ENVY, SPITE AND JEALOUSY

The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece

Edited by
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INVIDIA, νέμεσις, θθόνος, AND THE ROMAN EMOTIONAL ECONOMY

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Writing to Atticus from Cicilia in September of 51 bc, Cicero responds as follows to the news that an enemy of his, M. Calidius, had recently met defeat in the consular elections. "It is a great sign of affection to say that you are glad about the defeat of your sister's son's uncle's rival. Indeed, it prompts me to rejoice too – which hadn't occurred to me. You don't believe me? Just as you like; but frankly I do rejoice, since feeling νέμεσις is different from feeling θθόνος." Cicero writes here in the relaxed and playful, even arch, manner that he often adopts with Atticus. One token of the manner is the reference to Atticus's sister's son's uncle, who of course is Cicero himself: the parenthesis, probably first tossed off as a jeu d'esprit by Atticus, is here appreciatively lobbed back to its author. Another token is Cicero's semi-slippping into Greek at the end, where he alludes to the sort of distinction that Aristotle draws in the Rhetoric between νέμεσις and θθόνος: the difference between feeling pain at another's unmerited success and feeling pain at another's success, not because it is unmerited, but because the other is our peer. This is the distinction approximated in Shackleton Bailey's translation of Cicero's

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1 Cic. Att. 5. 19. 3 (translation adapted from Shackleton Bailey): quod scribis libente te explicatulisse eum qui cum sororis tuae fili patris certatis, magni amoris signum. Iaqua me etiam admovus usque uadiem; nam mihi in nement non vestat, non credo inquin. Us libet; sed plane gaudueo, quoniam tu meum interest quoque.

2 Arist. Rhet. 2.9 (388b8-20): "... Anteexem de tae oikai naflyu mou o καρδιών ναι μνυμαι τα ται ιανθών επει δη της φοβερης καταγωγης αυτου του τροφου του και ετος του αυτου ωθον της λυτρωσις επει της διανοις επαρκησεις... λατος ζες θανατου του και ο φθονος και ο νεμεσος και ο δεξιος και ο νεμεσος και ο δεξιος και ο φθονος είναι επει της επαρκης, διεβολας της αναθεμετεραις της επαρκης.
semi-Greek, 'since malice is one thing, righteous indignation another': to be glad that Calidius had falsified just because he is Calidius would be malicious, a case of φριξός; to be glad that he failed because he did not deserve to succeed is a sign of healthy character.

The nod to Greek ethics is, as I said, part of Cicero's manner in the letter, both playful (Cicero demonstrates, tongue-in-cheek, that he is ethically 'sound') and a reminder that their shared culture is one of the bonds between friends. Perhaps, though, Cicero's use of the Greek here is not just mannered, but a means of achieving clarity as well. For if we ask how Cicero would have expressed the same idea in Latin had he used the most commonly deployed terms that correspond to the Greek ethical concepts, the answer is clear: or rather, not clear at all: for he would have said 'plane gaudeo, quoniam invidia ab invidia interest' — 'since invidia is one thing, invidia another', or simply 'invidia is different from invidia'.

So much, at any rate, is the burden of my surface argument in this chapter: the Romans defined their emotional terrain in such a way that the one label, invidia, did the work of two quite distinct labels in Greek. That is the more trivial point of the phrase 'emotional economy' in my chapter title: the tidy-fisted Romans were so economically emotionally that they used one label for two seemingly distinct kinds of affect: The more important point of the phrase, however, is connected with my deeper argument, which has nothing to do with such lexical equivalents or labels. The argument is this: first, that the only sound way to understand the emotional language of any culture, our own included, is in terms not of lexical meaning but of 'scripts' — the narratives that we all enact when we experience any emotion; second, that it is the way a given culture's scripts interact that reveals the structure and dynamics of the culture's emotions — the ways in which emotional energy is expressed, understood, and harnessed to do various kinds of cultural work.

I will develop and, I hope, clarify these contentions: but first some background on the semantics of invidia — familiar ground, I am sure, but necessary to cover in order to make plain where my argument comes from. If you check invidia in the Oxford Latin Dictionary, you will find an account that rightly derives the word from the adjective invidiās, which is in turn formed from the compound verb invidēre, roughly 'to look against': that is not, just 'to look at' (which would be the non-existent compound *ad-viderēs*), but 'to look at in a hostile manner or with hostile intent' — the difference is comparable, for example, to the distinction between *ad-viderē* 'to carry to or towards' and *invidēre* 'to carry against', that is, 'attack'. In other words, we are in the territory of dark looks and the Evil Eye. The *OLD* organizes this territory primarily according to an implied distinction between 'active invidia' the 'ill will, spite, indignation, jealousy, envy' that we feel toward some person or object or state of affairs — and 'passive invidia' — the 'odium' or 'dislike' directed against us; and what the *OLD* leaves implied is explicit in the very similar analysis of the *Theaurus*. (Parenthetically, both *OLD* and *TLL* distinguish a third, more specialised sense of *invidia* — a 'rhetorical' or 'forensic' sense — used of the sentiment aroused against an opponent: I believe that it is historically misleading to regard this sense as a distinct aspect of the term, but the point will not affect my argument.)

