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On the front cover: A calendar frieze representing the Athenian months, reused in the Byzantine Church of the Little Metropolis in Athens. The cross is superimposed, obliterated Taurus of the Zodiac. The choice of this frieze for books in Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches reflects this series' emphasis on the blending of the diverse heritages—Near Eastern, Classical, and Christian—in the Greek tradition. Drawing by Laurie Kain Hart, based on a photograph. Recent titles in the series are:

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Chapter Fourteen

Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy in Plato

Brooke Holmes

It is no easy task to describe Plato's theory of virtue. But it is arguably even more difficult to grasp the intricacies of his account of why the soul fails to flourish. Part of the challenge has been to distribute responsibility for error among the basic players in his moral psychology. Do we stray because of false beliefs about the good? Or is it because our irrational appetites overpower our rational desires that we go wrong? Matters have been further complicated by the question of how we read the dialogues in relation to one another: do Plato's states evolve out of, and eventually in opposition to, a Socratic core, or is his commitment to the "Socratic" idea that error is ignorance unwavering?1

It is well known that in his efforts to describe virtue and vice as states of the soul, Plato often has recourse to concepts of health and disease drawn from contemporary medicine. His use of such concepts has received considerable attention. 2 Nevertheless, given what a rich resource the medical analogy is in Plato's writings, a reappraisal of its functions may give us another angle on the problems of error and ethical agency in his corpus. 3 In this paper, I outline two strategies for such a reappraisal. I advocate, first, taking a broader view of the conceptual resources that medicine has to offer ethics by looking beyond its ideas about health as a balance of powers or the nature of techne to its creation of the physical body as an object of care. I then explore how the dynamics of sameness and difference native to analogy allow Plato to navigate between his
commitment to dualism and his exploitation of the body as a means of explaining why virtue eludes us.

In focusing attention on the physical body, I am aiming, in part, to counter the longstanding tendency to take that body as given and thus outside of history. I see the physical body, rather, as a conceptual object, an "epistemic thing" that coalesces only within specific conceptual and imaginative frameworks. The body defined in these terms is taking shape within debates about nature and, more specifically, human nature in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE. It is vital to these debates as the matrix of biological life. But the body is also making a significant contribution to the explanations of threats to life and health advanced in these debates, explanations that marginalize gods and other divine agencies as causes of disease. These explanations implicating the physical body in disease in two major ways. First, because it is constituted by powerful and highly labile stuffs or humors, the body is susceptible to an innate "badness" that easily spirals into disease. The second problem is epidemic. The body described in early Greek medicine is enmeshed in impersonal forces that require specialized knowledge to comprehend. Given that people lack an intuitive grasp of how their bodies work, they fail to take proper care of them, thereby becoming unwitting catalysts and allies of disease; when diseases strike, they are helpless.

Thus, although modern scholars are accustomed to thinking of disease in terms of bodies, neither this idea nor the idea of the physical body itself is something that can be taken for granted in the archaic and classical periods. By recognizing the historical foundations of the physical body, we may shed light on the intellectual milieu in which Plato's psychology forms. In recent years, historico-philosophical approaches to Plato's psychology have stressed its affinities with ideas about the person in Homer. Such approaches are a reaction, at least in part, to the evolutionary "discovery of the mind" narratives of Bruno Snell and like-minded critics. But while they have provided important corrective to Snell's narrative, these studies have sometimes obscured the full context of Plato's understanding of harm and suffering. On the question of what causes people to err, Plato rejected the popular view, fostered by Homer, Hesiod, and the tragedians, that the gods bring about misfortune. He was thus in the position of having to outline causes other than the gods to explain why we suffer. The medical analogy, worked and reworked in the dialogues, attests the usefulness of the physicians' naturalistic explanations to Plato's own task. In fact, I will argue that the two major tenets of medical etiology, humorals change and our alienation from our bodies, have clear parallels in his ethics, the latter in our lack of self-knowledge, the former in the volatility of desires, pleasures, and pain.

The operative word here, however, is parallel: the badness inherent in the body, as Plato argues in the Republic, is itself too "foreign" to the soul to explain psychic badness. In that text, he locates the foreignness of the body in its corruptibility (the soul being immortal). Plato could also understand the strangeness of the body in terms of the non-human, good-indifferent causes that operate there. In the Phaedo, it is precisely because those working in the inquiry into nature (peri phusis historia) rely on physical causes—air, water, and other "arange" things, or the contraction and the relaxation of the sinews—in their accounts of cosmic events and human actions that Socrates says he went his own way (97d5-99d1): how absurd, he says, to explain the fact that I am sitting in jail in terms of bones and sinews rather than recognizing that it seemed best to me to sit here and undergo whatever penalty the Athenians order. Socrates' shift from physical causes to beliefs about the good has been seen, in both the ancient and the modern worlds, as a founding moment in philosophical ethics. I recall it here because it draws attention to the limits of the physical body as an explanatory factor in human behavior. If, as Socrates implies, the body is foreign to our faculties of motivation and deliberate action, then blaming it when those faculties fail risks mixing up what defines us as human with the non-human flux of the physical world.

The buffer between the body and the soul is formalized by analogy. But analogies, of course, are double-edged swords, predicated as much on similarity as on difference. Given that lines of affinity between the body and the soul have the potential to erode the boundary between them, the balance between comparision and contrast in the medical analogy is particularly delicate. It is the rich tensions that analogy supports, I suggest, that make the medical analogy so significant to Plato's understanding of the relationship between the body and the soul. The medical analogy is a slippery creature. Since it is not really an argument, it does not fit comfortably in either the interpretive or the polemical. But in the end, its scope and complexity, developed across dialogues, can escape dramatic readings of single works. Given limits of time and space, I make no claim to do the medical analogy justice here. Nevertheless, I do hope to make the case that it is an important conceptual tool for Plato in his elaboration of dualism as a dynamic inquiry into the nature of the ethical agent. I begin by looking more closely at how the physical body is represented as a site of vulnerability in classical Greek medicine. Then, building on this discussion, I sketch the shifting relevance of this body to the soul in Plato's corpus, using two texts, the Protagoras and the Philebus, as points of orientation. I argue, first, that in the early, "Socratic" dialogues Plato adapts the idea of physiological or "bare" life to conceptualize a human life centered on rationality, beliefs, and agency. The body thus offers, on the one hand, a model for imagining human nature understood as the object of technical knowledge, thereby helping Plato theorize the risk posed by ignorance. Yet, on the other hand, the body functions, precisely because it is animated physiologically, as the foil against which psychic capacities of agency are defined. I then consider how the medical analogy develops as Plato grows increasingly interested in how the things inside of us, particularly appetitive desires, corrupt
our capacity for agency and, more specifically, our capacity to seek the good.
The most significant change to the analogy, I suggest, is that the physical causes in medical etiology, primarily the humors, acquire explanatory power. The increased significance of bodily causes raises the question of whether they can, in fact, cross the gulf of analogy to exercise power over the soul and, if so, how that crossing transforms the tension between human and not-human, self and not-self within the ethical agent.

I offer here only a preliminary exploration of these strategies. Nevertheless, I hope that by focusing on how the body was helping to define the blind spots and discontinuities in the self in this period, we can gain a better understanding of Plato’s account of psychic disease without relying on the contemporary discourses of psychoanalysis or cognitive science. That is not to say there are no points of contact between present and past models of the self. Indeed, by restoring diachronic change to ancient Greek concepts of the ethical subject, we may see how the enduring problem posed by having a body to being a person takes shape in the West. Giving full weight to that problem can, in turn, help us to understand that the object of ancient practices of care is far more lively and complex than we have realized.15

Medicine and the Care of the Body

The name Plato has long been synonymous with the denigration of the body in the Western philosophical tradition.16 The vantage point of the present text frames “the body” in Plato as familiar and frankly unpromising territory. But Plato’s views on the body do not arrive ex nihilo. Nor does the body have to be bad. In fact, “the” body may not be a necessary category at all in earlier Greek thought.17

One means of denaturalizing the physical body is by making strange another concept that has come to seem obvious, namely that of natural causality. The idea that everything can be traced to hidden physical causes can appear less inevitable if we take seriously the most important alternative to it. In Homer, as well as in other early poetry and prose, phenomena that disrupt either a sense of self or the persona presented to others—a birth pang, a surge of energy, a flash of insight—are conventionally attributed to the gods or other daemonic agents. Scholars focused on the origins of science or natural philosophy still dismiss these beliefs as a kind of primitive trust in capricious gods. Others, conversely, have been reluctant to admit any incursion of divinized intentions and forces into the sphere of the person in early poetry. This reluctance can be explained in part by the tendency to see a “force-field” model as invalidating any claim the archaic subject might have to unity or genuine agency.18 For those working to restore moral responsibility to the Homeric hero, it has been advantageous to}

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dowplay the agency of the gods, casting them, rather, as externalized versions of motivations and forces internal to the subject.19

It is true that integral parts of the self, such as the thumos, as well as forces like anger, grief, or love, can generate a sense of inner conflict in early poetry.20 Yet if we assume that the gods simply give metaphorical expression to this conflict, we risk losing sight of the labor, both conceptual and imaginative, that goes into shaping the explanatory frameworks of both medicine and philosophical ethics. That is to say, if debates about Homeric agency are conflated with discussions about Platonic psychology—with some critics acknowledging love or anger as forces, others insisting on their status as beliefs—we do not ask how the tension between a physical force and a belief, so critical in Plato, emerges as a threat to the autonomy of the agent.21 Yet it is arguably through this process of emergence, insofar as it raises questions about what kinds of causes operate inside the self, that the very notions of “psychology” and “autonomy” become intelligible.

