In this article, I analyze the role of Heracles’ famous body in the representation of madness and its aftermath in Euripides’ *Heracles*. Unlike studies of *Trachiniae*, interpretations of *Heracles* have neglected the hero’s body in Euripides. This reading examines the eruption of that body midway through the tragedy as a part of Heracles that is daemonic and strange, but also integral to his identity. Central to my reading is the figure of the symptom, through which madness materializes onstage. Symptoms were contested sites of interpretation in the late fifth century, supporting both conventional narratives about human suffering and new stories advanced by contemporary medicine and ethics. In exploring the imaginative possibilities of these new stories, I do not privilege a “secular” over a “divine” reading. Rather I aim to offer a model of interaction between medicine and tragedy that sees the cross-breeding of worldviews as productive of innovative drama.

**INTRODUCTION: HERACLES, THE SYMPTOM, AND THE POETICS OF OVERDETERMINATION**

Heracles ranks among the classic paradoxes of Greek mythology. Demigod and Übermensch, he exemplifies “the paradigm of transgression that ought to consolidate the norm.”1 Euripides’ *Heracles*, the only known tragedy devoted to the hero’s madness, has proved as challenging to grasp as its protagonist. The “clinical” realism of Heracles’ symptoms and the theological speculation of the play’s final scene have been read in light of Euripides’ commitment to the new learning of the late fifth century. Interpretations that depart from myth, however, must contend with Iris’ appearance on the skêne and her attribution of

the madness \( \textit{lussa} \) to Hera’s anger. The fact that she is actually accompanied by Lussa would seem to confirm the divine, external cause of the madness. And yet even the personification instantiates the tragedy’s contradictory nature. With absurd prudence, Lussa warns Hera and Iris to abandon their plot against Heracles lest they err.

In \textit{Heracles}, the dissonance that is characteristic of Euripidean tragedy reaches a new level. In turn, discussions of the play amplify the ongoing debate about the relevance of contemporary Athenian intellectual culture to Euripides’ creative output: the tragedy is either a pious playwright’s affirmation of traditional theology or a sophist’s critique of the gods and myth. Against this schism, the final scene has stood as an occasion for relative consensus. In a startling reversal of another tragedy about a warrior’s madness and misdirected violence, Sophocles’ \textit{Ajax}, Theseus steps in at a critical moment to dissuade his friend from suicide and extend an invitation to Athens.\(^2\) Whether traditional or novel, the \textit{aretē} displayed by Heracles in reconciling himself to his fate and accepting Theseus’ offer of a new life has been widely read as the emblem of the tragedy’s uncommonly bittersweet humanism.\(^3\) \textit{Heracles}, on this view, provides a sense of closure that belies the play’s capacity to vex and to confuse its critics.

In this essay, I depart from these two major critical approaches to \textit{Heracles}: polarizing interpretations of Heracles’ madness (external-divine or internal-naturalized), on the one hand, and readings of the final scene in strictly conciliatory terms, on the other. In the reading I offer here, the play, like its hero, thrives precisely at the intersection of competing worldviews and through their

\(^2\) In \textit{Ajax}, the loss of honor resulting from madness leaves the hero no option but suicide, and friendship is asickle as \textit{tuchē} (678–83; cf. \textit{HF} 558–60). On Heracles and Ajax, see James 1969; de Romilly 1979; Barlow 1981; Furley 1986; Worman 1999.

\(^3\) For the claim that Heracles’ decision to live pioneers a new \textit{aretē}, see Chalk 1962; de Romilly 1979: 6–9; Barlow 1981: 119–20; Higgins 1984: 104–105; Furley 1986; Fitzgerald 1991: 93–95; Cerri 1997; Assaël 2001: 178–86. On the tenacity of traditional \textit{aretē} and the hero’s \textit{ethos} in the play’s final scenes, see Adkins 1966: 209–19; Schlesier 1985: 27–40; Loraux 1987: 8–9; Yoshitake 1994: 143–46. By humanism, I mean the tragedy’s foregrounding of Heracles’ vulnerability and the value it places on human, especially civic, relationships in the aftermath of disaster. The play has also attracted readings in the tradition of Classical Humanism, defined by Niall Rudd as “the rational study of Greeks and Romans as fellow human beings” (1996: 283). Here, for example, is Verrall on the tragedy: “for power, for truth, for poignancy, for depth of penetration into the nature and history of man, this picture of the Hellenic hero may be matched against anything in art” (1905: 140). That Verrall’s own studies of Euripides’ representation of the nature and the history of man no longer enjoy support reminds us, however, that our affinities with the Greeks and Romans as “fellow human beings” are rarely self-evident and often misaligned with the principles of humanity according to which Greeks and Romans imagined their own communities. To speak of humanism, then, is to negotiate between past and present ideas about the human, ideas that are mutable and multi-layered in both the ancient and the modern periods. Recent readings of \textit{Heracles} have focused, for example, on the importance of the \textit{polis} to Heracles’ reintegration into human society: Foley 1985: 165–67, 174–75, 192–204; Braden 1993: 247–49; George 1994: 155–57; Mills 1997: 129–59; Worman 1999: 102–103; Assaël 2001: 178–86. The present reading considers the human against the backdrop of sophistic and medical debates about human nature (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος, as at [Hpc.] \textsc{VM} 20, Littre´ I.620=146,2 Jouanna).
cross-fertilization. Insofar as the mythic Heracles is in part defined by pathology, his nosos cannot be definitively classified as internal or external. Nor is there one idea of what is inside and what is outside a human being in late fifth-century Athens. Finally, the meaning of the “human” in the last scene is contested, as Heracles, Theseus, and Amphitryon struggle, in the absence of a deus ex machina, to determine what has, and should, be done, and by whom or what: in short, to determine how to recover the human from the chaos of madness.  

Heracles is committed, in other words, not to indeterminacy but to overdetermination. Its multiple stories about the meaning and the implications of madness and Heracles’ resulting grief converge on the figure of the symptom, defined for my purposes here as a rift within one’s sense of self or one’s public persona that betrays the unseen presence of a fearsome, alien world. It is through the symptom that Lussa breaks into the world of mortal events, at least from the perspective of an audience aware of her role. But symptoms also mark the point at which Heracles’ infamous body—the body of brute strength; the body enslaved to impinging forces and uncontrollable appetites; the body that suffers while acting, and is feminized by its suffering—erupts into visibility. And finally, it is through symptoms, not only of lussa, but also, in the final scene, of grief (lupê), that Heracles struggles with the disordered and disordering body as something that is both his own and radically other. What makes symptoms so fascinating is that, unlike epiphanies, they do not unveil a hidden world. Rather, they provoke speculation about what lies beyond the border between the human and the daemonic and the traffic across that border. By concealing as much as they reveal, symptoms invite competing interpretations. Insofar as it surfaces through symptoms, the Heracleian body is not a known entity, but rather a cipher that challenges and remolds the identity set forth in the first half of the play.

The complexity of Euripides’ representation of Heracles’ madness and its aftermath may become clearer if we put the play in dialogue with new accounts of the body, disease, and human nature being disseminated by advocates of the new medicine in the late fifth century. I approach medical thinking as neither

5. Heracles’ flesh, Anne Carson has written, “is a cliché” (2006: 13); see further below, n.72. On Heracles’ body in Euripides’ play, see also Worman 1999. Worman’s focus is not on the diseased body, but on the ability of “the exterior of the body—and especially the materials that cover it—to represent familial and civic bonds as visible and performative” (94). I am interested in Heracles’ body as a locus of forces that he both harnesses and suffers.
6. On the multiple characterizations of Heracles available to poets and philosophers in Athens in the second half of the fifth century, see Woodford 1966.
7. The “new medicine” represented in the sixty-odd extant treatises gathered in the Hippocratic Corpus is “new” to the extent that it offers naturalizing (phasis-based) explanations of symptoms without enlisting gods or daemons as causes. The absence of the gods from the explanatory framework of the medical writers does not mean that they are atheists or irreligious. It is because of their broad
dogmatically anti-theistic, an approach that has been roundly discredited in recent decades, nor as proto-positivist, i.e. a precise description of physical reality conducive to literary realism. Rather, I understand medicine as a privileged site for conceptualizing human participation in the unseen worlds of the inquiry into nature (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία, Pl. Phd. 96a8). Plato railed against the prioritization of “absurd” causes in this inquiry, things like rocks and earth that are “incapable of taking heed of human things” (οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, Leg. 886d8–e1) and indifferent to the good. These are the kinds of causes that medicine takes up. By refusing to blame social agents (angry or jealous gods, negligent or impious persons) for disease and by imagining that symptoms arise from a hidden space of fluids and forces inside the body, medicine transforms not just the narratives, but the kinds of narratives available to explain why symptoms happened.

Symptoms are also intrinsically important to tragedy as instruments for cuing the outbreak of the gods’ power onstage. At the same time, symptoms are realized in and through a person, as opposed to bird divination or hieroscopy where the gods turn animals into conduits of power. They thus raise the question of the character’s implication in his or her diseases, a situation regularly exploited in tragedy. Grasping Heracles, then, requires an account of how tragic causality might be complicated, rather than overturned, by contemporary debates about the meaning of sudden, inexplicable symptoms, the nature of human vulnerability, and ideals of areté and health.

In short, Heracles’ symptoms can be assigned neither to medical nor to magico-religious paradigms. Rather they function as nodes where narratives about the meaning of suffering intersect. The symptom thus becomes a privileged site for observing how Euripides probes the tragic implications of these narratives, old commitment to natural causality that I speak of “the” new medicine or “the” medical writers. Yet it must be stressed that within the Hippocratic Corpus one finds an astonishing range of genres, assumptions, and approaches that in a different context would require further specification.

8. A concise overview of the relatively recent shift in the field of ancient medicine away from Enlightenment and positivist approaches can be found in van der Eijk 2005: 1–8.

9. I have given a much fuller account of these narratives and the emergence of the physical body as an object of knowledge in Holmes Forthcoming (a).

10. At the end of her indispensable book on tragic madness, Whom Gods Destroy, Ruth Padel speculates on the conditions necessary for the sporadic efflorescence of tragedy in the Western tradition. She argues that what the diverse societies that produce tragedy have in common is that they are all in a way “poised on some momentary cusp between theological, or daemonological, and innovative scientific explanations for human pain. . . . Maybe, a medical and theological tug-of-war between religious and scientific explanation encourages an attention to madness as illustration of human suffering that is best expressed in tragedy” (1995: 247); see also Padel 1981: 123–25. I believe that Padel’s suspicion is well founded with respect to Athenian tragedy. But cf. Gill 1996: 264: “One difficulty with this suggestion, as a way of summarizing [Padel’s] own approach, is that she tends, especially in Mind, to present the fifth-century medical, religious, and tragic perspectives as (similar) aspects of a single thought-world, so that she provides little basis for seeing in Greek thought a transition from religious to scientific perspectives.” Padel thus succeeds in bringing diverse perspectives together, but neglects the friction that she deems critical to tragedy qua genre.
and new, in a play that introduces the most scandalously embodied of Greek heroes to his capacity for suffering. I will argue that the inherent polysemy of the tragic symptom, the anxieties about self-mastery introduced by Heracles’ madness, and the compromised position of theodicy in the play together create the conditions for an exploration of human vulnerability within an opaque, inhuman cosmos, an exploration thematized by the figures of disease and the body. It is a situation that Euripides nevertheless approaches in uniquely tragic terms. Heracles is cast as an exemplar of late fifth-century civilizing virtue whose madness brings in its wake the transformation of identity.

In considering Euripides’ innovative presentation of Heracles’ madness in the context of contemporary medical and sophistic culture, I try to model a strategy for interpreting his generative relations with his intellectual milieu that sidesteps questions of adherence and rejection, belief and impiety. Claims of medical influence on tragedy, of course, can never be proven beyond a doubt, as is the case with most arguments about influence, allusion, and generic interaction. But this simply means that the final test of the validity of these claims is whether they can enliven and enrich our relationship to tragedy. My argument thus ultimately rests on the readings themselves. Nevertheless, given the interpretive difficulties raised by Heracles, I begin with a more detailed account of my methodological approach to the relationship between contemporary medicine and tragedy.

Herkules and Medicine: Methodological Considerations

Euripides’ interest in medicine was recognized in antiquity and is widely accepted today. Unlike Aeschylus, he lived and wrote during a period when we are quite certain that medical texts were circulating, physicians were active

11. Like Röhdich 1968, I see Euripides opening up a space in Heracles where the tragic implications of the new learning can be explored. It will become clear, however, that unlike Röhdich and others (Burnett 1985; Gregory 1991; Papadopoulou 2005: 84–85), I do not see the outcome of this exploration as a rehabilitation of conventional piety or myth. As Emily Wilson has stressed, multiple narratives remain viable until the end of Heracles, “undermin[ing] the authority of myth” (2005: 80). See also Kerferd 1981: 169–72 and, for a general reconsideration of tragedy’s intellectual context, Allan 1999–2000; idem, 2005, although he does not consider medicine in any detail. On Euripides and medicine, see below, n.13.


13. See especially E. fr. 282K (=Autolycus fr. 1 J.-V.L.); 286bK (=Bellerophon fr. 9 J.-V.L.); 981K; 1072K; 1086K. On the basis on fr. 917K, which Clement of Alexandria paired with [Hpc.] Aph. 1.2 (Littre’ IV.458), Nestle asserted that Euripides had read Airs, Waters, Places (1938: 24–27). Few scholars have been as bold as Nestle, but the affinities between Euripides and contemporary medical writing have been repeatedly noted. Of all the tragedians, Guardasole sees “un’ idea di medicina scientifica, libera de pregiudizii religiosi” in Euripides alone (2000: 41; see further 76–86); Kosak 2004 is a monograph devoted to Euripides and medicine. See also Harries 1891: 7, 13; Musitelli 1968; Mattes 1970: 8, 76; Ferrini 1978: 50–52; Pigeaud 1981: 376–439; Jouanna 1987: 124–26; Garzya 1992: 511–12; Craik 2001.
participants in epideictic arenas, and the new medicine was being practiced, at least in the urban centers of the Mediterranean. There is less of a consensus, however, on the question of how this interest informed the representation and significance of disease in Euripides’ tragedies, which are manifestly full of gods and conventional poetic images of daemonic attack.

