THE GRAMMARIAN’S AUTHORITY

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I

For the most part, only scholars professionally concerned with Virgil now read Servius, and that is too bad. Not so much because Servius is lost to a wider audience, but because something of Servius’ own peculiarity is often missed. The scholar brings to the work his own understanding of what the commentator should be doing, a set of expectations quite different from Servius’, shaped by his own times, experience, and sense of professional responsibility to the text of Virgil. What is really needed for the job of understanding Servius is the mind of an adolescent, preferably of the late fourth and early fifth centuries—the mind, that is, of one of Servius’ students. This paper attempts to approach Servius’ commentary from just such a point of view, in order to set Servius’ remarks on Virgil’s language—much the largest category of comment—in the context from which they arose, that of the grammarian’s school.

We will begin to establish that context indirectly, by examining briefly the educational role assigned to Servius by one of his contemporaries, Macrobius; we will then turn to the commentary itself. By proceeding in this way, we can achieve three related purposes. First, we can emphasize one of the fundamental differences between the fictional and the real Servius, a difference that results when another man’s expectations are imposed on the figure of the grammarian. Understanding how Servius diverges from the expectations of a contemporary should in turn make it easier to see how and why he diverges from the expectations of a modern reader: we can emphasize, for example, the complexities that result when exegesis, the goal of both the ancient and modern commentary, is blended with instruction in a living language, a goal of Servius’ commentary not shared with the modern counterpart. Third, and most important, by placing ourselves in the pupil’s position, we should be able to experience directly one discreet element of Servius’ personality: the grammarian’s sense of his own authority. We know what Servius says about Virgil, but Servius’ conceptions of his own task and of his own status as a cultural figure remain largely unexpressed: the commentary form does not lend itself to personal presentation, and Servius himself does not strike one as a man given much to reflection. Yet it is demonstrably true that there is at

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work a singular, and often decidedly quirky, turn of mind; and Servius' implicit self-image can be seen to influence the explicit comment, to the degree that at times the latter can properly be understood only when the former has been taken into account. It is the ultimate purpose of this paper, then, to suggest both how Servius thinks of himself and how those thoughts influence what he says.

Three points should be made clear before we begin. First, although the following is concerned with the linguistic side of the commentary, the discussion does not pretend to be a full and detailed account of Servius' conception of the language, which is a complex affair and beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the discussion attempts to represent that conception fairly, within the limits imposed by its own narrower concerns; and the conclusion will suggest how further work on this subject might proceed. Second, the (so-called) vulgate commentary is taken to be essentially that of Servius, and the fuller commentary first published by Daniel to be a later compilation, offering interpolations and additions to the Servian core. Third, it is assumed that all of the teaching in the commentary is Servian, at least by adaptation: that is, the primary concern of the discussion is not with the question of what in the commentary is "Servius' own," as opposed to views and material derived from his sources. That problem, emphasized by a recent writer on the subject, is both real and probably insoluble, but is not central to the following discussion, which is concerned more with attitudes than with specific points of doctrine. Although the great bulk of Servius' material is tralatitious, Servius must be understood to take responsibility for, and in effect present as his own (unless he indicates otherwise), both what he tells us and the manner in which he tells it to us. The general principle is plain enough and is linked to the specific method employed below: for in the central portion of the paper we shall be listening to Servius as his students would have heard him, in order to define the impressions, both of Servius' teaching and of Servius himself, that would have been fixed in minds more prepared than the modern to accept his instruction as fresh. In this sense, what follows takes all of the commentary to be "Servius' own," capturing the grammarian in the moment of instruction: references to probable or possible sources, and to the more general context of the scholarly tradition, have been introduced where necessary but have otherwise been kept to a minimum; and in the instances where a specific feature of the comment is attributed to Servius himself, specific reasons for that attribution are also given.

2. The view of Thilo, as vindicated and refined by subsequent scholarship; see, most recently, G. P. Goold, "Servius and the Helen Episode," *HSCP* 74 (1969): 101–68, esp. 102–22, and C. E. Murgia, *Prolegomena to Servius 5: The Manuscripts*, University of California Publications, Classical Studies, 11 (1975), pp. 3–6, with references in both to the most important literature. In the following discussion all references are to the vulgate Servius, and the *Aeneid*, unless otherwise specified; references to the expanded commentary are noted by the abbreviation DServ.

In order that Servius might stand out more clearly in his own character, it
should be useful, first, to establish a point of comparison. An appropriate
text is at hand to provide a backdrop, one which not only purports to show
us Servius engaged in linguistic instruction, but also provides him with a
young pupil: the Saturnalia, Macrobius' idealized recreation of the saeculum
Praetextati, in which Servius is made to play the role of the "good" gram-
marian, demonstrating the moral and intellectual qualities desirable in one
of his profession. As such, Servius is called upon early in the first book
(Sat. 1. 4) to deal with the adulescens Avienus, who at this point in the
dialogue wears the character of an essentially sound, if somewhat obstre-
perous and unformed young man. On listening to a discourse by one of the
aristocratic participants, Caecina Albinus, Avienus had been struck by the
untoward quality (novitas) of certain turns of phrase used by the older and
more learned man, and is moved to question their legitimacy: in effect, he
asks why Caecina had committed two solecisms and a barbarism (respec-
tively, noctu futura for noce futura, diecrastini for die crastino, and Saturna-
liorum for Saturnalium). The defense of Caecina is entrusted to the pro-
fessional, Servius, who explains each of the usages in turn, according to the
general principle that what Avienus in his ignorance had taken to be
novitas was in fact antiquitas. The appeal to antique usage fails to impress
the adulescens: Avienus savages the grammarian for using his professional
status to encourage the use of expressions that have been "rubbed out" and
"cashediered" by the passage of time. Avienus calls for the use of "current
language," praesentia verba, until he is brought to heel by the grave rebuke
of the group's most distinguished member, Praetextatus himself (Sat. 1. 5).

In the conflict between teacher and pupil that arises from Servius'
tuition of Avienus, two points are especially important for our present
purposes. One is general, Avienus' insistence upon praesentia verba. The
other is specific, the precise terms used by Servius in his explanation of
diecrastini (Sat. 1. 4. 20–27), the last of the controversial expressions treated
before Avienus' outburst. Here, as commonly elsewhere, the words put in
Servius' mouth are drawn from a chapter of Gellius; and, as is his practice,
Macrobius substantially rearranges and modifies the chapter to suit his
purpose. Servius' defense proceeds from the assertion that the doctissimus
vir, Caecina, did not use the expression sine veterum auctoritate; the method

4. For more general discussion of Servius' role in the Saturnalia, and of the context of the incident
described below, see R. Kaster, "Macrobius and Servius: rerecandia and the Grammarian's Func-
tion," HSCP 84 (1980); the present study is intended to be a companion to the latter.

5. N.A. 10. 24, to which Gellius' preface runs: "diepristini, diecristini et diequarti et die-
quinti, qui elegantius locuti sint, dixisse, non ut ea nunc volgo dicurnur" (those who used the
language elegantius are identified in the first sentence as classical and preclassical authors, "those
of the age of Cicero and before"; cf. 13. 6. 4 for similar chronological definition). In regard to Macro-
bius' use of its sources, it might be useful to note the liberty with which Macrobius patches together
his own section from the disiecta membra of Gellius: Sat. 1. 4. 20~V.A. 10. 24. 1; 1. 4. 21~10. 24. 8;
1. 4. 22~10. 24. 5; 1. 4. 23~10. 24. 8 (resumed); 1. 4. 24~10. 24. 10; 1. 4. 25~10. 24. 6; 1. 4. 26
(Symmachus' addition to Servius remarks)~10. 24. 7; 1. 4. 27 (Praetextatus' addition)~10. 24. 3—all
with both necessary and casual changes of wording.
of the defense itself, and so the use of *auctoritas*, is essentially analogical. That is, Servius adduces no actual use of *diecristini*, nor does he even suggest (as did Gellius) that that precise form was ever used by the *veteres*. Rather, the expression is justified, solely and explicitly, by analogy with such attested archaic forms as *diequinti* and *dienoni*. Servius’ defense of “analorical archaism” and the attitude toward the *veterum auctoritas* that is involved conform thoroughly to Macrobius’ point of view: they are in accord both with Servius’ status as the “good” grammarian, the man who guarantees the continuity of the language, and with the more general notion that stamps every page of the dialogue, the belief that all elements of the cultural tradition continue as living presences, influencing and validating every aspect of the life of a mature and learned man. At the same time, the defense offered by Macrobius’ Servius and the regard for *auctoritas* implied in “analorical archaism” are directly opposed to the doctrines of the Servius we find in the commentary.