In epic poetry, as well as in other evidence for archaic religious beliefs and practices, we find that interactions between gods and people require the idea that powerful minds can act on the world in unseen, unusually efficacious ways. Though we may want to distinguish between a hero’s decision to restrain violence (Iliad 1.188-222) and sudden paralysis (Iliad 13.434-40), the distinction we draw will not affect whether the gods are involved. Homeric heroes move in a world imbued with the divine, a world where the boundary between the self and the daemonic other is both fluid and real. One common response to sudden pain or other feelings of rupture would have been the inference that a god had somehow crossed into the terrain of the self.22 How, then, are the boundaries between the self and a god conceptualized?
The ability of a god or another daemonic agent to affect us can be explained in terms of a straightforward power differential: gods are stronger than people. As soon as Achilles realizes that Apollo deceived him as he stormed the walls of Troy, he rages that he would try to exact revenge, “if the power (dunamis) belonged to me” (Iliad 22.20). That power, of course, does not belong to Achilles nor to any other mortal.
Sheer force, however, cannot fully account for the gods’ advantage. Very often, the asymmetry of power between mortals and immortals is expressed in epineme terms: “but always the mind (nous) of Zeus is a stronger thing than a man’s mind,” Homer observes, as the Olympian drives on the fury in Patroclus’ lines (Iliad 16.688-91). Hesiod says something similar—so it is in no way possible to escape the mind of Zeus” (Works and Days 105)—in remarking on the army of diseases that overtake us in deadly silence. Throughout antiquity, results of daemonic force, such as plague or epidem, are imagined to arrive via arrows, weapons largely defined by their power to catch their victims unawares.23
Mortals, then, are not simply weak but blind. Our lack of knowledge has something to do with the fact that gods can move in the world unseen. But in some cases there is nothing to see. Zeus, for example, stirring the frenzy in Patroclus' heart, is acting by his intentions alone. What we are truly blind to, then, are the intentions and desires of more powerful minds capable of interfering in our own feelings and thoughts. These transgressions imply that we are bound not only by skin but also by the edges of a conscious field. They index a world animated by pity, love, envy, and anger, a world webbed by a kind of ethical electricity that situates our triumphs and our sufferings in a community of gods and humans.

Much of this is familiar ground. Revisiting it, however, can remind us of the explanatory burden faced by those offering naturalizing models of disease and distress. Such models must account for why we are too weak to ward off these conditions and too blind to see them coming. More complicated—but no less pressing I would argue—is the expectation that these models can be aligned with a moral and social order.19

It is widely known that from the sixth century onward, many "physicists" and medical writers begin to shift their attention away from the gods toward the health as a condition where no one of the body's constituent elements, things like phlegm or "the acid," has become too powerful under the influence of the hot or the cold or other such forces.22 In the words of one Hippocratic author, the discoverers of the medical technē saw "that the things inside a human being hurt him."23 What gives this claim its explanatory weight is the elaboration in fifth- and fourth-century medical writing of the mechanisms by which these "things" bring about disease. Indifferent to the good of the whole body, humors operate on a principle of limitless expansion by attracting like things to themselves, a process catalyzed by impersonal stuffs and forces, dunamēs, embedded in a cosmic economy of power.24 The process is not teleological, since the malignant humors do not, like Zeus, "aim" for hegemony. Rather, by "gathering themselves together gradually" (kata mikron sullegomena), diseases build up the power to spring suddenly on people, as the author of the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen writes.25 The force of that spring mimics a god's intent to harm; its suddenness reproduces the unexpectedness of daemonic attack.26

Even in this brief synopsis of humoral etiology, it is possible to see how the physical body becomes a conceptual resource for explaining the constitutive weakness that opens us to suffering. The power differential between mortals and immortals has been rethought, first, in terms of a struggle between impersonal forces outside the body and the things inside of it, then as the triumph of a single humor inside the body over the other parts. The greatest threat to our well-being lies in the humors, labile stuffs that, caught in a world of continual change, are easily diverted from life.27 We can also begin to see how the "innate blemishes" of the body are magnified by failures of seeing and knowing. In On Regimen, the reason why diseases can "spring" upon us is that they accumulate force below the threshold of our awareness. In conceptualizing the inside of the body as objective rather than subjective, that is, conscious space, the medical writers alienate from the inner body means that we do not perceive the growing power monitoring the body for faint signs of trouble before "the healthy" is mastered by "the diseased" and the pathological process spirals beyond control.28 That and fourth centuries: the body is untrustworthy. In light of the body's natural volatility and opacity, optimal health requires medicine's steady and knowledgeable hand.29

It is not hard to see, however, that bodies do not only go astray but also grow and flourish. Though often more implicit than explicit in medical writing, there is a strong sense in these authors of an "automatic" principle of biological life operative in the body.30 Sometimes aligned with the body's nature, phusis, or with a kind of inner heat, this principle is particularly visible in physiological processes and events like digestion or blinking, as well as in the body's own struggle to overcome disease.31 In addition to mechanical causation, then, we also find in medical writing a nascent sense that organisms have a natural drive to flourish.32 That drive can, as we have seen, be conquered by incoming forces and co-opted by the disease process. Its susceptibility to this fate can explain the need for technē. Nevertheless, its presence suggests we need a slightly more nuanced account of the relation of biological life to technical control.

One of the most remarkable things about this principle of life is that it is discontinuous with the intentions and desires of the person. That is to say, although the medical writers take for granted that patients want to be healthy—see author offers the quasi-Socratic observation that if people had knowledge, they would never fall into their diseases.33 Although the patients cannot themselves to become healthy the way a Homeric hero might check his thumus (Il.9.254-56), just as it is not possible, as Aristotle will point out, to persuade someone not to get hot or feel hunger, since he will suffer these things anyway.34

Our estrangement from the automatic operations of life in the body is why we must impact our health or our diseases in a mediated way: through what we eat, whether we exercise, when we sleep, and so on.35 But the causal relations that bind eating, sleeping, and exertion to outcomes in the body are complex and opaque—hence the need for experts to help us realize our natural desire to flourish. Moreover, if these practices impact health, we would expect that they also cause harms, making those who act in ignorance the unwitting catalysts of their own diseases. The technē, then, not only enables us to defend the body's innate drive towards life against the instability of the humors and the hostilities of the world. It also keeps us from undermining our health.

The belief that beauty or virtue must be nurtured has deep roots in Greek thought.36 Nevertheless, with the emergence of the body as a place of risk, the

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concept of care, and in fact the responsibility to take care, is transformed and expanded. I suggested above that naturalizing models of disease, despite appearing to dwell entirely on amoral stuffs and forces, have an implicit burden to situate suffering in relationship to a social or moral order. The possibility of taking responsibility for a body that lies outside the dynamics of praise and blame and towards the body as its guardian may have just this form. In glancing briefly at medical etiology, we could conclude that it depends on what we might call the fragmentation of agency: the sudden symptom is no longer the outcome of malicious daemonic intent; it is the result, rather, of a causal series catalyzed by physical elements and realized through the stuffs inside the body. The medical art resurrects agency. By enabling intelligence and the desire to be healthy to cut across the non-human flux in which the embodied person is dangerously embedded, it recuperates a role for personal agents who may, by exercising power over the body, contain its vagaries and thus avert or reverse suffering.

The idea that we are capable of managing the risks of having a body offers an inchoate model of ethical subjectivity that will prove deeply influential in both philosophical ethics and popular morality. It is true that extant medical writings show little interest in positioning patients as ethical agents, in large part because physicians themselves usually arrogate power over health. Nevertheless, many of these texts are committed, implicitly (by addressing themselves to a lay audience) or explicitly, to educating patients. By putting the knowledge of how to take responsibility for the body in the public sphere, they lay the groundwork for an ethics of care that is taken up in moralizing texts.

The most extensive of the educational texts in the Hippocratic Corpus is the treatise mentioned earlier, On Regimen, a text that declares outright that people should learn to “help themselves.”41 The author is targeting two specific audiences of medical practioners.42 The first comprises “the great majority of people who necessarily live hopelessly and cannot take care [epimeleia] of their health by neglecting everything else.”43 The second, smaller audience is made up of those who are well off and convinced there are no benefits of wealth or anything else without health—in other words, an audience willing to pursue health at all costs. Such devotion to the care of the body may appear improbable. Yet it gains some credibility from a passage from Republic: III in which Plato has Socrates complain about the “excessive care of the body” (hê peritêt bavet epimeleia tou somatos) that has taken off among the leisured classes. These obsessions, he says, “always make people imagine they are sick and never let them stop taking pains over the body” (407b4-c0). Xenophon’s Socrates, on the other hand, is far less negative about the care of the body itself. Indeed, Xenophon tells us that he “never neglected the body and did not praise others for their neglect” (Memorabilia 1.2.4, cf. 1.1.5-8). Elsewhere he reports that Socrates encouraged his followers to care for (epimeleia) their health, both by seeking knowledge from experts and by paying attention to the impact of food and drink on their constitutions (Memorabilia 4.7.9). Nevertheless, despite the different perspectives Plato and Xenophon represent, their writings suggest a reciprocal strengthening of anxieties about the physical body and the cultural authority of medicine as its guardian at the turn of the century.44 Plato’s attack on contemporary medicine in Republic II attests its authority. Yet it also gives an indication of the challenges being mounted to its claims to therapeutic expertise in this period. The fulcrum of many of these challenges is the idea that as there is a need for a care of the body so there is a need for a care of the mind or the soul.45 In what is probably the most well-known example, Socrates declares in Plato’s Apology, “I have been going about doing nothing besides trying to persuade you, young and old, to care (epimeleia) not for your bodies nor for your possessions but for the highest welfare of your soul” (30a7-b2). We have now glanced at the practices of bodily care that are a likely influence on the care of the soul that emerges as a concern in the later fifth century. I turn now to the Protagoras and several other early dialogues to see how the body informs the representation of the soul and its errors in Plato’s corpus.

