Working papers and selected publications

 

 Recent

“A 'Pencil-Sharpening' Algorithm for Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring” (with B. Brooks and Y. Sannikov), February 2016.

 “One Sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining”, with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti,  Theoretical Economics (2015)

“A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Threats” (with D. Pearce), Econometrica 83.4 (2015)

An Algorithm for Two Player Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring”, with Y. Sannikov, May 2014 Theoretical Economics.

Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games”, with D. Pearce, mimeo, ETC WP 2013.

Networks

“Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks”, with M. Manea, Journal of Economic Theory, 2012.

“Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks”, with M. Manea, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012

 

Inefficient markets

Bubbles and crashes”, with Markus K. BrunnermeierEconometrica, 2003, 71(1), 173-204.

Synchronization Risk and Delayed Arbitrage”, with Markus K. BrunnermeierJournal of Financial Economics, 2002, 66, 341-360.

 

Bargaining

One Sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining”, with D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti,  Theoretical Economics (2015)

“A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Threats” (with D. Pearce), Econometrica 83.4 (2015)

Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games”, with D. Pearce, mimeo, ETC WP 2013.

“Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks”, with M. Manea, Journal of Economic Theory, 2012.

“Markov Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining in Networks”, with M. Manea, Games and Economic Behavior, 2012

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts”, with David G. Pearce, Econometrica 2007.

A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types”, with David G. Pearce, November, 2003.

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, September, 2002.

Evolutionary Stability in a Reputational Model of Bargaining”, with Rajiv Sethi. January, 2001.

Bargaining and Reputation”, with Faruk GulEconometrica, 68(1), January 2000, 85-117.

Implementation

“Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information”, with Hitoshi Matsushima, mimeo, August 1992. Link to mimeo.

Exact Implementation”, with Hitoshi MatsushimaJournal of Economic Theory, 64(1), October 1994, 1-19.

Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information”, with Hitoshi MatsushimaEconometrica, 60(5), September 1992, 993-1008.

A Response to Glazer and Rosenthal”, with Hitoshi MatsushimaEconometrica, 60(6), November 1992, 1439-1442 (in Notes and Comments).

 “Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”, with Arunava Sen, Econometrica, 59(4), July 1991, 997-1021.

Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition”, with Arunava Sen, Journal of Economic Theory, 50(2), April 1990, 285-299.

Repeated games

“An Algorithm for Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring” (with B. Brooks and Y. Sannikov), October 2015.

An Algorithm for Two Player Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring”, with Y. Sannikov, May 2014 Theoretical Economics.

 “Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games”, with D. Pearce, mimeo, ETC WP 2013.

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts”, with David G. Pearce, Econometrica 2007.

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, September, 2002.

“A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce, in Game equilibrium models, R. Selten (ed.), Berlin, Springer Verlag, 1991. Link to mimeo.

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition”, with Prajit K. Dutta and Lones SmithEconometrica, 62(4), July 1994, 939-948 (in Notes and Comments).

Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio StacchettiJournal of Economic Theory, 60(2), August 1993, 217-240.

Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships”, with Paul Milgrom and David G. PearceEconometrica, 59(6), November 1991, 1713-1733.

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio StacchettiEconometrica, 58(5), September 1990, 1041-1063.

The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata”, with Ariel RubinsteinEconometrica, 56(6), November 1988, 1259-1281.

On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting”, Econometrica, 56(2), March 1988, 383-396.

Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”, Journal of Economic Theory, June 1986.

Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring”, with David G. Pearce and Ennio StacchettiJournal of Economic Theory, 39(1), 1986.

 

 

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