The contrasting point of view of the “real” Servius can readily be seen in several notes on the *Aeneid*; characteristically, the instruction appears early, in the first book, so that the student might carry the lesson with him as he proceeds:


The final sentence warns against the imitative extension of the peculiar usages that can be found in the text and conveys the main point of the note. The teaching found there can be compared with the burden of another note which occurs not long after:


6. In a sentence omitted by Macrobius, Gellius does offer the assurance that “item simili figura ‘diecristini’ dicebatur, id erat ‘crastino die’” (10. 24. 8); the only attested use of *diecristini* before Gellius (who uses the form himself at 2. 29. 7) occurs at Plaut. *Mostell.* 881, a fact of which Macrobius would have been unaware.

7. 1. 4. 20 with 1. 4. 25–27: the analogical defense is found most clearly at 1. 4. 25 (“vverum ne de ‘diecristini’ nihil retulisse videamus, suppetit Caelianum illud ex libro Historiarum secundo. . ..”) with a passage offering *diequinti*; Symmachus and Praetextatus each follow with a quotation, offering *diequinti* and *dienoni*.

8. In the final sentence I have read *ponimus* and *formamus* with Thilo and the manuscripts of Servius, against *posita sunt* and *formata*, the readings of codex C of DServ. printed by the Harvard editors; for the reason, see p. 227 and n. 30.
Here again, the main thrust of the note (indicated in italics) moves in the same direction as the comment at 1. 4. Both notes deal with the use and abuse of analogy and with the proper relation between analogical formation and auctoritas; the combined lesson is plainly opposed to the sort of validation given diecrastini by the Servius of the Saturnalia, where the one odd formation is justified on the analogy of other, comparably odd expressions. The notes at 1. 4 and 1. 26 are examples of the specific and limiting application of the more general statement concerning figurative usage found later in the commentary:

5. 120 PVBES INPELLVNT figura est, ut [1. 212] “pars in frusta secant.” et scendum inter barbarismum et lexin, hoc est, Latinam et perfectam elucionem, metaplasmum esse, qui in uno sermone fit ratione vitiosus, item inter soleicisum et schema, id est, perfectam sermonum connexionem, figura est, quae fit contextu sermonum ratione vitiosa. ergo metaplasmus et figura media sunt, et discernuntur [sc. from barbarism and solecism, respectively] peritia et imperitia. fiunt autem ad ornatum.

Compared with the definitions found in the grammatical tradition, Servius’ note here is itself distinctive in several details and can be compared with the less precisely worded doctrine stated by Servius in his commentary on Donatus’ ars (GL 4. 447. 8–10):

quidquid scientes facimus novitatis cupidii, quod tamen idoneorum auctorum firmatur exemplis, figura dicitur. quidquid autem ignorantes ponimus, vitium putatur.

This last, broad formulation, with its emphasis on novitas, “novelty” (toned down to ornatus in the commentary, where very little that is good is said about novitas), and its vague proviso concerning auctoritas (“idoneorum auctorum firmatur exemplis”), could well be interpreted as countenancing the kind of analogical argument offered in Macrobius. The comment on Donatus provides the more general and freer alternative to the more specific and confining statements found, for example, at 1. 4 and 1. 26. It is in the latter places, it seems, that we hear the more authentic voice of Servius the teacher, and it is a voice rather different from that of the “good” grammarian of the Saturnalia.

There is more at stake here than just another difference in detail between the two Servii, the creation of Macrobius and the author of the commen-

9. For similar formulation (“sed de his tantum quae legimus sunt ponenda; non enim artis sunt ista sed usurpationis. . . .”), cf. the note at 1. 587.

10. Servius’ formulation is unusual in its precise, tripartite schematization (lexis/metaplasmus/barbarismus and schema/figura/soleicisms), and the formal categories of lexis and schema; the latter especially is noteworthy, since for obvious reasons schema itself is normally used interchangeably with figura, to denote what under normal circumstances would be a solecism: e.g., Donatus (GL 4. 394. 23–24), “soleicisms in prosa oratione, in poemate schema nominatur”; Pompeius (GL 5. 292. 13–39), “Plinius sic dicit, ‘quando sit soleicisms, quando sit schema, sola intellectu discernit’” (= Plin. Dub. serpent. frag. 124 Mazzarino = frag. 125 Della Casa), with Pompeius’ discussion, where figura and schema are used indifferently; cf. also Quint. Inst. 9. 3. 2 with Donatus GL 4. 397. 5–6.

11. On the tendency of Servius to vary his teaching in the commentary on Virgil, “where he was not as bound to the [grammatical] tradition” as in his observations on Donatus, see the remarks of P. Wessner, “Lucan, Statius und Juvenal bei den römischen Grammatikern,” PhW 49 (1929): 329.
tary. In the two approaches there is a fundamental difference in attitude toward, and understanding of, the processes of the language, the authority of the culture which stands behind it, and the status of the grammarian himself. The use made of analogy in the Satuurnalia is an integral part of the ideal of cultural continuity developed in the dialogue. That approach implicitly assumes that the forms guaranteed by auctoritas are—to use the term employed by Servius at 1. 26—as sound (integra) as the forms used in “regular” speech, and thus as suited to the operations of analogy: through that linguistic exercise one achieves a more intimate and vivid participation with the ancients. Precisely the opposite is true of the teaching of Servius, for whom auctoritas holds no such guarantees: figurae (or metaphasms, which operate under the same terms) represent a large, but finite and isolated, repository of forms of expression. The repository is, above all, controllable. It is not to be extended: figurae are elements which may, under certain circumstances, be used virtually as a kind of literary allusion; at the same time figurae are examples of what, as a matter of general practice, should be regarded as “vicious” and be strenuously avoided. In Macrobius, figurae represent a channel of communication between past and present thrown open modestly and reverently by the grammarian himself; in Servius’ commentary, figurae represent a nearly closed door, over which Servius himself stands guard: the ends of immediacy and participation served by the grammarian of the Saturnalia in his instruction of the young Avienus are countered in Servius’ own teaching by the preservation of distance and control.

III

The goals of distance and control are themselves partly a function of an institutional quirk of Roman education: figurae occupied a kind of no-man’s-land in the passage from the school of the grammaticus to that of the rhetor, falling a bit beyond the grammarian’s goal, and a bit short of the rhetorician’s main concern. This institutional no-man’s-land coincides with a no-man’s-land of language and method: the ambiguous place of figurae in the structure of formal education is reflected in the function of

12. For such differences in general, see Kaster, “Macrobius and Servius.”
15. See the remarks of Schindel, Die lateinischen Figurenlehren, pp. 12–18. Servius most often uses figura in the sense of the schema grammaticum, concerning the loquendi ratio, distinguished by Quintillian (Inst. 9. 3. 2: “verum schemata lexeos duorum sunt generum: alterum loquendi rationem novat, alterum maxime connectione exquisitum est. quorum tametsi utrumque convenit orationi, tamen possis illud grammaticum hoc rhetoricum magis dicere”), less often in the sense of Quintillian’s schema rhetoricum (= the figura verborum as it is usually found in the handbooks; both of the schemata lexeos are to be distinguished in turn from the schemata dianoecas, “figures of language” vs. “figures of thought,” the latter wholly the concern of the rhetor).
figurae in the commentary, where they mark off the boundaries between several pairs of oppositions, at the same time leaving those boundaries porous and vague. The situation might be represented schematically as follows, in terms of the oppositions that will concern us most:

So, for example, in the economy of Servius’ commentary, figurae form a point of juncture between the two purposes of the commentary itself, the exegetical or critical on the one hand, and the prescriptive on the other, an extension of the methodic instruction in the language: figurae are called upon to make intelligible what the author is saying (and/or defend his way of saying it), while at the same time figurae segregate the author’s usage from what the grammarian intends to teach. In any given note, one purpose may be seen to predominate, but the boundary between the two purposes is never completely and neatly distinguished. In fact, one should perhaps speak in general not so much of boundaries as of buffer zones. The institutional niche of figurae corresponds to their use as a buffer (compare Servius at 5.120, quoted above, where such usages are termed media): the category figura protects the normal operations of the language against the authority of the text, just as it protects the text against the charge of soleimnism. Figurae provide a safety valve at the meeting point of two opposing impulses.

As the goals of “protection,” “distance,” and “control” suggest, the commentary is very often a scene of conflict, between “the ancients” and “ourselves,” between different forms and sources of authority, between the

16. This is the “quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi” of grammar (cf. August. Contra Faustum 22.25 (PL 42.417): “puer in barbarismo reprehensus, si de Vergilii metaplasmos se velit defendere, ferulis caederetur”). It is usually, but not always, extended to Virgil: see Servius at, e.g., 4.355, 8.260, 10.572.