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Analogy between Living and Living Well

The dramatic scene of the Protagoras is set by the arrival of a young man, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus, at the house of Socrates just before the break of dawn. Protagoras has recently come to Athens, and Hippocrates, desperate to see him, is hoping that Socrates will accompany him to Callias’ house, where the great sophist is staying. Socrates acquiesces, but, as they wait for it to get light, he engages Hippocrates in some preliminary questioning to see if he knows what he is getting himself into. Taking advantage of his interlocutor’s name, Socrates organizes this opening discussion around a medical analogy that draws on the difficulties of navigating harm and benefit in an indifferent world.

Socrates introduces the analogy after seeing that Hippocrates has little sense of what he stands to gain from Protagoras’ instruction. It is designed, accordingly, to imbue Hippocrates’ uncertainty with a sense of danger. The sophist, Socrates says, is like a merchant of foodstuffs. Both supply nourishment, the former to the soul and the latter to the body. The merchant lacks knowledge about whether his wares will help or harm his clients, the soul (313b8-e1; cf. 334a3-5). Those who buy from him, then, are taking a fact, they are in even greater danger than the buyer of provisions. If you buy some food, you can take it home in a jar and consult with an expert about whether to eat it and how much to eat, so that there is no great risk in such a
purchase (314a3-b1). But with knowledge, the soul is the jar. The moment you open it to the sophist you are vulnerable to the power of his teachings.

Socrates here takes for granted the basic tenets of contemporary medicine that we have just seen: the importance of food or drink to health, the idea of a body at risk and in need of prophylactic measures, the inability of the person to take those measures without expert guidance, and the person’s responsibility, given the worth of the body, to seek out knowledge. By placing particular weight on the chanciness of acting in ignorance, he appears to reference the familiar late fifth-century opposition between tēchē (chance) and techē, an opposition that, as we can see from several extant texts, carried special resonance in medicine. Yet whereas the medical authors are focused primarily on proving that medicine is a techē capable of systematic results, Socrates, accepting medicine’s authority, dwells darkly on a world in which it is absent. He returns repeatedly to the idea of the threat posed by ignorance (314a1-2, 313e2-314a1, 314b1) while reminding Hippocrates how very much is at stake: take care, he warns, that you do not risk what is most dear to you on a roll of the dice (314a1).

Socrates’ vivid introduction of the analogy means he takes it for granted that there are two different things involved here: body and soul. One meaning of understanding this difference is in terms of hierarchy: the soul, as we have just seen, is most dear. Hippocrates, Socrates assumes, naturally holds it to be of greater worth than the body (313a6-7). But what justifies the value of the soul? I would like to look briefly at how this claim of value defines the soul against the body before returning to their affinities and what the analogy tells us about the threat faced by a soul left untended.

Right after marking the soul’s worth, Socrates appends a short description: the soul is that “on which conducting one’s own affairs well or poorly [αὐτῷ ἐκεῖ ἐκακός προτίμειν] depends” (313a7-8). But what does this mean? To begin, the dependence of one’s own things points to an intimacy between the soul and the person stressed in other early dialogues. In the Apology, as we have just seen, Socrates, reflecting on his life’s work, recalls urging his fellow citizens not only to take care that the soul be as good as possible but also to care for the self (τὸ ἰσχύειν ἣν ὑπάρκει [κοινώτως]), that the care for the soul is here interchangeable with the care for oneself suggested, as Eric Havelock pointed out over thirty years ago, that Socrates’ commitment to the soul was founded in large part on the equation of the soul with the person. Like Burnet and others before him, Havelock insisted that Socrates’ call to care for the soul was a radically new phenomenon in Greek society. He emphasized, too, the novelty of using the reflexive pronoun to create the self as an object of care. But if we accept both the Socratic soul and the Socratic self as similar innovations, it becomes difficult to use them to define one another. This makes the presence of a third, contrasting term, self, useful.

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In Alcibiades I, the strategy of defining the soul against what it is not comes to the fore as we watch Socrates, adopting his exhortatory role, urge the dialogue’s namesake to care for himself. It is useful for us, as it would have been for the many initiates to later Platonism for whom the Alcibiades I was a prolegomena text, that Alcibiades is uncertain about what this care entails. Socrates explains himself by following a process of elimination, running through a list of candidates whose care might be equivalent to caring for the self only to reject each of them. He begins with objects within the orbit of the self, but far from its center, things like shoes and rings. Each object is abandoned on the grounds that it merely belongs to a part of the body (127e-128b). These failures are reflected in the grammar of care. In each case, the object, rather than replacing the reflexive as the genitive object of the verb “to care,” merely displaces the reflexive to the position of a possessive genitive (τὸν ταναιτος ταναιτοτικόν, ταναιτοτο ταναιτοτο, 128d6).

In this first series, the body holds center stage as each of these objects is contrasted either to it or to a body part. Yet the art of caring for the body does not qualify as an art of caring for oneself, and in the next phase of the argument we learn why. Here, Socrates shifts to another binary pair, user and used, a pair that allows him to move body parts (hands, eyes) into the same class with objects (tools, harps). The process culminates with the displacement of the body is “other” (heteron) than the person precisely because it is the consummate object of use rather than a user (129e7). The body thus becomes the foil against which the person is defined in a relationship of agency and passivity. From here Socrates jumps to the equation of the person with the soul, stating that the user of the body just is the soul. The soul’s identity is then reinforced by a second, no less important, binary: ruler and ruled. Since, as Socrates asserts and Alcibiades readily concedes, the body cannot rule itself, the soul must be its ruling element (σέρειοι).

The first opposition, between active and passive, recalls the working definition of the soul in the Protagoras passage as that through which we act. Its central role in agency can justify the priority of its care in different ways. In Alcibiades I, it is quite simply because the soul is a user that it is equivalent to the person, whose significance as an object of care is assumed. Plato could also be the soul’s capacity to act to privilege the care of the soul over that of the body on the grounds that, as the caretaker of the body, the soul must be in optimal health if it is to do its job. The medical writers themselves show little interest in treating the souls of their patients. In the Republic, however, we do find the argument that while a healthy body cannot improve the soul, the health of the soul determines how well it can supervise the body (334d-342c); the argument resurfaces in a fragment of De Democritus. The rationale for the claim appears several pages later, where Plato points out that a body is not treated by a body, but by a soul (408c1-5).
It is not only because the soul is responsible for the care of the body that its own care is a priority. Plato could also establish the value of the soul vis-à-vis the body by emphasizing its capacity to determine action in accordance with an understanding of benefit and harm conceptualized more broadly. That capacity is explicitly recognized in the Protagoras, where Socrates says the soul determines whether someone acts well or poorly. In this context, the body is a foil not only because it is passive and instrumental, but also because it cannot discern goodness or badness. Such discernment plays an important role in the early dialogues, where Socrates often invokes the difference between merely instrumental goods, such as health, whose goodness or badness is contingent, and a good that is not for the sake of anything else, namely the flourishing of the soul. Socrates also sometimes makes the related claim that those who are experts in these contingent goods do not, by virtue of that expertise, understand whether these goods are really good or bad in a given situation. The physician, for example, might know the nature of health and disease without knowing whether health or disease is the more terrible" (La. 195c-10). In contrast, those who have achieved knowledge tout court can determine the value of their actions in relation to the good. Insofar as knowledge is correlated with the health of the soul, the proper care of the soul guarantees that our behavior is aligned with the good.

Herein, then, we can locate some of the ways the soul might be defined against the body: it is active, not passive; whereas the body is fundamentally amoral, the soul determines the good and the bad. In what terms, then, can we establish the similarities implied by analogy?

One obvious answer would be that, although the body's relationship to the good is contingent, the idea that there are things beneficial or harmful to its health nevertheless offers a model for the soul. It is certainly true that this is part of the body's usefulness at the beginning of the Protagoras. But Socrates goes beyond questions of benefit and harm to explore the relationship between ignorance, risk, and the need for experts that was central to medical authority by the late fifth century. He thus casts the soul, for all its closeness to the person, as in some way naturally strange to that person, so strange that familiarity with its needs must be mediated by knowledge that comes from outside.

The specificity of this knowledge becomes clear in another medical analogy, this time in the Crito. Socrates here trades the buyer of provisions for the athlete, who has to follow the advice of his trainer or his physician in order not to destroy his body. Socrates emphasizes the expertise of the physician by contrasting it to the ignorance not only of the layperson but also of the larger community that was traditionally responsible for nurturing virtue. The analogy is interesting not only for its emphasis on expert knowledge but also for how it represents the object of that knowledge.

