comprehensive dataset we assembled was designed to do just that: It provides significant and novel insights about the fundamental dynamics that have shaped the evolution of the immigration debate. Moreover, by making the new dataset publicly

²² Of these, 364 manifestos are from center-left and center-right parties, with the remainder coming from AIP's.

available, we hope that future research can use this study's findings as a springboard to more targeted tests of our general arguments in specific, confined contexts.

Turning to the data collection process itself, a third potential issue is our choice to rely on human coders rather than on automated textual analysis (ATA). The use of human readers for detecting and classifying immigration-related statements represents a far more arduous approach, but we chose it for several reasons. A chief concern was that ATA would miss too many segments that discuss immigration only indirectly. Consider, for example, the following statement from the 2002 manifesto of the German Christian Democrats: "In major cities, parallel societies are being formed." The statement makes no direct reference to immigration, but the context makes clear that it speaks to problems concerning immigrant integration. Scholars can of course try to devise a very extensive list of keywords in each manifesto language, such that terms like "parallel societies" would be flagged as immigration-related. However, in addition to the work that is required to develop such a list, coders would still have to read the original text in order to assess the context and rule out false positives. An even more problematic issue is the use of non-specific terms. There are quite a few sentences that employ very general language in discussing immigration, and are thus likely to go unnoticed by a keyword method. For example, "Not everyone can come here, not everyone can stay here" (Socialist Party Belgium, 2007). In sum, while recognizing that human coders have more potential limitations in terms of maintaining consistency across codings, we contend that, on balance, for the task at hand their benefits outweigh the negatives.

Finally, one could question the usefulness of manifestos as an indication of party positions. Here, two different issues are pertinent. One is whether parties actually follow through on what they proclaim in manifestos; a second is whether studying manifestos places too much emphasis on the pre-election period and perhaps misrepresents how parties appeal to voters in different settings.²³ With regard to the link between statements and actions, we would note that our emphasis is on how parties bring up immigration (if at all) when trying to appeal to voters, not on the policies they enact. After all, few parties are in a position to significantly reshape

²³ A related debate is about the extent to which manifestos matter in influencing voter perceptions of parties (e.g., Adams et al. 2011; Fernandez-Vazquez 2014).

immigration policy after the elections. The challenge in this study is therefore to find ways to track over time how parties position themselves. As such, manifestos are useful as they represent what parties put forward as their official stance and serve as the basis for the policy direction they are likely to advocate (Klingemann et al. 1994; Gemenis 2012).²⁴

To address the concern of a possible mismatch between the manifestos and what parties are declaring in other contexts, we conducted another analysis in which we compared the results we obtained from classifying manifesto statements to a similar coding of party press releases. For this purpose, we used data from Norway, the only country in our sample for which there is a digitized repository of a complete set of press releases by the major parties covering an extended period. We translated all immigration-related sentences in the press releases made public in the 12 months leading up to the 2001 and 2005 elections, and coded them using the identical protocol used to code manifestos.

The results reveal a high degree of correlation (0.7) between the distribution of statements across different categories in the manifesto data and in the press releases data. Both topics and sentiment were quite similar across sources, suggesting that analyzing manifestos provides a fairly good estimate of how parties discuss immigration in other contexts (see the Appendix for additional information). Having said that, there is certainly more to party positioning than what parties proclaim in their manifestos. Our data will allow researchers to test when and where there may be divergence between manifesto positions on immigration and other party statements.

4. Results

4.1. Major Parties on Immigration: Polarization or Convergence?

We begin our analysis by focusing on how the major parties have addressed immigration over time. Specifically, we explore a key question debated in the literature, namely whether the Center-Left and Center-Right have dealt with the issue in contrasting ways, leading to increased polarization, or whether they have instead exhibited greater similarity. We address this question

²⁴ We also do not claim that election manifestos are the only source suitable for studying party positions on immigration. Legislative actions or other types of political statements are clearly also relevant. For an analysis of how political actors frame immigration (from 1999 to 2006) based on newspaper coverage, see Helbling (2014).

by differentiating between three related-yet-different dimensions of how a party handles a certain political issue: how much focus it places on it (*salience*), what specific aspects of the issue it chooses to address (*substance*), and the position it takes on these aspects (*sentiment*).

Salience

Nowadays the issue of immigration seems to be ever-present in political discourse, but that was not always the case. In fact, case studies have argued that the major centrist parties largely met the onset of postwar mass migration with silence (e.g., Messina 1989). Our cross-national analysis not only confirms this argument, but also reveals that relative silence persisted throughout the 1980s.

As a proxy for salience, Figure 1 plots the percentage of centrist parties' manifesto statements that were devoted to immigration.²⁵ Two major trends stand out: increasing salience over time and a remarkable similarity across party families. First, salience has increased notably over the years. Parties rarely discussed immigration in the 1960s and 1970s, and the subject only began to gain prominence in recent decades. In the 1960s, only .15 percent of the manifesto text was spent on immigration or its repercussions. By the 1970s, this number increased somewhat (to .44 percent), but nonetheless remained low. To put these figures in context, by the mid-1970s, millions of foreigners had already arrived in Western Europe, transforming industries and neighborhoods in the process (Dancygier 2010). Yet, most parties failed – or chose not – to address these changes or grapple with migration's far-reaching consequences. To illustrate in another way this striking tendency of mainstream parties to ignore immigration, consider the following: eighty percent of the manifestos we examined were entirely silent on the issue during the 1960s and 53 percent during the 1970s. Even during the 1980s, after most countries in our sample had experienced several decades of large-scale inflows, and when it had become clear that many migrants and associated integration challenges were here to stay, immigration still

²⁵ We calculate salience by summing the number of words in each sentence that deals with immigration, and we divide this sum by the total number of words in a manifesto. We obtain very similar results when we divide the number of sentences devoted by immigration by the number of total sentences in a manifesto ($r = .98$).

occupied a small portion of parties' general election programs (one percent of the text), and still one third of manifestos (32%) did not address the issue at all.²⁶

It was only during the 1990s and the 2000s – amid rising refugee inflows and growing awareness of integration problems – that the issue occupied a more prominent role. In the first half of the 2010s (before the influx of refugees began to intensify), parties' attention to immigration dropped off slightly, but salience was still at its second-highest level since the 1960s.

In brief, starting out as a largely ignored issue, immigration has captured an increasing share of centrist party manifestos. Nonetheless, it has not dominated party platforms: Even in the 2000s, the peak of immigration's salience, the average manifesto dedicated 4.6 percent of the total text to the topic. Though considering that parties confront dozens of issues, this figure is in fact quite high. To gain some perspective, it is useful to point out that other issues of note – the EU (2.5), law and order (5.5) and the military (1.2)– received comparable, and in some cases less attention.²⁷

We also observe striking consistency across party families: Center-right and center-left parties' emphasis on immigration has shifted in tandem, and this co-movement has occurred to a remarkable degree. Party competition revolves, to a large extent, around the definition of the political agenda. While parties often find it difficult to shift positions on a particular issue, they can nevertheless shape the political space by emphasizing issues that benefit them and downplaying those that are disadvantageous (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 1994). Yet our results indicate that with respect to the politically charged issue of immigration, ideologically distinct mainstream parties have generally pursued *very similar* strategies. They have not distinguished themselves on the basis of salience and instead have been much more likely to converge in their emphasis of the immigration issue. In each decade, the level of salience on the Right has been closely mirrored by that on the Left.

²⁶ When we exclude Denmark, Italy, and Finland (countries with a somewhat later onset of mass migration), the percentage of words/sentences during the 1980s only increases slightly, to 1.26/1.1.

²⁷ These figures pertain to the mean share of manifesto quasi sentences dedicated by the Social Democratic and Conservative parties in all 12 countries included in our study during 2000-2010. The key point of this imperfect comparison is to help contextualize the high salience of immigration in recent years.

This finding might be surprising to some. After all, observers note that the Center-Right, at times prompted by vocal anti-immigrant parties, chooses in some instances to make immigration a campaign issue in an effort to win over ethnocentrist voters from both the Left and the Far-Right.²⁸ Is it the case then that our aggregated salience measures mask substantial variation within countries?

To shed light on this question, Figure 2 breaks down salience by party family and country. The country plots do indicate that salience can deviate during a given election year. In Denmark, for instance, the center-right Conservative People's Party dedicated nearly a quarter of its manifesto (22.8 percent) to immigration in 2001, but salience was much lower among their center-left competitors, the Social Democrats (7.9 percent). Likewise, whereas the German Christian Democrats emphasized the issue in 1998, the Social Democrats nearly ignored it (8.8 vs. 1 percent, respectively). A similar pattern is apparent in the Netherlands in 2003. Yet, notwithstanding these instances of divergence, the general trend remains one of similarity. The country plots reveal that elections in which one major party clearly exceeds the other in terms of salience are rare and are typically followed by a recalibration in the next election. Overall then, the pattern we observe within countries mirrors the big picture: The Left and the Right are increasingly talking about immigration, and they do so with remarkably similar frequency.

Content

In examining the dimension of salience, our findings point to partisan convergence. Yet, salience is only one dimension of party behavior. As discussed, large-scale immigration has touched upon dozens of issues, ranging, among other things, from native wages or border control to anti-discrimination and Islam. As the salience of immigration has grown, so have its diverse manifestations. This complexity is captured in Figure 3. The graph presents the number of different immigration-related categories that a given manifesto discusses. That is, for each

²⁸ See sources cited in Section 2.

manifesto, we count the number of distinct categories that are referenced (see an example in the footnote below).²⁹

The number of issue areas has shot up over time, reflecting, perhaps, the increased complexity of the questions that arise as a result of long-term settlement. In the 1960s and 1970s, the large centrist parties in Western Europe not only hardly addressed immigration, when they did it was by discussing only a narrow set of dimensions (typically, immigration policy and economic issues). The average manifesto referenced 2.6 categories in the 1960s and 4.4 in the 1970s. Over time however, parties have discussed immigration through a broadening prism, touching on matters such as asylum and refugees, language skills, culture and national identity, law and order, and religion. In fact, by the 2000's, the average (and median) manifesto dealt with 12 different facets, representing a nearly five-fold increase when compared to the 1960s.³⁰ Again, this pattern is almost identical across the Left and the Right.

Yet, the finding that the major parties on both sides of the ideological divide exhibit similar patterns with respect to the salience and complexity of the immigration discussion does not necessarily mean that they have also discussed the same set of issues. In theory, parties can distinguish themselves by focusing on specific immigration-related issues. To examine this possibility, Figure 4 charts the relative salience of the Center-Right's and the Center-Left's top ten issues, from 1980 until today (see also Table 3; for a distribution of all issues going back to the 1960s, see the Appendix).³¹ Together, these categories constitute 74 and 77 percent of the Center-Right's and the Center-Left's immigration-related references, respectively.

The first thing to note is that the top ten issue domains largely correspond across party families. There are only a few exceptions: "Language" and "Deportations" are among the Right's top ten but not the Left's where they rank at 12 and 13, respectively. "Equal Treatment" and "Tolerance

²⁹ The following sentence in the 2005 manifesto of Denmark's Conservative Party contains references to four distinct categories (women's rights, national culture/identity, religion, civil liberties): "Immigrants must learn to show respect for Danish values such as our democracy, freedom of speech, religion, views of women and cultural values."

³⁰ Note that during this period, the length of manifestos has not grown at a similar pace; increased complexity is thus not the result of increased length.

³¹ Because of the small number of sentences and low complexity in prior years, a smaller number of issues represent a relatively large percentage of overall claims before 1980. However, the above trends do not change much if we extend the analysis back to the 1960s.