17. See the preceding note and compare Servius at 1.120, on the syntax of Iliomei, a matter of antiptosis (the use of one case for another, here the dative for the genitive): “quod etsi forte contingat, non regula mutatur, sed antiptosis fit, qua plerumque utuntur poetae.”
deference owed to the author’s prestige and the domination of the text by the grammarian himself. Understanding the commentary means, in large part, understanding how those various conflicts are orchestrated and controlled by the grammarian; and understanding the latter requires that we fully appreciate the sense of authority that the grammarian derives from his own institutional niche. As is often pointed out, Servius’ approach to the text is dominated by regulations and categories; and this quasi-bureaucratic treatment of Virgil has done little to endear Servius to modern tastes. But for our purposes it is important to bear in mind that control of regulations and categories carries with it a particular kind of power. Servius understands whatever comes before his eyes in terms of the rules provided by the institution of which he is a part; and it is to the command of those rules, and to his status in that institution, that Servius owes whatever authority he possesses. Servius is a man who has so thoroughly internalized both the rules and authority of his position that they are at times combined and expressed unconsciously, in ways which offer unexpected glimpses of Servius’ personality and his own self-image.

An understanding in general terms of the basis of Servius’ rules and authority and of the way they are deployed in the commentary is a useful prelude to a consideration of Servius’ self-image. Servius’ status as a grammarian, his place in a specialized and formally elaborated institution, involves a specialized knowledge, recte loquendi scientia; and that knowledge in turn rests on the natura of the language. Recte loqui means naturaliter loqui. Usage that is strictly “correct” is “natural” usage: the natura of the language in turn is defined by the ars, where “nature” is formalized as ratio and regulae; and the ars, in its turn, is the product and property of the grammarian. The “nature” of the language is thus incorporated in the institution and identified with the grammarian’s expertise: the linguistic forces that lie beyond his institutional niche, and contradict his expertise, are at the same time “against nature.” Consider, for example, the comments on figurative usage noted above. By definition a deviation from “correct” usage, figurae are also necessarily a deviation from “natural” usage, the sermo naturalis. The grammarian therefore is inevitably as opposed to the analogical extension of figurative usage as he is to the extension of any other use “against nature”: with Servius’ anti-analogical note at 1. 4, we can compare the following note, which warns against analogical backformation based on a form whose natura has been “corrupted”:

2. 195 PERIVRI in verbo “r” non habet; nam “peiuero” dicimus corrupta natura praepositionis. quae res facit errorem, ut aliqui male dican “peieurus.”

18. Cf. 2. 132 (figura vs. sermo naturalis); compare also 1. 5 (usage adopted causa metri vs. what one does naturaliter; expanded at 5. 467), 2. 60 (usurpatum vs. naturale; on this note, see further below, p. 227), 7. 161 (secundum naturam vs. figuratum).

19. See also the note at 4. 427, with the similar thought behind it: “REVELLI non ’revulsi’; nam ‘velli’ et ’revelli’ dicimus. ‘vulcus’ vero et ’revulcus’ usurpatum est tantum in participiis, contra naturam”; and cf. 2. 39 (1. 149) on the word vulgus, and the “error” created in its declension by the analogical influence of the word pelagus (itself “unnatural” because derived from the Greek).
Here, as in the case of *figurae*, an accommodation must be reached with the "corruption" that is already an accomplished fact: Servius is saying, in effect, "This far but no further." Hedged around by the wall of *natura*, Servius deals from a clearly defined position of strength with the other, less well-defined forces—*auroritas* and *usus*—that have an impact on the language. These forces are variously treated in the commentary. For example, although *auroritas* serves largely as a court of last resort, defining the periphery of permissible usage rather than the core of correct usage, *auroritas* can also appear, on an ad hoc basis, to govern the language, when it serves the grammarian's (predetermined) didactic purpose. The same is true of *usus*, (nominally) "ordinary, current usage": what "usage has maintained" can be a determining factor, and can even be given credit for having altered the "nature" of the language. But throughout, the grammarian himself, with his grasp—or rather, definitive control—of *natura*, stands watch over *auroritas* and *usus*, guarding against the perceived "abuse," "confusion," and "corruption" of both.

The general fact of this intricate and often arbitrary interweaving of *natura*, *usus*, and *auroritas* is itself more or less familiar. Only two elements need emphasis here. First, one can reasonably suggest that the authority of the grammarian's own pronouncements would tend to be perceived, by his students and by the grammarian himself, as decisive: it is the gram-
marian who establishes the distinction between "what we read" and "what we say," who grants his permission according to his view of "what we are able to say," who determines the proper sphere of particular usages, and who above all issues warnings. Second, there are the consequences that follow when that authority is blended with the prescriptive purposes of the commentary: Servius' manufacture of the language for his students' benefit tends to result in observations on Virgil's language which can sound absurd to the modern ear, attuned as it is solely to the commentary's exegetic function. Neither tendency can be separated completely from the other, but the effects of the second are more easily seen in individual notes. We shall therefore examine this second tendency, in order to identify a few of the strategies used by Servius in his instruction, before returning to consider the implications of the first.

We must accustom ourselves to listening to Servius with the ear of his students, when he says, for example:

10. 526 PENITVS DEFOSSA TALENTA . . . sane melius [i.e., rectius] "infossa" diceret quam "defossa," ad quod est metri necessitate conpulsus. . . .

or:

11. 468 ILICET "confestim," "ilio": quod ne diceret, metri necessitas fecit; nam "ilio" dicimus.

These and other notes which invoke the "necessity" or "compulsion" of meter (and anyone at all familiar with the commentary knows how common they are) were not intended to be, and would not have been understood to be, purely or even primarily exegetic. That is to say, they are not earnest but grotesquely inadequate attempts to judge or explain Virgil's own technique; rather, the force of these observations is directed almost entirely at the student, telling him what he should, or should not, do: that the words are Virgil's is virtually incidental. Freely paraphrased, these lessons would be understood to mean something like this: "Don't get it into your head that you should do what Virgil has done here; your usage should be such only when all other options have been closed." The text serves as an instrument, the author as "dummy," both shaped and manipulated to meet Servius' purpose. The manipulation appears over a wide range of rhetorical ploys. A similar, and again essentially negative, tactic involves the use of the phrase debuit dicere, for example:

1. 16 HIC ILLIVS ARMA figura creberrima adverbium pro adverbio posuit, praesentis loci pro absentis; debuit enim dicere "ilio."

25. "What we read" vs. "what we say": e.g., 2. 487, 3. 278, 7. 605. possumus uii / licenter utimur / pro nostro arbitrio utimur: e.g., 1. 47, 96, 159, 177, 194, 343, 430, 451, 484, 2. 610. Sphere of usage: cf. 1. 251, 2. 18, 6. 79, 10. 481. Warnings: cf. 2. 513 "VETERUM USURPatum est ergo, ut supra diximus, hoc tantum uii si necesse sit licet," with 1. 253 "HONOS cum secundum artem [i.e., naturam] dicamus 'honor', 'arbore', 'loper', plerumque poetae 'r' in 's' mutant causa metri . . . hoc quidem habet ratio; sed ecce in hoc loco etiam sine metri necessitate 'honos' dixit. item Sallustius paene ubique 'labos' posuit, quem nulla necessitas coegit. melius tamen est servire regulum [i.e., naturae]."

26. Cf. 2. 513 and 1. 253, cited in the preceding note; 1. 118 (obseruavit diligentius custodiri debet vs. auctores plerumque corrumpunt); and esp. 1. 3, p. 232 below.
Again, *debuit dicere* is directed at the student more than at the text. Servius is not quite literally contending, at 1. 16, that Virgil "should have said" *ille*, but is making plain to his student what *he* should use: what is at stake is not so much a fault worthy of criticism or demanding correction in Virgil (*figura* provides the necessary protection against that), but a deviant usage which the student should avoid. Similarly, *ausus est* at 9. 467 is not really meant to describe Virgil's action, for his "daring" is, after all, immediately undercut by the explanation given, that his words reflect the usage current *apud maiores*, of whom he is one; rather, *ausus est* is directed at the student, to impress upon him what should be regarded, and so avoided, as "bold." *Debuit dicere*, the phrase of negative instruction by example, has the effective meaning in the commentary of *debemus dicere*. Such notes have twin results: they appear to place the author *in statu pupillari* so that the lesson might be driven home through the use of the third person singular, while they segregate his usage from that being taught by Servius.

In these examples, prescription proceeds obliquely, but nonetheless apparently, through the use of the third person singular, as Servius plays his own views off against the text. But prescription is at work in another aspect of Servius' style, one which is not at all apparent on the surface of his language but wholly implied in his role. It is a nuance which again requires that Servius be heard with the ear of his pupils, and which, not incidentally, adds to the difficulty of teasing apart the strands of *natura*, *ausus*, and *auctoritas* in Servius' weave. We might look again at the notes at 1. 4 (the last sentence) and 1. 26:

1. 4 de his autem haec tantum quae lecta sunt ponimus nec ad eorum exemplum alia formamus.