Now in general I think that both lexica are doing the job that lexica are supposed to do, and I have no serious quarrel with them. In distinguishing the so-called passive and active usages, they reflect the Romans' understanding of one feature of the word's usage, a feature that even led to the coinage of the term *invidentia* to express the 'active' feeling, so that the ambiguity could be avoided. And the lexica provide a decent range of glosses, in the sense that most occurrences of the Latin label *invidia* can be intelligibly 'translated' by one or another of the English labels that the *OLD* offers. But a label is not a meaning, and a lexicon is not the language. A lexicon's approach to the language of emotions generally leaves unanswered a host of crucial questions; and what is true of emotion terms in general is certainly true of *invidia*. For example, what exactly is the relation between labels such as 'dislike' and 'envy' and 'spite'? Is it merely


5 Both *lexica* have been influenced here by the excellent discussion of *Wistrand 1946*, to which I am also much indebted: the broad criticisms of *Wistrand* developed by *Odstrømer 1949* are rightly rejected in *TLL* (indeed, *Odstrømer* offers a signal instance of how the study of emotion language, when conducted solely at the level of lexica 'equivalence', can run off the rails). Yet in suggesting that this adversarial sense arose as a specialised usage of forensic rhetoric and only then percolated through other domains of Roman language and life, *Wistrand* seems to have got the direction of influence just the wrong way around.

6 *Cic. TD* 3.20: *si supers in aequitatem incidere posset, posset etiam in morondium, posset in invidentiam. non alia invidiam, quae tam est cum invidiare; ab invidiendo autem invidiens recte dicit poetas, ut effigiamus ambiguum nomen invidiar...* and cf. *TLL* 7.1.2 90.39-191.15 s.v. *invidiaria.*
called, however, is the whole process and all its constituent elements, experienced as a whole: your 'anger' can be understood only as the little drama that body and mind exact together from beginning to end. Subtract any element of the drama, and the emotion does not exist: without the response, there is only dispassionate evaluation of discourse; without the evaluation, there is a mere 'seize' of mind and body that is about nothing at all.9

Stressing the script as a whole in this way lets us give due weight not only to the response - the usual focus when talk turns to emotions - but also to the evaluation; and giving evaluation its due is important in at least two ways. First, it draws into discussion the cognitive aspects of emotion - the involvement of belief and judgement - which often have been separated from or contrasted with emotion. (Granted, the importance of cognition to emotion will be more familiar to students of Aristotle than to those whose views have been shaped, willy-nilly, by Rene Descartes or William James or B. F. Skinner.) Second, stressing the evaluation necessarily stresses the specifically cultural content of emotion: the behaviour of the autonomic nervous system may be a constant in human biology, but the judgements and beliefs that prompt such behaviour are highly variable from one human culture to another.

So - to return to invidia - what script or scripts does a Roman experiencing invidia enact, what are the evaluations essential to the emotion, and what is its cultural content? To start to answer these questions, we can consider the partial taxonomy of scripts that appears as Figure 12.1: I stress that this taxonomy was not constructed a priori; I did not sit down and decide what a plausible taxonomy might look like, then try to sort the textual instances accordingly. The taxonomy was built inductively: these are just the consistent patterns that emerge from reading, at least a couple of times each, every passage in classical Latin in which invidia, invidere and their cognates occur and asking this question: what are the common threads in the stories that are told under the cover of invidia?10

At the most general level, all the stories share a perception that another person is enjoying some good - and an unpleasant 'feeling' of some sort (dolor, affectus, vel sim.): these traits are hardly surprising, because they are the very traits that the Romans themselves picked out

9 This holistic approach to understanding emotion is well emphasised in different terms, by e.g. Schneider 1993; Damasio 1995: esp. 127-64; Ben-Ze'ev 2000: esp. 49-78. The important new work by Naushaud 2001 appeared too late to be laid under contribution to this chapter, but it is clearly compatible with the cognitivist line taken here.

10 Particularly in view of the TLL: articles give only a sampling of the evidence. I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by the Packard Humanities Institute CD-ROM no. 5.3 (1991) in tracing the uses of invidia and its cognates.
Aeneas, recall, has tethered a bird to a mast and promised top prize to the archer who strikes the fluttering creature. First one archer hits the mast, then another severs the tether, then Eurytion brings the bird to earth with his arrow — but still king Acestes shoots, and his arrow miraculously catches fire in mid-air and is consumed. Recognizing a portent when he sees one, Aeneas awards top prize to Acestes, and the narrator adds (539-43):

nee bonus Eurytion praelato invisit honori,
quamvis solus avem caelo deicet ab alto.

