In 1946 the psychologist D. O. Hebb reported an experiment conducted at the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology in Georgia.¹ The Yerkes staff had been used to treating the chimpanzees anthropomorphically, attributing to them distinct and consistent personalities and emotional dispositions; so Pati was said to hate human beings, for example, while Bamba was friendly but quick-tempered. The staff relied on these attributions in caring for and working with the animals, because they appeared to have a predictive value. Pati’s supposed hatred for humans made handlers wary of her sneak attacks, whereas the staff could expect that the irritable yet basically friendly Bamba would attack with the straightforwardness of candid anger; and these attributions in fact proved to be “intelligible and practical guides” to the animals’ behavior. The experiment, by contrast, consisted of “a thoroughgoing attempt to avoid anthropomorphizing description in the study of temperament”: for two years the staff were rigorously to avoid intuitive reading of the chimps’ feelings, to avoid drawing any connection between feelings and behavior, and instead to compile only records of actual behavior, with a view to obtaining “an objective statement of the differences from animal to animal.” It proved to be a long two years: for from this attempt to avoid attributing emotions to the chimps, “all that resulted was an almost endless series of specific acts in which no order or meaning could be found.” The chimps’ behavior became literally unintelligible, as though they were human psychopaths whose actions lacked any stable reference point—and handling them became quite dangerous indeed.

Now this experiment probably does not prove that chimps actually have emotions, as we would recognize them in each other. But it does provide a vivid reminder of how much we humans depend on reading emotions in constructing orderly patterns of meaning in our daily lives. Such patterns depend on, among other things, understanding causation, in constructing for our own lives a plausible narrative that correlates ends and means, causes and effects. My relations with others depend on managing the ways in which the narrative I construct for

An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Charles Alexander Robinson Jr Memorial Lecture at Brown University in April 2011 and also at Princeton University, the University of Chicago, and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York: I am grateful to the audiences on all three occasions for their helpful responses, and to Denis Ferrey, Fritz Graf, Josiah Ogdon, Richard Thomas, and Peter White for reassurance at a still earlier stage that my view of Georgics I was not just eccentric. Finally, my sincere thanks go to James Rees and the referees of Phoenix. All translations in the text are my own.

¹ Hebb 1946 (quotations in the text from 80). My attention was first drawn to Hebb’s paper by Gordon (1987: 1–4).


INNOVATION AND THE END OF GEORGICS I

ROBERT A. KASTER

myself intersects with the narratives I can plausibly construct for them, and in that intersection much depends on assessing the others' temperaments, to make reasonable inferences and predictions about the judgments that they will make and the behavior that will follow.

These are just the practical heuristics of daily life, and they are inevitably mirrored in the hermeneutics of reading. Making sense of any narrative depends on making similar attributions of temperament, assessments of motive, judgments of appropriateness: just think of the end of the *Aeneid* and the vast debate prompted by Aeneas' anger in a situation where the attribution of the emotion and its object—what his *ira* is about—seem tolerably clear, but where judgments of appropriateness have differed radically. We are uneasy as readers when we cannot confidently ascribe plausible emotional states to the poet, or persona, there before us, or when we cannot understand the emotion's basis: it is as disconcerting as coming face to face in the street with a passer-by gripped by some strong but undetectable feeling, or by an obvious but inexplicable fear.

I recently experienced unease of this sort on reading again a text that I had read scores of times before and really trying, for the first time, to understand its emotional import. The text is the interchange between Meliboeus and Tityrus at the start of the first *Idyll* (1:12):

**Mel.** Tityrus, tu patruiae resulrons sub tegmine fugi silicetar eros Musum mediatur arena, no narras fons et dulcis linguis atque
no patram fugamur, tu, Tityrus, leo in umbra
formiscus vixistis dicas Amymonia silvis.

**Tityr.** O Meliboe, duum noli haec viva fact.
Namque eris tae miseri semper dux, illius eram
saepe sese nasci ab ostilio inhuman aequas.
Ile mens avenae locis, ut carnis, et spum
saepe quae sollem calamus permiscit agent.

**Mel.** Non equales insidias, minor magic: un questo tibi
seque adee turbator agius.

**Mel.** There you lie, Tityrus, beneath the spreading beech's shade, reeking your woodland Muse on slender pipe, while I least behind my homeland's bounds, its sacred field. I go in flight from the land; you, Tityrus, in the wild lastly teach the woods to echo fair Amymon's* *nais.

**Tityr.** Oh, Meliboeus, it's a godmade this peace and quiet for me. For he will always be a god for me, that one, and often will a tender touch from my penis stain his altar with its blood. He's the one granted my castle leave to roam, as you set, and allowed me to play what I please on my rustic need.

**Mel.** I for my part don't feel dubious; rather surprise: such utter confusion reigns in every field, all around.

For the most part, the text talks explicitly only of what the two are doing now, or what has been done in the past; much of the most important communication proceeds obliquely and, I suggest, indeterminately. On the surface, Meliboeus merely remarks the difference between his condition and Tityrus', and says enough to show that he regards his condition as less desirable, more painful in emotional terms: thus the repeated reference to his flight from his patria and the pathetic epithet dulcis, as opposed to the repeated reference to Tityrus' ease, resulrons sub
tegmine fugi ... lentus in umbra. By contrast, the reason he remarks the difference, the point he wishes to make, is left entirely implied.