27. It is clear, however, that *debuit dicere* could readily be construed as an adverse criticism of the author: cf. especially August. *Contra Faustum* 22. 25, quoted below n. 75, and note the scholia in Servius and DServ. at 1. 273: while Servius offers "GENTE SVB HECTOREA id est 'Troiana'. sed debuit dicere 'Aeneia', diximus superius [1. 235] nomina poetas ex vicino usurpare" (where the deviation from what "should have" been said is explained/defended as a poetic usage), the same idea appears in DServ. as: "GENTE SVB HECTOREA id est 'Troiana'. sed quidam reprehendunt quod 'Hectorea' et non 'Aeneia'. mos est poetis nomina ex vicinis usurpare. . . ." where "quidam reprehendunt" is probably a generalizing inference drawn from Servius himself by the compiler of DServ. (the last clause certainly appears to be no more than a finicky rewriting of Servius typical of the compiler). *Debuit dicere* seems to be located, like *figura* itself, in a gray area: although the practical—i.e., monitory—purpose of the phrase clearly dominates in its numerous appearances in the commentary, it would plainly be wrong to deny out of hand that *debuit dicere* carries a connotation of criticism of Virgil himself.

28. Cf. 2. 610 (concerning a point of usage similar to that in 9. 467), where each of the three elements of Servius' statement, "debuit dicere, sed novitatem addictavit, nulla cogente necessitate," is intended as a warning for his pupils, and not as an "objective" interpretation or evaluation of the verse.

29. Cf. the language of 1. 319, cited in n. 23, "facere non debemus" (with reference to a *Graeca figura*).
and:

1. 26 [sermones] qui pathos habent ita ut lecti sunt debent poni . . . integris autem et ipsis utimur et eorum exemplo alios.

As was noted, the readings of the manuscripts of Servius at 1. 4, ponimus and formamus, are accepted here, against posita sunt and formata, the readings of DServ. imposed on Servius by the Harvard editors. The reason for following the manuscripts of Servius is very simple: they bear witness to a constant feature of Servius' language, the use of the first person plural indicative in a sense that is not simply descriptive, but prescriptive. That is, ponimus, unless otherwise qualified, would tend to mean ponere debemus, formamus to mean formare debemus, utimur to mean uti debemus: compare the parallel uses of the verbs at 1. 4 and 1. 26, ponimus . . . formamus :: debent poni . . . utimur. This thoroughly natural overture is apparent as soon as one listens to Servius as a teacher of his native language and not simply a (descriptive, objective) commentator in the modern vein. The nuance occurs throughout the commentary, including some of the notes already cited; it is found most clearly, perhaps, in one of Servius' more striking pieces of instruction:


Here, as Servius stresses what is "natural," the meaning of dicimus slides entirely into the realm of what should be, leaving simple description behind.

Beyond demonstrating the readiness with which description is subordinated to prescription, this last example deserves special attention for another, related feature, the nonchalance with which Servius identifies a palpable archaism (ipsus) with what "we (ought to) say." In fact, both dicimus and naturale implicitly deny that ipsus is an archaism at all. Rhetorically, as a means of guaranteeing the lesson to be taught, naturae plays the more important role. In terms of the diagram above, naturae places ipsus below the line of figurae, so that it is ranged squarely with the grammarian in his institutional niche. That niche, shared by the gram-
marian and *natura*, can be a highly idiosyncratic place, in large part because the concept of *natura* is not without eccentricities of its own. On the one hand, the *natura* of the language can not be defined in historical terms in any simple and straightforward sense. Despite the fact, for example, that *ussus* is regarded more often than not as a corrupting influence, it is certainly not true that the earlier examples of the language are simply regarded as revealing the language in its "purer" or more "natural" state. On the other hand, the *natura* of the language is not timeless, an abstraction which somehow stands outside of history, for it is capable of being affected by time: not only can *natura* be "corrupted,"34 and not only can *ussus* change the "nature" of certain parts of speech,35 but Servius' treatment of archaism itself implies at times that the "nature" of the language, as it was known to the ancients, overlaps only partially with that of his own language. When this shift is imagined as having occurred, or whether it has ceased to occur, is not quite made clear, although, as we shall see, the agent of the change would appear to be the grammarian himself. The points to be emphasized at this moment, however, are these: (1) to the extent that *natura* inheres in the institution, in the form of rules (*regulae*, the institutional guarantee of what is *rectum*), it provides the grammarian with a relatively stable place to stand; and (2) like *figurae*, archaisms, where they are noted, implicitly involve usages which not only contradict the lesson Servius wishes to teach but run "against nature." In our attempt to gauge Servius' sense of his own authority, therefore, it is important to understand what Servius has in mind when he deals with "archaism," in the opposition of *antiqui* and *nos*.

It is evident that when Servius identifies one of Virgil's usages as *antiquum*, an archaism, he does not mean that it is an archaism relative to Virgil's time (although it may be that as well), but that it is perceived as obsolete when tested against his own complex sense of current usage. Virgil himself was one of the *antiqui* (*maiores, veteres*), grouped as such, by the levelling characteristic of ancient scholarship, with the classical and pre-classical authors: although Servius was aware of the chronological relationships among the various literary figures, the distinction drawn today between "archaic" and "classical" usage was not a functional distinction in his work.36 Further, a necessary corollary derives from this repeated testing of Virgil's language for the obsolete: as in the identification of *figurae*, the identification of what is *antique dictum* has a prescriptive purpose. In fact, the basic relationship between the functions of *figurae* and archaism in the commentary can be stated fairly simply: as the demarcation

34. Cf. the note at 2. 195, p. 223.
35. Cf. the comments at 5. 603, in n. 22.
36. Awareness of the consequences of this fact has been slow in its diffusion, cf. Williams, "Servius, Commentator and Guide," p. 53. Both the importance of understanding that "archaic," in a grammarian's comment, means "archaic" relative to his own time and perception, and the imprudence of accepting such distinctions at face value, are well discussed in a long note by W. Lebek, *Verba Prisco: Die Anfänge des Archaiersens in der lateinischen Beredsamkeit und Geschichtsschreibung* (Göttingen, 1970), p. 18, n. 22.
of *figurae* is an attempt to deal with deviant usage in synchronic terms, applying the standards of normal usage to the author as though he were a contemporary, so the attempt to treat the language historically is an attempt to isolate such deviations in diachronic terms; whereas the synchronic approach tends, in one of its aspects, to place the poet in *status pupillari*, so that a barrier between his usage and that of the student might more readily be established, the diachronic approach aims at the same effect through the construction of a temporal barrier.

Since the functions of the two approaches are so similar, we should expect them to be expressed in very similar language. In fact, the associations that form in Servius' mind, as the two approaches tend to melt one into the other, can be seen in the trend of his own rhetoric of instruction. In the examples listed below, we can watch Servius' thought pass from the synchronic to the diachronic, with an intermediary blending of the two, from figurative use versus what "he should have said," through figurative use versus what "*we now* (ought to) say," to archaism versus what "*we now* (ought to) say" (the examples also further illustrate the interchangeability of *debut dicere* and the prescriptive indicative, *dicimus*):

1. 16  *figura* . . . *nam debut dicere* . . .
2. 435  *figurate dixit* . . . *nam dicimus* . . .
3. 73  *figura* . . . *nam modo dicimus* . . .
4. 544  *antique dictum* . . . *nam nunc dicimus, nec iungimus* . . .
6. 507  *archaismos* . . . *debut enim dicere* . . .

The instability of the distinction is demonstrated by the progression of the notes in general, and is especially evident in the last two. At 9. 467 (as we saw above) *debut dicere* and *ausus est* look to the present and are intended to have their impact on the student, while the explanation (*qua* . . . *dicebatur*) looks to the past and effectively segregates Virgil's usage at the same time that it negates any suggestion that he was, in reality, "bold": his usage, a function of his being one of the *maiores*, only appears bold when measured against the current state of the language. In the case of 10. 807 ("*dum pluit in terris, ut possint sole reducto / exercere diem*"), the operation is even more striking:

DVM PLVIT hic distinguendum: nam si iunxeris "*dum pluit in terris, " erit archais-
mos; debut enim dicere "in terras." tamen scendendum est hemistichium hoc Lucretii
(6. 630) esse, quod ita ut invenit Vergilius transtulit.