Good Eurytion did not feel invisita for the praelato honoris — a Vergilian way of saying that he did not feel invisita for Acestes, who had been praelatus, given precedence, in honour. The comment is added because in ordinary circumstances Eurytion would have felt invisita, and indeed would have been quite justified in that feeling, for a prize that was rightfully his by the rules of the game was given to another; that is the point of the final clause. But Eurytion is bonus here precisely because he sees that these are not ordinary circumstances and so is willing to forgo his right.

Alternatively, in script 4, the relevant sense of right has no explicit reference to oneself at all. My doxor derives from seeing you gain or use some good — wealth, prestige, authority or the like — in a way that affronts some general societal principle: you have behaved high-handedly, cruelly, self-indulgently or against the common good, and you damn well ought to be ashamed of yourself. That, at any rate, will be the burden of my argument in the rest of this chapter: this script of invisita — the script that most clearly distinguishes invisita from both Greek φθόνος and English ‘envy’ — is intimately connected to the emotion of shame; in this manifestation — and it is in fact the most common manifestation of invisita, by some distance — invisita bears the same relation to pudor that vèròcità does to αἰλοίκ in Greek. Before I develop that argument, however, let me first briefly round off my discussion of the taxonomy by noting a few other aspects of it that seem to me important, though I cannot fully elaborate them now.

First, the taxonomy in Figure 12.1 is only partial, in the sense that it could be extended ‘downward’ in further ramifications, which I have omitted here primarily because they are not relevant to my main argument. For example, in the case of script 2, if I feel doxor at seeing a good because it is your good, I can feel that way just because it is your good, period, or I can feel that way because it is your good and not mine (that is, a distinction between a merely begrudging thought, as we might put it in English, and a thought that is both begrudging and covetous at the same
time). For another example, each of these scripts can be enacted either ‘in fact’ or, so to speak, ‘proleptically’; in the case of script 1, I can feel doxor at, and so ‘begrudge’ you, a good that you in fact already possess, just because it is a good — I can want to wipe that smile off your face, say, just because it is a smile; or I can feel doxor at, and so ‘begrudge’ you, a good that you might come to possess — I can deny you a drink of water when you are thirsty, say, just because it would quench your thirst.

We should note too that the taxonomy’s constitutive scripts are not mutually exclusive — something generally true of emotional scripts. I believe, and that in two senses. First, it is obviously possible to experience different invisita scripts simultaneously towards different persons or states of affairs. (Iago does this very conspicuously, and it is the multifariousness of his emotion, as it elaborates the elements of the plot, that makes him the brilliant creation he is.) But it is also possible to experience different invisita scripts simultaneously towards the same person or state of affairs, a point I can illustrate with ‘the case of the negligent colleague’. Professor X shirks administrative jobs so that he will have more time to publish and feed his scholarly reputation. Worse, he even tells his graduate students his little secret: the first time you are given a committee job or the like, just mess it up so there will be no real penalty, and you will never be asked again. (N. of course, is entirely fictional construct.) Now, you know all this about X, you feel doxor at what you are sure is ineptional, high-handed and shameful behaviour损害ing to your department’s common purpose and communal ethos, and you think that he should be ashamed: at the same time, you are aware of the advantage that this behaviour brings him, and you feel doxor because his advantage puts you at a disadvantage in a zero-sum game: it is just not fair that he gets to spend more time on his research while you have less time because you have to pick up some of the slack. You are acting out versions of scripts 3 and 4, in other words. And, if you are a less-than-perfect human, you will perhaps at some level simultaneously feel doxor accompanied by the thought: ‘To hell with fairness: I just wouldn’t mind being in his shoes.’ Welcome to script 2. We could say in this case that your invisita is rich, many-sided and overdetermined.

As a final fact about the taxonomy I note a curiosity that deserves mention though I am not able to explain it: the relevant Latin lexical items — the cognates invisere / invisus / invisus / invisarios — are not distributed evenly among the scripts. The verb invisere and the adjective invisus cluster very densely on the left side of the taxonomy (the Latin