The question is particularly pressing for Heracles, which combines vivid, “clinical” symptoms of madness with an equally vivid personification of Lussa. Despite a range of critical perspectives on the tragedy’s portrayal of disease, certain patterns do emerge in the scholarship. On the one hand, Heracles’ symptoms have been read in light of contemporary medical descriptions of disease, a practice consistent with more general studies of tragic madness. Both Euripides in Heracles and the author of On the Sacred Disease, for example, include rolling eyes, foam at the mouth, and irregular breathing in their descriptions of the madman. The play’s references to Hera and the appearance of Lussa, on the other hand, have been taken as foreclosing readings of Heracles’ madness as anything other than god-sent and external. Although the schematic division into medical (or “realist”) symptoms and divine causality is particularly exaggerated in scholarship on Heracles, it has characterized much work on tragic disease.

In what follows, I challenge this schematic division by complicating each of its terms. I begin by drawing attention to the polysemy fostered by the symptom, arguing that symptoms had become a locus, inside and outside of tragedy, of competing explanations of suffering circulating in the late fifth century. I then


17. Heracles is often contrasted on these grounds with Orestes (Hartigan 1987; Theodorou 1993).

18. A recent monograph on Heracles demonstrates the persistence of this classification: “as a general rule, medical works substituted natural causes for divine causation in any type of bodily or mental disorder. Greek tragedy, on the contrary, is a literary genre that dramatizes myths; it may indeed be enriched by the vocabulary of ancient medicine, it may even at times seem, especially in the case of Euripides, to present its audience with almost clinical cases of madness, yet it retains the notion of divine causation of madness as established in literary tradition from Homer onwards” (Papadopoulou 2005: 59).
consider the complexity of the unseen world intimated by the tragic symptom. For having inherited the structure of so-called “double determination,” tragedy as a genre and Euripides in particular problematize the position of the tragic patient as the mysterious interval between the gods’ intentions and the outcomes of these intentions. The patient, in other words, contributes an unknown quantity to the production of effects. Cause, then, is not solely external. Heracles is implicated in his symptoms, as well as in his acts. By drawing attention to the tragic patient as an interval, symptoms generate speculation about the complicity between outer and inner forces in the expression and consequences of disease. Once I have sketched a framework for analyzing symptoms, I look at the kinds of stories they might have accommodated before I turn to the reading of *Heracles.*

**THE POLYSEMY OF THE SYMPTOM**

There are considerable difficulties involved in using symptoms as proof of medicine’s influence on *Heracles* or any other tragedy. First of all, Heracles’ symptoms are much like those of other tragic characters under duress. Clytemnestra speaks of Cassandra foaming with rage and confusion like a wild animal (A. Ag. 1064–67). When Io is driven offstage by a sudden attack of madness, her eyes twist in their sockets (A. Pr. 877–86). As early as the *Iliad* we find the classic tragic symptom of rolling eyes (στρεφεδίνηθεν δέ οἱ ὄσσε, 16.792) when, in the prelude to his death, Patroclus is struck on the back by Apollo. In tragedy, whose audience lacks an omniscient narrator, symptoms play an important role in registering inner turmoil and daemonic power in shared space, where they can be observed and reported by other characters. Like masks, lyric meters, language, gesture, and musical innovation suited to the communication of emotion, symptoms may be counted among the tragic conventions for representing suffering.

Against the view that medical writing was a source for tragic symptomatology, one might argue further that, unlike theories about cause, symptoms are there for anyone to see and to describe. Euripides, on this view, was an unusually


gifted observer of pathological conditions. It is possible to counter that what gets noticed is what one is looking for; medicine can be seen as codifying a way of looking at the body that is then used to present tragic disease. This argument, however, can only be taken so far, since both the physician and the tragedian tend to focus on the most spectacular symptoms. And if we can identify habits of seeing, such as heightened attention to the eyes as sites of meaning, these habits are likely due to the cultural context shared by the poet and the medical writers.

It is, in fact, this shared context that poses the most powerful challenge to narrow characterizations of Euripides as either an avid reader of contemporary medical texts or as a strict realist or as a traditionalist poet. Critics who look to the treatise *On the Sacred Disease* as a source of medical information often fail to note that the very symptoms identified as Hippocratic are targeted by competing explanations in that text. When symptoms such as bellowing or frothing at the mouth are first introduced, they are correlated with interpretations given by the author’s opponents, the magico-religious healers, who place blame on “the divine and the daemonic” (τὸ θεῖον ... καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον):23

If the patient imitates a goat, if he grinds his teeth, or suffers convulsions in the right side, they say that the Mother of the Gods is to blame. If he utters a piercing and loud cry, they liken him to a horse and blame Poseidon. Should he pass some excrement, as often happens under stress of the disease, the surname Enodia is applied. If he utters sounds that are more frequent and thin, like those of birds, it is Apollo Nomios. If he foams at the mouth and kicks, Ares has the blame. When at night occur fears and terrors, delirium, jumpings from the bed and rushings out of doors, they say that these are the assaults of Hecate and the attacks of the heroes.

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The multiplicity of symptoms, which are taken for granted as part of a common vocabulary, is easily aligned with a polytheistic etiology. Treatment involves propitiating the right god.

The author of *On the Sacred Disease* shares neither the daemonic explanations nor the therapeutic strategies of his opponents. From his perspective, the symptoms in question are caused by a cold substance called phlegm that is innate in the body when it grows too powerful in congenitally phlegmatic people who are exposed to certain stimuli (e.g. winds, fear). Preventative treatment is possible, and involves manipulating the relationship between corporeal forces-qualities (e.g. the hot, the cold, the wet, the dry) through diet so that the body can withstand changes in the environment or other potential catalysts. Yet despite the substantive differences between the medical writer and his opponents, he systematically charts the path of phlegm through the body by means of the same symptoms that feature in the magico-religious healers’ explanations.

It is likely that *On the Sacred Disease* was performed publicly in the last quarter of the fifth century. It offers solid evidence that symptoms, especially spectacular ones, had become contested sites of interpretation in this period, which coincides with the probable date of the performance of *Heracles*. Historiography, too, allows us to see the proliferation of explanations for the symptom. Herodotus, for example, attributes Cambyses’ madness either to his treatment of Apis or to “any of the evils which overtake humans” (εἴτε δὴ διὰ τὸν Ἀπιν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλους, οία πολλὰ ἐσόθε ἀνθρώπως κακὰ καταλαμβάνειν, III.33). According to some people, Cambyses had suffered from birth a serious disease “which some people call sacred” (τὴν ἱρὴν ὀνοµάζουσί τινες); this is almost certainly epilepsy. Herodotus finds this kind of explanation plausible: “and there is nothing strange in the fact that, his body suffering a serious disease, his phrenes should not be healthy” (οὔ νύν τοι ἀεικὲς οὐδὲν το/upΣil[Φeneν το/upΣil[Φene σώµατος νο/upΣil[Φeneσον µεγάλην νοσέοντος µηδὲ τὰς φρένας ὑγιαίνειν). Note that the body enters this account as a substitute for the gods’ vengeance. Over the course of the fifth century, then, tragedy’s use

24. The passage resembles Babylonian medical texts, where each symptom corresponds to the “hand” (qāt) of the demon responsible (HeeBel 2004: 108–10). It may contain vestiges of archaic Greek diagnostic strategies, as Parker 1983: 210 has argued.
26. Ibid. 7 [ch. 10 Jones] (Littré VI.372–74=14,21–16,23 Jouanna).
28. *Heracles* is usually dated to 415 BCE or thereabouts on metrical grounds, but see Beta 1999: 148–57 for speculation on a date in the 420s (on the basis of papyri fragments that differ markedly from our text, Beta argues, following W. Luppe, that Euripides then revised and restaged *Heracles* around 415).
29. See, too, Hdt. VI.84 on the madness of Cleomenes, who is either punished for sacrilege or suffers the effects of drinking too much unmixed wine. For Herodotus’ interaction with fifth-century medical culture, see Thomas 2000: 28–74, 34–35 on Cambyses.
30. The medical writers in this period had no “knock-down refutation of double determination,” i.e. divine and natural causality, as Lloyd has pointed out (1979: 57). But they do offer their
of symptoms to stage encounters between gods and humans increasingly dovetails with a lively public debate about how symptoms should be interpreted.

The participation of the same symptoms in multiple, competing stories may have made it possible for one story to be screened behind or to challenge another, particularly in a genre like tragedy and with a tragedian like Euripides. Thinking in these terms offers an alternative to endlessly arguing about whether Euripides was a savvy heir to Aeschylus or a particularly attentive observer or an adept of contemporary philosophical thought; it is clear that he was all of these things. I suggest, then, that we see the symptom as a tragic convention that could be used to hybridize different worldviews in the interest of creating innovative and compelling drama.

If we look to the tragic symptom, we see, in fact, that it regularly occasions questions while rarely providing answers. The Chorus of Sophocles’ Ajax, for example, responds to the news of his mad rampage by asking which of the gods is responsible (172–81). The Chorus of Euripides’ Hippolytus, speculating on Phaedra’s symptoms, entertains not only different gods as causes, but also jealousy, sorrow and pregnancy, the latter expressive of the female body’s “unstable” or “ill-fitted” mixture, δύστροπος ἀρµονία (141–69; cf. 237–38; E. Med. 1171–77). Indeed, uncertainty about which story to attach to the symptoms is regularly and, it would seem, deliberately exaggerated by Euripides, who, we might recall, is also fond of the unresolved agoûn. He scripts nosos as a condition that manifests itself in multiple registers. Boundaries around conventional disease scenes are blurred. Characters voice competing explanations of events, which are then undercut or challenged by other sources of meaning, either direct and ostensibly authoritative (Iris, for example, in Heracles) or more obliquely semiotic (e.g. Heracles’ onstage relationship to his weapons, which objectify his culpability). Indeed, as we will see below, Heracles’ symptoms are presented from a number of angles.

Even in cases where we know very well who has acted, Euripides’ multiple explanations make us aware of the risk of insufficiency within the common explanations as alternatives to divine ones, e.g. at Aer. 22 (Littre II.80=240,10–241,9 Jouanna) and Morb. Sacr. 1 [ch. 4 Jones] (Littre VI.364=9,8–10 Jouanna). See below, n67.


32. The expression δύστροπος ἀρµονία works on multiple levels. The word ἀρµονία, “joint” in Homer (Od. 5.248), comes to play an important role in Presocratics like Heraclitus and Philolaus as “a principle that explains the connection between things that differ or are unlike” (Huffman 1993: 139). Empedocles uses it to describe the principle that binds the elements in a composite body, e.g. DK31 B96.3–4. In the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen, it describes a successful mixture either in the ψυχε or the σῶμα (e.g. I 8, Littre VI.482=132,6 Joly-Byl). As for δύστροπος, it is a rare word in the classical period and seems to mean something like “troublesome,” e.g. Democ. (DK68) B100.

33. Lloyd 1992: 15–18. Like the symptom, the agoûn is suited to producing polarized positions on divine and human culpability. This is true not only in Euripides: see e.g. S. El. 528–76.

34. Orestes, for example, has a contained episode of delirium in the opening scene of Orestes, but nosos pervades his behavior throughout the play: see Greenberg 1962: 166–67; Smith 1967; Theodorou 1993: 41. For the conventional structure of nosos scenes: Vasquez 1972.
conceptualization of tragic irony, which is premised on the idea that the audience knows what the characters do not. It may turn out that one answer is not enough. The “right” answer may be recoded by one of the “wrong” ones. The version of the female body advanced in the *Hippolytus* parodos, for example, troubles the thematization of erōs as god-sent and extrinsic. In *Orestes*, all of Orestes’ answers to Menelaus’ question “what sickness assails you?”— the Furies of his mother’s blood, lupē, and sunesis, which means something like conscience (396–400)—remains viable for the length of the play, despite appearing to reference different interpretive frameworks. Characters take on necessity not only in the form of a god’s will or daemonic wrath, but as tuche, anankē, phusis, or nosos.35 In tragedy, then, and especially in Euripides, the symptom emphasizes causal uncertainty and makes that uncertainty dramatically productive, opening the stage to explanations of suffering that engage both a poetic-tragic tradition and medical and ethical ideas about pain and disorder.

Appreciating the texture of the symptom’s polysemy requires a better sense of what medicine’s worldview might contribute to tragic meaning, given that black bile or medical explanations of epilepsy, which was sometimes called the Heracleian disease (Ἡρακλεία νόσος), seem like an intolerable affront to tragic decorum.36 One possibility is that naturalizing interpretation entails the internalization of cause, a claim that has often been made in the name of Euripidean “psychology” (a term that is rarely reconciled with contemporary logoi of the psuchē and its suffering). Indeed, it is precisely because medicine is associated with a shift towards internal causes that some critics have sought to limit or deny its impact on *Heracles*, with its spectacular epiphany.