Does he make his observation in the spirit of an 'objective reporter' ('There you are, here I am, and that's the way it is')? Or does he mean to register surprise and seek an explanation ('Gee whiz, how come you're here and I'm here ...?')? Or does he mean to register envious indignation and seek a justification ('Hey, where do you get off ...?')? Or is there yet another nuance? And how does Meliboeus take the remarks? His report of the god's action is evidently offered by way of explanation, but in what spirit? Is it just an expression of gratitude, straightforward and even naive in its enthusiasm, an instance of 'tactless realization' that shows us a Tityrus so caught up in his own good cheer as to be careless of Meliboeus' distress? Or does he mean to respond to that distress by trying, in effect, to trump it with the god's favor? Is his report meant to mean an implied reproach in Meliboeus' remarks by letting him know that the difference in their conditions is due to no bad acts on his own part? Or does he seek to put Meliboeus in the wrong by suggesting that he is merely being envious when he should (for example) be glad? And when Meliboeus says that he feels not *invallis* but *survix*, does he say this because he realizes his initial comments could be misread? Or because he realizes that they were in fact mistaken? And when he denies feeling *invallis*, what exactly is he denying?

In response to all this, I think two things can be said: we cannot fully understand the exchange without knowing the answers to all these questions; and the answers to all these questions cannot be known. It is perhaps disquieting to find the Vergilian corpus opening with a representation of such thorough-going emotional opacity.

Still, whatever else can be said, Meliboeus' emotions are clearly about something. They depend on judgments, beliefs, desires. They imply a story that could be told, even if it is told here more allusively than explicitly. In principle, therefore, his emotions are intelligible. It is in my aim in this paper to consider how we make such emotional representations intelligible; I start from the fact that they imply an 'aboutness,' an account that can be given. First, I will give a general account of the emotion that Meliboeus denies feeling, *invallis*. Then I will apply some implications of this account to a pivotal passage in the *Georgics* I believe has not been well understood, because an emotion central to it has not been well understood.

---

26 e.g., Coleman 1977: 75 (on line 21).
If you consult the Oxford Latin Dictionary on the "meaning" of invicta, you will find that an etymology rightly deriving the word from the adjective invictus, itself formed from the compound web inviclus, "to look against" that is, "to look at in a hostile manner or with hostile intent"—in other words, the territory of dark looks and the Evil Eye.\footnotemark\footnotetext{This and the next several paragraphs, with Figure 1, are abridged and adapted from Kaster 2001, a larger account of invicta and its "scripts." The lexicography of invicta and its cognates tends to discuss the Latin in terms of one or another lexical "equivalent" in the modern European languages (Cervi, "Neutra"), a limited and limiting approach; see esp. Colodrohara 1949 for a study of emotion-language notions in the light of lexical "equivalents."} You will then find a menu of English glosses organized primarily, if tacitly, according to a distinction between "active" invicta—the "ill will, spite, indignation, jealousy, [or] envy" that we feel toward some person or object or state of affairs—and "passive" invicta—the "odium" or "dislike" directed against us.\footnotetext{The distinction between "active" and "passive" that the OLD leaves implied is explicit in the very similar analysis at TLL 7.3: 199-200:14 s.v. invicta (R. Sturz): "I: passive; invicta ea, qua preminet ab alia invidiosa: sine t. q. loqu. sine t. q. indignatus, offensio sim._, quibus motum sperare scatere non potest._, in universum._. B. probatuer._._. II: active; invicta ex, quia invicta: sine t. q. invidiosa (quae notae sub loco tr. praenae) sine t. q. indignatus, offensio sim._ (c. s. eius). For lexicographical approaches to the invicta-family, see also Wieden 1946, Sturz 1959: Schauf 1962, Wocher 1966: 92-102.} In offering these glosses the OLD is doing the job that lexica are supposed to do, and I have no serious quibble with it, in the sense that most instances of the Latin label invicta can be intelligibly "translated" by one or another English label that the OLD offers.

But a label is not a meaning, and a lexicon is not the language. A lexicon's approach to the language of emotions generally leaves unanswered a host of crucial questions; and what is true of emotion terms in general is certainly true of invicta. For example, what exactly is the relation among labels such as "dislike" and "envy" and "spite"? Is it merely contingent? Is it just the case that if you "envy" someone (as we would put it) you probably dislike him as well, or that if you "dislike" someone you will probably be inclined to "spite" him as well? But what causes us to feel any of these things to begin with? Why do you "look against" this person or thing, and not another? What range of persons or things can provoke that look? And why are all these English labels bundled together under the single Latin label, invicta?