Here the text is, in effect, moved into the present and punctuated as though it were the work of a contemporary, in order to arrive at what "should have" been said and avoid an "archaism."38 The inevitability of the blending

37. Cf. 1. 75 "notanda . . . figura; frequenter enim hac utitur. nam quod nos . . . dicimus, antiqui dicebant," concerning the use of the ablative for the genitive; see further pp. 230–31.
38. On the series of notes to which 10. 807 belongs, and with which it must be read to be understood fully, see further pp. 232–34 and n. 52. A similar shifting of time relationships, which creates the impression that Virgil stands at some undefined point between the present and the past, occurs more explicitly in several notes of DServ., e.g., 8. 125 "SVBEVNT LVCO . . . et hic 'subeunt'"
of the two approaches derives from the system inherited by Servius, in which the categories of auctores (associated with figurative usage) and antiqui had long since fallen together: auctoritas and antiquitas are essentially one and the same thing, and equally placed under constraint. Like the subordination of description to prescription, this fusion of auctoritas and antiquitas, of figure and archaisms, necessarily diminishes the precision of Servius' statements and the subtlety or consistency of his approach to the text. That fusion should not, however, obscure Servius’ real sense that the antiqui had used a language alien, in some fundamental ways, from his own. Three centuries earlier, Quintilian had observed, “If we compare the language of the ancients with our own, almost everything we say nowadays is a figura” (Inst. 9. 3. 1): Servius would have agreed, although he would have altered the formulation of the second half of the statement from quidquid loquimur to quidquid loquebantur. The strain produced by the change is perhaps most evident in notes which find Servius faced with a corruption in the received text. In such places we can see him struggling mightily but in vain to heave a line across the abyss: thus, at 9. 486 (“nec te tua funere mater / produxi”, as printed by Mynors, with the emendation of P. Bembo), he attempts the following:


The first sentence here offers a wholly fictive explanation, the second introduces an irrelevancy, and the third simply restates the first by way of conclusion. Most often, however, Servius’ command of natura and his awareness of its changes provide the necessary bridge. Consider, for example, his note on the difficult bit of phrasing at 11. 149 (“feretro Pallante reposto / proculbit super”):

FERETRO PALLANTE REPOSTO posito Pallantis feretro: nam antiptosis est.

Servius’ explanation, with its recourse to antiptosis, is evidently wide of the mark. The reason for the error, however, is capable of being misunderstood. Perhaps naturally, the modern reader reacts by assuming that the technical term is used “as a joker card” to circumvent the problem, and that “the ablative for Servius has the meaning of the possessive genitive.”

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41 iuxta veteres dativo iunxit, cum alibi iuxta usum praesentem accusativo iunxerit” (cf. DServ. at 4. 598, 8. 363, 10. 793, to the same effect). This type of note, which speaks of Virgil as acting variously iuxta veteres and iuxta usum praesentem (or the like), can be found elsewhere in DServ. at 9. 26 (to be read with Servius at 1. 14) and 9. 641; such a collocation of phrases never occurs in Servius.

39. The major exceptions to this statement are the neoterici, the post-Virgilian (i.e., “Silver Latin”) authors, especially Lucan, Juvenal, and Statius; their status as exceptions caused Servius some difficulty in his treatment of them; see my discussion, “Servius and Idemae Auctores,” pp. 181–209.

40. For variable treatment of the same usage, now in synchronic, now in diachronic terms, compare Servius’ remarks at 3. 359 with those at 12. 519; similarly, 8. 168 (on the use of bina) in conjunction with the notes at 1. 93 and 1. 313.

Servius' own thoughts, however, move in precisely the opposite direction: Servius is certain of the nature and function of the ablative and genitive in his own language, and is also certain that the nature and function of those cases in the language of Virgil and the antiqui amount to something very different. It is Virgil for whom the ablative had the meaning of the genitive, as Servius well knew:

1. 75 PVLCHRA PROLE . . . notanda tamen figura: frequenter enim hac utitur. nam quod nos per genetivum singularum dicimus, antiqui per septimum dicebant, ut hoc loco "parentem pulchrae prole," id est, "pulchrae prolis."

The belief is hardly unique to Servius, and could only be reinforced by Virgil's repeated practice. That the manipulations of Virgil could, in a sense, appear more odd at a distance of four hundred years than they do at a distance of two thousand—quite as odd as the "archaic" usage (in our sense) of Ennius—is a quirk of language and history not always fully appreciated. Thus Bentley, observing Servius' note at 10. 710 ("PASTVS pro 'pastum'. nam supra ait 'quem': ergo antiptosis est"), reacted with characteristic vigor to what he perceived to be a grammarian's sleight of hand: "What the hell is that antiptosis?" Both Servius and Bentley were attempting to deal with a passage where, again, the received text was corrupt, 10. 708–10:

... aper, multos Vesulus quem pinifer annos
defendid multosque palus Laurentia silva
pastus harundinea.

True to himself, and to the sense of his own independence and authority, Bentley emended pastus to pascit or pavit (the former is printed by Mynors). Servius, also true to himself, interpreted the passage according to his own sense of the language and its changes, relying on an inference drawn from other passages where Virgil does use the nominative "in place of" the accusative. Bentley here was right, Servius wrong. But we should clearly understand that in such cases Servius is using the technical terms, not as a means of concealing his difficulties, but as a means of acknowledging the

42. With Servius' interpretation of 11. 149, cf. the alternative explanation of 2. 554–55 ("hic exitus illum / sorte tulit") noted by DServ.: "quidam 'exitus sorte' pro 'sortis' tradunt, ablativum pro genetivo." Regarding the implicit recognition of archaic practice present in claims of antiptosis, see especially Book 9 of Nonius Marcellus, "de numeris et casibus," which is wholly concerned with instances of antiptosis and which presents very vividly the distance between the language of the antiqui and the perceptions of late antiquity.

43. "quae, malum, illa antiptosis?" in his comment at Hor. Epod. 5. 28.

44. See DServ. on 2. 377 delapsus, and the grammatica Vergiliana attributed to Asper (in G. Thilo and H. Hagen, Servii Grammatici . . . Commentarii, vol. 3 [Leipzig, 1902], p. 534) on 1. 314 obvia; cf. also Servius at 11. 775 cassida, for the accusative used "in place of" the nominative, where, on a literal, morphological level, his description of Virgil's neologism is not far wrong.

45. It is worth noting, however, that Servius is not more wrong, only more obviously wrong, than the large majority of modern editors, who deal with the problem by punctuating after Laurentia, thereby producing for pastus a variety of colon whose disposition in the hexameter is thoroughly foreign to Virgil's practice (as Bentley himself was later to show, in his comment on Lucan 1. 231); see also G. B. Tonnend's valuable paper, "Some Problems of Punctuation in the Latin Hexameter," CQ 19 (1969): 330–44 (for Virgil, esp. pp. 339–43; although 10. 708–10 is not included among Tonnend's examples, his remarks are relevant to it).
points of discontinuity that exist between the Latin of Virgil and the *antiqui* and his own. The technical term is simply the economical instrument provided the grammarian by his profession. Its meaning is condensed, its function in the commentary both expressive and effective: it simultaneously reveals to and impresses upon the student the distances, temporal and linguistic, that separate him from Virgil. Offering a guarantee which carries the weight of Servius’ institutional authority, the technical term both conveys and enforces the lesson to be learned.

The examples offered in the last paragraph are extreme cases, insofar as they find Servius at or near the point of helplessness, and show his method, when measured against modern expectations, at its worst. But the extreme cases only highlight the normal practice. Both Servius’ own limited historical perspective and his largely prescriptive concerns tend to anchor him in the present moment, the *nunc*, of his teaching. His purpose is to anchor the student in the same, rather strange, slice of time. So one finds early in the commentary the following note, of a very common type and transparent in its intentions:

1. 3 MVLTVM ILLE . . . et “ille” hoc loco abundat; est enim interposita particula propter metri necessitatem, ut stet versus; nam si detrahás “ille,” stat sensus . . . est autem archaismos.

This comment, with, for example, 5. 540 “PRIMVM ANTE OMNES unum vacat,” or 5. 833 “PRINCEPS ANTE OMNES unum vacat,” should be understood to be aimed implicitly at the tendency of the common language to add “unnecessary” words or use synonymous pairs for the purpose of intensification. The note, with its concluding sentence, is meant to suggest, “This sort of excess baggage (*abundat*) is obsolete: that is not the way we (ought to) speak or write nowadays”; and it is with the message of this note in mind that one must read, as Servius’ students would hear, the long series of notes of the *abundat*- or *vacat*-type that follows.

It is the purpose and net effect of such notes to place the *auctores* and their unwanted usage firmly in the past:


46. For the text used as an instrument to undermine “bad habits” of common speech, see n. 23 on *omnis* and *lotus*, and below, p. 232. On pleonastic intensification, see Löfsted, *Late Latin*, pp. 21–24.