Yet we cannot too quickly assume the amalgamation of “medical” and “internal.” For the tragedians were themselves deeply interested in “internal” as well as “external” causes, an interest often discussed in terms of double determination. Moreover, the medical writers formulate their own kind of double determination by explaining symptoms in terms of both an exciting cause (sometimes called a πρόφασις) and the constituent elements of the material body, a formulation that has a considerable impact on early accounts of “diseases of the soul.” Limits of space preclude a full engagement with these issues. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of how the symptom helps stage tragic responsibility will allow us to gain a more precise sense of the conceptual and imaginative resources that contemporary medical thought might have contributed to *Heracles.*


36. Some apparently pedestrian medical details do appear in tragedy: see E. fr. 682K (*Scyrians* fr. 2 J.-V.L.), on a chill of bile; S. fr. 507R on tertian and quartan fevers. Nevertheless, it is not until the fourth century that black bile becomes a physical explanation for madness: see [Arist.] *Pr.* XXX. See also Klibansky et al. 1964: 15–42; van der Eijk 2005: 139–68. On Heracles and epilepsy, as well as on other diseases called Ἡρακλεία, see von Staden 1992.
TRAGIC SYMPTOMS AND THE BLACK BOX

For all its carnage, tragedy, unlike epic, is drawn to violence that happens out of sight. It is a genre that seeks to track the coming-to-light of damage done behind closed doors or under the voluminous folds of the tragic costume. Often this revelation takes the form of a corpse. But whereas the corpse appears after the fact, symptoms index the unseen attack as it unfolds. The embodied hero becomes a site where concealed forces, commonly understood as instruments of a god’s anger or a coiled family curse or powers that tread the line between daemonic and natural, first materialize onstage. These forces turn the hero into a conduit of daemonic power and raise the question of complicity. 37

Already in archaic poetry the concept of the conduit is flexible. Emphasis may be placed either on the god as the source of power and knowledge or on the person through whom these things are made manifest. In Agamemnon’s famous Apology (Il. 19.86–138), he blames Zeus for atê while still accepting responsibility for the damage done through his blindness. 38 Fear usually reveals more about the warrior than about the daemonic force that attacks him: as Idomeneus says in the Iliad, under the pressure of an ambush “there men’s aretê shows forth most of all” (ἔνθα θαλήσ τε ἀρετή διαείδεται ἄνδρον, 13.277). Although menos is a force that surges through the natural world and is often a gift from gods to heroes, Andromache, in a proto-tragic gesture, tells Hector: “your menos will destroy you” (φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν µένος, Il. 6.407).

I say “proto-tragic” because it is in tragedy that the friction in these mortal-immortal relationships comes to the fore. 39 In Aeschylus, characters sense impending doom through a prescience that is both divine and visceral. Fear and anxiety travel in the innards as fluxes, attacking the kardia or the phrenes, sometimes lacerating them. Yet characters are unable to understand these feelings or act on them, an impotence that only compounds their apprehension. 40 Even more complex are the cases where daemonic pressure appears to compel action. Seven Against Thebes is animated by the mad decision of Oedipus’ sons to embrace the Labdacid curse. Cooperation between mortal and immortal, as in Demodocus’ account of poetic inspiration (Od. 8.44–45), can turn combative. The god-driven

37. The weapons of gods rarely cause fatal wounds: the arrows of Artemis and Apollo in Sophocles’ Niobe (Carden 1974) may have been an exception. On the avoidance of direct contact between mortals and immortals, see Willcock 1970: 7n.21; Vernant 1991: 44–45; Loraux 1995: 211–26.
38. The classic discussion is Dodds 1951: 1–27. See also Williams 1993: 50–55.
39. As Jean-Pierre Vernant influentially argued, “The tragic consciousness of responsibility appears when the human and divine levels are sufficiently distinct for them to be opposed while still appearing to be inseparable. The tragic sense of responsibility emerges when human action becomes the object of reflection and debate while still not being regarded as sufficiently autonomous to be fully self-sufficient” (1988: 27). See also Lesky 1966. Threats to autonomy, however, need not be expressed exclusively in terms of the gods.
(θεοφόρητος, A. Ag. 1140) Cassandra describes her revelation of truth as a “terrible labor” (δεινὸς...πόνος, 1215) that pits her against Apollo. It is in Euripides once again that the relationship between mortal and immortal in such contexts is most obscure. In portraying a Phaedra who struggles at length to overcome her disease through self-starvation, for example, he raises the question in Hippolytus of whether one can, in fact, resist divine force.

In tragedy, then, a nimbus of uncertainty surrounds the body where symptoms erupt. These symptoms mark the threshold of the perceptible world. In showing, they recall what the perceiver is not shown and cannot ever be shown: the hero’s encounter with the daemonic. By functioning as the hidden passage between divine speech and its effects, the body onstage exaggerates what the philosopher and classicist Eugène Dupréel once called the interval, which he defined as the hidden “trench” (le fossé) that lies beneath the bridges built by inference and explanation, the distance between causes (e.g. Aphrodite’s power and intentions) and effects (e.g. Phaedra’s symptoms or Helen’s flight to Troy).

For Dupréel, “there is always, between our two terms, a place for something intercalated, for the unexpected, for what is not given by the specific relationship of causality that links one term to the other” (1933: 10, my translation). It is in the space of the interval that the subject becomes implicated in the production of tragic disease and its consequences. The interval thus functions as a complement to the polysemy of the symptom. Whereas polysemy describes the possibility of multiple explanations for a rupture in the fabric of the subject, the interval draws attention to the incalculable role of the subject in his or her own undoing.

The weight given to the interval between an extrinsic catalyst and its visible expression in the symptom or the act is, in fact, a distinguishing feature of tragedy. Tragedy is fascinated, after all, with the hero’s entanglement in his errors and his suffering. The place of the hero as a mysterious gap between cause and effect is underscored by staging techniques that stress the distance between gods and humans, such as the mèchanè, and thus make the tragic patient the immediate origin of the symptom. Despite the use of the gods as causes, then, the tragic staging and figuration of disease can be distinguished from the explanations advanced by the magico-religious healers in On the Sacred Disease, which simply correlate symptoms with the god who is aitios, or epic accounts that pay equal attention to the gods and their victim, using the dactylic hexameter to stitch together the mortal and immortal worlds.

Furthermore, tragic approaches to the place of the subject in disease and its aftermath are dynamic over the course of the fifth century in response to external and internal factors and the styles of individual tragedians. In Euripides, who was known in antiquity for his preoccupation with love and madness ([Long.] de Subl. 15.3), we can see the concept of double determination fracturing under a number of pressures: medical and sophistic explanations of human behaviors in terms of impersonal, internal forces; the rise of the courts together with a rhetoric of
responsibility in Athens; and the staging and restaging of tragedy itself. In the *agôn* between Helen and Hecuba in *Troades*, for example, double determination—an organic concept, despite its name—splits into mutually exclusive worldviews. In Helen’s argument, if the gods are guilty, we are free to go.\(^{41}\) In Hecuba’s rejoinder, being weaker than the force of objects that promise pleasure, here the image of Paris’ beautiful body and his wealth, makes us culpable.\(^ {42}\) What mortals call Aphrodite, she claims, should properly be called *ἀφροσύνη*, “thoughtlessness” (τὰ μῶρα γὰρ πάντ’ ἐστὶν Ἀφροδίτῃ βροτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τούνυμοι ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἠρχεῖ θεᾶς, *Tro.* 989–90). The grounds here for what Bernard Williams has called “agent regret” (1993: 63–74), of which Helen is blissfully unaware, would seem to be not simply that Helen *did* something. Rather Hecuba singles out the internal mechanisms of that action (thoughtlessness) and the nature of the external catalysts for that action (images, lust, greed).

Hecuba’s clever substitution of *aphrosunê* for Aphrodite suggests that in Euripides the tragic imagination has become responsive to contemporary speculation about the impersonal powers that work through human *phusis*. In fact, tragedy’s interest in the interval can explain why the natural polysemy of the symptom (here Helen’s mad act) attracts narratives that develop ideas about the daemonic space inside the person.\(^ {43}\) Many of these ideas in the late fifth century were being elaborated within medical and biological writing.\(^ {44}\) A brief look at medical thought may shed light on Euripides’ innovative and unsettling presentation of Heracles’ madness, while also steering us away from anachronistic projections of the modern (post-Cartesian, post-Kantian, post-Freudian) psychological self. In light of the space constraints I will touch briefly on three general aspects of medical thought that may be most pertinent to *Heracles*: the relationship between embodiment and blindness; the presence of inhuman things inside the body that hurt it; and the weight placed on causes like *phusis* and * anakê* in interpretations.

\(^{41}\) Pasiphae’s defense in *The Cretans* (E. fr. 472eK=Cretans fr. 5 J.-V.L.) is similar to Helen’s in that she disavows any responsibility for her disease by blaming the gods and her husband Minos, whose transgression against Poseidon has ricocheted back as her crime.

\(^{42}\) See also *Br.* 314–18, where Tiresias rebuts the claim that Dionysus makes women lascivious by arguing that the expression of chastity or its opposite depends on *phusis*. For the language of being “less than” pleasure in Euripides, see *Andr.* 629–31; *Hipp.* 475–76, 727; fr. 187.6K (*Antiope* fr. 11 J.-V.L.); 282.5K (*Autolycus* fr. 1 J.-V.L.). Aristotle will refute the idea that pleasurable things have a compulsory effect on us: γελοιον δ’ θ’ αἰτιασθαι τ’ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ σὺν αὐτὰν εὐθῆχαν ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦτων, “it is absurd to blame things outside, but not oneself for being easily preyed upon by such things” (*EN* III.1, 1110b13–14).

\(^{43}\) In calling Helen’s act a symptom, I am not ignoring the special status of the tragic act vis-à-vis, say, rolling eyes or convulsive movements, i.e. cases that would be included in what Mastronarde calls “events” rather than decisions (2002: 37). Nevertheless, acts are part of the continuum of effects produced by tragic disease (Vasquez 1972: 19–28).

\(^{44}\) Although I focus on medicine, which I believe plays a critical role in the dissemination of these ideas on account of its function as a *techne*, it is true that Euripides would probably have judged *phusikoi* who wrote on biological topics, such as Democritus or Empedocles, as representative of contemporary ideas about the body and human nature, as Craik 2001: 82 points out.
of suffering. Each of these aspects will in turn inform my reading of the play, where their creative energy can be gauged.

In establishing these basic points, I am not claiming that they form the “real” world of the play, onto which everything else is overlaid as allegory or poetic adornment. If I go into details that seem inconceivable for tragedy, I do so to create a picture that is robust enough to counter simplistic characterizations of the new medicine (“rational” or “clinical” or “technical”) and to show that a phrase like “natural causality” needs to be denaturalized if we are to recognize the imaginative range of tragic suffering.

SYMPTOMS IN EARLY GREEK MEDICINE

In archaic poetry, humans are vulnerable not simply on account of their mortality. They are also at risk because of their fundamental blindness vis-à-vis often malevolent gods. “It is,” as Hesiod says, “impossible to escape the mind of Zeus” (οὔ τί πη ἔστι ∆ιὸς νόον ἐκΣιαλέασθαι, Op. 105). The gods’ ill will may be understood in terms of their participation in social networks that traverse both the human and the divine worlds, networks that are governed by mutually intelligible wishes (e.g. for timê), emotions (love, hate, delight, envy), and expectations about what is just, fitting, or pure. Since their intentions are in themselves efficacious, the gods’ weapons have, as Ruth Padel has observed, “a metonymic, iconic quality, marking daemonic advantage over the human: that power to hurt, that aggressiveness” (1992: 152). They are symbols more than instruments. The relevant question, then, is not how the gods produce symptoms, but why. The human response is likely to include an attempt at appeasement.

Consider now the causes onto which the author of On the Sacred Disease shifts blame: phlegm, the brain, winds. These things neither enjoy a surplus of knowledge nor participate in relationships based on desire or intention. Outcomes depend on the natures of things and the power differential between dunameis, a word I translate as “forces” but that more properly describes the capacity of something to act or to suffer. Moreover, the encounter of forces takes place in a spatially defined somatic interior. Three implications of this explanatory shift are worth stressing.

First, it is in the nature of the symptom to arrive from left field: you never see trouble coming until it is upon you. In the magico-religious model, the symptom feels daemonic because it erupts at the crossing of two discontinuous, yet interpenetrating planes of reality: seen and unseen, mortal and immortal. The

45. Tragedy may negotiate problems raised by medicine without adopting its “reality,” just as it negotiates problems with the democratic polis in plays about kings (Griffith 1998).

46. Note that a religious response would not have precluded a pharmacological one.

47. The impossibility of seeing the effect of the south wind on the brain or phlegm requires the author to use analogies demonstrating the wind’s effects on objects that can be seen, such as clay vessels (Morb. Sacr. 13 [ch. 16 Jones], Littre VI.384–86=24,9–14 Jouanna).
medical writers, in accordance with a general interest in the inquiry into nature in “unseen things” (ἄδηλα), uphold the idea of two realities, but relocate the unseen inside the body. In so doing, they create the bodily interior as a space largely below the threshold of perception and beyond the ambit of the patient’s agency, a space that represents the quite literal incorporation of the daemonic. In so doing, they create the bodily interior as a space largely below the threshold of perception and beyond the ambit of the patient’s agency, a space that represents the quite literal incorporation of the daemonic. Innards, it is true, could always be touched by the daemonic. Yet it was at the moment that they felt strange that one inferred that something alien had become contiguous with the sphere of the self. In medicine, the alien world betrayed by the symptom is the play of impersonal forces that is always going on inside the body under the silent cover of health. An influx of external force may be felt immediately if it is very powerful. But it may just as easily set off a chain of events that go unperceived until the symptom belatedly erupts.

Thus in On the Sacred Disease symptoms are not produced directly by the south wind, as they might be by the hand of Zeus. Rather, the south wind strengthens a constituent element of the body, in this case phlegm, to the point where it can overpower the blood and block the flow of air, thereby producing symptoms. My second point, then, is that the symptom in medicine always lies at the end of a causal chain that (often silently) implicates the things inside the body, however a given writer understands these. The author of another Hippocratic treatise phrases the discovery of the founders of medicine perfectly: “they saw that these things [sc. humors] are inside a person and they hurt him” (ταύτα γάρ ἐώρον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ ἐνεόντα καὶ λυµαινόµενα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. [Hpc] VM 14, Littré I.602=136,8–9 Jouanna).