To begin to answer these questions I can make the obvious point that all emotion terms, in any language, are at base just convenient devices for sorting experiences that share a general surface likeness. In Latin, for example, the amor of sexual partners and the amor of family members converge on a cluster of thoughts and feeling—having to do with "attachment," "concern," and the like—that are sufficiently similar to motivate the use of the same label. But of course sexual amor is also different from familial amor, and that difference depends in large part on the different intentional states of the person experiencing the emotions—their different judgments, beliefs, and desires. Such intentional states, in turn, are embedded in narratives—sequences of cause and effect, of perception, evaluation, and response—that can conveniently be called "scripts." It is in terms of such scripts that the language of emotion can be most fully understood; and understanding the language of emotion in this way necessarily stresses its specifically cultural content. The workings of the autonom nervous system that cause us to grow faint with "fear" or flush with "anger" may be constants in our biology, but the judgments and beliefs that prompt these workings vary significantly from one human culture to another.\footnotetext{For development of this point, in connection with the concept of juriditas, see Kaster 2001. For example, each script can be construed either "in fact," or so to speak, "pedagogically," in the case of scripts 2, I can feel I doer as, and in "tegredice" you, a good that you in fact already possess, just because it is a good (I can want to wipe that smile off your face just because it is a smile), or I can feel I doer as, and in "tegredice" you, a good that you might come to possess (I can deny you a drink of water when you are thirsty just because it would quench your thirst). Not only that the scripts are not mutually exclusive: it is quite possible, in fact common, to enact two or more of them simultaneously with reference to the same person or state of affairs.} So—in the case of invicta—what script or scripts does a Roman experiencing invicta enact, what are the evaluations essential to the emotion, and what is their cultural content? To start to answer these questions, we can consider the partial taxonomy of scripts represented in Figure 1. The taxonomy is only partial, in the sense that it could be extended "downward" in further ramifications, omitted here primarily because they are not relevant to the main arguments to come.\footnotetext{Particularly since the TLL articles give only a sampling of the evidence, I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by the Packard Humanities Institute CD-ROM #5.1 (1991) in tracing the uses of invicta and its cognates.} I would also stress that the taxonomy was not constructed a priori; I did not sit down and decide what a plausible taxonomy might look like, then sort the textual instances accordingly. The taxonomy was built inductively: these are just the consistent patterns that emerge from reading, at least a couple of times each, every passage in classical Latin in which invicta, invictus, and their cognates occur, while asking this question: what are the common threads in the stories that are told under the "head" of invicta?

At the most general level, all the stories share a perception—that another person is enjoying some good—and a response that includes an unpleasant "feeling" of some sort (doer, aegredice, vel sim.). These traces are hardly surprising, because they are the very traits that the Romans themselves picked out when they defined or otherwise reflected on the emotion.\footnotetext{For development of this point, in connection with the concept of juriditas, see Kaster 2001. For example, each script can be construed either "in fact," or so to speak, "pedagogically," in the case of scripts 2, I can feel I doer as, and in "tegredice" you, a good that you in fact already possess, just because it is a good (I can want to wipe that smile off your face just because it is a smile), or I can feel I doer as, and in "tegredice" you, a good that you might come to possess (I can deny you a drink of water when you are thirsty just because it would quench your thirst). Not only that the scripts are not mutually exclusive: it is quite possible, in fact common, to enact two or more of them simultaneously with reference to the same person or state of affairs.} At the next level, however, the most important narrative distinction is not the distinction between "active" and "passive" found in the lexica—between feeling invicta and being its object—but whether or not the story must be told with reference to some principle of right or fairness or the like: whether or not it is a "moral" story, in short. So on the left side of the taxonomy (scripts 1 and 2), I feel invicta—I have an unpleasant psychosomatic experience when you see your good—not with reference to some principle of justice, but just because it is a good, or just because it is your...
good. I suggest in Figure 1 a characteristic thought that could be expressed by someone acting out each script, and a thought that actually is expressed by the most fully rounded representative of such English literature, Iago, who responds quite distinctly to the virtue of Desdemona (because it is virtue) and to the happiness of Othello (because it is Othello). 3 I take it that these scripts of invectio will seem familiar and need no elaborate illustration: 3 scripts 1 and 2 both shape, for example, Ovid's extended personification of Invidia at Metamorphoses 2.760–832, and one or the other of them appears in a pair of well-known passages from Aenma 4 that we can consider briefly.

As he sends Mercury to give Aeas the order to sail, Jupiter expresses his general displeasure at the hero's failure to keep his shoulder to the wheel (Verg. Aen. 4.227–231):

non illum robidi genera noli promittera salutem
premitque Ganosque sibi his vindictis armis;
undique qui praestans imperio, bellicos fœustum
Italiam regentes, genus altaeque Iusti præcessit,
ac tenuis sub iugi mittere rebum.

Not that sort did his fair, fair mother tell us he was,
and on strength of that twice snatch him from Greeks arms;
no, he'd be the sort to nate Italy (she said), a land negligent
with power, rumbling with war, and bring forth a line
from Tuscan's lify blood, and make all the world submit to law.

The father of gods and men then complaints with the question (232–234):

si nullam accedisse tururum gloria reum
non super ipse suae militiae labe taborum,
Ascensione pater Romans invideo armis?

If glory bought by such great deeds does not kindle him,
and if he sees no massive sail in trains for his own name's sake,

Which is to say: "Does the father feel ather at the thought of his son's good?"