It is perhaps surprising that the soul is not named here. Its absence, however, only makes it more credible that what interests the Socrates of the early dialogues is not an existing idea of the soul, but rather the part of us that is concerned with right and wrong and defined against the good-indifferent body. Yet once again, the body's role in definition is not limited to that of a foil. Insofar as it is understood as "what is benefited by health and injured by disease," it also offers a model of object of expert knowledge about benefit and harm. In the first section, we saw that the object of medical knowledge in this period is not simply the body, but more broadly a principle of biological life that had begun to register in medicine's field of vision behind the "automatic" body in its inclinations towards health. It is this principle, I suggest, that allows Plato to limit an analogous principle, what we could call a principle of ethical life, which animates an object analogous to the body, namely "what is injured by the wrong and improved by the right."

One advantage of creating an analogy with the body in these terms is that it suggests that just as we are endowed with a tendency toward health, we are endowed with a natural directedness toward the good. Moreover, the model of health situates the goal of that directedness as an ongoing state, rather than as a single outcome or product; in the case of the soul that goal is often presented as simply "doing well." It seems to have been a fundamental "Socratic" maxim that everyone wants to do well. Later in the Protagoras, Socrates turns this into a defining feature of human nature: "to want to go towards those things that one thinks bad instead of [things thought] good is not, it seems, in human nature [en our own good]," as Heda Segvic observes of this passage. "What we want is, ultimately, to do well for ourselves. The striving for this condition of doing well, which Socrates calls 'the good,' is something that every human soul comes equipped with."

The crux of Socrates' claim in the Protagoras, however, rests on the verb "to think." For we are animated by a natural principle of ethical life, the good and the bad should, far from being defined subjectively, be objectively determined. That objectivism would seem to be the very reason there are experts in
harm and benefit. 52 If what we, qua ethical beings, really want is the actual good—and Socrates makes clear in the Gorgias that someone who, having pursued what he thought good, turns out to have been harmed did not truly want the presumed good (468b1-d7)—then we need these "physicians" of the soul to help us align what we judge good with the actual good. 53 At the same time, the Socratic emphasis on care makes it clear that this alignment also requires a good deal of labor on the part of the person. That is, however indispensable the expert, his knowledge means nothing if it is not internalized by the "user" through thinking, given that the user can act only in accordance with what he thinks is good. The beauty and the difficulty of a principle of ethical life thus conceptualized lies in its coexistence of deliberative agency and natural flourishing: if one has knowledge, the desires and the actions it motivates spring from the soul. Once the objective and subjective facets of our nature have been united, we become, as it were, "moral automata," acting in such a way that sustains the flourishing of our inborn, rational agency. 56

The challenge of such a model, however, arises from the difficulty of explaining how what we think is good becomes misaligned with the good. That misalignment is easier to explain in medicine. For there is, as we saw above, a natural discontinuity between a non-conscious, "objective" principle of biologic life and our motivations. 57 That is to say, it is precisely because the person is not his body that, without expert knowledge, he unwittingly reproduces the indifference of the external physical world to his health, thereby becoming a force of tuchê. 58 But how should we understand the misalignment between a principle of ethical life and our motivations? Despite the significance of risk in the opening of the Protagoras, chance alone cannot explain a split inside the soul between our natural desire for the objective good and the subjective desires on which we act: if the soul is defined by its capacity to seek the good, we need to know how our capacity to identify the good goes wrong. In other words, in a state of ignorance, it does not make sense that psychic agency, in relation to its internal, natural end, casts about at random. Rather, we would expect that it somehow grows perverted, much as in naturalizing models of disease the force of life acquires a pathological expression. 59 Why? Then, does the soul's innate drive to seek the good misfire?

Towards the end of the Protagoras, Socrates gives us an answer to this question that is as interesting for what it does not say as for what it does say. Socrates claims at the outset of the argument that he intends to refute a view that he ascribes to the masses:

It seems most people think something like this about knowledge, that it is nothing more than, say, a feeling or ruling element. They don't see it like that. They hold that it is not the knowledge that a man possesses which governs him, but something else—now passion, now pleasure, now pain, sometimes love, and frequently fear. They just think of knowledge as a slave, pushed around by all the other affections. (Protagoras 352b3-c2)

Though Socrates does not give any specific reasons why he rejects this position, the charged language of power—whereas knowledge should be something "hegemonic" (hégemonikon) and "ruling" (archikon), on this view it is pushed about "like a slave" (hóper peri andrappodon)—suggests that he may be objecting to the assumption that force flows towards knowledge (knowledge is both a thumb of the passions) rather than away from it (knowledge instrumentalizes bodies and passions). 60 If this is right, we could speculate that we err only when our capacity to know has been corrupted through "mechanisms" internal to knowing: love and anger and fear are just too different from knowledge to affect it in this way. It is hard to be more certain, however, because as the argument unfolds, Socrates gives up talking about knowledge altogether. Instead, he begins to speak of beliefs that people have about the good, rather surprisingly equating these with beliefs about what is pleasant. Both Socrates' apparent bait-and-switch on the topic of knowledge and his conflation of the good and pleasure have puzzled commentators. 61 What I wish to consider briefly here, however, is whether the explanation that Socrates provides of error does indeed identify a "mechanism" internal to, if not knowing, then forming beliefs about the good.

Socrates' own argument about why we err turns out to revolve around the idea of perceptual distortion. The same magnitudes, he points out, appear larger to us when they are closer and smaller at a distance; things closer sound louder than things far away. Judging the amount of goodness-pleasure in something, he claims, is subject to the same type of distortions. That is, the appearances that lead us to form our beliefs—and hence, to act in certain ways—are often exaggerated vis-à-vis the true goodness or pleasure in an object or activity. The only remedy for such a situation, Socrates declares, is a "measuring technê" that renders the deceptive image ineffectual (akarén), thereby allowing us to gauge goodness-pleasure and see what we truly want.

Now if doing well for us lay in doing and choosing things of greater dimensions and in not doing and rejecting things of small dimensions, what would our salvation in life be? Would it be the art of measurement or the power of the appearance? For isn't it the appearance that disorients us and makes us often change our minds about the same things and go back and forth in our actions and decisions about things big and small, while the measuring art would have rendered the image ineffectual and, by clarifying the truth, kept our soul calmer—resting in the truth, and thus would have saved our life? (Protagoras 356c8-c2)

On first glance, this explanation does appear to move away from the representation of ignorance as chance in the opening discussion of the dialogue, where it is because the layperson has no idea about benefit and harm that anything he does is a gamble. Here, in contrast, Socrates appears to isolate what Plato will call, in the Republic, a defect (pathimā) of our nature (X, 602a42), namely our suscepti-
bility to the distorting power of the phenomenon (hé tou phainomenon duvain). That "defect" can anchor a systematic explanation of why our natural tendency to gravitate towards the good is diverted towards apparent goods. Ignorance, then, is not simply the lack of knowledge of harm and benefit, but a pathological condition of our faculties of judging, believing, and desiring. 52

Yet at the same time, the sense of risk and chanciness fostered by the medical analogy at the beginning of the dialogue does not disappear. Socrates is vehement in his denial that things inside us—fear or anger or love—can yank us around if we have knowledge. When, later in the dialogue, he shifts to beliefs about the good, he does allow for some yanking around, but he emphasizes the conditions outside us, rather than inside us, that render our lives unstable. It is true that the phenomena that make us wander are produced through our own faculties of perception—this is why technical amelioration is possible. Still, what Socrates stresses is how this "defect" opens us to a world where things are always moving their position relative to us. The art brings calm to our souls by cutting through this flux to put objects in proper perspective.

Nevertheless, despite Socrates' emphasis on the way the world makes us wander this way and that, he adheres to the idea of a pattern of misfiring: what is closest always appears biggest and, less overtly but no less important, what is closest seems always to be precisely what we do not really want. So even if many objects come within our reach, we do not grasp at all of them just because they are there. Indeed, even in the opening discussion about sophists and merchants we get the sense that the buyer is not simply hapless but perhaps attracted towards the wrong kinds of foods. 54 But if our changing relationship to objects is not enough to explain error, we need an explanation of why our faculty of perception habitually makes the kinds of mistakes it does in imparting pleasure to certain objects or activities like fishcakes or sex. In recent years some scholars have argued that the Socrates of the Protagoras and other early dialogues would chalk such errors up to appetitive desire. 55 Yet these arguments do not acknowledge Socrates' deliberate shift in the Protagoras away from speaking of anarchic things inside us to describing how our faculty of perception exposes us to an anarchic world. That shift points to, if not a disjunction between explanations of error focused on "things inside us" and those focused on perceptions, at least a difference between them.

It is difficult to know how Plato understood this difference when he wrote the Protagoras. But by the time he wrote the Philebus—generally agreed to be a late dialogue—he thought it necessary to address the anarchic elements within us directly. Taking those elements on their own terms turns out to involve bringing into focus another aspect of contemporary medicine, namely the things in the body that implicate us in the turmoil of the physical world. 56 I turn now to look at how the problem of the disordering elements inside us is introduced in the Philebus in relationship to the concerns of the Protagoras. I will then very briefly consider two earlier texts, the Gorgias and the Republic, where we can see the medical analogy developing to accommodate the problem of our desires, especially the desire for sensory pleasure. I then return to the Philebus to see into echoes of them.