13 To take another example, what we call ‘jealousy’ — in the sense of my begrudging you a good that I have (e.g. my spouse) and do not want you to gain because it would cease to be mine — would be a ‘proleptic’ version of script 3 (my doxor at the anticipation of your enjoying a good that is rightfully mine). Note, however, that this sentiment in fact rarely appears as invisita.
words that correspond most directly to φθορίζω and φθονοριζώ: while they sometimes appear in contexts where script 3 is being acted out, invidere rarely appears in connection with script 4, and invideo never so appears. Conversely, occurrences of the adjective invideo... from the noun invidium, are concentrated on the right side of the taxonomy. Though it sometimes appears in connection with script 2, especially where what we would call ‘courageous thoughts’ are involved. Only invideo appears at all commonly across the whole range of scripts. But its most common setting, as I have already mentioned, is the little drama of script 4 that is where it appears about two times in every three, to do the work done in Greek by the idea of νῆμας. Hence my original contention that Cicero slipped into Greek to make plain a distinction that ordinary Latin would have left unclear, when he wanted to express the idea that the shameful Calidius deserved to be the object of ‘righteous indignation’; and hence my contention that script 4 is, in effect, Latin’s νῆμας-script.

Now when I make that claim I have something very specific in mind: the behaviour and concepts of νῆμας is described in very similar terms by James Redfield, Douglas Cairns and Bernard Williams.14 On this view, νῆμας stands in a precise and special relationship to θύμος: together they form what Redfield calls a ‘reflective pair’. If you have a proper sense of θύμος, you know your standing relative to others in any circumstance, you know what obligations (including obligations of respect that standing imposes on you, and you know what obligations (including obligations of respect) that standing imposes on others relative to you. If your behaviour fails to meet those obligations, you should feel θύμος (which for present purposes we can call ‘shame’), and in fact you will feel θύμος, unless you are what we would call ‘shameless’. But whether or not you feel θύμος, others will certainly feel νῆμας, a reaction ‘ranging from shock, contempt, and malice to righteous rage and indignation’.15 by feeling and expressing this emotion, they show that they have a proper sense of θύμος, and they try to jump-start your own sense, if it has shown itself deficient. So the two emotions are the ‘inner and outer aspects of the same thing’: failures of θύμος provoke the νῆμας of others; and ‘the nemesis of others evokes θύμος in oneself’.16 The most common script of invideo in Latin forms with puder a very similar reflective pair.17

15 Williams 1993: 80.
16 Redfield 1975: 116, 117.
17 Hence the present chapter can be read as a partial correction of the following claim made in Kaster 1976: 134 and 135; ‘Latin authors express all the sentiments that νῆμας comprises, but it has no single term that both embraces them all and forms a reflective pair with puder: invideo perhaps comes closest in semantic range, but it is too broad a concept, and its uses have no particular association with puder or impudicitia.

Take the following passage from Suetonius’s De grammaticis et rhetoribus — an example of which I am particularly fond because I see now that I did not fully understand the passage when I made my edition and commentary several years ago. Suetonius is talking about Albinus Silus, a distinguished rhetorician and declaimer of the Augustan era, who combined with his teaching a very close practice at the bar. Here is what Suetonius says, in my published translation (Kaster: 1995: 37).18

He also argued cases in court, but that quite rarely, since he sought only the most substantial cases, and even then would take on no part of a case save the conclusion. (4) He later withdrew from the forum, partly out of shame and partly out of fear. For on the occasion of a suit before the centurion’s court, when he was attacking his opponent for impetly towards his parents, he offered the man the opportunity to swear an oath ‘Swear’, he said, ‘by the ashes of your father and mother, which lie unburied’, with some other remarks along these lines, intending none of them to be taken literally — whereupon the man took him up on the offer and the judges allowed it, so that he made a botch of his case, incurring substantial ill will in the process. (5) And on another occasion he was defending a man on trial for murder before the proconsul Lucius Piso at Mediolanum: as the lectors sought to quick the excessive cries of his admirers, he flew into such a rage that — having lamented the condition of Italy, which he claimed was being reduced once again to the status of a mere province — he tore things off by invoking Marcus Brutus, whose statue was in sight of the courtroom, as the source and defender of laws and liberty, and he very nearly paid the penalty.

The general point and statement are clear. As an advocate, Albinus was a prima donna who not only wished to perform the most desirable role (the role of summation) in the most desirable cases but who also was given to

18 Suet. Gnaeus. 30.3 5 (Albinus Silus): ‘egit et causas, verum rarius, dum amploissimam quamque securitatem, nec alium in uilla locum quem perpendere: (4) postea renuntiavit foro partim pudore, partem mutu: nec cum in lite quadrum centum virum adversario, quem uitum erga parentes incessit, legum tantum quasi per figuram se obtulit — turra per patris matrise cineres, qui incondis itaen! et alia in hunc modum — anteprete co condicionem nec indicibus aperantibus, nec simae magna uae invidiisque ualidec affluit: (5) et rursus in cognitione caedis Mediolani apud L. Pisonem processuam defensae rei, cum cohobrent lectores minias laudantiam voce et iactandam ut — deploravit Italie statum, quasi item in formam provinciae redigere — M. insequer Brutum, cives statum in cuncta egravi, incognitum legem at libertatem uacuam et vindexe, se non posse salvi. The anecdote in 4, discussed below, is probably derived from Sen. Controversiae 7. pt. 1 (cf. also Quint. Inf. 9.2.95).
untimely and self-indulgent displays, with lamentable result: he withdrew from the forum partly out of shame and partly out of fear. Suetonius says, and then he cites two anecdotes to bear out his contention.