& Racism” occupy the third and fifth position among the Left but only the eleventh and twelfth position among the Right, respectively. With respect to “Equal Treatment” we do observe an enduring difference. Parties on the Left have always been more likely to address matters of discrimination and equality, and they also do so when it comes to immigrant populations. By contrast, the Left’s preoccupation with “Tolerance and Racism” has declined, and differences between party families have substantially narrowed.

However, these exceptions should not disguise the main pattern: Not only do centrist parties address similar topics when discussing immigration, they also do so with comparable frequency over time. This includes a wide range of issues such as “Asylum and Refugees” (with the exception of the 1990s); “Culture and Identity”; “Deportations”; “Economic Integration”; “Education”; “Illegal Immigration”; “Jobs” (with a slight divergence in the 2010s); and “Language.”

There are only two issues that begin to deviate in the 2010s, with the Right devoting increased attention: “Immigration Policy” and “Integration.” Yet even with respect to these two issues, it is the case that they received nearly identical coverage across party types in earlier decades, and the difference in salience in the 2010s is not statistically significant at conventional levels.³²

We next address another claim, namely that the Right tends to be more preoccupied than the Left with who is allowed into (or stay in) the country versus the question of how to treat those migrants who have already been granted entry. The Left, by contrast, is said to concern itself more than the Right with the issue of integration (e.g., Duncan and Van Hecke 2008; Givens and Luedtke 2005). We examine the relative emphasis assigned to each dimension – “Restrictions” minus “Integration” – across mainstream parties. *Restrictions* consists of “Immigration Policy”, “Deportations”, and “Border Protection”; *Integration* contains both the general “Integration” category as well as “Economic Integration”. Figure 5 (top panel) presents the raw results and shows a great deal of change over the decades. The changes exhibit a W-like pattern, with a clear emphasis on who is allowed into the country in the 1970s and 1990s (and less so in the 2000s and 2010s) and a trend toward discussing immigrant integration in the 1980s and 2000s. These

³² The difference in “Integration”/“Immigration Policy” across party types is significant at $p = .14/.17$. The sample size is 31.

shifts were perhaps more pronounced among center-left parties, but the patterns are nonetheless very similar across the mainstream parties. Analyzing these differences in a regression format (see Appendix) shows that the differences between the mainstream parties' relative emphases remain below statistical significance throughout the period.

Another key claim in the literature holds that cultural clashes between natives and immigrants have become *the* dominant aspect of the public debate over immigration, eclipsing attention to economic aspects. Particularly parties on the Right, as well as their supporters, voice concerns that large numbers of migrants with origins from outside of Europe continue to hold on to home-country cultural norms is certainly of concern to many European voters. Cultural conflicts have been a frequent topic of media discourse and political speech, especially as they pertain to Europe's Muslim communities.³³ But is it the case that centrist parties across Europe, and particularly those on the Right, have increasingly focused on cultural issues and have they indeed prioritized cultural over economic issues in their manifestos?

In Figure 4 we charted the salience of the "Culture and Identity" dimension, and it does not appear that statements about immigration's cultural implications have been on the rise. Nonetheless, it could still be true that attention to economic issues has fallen when compared to references to culture and identity, and that these trends vary across parties. Figure 5 (bottom panel) speaks to this possibility by presenting the relative share of references dedicated to economic matters as compared to cultural ones.³⁴ Three patterns are particularly relevant to our investigation. First, we see a U-like shape, whereby economic issues used to dominate the discussion in the 1970s but increasingly gave way to cultural matters until the 1990s. In the last two decades, economic aspects have again grown in relative importance, and the gap in relative emphasis has widened once more.

³³ Höglinger et al. (2012) examine framing strategies by political actors in 6 European countries and find that the cultural frame is more common than the economic one. See also, Roggeband and Vliegenhart (2007) on the Netherlands. For a review of public opinion on immigration that emphasizes the importance of cultural threat, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014).

³⁴ Our measure of the economic dimension includes: "Economic Integration," "Jobs," "Wages," "Other Economic," "Welfare System," and "Housing." "Culture" simply refers to "Culture & National Identity."

Another notable and related pattern is that throughout this period, the relative emphasis on economic issues has never dipped below zero: Claims that the cultural dimension has overtaken the economic one appear to be somewhat exaggerated, at least when it comes to general election manifestos.

Third, we see once again that that the mainstream parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum have clearly followed a similar pattern over time, with differences across party families in relative emphasis remaining small throughout. These differences never attain statistical significance in any of the time periods under examination, a result that also holds up in a regression with additional controls (see Appendix).

In brief, it is not the case that there has been a shift, headed by the Right, towards cultural issues and away from economic ones. When mainstream parties address immigration in their election programs, matters relating to national culture and identity do not tend to dominate, and on average, discussion of cultural aspects does not surpass attention to immigration's economic aspects. Note that it is theoretically conceivable that parties use more powerful language when discussing cultural issues, leading to a perception that such issues have become more prevalent, when in fact they have not. However, when considering quantifiable measures of salience, it is clear that discussion of the economic dimension is more frequent.

Finally, in another test designed to assess partisan polarization or convergence, we probe whether the degree of attention a given issue receives in center-left manifestos predicts the degree of attention the same issue receives in the program of the Center-Right (and vice versa) during the same election. Indeed, across a range of prominent issues we find positive, and mostly significant, associations between the Left's and the Right's focus on different issues (see Appendix).³⁵

Summing up, even though immigration is an issue of substantial complexity encompassing a multitude of issues, parties on the Right and Left have focused mostly on similar topics. This pattern holds whether we focus on single categories or on more aggregated issue clusters. On the

³⁵ Specifically, the association is always positive, and in five out of eight cases it is significant at $p < .10$ or less.

whole then, the political discussion over immigration, as measured through pre-election manifestos, is characterized by a process of co-movement and convergence, not divergence.

Sentiment

Thus far we have shown that when it comes to salience and content, there are few significant differences between the Left and the Right: The two party families move in tandem within and across countries. These findings lend some support to allegations made by populist challengers that established mainstream parties do not represent clear alternatives when it comes to immigration. Yet, these mainstream parties may differ in one key respect: the sentiment with which they discuss immigration and its manifestations. In fact, another line of critique has suggested that the Left has become too immigrant-friendly, providing an opening to Center-Right and Far-Right parties and generating increased polarization around the issue. Which of these accounts is closer to the truth, if any?

By coding all immigration-related statements parties have made, not only by the substantive focus but also by its sentiment, we can assess the relative merits of these accounts. We begin by examining the aggregate *Net Sentiment*, which covers all issue categories. The *Net Sentiment* subtracts the percentage of claims that are negative from those that are positive; values above zero therefore denote a more positive tone, on average. Figure 6 displays the *Net Sentiment* by party type across the decades. It seems that neither account fully captures the actual development: The Left and the Right do differ in tone, but we cannot speak of polarization. Though the Left speaks in more positive terms, the two party families pursue parallel trajectories. In the 1970s, when immigration was hardly mentioned, *Net Sentiment* was largely positive and indistinguishable across party families. Since the 1980s, we observe separation, but the Left and the Right nevertheless follow the same trend. *Net Sentiment* became more negative among both party types between the 1980s and 1990s, and the gap in tone between the two parties has held steady for the last three decades (though the gap in the 2010s is smaller compared to previous gaps, this difference is not statistically significant). In short, with respect to sentiment, we can conclude that polarization is not taking place.

Moreover, though we cannot say that party families have adopted the same sentiment, we observe signs of convergence. When we disaggregate *Net Sentiment* into the share of positive and negative statements (Figure 7), it becomes clear that the Left has in fact become more negative in its approach over the decades. By the 2010s, the share of negative sentiments, which had been considerably higher among the Right, is no longer distinguishable across party types.³⁶ Our results refute the notion that the Left has become more welcoming and uncritical of immigration and thereby has contributed to an increasingly divisive immigration debate. If anything, the opposite is true.

Comparisons of policy stances across countries and parties can be complicated: A position that appears restrictive in one country might be judged liberal in another (cf. Laver 2014). We therefore also run a series of regressions that examine trends within and across countries, covering both the overall net sentiment and that of the most salient issues. These tests confirm our assessment: There is no evidence of rising partisan polarization (see Appendix).

4.2. Anti-Immigrant Party Success and Mainstream Party Positioning

A common theme in the literature states that the rise of anti-immigrant parties has led to a reconfiguration of mainstream parties' position on immigration. The Center-Right, seeking to coopt its extremist competitor is alleged to have shifted rightwards, taking a more negative stance, increasing its emphasis on cultural threats that immigration poses, and pushing for restrictions. The Center-Left, fearing a backlash from its working class base, is said to quickly follow suit (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Schain 2006; van Spanje 2010). Some have questioned this account, arguing that the influence exerted by the Far-Right has been either overblown (Mudde 2013) or hardly present at all (Duncan and Van Hecke 2008).

Our data do not allow us to test for a causal effect of AIP's on the stance of mainstream parties.³⁷ However, we can explore a set of empirical associations that are key observable implications,

³⁶ In the 2000s, the share of negative statements was, on average, 17.9 points higher on the Right than it was on the Left ($p = .004$). By the 2010s, this gap has shrunk to 6.1 points ($p = .441$). The difference of this difference is, however, not significant ($p = .252$).

³⁷ For example, a set of conditions may cause both a rise in AIP's and a shift in mainstream party positioning. Additionally, variation in the ways that centrist parties tackle immigration could also lead to variation in AIP success.

necessary conditions if it indeed were the case that AIP's exert significant influence on centrist parties.

As before, we first consider salience. Have centrist parties devoted more space in their manifestos to immigration as they face rising support for AIP's?³⁸ The percentage of text that centrist parties dedicate to immigration in a given election and the vote share obtained by AIP's during the previous election correlate at .52, consistent with the notion that AIP's electoral success influences centrist parties' immigration agenda.³⁹ In Table 4 we regress salience on the vote share attained by AIP's in the previous election and additional controls. First, we again see that there is little difference between party families when it comes to salience (see the coefficients of *Center-Right Party*; note that the interaction between *Center-Right Party* and *AIP Vote Share (Previous Election)* is also insignificant (not shown)). Second, it may be a rise in immigration that is responsible for both a strong AIP and increased salience. When we control for the size of the immigrant population, the success of AIP's continues to predict salience, but its effect size is cut by about a quarter, and it is further reduced when we add decade and country fixed effects. That is, when we examine the effect of AIP's within countries and within decades, a one standard deviation rise in the AIP vote share (6.9 percentage points; the median is .10, the mean is 4.2) is associated with a .54 rise in the percentage of text spent on immigration in the next election. This effect is about one fifth of a standard deviation of salience (based on results in column 4). In other words, if taken at face value, these numbers suggest that it would have to take an immensely successful anti-immigrant party to bring about a meaningful shift in centrist parties' attention to immigration.

We next turn to the question of whether strong AIP's influence the content of how mainstream parties' discuss immigration. Table 5 examines the relative emphasis centrist parties place on the two dimensions discussed earlier: "Economics vs. Culture" and "Restrictions vs. Integration." The key predictor of interest is again the electoral success of AIP's in the previous election. We find some, albeit weak, statistical evidence of an association between AIP success and a shift

³⁸ We define an anti-immigration party as a party that makes opposition to immigration a central part of its agenda. To identify such parties we rely on existing indices of AIP's (see Wendt 2009) and our own analysis of the secondary literature. See the Appendix for a list of AIP's.