48. Thus you do not “check” your bile the way you might check your thumos (Il. 9.254–56). Rather you affect it through diet or other technical means. The inside of the body is also hidden from the external observer, on account of what the author of On the Technē calls its στεγνότης, “density” (11, Littré VI.20=238,17 Jouanna).
50. Padel’s claim “that you could have a virus, or madness, and not know, is not a concept available in ancient Greece” (1995: 35) ignores this fundamental premise, which is well documented in the medical treatises. For example, the idea that one can grow sick without knowing it lies behind the discovery touted by the author of On Regimen of “pre-symptoms,” which improve early detection of a diseaseable disease that grows “bit by bit” (κατὰ µικρόν, I 2, Littré VI.472=124,29–126,3 Joly-Byl).
51. Notice how the author deftly adopts the verb ὠράω to conflate the object of what the early physicians see (the things inside the body as they exit the body’s orifices) and the explanation of human suffering that they “discover.” The medical writers consistently yoke the revelatory nature of the symptom to their explanatory claims, thereby managing to occlude the causal uncertainty that surrounds the symptom. See e.g. the use of the expression “you will know x by y,” τούτω/i[ntaΣu ἐνεόντα καὶ λυµαινόµενα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. [Hpc] VM 14, Littré I.602=136,8–9 Jouanna).
What this point means is that the new medicine, like tragedy, is deeply committed to the interval as a formal space. Factors inside the person (a congenitally phlegmatic constitution; the effects of diet; the labile nature of the body’s constituent elements) determine the outcome of an encounter between any given body and e.g. the south wind. Although this is also the case with epic fear, in medicine the interval comes to be correlated with the subphenomenal, inhuman space of the corporeal interior. The passage of external force through this interval is elaborated into mechanisms of action and reaction by which what comes from outside either becomes complicit with something inside the body to produce disease or is resisted, broken down, and assimilated by the body as a whole. In both scenarios, however, these processes are estranged from the conscious, intentional agent. As a result, the role of corporeal phenomena in materializing character is undergoing a radical and multi-faceted change.

Thus far I have focused on how medical interpretations of the symptom cast the composite, labile inner body as the daemonic origin of the symptom. My final observation concerns external catalysts. The new medicine, as we have seen, excludes the gods from its etiologies of disease. The physical body participates in a world of impersonal forces whose interactions are governed by “nature, necessity, and chance” (phusis, anankê, tuchê), to invoke the triad of causes ascribed to materialist cosmology by Plato (Leg. 889b1-c6), rather than intentions, emotions, or a sense of the human good.

To be fair, only phusis and anankê are acknowledged by the medical writers as governing the inner body and the world around it. In theory, tuchê does not exist for them. Everything happens on account of something (διὰ τι). This observation makes the technical management of diseases and bodies possible, but it does not guarantee it. The winds, for example, lie beyond the reach of technê. The medical writers act how and where they can, primarily by manipulating the body through diet. What is worth stressing is that their strategies of mastery have built into them an understanding of vulnerability, one quite different from that found in magico-religious models. In seeking to carve out a realm of practice independent of tuchê, the medical writers describe a set of invisible relationships between bodies and the outside that may escape manipulation. It is the unchecked circulation of force within these relationships that produces the events we experience as tychic. Symptoms, in other words, recall the radically impersonal world in which our bodies embed us. Similarly, by trying to control the physical body, medicine essentially creates a body defined by its hidden and strange interior, the non-conscious, constituent things that are complicit in disease, and its openness to

52. [Hpc] Art. 5 (Litttré VI.6–8=228,6–230,2 Jouanna); VM 1 (Litttré L570–72=118,10–119,4 Jouanna); Loc. 46 (Litttré VI.342=84,17–21 Craik). But cf. Morb. I 8 (Litttré VII.154=20,19–20, 22,10 Wittern).
53. [Hpc] Art. 6 (Litttré VI.10=230,16 Jouanna).
54. See the comments in Dunn 1997 and Kosak 2004 on tragedy and the failures of technê.
inhuman external forces. It is this body, at the very moment it has become alien and hence visible, that medical explanations of symptoms summon to mind.

It is the imaginative world of medical narratives about suffering that is most likely to have influenced how human nature was being conceptualized in contemporary non-medical contexts. This would have been particularly the case in contexts where the gods have become insufficient explanatory mechanisms. Although talk of Euripides’ “psychology” makes his ideas and interests appear sui generis, there is evidence that theories of the diseases and therapies of the psuchê in the late fifth century were being self-consciously developed on analogy with those found in medicine.55 A fragment attributed to Democritus, for example, states: “medicine heals the sicknesses of bodies, while wisdom rids the soul of its sufferings” (ἰατρικὴ μὲν γὰρ σώµατος νόσους ἀκέεται, σοφὴ δὲ ψυχῆς παθὸν ἀφαιρεῖται, DK68 B31).56 Gorgias, exculpating Helen in his famous Encomium, sets forth not only the gods as possible causes of her transgression, but also words and images (Hel. 3). In both scenarios, it is in the nature for what is weaker to be ruled by what is stronger. When it comes to interactions with the outside world such as seeing, the relations of force are determined not by what we want (θέλομεν) but by what happens (ἔτυχε).57 Gorgias describes an inner mechanics of compulsion in which words are like the pharmaka used by physicians to manipulate humors inside the body (14) and images set off a series of events within the psuchê that may lead to madness and disease (15–17). What happens in these cases is not an error (ἀμάρτηµα), but a misfortune (ἀτύχηµα), that is to say a human disease (ἄνθρωπον νόσηµα) or psychic ignorance (ψυχῆς ἀγνόηµα, 19).

What the evidence from Gorgias and Democritus suggests is that naturalizing approaches to disease, with their focus on the corporeal interior, causal chains, impersonal forces, and unfortunate encounters, had conceptual and imaginative implications that could be elaborated in non-medical contexts. These implications may have attached to the idea of the body even when that body is not seen as the

56. Diels expressed doubts that these are the ipsissima verba of Democritus, but other fragments confirm that the idea is Democritean (e.g. B57, B187). In his ethical fragments, Democritus regularly speaks of powerful forces inside the self such as the desire for pleasure as potentially harmful (e.g. B149, B159, B191). Maintaining stability in the psuchê requires using the techne of wisdom to manage tuche, that is, our innate vulnerability to chance encounters that may provoke psychic distress (B119). For the parallels between Democritus and the medical writers, see Vlastos 1945; idem, 1946. On his interest in the mechanics of human behaviors and interaction, see Warren 2007. On the medicine of the psuchê, see also e.g. Antiph. (DK87) A6; Pl. Prt. 313a-314c; Isoc. Pax 39–40. Nussbaum 1993 looks at the analogy’s development in Aristotle and especially Hellenistic ethics.
57. τέρωμε γὰρ οὖ τὸ κρείσασον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰχθυον αὐλίσχαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰχθυὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρείσασον ἀγειδεῖται καὶ ἀγείδηται, καὶ τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρείσασον ἐγειρεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἰχθυὸν ἠπιστεῖται (“For it is natural not that the stronger is hindered by the weaker, but that the weaker is ruled and led by the stronger, and that the stronger lead and the weaker follow,” Hel. 6). See also 15: ἃ γὰρ ὀρόμεν, ἔγει ψύσαν οὖ ἦν ἤμεις θέλομεν ἀλλ’ ἦν ἐκαστὸν ἔτυχε (“For whatever we see does not have the nature that we want it to have but what each one happens to have”).
humoral body in all its details, as well as to nascent ideas of the soul as an object of care. They may have been particularly fertile in contexts where the ethical ideal of self-mastery was at stake. Suffering external forces, being shaken by inner turbulence, and being enslaved to disease were states and experiences that were explicitly feminized in the classical period.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time, every embodied self harbors this feminine potential in the absence of technē.\textsuperscript{59} Heracles engages in, among other things, a tragic exploration of the realization of this potential in a hero defined by his body.

\textbf{HERACLES, SYMPTOMS, AND TRAGIC SUBJECTIVITY}

The emergence of concepts of the physical body and natural causality in medicine and the inquiry into nature is not the secret behind Heracles’ madness, any more than Iris’ explanation is. Yet being aware of these ideas opens up new perspectives on some of the tragedy’s most intractable problems while drawing attention to other complexities and thematic patterns. I begin by laying out two such problems, namely the rationale for the madness and the import of Heracles’ remarks on divinity at the end of the play, before turning to a reading of the play that uses the figure of the symptom to offer new angles on them.

First, interpretations of the symptom in medical writing provide us with fresh resources for understanding the complex interplay between inside and outside in the staging of Heracles’ madness. For existing approaches to this interplay, which rest on modern psychological categories or ossified concepts of \textit{hubris} and transgression, have proven unsatisfactory. Euripides depicts the Heracles of the first half of the tragedy as a culture hero, stripped of his appetites. This hero readily credits the gods for his success, dedicating an altar to Zeus after his Minyan victory (48–50) and recognizing the household gods who ensured his safe return from the underworld (608). The excessive violence threatened at 562–82, where Heracles swears that heads will roll and the river will choke on corpses, subtly cues that “other,” less self-controlled Heracles without justifying modern diagnoses.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} See esp. Just 1985 on the nexus slavery-pleasure-emotion-female nature. See also Carson 1990; Loraux 1995.

\textsuperscript{59} Hanson 1992: 51.

Some critics opposed to the psychologization of Heracles have argued that the hero is of two minds just because he is Heracles. On this reading, the madness occupies an extreme point on the continuum of his mythic personae and should be understood in structural, rather than psychological terms.\textsuperscript{61} Hubris thus falls away as a causal mechanism within the drama. Yet such an approach leaves us with the question of the relationship between a schizophrenic mytheme and a tragic subject. Beyond identifying the logic of the Heracles myth or observing that madness is integral to Heracles’ identity, we need to ask how Euripides represents Heracles prior to the madness and what kind of hero emerges in its aftermath. How does Heracles deal with the violent eruption of his mythic character? How does this event transform him? What is the relationship between lussa and lupē, which extends the threat posed by the madness to Heracles’ identity through the final scene? Recognizing that Heracles’ body might sit at the intersection of different frameworks of interpretation can help us answer these questions.

Naturalizing interpretations of the symptom also allow us to reconsider Heracles’ puzzling remarks on divinity at the end of the tragedy. Theseus, in an attempt to exculpate the despondent hero, argues that the gods, too, are subject to errors and passions. Heracles replies that the poets’ stories are lies “since god, if he is rightly a god, needs nothing” (δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεὸς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁρθῶς θεός, οὐδενός, 1345–46).\textsuperscript{62} This statement, of course, is as much Heracles’ recognition of what he is not as it is a positive observation about divinity and, implicitly, its relationship to human suffering. Nevertheless, Heracles’ words undermine Iris’ explanation of the madness in terms of what Hera wants (῞Ηρα . . . θέλει, 831).

Cognizant of the threat that these lines pose to the tragedy’s mythic framework, some scholars have credited them to the playwright speaking in propria persona, either because he wants to call into question the dramatization of Iris and Lussa or because he is simply cuing his allegiance to the new learning.\textsuperscript{63} Others have sought to limit the lines’ scope of application, dismissing them as the ad hoc arguments of a desperate man, later retracted, or germane only to violence among the gods and not to the details of Heracles’ own life.\textsuperscript{64} Still others have thought...
that Heracles is expressing mere disapproval of gods who behave inappropriately, rather than rejecting outright the possibility of such behavior.\textsuperscript{65}

None of these solutions is tenable: the lines cannot be neutralized. In asserting that god needs nothing, Heracles invokes a contemporary understanding of divinity that is detectable in the fragments of Xenophanes and other early philosophers.\textsuperscript{66} Medicine contributes to this conversation by supplying causal alternatives to the gods’ emotions and intentions in their explanations of disease. Some physicians went further in their challenge to magico-religious explanation. One of the major arguments advanced in \textit{On the Sacred Disease} is that that the body cannot be defiled by the god, what is most perishable by what is most pure (οὐ μέντοι ἐγωγε ἀξιῶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι σῶμα μαίνεσθαι, τὸ ἐπικρήτατον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄγνωτάτου, \textit{Morb. Sacr.} 1 [ch. 4 Jones], Littre VI.362–64=9,8–10 Jouanna).\textsuperscript{67} Later in the treatise, the author offers the phlegm-corroded, fetid brain of an epileptic goat as proof of the claim that it is not a god, but the disease that violates (λυµαίνεται) the body.\textsuperscript{68} But it is an open question what this violation \textit{means}.

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in myth is also a strategic position taken up within a given tragic context, rather than an unquestioned norm.
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\textsuperscript{65} Stinton 1976: 82–84; Foley 1985: 165. See also Yunis 1988: 139–71 and Papadopoulou 2005: 114–16, arguing that while the existence of a being Hera is not in doubt, Heracles refuses to acknowledge her as a god. Yet there is no suggestion as to what the status of such a being or force would be in the play, and Heracles’ phrasing does not support this reading, as Lawrence 1998: 136–37 observes.

\textsuperscript{66} Bond 1981 ad loc. and others (Wilamowitz 1909: 481–82; Lawrence 1998; Assaël 2001: 115–16) have seen Xenophanes’ influence (DK21 B11; B23). But see also Meliss. (DK28) B7–8; Antipho. (DK87) B10; Emp. (DK31) B134; Anaxag. (DK59) B12; Democr. (DK68) B166. At X. Mem. I.IV.10–11 the idea that the gods need nothing from us is part of the standard position for a critic of traditional religion, who holds more generally that the gods pay no heed to human affairs (see also Pl. Leg. 886e1–2, cited above).