The question presumes that the father does not want the good for himself, for he

3Script 2 can further rampify, not only according to the distinction between "actual" and "pedagogic" goods already remarked (above, 6), but also according to the degree of self-affectiveness elicited: I can feel ather at seeing your good just because it is your good, period, or I can feel that way because the good is yours and not mine (a, a distinction between a merely beguiling thought, as we might put it in English, and a thought that inhabits beguiling and covetous at the same time). The self-affectiveness version of script 2 invideo enacts our "story" of more differential states, as a feeling that can be assayed either by your losing the good in question or by my gaining the same (or equivalent) good; this is "true" envy, with no extra context: cf. Rawls 1971: 533–534, Taylor 1988.

4These scripts of invideo-in-vire are most relevant to the iconography of Ithyঀ, invade discussed in the excellent survey of Dusablin and Dickies (1983), and are at the center of discussion in Barone 1993: 107–175.
has abandoned tantarum gloria rerum: no, he merely bequeaths his son that good, as we would say, because it is a good, or because it would be Ascanius' good (or conceivably both). In either case such feelings would of course be wicked, and that is why Jupiter says it: he wants to put Aeneas in the wrong, and so he casts him in a role that has no moral basis.

It is with some irony then—for of course Aeneas does not hear Jupiter's reproach—that Aeneas takes precisely the same tack barely 100 lines later, in the speech that finds him at his rhetorical low ebb in the poem, when he tries to cast Dido in a similarly wicked role (347–350):

If the heights of Carthage and the sights of a Libyan settlement keep you, a Phoenician, rapt here, why in the world is it a matter of invisa that Trojans settle in the Land of the West? It's just that we, too, seek alien realms.

The form of the expression here is different—the idiom qua invisa est is equivalent to our invisa, "why do you feel invisa" at a given state of affairs—but that is the thought is the same. Dido (Aeneas' alleges) wants to deny the Trojans the good in question, yet she has no interest in it herself—in fact, she already has an equivalent good of her own. She can therefore have no defensible reason for feeling invisa for the Trojans: she must want to deny them the good because it is a good, or because it would be theirs (or conceivably both). In any case—acting our either script—she would be acting without reference to any principle of justice. On the right side of the taxonomy, by contrast, I feel invisa at your good only with reference to some sense of "right." It may be a sense of right that is self-regarding, and therefore potentially self-serving (script 2); the characteristic thought here is that the good you enjoy is rightfully mine (this is the script that Iago acts out in relation to Cassio). For an example, recall here another passage from Vergil, the archetypal context in the funeral games for Anchises in Aeneid 5 (485–542): Aeneas has treasured a bird to a mast and promised top prize to the arch who strikes the fluttering creature. First one archer hits the mast, then another severs the tether, then Euryton brings the bird to earth with his arrow; but still king Acestes shakes, and his arrow miraculously catches fire in mid-air and is consumed. Recognizing a portent when he sees one, Aeneas awards top prize to Acestes, and the narrator comments (541–542):

neque Euryton praedare invisa honoris;
quaestis volo arem caro demerit ab alto.

Not did good Euryton feel invisa for the "preferred honor," though he alone had brought the bird down from lofty heaven.

That good Euryton did not praeclare invisa honoris is a Vergilian way of saying that he did not feel invisa for Acestes, who had been praeclatus, given precedence, in honor. The comment is added because in ordinary circumstances Euryton would have felt invisa, and indeed would have been justified in that feeling, for a prize that was rightfully his by the rules of the game had been given to another: that is the point of the final clause. But Euryton isbonus here precisely because he can see that these are not ordinary circumstances and hence willingly forgo his right.

The remaining script—in fact the single most common invisa script—and that by some distance—is one in which I am moved by a sense of "right" that has no explicit reference to self at all. Rather, my dolor here derives from seeing you gain or use some good—wealth, prestige, authority, or the like—in a way that affronts some general societal principle: you have behaved (or are behaving, or are about to behave) high-handedly, cruelly, self-indulgently, or against the common good, and you damn well ought be ashamed of yourself.12

This script's link with shameful behavior is strong and clear as far back as we can trace the concept invisa. I will offer just a few illustrations, starting with our earliest example of continuous Latin prose, the preface to Catu's Da agricultura, in which he famously compares farming with trade and money-lending (pr. 1–4).13

Etvis interdum praeclare mercaturi rerum quibus, nisi tam peregrinum sit, et item fructuari, sit tam homuncum sit. maiores nutriit hic haebantur et tio in tibus posterosque: forsum dupli con- dominari, foetidiorum quadraginta sermo, etiam xerum studiis studiisque teneat extremos, versum, et supra supra, peregrinum et coloniismum. et in agricolt et varis percussis et milites stetisse religiis gignuntur, maximissimum quos quaeque stabilitissimissimique consequeret minimisque invisisludis minimis se minime maius vigilantium sunt quin et ei studios occupant ventum.