The second anecdote obviously has to do with *merus*; what Suetonius depicts as Albusius’ brush with death when he threw a tantrum and called upon the memory of Caesar’s murderer in a courtroom ultimately under the auspices of Caesar’s heir. The first anecdote has to do with *pudor* and with *invidia*, it turns on a technical point of civil law. Seeking to bring the opprobrium of *temperius* upon his opponent, Albusius called on the man to swear an oath by his parents’ ashes, allegedly unburied; but while making a florid gesture that would be just the thing in a declamation, he failed to reflect that under the rules of civil procedure, the party offered the oath could win the case merely by swearing the oath in the form offered. So he made a mess of the case, and incurred great *invidia* in the process. Here the translator’s choice of ‘ill will’, while perhaps intelligible, is rather lame and insipid. It scarcely approaches the real thought behind *invidia* in this little drama, which I take to be something like this: viewing the wreck of the case, an onlooker would be inclined to think, ‘Well now, look at Mister Big-Shot Professor, with his big reputation and his pick of juicy cases—he’s so wrapped up in himself and his cute tricks; he screws up by making a such-and-such mistake; he oughta be ashamed of himself!’ And so, Suetonius assures us, he was.

This is *viamontic script invidia* at work, and its link with ‘shameful’ behaviour is strong and clear as far back as we can trace the concept *invidia*. Let me offer just a few more illustrations, starting with our earliest example of continuous Latin prose, the preface to Catö’s *De agricultura*, in which he famously compares farming with trade and money-lending (pp.1-4):

* Est o o interdum praestare mercaturis rem quaerere, nisi tam peculiosum sit, et item fenerari, si tam honestum sit. maiores nostri sic habuerant et ina legibus posuerant: farem dupli condemnari, generatorem mercaduli . . . mercatorem autem strenuum studio-sumque rei quaerendae existimo, verum, ut supra dixi, peculiosum et calamiosum. et axagroci et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi singnuntur, maximeque pius quas est sulpibus stabulissimusque conse-intur quinimumque invidiosus minimeque male cogitantes sunt qui in eo studio occupati sunt.

The problem with trade, he says, is that it is insufficiently secure, while the problem with money-lending is that it is insufficiently honourable. Farming, by contrast, is a ‘maxime . . . pius quasest stabulissimusque . . .’

19 On the technicality see Kaster 1995: 322.

minimeque invidiosus: it avoids the insecurity inherent in trade and the *invidia* that clings to money-lending – the feeling that those who engage in it are in fact worse than thieves, that like thieves they are violating a social norm and should be ashamed of themselves.

This script of *invidia* responds to the gaining or use of an advantage in a way deemed socially destructive and discreditable; accordingly, the script appears in contexts as varied as the forms of socially destructive and discreditable behaviour itself. Some other examples, very briefly:

1. Defending Caelius, Cicero says that he will not ask that the indulgence owed to youth be extended to his client: no, no, it may be that other members of the *aeneae domae* lead lives of self-indulgence, going into debt, surrendering to *petulantia* and *libidines*, and thereby incurring the *magna invidia* owed to *vitia* and *pecata* – but *not* his blameless client.

2. Speaking of himself, Cicero returns repeatedly during the last twenty years of his life to the *invidia* directed at him as a result of his role in suppressing the Catalinian conspiracy, a role in which – on this view – he exercised his authority high-handedly and against the interest of the *res publica*.

3. In a structurally identical circumstance, the dictator Cornelius Cassius suffers *invidia* for imprisoning the seditious Marcus *Manilius Capito* at *38 BC*: as Livy tells the story, the triumph over the Volsci that Cassius celebrated at the same time as Manilius’ imprisonment was read by much of the plebs as symbolic of not his glorious victory over a *hostis* but of his arrogant and shameful abuse of power in dealing with a *civis*.

4. Or take the humiliating charade in which Agricola, according to Tacitus, was forced to perform: when Domitian’s agents made it

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20 Cic. Cat. 93. 10: ‘*quaerere* ego severtissiae tuae ita ut operibus respondere non audeo, erat enim meum deprecari *suctionem* adolescentiae veniamque petere: nona, inquam, audeo; perlegi nihil utor sexis, concessa omnibus utra dimittis; tandem potu, ut *quaerere* comitem hos tempore ausi acrii, petulantiae, *libidinum* inveniant, quem video eum magnum, tamem ne haec alium pecus, ne uteris as tempore austri viso nunciant.