47. With 1. 3 compare 1. 12 “TYRII TENERVE COLONI deest ‘quam’,” with generalization concerning what *amant antiqui diere* vs. *nos exprimimus*: the purpose of the generalization, the enforcement of the proper use of the relative pronoun, is clear (cf. the large number of other notes of the *deest*-type, the complement of the *vacat*-type). With the inclusion of the phrase *propter metri necessitatem* at 1. 3, cf. the remarks above, p. 225, and the scholiast at 1. 5, cited in n. 18.
The note deals with the coordination of prepositions with the case system, and is cast, in effect, in the form of a *quaestio* ("Why does this appear to be a solecism?") to which two solutions are offered. The second is specific, seeking to explain that the ablative is correct by current standards because no change of place occurs. The first is general and more interesting, the *antiqua licentia*: the standard that today would mark the usage as a solecism does not apply to the *antiqui*, whose language did not operate according to the same distinctions that we draw in the use of *communes praepositiones*. The note, which has as a variant the type found at 9. 467, is meant to fix the distinction in the minds of Servius' students, even as it exempts the *antiqui* by drawing a line between past and present. Yet the blurring of distinctions in this matter—and above all the haphazard use of *in* with the ablative and accusative—was much more a characteristic of late Latin than of the ancients. Once more the undesirable practice of common speech is put off on the *antiqui*; and to provide reinforcement, a series of scholia proceeds from this note, reminding the student that the lack of proper distinction belongs to the past, is "obsolete," *archaismos*.

Servius' didacticism makes his observations unreliable, and sometimes bizarre, but not disingenuous. The distinction needs to be emphasized, not only for a fair reading of Servius, but, more importantly, because of the reasons that underlie it. When a usage is explained as arising *metri necessitate*, when Servius suggests what Virgil *debuit dicere*, when he comments on what "we say," when he distinguishes what "we say now" from "archaism," the text of Virgil and the state of the language more generally are subordinated to Servius' sense of his own function and authority. From real objects capable of being explained or described in historical terms, text and language become ciphers, assigned whatever validity or significance Servius chooses. The choice is the result of a complex and subjective process, but is not a matter of raw and conscious manipulation. The choice is expressed impersonally, through appeals to *natura* and the use of technical terms, the guarantees provided by his institutional niche; but Servius not only accepts those guarantees, and the authority they provide, as useful tools, he absorbs them into his personality. Servius believes what he says—about Virgil, the *antiqui*, the language, and *nos*—because he simply cannot believe otherwise: he is an example of a man who has been fused completely with the institution he represents. That the impersonal guarantees, func-

48. Cf. Servius at 2. 401 (cited in his comment), as well as 5. 332, 6. 51, or 10. 305.
49. The lesson is expanded at 1. 295, where one finds the assertion that the *natura* of certain *communes praepositiones* has changed with time; for the phrase *antiqua licentia*, see also 1. 253 (on the phrase "in sceptra reponis") and 6. 203 ("super arbores").
50. 9. 467 "debuit dicere...ideo ausus est...quia...apud maiores...dicebatur"; see pp. 225–27 and 229–30 above.
tion, and authority have all been thoroughly internalized is evident when we find the workings of Servius’ mind displayed unconsciously, by way of projection: Servius most clearly reveals himself when he explains the actions and motivations of someone else. Three examples will both illustrate this last statement and draw together several of the matters treated above: the use of the text as “dummy,” the nuance of the prescriptive indicative, and Servius’ conception of his own status.

The first example is quite straightforward:

8. 435 TVRBATAE pro “turbantis”: nam timuit homoeteleuton et fecit supinam significacionem.

The note combines the exegetical function of the commentary (it explains, and justifies, Virgil’s use of the wrong participle) with the prescriptive, and is thus a variation on the metri causa- or debuit dicere-type: whereas the latter is essentially negative, obliquely warning the student against a given usage, the comment at 8. 435 is largely positive. Servius projects his own values and concerns onto Virgil, in order to inculcate the lesson in his students by attributing a certain kind of behavior to the poet: as Servius was, and as he would have his students be, so Virgil “was afraid of homoeteleuton” (i.e., the collocation turbantis Palladis), because homoeteleuton represents a vitiosa elocutio, a “flawed form of expression,” to be avoided in polished speech or writing. This instance of projection does not require much comment in itself, but should be compared with our second example, where the same tendency is present in more interesting if less obvious form. The scholium involves the normative aspect of dicimus; and the person who functions this time as the medium of Servius’ message is not Virgil, but Valerius Probus:

10. 444 AEQVORE IVSSO (1) pro “ipsi iussi.” (2) et est usurpatum participium.

nam “iubeor” non dicimus unde potest venire “iussus.” (3) sic hic participium usurpavit, ut Horatius verbum, dicens [Epist. 1. 5. 21] “haec ego procurare et idoneus imperor et non invitus.” (4) ergo satis licenter dictum est, adeo ut huic loco Probus [hic corruptum] alogum adposuerit.

The didactic intent of the note concerns the form iubeor, and could be paraphrased along the following lines: “We do not (ought not to) use ‘iubeor’, or forms derived from it. Look: Virgil did, and his use is so odd that Probus even marked the passage as questionable.” The point is that Probus

53. For criticism of homoeteleuton as a vitiosa elocutio, see the notes at 4. 504, 9. 49, 9. 606; with the function of the phrase timuit homoeteleuton at 8. 435, cf. 3. 663 (“propter homoeteleuton noluit dicere”), 10. 571 (the same), 11. 464 (“vitavit διαμορκέλευτον”), 12. 5 (on the avoidance of homoeteleuton and apparent solecism), 12. 781 (“vitavit propter διαμορκέλευτον”).

54. The text given is that of Thilo, who seems to have made the best of the general corruption in his MSS by treating the phrase hic corruptum (appearing only in M of the MSS which he used) as an interpolated note originally intended to describe the state of Servius’ text itself, where the nonsensical a. longam (in M, a longam or ad longam in the other MSS) occurs instead of alogum, an emendation of Burmann; alternatively (if less likely), hic corruptum could have found its way into the text at an earlier stage, as a gloss on the original reading, alogum.

55. On the alogus, see Isid. Orig. 1. 20. 27: “alogus nota quae ad mendas adhibetur”; the alogus is listed among the critical signs, but is not glossed, in the Anecdoton Parisinum (GL 7. 533–36).
is very likely to have done nothing of the sort. This is not to say that Servius invented Probus' annotation, but that Probus' concern and Servius' concern were probably not as congruent as Servius, in the urgency of making his point, came to suggest: while Servius reacts to the question of grammar, Probus was probably reacting to the meaning (the figure of thought), the transferred epithet involved in the use of acquære iüsso in place of socii . . . iüssi. 56 This suggestion is supportable on at least four counts. First, the gloss that begins Servius' own note points in the direction of thought rather than form. Second, this particular figure of thought appears to have been featured prominently in collections of such passages: in fact, it stands near the head of the list of expressions allegedly coined by Virgil, in the enthusiastic recitation of Macrobius' Servius (Sat. 6. 6. 3), where again it is the transference of the epithet that is noted. Third, and in marked contrast to the foregoing, there is the singularity of Servius' own teaching. Servius' statement regarding iubeor (and so iussus) is, I believe, unique among the grammarians, although his citation of Horace's use of imperor shows his train of thought clearly enough. 57 Iubeor is proscribed on the principle that a verb which governs the dative in the active voice (e.g., impero tibi, invideo tibi, obicio tibi; cf. Diom. GL 1. 399. 13–32 for the fullest account) should be given an impersonal construction to express the idea of the passive (i.e., imperatur mihi, not imperor). Since iubo came to be used with the dative under the influence of impero, it should also be governed (Servius reasons) by the same rule—iubetur mihi, not iubeor (a bit strict, but certainly unexceptional Latin): the prohibition of iussus is a further, less than thoughtful extension of the regularization. But that leads to the fourth consideration: the attempt at regularization that inspired the remarks at 10. 444 is very unlikely to have appealed to Probus. 58 In line with his taste for the unfashionable authors, Probus' views ran in the direction of anomaly: his opinion concerning "finitiones illas praerandicas et fetutinas grammaticas" is on record (Gell. NA 13. 21. 1) and is in accord with Suetonius' portrait of the man, himself something of an anomaly in the world of the grammatici, with interests and practices which deviated from the norm (Gram. 24). It would seem virtually certain that the "licence" that

56. This point was realized already by O. Ribbeck, Prolegomena Critica ad P. Vergili Maronis Opera Maiora (Leipzig, 1866), p. 151, but his prior assumptions regarding Servius' learning (assumptions derived from Macrobius) made him unwilling to believe that Servius himself could have been concerned with the morphological point: he therefore regarded the note as an interpolation; a similar conclusion was reached, for slightly different reasons, by H. Georgii, Die antike Äneiskritik . . . (Stuttgart, 1891), pp. 454–55. Cf. also N. Scivoloet, "La 'filologia' di Valerio Probo," GIF 12 (1959): 117.