Grown, it's sometimes preferable to seek wealth through trade—save that it's too risky—and similarly by putting money out at interest—it could be as honourable. Here's what our ancestors thought, and established in law: that a thief is fined twofold, but a money-lender fourfold . . . . Now a trader I judge to be a vigorous sort and dead keen on making money, but, as I said, vulnerable to risk and liable to disaster. But it's from amongst farmers that the bravest men and most vigorous soldiers arise and the most righteous and reliable income derives, and the sort least liable to invisa, and the people engaged in this pursuit are least of all given to wicked schemes.

So in a nutshell, Catu says, trade is insufficiently secure, while money-lending is insufficiently honorable. Farming, by contrast, avoids the insecurity inherent in trade and the invisa that links to money-lending—the feeling that those who engage in it are in fact worse than thieves, that like thieves they are violating a social norm and should be ashamed of themselves. Because this script of invisa

12The argument that this script of invisa is Latini's counterpart to vidissim, forming with posta the same sort of "reflexive pair" that vidissim, does with alas, is developed more fully in the paper cited above, n. 3.
13On the text, reading invisa, see most recently Courtney 1999: 50.
responds to gaining or using an advantage in a way judged socially destructive and discreditable, it appears in contexts as varied as the forms of socially destructive and discreditable behavior itself. Some other examples, very briefly:

- Defending Catlius, Cicero says that he will not ask that the indulgence owed to youth be extended to his client: no, no, it may be that other members of the juvenis dedit lead lives of self-indulgence, going into debt, surrendering to petulantia et libidines, and thereby incurring the magna invidia owed to exsilia et pecus—bet he is blameless client [13].

- Speaking of himself, Cicero returns repeatedly during the last twenty years of his life to the invindex directed at him as a result of his role in suppressing the Catilanian conspiracy, a role in which—on this view—he exercised his authority high-handedly and against the interest of the res publica.

- In structurally identical circumstances, the dictator Cornelius Cossus suffers invindex for impignorating the seditious Manlius Capitolinus in 385 B.C.E. As Livy tells the story, the triumph over the Volsci that Cossus celebrated at the same time as Manlius' imprisonment was read by much of the gentry as symbolic not of his glorious victory over the Volsci but of his arrogant and shameful abuse of power in dealing with a cret. [15]

- Finally, and returning to Vergil, we know the speech of sham self-awareness that Menentius is made to speak as he mourns Laurus' death at the end of Arneid [10]. He berates himself not only for allowing his son to die in his stead, but also for having in the first place "stained" the boy's name, by his own bad acts, pulso ob invindex solos sepeque paternem—"the invindex in question being that felt by the subjects whom he cruely abused. Had his subjects' invindex caused Menentius to feel then the shame that he feels now, he would not now to have feel the same he feels; but of course had Menentius

[12] Cic. Cat. 30: si quis ego oratoribus tuae tuaeque auspiciis respondere non auderit, esse meum numen deprecantur vacatis adhucsemius commemorando praeceps. Non respondere auderit, perfidio nimirum ait hostis, contraest consilia tuae divinitatis. nunc post ac si qua in ipsius commemoratio possit esse aalvum, praedictum. libidinis iumentum, quam viser eum magnum, signum ex his absim poetar. me autem a temporum novit aetatem.

[13] Cic. Cat. 2.2: amatoris video, mea vero peregre esse in easticum annum susurrat, quam subs picta invexis nuta, si minus in processus numeri minus estur anima cum quibus in过程 exemplis, cfr. Cat. 1.29-29, 2.3, 15, 17, 26, 29; Sall. 9, 31. Dnem. 44. cfr. Resp. 41, 46, 72, 96, 97, 98, Phil. 1.38, 3.26; 3.26, similiter Sal. 22.3, 431: Serv. 1.4, 1.5.

[14] Liv. 6, 16, 4: eccendit in cimento Mugdia satis excitans magnum partem publicae, omnes laudes maiore mortuus se heliobat pomo, ultimamque simulacrum artem maritim turbam. dictatis de PoiMOVEI misericordia. —in iuregue magis triumphus quam gloriam soli, suisque dem ab illius partem cuin accusator et cret non eum fames famem: utrum detineat tanquam sacerdos, quod non M. Manilius accur natum est detines.


then been capable of feeling such shame, he would not have behaved in a way that provoked his subject's invindex. [11]

Now reading the texts with a thought for these scripts produces in general, I think, a more nuanced understanding, if only because it compels us to pause to consider exactly what sort of human response any given passage seeks to represent. For that matter, what sort of divine response, too—for the gods, as we know, have the same emotions as humans, only bigger. To illustrate this point, and to illustrate the utility of this way of reading, I will in the balance of this paper try to persuade you that one of the best-known passages in Vergil has been consistently misread because an emotion central to it has been misunderstood.

The passage occurs at the horrific conclusion to Georgias 1.14 Consideration of the sun's prognostic displays has led the speaker to recall the many signs that surrounded the death of Julius Cesar, when (as he says) the "mimica generantur" of men were in terror of eternal night (468: impius... et anima terrae mutata). This memory of deathful omens in turn leads to thoughts of civil war, and of Roman strength bleeding away time and again on the plains of northern Greece (489-492):

"ergo inter se parus convertere soli
Romanae acies iterum visere
ne facta indignum sapientiae haec vides nec
Etiamque eti latum Haemis pinguedinius campo.

