Teaching Assistant: Formal Political Analysis I (POL 575), Spring 2017 and Spring 2018 (Princeton, Instructor: Germán Gieczewski)
This course is designed as a rigorous introduction to the concepts and models used to analyze political behavior in strategic contexts. We begin with a brief introduction to the theory of choice. The course then focuses on game theory covering normal and extensive form games, games of incomplete information, repeated games, and bargaining.
Instructor: Politics Math Camp, Summer 2017 (Princeton, joint with Amanda Kennard)
The math camp reviews basic calculus and linear algebra, as well as introducing the fundamentals of real analysis necessary for graduate courses in formal and quantitative methods. The goal of the camp is twofold. The first is to provide an opportunity to review the basic tools in calculus and linear algebra by solving a number of practice problems. The second goal is to facilitate a smooth transition to the mathematical foundation course (POL 502). For this goal, we cover the basic concepts of real analysis. Specifically, the camp ensures that students can use these basic concepts to prove mathematical propositions.
Teaching Assistant: Macroeconomics I (ECON 503), Fall 2013 (Sabanci, Instructors: Remzi Kaygusuz and Hakki Yazici)
In this course, main issues in modern macroeconomic theory are discussed and modern macroeconomic tools and techniques are extensively studied. The main topics that are covered are Deterministic and Stochastic Neoclassical Growth Models, and Real Business Cycle Theory.
Teaching Assistant: Political Economy (POL 349), Fall 2016 (Princeton, Instructor: Thomas Romer)
Examines the role of political institutions in facilitating or hindering economic prosperity. We start with the basic tools of political economy - collective action, elections, and delegation. These tools are then applied to the problems of controlling rulers, and the persistence of inefficiency.
Teaching Assistant: Games and Strategies (ECON 201), Spring 2013 and Spring 2014 (Sabanci, Instructor: Ozgur Kibris), and Fall 2011 - Fall 2012 (Sabanci, Instructor: Ahmet Alkan)
Examples and formulation of games, solution concepts: games with sequential moves, backward induction, games with simultaneous moves in normal form, Nash equilibrium, mixed strategies, subgame perfect equilibrium; prisoners' dilemma games, games with strategic moves, games with asymmetric games, games with strategic moves, games with asymmetric information, collective-action games, evolutionary games, voting, bargaining, bidding concepts of game theory. Applications to law, government, politics, diplomacy, business, management and economic behaviour. information, collective-action games, evolutionary games, voting, bargaining, bidding.
Teaching Assistant: Game Theory (ECON 310), Spring 2011 (Sabanci, Instructor: Mehmet Barlo)
Noncooperative games in extensive and normal forms solution concepts and refinements, rationalizibility; games with perfect information, behavioural strategies; incomplete information, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, sequential rationality; cooperative games, games in coalitional form, convex games, balanced games: core, Shapley value, nucleolus; bargaining; coalition structure games; applications.