57. With Servius on inbeor, cf. ps.-Acro at Hor. Art P. 56: "mire, dum de fingendis verbis loquitur, secundum Graecos ipse finxit 'invidore', 'invidiorem', id est, 'invidiam patior': nam 'invidiorem' negatur posse dici," with the note at Epist. 1. 5. 21 (cited by Servius): "'imperor' finxit ex Graeco σελέομαι, ut in arte poetica 'invidior' (δύνουμαι)."

58. Although J. Alstermann (De M. Valerio Probo Bertyio [Bonn, 1910], p. 11) connects the scholium at 10. 444 (= frag. 36 = frag. 98) with the view attributed to "Probus" in cod. Paris. lat. 7491 f.92 (= GL 4, p. xxiii = frag. 97: "item scieindum est quod ipsa declinatio impersonalis quae in 'tur' exit, a neutralibus, ut ait Probus, figuratur, quia ipsa neutra passivum ex se non faciunt"), the latter probably does not go back to Valerius Probus, but represents an inference drawn from Probus Inst. art. (GL 4. 156. 33–157. 3) on verba neutria.
disturbed Probus was contained in the *idea*, the "nonsensical" (ἄλογος) collocation of *aequor* and *iussum* ("the hidden field"). Servius on the other hand seized upon the grammatical form: finding in one of his sources a reference (probably vague) to Probus' annotation, Servius instinctively assumed that their concerns were identical, and saw a support for his own, rather idiosyncratic position on the question of what "we say." Servius' treatment of his scholarly predecessor is precisely the same as his treatment of Virgil himself.

Servius' capacity for misunderstanding or misrepresenting his sources has been remarked before, although not for the reason involved here. The note at 10. 444 takes us beyond casual manifestations of carelessness or animus to a distortion which, like the nuance of *dicimus* itself, is built-in and automatic, conditioned by Servius' role and status. The distortion is virtually the product of reflex: as such, it brings us very close to the center of Servius' identity. We can perhaps take the last step by looking at our third example, another instance of projection, which seems to define precisely Servius' view of his own status:

4. 9 INSOMNIA TERRENT (1) et "terret" et "terrent" legitur. (2) sed si "terret" legerimus, "insomnia" erit vigilia; hoc enim maiores inter vigilias et ea quae videmus in somnis interesse voluerunt, ut "insomnia" generis feminini numeri singularis vigilia significaret, "insomnia" vero generis neutri numeri pluralis ea quae per somnum videmus. . . . (3) scientiam igitur quia, si "terret" dixerimus, antiqua erit elocutio; "insomnia" enim, licet et Pacuvius et Ennius frequenter dixerit, Plinius tamen exclusit et de usu removit. . . .

Servius' note, a discussion of a variant reading, is set squarely in the midst of one of the minor bogs of Latin lexicography, the distinction between the feminine singular *insomnia* ("sleeplessness") and the neuter plural *insomnia* ("[disturbing] dreams"). It is not, however, the latter point which is of main interest here, but the final clauses of Servius' note quoted above. That portion of the note ultimately derives from the elder Pliny's *Dubii sermonis libri VIII*, and is adduced by Servius in order to inform his students that the feminine singular *insomnia* (with *terrel*) would involve an "archaic form of expression," an *antiqua elocutio*. The precise moment that the usage

59. The Homeric scholia, where ἄλογος is, to my knowledge, never used for purely morphological matters, are helpful here: with the question of *iusso* vs. *iussi* at 10. 444, cf. schol. A at II. 18. 198, on ἀδέων vs. ἀδές, and the criterion of ὁκ ἄλογος: "ἀδέος: παρὰ Ζωνδώτου καὶ Ἀριστοφάνει διὰ τοῦ, ἀδέος, ἔν ἀδέος χωρὶς ἐπλούς. καὶ λόγοι ἔχει χαριστὰ, καὶ ὁκ ἄλογος ἐστὶν ἡ γραφή.

60. See the remarks of Goold, "Servius and the Helen Epistle," pp. 334–40 (concerned mostly with pure blunders), and cf. the discussion by J. E. G. Zetzel, *Latin Textual Criticism in Antiquity* (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972), pp. 113–14, of Servius' notes at 3. 535 and 3. 636 (a malicious distortion of Donatus?).

passed into the realm of the obsolete is pinpointed, in Servius’ understanding, by the magisterial act of Pliny—"exclusit et de usu removit." The statement and the idea behind it are intriguing: why, and, more to the point, how did Pliny deal with the word so that it was “excluded and removed from use”? How did he express himself? We do not know, and there is room for various conjectures concerning the reason for the distinction: K. Barwick, for example, thought that the statement represented Pliny’s preference for ratio (analog) over vetustas. It may be, however, that Pliny’s differentiation of the two “ambiguous” forms, one (the feminine) singulare tantum, the other (the neuter) plurale tantum, was intended primarily to emphasize the distinction in meaning (the center of attention in Servius and the other grammarians as well), and was grounded in his sense of usus (con- suetudo, current usage) set against vetustas. In other words, Pliny was probably attempting to do no more than clarify a situation which already existed: in the literary language, the feminine singular was an archaism well before Pliny’s day, occurring only in the older Republican poets, and thereafter in the archaizing authors of the second century, the neuter plural, on the other hand, appears to have been used regularly in the literary language of the first century (including that of Pliny himself), and to have come to enjoy even greater currency in ordinary speech: its preservation in the common usage of later Latin is attested (beyond its literary occurrences) by its reappearance in It. insogno and Sp. ensueno. If it is reasonable, then, to believe that Pliny’s remarks simply recognized and defined the status quo, we might even suggest how Servius found those remarks transmitted in one of his sources—perhaps something along the lines of the following:

62. “insomnia”...removit” is printed as frag. 13 of the Dub. serm. by A. Mazzarino, Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta, vol. 1 (Turin, 1955) (cf. the same author’s “Una nuova pagina di Plinio II Vecchio, II. Plinio e le compilazioni da Plinio,” Maia 2 [1949]: 46), and as frag. 15 in the edition of A. della Casa (Il Dubius Sermo di Plinio [Genoa, 1969]), with her commentary, pp. 210–11: the belief of Getty, “Insomnia in the Lexica,” pp. 22–23 (followed by Ussani, Insomnia, p. 80, n. 2, 82, n. 2), that Servius’ statement represents an inference drawn from Pliny’s own prose usage, is clearly impossible (Pliny was never an auctor in that sense). It should be noted that Della Casa prints insomnia (the reading of DServ., cod. F) in her edition, and may be correct: it is Servius’ normal practice to accommodate the case of a word quoted to the syntax of his sentence. Whether one reads insomnia or insomnia in Servius, however, the context leaves no question (pace Mazzarino) that Servius means anything but the feminine singular.

63. Barwick, Remius Palaemon, p. 206: his view is less than compelling, however, since there is a categorical difference between the examples he adduces in support (involving the opposition of morphological regularity and anomaly, e.g., frag. 29 Della Casa, the preference for the ablative nobiliore over the “archaic” nobiliori) and the opposition of feminine singular and neuter plural insomnia, where the applicability of analogy is far from obvious.

64. For insomnia (fem. sing.), see, in addition to the general references to Ennius and Pacuvius in Servius (collected as frag. inc. 2SV and frag. 430R², respectively), Plaut. Merc. 25, Caecilius frag. 168R² (= Non. 308. 13–14 Lind.), Ter. Eun. 219, Pacuvius frag. 9R² (= Charis. 129, 7B.); in the second century, Gellius N.A 7. 4. 4 and Marcus Aurelius (in Fronto, p. 6, line 2 Van den Hout); later in Ammianus, 19. 2. 14.


67. For the general form suggested here, cf. Servius at 9. 4: “SEDEBAT ut Asper dicit, ‘erat’, quae clausula antiqua est et de usu remota” (cf. at 1. 56), and nn. 68–70.
Plinius (or, sic Plinius, or, Plinius ait). 68 "insomnia," licet et Pacuvius et Ennius dixerit, 69 penitus tamen de usu recessit (or, exclusa est, or, remota est). 70

The precise form of the notice is not crucial; in distinguishing the usage of the antiqui, Pliny no doubt used some such phrase as *hodie non utimur*, or abolevit, or in *usu non est*, the kind of phrase which abounds in Servius. The point is this: the magisterial act—"exclusit et de usu removit"—was probably not Pliny's at all, but the product of Servius' interpretation, the act of a Pliny created by Servius in his own image, with his own prescriptive use of such phrases as *hodie non utimur* in mind. The chain of events suggested above, it is fair to say, accurately reflects both Servius' method and self-image. There is no question of who, in Servius' mind, has the final say in the life of the language: the observation of another man concerned with the language is translated by Servius, removed in time and imbued with the sense of his own authority, into an act of verbal extinction: *ipse dixit*.