\textsuperscript{67} The author seems here to be thinking of some kind of anthropomorphic gods. Elsewhere, however, he speaks of the disease as “no more divine” (θεῖοτέρον) than others (2 [ch. 5 Jones], Littre VI.364=10,5 Jouanna), and other medical authors speak of e.g. necessity as divine (\textit{Vic.} 1 5, Littre VI.478=128,19 Joly-Byl). These latter uses of the term θειότατον have led some scholars to argue that there is no radical discontinuity between mechanical and divine causes of bodily ailments (Collins 2003: 24–26) and that Hippocratic medicine does not rule out divine intervention (Horstmannshoff and Stol 2004: 6). These claims, however, fail to note any difference between concepts of the divine in terms of personal gods and concepts where impersonal nature is divine. On the few occasions where the medical writers do speak of the divine in the former sense (\textit{Morb. Sacr.} 1 [ch. 4 Jones], Littre VI.364=9,13–10,3 Jouanna; \textit{Vic.} IV 87, Littre VI.640–42=218,14–22 Joly-Byl), it is with reference to the gods’ ability to help. The author of \textit{On Regimen} adds, δεί δὲ καὶ αὐτόν σώλομιζόντα τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, “one must call upon the gods while also helping oneself.” In \textit{On the Sacred Disease}, if the gods do come into play, they deal with errors, ἁμαρτήματα (1 [ch. 4 Jones], Littre VI.364=9,13–15 Jouanna); it is unclear whether the author even endorses this claim or merely makes it as part of his refutation of his opponents. In short, the idea that disease is caused by divine or daemonic agents is absent from the medical writers and at times openly refuted. On the relevance of this claim in \textit{On the Sacred Disease} to both \textit{Heracles} and \textit{fr. 286bK (=292N2) from Bellerophon}, see Harries 1891: 15–16; Nestle 1938: 27–28; Mesturini 1981. On fr. 286bK (=292N2), see also Müller 1993.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Morb. Sacr.} 11 [ch. 14 Jones] (Littre VI.382=22,2–4 Jouanna).
The final scenes of *Heracles* dwell precisely on the question of what the unmotivated violation of the body means. Having questioned the gods’ desire as a cause and having refused to see himself as a legitimate target of divine anger (1310), Heracles confronts the catalyst for his madness as a force outside the laws of justice and gods. He names that force tuche.69 And while this may be a tuche to which Heracles appends the name Hera (‘Ἡρας µι ... τύχη, 1393), it is Heracles’ resistance to blaming Hera for everything that drives his struggle with Theseus over the implications of madness for heroic identity, as I argue at greater length below.70 Before examining Heracles’ attempt in the final scene to make sense not only of the madness, but also of the ensuing grief, however, I look to two prior points where we can see the crossing of different worldviews on the body, first in the representation of Heracles’ vulnerability and his blindness and second in the staging of the madness.

**THE HERO WHO SHOOTS FROM AFAR**

Heracles was virtually synonymous with his body, and specifically with the amoral forces, *bia* and appetite, that were often associated with it.71 His body grounds his contradictory qualities: strong and weak, masculine and feminine, fearsome and comic, civilizing and savage. His *menos* overwhelms attempts at canalization and turns into *mania*, while his life is dominated by his *ponoi*: his labors, but also his sufferings.72 Associated with no less than three diseases, he was also a popular cult healer.73 His appetites are so outsized that, as Nicole Loraux has argued (1995: 116–39), his hypermasculinity becomes a kind of femininity. It comes as no surprise, then, that the only two tragedies known to have featured Heracles as a protagonist, Sophocles’ *Trachiniae* and Euripides’ *Heracles*, construct his conflicted, tragic identity by joining his boundless strength to the figure of disease, thereby placing his body, with its enormous capacity for inflicting and suffering pain, center stage.

Yet the two tragedians diverge considerably in their representations of both Heracles’ disease and his body. Sophocles’ Heracles is preceded onstage by legends of passion and enslavement. Early on, *Trachiniae* makes mention of Omphale (Tr. 69–70, 252–57), the queen whom Heracles was compelled to serve, and the murder of Iphitas (38), preparing the way for the hero vanquished by


70. On ‘Ἡρας µι ... τύχη, see Schlesier 1985: 18, 27–28, 35n.97, and compare the similar expression, describing a reversal of force (*βία*), at 216 (όταν θεόν σω σω πνεύμα μεταβαλὸν τύχη).

71. Heracles was defined by his physical strength: epic simply refers to him as βίη ῾Ηρακλείη (e.g. Il. 2.658, 19.98; Od. 11.601; Hes. Th. 332) and to the sophists he could represent the law of might makes right (Pl. Grg. 484a-b). His monstrous appetites made him a popular character in comedy and satyr plays.


his love for Iole (488–89) and the murder of Lichas (777–82). Moreover, his labors are couched as service to another man.\textsuperscript{74} Heracles’ strength comes from the stalwart hands, back, chest, and arms that he apostrophizes as the erstwhile conquerors of monsters (1089–1102; cf. 1046–47) when they are ultimately devoured by \textit{ate}\.\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Trachiniae} takes up \textit{nosos} as a natural outgrowth of Heracles’ prodigious passions, the \textit{οἰκεῖα πάθη} that end up devouring him while also lending visibility to what Bernard Knox famously called the “heroic temper” of Sophocles’ protagonists.\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Trachiniae} fuses \textit{nosos} with character, then, without challenging the involvement of the gods. For Heracles’ suffering turns out to have been foretold by Zeus’ oracles (1159–71), and thus unfolds in accordance with the paternal order.\textsuperscript{77}

Conversely, the Heracles who dominates the first half of Euripides’ tragedy is a civilizer and a savior. In the prologue Amphitryon gives the motivation for the labors as filial piety: Heracles seeks to regain his father’s ancestral land, thereby “lessening [Amphitryon’s] misfortunes” (συµφορὰς δὲ τὰς ἐµὰς / ἐκσιευµαρίζων, 17–18). The noble labors (γενναίων ... ἀρεταὶ πόνων, 357) tame and purify the earth (20, 225–26, 374, 700, 851–52), bringing freedom and calm in their wake (221, 402). Euripides’ Heracles is thus closer to sophistic reassessments of the hero, which emphasized the labors as freely chosen and civilizing, than to the archaic warrior.\textsuperscript{78} Moreover, although Heracles’ threatened revenge against Lycus gives us a glimpse of his antinomian tendencies, his passions are initially withheld from view. His relationship to Megara exudes domesticity rather than

\textsuperscript{74} The verb is \textit{λατρεύω} (34–35; cf. 70, 357, 830); see Jourdain-Annequin 1985: 497–522; Loraux 1995: 120–21.


\textsuperscript{77} See Wohl 1998: 3–56 on the reassertion of paternal order. On paternal power in the play see further Michelin 1987: 268–72; Mikalson 1986.

\textsuperscript{78} On the trend towards moralizing and humanizing Heracles in the latter part of the fifth century, see Woodford 1966 and Kuntz 1994, on Prodicus’ Choice. Amphitryon does speak of Heracles being mastered by either Hera or Necessity in undertaking the labors (20–21); see also 387–88, 580 (references to serving Eurytheues). Yet characters do not speak of Heracles as enslaved, and Omphale is not mentioned. The opposition freedom/slavery is played out rather between Lycus and the Thebans (e.g. 251, 270), which strengthens the portrait of Heracles as a liberator of the city. Indeed, the first half of the play uses Heracles, Thalia Papadopoulou argues, to set up “the idea of the sovereignty of the subject” (1999: 303); see also Cerri 1997: 237–41.
erōs, and when Megara does mention the sack of Oechalia (473), she is silent about Iole.79 The Euripidean hero’s mastery of wild, bestializing nature would thus seem to entail self-mastery. The Heracles of the play’s first half recalls the hero of the Prodikean Choice, who rejects his trademark pleasures to pursue a life of Virtue (X. Mem. II.I.21–34). He who brings freedom to the peoples of the world is the doulos of no one and nothing.

These themes take shape early in the play. In an agôn that has often been faulted for its length, Amphitryon and the usurper Lycus debate the nature of Heracles’ aretē, which is expressed through his identity as an archer (140–235).80 Heracles the bowman is no innovation.81 Yet, like Heracles himself, the figure of the bow had multiple meanings by the late fifth century. Lycus chooses its most damning associations in formulating a criticism that, while familiar from Homer, was particularly strong following the Persian War:82 the bow is the weapon of the coward, who is always ready to flee, never comes within reach of the spear, and never enters into a relationship of reciprocal seeing with his opponent (βλέπει τε κἀντιδέρκεται, 163). Invoking the image of hoplite warfare, with its rows of interlocked bodies enduring the spear in defense of the polis, Lycus adopts the claim of the archaic martial poets that he who refuses the front line is φιλόψυχος, too in love with his life.83 He belittles Heracles’ brawn, charging that he used nets rather than his own arms to catch the hydra and the Nemean lion (151–54). He reviles the bow as a coward’s weapon.

There is something strange about Lycus’ portrait of Heracles. Gone is the Heracles of Alcestis who would put Death in a headlock (Alc. 847, 1142), as well

79. Roger Just emphasizes freedom from another’s services and freedom from the passions as complementary aspects of the notion of freedom (1985: 177–80).
80. For Heracles as an archer: 179–80, 366–67, 392, 422, 472, 570. Against interpretations that relate the prominence of the bow to recent military events (the Persian Wars, Sphacteria, Delium), Helene Foley rightly stresses the importance of literary topoi to the archer motif (1985: 169n.43). For discussion of these topoi in Heracles, see Arrowsmith 1954: 84–86; Foley 1985: 169–75; Hamilton 1985; Michelini 1987: 242–46; Padilla 1992; George 1994; Cerri 1997: 241–45; Dunn 1997: 96–98; Dunn and Kirkpatrick 2002: 44; Papadopoulou 2005: 137–51. Note that in Trachiniae, the bow is mentioned hardly at all (266, 510–19), and the hand is not “well-aiming” but an expression of brute strength (488, 517, 1047, 1089, 1102, 1133).
81. Il. 5.394–402; Od. 8.225, 11.601–26; Pi. O. 9.29–41; Panyasis. fr. 6a-c (Davies).
82. For the denigration of the archer in the classical period, see e.g. S. Aj. 1122–23 and, on its barbarian associations, A. Pers. 147–49. The archer is an ambiguous figure in Homer, but appears to have become more problematic after the Persian War and the emergence of the barbarian as a value term: see Hall 1989 and pp. 42, 85–86 on the figure of the archer. See also Cohen 1994 on the suppression of the archer-Heracles in visual art in the classical period and the rise of depictions of Heracles with the club. The club in Heracles appears at 471, where Megara recalls that it was promised to the very son who will later die by it (993). It also surfaces ominously at 570 in the Drohrede.
83. Tyrt. fr. 10.18 (West); see also E. Ph. 597; Hec. 348. For ψυχή as “life at risk,” see West 1978 ad 686. The image of the hoplite line had been expressly called up by the entry of the aged Chorus just prior to these remarks: γέρων γέροντα παρακόµιζ/Θυ[τεΣκλριΚΤτ],/ΦεΚαΣπερπειν \\[Πεον \\[Ποτ/Θυ[τεΣκλριΚΤτ, εὐκλεεστάτας/πατρίδος οὐκ ὀνείδη (126–30 [127 et 128 inter se trai. Musgrave]).
as the Sophoclean Heracles. Lycus assumes rather a humanized Heracles, if only to pillory him. 84 This new Heracles uses not raw force but technē to master the land. Since his strength is unexceptional, he ought to take his place among his citizen-peers in the line of battle where he would “watch and exchange gazes, enduring the spear’s swift gash and holding the line of battle” (ἀλλ` ὃς μένων βλέπει τε κάντιδέρκεται / δορὸς ταχείαν ἄλοκα τάξιν ἐμβεβώς, 163–64). 85

Even stranger, however, is Amphitryon’s rebuttal. His response embraces the representation of Heracles as an archer, while elaborating on an idea that is left implicit by Lycus, namely that Heracles is φιλοσώµατος—avant la lettre, the word first appears in Plato (Phd. 68c1)—that is, a man too in love with his body to entrust it to tuche.

84. For parallels between Lycus’ approach and other rationalizations of epic-tragic heroism, see Papadopoulou 2005: 135–37.

85. My translation follows Arrowsmith in taking ἄλοκα to mean “furrow in the skin,” i.e. wound (e.g. A. Cho. 24; [El] Rh. 796). Bond, arguing that this translation puts too much emphasis on μένων and isolates βλέπει τε κάντιδέρκεται, follows Wilamowitz in reading ἄλοκα as the “furrow” or “swathe” cut by the opposing army, as do Kovacs and Carson. Two points in particular recommend against the “furrow” translation. First, it misses the important connection between “seeing” and “wounding” that becomes crucial to Amphitryon’s rejoinder. This connection is already evident in the epic formula ἀλλ` ὃ μέν δάντα ἰδὼν ἠλεύατο χάλκεον ἔγχος (“but he exchanging looks with him avoided the bronze spear,” ll. 13.184, 404, 503; 17.305, 526), which pairs an intransitive verbal expression of reciprocal seeing (δάντα ἰδὼν) with the exchange of weapons (albeit without a wounding). Reciprocal seeing, in fact, together with the exchange of words, defines the normalized encounter between warriors in the Iliad; asymmetrical seeing is often related to the arrow-wound (e.g. 13.649) or stealth (15.540–42). It is harder to understand how the idea of reciprocal seeing pertains to the furrow being cut in the ranks. Second, the phrase μένων . . . δορὸς ταχείαν ἄλοκα as a natural extension of the expression μένειν δόρυ (Heracl. 744; El. 388). Recognizing this, Bond makes δορὸς . . . ἄλοκα the object of all three verbs, a rather awkward solution. More preferable is the idea that Lycus’ words enact the tension between standing one’s ground and the rapid onset of violence by using the exchange of looks—part of standing up to the enemy, since in flight you show your back—in order to delay δορὸς ταχείαν ἄλοκα over the line-break. The resulting enjambment cleverly stages the surprising swiftness of the spear.
You find fault with the bow, a very clever invention. Listen to me and learn how to be wise. The spearman is the slave of his weapons; once he breaks his spear, he is not able to ward off death from his body, since he has only a single defense. And through the fault of worthless fellow-soldiers he dies himself, because of the cowardice of his neighbors. But the man whose hand can aim the bow holds the best weapon: having shot a thousand arrows, by others still his body is protected from death. Positioned at a distance, he guards himself against enemies who see only the wound of unseen arrows, and he does not betray his body to the enemy, but keeps it well protected. This is the wisest plan in battle: safeguard your body while harming your enemies, unmoored to tuche.