The Place of the Body in Psychiatric Disease

There are unmistakable echoes of Socrates' explanation of error in the Protagoras in the Philebus, a dialogue that returns to Plato's discussions of pleasure in earlier dialogues to develop a systematic defense of the good over the pleasant. 56 Once again, we learn that just as seeing things at close proximity gives rise to false opinions about their size, proximate pleasures and pains appear greater and more intense (41e9-42b6). Here, too, such distortion requires a method to cut away the part of pleasure or pain that is apparent and not real (to phainomenon all' ouk on).

This time, however, the problem of perceptual illusion is surpassed by another problem, that of "false" pleasures. These pleasures lead us astray not because they promise more benefit than they deliver. Rather, the benefit they promise turns out to be no benefit at all. To defend this claim, Socrates begins by recapitulating what he describes as a common definition of pleasure. 58

SO. It is often said, I think, that when the nature of anything is corrupted through combinations and divisions and fillings and emptings and any of things with those names happen.

PRO. Yes, that is often said.

SO. And when something has been restored to its natural state, then we decided that this restoration is a pleasure. (Philebus 42C-45D)

Pleasure, on this view, is the outcome of changes to a nature. Socrates presents this nature, with the ready assimil of Protagoras, his interlocutor, in physiological terms that recall contemporary medical writing and the fragments of the sixth- and fifth-century "physicists." Yet, having defined pleasure in these terms, Socrates immediately tries to deny its power. What if, he asks Protagoras, "none of these things having to do with the body (peri to sūma) were coming into being for us" (42D9-10)? What if, that is, there were no movements in the body and hence no pleasure and pain? 59 Protagoras is skeptical, unwilling to deny that the world is always flowing this way and that (anō te kai kathō), and in us, too, as the wise" say. Rather than refute this claim, as someone like Melissus might have done, Socrates says he will have to dodge it. He concedes that the pleasure of bodily restoration, unlike the phenomenon augmented by a measure of unreal pleasure, is real; later in the dialogue, he speaks of this pleasure as "delight in becoming" (chairousi diá tòn genesin, 54e5). He then changes tack, setting out
to show that despite the reality of becoming, it is not an objective good and thus should be avoided as much as possible.

The shift from proximate pleasures to false pleasures gives us an alternative schema for understanding how our happiness can be derailed by the fluctuating nature of the world. In the Protagoras we wander this way and that (and te kai kata) by trying to grasp the physical world perceptually, like children tugged around by a large dog on a leash. In the Philebus, we are implicated in the "this way and that" of the world by our own physicality. Indeed, it is because our bodies are the point of deepest implication in an unstable physical world that Socrates later blames them for the greatest and most intense false pleasures (45a-4-5).

One recognizable benefit of accounting for pleasure in terms of filling and emptying is that these mechanisms can explain why people are consistent in their mistakes about the good. That is to say, the idea that emptying brings with it the desire for filling can clarify why the soul (wrongly) identifies certain objects, i.e., objects that "fill" the body or the soul, as good or pleasant in the first place, rather than explaining why it misjudges the amount of goods or pleasure in an object. By putting this explanation of pleasure on the table, Socrates also confronts head-on one of the greatest difficulties in defending virtue as the natural state of a human being. Whereas the miseries of bodily disease make it easy to see why life in such a condition is not worth living, the misfiring of our desire for the good is not correlated with felt pain. In fact, "filling up" feels good, making it possible to claim that it is a natural good. The challenge of combating this claim can explain why the medical analogy becomes insatiably useful to Plato in "middle" dialogues such as the Gorgias and the Republic. It is useful, first, for the resources it offers Plato as he tries to describe how the things inside us, such as appetitive desires, derail our capacity to desire and pursue the good. But it is also true that the more Plato can describe diseases of the soul as objective conditions, the easier it will be for his "expert" opinion to override whatever seems or feels good to the patient: the more robust the diagnoses, the greater authority commanded by an art of care.

Of course, we might wonder why the idea of a medical analogy is even necessary if, as Socrates suggests in the passage from the Philebus, false pleasures are caused by our embodiment: if all diseases can be traced to the body, why develop a therapy of the soul? In truth, however, things are not so simple. To better understand how the body becomes relevant to the causes of psychic diseases, I would like to look in greater detail at how this new formulation of the medical analogy takes shape.

Let us turn for a moment, then, to one of the most extended medical analogies in Plato’s corpus, this time in the Gorgias, a dialogue often placed on the border between Plato’s early and middle works. Socrates, again the main speaker, begins the analogy by differentiating between medicine, which he casts as a technē of caring for the body, and cookery, a "knack" whose practitioners pretend to know what is best for the body but in truth cater only to bodily pleasures (464b2-465b6). The contrast gives rise to a second contrast between the apparent good of the soul, to which rhetoric caters, and the soul’s objective good, which is properly cared for by an art of justice. The analogy upholds the parallel between biological life and ethical life that we saw in the early dialogues. The common enemy, however, is no longer simply ignorance, as in the Protagoras, but ignorance qua the desire for pleasure. Since this pleasure is a false good, in the absence of true technical expertise one does not merely gamble with harm but actively courts it.

Strictly speaking, the analogy that Socrates offers isolates two kinds of pleasure, one bodily and the other psychic, and hence two kinds of disease. If we look carefully, however, he appears to hold that all desires occur in the soul. Therefore, every misguided desire is an expression of psychic disease, although in the case of cooking the misjudgment of the soul also hurts the health of the body. On this model, the enemies of bodily health that are most active in medical writing, namely the humors, disappear into the background, allowing the agents (patients, doctors, cooks) whose behaviors influence the humors to emerge as the significant causes of disease.

Yet even as the humors recede from view as causal factors in bodily disease, they appear to be informing Plato’s attempt in the Gorgias to describe in detail the mechanisms of errant desire, through which our souls arrive in a bad condition. The pathology of pleasure is related, as it will be in the Philebus, to processes of emptying and filling that create a cycle where the satisfaction of desire leads to ever greater appetites and more turbulence in the soul. The heart of the problem lies in the natural instability of appetite, which, left unchecked, spirals out of control, much as a humor will do in contemporary medical explanations. It is the possibility that a disease will become entrenched and incurable that makes Socrates urge those who have erred to seek a "cure" as soon as possible (484a-b2). The instability of humors and desires creates the need for physicians and trainers to discipline the body (504a-c-4) and experts in the soul who, by creating order and regularity, can counter the soul’s natural badness (504d5-4).

Deep similarities between humors and desires become increasingly visible in the Republic, where the analogy between vice and disease achieves a new level of prominence and complexity. Both humors and desires are natural and, indeed, constitutive elements of the body and the soul respectively. Yet once again, they are also a source of potential danger: like humors, the more desires are indulged the more numerous and intense they become, co-opting the motivational energies of the soul. Just as in contemporary medical writing, where humors come to enslave life to a force of dissolution, burgeoning desiresattered our beliefs and drive us to seek ever greater pleasures. In Republic VII, Plato likens the avatars of appetitive desires in the city, the drones, to bile and
phlegm in the body because they disorder the politeia in which they are found, and he equates this disorder with disease.\textsuperscript{94}

In the \textit{Gorgias} and the \textit{Republic}, Plato does not necessarily reject Socrates' explanation of error in the \textit{Protagoras}. Rather, he goes beyond the idea of a faulty faculty of perception to elucidate the causes of disease within, creatively adapting contemporary explanations of disease to probe the springs of our desires and the hidden state of a diseased soul. From this perspective, if the power of the phenomenon catalyzes an error, it is because there is already a tendency towards disease within us: as Plato says in \textit{Republic} VIII, the weak soul, like the body, requires only a small push to fall into disease (556e4-10). Even for the apparently healthy soul, lawful elements are buried within, capable of springing up on us unawares (IX, 572b3-8).

By focusing on these antinomian elements, Plato deepens the analogy between the physical body and the soul first developed in relationship to a principle of ethical flourishing. At the same time, he lays the groundwork for rethinking the question of where body and soul meet. In the \textit{Gorgias}, as we have just seen, disease is blamed on the person's "errors" against the body (479d), an idea that extends the depiction of the soul in \textit{Alcibiades I} as ruler and guardian. But as Plato pays more attention to the forces of flux and disorder within us, can we say that power also flows in the other direction? That is, can the unstable nature of the body function not only as a model of psychic disorder but also as a cause of it?\textsuperscript{95}

In fact, in a number of dialogues, the physical body does surge up beyond the boundaries of the medical analogy as the major threat to the health of the soul.\textsuperscript{96} In the \textit{Phaedo}, for example, the soul is dragged "towards things which never remain the same," not by the "power of the phenomenon," as in the \textit{Protagoras}, but by the body; it is the body that makes the soul wander about like a drunken man by forcing it to lay hold upon changeable things.\textsuperscript{97} The \textit{Phaedo} too, as we have just seen, faults our physical embodiment for false pleasures, so much so that the most obvious remedy for our psychic ills is to have no contact with the body at all. The more Plato focuses on the things inside us that harm the soul, it would seem, the more prominent the body becomes.

Nevertheless, as I observed at the beginning of this paper, Plato insists in the \textit{Republic} that while external forces can induce the innate badness in a body or a soul, it is only innate badness that can be blamed for disease and corruption (X, 610a1-3). That is, Plato does not lose sight of the idea found in the early dialogues that the principle of ethical life is destroyed by a mechanism internal to it. Moreover, even in texts that openly blame the body for ethical fault, that body cannot easily be conflated with the physical body described in contemporary medicine and at times by Plato himself. Whereas that latter body is necessary and implicated in the physical world and lacks sentience, the body in the \textit{Phaedo} appears to have beliefs conditioned by the experience of pleasure.\textsuperscript{98}

Plato's sense of the difference between the physical body and a sentiment, believing body can explain why, in the majority of his texts, he prefers to situate the appetites in the soul. Still, even in upholdining the difference between body and soul, Plato continues to explore how the body contaminates the soul.