And so once more Philippus has seen Romans in combat
dash themselves against themselves, their powers matched;
the Ones Above thought it fine that Eustathia and Harmachus' broad plains twice grow gorged and fat with our blood.

And so—before concluding with an image of the world swept away by a war running wildly out of control (509-514)—the speaker offers an urgent prayer (498-509), with the standard punctuation in modern editions):

[16] Cf. cfr. i. 313-320, on Menentius like figure of Metabas, father of Camilla, pulso ob invexem non esse paterne: nec modo ei tempore dictatus.

[17] Cfr. Dion. 11.3-3, in the Menentius—like figure of Metabas, father of Camilla, pulso ob invexem non esse paterne: nec modo ei tempore dictatus.
The prayer is crucial to the tone of the ending, and to the claim being made for Caesar, and central to the prayer (503–504) is an attribution of invisid: 

tam pridem nobis uelii se regia. Caesar, vas invisid. So a fair amount should ride on understanding just what this invisid is.

For some time now, Caesar, the "palace of heaven" has been feeling invisid against us—us mortals, as hominem soon makes plain—with respect to you. Or as we might say, "For some time now, Caesar, the palace of heaven has been bequelling you to us": you are a good, the uelii region wishes to deny us this good, and it has been so disposed for quite a while. Now this invisid is not, first of all, the so-called "envy of the gods," or φθόνος, τὸν θεοῦ, that we know chiefly from late archaic and classical Greece, where the gods—of Aeschyulus or Pindar or Herodotus—often feel φθόνος, as an Eastern potentate or a Greek tyrant because he seeks or threatens to surpass the lot of the merely mortal and rival the gods themselves.28 Rather, the expression initially seems to align itself with the thought that appears most commonly in Latin when invisid is attributed to the gods: it is assumed that the gods just wish to deny us a good, either because it is a good or because they just do not want us to have it.29 This is the thought that appears most often in connection with cases of untimely death and with expressions of mourning and consolation: in the grip of this thought, aggrieved mortals act out their pain by convoking the gods of malicious invisid, and that at first sight seems to be the case here.30

But then a second predicate fills out the thought in an unexpected way, with implications that make this meditation on divine invisid all but unique in Latin literature. The palace of heaven feels this invisid and "complains that you care about the triumphs of men." hominem is pointed, and shows the thrust of the celestial thought, as the uelii region seeks to claim Caesar for itself.31 The thought is plainly not that the gods feel jealous ill will for Caesar as a would-be rival to their power (as in the φθόνος τὸν θεοῦ), nor that they simply begrudge Caesar to "us," as an exercise in malice. Rather the court of heaven covers Caesar for itself: because the denizens of the regia think that he properly belongs with them, they complain that he refrains by concerning himself with mortal triumphs. Under this conception of the invisid domus, the gods feel pain at seeing "us" have a good that they regard as rightfully theirs (cf. script 3); and it is this particular conception of divine invisid that is nearly unique. I have found it elsewhere only in the Herculane Oetaicus ascribed to Seneca, of Jupiter's invisid for Amphion and his wish to claim Hercules as his own (1510–12):

And yet heaven's lord felt invisid for a mortal, wished that the "velium of Aesopus" be called his own.

I assume that this passage looks directly back to the Vergilian, as the poet seeks the right thought with which to frame another heroic figure caught between two worlds.

This instance of divine coveting of course resonates a motif already found near the beginning of the book, the anticipated apotheosis of Caesar; but here the motif has a very different tone and coloring. In lines 24–42 Vergil exubertantly, even playfully, scours the idea that Caesar will soon be one of the gods (men) who have the opportunity to choose which divine realm he will make his own:

32Cf. the Bresici exposition ad loc.: spectatus quod hic est in terra, non (in) caelo sum also.
No. Caesar belongs in the regia, and so it serves heaven’s rhetorical purpose to present in the worst possible light any action that keeps Caesar among men. The complaint is thus sharply opposed to the speaker’s point of view, and deeply hostile to humanity, insofar as it implies that the palace of heaven does not care a whit about the moral regium. But that is exactly what we should expect, given the structure of the passage to this point.

Consider together lines 498–504. First, the prayer so the “ancient gods,” the de partis, and the native heroes of the land, the Indigetes, with the latter represented by Romulus, the former by Venus: at least do not keep this youth from bringing aid to a sestertius overturned. Next come two clauses presented in parallel by the repeated phrase iam pridem: with our blood we have long since paid enough (or, if haimus is present, we have long been paying enough: the crucial word in either case is saeit) for the perjuries of Laomedon’s Troy, for a long time now heaven’s court has been feeling a hostile toward us because of you, Caesar, and has been complaining that you care for mortal triumphs. The two clauses are often read separately, but the repeated iam pridem demands that they be taken together, as bearing on the same point; and it is one of Roger Mynors’s several important contributions to this passage that he makes explicit what this point is: “what holds [the clauses] together is that they present two reasons why action now is urgent: (1) it is overdue; (2) at any moment we may lose the one person who might succeed.”162 Or to put it another way, because the clauses give the reason why the gods addressed should heed the prayer, there should be a colons (not a period) after prohibite and a comma (not a semicolon) after Troianae:24

di partis Indigetis et Romule Vestaque maestr.
qua Tuscan Thiberim et Romanul Palantia urae.
hanc talem rerum sanctam sacram sancto
prohibite: saeit iam pridem unguentis nostris
Laomedonius lenis terrans purgata Troiae,
iam pridem subi cautis est regia, Caesare,
invicta aviae homium quintum carum triumphi.