21 Cicero Cat. 1. 22: ‘*temetis* video, si mea voce perturritus ict in esculatu animam induxes, quanta *tempesces invidiae* nobis, si minus in praesens tempus recens memoria sedum tuorum, ut in posteraem impendiat’; cf. Cat. 1.28-9, 2.3.15, 3.3, 28-9, 39.9, 33 Dom. 44, 4 Hor. Resp. 61, Piso 72, Mil. 82, Phil. 3.16, Leg. 3.26, sim. Sall. BC 22.3, 43.1, Suet. Jul. 14.1.

22 Livy 6.16.5: ‘*coniicato* in cururem Manilio satis constat magnum partem plebis vestem mutasse, milites mortales capillum ac *barbarum prominece, observantiam, vestibus* carceris meas tum turman. *dictator de Volsci triumphatus, invidiaque magis triumphans quam glorios sui*, quippe domi non militiae partem eam actumque de civis non de hoste fremebant: unum defenso tantum superbere, quod non M. Manlius ante currum sit ductus.’
plain that it was not prudent for him to seek the proconsluship of Africa or Asia that he deserved; he first had to beg to be ‘excused’ – and then had to thank the emperor for the ‘favour’. Domitian’s role in the charade, and the hollow benefitum he extended, were shameful and so, appropriately, the object of invidia: but of course the shameless Domitian did not blush.23

5. And as a final example, consider epigram 3.21 of Martial: a slave who had been brinded on the forehead as a punishment saved his master’s life during the proscriptions – a gift, in the event, not of vita but of invidia.34 The thought is that only a cruel and abusive master would mistreat so loyal a slave; and so, in Shackleton Bailey’s translation, ‘This was not saving his master’s life but putting him to shame.’

Now the slave in this last tale, I take it, did not intend to put his master to shame. That is rather the unintended consequence of his action, as it is interpreted by a notional set of onlookers: placing the action in a larger, implied narrative of past actions (the master’s, the slave’s), the onlookers construct and act out an emotional script that then connects to that larger narrative. This is the way our emotional scripts tie us to the narratives of each other’s lives. In the case of invidia, an ‘onlooker’ is always at least implied, just because it is invidia, linked by etymology and actuality to ‘seeing’; and this essential link to ‘seeing’ explains the intimate connection of invidia with ‘shame’, which depends on (among other things) the sense of seeing yourself being seen under some discreditable description.25

So all of the vocabula-script invidia implies a performance observed and judged. Furthermore, much of the vocabula-script invidia – and I think the most interesting part – is the result of managed performances, the more or

23 Tacitus Agr. 42.1–2: ‘accessere quidam cognitium principis peritii...’; ac primo occulcitis quietem et oium laudeae, nos operam ne in adubrandam excussione offere, postremo non iam obscuri saeuentes simul terronesque pertaxere ad Domitianum: qui paratus simulatae: in adubrandam composuit, et auditus precibus excusatis et, cum admissus, ait: sih grauis passus est: nec erubuit benefici invinda.

24 Martial 3.21: ‘proscriptum famulus servavit: fronte notatus. / Non fuit haec domini vita, sed invinda:’ cf. Val. Max. 6.8.7 (on the escape of Antuinus Restio, the presumed model for Martial’s poem); ‘ipse [sc. servus], nihil aliud quam umbra et imago suppliciorum suorum, maximum esse emolumentum eius a quo tum gravioris punitus erat salutem iaducavit, cumque abunde forest iram remittit, adiunct estiam caritatem’.

25 For one approach to the Roman sense of ‘shame’, see Kaster 1997. For the dependence of the emotion not on being seen (either actually or notional) but on seeing oneself being seen (either actually or notional), see the important remarks of Taylor 1985: 60–1, which are consistent with the Roman evidence.
similar kind of theatrical coup is brilliantly evoked by Apuleius in his *Apology* (25), where he recounts how his main persecutor came into the forum of Oea, breathless and distraught, and read out to the gathered crowd part of a letter by Apuleius' wife, Pudentilla, in which her 'enchantment' was supposedly revealed.