³⁹ Different measures pertaining to seat shares or the current election yield similar results.

away from economic and toward cultural aspects (Models 2 and 3), but the substantive magnitude of this effect is small (i.e., even a 10 percent showing of an AIP in the previous election is associated with a quarter of a standard-deviation change in the dependent variable). With respect to the relative emphasis on restrictions (as opposed to integration), our analysis shows no relationship with AIP success. In all specifications, the estimated effect remains small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Moving from substantive emphasis to sentiment, we again find no systematic evidence of an association between previous AIP performance and the sentiments of immigration-related statements. Figure 8 presents the effects of AIP vote share in the prior election on the net sentiment covering all issues as well as a number of salient issues.⁴⁰ There is no issue sentiment for which the electoral success of the AIP consistently affects centrist party sentiment. Most effects are statistically insignificant, rather small in magnitude, and vary in direction. Overall, these analyses do not support the notion that major centrist parties shift towards a more negative stance on immigration when they face a rising AIP.

In sum, we find little evidence that anti-immigrant parties shape how centrist parties approach immigration in their manifestos. AIP success may lead to a small rise in the salience of the issue, but it does not appear to meaningfully shift relative issue emphases or sentiment. These associations, if they exist, are tenuous at best.

5. Discussion

Immigration is one of the most pivotal and prominent political issues of our time. It touches on aspects that are central to politics and society, ranging from questions about who is allowed to enter the country's borders, to its impact on national culture and identity, to fundamental debates over the allocation of rights and resources. It is no wonder then that scholars have invested substantial efforts in studying the politics of immigration, leading to significant progress on a range of research questions. Yet, few studies have provided a broad understanding of how the immigration debate has evolved over time. Instead, much of the relevant literature tends to

⁴⁰ Note that in this analysis, "Integration" does not include "Economic Integration". Instead, "Economic Integration" is part of the "Economic Issues" cluster.

consist of comparative case studies of two or three countries that focus on variation across a particular dimension, such as immigration-related political conflict or citizenship policy.⁴¹ Studies that examine the political debate in broad strokes often analyze a narrower period of time and set of countries than we do here. Key questions therefore remain unanswered. Perhaps most conspicuously, a big-picture understanding of how mass immigration has developed as a mainstream political issue since its postwar onset is still lacking.

This void is in part a reflection of data constraints. Because no suitable data sources have been available, we have only limited knowledge about the general trends that characterize the development of the immigration issue across countries and over time. By developing a new dataset that offers a detailed and comprehensive repository of how the major national parties in twelve countries have positioned themselves in the immigration debate in their pre-election manifestos, this paper seeks to make headway on this exact challenge.

Relying on this new dataset, we have drawn the contours of immigration's evolution as a contested electoral issue. Furthermore, in doing so, we resolve several fundamental questions in the literature on the politics of immigration. A key finding of our analysis is that trends have been very similar across the left-right divide. Even in instances where initial levels differed across mainstream parties, we find evidence of a consistent co-movement on dimensions of salience, substance, and sentiment, in some cases moving clearly toward increasing convergence. In other words, our analysis goes against the notion that immigration is an issue on which mainstream parties have progressively polarized. By implication, our data demonstrates that the idea of a reliably immigrant-friendly Left cannot be sustained.⁴²

With respect to substance, we demonstrate that cultural concerns have not marginalized the discussion of immigration's economic aspects. The "cultural turn" argument thus needs to be qualified, as its implications are only partially borne out in the data.

Our findings also speak to debates about anti-immigrant parties. Much has been made of the role of the Radical Right in setting the terms of the immigration debate. However, we show that the

⁴¹ For examples of comparative case studies, see, e.g., Bleich (2003), Bloemraad (2006), Dancygier (2010), Ellermann (2009), Hollified (1992), Joppke (1999), Maxwell (2012) and Money (1999). For recent work that includes a larger set of cases, see Beine et al. (2016), Goodman (2014), and Koopmans and Michaloswki (2012).

⁴² Studies and media coverage about the political space in Europe generally classify the Center-Left as being supportive of cultural and social openness; see, e.g., Kriesi et al. (2008).

rise of anti-immigrant parties is only weakly correlated with mainstream parties' approach to immigration. On dimensions of salience, substantive focus and sentiment, our findings provide little evidence to suggest that AIP's dictate, or even influence, how centrist parties address the topic. This result is consistent with recent work (Alonso and da Fonseca 2012; Oldham and Bale 2015) that emphasizes the autonomous role of the larger parties in deciding when and how to weed into this politically fraught topic.

While we cannot conclude that AIP's have been instrumental in structuring mainstream party approaches, we *can* conclude that one of their most often-voiced critiques – that there is no difference between Left and Right when it comes to immigration – has some merit.

Beyond this study, a key contribution is the creation of a large new dataset that can be used by other scholars. The publicly available dataset, which will contain all translated sentences (in their original language and in English) and all category and sentiment codings, will allow researchers to examine a host of new questions and test additional hypotheses. It will also permit scholars to place specific country cases, parties, episodes, and issues into a larger context and can therefore help guide case selection. Furthermore, scholars can rely on our coding protocol to expand the dataset's coverage to other parties, countries, and upcoming elections. On a more methodological note, researchers can apply automated text analysis to our dataset to uncover additional patterns and trends as well as gain further insights on the merits and drawbacks of different text-based approaches.

Another avenue of research that our dataset opens up is the comparison across issues. Scholars can pair our dataset with CMP data or expert surveys to assess whether changes in the salience, substance, or sentiment of immigration are associated with such changes in other domains. For example, do parties shift towards a more negative stance on immigration when they advocate spending policies that tend to harm working class voters? Does the salience and sentiment of immigration coverage change when parties move on the left-right spectrum in other policy fields? Answers to these types of questions would significantly enhance our understanding of how immigration has shaped electoral politics.

Additionally, future work can compare coverage on the basis of host-country and immigrant characteristics. For instance, studies can test whether macro-economic conditions affect how parties position themselves on immigration or whether parties increasingly discuss immigration's

domestic effects when they want to distract from external, foreign policy events. With respect to immigrant characteristics, analysts can investigate whether immigrants' unemployment rates, countries of origin, or religious backgrounds influence how parties approach immigration. To this end, we have begun collecting cross-national longitudinal statistics on immigrant characteristics that we will make available once this effort is completed.

Another promising use of our data is studying the link between what parties *say* about immigration in manifestos and what they actually *do* post-election. Recent efforts to map immigration policies (e.g. Beine et al, 2015; Bjerre et al 2015) open opportunities for connecting the programmatic aspects that we study to these policy outputs. Such efforts would further expand our understanding of the continuously evolving public debate over immigration.

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Table 1: List of Categories

Asylum & Refugees	Housing	Other
Border Protection	Illegal Immigration	Over-population
Citizenship	Immigration Policy	Religion
Civil Liberties	Integration	Slaughtering of Animals
Culture & Identity	Islam	Spatial Clustering
Deportation	Jobs	Tolerance & Racism
Economic Integration	Language	Voting Rights
Education	Law & Order	Wages
Equal Treatment	National Security	Welfare System
Gay Rights	Other Economic	Women's Issues

Table 2: Salience of Issues: Example

	<u>Number of distinct issues referenced</u>	<u>Issues</u>
Sentence 1	2	Welfare State; Economic Integration
Sentence 2	1	Jobs
Sentence 3	3	Illegal immigration; Law & Order; Jobs
Sentence 4	1	Religion
Total number of issue references:	7	
Salience of (%):		
Welfare State	14.3	(1 out of 7)
Economic Integration	14.3	(1 out of 7)
Jobs	28.6	(2 out of 7)
Illegal Immigration	14.3	(1 out of 7)
Law & Order	14.3	(1 out of 7)
Religion	14.3	(1 out of 7)
All other issues	0.0	(0 out of 7)

Note: In this example, a manifesto contains four sentences that make reference to immigration.

Table 3: Top Ten Issues by Party Type from 1980 onwards

	<i>Center-Left</i>						<i>Center-Right</i>				
	1980	1990	2000	2010	Average		1980	1990	2000	2010	Average
Immigration Policy	12.0	19.5	15.0	12.9	14.8	Immigration Policy	14.6	17.7	16.6	21.2	17.5
Asylum & Refugees	12.6	11.9	10.6	11.0	11.5	Asylum & Refugees	11.9	22.1	12.3	9.3	13.9
Equal Treatment	11.0	7.4	9.5	11.0	9.7	Integration	10.0	9.3	11.6	14.8	11.4
Integration	8.3	6.3	13.0	9.1	9.2	Culture & Identity	6.0	3.1	6.7	5.6	5.4
Tolerance & Racism	11.8	13.9	5.1	5.3	9.0	Economic Integration	5.8	4.0	5.0	3.9	4.7
Economic Integration	6.9	3.9	6.7	6.3	5.9	Jobs	3.3	2.8	4.5	7.4	4.5
Culture & Identity	6.4	6.3	4.9	5.0	5.6	Language	3.2	4.2	5.1	4.8	4.3
Illegal Immigration	1.9	5.2	4.4	3.8	3.8	Illegal Immigration	1.3	4.8	5.4	5.4	4.2
Education	5.4	2.9	3.3	3.1	3.7	Education	8.8	2.1	2.4	3.0	4.1
Jobs	2.3	3.1	3.4	5.1	3.5	Deportation	3.9	6.2	2.6	2.5	3.8

Table 4: Anti-Immigrant Party Success and Subsequent Salience of Immigration-Related Issues among Major Centrist Parties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
AIP Vote Share (Previous Election, %)	0.192*** (0.0261)	0.147*** (0.0285)	0.0609* (0.0262)	0.0782** (0.0261)
Center-Right Party	0.0724 (0.345)	0.101 (0.348)	0.0398 (0.286)	0.116 (0.188)
Immigrant Population (%)		0.114* (0.0438)	0.0921** (0.0303)	0.118 (0.0899)
1960s			-0.237* (0.115)	-0.257 (0.159)
1980s			0.383** (0.129)	0.308 (0.187)
1990s			1.382** (0.433)	1.265** (0.443)
2000s			2.879*** (0.605)	2.594*** (0.628)
2010s			1.954** (0.718)	1.538 (0.792)
Constant	1.029*** (0.180)	0.300 (0.334)	-0.149 (0.200)	-0.339 (0.545)
Country FE	No	No	No	Yes
N	363	363	363	363
R-squared	0.269	0.305	0.427	0.476

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses.

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

The dependent variable is the salience of immigration in major centrist parties' manifestos (i.e., the percentage of words of the manifesto text that is dedicated to immigration-related issues).

Regressions exclude one outlier, Denmark's Conservative People's Party in 2001, which devoted 22.7 percent of its manifesto to immigration, by far the highest value among centrist parties (the second-highest percentage is 12.5 percent). The results do not change much when this observation is included.

Table 5: Anti-Immigrant Party Success and Subsequent Immigration-Related Emphases among Major Centrist Parties

	<u>Economics vs. Culture</u>				<u>Restrictions vs. Integration</u>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
AIP Vote Share (Previous Election, %)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.005 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)
Center-Right Party	0.008 (0.035)	0.011 (0.023)	0.006 (0.023)	0.007 (0.019)	0.013 (0.058)	0.012 (0.059)	0.013 (0.061)	0.018 (0.023)
Immigrant Population (%)		0.013** (0.004)	0.013** (0.004)	-0.011 (0.012)		-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.036** (0.011)
1960s			0.198 (0.175)	0.173 (0.176)			0.120 (0.180)	-0.006 (0.190)
1980s			-0.053 (0.049)	-0.030 (0.045)			-0.099 (0.080)	-0.051 (0.080)
1990s			-0.068 (0.055)	-0.013 (0.053)			-0.018 (0.095)	0.051 (0.095)
2000s			-0.049 (0.057)	0.059 (0.074)			-0.142 (0.098)	0.005 (0.098)
2010s			-0.032 (0.071)	0.121 (0.106)			-0.124 (0.110)	0.082 (0.121)
Constant	0.099** (0.030)	0.000 (0.037)	0.030 (0.058)	0.197* (0.089)	0.041 (0.047)	0.052 (0.067)	0.103 (0.085)	0.331** (0.110)
N	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236
R-squared	0.004	0.070	0.127	0.181	0.002	0.002	0.051	0.255

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses.