Ancient Gods, heroes of the land, and Romulus, and you, mother Vesta, who watch over Tuscan Tiber and Roman Pauto, at least do not step this young man from bringing aid to a world overturned: enough long since we have paid in blood for the treachery of Laomedon’s Troy, long since

162 See aside, as not related to my main argument, the question what word modifies: see the alternatives surveyed by Mynors 1990: 96 (ed.): I. I prefer to read de partis and Indigetes as distinct (with Thomas 1990: 15); differently, Mynors 1990: 96, though this too has no material bearing on my argument.
163 Mynors 1990: 97.
24 This implication of Mynors’s point is granted by Crafer (1998: 65), but because he reads haimus inadulterated allegorically (as “suppository” expression of fear that Orestes will be killed in battle before ending the war), he does not push the matter farther (see below).
PHOENIX

has heaven's court been feeling iridescent against us over you, Caesar, complaining that you care for triumphs of men . . . .

Furthermore, the pronouns show how we are to visualize this setting of vivid prayer, as we move from the deixis of heu . . . locum—the youth imagined as on hand right here, while the speaker addresses the gods—to the direct address of te. The speaker turns from one party (the di patriis) to the other (the tuum/sui) in the same speech/circumstance: the one clause (saeui saeum pridem) is spoken as though directly to the di patriis but in Caesar’s hearing, the other (saeum pridem tuus) to spoken as though directly to Octavian in the hearing of the di patriis, with both clauses giving a basis for the prayer, the reasons why it should be granted now.

There is, however, something very important about this sequence of thought that has not been noticed before. The prayer to the di patriis is urgent in part because, as Mynors put it, “we may lose the one person who might succeed”: but we face that danger precisely because of the iridescent of the cael regis. It seems that in thinking about this passage we should avoid the usual habit of referring without distinction to “the gods”; for evidently prayer is being made to none of these gods to anticipate a danger posed by another. On the one side, the gods of the Roman home and of Roman history, who protect the river that nurtured Rome’s greatness and the hill on which by tradition it was founded. Romulus, the founder king and hero, to whom Octavian is here implicitly assimilated;27 Vesta, the spirit-flame of home and hearth, handed over to Aeneas with lares and penates as Troy fell (cf. Aen. 2.296). On the other side, the gods of the heavenly court, the conventional, Olympian pantheon: Apollo and Neptune, whom Laomedon defrauded, setting in train the cycle of crime and compensation that his heirs are still repeating; the great gods, whose battle over Troy was revealed to Aeneas’ mortal vision by his mother as he brought the household divinities out of the doomed city (cf. Aen. 2.604–618); the gods not near at hand but far above, the superi, who just previously were said to be well pleased by the repeated spilling of Roman blood (491: nec fuit indignum superi), and between these contrasting sets, between the native gods close at hand and the remote, self-interested court of heaven, is the iridescent, Caesar, capable yet vulnerable. The prayer’s core, ne probetis, implies that he has both the will and the ability to bring aid to the saeculum: and indeed that very ability implies that he somehow stands outside the topos-tary saeculum, that he is in but not wholly of this mixed generation of men, that he has some stable standpoint which gives him the leverage to make things right. But precisely because he has this extraordinary standing the cael regis feels that it can rightfully

28The contrast has been noted before, in different terms; e.g., Miller 1980: 107 (?“In his prayer for deliverance . . . he ignores Jupiter, the divine father of the Trojan corner, and turns instead to the more intimate divinities of the Roman people”); Mynors 1990: 96 (“The gods of Greece and of poetry are swept aside by intense feeling, and the Roman poet appeals to the deities most intimately concerned with Rome itself”).

make its claim and its complaint. The very attributes that suit Caesar to his role as savior also move the heavenly regis to claim him as its own, and to make him vulnerable to the version of divine iridescent imagined here. Hence the urgency of the speaker’s prayer.29

One further detail hinges on this refined understanding of heaven’s iridescent: the relevance of the following remarks, introduced by quippe etsi in 505. As usually punctuated, the phrase marks a subordinate adversative clause (ads), with quippe indicating that the speaker accepts the foregoing proposition as self-evidently valid: the nuance is “naturally so/understandably so, for . . .”30 But what, precisely, is “understandable”? Or in syntactic terms, what does the adversative clause modify—quippe et non curae? Richard Thomas—uniquely, so far as I know—chooses the latter, taking the thought to elaborate Caesar’s curae: in Thomas’s paraphrase, the gods “complain . . . that you care for triumphs among mortals (which you are compelled to do), inasmuch as right and wrong are inverted among them.” On this reading, the clause refers to heaven’s complaint, as the speaker in effect justifies Caesar’s curae: he does not pursue triumphs eagerly or even willingly, out of mere lust for glory—as the regis’s iridescent complaint seems to imply—but because the ruined state of the world demands that (as Thomas glosses curae) he “have a concern for [military action which will set the world right and result in] triumphs.”