One of Plato's most detailed attempts to describe the body-soul threshold is in the \textit{Platoi} series, where, as we have just seen, the very rhythms of biological life become a threat. I cannot do justice to the scope of his account here. What I want to stress, rather, is that in imagining the pleasures of becoming, Plato comes to apply the fine-grained sense of sameness and difference that characterizes analogy to the causal relations between the body and the soul.\textsuperscript{99}

Early in the dialogue, Socrates, in fact, describes sensation as a disturbance that is both common to the body and the soul and particular (idion) to each (33d5-6). That particularity is critical, for it guarantees a certain amount of autonomy to each part. The body, for example, can be affected independently of the soul. Indeed, the strategy that Socrates develops to evade the world-in-flux, after he admits the impossibility of denying its power, hinges on the idea that many physiological processes, such as growth, escape our awareness (\textit{leitēth} . . . \textit{hēmat}, 43b1-6).\textsuperscript{100} These processes are sensed, it turns out, only if they are sufficiently intense to produce pains and pleasures. That the life of the body proceeds largely beyond the threshold of our awareness is, as we saw above, a central tenet of medical writing, where we often find the idea that trouble is perceived only at a given level of intensity.\textsuperscript{101} That idea is a godsend for Socrates, faced with the indisputable reality of the physical world. For it allows him to claim that by minimizing fluctuation inside the body through the avoidance of intense pleasures and pains, we can keep physical turbulence out of the soul.\textsuperscript{102}

Yet the difference between an invisible movement and one that surfaces in our awareness is not simply quantitative, but qualitative. Herein lies the key in the \textit{Philebus} to maintaining a decisive boundary between body and soul. For in crossing over from the body into our awareness, movements appear not as phenomenal pains and pleasures, as they tend to be in the medical writers, but as motivations to action, desires, and beliefs.\textsuperscript{103} Psychic movements may (though not in all cases) begin in the body, but they are not simply bodily, since they also draw on memories of what is needed for the correction of psychic disequilibrium (in pain) as well as beliefs about the good.\textsuperscript{104} The result is that the psychic \textit{setzme}ns, unlike the somatic one, informs future behavior and ideas about value. Despite its origins in the physical, then, it belongs firmly to the realm of the ethical.

In the \textit{Philebus}, then, Plato describes how the physical body surfaces, as it were, in the soul through sensory pleasures and pains. He thus bridges the gap theorized in analogy between the mechanical body of the medical writers and appetitive desires. He does so by implicating the soul in the body's own economy of force on the grounds that if the problem with appetitive desires is that they grow stronger the more they are indulged, the intense bodily changes
consequent on that indulgence have an active role to play in fostering instability in the soul. The body is thus no longer simply an instrument but a causal agent in its own right. Nevertheless, because the path from physiological change to motivated behavior always passes through the soul, bodily instability remains an ethical problem. At the same time, if Plato succeeds in the Philebus in securing the difference between body and soul at the level of causes, that difference hardly protects the soul from the body. For the very thing that divides a humor from a desire, namely the capacity of a desire to motivate action, is what allows the fluctuation of the physical world to lodge in the intimate recesses of our ethical life. That is, Plato’s elaboration of the medical analogy creates a path for the physiological body to become the body of tactile pleasures and affective responses. It is this body that motivates our entanglement in the material world, and in that sense it is no longer really a body at all. It has become, rather, that which is most precious to us: the soul. Plato had already, in the Republic, firmly located appetitive desires in the soul. What we see in the Philebus is the representation of those desires not as parallels to the tumultuous stuffs in the body but as both echoes and transformations of the tumult those stuffs create.

By mapping this path, Plato preserves the difference between body and soul while encroaching on the authority of medicine to describe and manage the pathological potential of the body. He appropriates the medical idea of a threshold between the body and the conscious person. The body that surfaces through pleasures, desires, and emotions thus indicates a malfunctioning in our nature that threatens to destroy not biological life but our capacity to live as humans. Body qua body cannot be ethically bad if it is to accommodate its own continuum of health and disease. Rather, it is the body that surfaces in a mediated, "analogical" way in the soul that compels the soul's innate badness to unfold. The continuum of sameness and difference inside the analogy thus takes on new life, determining not whether ethical life is bare life or not—a relationship of identity or opposition—but rather how ethical a given human life is on the basis of the proximity of the body.

Conclusion: Beyond Analogy

I have argued that fifth- and fourth-century medicine creates an influential paradigm for explaining why we suffer in the absence of angry gods or malicious daemons. At the heart of this paradigm lies the physical body, defined both by its natural principle of flourishing and its equally natural tendency toward disorder. These tendencies, coupled with our lack of intuitive knowledge about how to take care of the body, necessitate the arts of the trainer, and especially the physician. This paradigm becomes integral to Plato’s account of why we err. By recognizing a principle of ethical flourishing, he definitively establishes our capacity for deliberative agency against the foil of the physical body, while at the same time adapting that body’s objective tendency toward life to describe our agency as a natural gravitation towards the good. The very naturalness of our desire for the good makes it impossible that anyone would desire to live a life directed otherwise. If we do not want to err, however, and if we deny that physiological forces can take the place of our intentions, the challenge becomes to explain how our faculties of belief and desire are made strange from within.

In taking up this challenge, Plato devotes increasing energy to describing the nature of the soul as a place not unlike the inside of the physical body. In so doing, he eventually allows the very instability of the body to surface in the soul. If, in the Protagoras, the measuring art promised to protect the soul from the vagaries of the external world, in the later dialogues the care of the soul is increasingly focused on how those emotions are realized through and in us. Thus, while Plato never gives up the idea of a threshold between the body and the soul, he admits enough of the body into the soul to require a rethinking of the boundary between self and not-self: if the problem of Socratic ignorance is that we are strangers to our true natures, Plato increasingly insists that making our true nature familiar requires silencing the body that surfaces in the soul through desires masquerading as desires for the good. His elaboration of the analogy between medicine and ethics thus ends up as an ambitious project of conceptualizing a psychophysical subject under the care of philosophy.

Notes

1. This article has been much improved by insightful feedback from the volume editors, Karen Bassi and Peter Euben. I also wish to thank Kathryn Morgan, Danielle Allen, David Wolfford, Matt Evans, Barbara Kowalzic, and Heinrich von Staden for comments and stimulating discussion; their questions and objections have made this paper stronger. I thank, too, the audience for an abridged version of this paper at the "Platoisms" conference at the University of South Carolina in March 2008. Finally, I am very grateful to the Institute for Advanced Study, where this paper was researched and written under ideal conditions with the support of a Mellon Fellowship for Assistant Professors in the School of Historical Studies.

Medicus Graecorum, L.2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1984: 2nd ed. 2003), 218-220.


5. By agent I mean the capacity of human beings to act on the basis of beliefs and (less often) knowledge as that agent is variously acknowledged and defended in the dialogues. I use the term "ethical" to indicate that this agent is embedded in contexts where his actions are deemed good or bad vis-à-vis an objective, common, and rational end.

6. Nearly all the extant medical writings ignore the gods and simply advance naturalizing (physis-based) accounts. For arguments against making intentional gods into causes, see, e.g., [Hippocrates], on the Sacred Disease I (J. Joanna, ed. and trans., Hippocrates: La maladie sacrée, t. 2.3 [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2003], 9:8-10=E, Littré, ed. and trans., Œuvres complètes d'Hippocrate [Paris: Baillière, 1839-61], IV, 362-64; [Hippocrates], Airs, Waters, Places 22 (J. Joanna, ed. and trans., Hippocrates: Airs, États lixès, t. 2.2 [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1996], 238-929=E, Littré II, 76-78). The gods appear rarely as potential healers in these treatises: see [Hippocrates], on Regimen IV 87 (R. Foly, ed. and trans. [with the collaboration of S. Dyll, Hippocrate: Du régime. Corps (
Nevertheless, in Plato’s dialogues the aim of medicine is basic physical health, and the medical writers themselves tend to treat health as bodily comfort. Note, too, that for my purposes it does not matter whether the dialogues usually referred to as "Socratic" (Apology, Crito, Laches, Charmides, Ion, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Hippias Minor, Menexenus, Euthyphro, Republic I; also often included are Alcibiades I and The Lovers, on whose authenticity see J. Annan, "Self-Knowledge in Early Plato," in Platonic Investigations, ed. D. J. O'Meara [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1985], 111-15) reflect the views of the historical Socrates. In what follows, for "Socrates" read "Plato’s Socrates," a character whose fidelity to a historical person cannot be detailed with certainty.