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

The dependent variable "Economics vs. Culture" is measured by subtracting the percentage of claims devoted to cultural issues from the percentage of claims devoted to economic issues. The dependent variable "Restrictions vs. Integration" is measured by subtracting the percentage of claims devoted to issues relating to integration from the percentage of claims devoted to issues relating to restrictions.




Figure 1: Salience of Immigration in Manifestos across Party Families
Note: The circles and diamonds denote means; the capped lines represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 2: Salience of Immigration in Manifestos across Countries and Party Families





Figure 3: Diversity of Immigration-Related Categories Discussed in Manifesto

Note: The y-axis denotes the mean number of distinct issue categories which are discussed in a manifesto. A higher value signifies that the party referenced a larger number of issues when discussing immigration. The circles and diamonds denote means; the capped lines represent 95% confidence intervals.



Note: Equal Treatment and Tolerance & Racism are in the top ten among the Left, but not the Right. Language and Deportation are in the top ten among the Right, but not the Left.



Figure 4: Salience of Top Issues across Party Families




Figure 5: Relative Emphasis of Issue Categories

Note: In the top panel, the y-axis measures the percentage of references that are devoted to issues pertaining to restrictions minus the percentage of references that are about integration. In the bottom panel, the y-axis measures the percentage of references that are devoted to economic issues minus the percentage of references that are about national culture and identity (for absolute values, see the Appendix).




Figure 6: Net Sentiment across Party Types

Note: The circles and diamonds denote means; the capped lines represent 95% confidence intervals.





Figure 7: Sentiment Balance, Center-Left and Center-Right

The circles and diamonds denote means; the capped lines represent 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 8: Anti-Immigrant Party Success and Subsequent Sentiment of Major Centrist Parties

Note: The graphs show OLS regressions results in which the dependent variable is the net sentiment (overall or on a specific issue). The effects refer to the coefficients of *AIP Vote Share (Previous Election, %)*, displayed with 95% confidence intervals. The following covariates are included: *Center-Right Party* in Model 1; *Center-Right Party* and *Immigrant Population (%)* in Model 2; *Center-Right Party*, *Immigrant Population (%)*, and *Decade Fixed Effects* in Model 3; *Center-Right Party*, *Immigrant Population (%)*, *Decade* and *Country Fixed Effects* in Model 3. For complete results, see the Appendix.

The Evolution of the Immigration Debate: A Study of Party Positions over the Last Half-Century

Appendix

August 2017

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Discussion of Comparison between Manifestos and Press Releases

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Discussion of the use of CMP Categories as Proxies for the Immigration Issue

Table A8: CMP Classification and references to Immigration, centrist parties (1997-2010)

List of Issue Categories

Below we list the 30 issue categories we identified as comprising the immigration debate in Western Europe. This list includes brief instructions. Additionally, coders were given a protocol (see the last section of this Appendix) that contained further detailed instructions and clarifications on how to code manifestos.

Economic Issues

1. Labor market: impact on job availability of natives; facilitating the recruitment of high-skill or low-skill labor; references to labor shortages in certain sectors. For example, statements referring to immigration filling labor shortages should be coded here.
2. Labor market: impact on wages of natives

Economic Issues: Impact on public resources

3. Welfare system: abuse of public services; service/welfare provision for immigrants (for example, in health, income support, etc.).
4. Education system: for example, draining resources; larger class sizes due to immigration; challenge of educating immigrant school children; note: the reference to education should be fairly explicit.
5. Housing: for example, competition over public housing; finding accommodation for refugees; housing conditions for immigrants

Other Economic Issues

6. Immigrants' economic integration: for example, immigrants being unemployed; immigrants receiving labor market training; immigrants receiving special consideration for job placements
7. Other economic issues not classified

Integration-related issues

8. Integration: this is a broad category, and sentences may fall into several categories, e.g., integration and language; peaceful co-existence; participation in civil society.
9. Language: for example, lacking language acquisition of immigrants, providing language courses; reduce language barriers; imposing language requirements

Impact on rights of vulnerable or minority groups:

10. Women's issues: women's rights; concerns related to women (for example, making it easier for women to enter the labor market/learn the language; forced marriage; honor killings, etc.). Note: Any statements that make references to improving the lives of immigrant women should be coded "positive." This includes references to combatting honor killings, forced marriage, genital mutilation (these latter categories should also be coded under the "Islam" category as a *negative* reference because they relate to the supposed negative impact of Islam.)

11. Gay rights: for example, statements referring to the impact of immigration/Muslim populations on the lives of gays.

Additional Issues

12. Tolerance and racism: for example, statements condemning racism/racist acts; establishment of hate crime laws; Islamophobia; statements challenging the seriousness of racism/racist acts.

13. Law-and-order/Safety: for example, immigrant-on-native crime, crime rates, incarceration rates; immigrants disregarding domestic laws; immigrants being law-abiding; establishing hate crime laws; immigrants joining the local police force. Note: references to illegal immigration do NOT fall under this category.

14. National culture/national identity/national values: references to the impact of immigration on national culture, identity, values; immigrants following national code of conduct/basic values/rule of law; references to multiculturalism; references to shared values/assimilation. Note: references that describe immigration as positively contributing to the national culture/identity should be coded positive. References that state that only immigrants who share national values are welcome should be coded as negative or, depending on the tone, neutral.

15. Citizenship: for example, requirements for citizenship; value of citizenship.

16. Religion: accommodating the religious needs of immigrant groups; need to protect religious freedom; references to Christian/Judeo-Christian values.

17. Islam/Muslims: wearing of religious symbols (even if the headscarf/burka is not explicitly stated); Islamic education; girls participating in physical education at school; Islamophobia; issues related to the integration of Muslims/Islam; "Islamization." Note: although it is covered under the "religion" category, please check both religion and Islam when references are about Islamic religion. Do not check both religion and Islam when references to Muslims are not about religious practice or beliefs (for example, referencing the economic integration of Muslims).

18. Deportation: for example, conditions for deportation; this category also includes repatriation (note: facilitating repatriation should be coded negative because it implies that parties want to reduce the number of immigrants.)

19. Immigration policy: references to restrictions on immigration; quotas/point systems; relaxation of restrictions; legalization and residence status of immigrants; rules for letting in certain types of immigrants (e.g., by skill level, sector, family status/spouses).
20. Spatial clustering of immigrants/spatial segregation: references to residential clustering, physical segregation.
21. Slaughtering of animals
22. Border protection: providing resources to protect the border; status of border security. Note: broad statements about opening/not opening borders to immigrants should fall under “immigration policy”, unless they clearly reference the border.
23. National Security (incl. terrorism): for example, the impact of immigration on national security; immigrants committing terrorist acts.
24. Overpopulation/ overcrowding: for example, statements indicating that there is no space for immigrants in already densely populated areas.
25. Civil Liberties/Freedom of expression: This category refers to the *impact* of immigrants on civil liberties or the freedom of expression in the country. This category is NOT about the freedom and liberty or equal treatment of immigrants themselves.
26. Asylum/refugees: for example, statements about the inflow of refugees; conditions and regulations of the asylum process.
27. Equal Treatment: statements referring to the treatment of immigrants as equals or not (whether in support or in opposition). These can be general statements (e.g., “everyone is equal regardless of gender, heritage, or skin color”), as well as specific statements. For example, the sentence “Full social benefits for citizens only” should be coded under this category, “negative” (as well as under the “welfare system” category). References to the issue of immigrant discrimination and “affirmative action” should also be coded under this category. Note: if a statement is about combatting discrimination in employment code under “equal treatment” AND under “immigrant economic integration.”
28. Illegal immigration: for example, references to immigrants entering the country illegally.
29. Voting Rights of Immigrants: references relating to immigrants having the right to vote (generally in local elections) should be coded under this category, NOT under the “equal treatment” category.
30. Other (if a sentence cannot be classified in any of the above categories).

Coding Instructions

- Please highlight in yellow the relevant sentences in each manifesto
- Calculate “1” above
- Copy each relevant sentence into the excel sheet in the native language
- Translate each sentence into English
- Classify the sentence into the relevant categories in section “2” above – note that it may be the case that a sentence can be categorized as falling under more than one category.
- If the sentence is stated in an anti-immigration context, enter a NEGATIVE. If it is stated in a positive context, code it as a POSITIVE. If the context is neutral, code it as NEUTRAL. To clarify, positive statements refer to:
 - a. Increasing immigration OR
 - b. immigrants’ having a positive impact on a given issue/area OR
 - c. enacting policies that favor immigrants.

Negatives statements refer to the opposite.

- In many instances, it is important to place sentences in their proper context by looking at the following sentences. For example, on its own, this sentence: “Unfortunately there is a growing number of children whose parents teach them insufficient German at home” may be coded as negative under language because it implies that immigrants have a negative impact on the German language or are not integrating properly with respect to language skills. However, if the following sentence states the need to expand provision of resources to learning the language, then this sentence should be coded neutral.
- Some sentences will not strictly be about immigration even though it is clear from the context that they are related to immigration. In this case, err on the side of inclusion and code each sentence. For example: “Our country is densely populated, and housing shortages abound. Increases in immigration therefore cause further stress on the housing market.” On its own, the first sentence does not deal with immigration, but it is clear from the next sentence that the manifesto brings up the issue of housing shortages because immigration will further add to these. The first sentence should therefore be included in the coding (“housing” and “overpopulation” should be checked) as should the second (“housing” should be checked).
- Write up in a word document all the issues that come up in when coding according these instructions. If you code more than one party, please create one word document per party.
- In the excel sheet, highlight in RED all sentences for which you have questions regarding the correct coding and indicate your questions in the comments column. We can then review them together and decide on the preferable classification.

Additional Coding Guidelines

After going over a large number of manifestos and detecting problems with regards to inter-coder reliability, we wrote up further clarifications. A final coder coded all manifestos with the help of these guidelines.

General Points:

- Only code categories if they are tied to immigration, NOT if they appear in a sentence in a way that is unrelated to immigration. For instance, in the following sentence, “national security/terrorism” should not be coded because it does not relate to immigration. Only “immigration policy” should be coded: “Favoring the cooperation of the European Union with its neighbors in varied and vital domains such as trade, transportation, energy, culture, education, immigration, the fight against terrorism, or the prevention of conflicts.”
- The way we devised the coding rules implies that a given category should not always also be tied to another category. For example, some references to Islam will not relate to religion; some references to religion will not relate to culture; some references to illegal immigration will not relate to immigration policy, etc. Make sure that there are no categories that you think always go together.
- When coding far-right (and perhaps center-right) manifestos, be careful not to confuse racist statements with the category “racism and tolerance”. For example, the sentence “We have spoken here of 'non-Whites' because immigration is, as we have said, a racial problem” refers to the problem of racial diversity. Depending on the context, this would be coded as “culture and identity” (negative) because it is a statement referring to the problem of a multicultural society.
- In some countries (esp. Germany, Switzerland and Austria), references will often be to “foreign workers” rather than simply “foreigners” or “immigrants”. Only code a sentence as belonging to an economic domain if the content is about economics. For example, “foreign workers take jobs that natives do not want” should be “jobs”, but “The Party stresses that foreign workers' rights must be ensured” should not fall under an economic category.