Now this view has some difficulties, chief among them the fact that much of the thought on which it most depends has no counterpart in the Latin text: in particular, the notion that triumphs would be a mere by-product, not the true object, of Caesar’s curae, and the highly colored plea that Caesar is “compelled” to care for triumphs, would both be important, no-ordinary elements of the speaker’s argument that Vergil just did not bother to make plain. Yet though I do not think it is the best possible approach, Thomas’s reading certainly has the merit of acknowledging, by implication, that the alternative, standard reading is far more problematic still: that reading constructs quippe closely with quippe et; and that construction in turn makes the speaker of the poem complicit in the heavenly court’s iridescent. “Long since,” the speaker says, “the court of heaven has been feeling iridescent against us over you, Caesar, and has been complaining . . . understandably . . .” No: the speaker cannot find the gods’ complaint “understandable” or self-evidently valid, because that means accepting the peevish and iridescent terms in which the complaint is cast and the characterization of Caesar’s actions and motivations as vacillating through a contentious cael regis, not as a selfless attempt to rescue a world overturned—as the speaker puts it earlier
The praying, with 

The phrasing, with *quaeque* introducing an emphatic assertion in the main clause in connection with circumstantial ads, is of course very common in Lucan, who was much on Vergil’s mind in the Georgics.11

Getting heaven’s invisida right—if that is what we now have done—has some significant consequences. First, and in contrast to some other contemporary readings, it offers what seems to be an unambiguous favorable and hopeful view of Caesar, who is raised above the sauromates that he will save if only he is allowed by a covetous heaven. Second, this reading tends to throw much more of the moral burden for human suffering on the powers of heaven. If “we”—mortal Romans—have long since paid enough for our ancestors’ wrongs, then plainly it is unjust that we are being made to pay more; and insofar as we will be made to pay still more if heaven’s invisida robs us of a savior, then heaven’s invisida is fully implicated in the injustice. It seems noteworthy that whereas we began this capstone passage with inglorious generations of men, *impia saevas* (terrible eternal night in 468, we close with an impious god, Mars impius, turning amok in 511. So far has the rhetoric of the passage carried us in the space of forty lines. Perhaps too far for the taste of Horace, whose second poem in the first book of Odes is famously in dialogue with this passage of the Georgics.12 *Iam satiis at the ode’s start (1–4): Iam satiis terreni niveo atque dirae / grandinis mistis pater et ruhen / destra saxar sacras incne aeres / terrae urbeum* (recalls *sati sati* 1.1.13–16: *vidimus fatalem Tiberim retinet/ litora Eurus vulturis undis / ire dicentum monumenta regis / templum Victor, et especia 26–28: pues quaestigent/ virgines sanctae minus audirem/ Carmina Vesta*?) and for the *vecii imperii* (25–26: *quem voce duximus populum rustici / imperii rebus?*); and at the poem’s end Caesar again appears as savior (49–52: *hic magnus postis triumphus (sic!)/ hie amis dicet pater atque propeps, / novus iuvat Medicus equitae impletur / idiate, Caesar*). Caesar’s premature removal to heaven, too, is again imagined as a possibility (45–49), but now with a difference. This time the translation would result not from the *invidia of heaven but from Caesar’s own revaluation against our human wickedness: nec te remissas visetas sipinquos exire aura tellus, “let not a breeze too swift take you off, hostile to our sives” (47–49). The overall burden has shifted squarely onto our shoulders, and Horace wants nothing to do with the *invidia of heaven’s regia: indeed, it is pointedly the gods of the Olympian pantheon who are canvassed as possible saviors in lines 29–44, first Apollo, then Venus, then Mars, before the speaker settles on Mercury, the divine go-between, as the god whom we are to recognize in Caesar’s mortal form.

11E.g., 462–66: *quaeque, ubi se fuerit hunc superans sertis est te: unde unde vultem aliquamque via victa nosse; pedemurque ubi sam vacuus cupris et omen / communicare ubi possumus praecipitium ... 4.771–772: sequis quius peric lupica est alerea nasa / inde saeva, praecrit hic genio mutueus tutebatur ... 4.925–929: sequis, ubi multis lacrimas, parremus domus / in membros, iones ubi multa lami ostreae (sic, / unde nunciri) vult usque propter membra / percutit, ut e illi sua consanguine fiamus!*

12See, e.g., 4.428–435 (Pudens); 4.472–480 (Scaurus); 4.478–480 (Dido).
PHOENIX

If this is correct, then the distance between the end of Georgics 1 and Odes 1.2 allows us to trace an important step in the development of the Augustan ideology of vice and salvation. But that is the subject for a different essay.

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PRINCETON, NJ 08544
U.S.A. kaster@princeton.edu

BIBLIOGRAPHY


On this see the stimulating essay of Wallace-Hadrill (1982).

INVIDIA AND THE END OF GEORGICS 1


--- On this see the stimulating essay of Wallace-Hadrill (1982).