I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. Starting with Fall 2020, I will be a Postdoctoral  Fellow in the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard University. At Princeton, I am a student associate of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. My work has been supported by the Center for International Security Studies, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the East Asian Program, and the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies.

I study international trade, regulation, and lobbying with a focus on Japan using formal and quantitative methods. My research addresses the overarching question of how the structure of foreign policy decision-making shapes international cooperation. My dissertation presents a general framework for how politicians, industry, and bureaucracies interact to create foreign economic policy. My work demonstrates 1) that some structures and decision-making procedures of bureaucracy render it more permeable than others to external influence and 2) that a bureaucracy's permeability to outside influence results in different policy outcomes. I provide evidence for this argument in three papers, each exploring one aspect in the causal chain between bureaucratic actors and policy implementation in the context of international trade law, domestic trade remedies and regulation. To evaluate my theory, I construct a series of cross-national quantitative analyses and micro-level case studies of trade bureaucracies in the United States and Japan. I pair this with further evidence gathered from nine months of fieldwork in Tokyo and two in Washington DC.