Immigration Policy

- References about facts (e.g., “our country is home to many immigrants”; “immigration has been occurring for decades”) that do not make suggestions about policy should be coded as “other”, not as immigration policy.
- A significant number of sentences state that it is important to create better conditions in the sending countries as a way to limit immigration to the receiving countries/Europe. These sentences should be coded under “immigration policy” because they essentially

say that it is better if these potential immigrants stay where they are and propose making efforts overseas to limit the number of people arriving to the country's borders.

- Statements declaring countries to be or not to be “immigration countries” (e.g., “Germany is not an immigration country”) should be coded under “immigration policy.”
- References to asylum seekers should also fall under “immigration policy” if the statement makes it clear that the party favors increasing/decreasing asylum seekers. For example, “our country accepts too many asylum seekers” should be both “immigration policy” and “asylum and refugees”. “We need to improve housing conditions for refugees” should be “asylum and refugees” and “housing”, but not “immigration policy.”
- Sentences referring to the need for foreign labor, labor shortages, labor surplus in certain industries or the economy as a whole and the resulting need or lack of need for immigrant workers should be coded under both “immigration policy” and “jobs.” Statements that make no reference to immigration policy, should ONLY be coded as “jobs” (or “wages”), not immigration policy (e.g., “immigrants do not take jobs away from natives”; “immigrants reduce the wages of natives”)
- Statements about a country having a lot of immigrants should be coded as immigration policy only if it is clear from the sentence that the party agrees or disagrees with the existing policy that has resulted in a large immigrant presence. If it is not clear what the party’s stance is on this issue in terms of immigration policy, then code as “other” (e.g., “We now have many immigrants in our country”).

Equal Treatment

- Many references about voting rights should not be coded as “equal treatment.” If the sentence is only about voting rights, it should be coded only under voting rights. If the sentence also includes a specific reference to equal treatment, then code both. For instance, “We believe in equal rights for immigrants, and this includes voting rights” should be coded as both “equal treatment” and “voting rights”. A sentence like “we support voting rights for immigrants” should be just “voting rights”.
- References to providing equal opportunities in a given policy field should be coded as “equal treatment” AND the policy in question. For example, “Educational equality of immigrants will be promoted through targeted educational guidance and sufficient language training” should be categorized as both “education” AND “equal treatment.” In contrast, the following sentence should NOT be “equal treatment”: “We will also provide major increases in youth and adult training, with special provision for women, ethnic

minorities and the disabled; and integrate a reformed Youth Training Scheme into our scheme for a two-year student-traineeship.”

- Statements about equal treatment/no discrimination in employment should be coded as “equal treatment” AND “economic integration”, or “equal treatment” AND “jobs” (depending on the context).
- For a statement to be categorized as falling under “equal treatment”, the issue of equal treatment needs to be salient. “We want to improve the integration of immigrants legally residing in Austria and promote opportunities for participation for all in Austrian society” does not necessarily imply *equal* treatment because it does not include “equal” opportunities; the sentence could still imply that immigrants should not participate to the same degree as natives. (This sentence falls under “integration”).
- The category “equal treatment” is about leveling the playing field between immigrants and natives and providing equal opportunities, or about affirmative action (sometimes called “positive discrimination”) to make immigrants and natives more equal. It is NOT about racism and racist assaults or peaceful co-existence. However, sometimes this distinction is ambiguous. For instance: “It is the government's duty to take away existing prejudice and forcefully fight discrimination.” Here, Prejudice refers to “racism and tolerance”, but discrimination refers to “equal treatment”. The statement “Labour has already strengthened the legislation protecting minorities” can be about “equal treatment” if, for example, it is about job discrimination, but “racism and tolerance” if it is about hate speech. Use your judgement: depending on the context some sentences can be coded as both “equal treatment” and “racism and tolerance”, but be aware of the conceptual distinction.

Economic Integration

- Do not code economic integration of immigrants if the statement is about unemployment more generally or the favoring of natives in employment, or actions on the part of employers that do not relate to immigrants’ economic integration, but only to the hiring of immigrants in a more general sense. The following sentences should NOT be coded “economic integration”, they should be coded “jobs” (and “equal treatment”): “With an unemployment rate among the highest in Europe, it is only natural that our own people come first”; “The Vlaams Blok is very clear here: primacy of work for our own people.”

Culture and Identity

- Only code references that are about the *content* of culture. In other words, when the word “culture” or “cultural” appears, this does not always mean that the reference is about the role of culture; it could simply be a different word for “foreign”. E.g. “Decades of

immigration from foreign cultures have caused a radical change in our population structure” is not specifically about culture.

- Immigrants’ “identification” with the country is not necessarily about national identity and culture; for example, the following sentence is about integration – the content of identification is NOT specified as cultural or national: “Successful integration for our country means: Identification with our country, equal participation and responsibility,” so this should not fall under “culture.” The same is true here: “This [e.g. identity issues among second generation] could lead to great tensions within society.”
- General references about the impact of immigration on “society”, when it is not clear what society means in this context (could be economic or population structures, for instance), should NOT be coded as “culture.”
- Only code references to religion as “culture” when the statement clearly references issues that come up in our categorization of culture (e.g., references to immigration challenging Judeo-Christian cultures). Do not automatically code statements about religion as statements about culture.

Jobs

- Code as “Immigration policy” AND “jobs” or “immigration policy” AND “wages” when the statement is about the impact of an immigration policy on working conditions/wages, etc. For example, “allow free movement of workers throughout the territory of the enlarged Union by ensuring that the working conditions are those of the host country by effective cooperation between the labor inspection services of the Member States” clearly refers to the impact of immigration on the labor market and this should therefore be coded.
- Illegal employment: any reference to illegal employment where it is not explicitly stated that this is done by illegal immigrants should be coded as “jobs” and “law and order” (and NOT to “illegal immigration”). This refers to “off-the-books”, informal, not registered employment. E.g.: “prevent the undermining of such schemes through illegal employment, seasonal employment, supposed self-employed workers etc.”; “Besides all this, other measures are implemented that prevent the continued existence of illegal employment, such as improved working conditions and better pay for dirty and unpleasant work.”

Tolerance and Racism

- Statements that include the word tolerate, racism or racist aren't automatically about tolerance and racism. For example, the sentence "We won't tolerate Germany's liberal order being undermined by Islamist, Sharia-based conceptions of social order" should be coded under "culture" and "Islam", but not tolerance and racism.
- See also distinction between discrimination/equal treatment and "tolerance and racism" above.

Education

- Code "language" AND "education" when the sentence is about language instruction in schools/educational institutions; do not only code language here but also education. Examples: "Children of people without Austrian citizenship whose first language is not German must pass a German language test a year before the beginning of school." "Foreign children must, when necessary, be prepared for school instruction with language courses."
- References to student visas should be coded under "immigration policy" and not "education", if there is no specific reference made to the education system or the impact of immigration on the education system. References to the impact of immigration on universities or schools should be coded under "education" (and "immigration policy" if the reference calls for/is against education-based immigration).

Illegal immigration

- Sentences that are about legalization/regularization/amnesties should be coded under "illegal immigration" (these terms are about giving illegal immigrants a documented, legal status). They should additionally be coded as "immigration policy" if it is clear that the reference is making a policy suggestion as to whether immigrants should be legalized (and hence stay in the country) or not. For example, "We will, however, refuse a mechanism for massive or permanent regularization that would provoke an unmanageable appeal." should be "illegal immigration" and "immigration policy".
- References that are about illegal immigration without making a policy recommendation should just be "illegal immigration." For example: "Illegal immigration is a major problem".
- When immigrants or asylum seekers overstay their visa/allowed time and this turns into illegal immigration, this should be coded as both, "illegal immigration" and "immigration policy" or "illegal immigration" and "asylum seekers."

- Illegal employment: see above (under “Jobs”)

Asylum and Refugees

- Some manifestos contain very long sections about asylum seekers; in those cases, each statement should be coded as the given issue (e.g., deportation, illegal immigration etc.) AND “asylum and refugees”.
- Many references state that countries should not let in those who do not actually flee persecution and war, but only pretend to be doing so. These migrants are therefore not genuine asylum seekers, but they apply for asylum because they want a better standard of living, i.e., they are economic migrants. These references should be coded under “asylum and refugees” (and “immigration policy” depending on the context) because this distinction between “real” and “bogus” asylum seekers is a major issue in the asylum debate.
- References to asylum seekers should also fall under “immigration policy” if the statement makes it clear that the party favors increasing/decreasing asylum seekers. For example, “our country accepts too many asylum seekers” should be both “immigration policy” and “asylum and refugees”. “We need to improve housing conditions for refugees” should be “asylum and refugees” and “housing”, but not “immigration policy”.

Law and order

- Deportation of criminal immigrants/immigrants engaging in unlawful activities should be coded both “deportation” AND “law and order.”
- References to smuggling, especially when the reference indicates that smuggling is criminal, should be both “illegal immigration” and “law and order”. For example: “For severe forms of smuggling of illegal immigrants - for example when resulting in death - the penalties were increased to up to 10 years imprisonment.”
- Some references that are about another category also mention associated problems that have to do with criminal activity, or breaking laws. For example: “Norway should consider a separate ID-register for asylum seekers and refugees to prevent people from creating multiple identities” is about “asylum and refugees” and about “law and order” since the issue of asylum leads some to break the law by creating multiple identities.
- Illegal employment: see above (under “Jobs”).

Religion

- Many references to Islamic cultural practices should NOT be coded as “religion”. These statements are about practices followed by Muslims that are not necessarily religious in nature or about religious teachings. For example, honor killings, or genital mutilations, should be coded under “Islam” and “women’s issues”, not “religion”.
- Reference should be coded as both “religion” and “Islam” if the reference is about religious teaching, religious instruction, institutionalizing Islam as a state religion. For example, the following sentences are about both, “Islam” and “religion”: “In the same spirit, the Islamic religion teachers that have taught for three years in the same institution and that have received a favorable opinion from their head teacher shall be appointed permanently”; “The Vlaams Blok is of the opinion that the recognition and the related subsidization of the Islamic religion should be immediately withdrawn because the Islamic religion is an anti-European and intolerant religion, and therefore incompatible with European values.” (The first sentence additionally falls under “education” and the second sentence additionally falls under “culture”)
- The following statements fall under “culture” AND “religion”: “We are a country with Jewish-Christian and humanist roots.” “Our clear choice makes the individual prevail over his or her cultural, philosophical, or religious attachments.”
- References to secularism should be coded under “religion” (and “culture” or other additional categories depending on the context).
- Matters relating to veiling (headscarf, burka) should fall under “Islam” and “women’s issues”. They should also be categorized under “religion” when the religious context is explicit. For example, statements about the wearing of religious symbols in schools referencing the headscarf (this should be “religion”, “education”, “Islam”, and “women’s issues”). When the religious context is not explicit, then “religion” should NOT be coded; e.g., “A full burqa ban goes against the principle of the right to freedom to organize your own life” (this should be “women’s issues” and “Islam”).

Women’s Issues

- Women’s issues that have emerged as a result of Muslim immigration (e.g., veiling, honor killings, genital mutilation) should be coded “women’s issues” and also “Islam”. Even though other religions may follow these practices (and many European Muslims do not follow these practices), they are debated in Europe because of the Muslim presence.