Amphitryon thus confirms earlier intimations of a more modern Heracles, sophos and proficient in technē: the arrow is “a very clever invention” (τὸ πάνσοφον δὲ ἑўρηµα), and he accepts Lycus’ substitution of nets for brute strength. The bow allows Heracles to stand outside the law of martial reciprocity. He wounds without being wounded; he attacks the many without needing the many for protection; he lies beyond the reach of tuche. Amphitryon’s rhetoric strengthens the opposition implied by Lycus between the archer and the hoplite, while challenging the distribution of value between them in civic discourse. In Thucydides’ Funeral Oration, for example, the citizen’s body is autarchic (αὔταρκες) insofar as it is freely offered to the polis to be consigned to tuche on the battlefield (II.41–42). Conversely, for Amphitryon, the archer is autarchic because he controls the tuchai of others, not through force, but through an epistemic advantage.

The asymmetrical relation of power between the archer and his victim bears a striking similarity to relations between mortals and immortals. For the gods also

86. 191–92 post 194 trai. Wilamowitz. Wilamowitz’s transposition has been accepted by recent editors (Diggle, Kovacs) but see Renehan 1985: 151–52 and Kovacs 2003: 169–71 for the difficulties with the passage.
87. See also I.70: ἢτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώµασιν ἀλλωτριωτάτοις ύπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρόνται, τῇ δὲ γνώµῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ύπὲρ σύτης (“The Athenians use their bodies in the service of the city as though they belonged to others, but their judgment as something entirely their own in the service of accomplishing something on the city’s behalf”). On the civic body in Thucydides, see esp. Loraux 1997. The relationship between arrows, visual asymmetry, and tuche is thematized in Thucydides’ report of the Sphacteria episode (IV.32–37 and 40).
88. Heracles’ pretensions to autarchy have long been noted: see Wilamowitz 1909: 127–28; Röhdich 1968: 80–81; Desch 1986: 13–14; Griffiths 2002.
enjoy a surplus of vision that facilitates their exercise of agency. In the scene of Patroclus’ death, Apollo invisibly approaches the hero from behind and strikes a blow to his back, leaving him helplessly exposed to Trojan spears (Il. 16.788–807). The poet brilliantly illustrates here the impossibility of meeting in combat (ἐντυποβολέω—a verb that recalls the reciprocal seeing stressed by Lycus) the god who strikes from afar (ἐχαρτηροβόλας), even when he strikes from up close. When Apollo does strike from afar, his weapon, of course, is the arrow. In early Greek poetry, arrows are behind some of the most disruptive pains of unseen origin, such as symptoms of plague, labor pangs, and erōs, as well as death. Like Apollo’s blow to Patroclus, the arrow appears from a place outside the victim’s field of vision: the retreating warrior Harpalion “glances warily in all directions, lest someone strike his flesh with a bronze” (πάντοσε παπταίνων, μή τις χρόα χαλκῷ ἐπαύρη, Il. 13.649), but he cannot for all his caution see the arrow of Meriones coming to kill him. In the same way, the wound caused by the archer’s unseen arrows (τυφλοταρείσσεις τοξεύμασιν) in Amphitryon’s account arises from a place unobserved and unassailable. In this respect, then, it is like a symptom of plague or erōs.

The figure of the archer, then, offers us a first node for intersecting worldviews, here concerning blindness, the daemonic, and vulnerability. On the one hand, Heracles’ visual advantage over his victims as a bowman mimics that of the gods vis-à-vis mortals. Like a god, he is out of reach, with a boundless capacity to harm. At the same time, he is unaware of the blind spot in his own field of vision where Lussa will strike, producing not a wound but, as is typical of divine violence, symptoms. Amphitryon thus describes a classic case of tragic vulnerability premised on the belief not in boundless strength, but in unhampered visibility. On the other hand, these traditional motifs are mobilized in the


90. For Heracles’ god-like status qua archer: Padilla 1992; George 1994. It should be noted that a god can himself be trapped in an asymmetrical relationship of seeing: think of Zeus in the Dios apatē, who fails to see Hypnos perched in the highest tree on Mt. Ida and thus falls prey to his power (II. 14.286–360). Zeus’ vulnerability in the Iliad already has consequences for Heracles, since it is precisely because Zeus is struck by atē that Heracles is born into a life of servitude (19.95–133). In Heracles, too, Heracles’ suffering takes place on account of a loophole in Zeus’ hegemony (827–29), rather than under its aegis (as in Trachiniae). There is an emphatic use of πατήρ in Iris’ announcement of the limits of Zeus’ power, underscoring the close relationship between the Father’s weakness, his contingent hold on Necessity, and his son’s suffering. For paternity themes in the play, see Gregory 1977; Mikalson 1986; Filhol 1989; Padilla 1994; Kraus 1998.

91. Röhdich 1968: 81. Cf. Wilamowitz 1909: 128 and Arrowsmith 1954: 54–55, arguing that senseless bia is Heracles’ vulnerability. This is not untrue, but his capacity for violence only becomes dangerous once he loses the ability to “see” what he is doing.
characterization of an unusual Heracles. The enemies he faces are bestial threats
to calm, freedom, and civilization. Throughout his labors, he has managed to keep
these foes in his line of vision. In Euripides’ brilliant plotting, however, Heracles’
decision to stable the monster Cerberus at Hermione while he returns to Thebes
leaves just enough space to introduce Hera’s series-canceling “last labor” (1279).
On this occasion, a daemonic enemy that he cannot see erupts from a place he
cannot see, that is, the recessed depths of his body.92

Until the arrival of madness, Heracles had acted independently of tuche. Like
his counterpart in the Prodikean allegory, he had been in control of his choices,
subordinating his σῶμα to his gnōmē.93 Heracles’ body, in fact, appears repeatedly
in Amphitryon’s speech: four times in sixteen lines. Even more surprising than
the repetition is the fact that σῶμα appears not as an instrument of bia, but
rather as something requiring protection. This unexpected idea finds further
support if we accept the manuscript reading at 825, where Iris says that she
and Lussa have come to wage war against the body of one man (ἐνὸς δ’ ἐπ’
ἀνδρός σώματα στρατεύομεν, L).94 The vulnerability of the body would appear
confirmed when Heracles, having awoken from his madness, panics upon seeing
his scattered weapons “which before stood by my arms and preserved my
flanks” (ἂ πρὶν παραπέπληγµέντ’ ἐµοὶ βραχίονι ἐσωτέρα φλευράς, 1099–1100). Protected
by arrows, Heracles’ body had been invulnerable, unscathed, no one’s slave—in
short, not very Heracleian at all. Heracles wakes up in a world transformed by
its violation.95

The body’s violation brings not death, but something worse than death. For
Lussa destroys Heracles not simply by using her own visual advantage—she enters
the house unseen (ἀφαντοί, 872)—but by perverting the archer’s power. 96
The ambiguity that will come to surround the instruments of that power, by which I
mean both the arrows and Heracles himself, is first cued in Amphitryon’s account

92. The innovative plotting extends to the timing of the madness, which appears to have been
placed before the labors in earlier texts: see Bond 1981: xxviii–xxx.

93. At X. Mem. I.1.28, the strength of the body requires that it serve gnōmē and undergo
training (εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνάτως εῖναι, τῇ γνώµῃ υπηρετεῖν ἐπιστέον τὸ σῶµα καὶ
γυµναστέον σὺν τῶν καὶ ἱδρύτι). Although Xenophon’s telling of the story owes much to the
thematic concerns of the Memoriablia, it seems clear that the Prodikean Choice placed Heracles’
infamous body in the service of ethical, mind-based aretē and assimilated the famous labors to the
practice of such virtue.

94. Given the multiple occurrences of σῶμα in the earlier representation of the archer, its
usage here would provide a unique note of responsion. Virtually all editors, however, have accepted
Scaliger’s emendation δὸµατα (σ and δ are easily confused). This presumably better answers τόκει in
the previous line, but compare A. Th. 895–96, δόµοισι καὶ σῶµασιν πεπληγµένους, suggesting that
both σώµατα and δῶµατα are possible; see also Ar. Av. 1241. Reiske proposed σῶµα συµπρατεύοµεν,
although the verb does not occur elsewhere in tragedy.

95. On the importance of corporeal integrity to the autarchic ideal of democratic citizenship, see

96. Compare Il. 15.461. The mad are often said to be struck aside (παραπεπληγµένος,
παράκοπος), e.g. A. Eum. 329–30; Pr. 582; E. Hipp. 38, 238; Ba. 33, 1000; Ar. Lys. 831,
of the archer’s τυφλός arrow. The word τυφλός is usually translated as the arrow “unseen” by its victim until it strikes a wound. Yet Euripides often extends the adjective to those instruments by which the blind act in and on the world, such as the hand, the staff, or the foot.\(^97\) This secondary meaning anticipates Heracles’ encounter with Lussa, which transforms his arrow into something no longer unseen but blind. In this sense the arrow is like the archer himself, who, attacked from a space outside his field of vision, directs his power against the wrong target. I turn now to consider the staging of this attack and what it brings to light.

**Polysemy and the interval: Madness and the eruption of the Heracleian Body**

The unexpected arrival of Lussa and Iris on the skênê brings Heracles’ civilizing career to an abrupt close.\(^98\) Euripides’ gods usually appear in prologues or at the end of plays, where they provide background information or extend the repercussions of the tragic event into the future.\(^99\) The goddesses’ arrival here is more like the symptom itself: sudden, shocking, disruptive.

Even stranger is the nature of these divinities. By praising Heracles’ accomplishments, Lussa challenges the very logic of personification, as if Vice were to start advocating a life of virtue in Prodicus’ allegory. The paradoxical Lussa emphasizes the discontinuity between the level of (personified) divine explanation and the level of daemonic outbreak, that is, between Λύσσα σωφρονούσα, in Wilamowitz’s clever phrasing (1909: 124), and the Lussa who descends into the house. At the same time, the incongruities of the epiphany frame what follows. By unsuccessfully challenging the abstract reason that Iris gives for the madness (“if this man does not pay a penalty, mortal things will be great, and the gods nothing,” ἥθεοί μὲν οὐδαµο/πέρησαν, τὰ θνητὰ δ’ ἔσται µεγάλα, µὴ δόντος δίκην, 841–42), before transforming herself into its incarnation,\(^100\) Lussa casts the outbreak of disorder in and through Heracles as the hero’s failure to ward off the forces of Night that she embodies.\(^101\) The complex tonality of the scene once again signals the intersection of different narratives: one stressing Hera’s anger, another

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\(^97\) See E. Hec. 1050; Ph. 834, 1699; Ion 744.

\(^98\) In Homer, lussa is simply battlelust, and the personification is irrelevant (Hershkowitz 1998: 127–29). For tragic Lussa, see Duchemin 1967; Jouan 1970: 317–19; Sutton 1975, on vase-paintings of Lussa; Padel 1992: 163; idem, 1995: 17–20, 142–43. Lussa had a speaking part in Aeschylus’ Xantriae (fr. 169R), but we do not know if she was on the roof or onstage. She may also have appeared in Toxotides and Edonians.


\(^100\) These lines have been read as support for a hubris-based reading of the madness along Promethean lines: see esp. Arrowsmith 1954: 32–53. For echoes of Prometheus Bound, see Mullens 1939; idem, 1941; Jouan 1970; Papadopoulou 2005: 120–22. Cerri 1997: 249 invokes the well-known idea in Anaximander of cosmic justice. Those who put all the weight on the traditional motivations of Hera’s anger (e.g. Bond 1981 ad 841f.) have to ignore the very words that accompany the imposition of divine causality.

\(^101\) On the pervasiveness of Hades and the forces of Night in the play, see Assaël 1994.
attentive to the conflict between Heracles’ civilizing, autarchic virtue and the blind hero who becomes the conduit of another’s power.

The transition from divine commentary to mortal events begins with Lussa bowing to necessity and announcing that she will “sink unseen into the house of Heracles” (ἐς δόµους δ/Θu[teΣnΚlriΚΤt ἡµε/i[τaperiΣp[Φeneς ἄφαντοι δυσόµεσθ/Θu[teΣnΚlriΚΤt ῾Ηρακλέους, 874). The verb δύω can mean simply “to go,” as well as “to sink into.” Homer uses it of weapons (Il. 16.340), as well as of powerful forces such as pain (ὁδύναι, Il. 11.272), anger (χόλος, Il. 19.16), and madness (λύσσα, Il. 9.239) that enter a person. Sinking into the house coincides with Lussa’s entry into the body—“such races I will run into the breast of Heracles” (οὗ ἐγώ στάδια δραµούμαι στέρνον εἰς ὢρακλέους, 863)—just as the destruction of the house mirrors the collapse of the Ὠράκλειον δέµας (1036–37). Yet we should not imagine that Lussa enters the body as an embodied agent. In the archaic and classical periods, daemonic attacks are spoken of in terms of striking, seizing, and goading rather than in terms of habitation. The descent into the house muddies Lussa’s status as an embodied actor: “I will break through the roof and I will fall upon the house, having first killed the children” (καὶ καταρρήκω µέλαθρα καὶ δόµους ἐπεµβαλ/Theta/τέκν/Theta/τέκνης ἀποκτείνασα πρώτον, 864–65) turns into “but he killing will not know that he is slaughtering the children whom he begat, before he lets go of my madness” (ὁδ ὲκ α ν ὼ ν οὐκ εἴσεται πα/i[τaperiΣp[Φeneδας οὓς ἔτικτεν ἐναρών, πρὶν ἂν ἐµὰς λύσσας ἀφ/etaperiΣp[Φene/i[ταΣυ εται, 865–66). Having descended into the body, Lussa belongs to Heracles as much as he belongs to her, and madness takes on a uniquely Heracleian expression.