14. On Plato and Freud, see, e.g., A. Price, "Plato and Freud," in The Person and the Human Mind, ed. C. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 247-79; and J. Lear, "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis," in A Companion to Socrates, eds. S. Abel-Rappe and R. Kramkow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 442-62 (on Socratic elenchus). Justification for the comparison tends to rest on the claim that Plato and Freud independently discover timeless truths about the human mind. See also C. Bobonich and D. Destrée, Akrasia, 41-60, for the use of new cognitive research to explain why, in Plato, "in a deep sense, the person does not know her own mind" (ibid., 43), a concept that Bobonich explains in terms of the challenge it poses to the (Cassian) belief that we have incorrigible knowledge of our psychological states. But the idea that we do not know our own minds is no more intuitive than Cartesianism or models of thought that assume a porous boundary between the self and a di取消cific other. It seems, rather, that it emerges in certain historical contexts as the consequence of (including a reaction to) physical approaches to human nature.

15. On the care of the self as the defining feature of ancient ethics, see M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume II, trans. R. Hurley (Pantheon Books, 1985); and M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82, ed. F. Gros, trans. G. Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1-79. The discussions of exercises spirituals in P. Hadas, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spirituals (M. Foucault’s? Exercises from Socrates to Foucault: A Philosophical Letter to Blackwell), 1995), were an important source for Foucault. Hadot offers a different view of Foucault’s project, though his criticisms target Foucault’s work on the imperial period (ibid., 206-13). One of the main challenges to Foucault, apart from feminist critiques, has been that he neglects the “daemonic” desires and fantasies that shape the exercise of ethical freedom: for a psychoanalytic formulation of this critique, see J. Black, “Taking the Sex Out of Sexuality: Foucault’s Failed History,” in Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical Antiquity, eds. D. H. J. Larmore, P. A. Miller, and C. Platter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 43-66; and V. WohI, Love among the Rains: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 12-20. The critique is valid, but see the preceding note. Very little attention has been paid to the sessions between body and soul in techniques of care, though there has been an increasing awareness of medicine’s aspirations as an ethical science in later antiquity, especially in Galen.


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20. Homer’s descriptions of how these things behave in the body and the person’s relationship to them. See Clarke, Flesh and Spirit, and G. Sapatofa, I mysti dell’uomo in Omero (Rome: Carocci, 1999).

21. For the argument that Homer does allow for akrasia, see Gaskin, “Homeric He-Personality in Greek Epic,” esp. 56-57; see also ibid., 175-320, on Homeric models of strangeness, to some people, of the Homeric notions of action being utterly just in this, on the relationship between the implicit physiology of our early texts and later medical writing, see V. Langhoff, Medical Theories in Hippocrates: Early Texts and the “Epidemics” (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 37-40.


24. More complicated because there is also considerable fatalism in archaic and classical Greek thought. But see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.9, 1099a24-25: “for the greatest and most beautiful thing to be entrusted to chance is very unseemly.”

25. The most important early fragment is Alcm. [24] 4 B (Dick-Krantz). See also [Hippocrates], On the Nature of a Human Being 4.1, [Iouana, ed. and trans., [Hippocrates], La nature de l’homme. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum I.1.3 [Berlin: Akademie Verlag].
of psychic health on the grounds that Plato privileges the biogenetic rule of reason. There
analogous to an ordering principle of biological life in the medical writers. For instance,
in the reading of health, see G. Vlastos, "Equality and Justice in Early Greek

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1975: 2nd ed. 2002), 172-13-174, (=Livre VI, 40), and the helpful generalization at
Plato, Republic IV, 444c-82. The medical writings we have reflect a wide range of
gener and perspectives on the nature of bodies and diseases. The Mezo Fyrgus (esp.
4:26-27, 14:6-11, in W. H. S. Jones, trans., The Medical Writings of Anonymous
Londonensis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), thought to be based on
A Periapatetic medical doxography, suggests that there was even an even greater
diversity of opinions in fifth- and fourth-century medical writing than we have extant.
Since I am mainly interested in establishing the difference of medical explanation vis-a-vis magico-
religious explanation, I focus on a set of possibilities enabled by naturalizing explanation
but not necessarily realized in every treatment.
27. Though the inquiry into nature obviously contributes to the concept of im-
perisonal force, it appears that it is the medical writers who adopt dariom to mean the
History of Medicine: East and West, eds. Y. Otsuka, S. Sakui, and S. Kuriyama (Tokyo:
Ishiyaku EuroAmerica, 1999), 287-94.
28. "For diseases do not arise among people all at once; they gather themselves to-
gather gradually before appearing with a sudden spring (Iatrophs, ephainesthai)." [Hippocrates], On Regimen I 2, Joly-Byl, 124:29-126, (=Livre VI, 472).
29. For examples where the replacement of intentional agency with mechanical
causes is explicit, see, e.g., [Hippocrates], On the Sacred Disease 1 (Jouanna, 8:1-
13=Livre VI, 390-62); [Hippocrates], Regimen in Acute Diseases 17 (R. Joly, ed. and
trans., Hippocrates. Du régime des maladies aigus. Appendice, De l'aliment, De l'usage
30. See, e.g., [Hippocrates], On Places in a Human Being 43 (E. M. Craik, ed and
trans., Hippocrates: Places in Man [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996], 236:12-13=Livre VI, 336-38): "when the body is mastered by the things administered to it, the same things that
otherwise make it thrive prevail over the body and produce the opposite effects."
31. [Hippocrates], Regimen I 2 (Joly-Byl, 124:29-126,=Livre VI, 472).
32. See Plato, Republic I 341c-7: it is not sufficient for a body to be a body—it
needs something else, and this is why the medical technē was discovered.
33. In speaking of what bodies do on their own the medical writers usually use the expression apó autōn, or the adjective autōn, e.g., [Hippocrates], Ancien
r Medicine 21 (Jouanna, 148:6-7=Livre I, 624); [Hippocrates], Diseases of Women I 7
Descriptions of health as a kind of quasi-demonological apparatus (Cambridge); the impor-
tance of this automatic principle of organization. R. Stalley, "Mental Health," 111, and M. Vegetti, "Metafora politica e immagine del corpo negli scritti ippocratici," in
Formes de pensée dans la collection hipppocratique: actes du IVe Colloque international
hipppocratique de Lausanne, 21-26 septembre 1981, eds. F. Lasserre and P. Muhly
(Geneva: Droz, 1983), 569-89, contrast the humoral models of health with Plato's model

(111363)-111443) is directly related to a failure to care for one's ethical disposition,
the formation of which is described on analogy with the formation of a disease: "But our
dispositions are not voluntary in the same sense that our actions are. Our actions are under our control from beginning to end, because we are aware of the individual stages, but we only control the beginning of our dispositions; the individual stages of their development are unnoticeable, as in the case of illness. They are, however, voluntary, in the sense that it was originally in our power to exercise them one way or the other. (1116b30-1115a3, trans. Thomson.) For the “delayed reaction” model of sickness, see also Plato, Gorgias 516c2-3.

41. Teeling, in most cases where we find the vocabulary of neglect (ameletô, kata-
meletô, ameletos) in the Hippocratic Corpus it is the physician who fails to take care: see, e.g., [Hippocrates], Internal Affections 26 (P. Potter, ed. and trans., Hippocrates, vol. 6 [Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1988], 162-165), 234 (Litter Lit., 234); [Hippocrates], On Diseases I 12 (R. Wittern, ed. and trans., Die hippokratische Schrift De morbis I [Hildesheim, Germany, and New York: G. Olms Verlag, 1974], 28,10=Litter Lit., 160).

42. On the education of laypersons, see also, [Hippocrates], Affections I 1 (P. Potter, ed. and trans., Hippocrates, vol. 5 [Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1988], 6,1-7=Litter Lit., 208); the poem is now widely agreed to be integral to the text. See also Plato, Laws 720b2-6; 857c6-c1: medical knowledge distinguishes the free patient from the slave patient.

43. (Hippocrates), On Regimen IV 87 (Joly-Byl, 218,20-22=Litter Lit., 642).

44. On medical paideia, see Jager, Paideia, 3-45, and Schieffel, Hippocrates.


46. Although the author of On Regimen observes that many before him have written on the subject of human d½uâl (1,1-Joly-Byl, 122,7=Litter Lit., 466), the span of the text was probably recent. The absence of internal medicine, and specifically dietetics, in Homer may have to do with the paideia views expressed in antiquity: Plato, Republic III, 406a5-7, 408a5-b2; Celcus, On Medicine, poem 4-5.

47. Democritus [68] B311 (Diels-Kranz); Empedocles [31] A98 (Diels-Kranz); And-phon [87] A6 (Diels-Kranz); Critias [88] B39 (Diels-Kranz); Socrates Peace 39-40. The medical writers themselves have things to say about the pneuma (e.g., [Hippocrates], Airs, Waters, Places I 19, Jonsana, 234,10=Litter Lit., 72) as well as about the cognitive and emotional faculties: for a full overview, see Gundert, “Soma and Psyche.” The author of On Regimen notably offers care for both the body and the soul. Nevertheless, therapy remains largely immoral, and the medical authors do not broach the idea that beliefs or desires (especially for pleasure) shape the patient’s behaviors and thus constitute an important target of technical manipulation. See further, B. Holmes, “The Problem of Pleasure and the Limits of Medicine,” Proceedings of the Xth Colloquium Hippocratic-

48. For the analogy between nourishment and teachings, see also Plato, Phaedrus 270a4-9; Republic IX, 585a6-586a.

49. On the expertise of the physician or the trainer vis-à-vis the practices and food required for bodily health, see also Plato, Crito 47b1-3; Gorgias 490b1-7, 517d6-518a1. Medicine allows us to avoid chance and perceive benefit: Republic I, 341e6-7; Symposium 180e5-6.