- References to improving immigrant women's lives (e.g., through language instruction, work) should only be coded "women's issues", not "Islam". It is only when it is made explicitly clear that *Muslim* women are disadvantaged that both "Islam" and "women's issues" should be coded.

Table A.1: Issue Salience (%) by Party Type and Decades

	<u>Center-Left</u>							<u>Center-Right</u>						
	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	Mean	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	Mean
Asylum & Refugees	0.0	0.3	12.6	11.9	10.6	11.0	7.7	0.0	5.6	11.9	22.1	12.3	9.3	10.2
Border Protection	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1
Citizenship	0.0	8.2	2.5	2.2	1.7	5.5	3.3	0.0	1.6	1.1	2.4	3.2	2.5	1.8
Civil Liberties	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.7	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.7
Culture & Identity	0.0	6.9	6.4	6.3	4.9	5.0	4.9	8.3	2.2	6.0	3.1	6.7	5.6	5.3
Deportation	6.7	0.0	2.5	1.5	1.5	2.3	2.4	0.0	2.4	3.9	6.2	2.6	2.5	2.9
Economic Integration	0.0	5.1	6.9	3.9	6.7	6.3	4.8	3.7	7.4	5.8	4.0	5.0	3.9	5.0
Education	0.0	3.4	5.4	2.9	3.3	3.1	3.0	8.3	6.7	8.8	2.1	2.4	3.0	5.2
Equal Treatment	6.7	14.3	11.0	7.4	9.5	11.0	10.0	0.0	8.6	5.5	2.1	3.0	2.0	3.5
Gay Rights	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Housing	0.0	3.4	3.6	1.7	0.5	1.0	1.7	16.7	0.9	1.5	0.8	0.4	0.1	3.4
Illegal Immigration	0.0	0.0	1.9	5.2	4.4	3.8	2.5	0.0	0.4	1.3	4.8	5.4	5.4	2.9
Immigration Policy	46.7	23.9	12.0	19.5	15.0	12.9	21.6	16.2	29.2	14.6	17.7	16.6	21.2	19.2
Integration	0.0	8.7	8.3	6.3	13.0	9.1	7.6	5.1	12.5	10.0	9.3	11.6	14.8	10.5
Islam	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.5	0.8	0.4
Jobs	0.0	5.0	2.3	3.1	3.4	5.1	3.2	22.2	5.2	3.3	2.8	4.5	7.4	7.6
Language	0.0	0.3	2.0	2.3	4.6	2.9	2.0	0.0	0.9	3.2	4.2	5.1	4.8	3.0
Law & Order	0.0	0.3	0.0	2.7	2.4	2.8	1.4	0.0	2.0	3.2	2.6	2.0	1.0	1.8
National Security	0.0	4.4	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.3	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	4.5	6.1	2.0
Other	16.7	6.0	4.1	2.8	1.8	0.8	5.4	0.0	1.3	9.2	2.1	3.4	1.6	2.9
Other Economic	16.7	1.2	0.6	0.7	3.1	2.6	4.2	2.8	1.0	1.2	0.3	1.4	2.2	1.5
Overpopulation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3
Religion	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.3	1.1	1.1	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	2.0	1.3	0.7
Slaughtering of Animals	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Spatial Clustering	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.4	8.3	0.0	2.6	0.2	0.3	0.5	2.0
Tolerance & Racism	6.7	5.4	11.8	13.9	5.1	5.3	8.0	3.7	3.8	3.6	6.5	1.6	1.2	3.4
Voting Rights	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.9	0.9	2.2	0.9	0.0	2.5	0.2	1.4	0.1	0.1	0.7
Wages	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.1	1.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.1
Welfare System	0.0	2.6	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.2	2.8	4.1	1.5	2.1	1.1	1.0	2.1
Women's Issues	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.1	1.6	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.5	1.5	0.6	0.5

Table A2: Party Types and Emphasis on Key Immigration-Related Issues (continued on next page)

	<u>Restrictions</u>				<u>Integration</u>				<u>Restriction vs Integration</u>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Center-Right Party	0.029 (0.038)	0.030 (0.039)	0.028 (0.016)	0.077 (0.127)	0.013 (0.026)	0.015 (0.027)	0.010 (0.018)	0.061 (0.081)	0.013 (0.057)	0.012 (0.060)	0.014 (0.025)	0.017 (0.190)
1960s		0.010 (0.155)	-0.026 (0.154)	0.295 (0.275)		-0.106 (0.069)	-0.081 (0.078)	-1.138*** (0.030)		0.117 (0.179)	0.053 (0.183)	0.433 (0.276)
1980s		-0.107 (0.061)	-0.102 (0.062)	-0.094 (0.076)		-0.007 (0.036)	-0.020 (0.037)	0.014 (0.049)		-0.100 (0.080)	-0.083 (0.079)	-0.108 (0.094)
1990s		-0.047 (0.068)	-0.049 (0.068)	-0.029 (0.098)		-0.045 (0.037)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.034)		0.007 (0.093)	0.009 (0.088)	0.019 (0.119)
2000s		-0.093 (0.065)	-0.086 (0.065)	-0.073 (0.085)		0.018 (0.039)	0.010 (0.035)	0.058 (0.042)		-0.105 (0.093)	-0.090 (0.089)	-0.124 (0.116)
2010s		-0.074 (0.068)	-0.070 (0.069)	-0.087 (0.096)		0.009 (0.046)	-0.002 (0.043)	0.016 (0.051)		-0.081 (0.105)	-0.065 (0.101)	-0.100 (0.134)
Center-Right Party Interacted with Decades												
× 1960s				-0.449 (0.279)				0.027 (0.122)				-0.476 (0.310)
× 1980s				-0.037 (0.122)				-0.055 (0.074)				0.018 (0.170)
× 1990s				-0.048 (0.132)				-0.029 (0.081)				-0.026 (0.194)
× 2000s				-0.051 (0.128)				-0.090 (0.084)				0.036 (0.195)
× 2010s				0.007 (0.135)				-0.028 (0.098)				0.033 (0.218)
Constant	0.189*** (0.029)	0.256*** (0.062)	0.256*** (0.061)	0.239** (0.081)	0.145*** (0.016)	0.155*** (0.031)	0.164*** (0.030)	0.138*** (0.030)	0.049 (0.040)	0.102 (0.075)	0.094 (0.077)	0.101 (0.090)
Country FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236
R-squared	0.005	0.038	0.196	0.076	0.002	0.046	0.169	0.059	0.001	0.043	0.217	0.069

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. "Economics vs. Culture" is measured by subtracting the percentage of claims devoted to cultural issues from the percentage of claims devoted to economic issues. "Restrictions vs. Integration" is measured by subtracting the percentage of claims devoted to issues relating to integration from the percentage of claims devoted to issues relating to restrictions.

Table A2, continued: Party Types and Emphasis on Key Immigration-Related Issues

	Economic Issues					Culture & Identity			Economics vs. Culture & Identity			
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Center-Right Party	0.002 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.027)	0.001 (0.014)	0.006 (0.093)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.047 (0.059)	0.007 (0.034)	0.002 (0.031)	0.007 (0.020)	0.053 (0.109)
1960s		0.195 (0.155)	0.219 (0.158)	-0.014 (0.103)		0.006 (0.058)	0.025 (0.047)	-0.069 (0.057)		0.189 (0.177)	0.194 (0.179)	0.055 (0.121)
1980s		-0.046 (0.051)	-0.033 (0.045)	-0.040 (0.079)		0.011 (0.023)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.033)		-0.057 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.086)
1990s		-0.077 (0.045)	-0.063 (0.041)	-0.070 (0.062)		-0.004 (0.038)	0.004 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.064)		-0.073 (0.059)	-0.068 (0.047)	-0.064 (0.089)
2000s		-0.045 (0.049)	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.031 (0.076)		0.008 (0.035)	0.005 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.058)		-0.053 (0.063)	-0.039 (0.054)	-0.011 (0.101)
2010s		-0.020 (0.058)	-0.016 (0.054)	-0.002 (0.097)		0.003 (0.028)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.040)		-0.023 (0.071)	-0.008 (0.067)	0.017 (0.119)
Center-Right Party Interacted with Decades												
× 1960s				0.309 (0.242)				0.130 (0.093)				0.178 (0.284)
× 1980s				-0.014 (0.090)				0.043 (0.037)				-0.057 (0.097)
× 1990s				-0.017 (0.087)				0.015 (0.065)				-0.032 (0.106)
× 2000s				-0.028 (0.093)				0.065 (0.060)				-0.093 (0.114)
× 2010s				-0.035 (0.111)				0.053 (0.045)				-0.089 (0.130)
Constant	0.146*** (0.021)	0.184** (0.056)	0.172*** (0.040)	0.180* (0.076)	0.057** (0.019)	0.053 (0.042)	0.054* (0.023)	0.069 (0.057)	0.089** (0.027)	0.131 (0.071)	0.118* (0.047)	0.112 (0.099)
Country FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236	236
R-squared	0.000	0.096	0.230	0.129	0.001	0.003	0.218	0.020	0.000	0.059	0.162	0.076

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. "Economics vs. Culture" is measured by subtracting the percentage of claims devoted to cultural issues from the percentage of claims devoted to economic issues. "Restrictions vs. Integration" is measured by subtracting the percentage of claims devoted to issues relating to integration from the percentage of claims devoted to issues relating to restrictions.

Table A3: Issue Salience on the Right Predicted by Issue Salience on The Left

	<u>Salience of the Issue on the Right:</u>							
	<u>Immigration Policy</u>	<u>Asylum & Refugees</u>	<u>Integration</u>	<u>Culture & Identity</u>	<u>Economic Integration</u>	<u>Illegal Immigration</u>	<u>Jobs</u>	<u>Education</u>
<u>Salience of Issue on the Left:</u>								
Immigration Policy	0.071 (0.096)							
Asylum & Refugees		0.323** (0.106)						
Integration			0.157 (0.109)					
Culture & Identity				0.271* (0.111)				
Economic Integration					0.252* (0.107)			
Illegal Immigration						0.250* (0.097)		
Jobs							0.216* (0.106)	
Education								0.119 (0.109)
Immigrant Population (%)	-0.004 (0.026)	-0.027 (0.030)	0.003 (0.030)	-0.044 (0.026)	-0.054* (0.027)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.024)
Constant	2.407*** (0.470)	1.106* (0.513)	0.368 (0.546)	0.896 (0.457)	1.397** (0.473)	0.313 (0.366)	0.946* (0.409)	1.226** (0.412)
N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
R-squared	0.074	0.227	0.115	0.190	0.104	0.175	0.133	0.068

OLS; standard errors in parentheses. p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

The independent/dependent variable in each model measures the frequency of claims pertaining to a given issue in a manifesto by the Center-Left/Center-Right in the same election. Frequency is a 4-point measure representing the percentage of claims related to a specific issue (0 = 0-1%; 1 = >1% - <5%; 2 = >5% - <10%; 3 = >10%). All models control for decade fixed effects (results remain very similar when excluding decade fixed effects). Due to the small number of observations (we only examine manifestos in which immigration is mentioned and break these down further by party type) we do not include country fixed effects and instead control for the share of immigrants.