The messenger speech describes Heracles undertaking precisely those activities that define him elsewhere as violent and voracious: city-sacking (943–46, 998–1000), eating (955–57), wrestling (959–60), and clubbing heads (990–94). The series culminates, after Athena’s intervention, with his binding, a potent image of enslavement that conditions the audience’s introduction to the “new” Heracles. However extrinsic the goad to madness, then, it is only
realized once it has entered Heracles and erupted as symptoms of his mythic passions.

It is precisely because madness enters the tragic action through Heracles’ symptoms that it gives rise to multiple interpretations rather than straightforwardly pointing to Hera. The polysemy of the symptom is encouraged by the displacement of the daemonic, poeticized filter from the experience of those who actually witness Heracles’ rampage. Conversely, those with access to the divine plane do not see madness realized. The audience and the Chorus “see” Heracles’ symptoms through Lussa’s performative speech:

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{ἠν ἰδού καὶ δὴ τινάσει χράτα βαλβίδων ἄπο} \\
& \text{καὶ διαστρόφους ἐλίσσει σιγὰ γοργωτοὺς κόρας,} \\
& \text{ἀμπνοὰς δ/ΘυτεΣκΚλριΚΤτ ὀὐ σωφρονίζει, ταύρος ὦς ἐς ἐμβολὴν,} \\
& \text{δεινὰ μικάται δὲ Κήρας ἀνακαλὸν τὰς Ταρτάρου.} \\
& \text{τάχα σ’ ἐγώ μάλλον χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβω.}
\end{align*}
\]

867–71

Watch! He shakes his head at the race’s start; he rolls his Gorgon eyes from side to side, and he breathes uncontrollably; like a bull ready to charge he lets forth an awful bellow, calling up the Furies of Tartarus. Soon I will cause you to dance more still; I will charm you with a dreadful pipe.

Instead of the mad Heracles, then, we are given choral song that is rich in the conventional imagery of madness, such as the goad and Bacchic perversions (889–90, 896–97; cf. 1119), and punctuated by the cries of Amphitryon from the house.108 While the story of the events inside is restored to us in detail by the messenger speech, no one from the Chorus speaks of Lussa again. When Hera’s name recurs, it is under a cloud of confusion.109 For those inside the house see Heracles, but not Lussa. As a result, when symptoms erupt inside the house they give rise to uncertainty and speculation. The first confused reaction is that of the servants, who do not know whether they should feel fear or amusement (διπλούς δ’ ὀπαδοὶς ἠν γέλως φόβος θ’ ὁμοῦ, 950), if their master is playing or if he is mad (παῖζει πρὸς ἡµᾶς δεσπότης ἢ μαίνεται, 952).110 The second response is Amphitryon’s. Once it is clear that his

108. Compare A. Eum. 307–96, where the song of the Furies is part of the main action. In the prologue of Ajax, Athena announces her role in the madness, but to Odysseus alone, leaving the Chorus to speculate about which god is responsible. Tecmessa, the witness to the madness, blames δαίµον (243). We do see direct interaction between Athena and the mad Ajax (89–117).


son’s transformation is no game, he lays blame on the fresh blood on Heracles’ hands from the recent murders (966–67). The specter of Athena that hurls a rock at Heracles as he is about to commit patricide offers another explanation. Someone, Amphitryon, or possibly Heracles, blames her for sending a τάραγµα ταρτάρειον, a “hellish whirlwind,” against the house (906–908).

These different perspectives on the madness and its cause converge on the symptom. In Lussa’s speech, the head shakes, the eyes roll, the voice disappears and is reborn as a bellow, and Heracles’ breathing becomes uneven. The rolling eyes and the sudden silence reappear in the messenger speech, which adds foaming at the mouth, blood-gorged veins in the eyes, mad laughter, and visual hallucinations. But perhaps most importantly, symptoms form a bridge between the attack and a third framework of interpretation that begins to unfold at the moment when Heracles is wheeled out from the palace, asleep and bound to a broken column. Over the course of a slow and halting awakening, Heracles confronts his strange and unfamiliar body through the subsiding upheaval (τάραγµα) in his phrenes and his hot, unsteady breath.

Heracles’ reappearance, in fact, marks a turning point in the tragedy. The appearance of Lussa and Hera begins to fade, and the tragedy comes to fix on Heracles and his body, the ground of the symptom’s materialization, the instrument of violence, and, as will become clear, the source of continued disruption in the form of lups. The body wheeled out on the ekkuklėma is debilitated and culpable, bloodied and bound, stripped of defenses and lost in sleep—in short, the Heracleian body, hitherto concealed. This body arrives in the tragedy under the sign of what Amphitryon at one point calls ΚΣιένωσις, “aberration,” a term whose weight begins to sink in as we are shown Heracles encountering his body as a stranger. Nothing, Heracles says, as he slowly

111. Kroeker 1938: 121 rightly noted that this should not be seen as a “natural” cause, as Max Pohlenz had claimed. On the relationship between fresh bloodshed and madness, see Parker 1983: 128–30; Padel 1992: 172–89. On miasma, see further below.
112. Lines 1002–1003 suggest that Athena appears to Heracles. Yet it is possible that Amphitryon speaks at 906–908: see Bond 1981 ad loc.
113. Kosak 2004: 159–62 follows the word ταραγµός, which the medical writers use to describe internal imbalance, from the polis (e.g. 532) to Heracles’ phrenes over the course of the play. See also Padel 1995: 131–32.
114. Kovacs 1996: 142–43 argues that πέπτωκα and πνέω cannot refer to Heracles’ present experience, since when Heracles awakes, the madness is over: thus Heracles cannot say “I have fallen into a dreadful wave of mental confusion” whilst reasoning calmly about his present state. This complaint, however, misunderstands tragic convention. Characters are often capable of reporting on their experience in the midst of their illness or madness or, here, the aftershock of madness. Compare earlier allegations that Io in Prometheus Bound is not “really” mad because she describes her own symptoms, e.g. Harries 1891: 39–40; Mattes 1970: 79–80. Heracles’ experience of the ebbing madness helps blur the boundary between the attack of lussa, the onset of lupè, and the staging of the new, “sick” (νοσώτα, 1414) Heracles.
115. ὁ παῖ, τι τάσεις; τις ὁ τρόπος ξενώσεως / τῆς ἡμετέρᾳ (965–66). The word is a hapax in the classical period. LSJ gives “entertainment of a guest” (from ξενώσω). The Supplement adds “aberration.”
awakens, is familiar (σαφὲς οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν εἰωθότων, 1108). Even as he recognizes the sun, the heavens, and the earth, he continues to experience his “vigorous chest and arms” (νεανίαν θώρακα καὶ βραχίωνα, 1095), now bound, as something uncanny. Whereas in Bacchae, Agave has a dim awareness of her crimes, Heracles’ knowledge of what he has done can only arrive from his father: his self-alienation is total.116

Nevertheless, these arrows, these crimes, and this body belong to Heracles. Once madness materializes through the symptom, it is no longer autonomous or external; there is no treatment, no pharmakon to expel it. If the tuche of Hera strikes a single blow (1393), that blow turns out to reveal the body as innately vulnerable to misfortunes that disrupt it from within. This vulnerability is confirmed by Heracles’ weeping, once inconceivable: “Never have I shed water from my eyes, nor did I ever even consider that it would come to this, tears fallen from my eyes” (οὔτ’ ἀπ’ ὠμάτων ἔστασι αἰετὺ, ὀὔτ’ ἄν ὑμην ποτὲ / ἐς τοῖς ἀτοκῆς δόξαρ’ ἀπ’ ὠμάτων βαλεῖν, 1354–56). For tears demonstrate that tuche is not under the control of the autarchic subject, but is internal to his identity: “as it is, I see,” Heracles concludes, “that one must be a slave to tuche” (νῦν δ’, ὡς ἔοικε, τῇ τύχῃ δουλεύτων, 1357; cf. 1396; Or. 418; Ba. 366).

Thus lussa, this “novel thing” (τι καινόν, 1118), transforms the conditions of the life to be lived henceforth. As Heracles’ weeping suggests, the final scene is an exercise in determining what this life will look like. Its cyclical structure—Heracles laments, recovers, and laments again—makes it appear as if Euripides is restaging nosos, this time as a struggle with lupe that bears some similarities to the struggle against nosos that Heracles wages at the end of Trachiniae.117 Yet in this case lupe, unlike lussa and unlike the atê of Trachiniae, opens up the possibility that Heracles can overcome, or at least tame, the destructive forces revealed to be a part of him. Indeed, Theseus’ recuperation of the greatest man in Greece as philos and Athenian cult hero depends precisely on Heracles letting go of his grief and resisting the desire to “suffer badly” (πάσχειν κακῶς, 1313), as Theseus puts it. This is a particularly fascinating situation if we remember that Heracles placed similar pressure on Admetus in Euripides’ Alcestis over twenty years earlier, counseling him to lay aside his excessive grief (τὴν ἄγαν λύπην ἀφέω, 794) and rejoin an elite male community.118

117. For lupe and nosos, see E. fr. 1071K: λυπάτα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις τίκτουσιν νόσους (“for sorrows breed suffering/diseases for humans”); see also fr. 1070K, 1079K. Elsewhere in Euripides, lupe corrodes the phrenes (Hel. 1192); the kardia is bitten by it (Alc. 1100); it induces a chill (Hipp. 803). It is one name given by Orestes to the nosos that is destroying his body (Or. 398). For lupe as a psychic affection in the medical writers, see Hum. 9 (Littre V.488); Acut. Sp. 40 (Littre II.476=87,11–12 Joly).
118. There, too, as Wohl 1998: 152–75 argues, xenia restores elite masculinity against the pull of mourning called up by the death of Alcestis.
Heracles, whose pride is palpable, will not be unmoved by Theseus’ demand that he resurrect his heroic identity. Nevertheless, his mourning and his commitment to *miasma* make visible his resistance to Theseus’ solution to his crisis. Heracles’ gestures of refusal, which extend beyond the moment at which he decides to live, challenge readings of the final scene as a triumph of friendship between men and political redemption.\(^{119}\) What we see staged rather is a struggle, an *agôn* of sorts, in which meaning is not only spoken, but enacted, as Heracles shuttles between Amphitryon and his family, on the one side, and Theseus, on the other. This struggle suggests that, in the absence of a *deus ex machina*, the tragedy confronts two versions of humanism: that represented by the aged, mortal father and the dead sons and that represented by Theseus as *philos* and civic son. In the final scene, the symptoms of grief, through which the daemonic surfaces for Heracles as both alien and intimate, become a call to the creation of meaning. I close with an analysis of this scene as a third node of overdetermination, one where the crossing of “mythic” and “secular” perspectives on suffering allows the human and the sacred to circulate in unexpected ways.

**Miasma, Memory, and Heroic Identity**

Heracles, decimated by the knowledge of what he has done and gripped by sorrow, wavers between life and death. Theseus arrives onstage at this critical moment to present *philia* as the panacea for Heracles’ ills, the alternative to both actual death and the symbolic death of mourning. For it is not enough that the “new” Heracles is convinced to live. The old, untragic Heracles must be resurrected in order to be annexed to Athens.\(^{120}\)

Theseus’ strategy is twofold. He first addresses Heracles’ losses. By pledging to give him a share of his own honors, he guarantees that Heracles’ *timē* will be restored and recognized by a community, thereby answering Heracles’ argument that his *atai* will isolate him and deny him a home (1281–1302). In gifting his honors, Theseus reworks the idea of *tuche* that had been set forth at the beginning of the tragedy by Amphitryon. Whereas the hoplite is a slave of *tuche*, no man is untouched by misfortune on Theseus’ account. The answer to the vagaries of mortal life is to have *philoi* whose good luck will cover the costs of one’s own misfortunes and who can be paid back once the situation is reversed. Theseus’ offer of honors is, after all, the repayment of a debt, namely his rescue from Hades (κἀγὼ χάριν σοι τῆς ἐμῆς σωτηρίας/ τήνδ’ ἄντιδώσω, “this favor for my salvation I will repay to you,” 1336–37). Theseus, in fact, gains in the exchange by winning a good name (ἐὐκλεία, 1335) for the city. The figure of Heracles


\(^{120}\) “By rescuing the great civilizer from suicide, Theseus will be upholding Athens’ reputation as a civilizing city” (Mills 1997: 139). No wonder, then, that Theseus resists any evidence that the great civilizer is no longer the same man, a tendency that Conacher, for example, notes with approval (1967: 88).
with his arm around Theseus’ neck thus becomes an aristocratic variant on the interlocked bodies of the hoplites. Cooperation is recoded as a bulwark against risk.

The interdependence between Theseus and Heracles also replaces the destroyed familial bonds and extends the idea of exchange to include not only the restitution of honor, but also of sons: “deprived of my sons,” Heracles tells Theseus, “I hold you as my son” (παίδων στερηθεὶς παῖδ’ ὅπως ἔχω σ’ ἐμόν, 1401). Theseus thus renders Heracles’ misfortunes unspecific, allowing them to be compensated and, hence, forgotten.

The second prong of Theseus’ strategy targets precisely the dangers of memory. Philia is to function as a check on the imperative to remember this misfortune, which threatens to exceed the limits of compensation offered and to exercise pressure on Heracles’ future. Memory is represented in the final scene not only as the force of sorrow and mourning, but also as miasma. By taking a closer look at the competing meanings of miasma, we can better grasp what is at stake in Heracles’ struggle to overcome his grief.