51. E.g., [Hippocrates], On Places in a Human Being 46 (Craik, 84,17-21=Litter Lit., 342); [Hippocrates], On Ancient Medicine 1 (Jonsana, 118,10-119,4=Litter Lit., 570-72). See Schieffel, Hippocrates.

52. See also Plato, Hippicus Minor 372eb-373a2; Gorgias 505a2-b6, 512a2-b3; Timaeus 44d2-c2. The value of the soul means that psychic disease is most shameful: see Gorgias 477d8-e6, 478b4-c4.


56. On the soul ruling the body as a Socratic idea, compare Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.4.9-10, 4.3.14.

57. See above, n. 47.

58. Democritus [68] B187, B224 (Diels-Kranz). The reason why the care of the soul is more important is made clear at B159, where the soul, tried in a mock court case, is found guilty of causing the body’s troubles by the reckless pursuit of desire, “just as if a tool or a utensil were in a bad state one would blame the person who used it carelessly.” Health and combat illness, cf. Plato, Charmides 174e2-7; wisdom does not provide health since health belongs to a different art. (For a summary, see Plato, Euthydemus 251a4-5, and Meno 87b5-89a7. Intelligence and wisdom are required to use not just a craft but any possession.

59. In Aristobules I 12, 2-3, we may know about the body, but this does not guarantee that they know themselves (131a2-3). See also Charmides 164a1-c6.

60. Cf. Plato, Gorgias 511e6-512b1, where Socrates makes the same point, but names the soul.

61. See above, p. 379.

62. It is worth remembering that it is because that tendency towards life is already considered endowed in medicine (and hence in need of techne) that Plato can essentially prescribe something in the body that leans towards health while also treating the body as an object and product without the guidance of the soul. On medicine and gymnastics as the “masters” of the body, see Plato, Gorgias 518a1-5; cf. Sophist 226a1-2.


64. See also, e.g., Plato, Euthydemos 282a2.

67. Compare the "objective-participant conception" of the self articulated by Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic*, 11-12, who stresses the importance of participation in a community with shared values to a person's self-conception, as well as the person's attempts to uphold this conception by basing his actions on reasons; see also Anscombe, "Self-Knowledge." Gill finds considerable continuity between archaic poetic ( Homer) and later philosophical (Plato) models. Yet the idea that knowledge rests not with the community but with the expert suggests that Plato's perspective has been influenced by contemporary debates about technical knowledge and its objects, including the body. There are traces of the idea of a *psychê* that participates in an objective Logos in Heraclitus—see [22] BII3, B116 (Diels-Kranz)—but the idea that there are experts in its care remains strongly shaped by the medical analogy.

68. On psychological eudaemonism, our only motivation for our actions is a belief about the good: see T. Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 52-53. Yet this state of motivation can be classified as unnatural or, rather, "diseased" if our beliefs are misaligned with the truth. That is, only when we know the good do we desire naturally: see Segvic, "No One Eats Willingly," 9 and paxium on what she calls "Socratic wantings."

69. For the expression "moral automata," see Carone, "Calculating Machines," 63.

70. The needs of the body, of course, surface in consciousness as hunger or thirst. The problem is that they are underdetermined—hence the need for medical experts to tell you what to eat, how much, when, and so on. For a fascinating rare exception, where the body's need for a given humor appears consciously as a desire for certain foods, see Hippocrates, *On Diseases IV 39* (Joly, 95,26-95,9; cited VII, 558-60). Note, too, that when Plato treats the relationship between hunger and desire in the *Phædo*, the soul's capacity for memory is necessary to the formation of desire.

71. For the ignorant patient whose actions toward the body are governed by chance, see [Hippocrates], *On the Pneumêsis 5* (Iouanna, 228.8-12-Libre VI, 6-8), through here the patient is by chance successful in finding what will benefit him.

72. The opposite of living is dying. At the same time, disease has a nature that mimics many of the functions of life. In the same way, although the opposite of agency would seem to be chance, in fact a disease of the soul would be expected to cause our capacity to seek the good to misfire rather than eliminate it altogether. So a person does not stop forming beliefs about the good but rather forms the wrong beliefs.


75. The idea is first introduced at Plato, *Philebus* 32e-33c, where not feeling pleasure and pain is the most divine life.

76. Since pleasures and pains, however, still involve the soul. See also Plato, *Philebus* 45e-57:"it is clear that the greatest pleasures and the greatest pains arise from some kind of badness of body and soul and not from virtue."

83. Conversely, what is beneficial, e.g., medical regimen, can be unpleasant: see, e.g., Plato, *Gorgias* 478b-7.9. But even the pleasures in the *Phædo* can see that immediate pleasure sometimes results in greater (bodily) pain.
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84. Plato, Republic VII, 56c9-61a; cf. Republic II, 372d7-8; phlegmateous polia; Gorgias 516c2-519a1.

84. Plato, Republic VIII, 56d9-1c: cf. Republic II, 372d7-8; phlegmateous polia; Gorgias 516c2-519a1.

85. The body as obstacle, e.g., Plato, Phaedo 65a10, 66c1. The body as that which contaminates or defiles or maims the soul: see Republic X, 611b10-c5; Phaedo 67a2-67b2, 80e3-81c5. See also Timaeus 66d7-8e2: people are involuntarily bad because of bodily constitution (δια τέκνων θερισμόν χειρί τινος οὐκ ἐκτείνεται) and a poor upbringing.

86. Plato, Phaedo 79d-8.

87. At Plato, Phaedo 83d7-8, for example, the soul is said to be attached to the body if it “has the same beliefs as the body and delights in the same things.” Just before this, at 83d5, the soul believes “the things that the body says are true.”

88. Plato, Phaedo 83d7-8, for example, the soul is said to be attached to the body if it “has the same beliefs as the body and delights in the same things.” Just before this, at 83d5, the soul believes “the things that the body says are true.”


90. The discussion of bodily affections that are unperceived is first undertaken at the soul, there is not felt (lūkē) but “non-sensation” (anaxesthēsia). At Timaeus 64a2-65a3, contrary-to-nature impressions that are sudden and violent are felt as pains and sudden restorations as pleasures, but any gradual restoration of order is unperceived (anaxesthēsia).

91. As at [Hippocrates], On Regimen 1.2 (Joly-Byl 124:28-29=Liittré VI, 472). See also, e.g., [Hippocrates], On Diseases IV 35 (Joly-Byl 159:18-22=Liittré VI, 550), 36 (Joly-Byl 136:15=Liittré I, 602), a humor becomes manifest (phanterein) only through pain, while at 89.21-23=Liittré VII, 552. At [Hippocrates], On Ancient Medicine 14 (Jouanna, [Hippocrates], On Diseases I 20 (Weiten, 54:16=Liittré VI, 178) the adjectives “invisible” (adōn) and “not painful” (anadamōn) are near synonyms. The contrast between visible and invisible pains was significant in Anaxagoras’ theory of perception: see [59] A92 Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33 (2007) 19-54.

92. The historical Socrates apparently modeled this kind of life, e.g., Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.3.5. See Gooch, “Hesychia,” 25-26.

93. Against the view that these pleasures and pains are epiphenomenal, see Evans, “Plato and the Material Soul,” 77-107, 79-82, for a refutation of other interpretations that neglect the unique causal (i.e., motivational) power of bodily pains. Plato usually treats the whole soul as capable of both desires and beliefs, but cf. Timaeus 77b1-c5, where the appetitive part of the soul experiences pleasures, pains, and desires but does not participate in dôsa, logismos, or nous.

94. On the formation of desires in response to bodily luck, see Plato, Philebus 34e-35d. For the connection between pain, pleasure, and dôsa, see, in addition to body] and its desires and pleasures so that nothing else seems to be true except the corporeal [to sōmatosaideras] . . .

95. The up-and-downing in the soul is at some basic level a repetition of a movement (disorders in the bodily causes of disorders in the body, e.g., Plato, Timaeus 86b1-2) and at some level (it is because desires behave in ways that recall the mechanical behavior of material flux in which they are embodied; on the dangers posed to goodness by this...


beliefs (i.e., propositions about the good) cannot be resolved. For recent contributions, see Bobonich, "Akrasia and Agency"; Carone, "Akrasia in the Republic"; Carone, "Akrasia and the Structure of the Passions.

105. See Plato, Phaedo 63a-b. On the body's pleasures as foreign (alloktos) to us, see Phaedo 114c-3; Republic IX, 587a-5. In Republic IX, to feed the appetitive part of the soul or the thumetic one is to starve and weaken the person (586e-589a). Paradoxically, however, these pleasures are also the most familiar (582b-2). See D. Sedley, "The Ideal of Godlikekness," in Plato, ed. G. Fite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 791-810.

107. In the Timaeus, for example, to live justly simply means to conquer the motions from the outside world that ripple through our bodies as pleasures, pains, loves, and perceptions; if we are conquered, we live unjustly (42A2). The idea of disciplining desire is present from the Gorgias onwards. The Timaeus, like the Philebus and the Laws, works out practical strategies for discipline. It would seem, though, that such as responsibility increases as well. Gill, "The Body's Fault," and Carone, "Akrasia and the Structure of the Passions," observe the relationship between techne and responsibility in the presentation of psychic disease in Timaeus. On care as an ethical responsibility, see also Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.12.8; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b21-1115a3.

108. Plato never gives up the idea that no one wants to live with psychic disease; see, e.g., Timaeus 44c-1-2.

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