Table A4: Party Types and Net Sentiment Across Key Issues (continued on next page)

	<u>All Issues</u>			<u>Immigration Policy</u>			<u>Asylum & Refugees</u>			<u>Integration</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Center-Right Party	-0.426*** (0.105)	-0.405*** (0.058)	-0.483** (0.175)	-0.358** (0.118)	-0.421*** (0.080)	-0.530* (0.210)	-0.530*** (0.143)	-0.479*** (0.056)	-0.805* (0.331)	-0.132 (0.069)	-0.128* (0.054)	-0.069 (0.086)
1990s	-0.303** (0.092)	-0.266** (0.086)	-0.304** (0.107)	-0.021 (0.154)	0.142 (0.152)	-0.075 (0.240)	-0.373* (0.151)	-0.335* (0.130)	-0.554** (0.159)	-0.291** (0.091)	-0.349*** (0.095)	-0.276* (0.126)
2000s	-0.285** (0.091)	-0.260** (0.082)	-0.314* (0.120)	0.178 (0.113)	0.260* (0.103)	0.090 (0.144)	-0.163 (0.129)	-0.138 (0.105)	-0.243 (0.125)	-0.262*** (0.068)	-0.318*** (0.085)	-0.206* (0.084)
2010s	-0.283* (0.123)	-0.277* (0.116)	-0.393* (0.169)	0.153 (0.164)	0.175 (0.163)	-0.101 (0.280)	-0.205 (0.210)	-0.200 (0.188)	-0.470* (0.189)	-0.467*** (0.082)	-0.491*** (0.088)	-0.460*** (0.116)
Center-Right Party Interacted with Decades												
1990s			0.011 (0.189)			0.123 (0.316)			0.390 (0.329)			-0.042 (0.185)
2000s			0.066 (0.187)			0.186 (0.222)			0.205 (0.288)			-0.121 (0.134)
2010s			0.212 (0.249)			0.460 (0.340)			0.538 (0.437)			-0.029 (0.166)
Constant	0.681*** (0.072)	0.650*** (0.067)	0.705*** (0.081)	-0.018 (0.102)	-0.061 (0.107)	0.063 (0.123)	0.683*** (0.119)	0.635*** (0.081)	0.797*** (0.092)	0.963*** (0.041)	1.002*** (0.052)	0.937*** (0.035)
Country FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	200	200	200	154	154	154	129	129	129	137	137	137
R-squared	0.249	0.484	0.254	0.120	0.368	0.135	0.275	0.543	0.297	0.201	0.332	0.205

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. The dependent variables refer to the net sentiment of a given issue/cluster of issues. Because some categories do not have significant coverage in early decades, we restrict observations to manifestos published in 1980 or later. Results are very similar if we consider all years.

Table A4, continued: Party Types and Net Sentiment Across Key Issues (continued on next page)

	<u>Culture & Identity</u>			<u>Economic Integration</u>			<u>Illegal Immigration</u>			<u>Jobs</u>		
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Center-Right Party	-0.237 (0.152)	-0.200* (0.090)	-0.320 (0.349)	-0.261* (0.095)	-0.249** (0.073)	-0.268 (0.224)	-0.157 (0.122)	-0.137* (0.056)	0.167 (0.162)	-0.136 (0.122)	-0.129 (0.109)	0.133 (0.372)
1990s	-0.084 (0.176)	-0.030 (0.146)	-0.183 (0.193)	-0.062 (0.113)	-0.156* (0.075)	-0.159 (0.086)	0.105 (0.124)	0.091 (0.139)	0.306* (0.134)	0.193 (0.268)	0.263 (0.285)	0.267 (0.308)
2000s	-0.371* (0.164)	-0.240 (0.150)	-0.332 (0.200)	-0.118 (0.114)	-0.171 (0.105)	-0.051 (0.070)	0.085 (0.128)	0.112 (0.157)	0.282 (0.139)	0.767** (0.217)	0.776** (0.255)	1.100*** (0.115)
2010s	-0.394 (0.194)	-0.328 (0.195)	-0.547 (0.300)	-0.109 (0.115)	-0.191* (0.084)	-0.146 (0.099)	0.271 (0.158)	0.173 (0.167)	0.440 (0.264)	0.641* (0.254)	0.662* (0.279)	0.508 (0.283)
Center-Right Party Interacted with Decades												
1990s			0.231 (0.385)			0.196 (0.266)			-0.396 (0.230)			-0.148 (0.522)
2000s			-0.045 (0.341)			-0.140 (0.263)			-0.382 (0.227)			-0.627 (0.421)
2010s			0.274 (0.422)			0.081 (0.277)			-0.336 (0.330)			0.192 (0.499)
Constant	0.738*** (0.136)	0.639*** (0.115)	0.773*** (0.138)	0.895*** (0.075)	0.946*** (0.059)	0.898*** (0.045)	-0.838*** (0.114)	-0.837*** (0.112)	-1.000*** (0.000)	-0.299 (0.185)	-0.326 (0.225)	-0.433*** (0.109)
Country FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	108	108	108	111	111	111	88	88	88	85	85	85
R-squared	0.149	0.441	0.164	0.119	0.280	0.145	0.087	0.450	0.117	0.212	0.299	0.281

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. The dependent variables refer to the net sentiment of a given issue/cluster of issues. Because some categories do not have significant coverage in early decades, we restrict observations to manifestos published in 1980 or later. Results are very similar if we consider all years.

Table A4, continued: Party Types and Net Sentiment Across Key Issues

	<u>Language</u>			<u>Deportation</u>			<u>Tolerance & Racism</u>			<u>Equal Treatment</u>			<u>Economic Issues</u>		
	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
Center-Right Party	-0.360**	-0.368**	-0.101	-0.419*	-0.405*	-0.575	-0.221	-0.232	-0.361	-0.247*	-0.231**	-0.274	-0.250*	-0.257**	-0.158
	(0.115)	(0.105)	(0.156)	(0.173)	(0.179)	(0.365)	(0.124)	(0.139)	(0.181)	(0.117)	(0.081)	(0.213)	(0.122)	(0.089)	(0.210)
1990s	-0.495*	-0.468*	-0.250**	-0.432*	-0.534**	-0.325	-0.232*	-0.198	-0.235*	-0.271	-0.344*	-0.182*	-0.270*	-0.266*	-0.172
	(0.198)	(0.175)	(0.077)	(0.182)	(0.188)	(0.404)	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.164)	(0.156)	(0.079)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.172)
2000s	-0.370**	-	-0.229**	-0.446*	-0.509*	-0.670	-0.061	-0.037	-0.146	-0.186	-0.302**	-0.254*	-0.098	-0.112	0.018
	(0.104)	0.418***	(0.071)	(0.203)	(0.209)	(0.428)	(0.109)	(0.124)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.135)
2010s	-	-	-0.482*	-0.399	-0.552*	-0.600	-0.321	-0.222	-0.394	-0.105	-0.190	-0.137	-0.188	-0.217	-0.371
	0.629***	0.641***	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.209)	(0.392)	(0.180)	(0.156)	(0.225)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.091)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.241)
	(0.142)	(0.107)													
Center-Right Party Interacted with Decades															
1990s			-0.414			-0.122			0.059			-0.249			-0.215
			(0.311)			(0.433)			(0.220)			(0.395)			(0.238)
2000s			-0.262			0.365			0.268			0.162			-0.250
			(0.181)			(0.457)			(0.285)			(0.265)			(0.227)
2010s			-0.271			0.344			0.238			0.075			0.312
			(0.259)			(0.440)			(0.391)			(0.312)			(0.319)
Constant	1.098***	1.121***	0.958***	0.115	0.188	0.200	0.878***	0.851***	0.917***	0.980***	1.047***	0.990***	0.691***	0.704***	0.657***
	(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.034)	(0.222)	(0.192)	(0.337)	(0.080)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.009)	(0.113)	(0.095)	(0.133)
Country FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	104	104	104	80	80	80	108	108	108	107	107	107	151	151	151
R-squared	0.223	0.419	0.234	0.197	0.318	0.230	0.116	0.264	0.129	0.100	0.357	0.123	0.086	0.252	0.119

OLS; standard errors, clustered on party, in parentheses. *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. The dependent variables refer to the net sentiment of a given issue/cluster of issues. Because some categories do not have significant coverage in early decades, we restrict observations to manifestos published in 1980 or later. Results are very similar if we consider all years.

Table A5: Number of Coded Manifestos by Decade and Party Type

	Center-Left	Center-Right	AIP
1960s	22	24	0
1970s	36	37	0
1980s	36	35	4
1990s	36	40	19
2000s	31	36	25
2010s	14	17	11

Table A6: Coded Party Manifestos by Country, Year, and Party

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Party Type</u>	<u>Party Name</u>
Austria	1962	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1966	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1970	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1971	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1975	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1979	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1983	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1986	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1990	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1994	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1995	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1999	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	2002	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	2006	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	2008	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	2013	Center-left	SPÖ
Austria	1962	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1966	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1970	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1971	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1975	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1979	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1983	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1986	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1990	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1994	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1995	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1999	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	2002	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	2006	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	2008	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	2013	Center-right	ÖVP
Austria	1990	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	1994	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	1995	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	1999	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	2002	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	2006	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	2008	AIP	FPÖ
Austria	2013	AIP	FPÖ
Belgium	1961	Center-left	PSB
Belgium	1965	Center-left	PSB

Belgium	1968	Center-left	PSB
Belgium	1971	Center-left	PSB
Belgium	1974	Center-left	PSB
Belgium	1977	Center-left	PSB
Belgium	1978	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1981	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1985	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1987	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1991	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1995	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1999	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	2003	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	2007	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	2010	Center-left	PSF
Belgium	1978	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1981	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1985	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1987	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1991	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1995	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1999	Center-left	SP
Belgium	2003	Center-left	SP
Belgium	2007	Center-left	SP
Belgium	2010	Center-left	SP
Belgium	1968	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1971	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1974	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1977	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1978	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1981	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1985	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1987	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1991	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1995	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	1999	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	2003	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	2007	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	2010	Center-right	CVP
Belgium	2003	Center-right	MR
Belgium	2007	Center-right	MR
Belgium	2010	Center-right	MR
Belgium	1999	Center-right	PRL-FDF
Belgium	1985	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Belgium	1987	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang

Belgium	1991	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Belgium	1995	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Belgium	1999	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Belgium	2003	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Belgium	2007	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Belgium	2010	AIP	Vlaams Blok/Belang
Denmark	1966	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1968	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1971	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1973	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1975	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1977	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1979	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1981	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1984	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1987	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1988	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1990	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1994	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1998	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	2001	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	2005	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	2007	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	2011	Center-left	Social Democrats
Denmark	1960	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1964	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1966	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1968	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1975	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1977	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1979	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1981	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1984	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1987	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1988	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1990	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1994	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1998	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	2001	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	2005	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	2007	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	2011	Center-right	Conservative People's Party
Denmark	1998	AIP	Danish People's Party
Denmark	2001	AIP	Danish People's Party

Denmark	2005	AIP	Danish People's Party
Denmark	2007	AIP	Danish People's Party
Denmark	2011	AIP	Danish People's Party
Finland	1966	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1972	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1975	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1979	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1983	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1987	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1991	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1995	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1999	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	2003	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	2007	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	2011	Center-left	Social Democrats
Finland	1966	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1970	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1972	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1975	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1979	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1983	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1987	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1991	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1995	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1999	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	2003	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	2007	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	2011	Center-right	Finnish Centre
Finland	1970	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1972	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1975	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1979	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1983	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1987	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1991	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1995	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	1999	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	2003	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	2007	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	2011	Center-right	National Coalition
Finland	2003	AIP	True Finns
Finland	2007	AIP	True Finns
Finland	2011	AIP	True Finns
France	1962	Center-left	PS