The performance, however, could be no less effective for being wordless. Following someone around town dressed in mourning is a way of creating *invidia* that appears not only in the semi-fictional world of declamation (Sen. *Cons. 10. 1. 9*) but in the *Dias*, where it is expressly forbidden (47.10.15.27, cf. ibid. §6); similarly forbidden is any use of the emperor's image in *invidiam aliquam* – with a view to expressing or creating *invidia* against someone – say, by carrying the image to invoke the emperor's protection against an overbearing other (Dig. 47.10.38 pr., 48.19.28.7, cf. 25.8.92 pr.). In all these performances the crucial move is to cast yourself in the role of victim. That is what you do when you publicly throw yourself at the knees of another, not only to arouse his pity but to threaten him with others' shaming *invidia* if he spurns your plea. It is what Bibulus did when he withdrew to his house during his consilium, to bring *invidia* against the high-handedness of his colleague, Caesar (Sen. * Dial. 6.14.2*, cf. Vell. Pat. 2.4.45). According to Tacitus (*Ann. 3.16*), it is what Tiberius complained the elder Piso had done in committing suicide, and it is what Caligula did when he brought magna *invidia* upon a group of senators suspected of conspiring against him, in effect by taking himself hostage (*Cal. 56.1*): drawing his sword, he offered to kill himself right there if they thought he deserved it (one imagines the senators' mixed emotions). And it is what Britannicus did in the game that ensured his death (*Tac. Ann. 13.15*): called on to sing a song at a celebration of the Saturnalia, he chose lyrics that alluded to the denial of his patrimony – a choice that aroused pity for him and *invidia* for Nero. But perverse creature that Nero was, he did not feel the shame that such *invidia* should have aroused, but only heightened *odium* – the hostility most appropriate when you have been done a personal insult.

All these performances attempt to marshal emotion against someone judged guilty of misusing an advantage or a position of superiority. It is structurally fitting, therefore, to find almost identical performances mounted in relations with the divine, to arouse *invidia* against the gods when they have let us mortals down.27 Not surprisingly, death provides

Merely skimming this catalogue is enough to show that these performances are both very common and very rich in their diversity. But there is one thought common to them all: I feel *invidia* towards this person because he (almost always, he) is shamefully abusing his favourable circumstance, and I am going to make you feel the same thing – or in the idiom that occurs to me: *I am going to make you feel your invidia*. This is what *invidia* is in you towards the other.26 The emotion, and the performances that it inspires, thus produce a type of social glue, reinforcing certain kinds of judgement and unifying a group against a renegade. Let's just glance briefly at some of these performances, which (for the sake of convenience only) are sorted in the catalogue above according to the 'formality' and 'informality' of their setting – roughly, the degree of their institutionalisation.

So, for example, there is the highly structured setting of the *contio*, the address to a gathering of the people that could be convened only by a magistrate or priest. The *contio* is the formal space for creating *viciinis infectio* under the Republic, where the *contio* is to *invidia* what the *iaduum* is to *craimen*: the *contio* aims to create a consensus that someone has done something for which he should be ashamed; the *iaduum* creates the formal judgement that he has done something for which he should be punished. But the *contio* is only a highly regulated instance of the sort of performance that filled the open spaces of public life every day, as the streets and marketplaces of great cities and small towns witnessed a lively theatre of outrage and shame. The *flagitio* and related forms of semi-ritualised behaviour provide a cluster of examples. Following someone about and loudly proclaiming that they had abused you was obviously intended to achieve your purpose not only by encouraging your abuser to reflect on the error of his ways, but especially by making him feel the *invidia* of others – by bringing to bear against him the glances of witnesses who would see him for the high-handed or cruel person that he was. A

26 Drawing attention to this idiom was a great merit of Weinstand 1946.
INVIOLATA, VAPOROUS-SCRIPT INVIOLATA, commonly functions in Roman funerary art as an alter ego for the deceased. In Roman funerary art, the ghostly or spiritual form of the deceased is often depicted as a ghostly or spiritual form of the deceased. This is especially evident in the depiction of the gods of the Roman underworld, such as the god of fire, the god of death, and the god of the afterlife. The depiction of these gods is often used to convey the message that the deceased is still alive in the afterlife and is being watched over by the gods.

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In conclusion, the depiction of the gods of the Roman underworld is often used to convey the message that the deceased is still alive in the afterlife and is being watched over by the gods. This is especially evident in the depiction of the gods of the Roman underworld, such as the god of fire, the god of death, and the god of the afterlife. The depiction of these gods is often used to convey the message that the deceased is still alive in the afterlife and is being watched over by the gods.
fundamentum libidinis suarum gurgitem profundat, villam aedificare
in octo ommum tantam tugurium ut iam videatur esse illa
villa quam ipse tribunos plebis pictam olim in contionibus explica-
cabat, quod fortesissimum ac summum cive in invidia homio castus
ac non cupidus vocaret.

