The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, Keep it Tight

Citation:

Iaryczower, Matias, and Matthew Shum. “The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, Keep it Tight.” American Economic Review 102 (2012): 202-237.
getitright.pdf864 KB

Date Published:

Feb

Abstract:

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices’ initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.

Last updated on 02/15/2015