France	1968	Center-left	PS
France	1981	Center-left	PS
France	1986	Center-left	PS
France	1988	Center-left	PS
France	1993	Center-left	PS
France	1997	Center-left	PS
France	2002	Center-left	PS
France	2007	Center-left	PS
France	2012	Center-left	PS
France	1993	Center-right	RPR
France	1993	Center-right	UDF
France	1981	Center-right	UDR
France	1962	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	1967	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	1968	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	1973	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	1986	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	1988	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	1997	Center-right	UDR-RPR
France	2002	Center-right	UMP
France	2007	Center-right	UMP
France	2012	Center-right	UMP
France	1997	AIP	FN
France	2002	AIP	FN
France	2007	AIP	FN
France	2012	AIP	FN
Germany	1961	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1965	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1969	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1972	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1976	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1980	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1983	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1987	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1990	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1994	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1998	Center-left	SPD
Germany	2002	Center-left	SPD
Germany	2005	Center-left	SPD
Germany	2009	Center-left	SPD
Germany	2013	Center-left	SPD
Germany	1961	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1965	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1969	Center-right	CDU

Germany	1972	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1976	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1980	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1983	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1987	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1990	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1994	Center-right	CDU
Germany	1998	Center-right	CDU
Germany	2002	Center-right	CDU
Germany	2005	Center-right	CDU
Germany	2009	Center-right	CDU
Germany	2013	Center-right	CDU
Italy	1972	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1976	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1979	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1983	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1987	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1990	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1992	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	1994	Center-left	DS Democrats of the Left
Italy	2008	Center-left	Democratic Party
Italy	2013	Center-left	Democratic Party
Italy	2001	Center-left	Olive Tree
Italy	2001	Center-right	Casa delle liberta
Italy	2006	Center-right	Casa delle liberta
Italy	1976	Center-right	PPI
Italy	1983	Center-right	PPI
Italy	1987	Center-right	PPI
Italy	1992	Center-right	PPI
Italy	1994	Center-right	PPI
Italy	1996	Center-right	PPI
Italy	2008	Center-right	People of Freedom
Italy	2013	Center-right	People of Freedom
Italy	1994	AIP	Lega Nord
Italy	1996	AIP	Lega Nord
Italy	2001	AIP	Lega Nord
Netherlands	1963	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1967	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1971	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1977	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1981	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1982	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1986	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1989	Center-left	PvdA

Netherlands	1994	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1998	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	2002	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	2003	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	2006	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	2010	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	2012	Center-left	PvdA
Netherlands	1977	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1981	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1982	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1986	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1989	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1994	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1998	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	2002	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	2006	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	2010	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	2012	Center-right	CDA
Netherlands	1963	Center-right	Catholic People's Party
Netherlands	1967	Center-right	Catholic People's Party
Netherlands	1971	Center-right	Catholic People's Party
Netherlands	1994	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	1998	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	2002	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	2003	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	2006	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	2010	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	2012	Center-right	VVD
Netherlands	2006	AIP	Freedom Party
Netherlands	2010	AIP	Freedom Party
Netherlands	2012	AIP	Freedom Party
Netherlands	2002	AIP	List Pim Fortuyn
Netherlands	2003	AIP	List Pim Fortuyn
Norway	1965	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1969	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1973	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1977	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1981	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1985	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1989	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1993	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1997	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	2001	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	2005	Center-left	DNA Labor Party

Norway	2009	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	2013	Center-left	DNA Labor Party
Norway	1965	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1969	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1973	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1977	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1981	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1985	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1989	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1993	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1997	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	2001	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	2005	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	2009	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	2013	Center-right	H Conservative Party
Norway	1985	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	1989	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	1993	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	1997	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	2001	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	2005	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	2009	AIP	Progress Party
Norway	2013	AIP	Progress Party
Sweden	1968	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1970	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1973	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1976	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1979	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1982	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1985	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1988	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1991	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1994	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1998	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	2002	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	2006	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	2010	Center-left	Social Democrats
Sweden	1964	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1968	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1970	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1973	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1976	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1979	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1982	Center-right	Moderates

Sweden	1985	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1988	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1991	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1994	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1998	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	2002	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	2006	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	2010	Center-right	Moderates
Sweden	1991	AIP	New Democrats
Sweden	1998	AIP	Sweden Democrats
Sweden	2002	AIP	Sweden Democrats
Sweden	2006	AIP	Sweden Democrats
Sweden	2010	AIP	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	1963	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1967	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1971	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1975	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1979	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1983	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1987	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1991	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1995	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1999	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	2003	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	2007	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	2011	Center-left	SPS
Switzerland	1963	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1967	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1971	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1975	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1979	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1983	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1987	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1991	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1995	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1999	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	2003	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	2007	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	2011	Center-right	FDP
Switzerland	1995	AIP	SVP
Switzerland	1999	AIP	SVP
Switzerland	2003	AIP	SVP
Switzerland	2007	AIP	SVP
Switzerland	2011	AIP	SVP

UK	1964	Center-left	Labour
UK	1966	Center-left	Labour
UK	1970	Center-left	Labour
UK	1974	Center-left	Labour
UK	1979	Center-left	Labour
UK	1983	Center-left	Labour
UK	1987	Center-left	Labour
UK	1992	Center-left	Labour
UK	1997	Center-left	Labour
UK	2001	Center-left	Labour
UK	2005	Center-left	Labour
UK	2010	Center-left	Labour
UK	1964	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1966	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1970	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1974	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1979	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1983	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1987	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1992	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1997	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	2001	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	2005	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	2010	Center-right	Conservatives
UK	1992	AIP	BNP
UK	1997	AIP	BNP
UK	2001	AIP	BNP
UK	2005	AIP	BNP
UK	2010	AIP	BNP

Table A.7: Anti-Immigrant Parties During the Time Period Under Study

Country	First Year	Last Year	Party Name
Austria	2006	2013	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich
	1990	2013	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
Belgium	1991	1991	Agir
	1985	2007	Front National
	1985	2014	Vlaams Blok
Denmark	1998	2015	Dansk Folkeparti
	1987	2001	Fremskridtspartiet
Finland	1995	2015	Suomen Puolue – Perussuomalaiset
France	1981	2012	Front National
	2002	2007	Mouvement national républicain
Germany	1998	1998	Deutsche Volksunion
	1990	2009	Die Republikaner
	1983	2013	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
Italy	1992	2013	Lega Nord
Netherlands	1989	1998	Centrum Democraten
	1982	1994	Centrumpartij
	2002	2003	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
	1977	1981	Nederlandse Volks-Unie
	2006	2012	Partij voor de Vrijheid
Norway	1985	2013	Fremskrittspartiet
Sweden	2002	2010	Nationaldemokraterna
	1991	1994	Ny Demokrati
	1991	2014	Sverigedemokraterna
Switzerland	1991	2003	Auto-Partei Freiheitspartei der Schweiz
			Nationale Aktion – Action Nationale Schweizer Demokraten – Démocrates
	1971	2007	Suisses
	1967	1983	Republikanische Bewegung
	1995	2015	Schweizerische Volkspartei – Union Démocratique du Centre
UK	1992	2010	British National Party
	2010	2015	United Kingdom Independence Party

Note: "First/Last Year" indicates the first/last year the party enters our analysis as an anti-immigrant party.

Discussion of Comparison between Manifestos and Press Releases

The results presented in this analysis rely on party's statements in pre-election manifestos. One concern is that manifestos, given their more official status, may represent a picture of the party's issue emphasis that differs from the one that citizens experience when being exposed to the parties' statements in the news and the media. This is particularly a concern when studying party appeals on immigration, a topic that is often sensitive due to internal partisan divisions and politicians' possible fear of being labeled racist. To what extent then do manifestos provide a meaningful representation of parties' ongoing appeals to the voting public?

To address this question and to assess the external validity of our examination of manifestos vis-à-vis to the broader set of party communications with voters, we conducted another analysis in which we compared the results from our manifestos classifications to a similar coding of party press releases made public in the 12 months preceding the election. For this purpose, we use data from Norway, the only country for which there is a digitized repository of the complete set of press releases from the relevant period. We translated all 1,134 immigration-related sentences in the press-releases made public in the year preceding the 2001 and 2005 elections and coded them using the exact same classification scheme used to code the manifestos data.¹

The results reveal a fairly high degree of correlation (0.7) between the distribution of statements across different categories in the manifesto data and in the press release (PR) data. Yet this figure masks some degree of variation across parties and campaigns. For example, in 2001 the correlation was 0.58 and in 2005 it rose to 0.85. We also find variation across parties: among the DNA Labor party, the correlation was 0.67; the corresponding figure for the conservatives was 0.99. These correlations suggest that overall, the coverage of immigration-related topics is quite similar across document types.

Not only were the topics of discussion fairly similar, the statements in the manifestos and press releases also tended to be quite similar in sentiment. Figure A1 shows the distribution of sentiments across parties and campaigns. While not exactly the same, the general patterns are consistent across manifestos and press releases.

In sum, this exercise of comparing immigration-related statements in manifestos with those in the entire set of party press releases made public in the year before the elections reveals a relatively high degree of correlation. This suggests that analyzing the manifestos data provides a reasonable estimate of how parties discussed the immigration topic in contexts outside the pre-election platform.

¹ We focus on the 2001 and 2005 elections, as these were the only elections for which the Norwegian press release repository was complete.




Figure A1: Comparing Sentiments of Immigration-Related Statements across Sources in Norway: Manifestos vs. Press Releases

Note: “PR” denotes “Press Release”; “M” denotes “Manifesto”

Discussion of the Use of CMP Categories as Proxies for the Immigration Issue

A number of earlier studies have sought to overcome the lack of a category dedicated to the immigration issue in the CMP coding scheme by using several other categories as proxies for the immigration issue. Specifically, five categories were used for this purpose: Underprivileged Minority Groups (705), National Way of Life: Positive (601), Law and Order: positive (605), Multiculturalism positive (607), Equality: Positive (503).

To get a rough sense of how useful this approach is, we examined the distribution of all references to the terms "immigrant" or "immigration" in the pre-election manifestos in a number of English-speaking countries: UK, US, New Zealand, Australia, and Ireland. The digitized CMP data were restricted to manifestos from 1992 onward.

Table A.8 below presents the findings, indicating that the six top categories referencing immigration, reach about 2/3 of the references that explicitly discuss immigration. This indicates that a third of the references were not in any of the categories typically used as proxies. But the problem of the category-as-proxy approach goes deeper. Column [3] presents the share of sentences under the given category that directly mention the terms immigrant or immigration. This is surely an undercount of the total references to the immigration issue as it ignores instances in which immigration is referenced in other ways. But this comparison provides a useful ballpark indication of the extent of the problem.

As the table indicates, we see that the figures are abysmal. Only less than two percent of the sentences CMP coded under the "underprivileged minority groups (705)" category directly referred to immigration. The corresponding figure for "National Way of Life: Positive" (6%), as well as for the other categories, is similarly low. Even allowing for other ways of referencing the immigration issue, this brief exercise indicates that the use of CMP proxies for studying immigration politics is highly problematic.

Table A8: CMP Classification and references to Immigration, centrist parties (1997-2010)

Category	(1) Immigrant	(2) Immigration	(3) % sentences in category mentioning immigration
705: Underprivileged Minority Groups	28%	24%	1.6%
601: National Way of Life: Positive	14%	14%	6.1%
605: Law and Order: positive	10%	11%	4.2%
607: Multiculturalism positive	6%	7%	8.9%
503: Equality: Positive	3%	4%	0.8%
303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	3%	7%	0.4%
Total	64%	67%	

Note: The first two columns denote the breakdown of references in party manifestos to the terms "immigrants" and "immigration" across the different CMP categories. The third column denotes the share of sentences that the CMP coded in each of the categories that directly mentions the terms immigrants or immigration.