IV

The grammarian experiences his control of the language as something very personal. He is, to be sure, following a professional tradition of long standing when he offers to his students a version of the "Received Standard Imperial" Latin, 71 expressed in the impersonal terms of art, *natura, regula* or the like; but as he filters that version through his own idiosyncratic preferences, choices and distinctions, the grammarian presents himself, and thinks of himself, as the maker of the *lingua aetatis suae*, superior to the claims of *auctoritas* or *antiquitas*. Those dissatisfied with the grammarian's personal control could circumvent it only by insisting upon a different, higher authority: that of God, for example, 72 or the more diffuse authority of the *maiores*. The latter is the course taken by the Servius, the "good" grammarian, of Macrobius, in the incident from the *Saturnalia* with which we began this study; and for his efforts, the grammarian there is roundly abused by the youth Avienus, as a purveyor of the obsolete. We have already emphasized the radical difference in this regard between the two Servii, the figure created by Macrobius and the man who speaks in the commentary; 73 it remains to underline one additional point. 74 When Avienus

68. The formula "Plinius: ..." is of the kind commonly used to introduce the views of an individual in, e.g., the *scholia Veronensia*; with "Plinius ait," cf. for example "inquit Plinius" at frag. 3 Della Casa (from Charisius, presented as a direct quotation). "Plinius ita expressit" at frag. 9 Della Casa (from Pompeius, also a direct quotation), and see n. 10 above.

69. Or "frequenter dixerit": to whom this obvious generalization is owed must be uncertain.

70. Cf. Servius himself at, e.g., 7. 626, or 12. 298 ("TORREM erit nominativus 'hic torris', et ita nunc dicimus: nam illud Ennii et Pacuvii penitus de usu recessit").

71. The phrase is Löfstedt's, *Late Latin*, p. 48.


73. See above, pp. 218–21.

74. For more detailed discussion of the points made concerning the *Saturnalia* in this and the following paragraphs, see Kaster, "Macrobius and Servius."
demands that the participants in the symposium use *praesentia verba*, the *aetatis suae verba* (*Sat. I. 5. 1–2*), he is demanding, in effect, that they speak “natural,” “regular” Latin, the sort of Latin covered by the *nunc dicimus* of the commentary.\(^{75}\) In other words, despite the conflict between youth and teacher imagined by Macrobius, Avienus speaks much more in the manner we would expect of a student of the real Servius than an opponent: were he not meant to prove himself a basically decent sort, it would be easy to imagine his behaving like the grammarian’s pupils who delight in pointing out what Virgil *debuit dicere*.\(^{76}\) Avienus’ rudeness in his clash with Servius is part of his characterization, and a prelude to the education he receives in the course of the symposium: beginning as an *adulescens* in blinders, his sight fixed only on the present and a narrow range of knowledge, Avienus gradually extends his vision to an appreciation of the past and of diverse branches of knowledge. But that Avienus should speak as he does at the outset is appropriate in another respect: his initial limitations are precisely comparable to those of the *plebeia grammaticorum cohors* (*Sat. I. 24. 8*), whose limited knowledge and narrow concern with the language alone are repeatedly criticized by Macrobius. In the *Saturnalia*, the members of that *cohors* are despised for shutting themselves off, as though in a box sealed by ignorance of and lack of concern for the roots of their culture, while the “good” grammarian treats the language as an open channel of communication between past and present. But the Servius of the commentary constricts that channel and personally guards all approaches to it. He is in fact just another member of the *cohors*; and he uses the sealed box—his institutional niche—as his position of strength.

A further line of inquiry suggested by this paper may be indicated. It seems that the differences noted above between the real and fictional Servius are not to be explained simply by falling back on traditional categories such as “modernist” (or “rationalist”) versus “archaist,” or “analogist” versus “anomalist.” Beyond the general consideration that such designations stop short of true explanation, there is the fact that in these particular cases the labels do not adequately cover what they set out to

\(^{75}\) In addition to the remarks above, see the revealing comment of Porphryrio on Horace *Ars P.* 70–71: “cadentque / quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus: hoc est, ratio loquendi. [usus] nihil enim aliud est quam regula sermonis Latinii‖ (usus in the note was correctly deleted by Petschenig; the whole scholiast is clearly a comment on usus in Horace’s verse); see also ps.-Acro ad loc. and Brink’s valuable note.

\(^{76}\) Thus the *pueri* scorned by St. Augustine, *Contra Faust*, 22. 25 (*PL* 42. 417) (the comparison is with those who find fault with the prophets): “similes sunt, qui in magnis ista reprehendunt, puere inepitis in schola, qui cum pro magno didicerint nomini numeri singularis verbum numeri singularis esse reddendum, *reprehendunt Latinae linguae docetissimum auctorem*, quia dixit 1. 212 pars in frusta secant. *debuit enim, iniquiunt, dicere ‘secat.’*” On *debuit dicere* understood as a criticism, see n. 27. Since we know at least one *grammaticus* from whom the *pueri* would readily have acquired this obnoxious habit, we can wonder to what extent Augustine actually does speak here in the spirit of an "old grammarian" (so H. Hagendahl, *Augustine and the Latin Classics*, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia, 21 [1967], pp. 424–25, who discusses this passage with a number of others illustrative of Augustine’s reliance on the *auctoritas* of Virgil); in fact, this passage tends to suggest (and the other passages collected by Hagendahl tend to corroborate the suggestion) that Augustine’s regard for the definitive power of Virgil’s linguistic authority (even after the authority of the *mundani auctores* on matters of substance had been renounced) rather exceeded that of a typical member of the profession.
describe. They are applicable in part, but only in part: one must paint with very broad strokes to apply the terms "modern" (or "rational") to Servius, and with even broader strokes to present Macrobius as an archaist. For similar reasons one should avoid calling Servius' position "analogist." The designation is less than wholly satisfactory, because it begs the question, analogy with what? If analogy is a way of testing the uncertain against the certain, one evidently must first determine what is certain: here, although both the Servius of the *Saturnalia* (i.e., Macrobius) and the Servius of the commentary have recourse to analogy, they move in very different directions in their application of that test, because the criteria of certainty—"soundness," *integritas*—and the attitude toward authority are different in each case. To deal precisely with this situation, we need a means of analysis that is more general and more flexible than, yet able to take account of, the conventional categories.

Since the crux seems to be the matter of authority—where it lies, whence it derives, what form it takes, who has access to it—it might be useful to think in terms of focused versus diffused authority, and the different institutional forms to which different forms of authority might attach themselves. So, for example, the differentiated institution of the grammarians' school has the function and effect of focusing authority in an individual. There is a specific and well-defined task; the task is carried out by appeal to a relatively small number of criteria which are expressly designated as the repository of certainty; and access to that certainty is strictly controlled by the grammarian himself, who establishes the boundaries and manipulates the criteria on an ad hoc basis, giving greater weight now to one and now to another, through the authority vested in him. Thus, the identification of *natura* with the grammarian's own niche, the defense of *natura* against the corrupting influences of *usus* and *auctoritas*, as well as the shifts of *natura* itself which the grammarian is able to identify in his teaching, all express the focusing of authority in the precise person of the grammarian. On the other hand, one can look to the situation created by Macrobius, where authority, like the institution of the symposium itself, is comparatively undifferentiated. This is not to say that authority is less strongly felt (in fact, the cumulative effect may be more intense: the underlying ethos of the *Saturnalia* is distinctly authoritarian). Rather, authority is less easily and less explicitly pinpointed; it is undefined but unquestioned, everywhere and intangible. Although each of the participants exhibits a different expertise, gradations of expertise and authority are for the most part not openly acknowledged: it is the expressed belief that authority is evenly diffused throughout the group. Similarly, the bases of authority, and the criteria of validation, are assumed rather than expressed: an unspoken consensus prevails, and it is unnecessary, in fact improper, to draw distinctions on, for example, social grounds (aristocrat versus non-aristocrat) or temporal grounds (past versus present). Emphasis falls on individual subordination and self-effacement rather than on personal status and authority. Since authority itself is diffused, access to authority is not
restricted but encouraged and made easy. It is not surprising that in such a context the grammarian finds certainty where the grammarian of the commentary finds only deformation of the language.

If the foregoing suggestions have any merit, it should be possible to locate different degrees of "archaism" and "modernism" on a continuum from focused to diffused authority, to investigate the various ways in which the focusing and diffusion are expressed, and to treat different linguistic tendencies as symptomatic of different forms of organization, to which different individuals are drawn, and in which different values and loyalties are involved. We might then have a framework which would allow us to understand more satisfactorily the various trends in the literary language itself (for example, the rise of archaism in the second century), and to bring those trends into closer contact with other elements of the political, social and cultural history of antiquity.

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