As governor, we are told, Gabinius drained the wealth of Syria to build a villa
so magnificent that it dwarfed the villa of Lucullus, which he had assailed as a
tribune in 67, to bring invidia upon its owner. There are at least three layers of
invidia here. First, a tribune who was in fact ‘castus ac non cupidus’ could
credibly condemn the luxury and self-indulgence of a magistrate and use the
cometo-cry “Shame on you!” In contrast, associating invidia was one of the
important purposes a cometo could serve. But of course the phrase ‘castus
ac non cupidus’ is sarcastic, and we know that Cicero’s Gabinius was not that
sort of tribune. Rather, we are to understand that he was a hypocrite: when
seeking to arouse invidiam against the wealthy, he was himself see-
ing with eyes of invidiam, coveting the very thing that he was decrying. And
now that Gabinius has achieved more-than-Lucullan luxury, Cicero himself
of course uses the episode to arouse invidiam against the man—one of
his chief occupations in the years 56–55.

My last example comes from how to put it—a less subtle pen than
Cicero’s, that of Valerius Maximus; but it none the less has intriguing
layers of its own. In his chapter ‘De humanitate et clementia’, Valerius
tells us of Caesar’s respectful treatment, first of Pompey’s head, then of
Cato’s estate; and he relates Caesar’s remark on hearing of Cato’s suicide,
that each had felt invidia for the other’s glory. 34 Valerius’s report virtually
compels us to focus on the invidiam in three different ways. For Valerius
himself, invidiam almost certainly has the watered-down sense that it often
does, similar to the English idiom that allows one friend to say to another
‘Oh, I envy you that vacation’, expressing the covetous judgement of envy
without engaging the psychosomatic responses that give the emotion its
force and flavour: that is, Cato and Caesar would each simply have been
glad to have the other’s gudoria. This is entirely consistent with Valerius’s
overall historical sensitivity, sentimental and soaked in kitch as it is,
which probably imagined Cato and Caesar downing a few pints together
in the afterlife, letting bygones be bygones, and shaking their heads over
old times.

34 Val. Max. 5.1.10: ‘Catonis quoque morte Caesar audita et se illius gloriae invidias
voluit sese invindicis dissecraturumque eius libris ipsis inoluitur corpore, et
tercle divinorum Caesaris operum non parva pars Catos salus fuisset.’
Bloomer 1992:211–12 contrasts Valerius’s report with those of Plutarch (Cato 72)
and Cassius Dio (43.16.1) and rightly notes how this version ‘damp[s] the episode
to Caesar’s favour’.

For Caesar, it is I suppose conceivable that he meant something of
the sort that Valerius intended. But Caesar was, after all, also the author of
the Anticato, a vicious posthumous polemic, and he is unlikely to have
said that he coveted Cato’s gudoria. Far likelier, instead, that he had a more
realistic and hard-nosed understanding of the emotion, as entailing sheer
begrudgement: he and Cato each felt pain at the other’s glory just because
it was the other’s glory. 35

And what of Cato’s invidiam? Well of course, as a good Stoic, Cato
should have felt no invidia—nor any other passion—at all. Still, if we
imagine for a moment that Cato was human, we might suppose that he,
like Caesar, did feel the begrudgement of gudoria—invidiam. But we will also
remember that suicide—the one act for which Cato was most renowned—
was among the performances by which you could express and create
gudoria against someone whose advantage was gained or used in
high-handed, outrageous and shameful ways—adjectives that surely
capture Cato’s view of Caesar’s gudoria. We might then imagine his
agreement with Cicero, that ‘to vaingloriously take another’s gudoria— invidia
is one thing; invidia quite another.

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35. Cf. Cassius Dio’s version: ‘Caesar said that he was angry with [Cato] because he
had begrudged Caesar the glory of having spared him’ (16.2:1) Kallex kouddaur
mev de epivnousa zei theri oj ejepi tis mathiai autes eikones dievnikias)


PROGRAMME OF THE SECOND A. G. LEVENTIS GREEK CONFERENCE

THE RIVALROUS EMOTIONS IN ANCIENT GREECE: ENVY, SPITE AND JEALOUSY

Friday 2 March 2001
9.45 a.m. Registration
10.20 a.m. Welcome by Dr Keith Rutter

First session – Envy, Spite and Jealousy
(Chair: Dr Ruth Caston, University of California, Davis)
10.30 a.m. Professor Christopher Gill (University of Exeter)
In what ethical framework does spite belong? Or mapping the vices of rivalry in Greek
11.30 a.m. Professor David Konstan (Brown University; Leventis Visiting Professor)
Envy into jealousy
12.10 p.m. Discussion

Second session – Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle
(Chair: Professor Dori Scalfius, University of Edinburgh)
2.00 p.m. Dr Fritz Gregor Herrmann (University of Edinburgh)
Envy in the world of Plato’s Timaeus
2.40 p.m. Dr Cristina Vianio (University of Paris, Sorbonne)
On the thumos of Aristotle
3.50 p.m. Professor Aaron Ben Zíev (University of Haifa)
Aristotle’s account of emotions towards the fortune of others
4.30 p.m. Discussion