Like a sophist or a secular physician, Theseus theatrically rejects the concept of miasma, mocking the hooded Heracles’ attempts to protect him from the polluted body; at one point, he gamely invites him to smear blood on his cloak (ἔκµασσε, φείδου µηδέν/Λ[l][nΚreek οὐκ ἀναίνοµαι, 1400). In denying that Heracles’ act has marked him, Theseus upholds the idea of tuché as generic and forgettable. The full implications of Theseus’ position are made evident in a single statement: “there is no alastór for philoi from philoi” (οὐδεὶς ἀλάστωρ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκ τῶν φίλων, 1234). In tragedy, the alastór is the one who refuses to forget, the figure of perpetual mourning and perpetual anger, victim and avenger. Clytemnestra, emerging from the palace with Agamemnon’s blood on her hands, calls herself the alastór of the house of Atreus (A. Ag. 1501). In Oedipus at Colonus, a tragedy shadowed by the demise of the last generation, Oedipus declares that he will forever reign as an alastór in Thebes (788). Each is an alastór for philoi. If miasma and alastór compel a return to a specifically tragic scene of trauma, denying their power is equivalent to denying the threat posed by lussa to


123. Parker 1983: 311 compares S. OC 92–93 to HF 1234. Yet in Oedipus at Colonus, the polis succeeds in harnessing the power of the Furies for apotropaic use, and Oedipus remains on the edge of the city. In Heracles, however, it appears that Theseus has to deny any penumbra of the daemonic around Heracles, and the hero will enter the city alive.
Heracles’ identity as the paradigmatic civilizing Hellene. Theseus seeks to erase the mourning that binds the hero to the scene of his crime and his losses. He makes the price of amnesty an act of amnesia.\textsuperscript{124}

But what may be most interesting about Theseus’ “enlightened” denial of \textit{miasma} is its apparent conflict with his belief in the traditional motive for the madness: Hera’s anger and the tales of the gods’ crimes (1314–19). Such surface incoherence makes it clear that \textit{Heracles} never simply adopts one worldview (divine-mythic or “secular”) over another, but rather plays worldviews off one another to create complex stances towards Heracles’ madness. On reflection, in fact, Theseus’ position is entirely coherent. It is, in effect, an argument familiar from scholarship on \textit{Heracles}: the madness is not Heracles’, since “tragic madness is something external, invading, daemonic, autonomous” (Padel 1995: 20). Yet we can see that, at least within the tragedy, this is a partial and motivated explanation rather than a statement of fact. Theseus wants to extricate Heracles from what he has done and to recover his friend’s former \textit{kleos}. He thus lays the blame for the madness on the gods—the contest is Hera’s (‘Ἡρὰς ὤδ’ ἁγών, 1189)—but insists that the effects cannot touch them (or anyone else): “no one, being mortal, may stain divine things” (οὐ µιαίνεις θνητὸς ὦν τὰ τῶν θεῶν, 1232).\textsuperscript{125} If there is no \textit{alastor}, nothing insists on the specificity of Heracles’ misfortunes. The divine cannot be stained and, hence, forced to remember.

But Theseus’ position is not the only possible stance. Heracles, too, takes a similarly complex perspective on the madness and \textit{miasma}. We can recall that he dismisses Theseus’ stories of errant gods as lies and insists that “god, if he is truly god, needs nothing,” thereby challenging the logic of divine anger and retribution. Yet this “enlightened” doctrine would appear to be incompatible with his attachment to the regressive idea of \textit{miasma}. Once again, the appearance of incoherence arises from too rigid a categorization: Heracles’ approach is as coherent as Theseus’. Although he refuses to exploit the gods as scapegoats, he cannot give up blame altogether, as Theseus’ secularized approach to \textit{miasma} suggests might be possible. The notion of \textit{miasma}, with its disregard for intentionality, captures the helplessness of a body caught in a causal chain while still holding that body responsible for the damage.\textsuperscript{126} In some sense \textit{miasma} is simply the physical memory of human transgression. If we deny its force we may isolate heroic identity from a tychic and impersonal economy of force but we also strip the deaths of Heracles’ wife and sons of meaning.

Thus \textit{Heracles} offers not one, but two perspectives on \textit{miasma} and madness. Neither of these can be reduced to a “mythic” or a “secularized” approach. On

\textsuperscript{124} On amnesty as collective civic amnesia, see Loraux 1998: 83–109.

\textsuperscript{125} Compare E. \textit{Or}. 75–76 (Helen is speaking to Electra): προσφθέγµασιν γὰρ οὐ µιαίνοµαι σέθεν, ἐς Φοῖβον ἀνακέρουσα τὴν ἁµαρτίαν (“I suffer no defilement from addressing you, since I lay the blame on Apollo”).

\textsuperscript{126} On the irrelevance of intentionality to \textit{miasma}: Parker 1983: 111.
one side we find Heracles attracted back to the moment of his trauma by the forces of mourning, which are catalyzed by contact with his family, as well as by the need to recognize this “new thing” as constitutive of his identity. On the other side lies Theseus, who tries to liberate Heracles from his act in the interest of restoring his name and integrating him into social and political life. The tension between these two positions animates the final scene of the tragedy.

The struggle to be played out between Heracles and Theseus is first adumbrated in the two appeals to the suicidal Heracles at 1203–13 and 1214–28 by Amphitryon and Theseus respectively. Amphitryon, singing in excited dochmics and anapaests, entreats his son in the register of the body: “The weight of my body joins with my tears in the struggle. I supplicate you, falling on your beard and your knee and your hand, shedding a dark tear” (βάρος άντίπαλον δακρύωις συναμιλλάται: ίκετεύοµεν ἀµφὶ γενειάδα καὶ γόνυ καὶ χέρα σὰν προπίτνων πολίων / δάκρυοιν ἐκβάλλων, 1206–10). His unsuccessful appeal is superseded by Theseus’ measured, iambic arguments. Although these provoke Heracles’ rejection of the poets’ lies in favor of a perfect god, they ultimately result in his decision to live.

Yet the failure of Amphitryon’s supplication is not the end of his significance, nor of that which he represents. For it is through the process of taking leave of his father and his dead family after he has decided to live that Heracles is pulled back towards his misfortune and into lament (ὁἴµοι δάµαρτος καὶ τέκνων, ὁἴµοι δ’ ἐµοὶ, 1374). Overwhelmed again by his losses, Heracles returns to the weapons that had defined his heroism:

O bitter pleasures of these kisses!
O my weapons, my bitter partners!
I am at a loss as to whether I should keep these things
or give them up,
since falling against my flanks they will say:
“with us you killed your wife and children; you hold
onto us
as child-slayers.” Can I hold these things in my arms?
What could I reply? And yet, stripped of the weapons
with which I accomplished the finest deeds in Greece, should I die shamefully, having given myself over to my enemies?

These things must not be abandoned; in misery they must be kept.

The fact that the instrumental dative ἡµῖν is immediately followed by the weapons’ “own” assertion of culpability (ἡµῖς ἔχεις παῖδον τὸν σου) makes it impossible to decide if the arrows are instruments or culprits. The oscillation between “with us you killed” and “you hold us, child-killers” captures Heracles’ own uncertainty about whether he is innocent or guilty, subject or object. Here we begin to sense that Heracles cannot simply forget his act. In shouldering these weapons again he accepts their constant falling against his chest—a reminder of his sons’ futile supplication⁵— as part of his own movement, part of the sense that he has of his own weight. The arrows commemorate his vulnerability to unseen forces even as he trusts them once again to screen his body from harm (1382–84).¹²⁸

Heracles’ decision to reclaim his identity as an archer thus takes shape within the crucible of tragic memory. Recognizing the force of the alastor in these instruments and in the magnetic pull of Heracles’ family makes us aware of the fragility of this decision. Arrows in hand, Heracles finds himself back at the point where his aretē had been extended (Lycus, like other Euripidean villains, appears to be an ad hoc creation), then destroyed. That is to say, his return to Thebes had marked the interruption of his final labor. With Hades’ own hound, Cerberus, being held at Hermione, Heracles had been free to summon Lussa’s (860) for his mad “trip” to Mycenae. At the end of the play, he must undertake that trip again, this time in reality. Yet his sense of distance from the former Heracles is palpable. He worries about going to Mycenae alone, “lest, bereft of my sons, I suffer something on account of my sorrow” (λύπη/τι παῖδων μὴ πάθω μονοµενος, 1388). Is Heracles worried that lupe will overtake him as madness once did, leaving him vulnerable to Cerberus? Or is he fearful at the possibility that he is no longer able to tame the forces of Hades, whose Bacchant he has now been? Sorrow opens him to suffering, renders him vulnerable to the eruption of τι: something, anything, an upswell of forces in himself that he cannot control.

The struggle against lupe that Heracles fears is, in fact, enacted before our eyes. His address to his weapons had led us to believe that his lament had been stilled. Yet with the mention of lupe at 1388 he suddenly exhorts the city to grieve with him (κείρασθε, συµπενθήσατ/Θυκρικτη, 1390). Heracles’ use of a συν- compound with the Thebans instead of reciprocating Theseus’ inclusionary civic language

¹²⁷. Bond 1981 ad 1379 notes that πλευρὰ τἀµὰ προσπίτνοντ/Θυκρικτη ἐρε/i ερε echoes Heracles’ children falling on their father in joy (προσπεσοµένοι, 79) and supplication (προσπεσοµένων, 986).

¹²⁸. Cf. Foley 1985: 168 (shouldering the weapons is “a magnificent gesture of self-mastery”). The gesture seems to mark, rather, the impossibility of self-mastery, which is not to say it is an act of cowardice, pace Fitzgerald 1991.
(1202, 1205, 1386) looks like an attempt to set up an alliance proper to women—for there are no women left to mourn—in place of philia. Sensing trouble, Theseus abruptly intervenes: he commands Heracles to get up and leads him forward, towards Athens. Heracles obligingly breaks off his lament, accepts Theseus’ offer of physical support, names him as a surrogate son, and begins speaking the discourse of philia (1403–1404). And yet again the movement forward stalls. Amphitryon, to whom Heracles again turns, observes that Athens is a land (πατρίς) that is lucky in sons, as Thebes manifestly is not. At the word εὐτεκνὸς, Heracles, like Leontius in Plato’s Republic (439e-440a), is compelled to turn back, away from Athens and Theseus, to look again upon his own sons’ bodies.

Wherein lies the magnetism of the miasma that Theseus would deny? What pulls Heracles back to the scene of his losses? Theseus, doubting that seeing the children’s corpses will make Heracles “feel better” (ῥά ιτας αλταων ἔση ιτας ητας), calls this powerful sight a φίλτρον. A φίλτρον is a “love-charm,” something that incites love and affection. Naturally, children provoke such attachments, which may be terribly intense (δεινά). This is especially true for mothers, according to a long-standing sentiment in Greek literature that is particularly pronounced in Euripides, and Theseus is well aware in another Euripidean tragedy of the dangers of feeding a mother’s ῥυπε with the sight of her son’s fallen body (Supp. 941–46). Heracles, who had earlier declared, “the entire race is child-loving” (παν δὲ φιλότεκνον γένος), finds that to be child-loving is to be inscribed rather into the race of women (φιλότεκνον πος παν γυναικειον γένος, Pho. 356), whose grief is unforgettable and incurable. How, then, as Theseus implies, could Heracles’ grief be healthy?

129. Mills 1997: 143 notes the prevalence of συν- compounds without recognizing Heracles’ subversion of Theseus’ language.

130. On Thebes as an “anti-Athens,” see Zeitlin 1990, although she does not include Heracles in her analysis on the grounds that he is a Panhellenic hero and, hence, insufficiently Theban (144n.16). Cf. Bernardini 1997, arguing that Heracles is indeed Theban in Euripides’ play, but that the play lacks an overt opposition between Thebes and Athens; his focus is on the city’s institutions, however, rather than on the broader tragic framework of the final scene that I describe above; see also Cerri 1997. On the play’s idealized portrait of Athens, see Tarkow 1977; Papadopoulou 2005: 151ff.

131. Bond dryly wonders “whether the excitation of emotion will relieve it” (1981 ad 1407). His quasi-medical language brings out the medical dimension of Theseus’ expression: Kosak 2004: 172–73 notes that the expression ῥά ιτας αλταων ειναι in the Corpus designates treatment that may ease pain, but does not cure the disease. The medical language also suggests a conversation taking shape in contemporary culture on the indulgence of emotion and health, a conversation that looks forward to the Aristotelian appropriation of katharsis to describe the role of tragedy in the expulsion of emotions.

132. E. And. 207; Hipp. 509.


And indeed, the desire to see the dead children gives rise in turn to a desire to embrace Amphitryon (πατρός τε στέρνα προσθέσθαι θέλω, 1408). The gesture of falling on the father in lament recalls Amphitryon’s supplication at 1203–13 and undoes the “friendship-yoke” (ζευγός γε φίλιον, 1403) between Theseus and Heracles that had created a visual tableau of philia. Faced with the spectacle of this embrace, Theseus is finally provoked to charge Heracles with “being womanly” (εί σ’ ὅβεται τις θηλίν ὄντ’ οὐκ ξινέσει, 1412), an accusation for which evidence had been building from the moment at which the Heracleian body exploded into visibility, through Heracles’ Bacchic frenzy, his subjection to a goddess, his covering of his head, and his tears and lamentation.135

The alastôr that Theseus seeks to deny thus appears through those figures most at odds with the civilizing virtue that had defined Heracles at the outset, the figures that are most proximate to the Heracleian body: the mourning mother, the impotent father, the Bacchant, the Theban. Yet if Theseus’ charge recalls the Sophoclean Heracles railing against his own feminizing pain (Tr. 1071–75), this Heracles resists to the very end Theseus’ attempts to repudiate his experience. He refuses to restrict the meaning of ponoς to his labors, defiantly reinscribing the word with the weight of his suffering (ἅπαντ’ ἐλάσσω κείται τόνδ’ ἐτλην κακά, 1411; cf. 1255–81). He refuses to accept that, by laying claim to that suffering, he lives debased, lowly (ταπεινός, 1413). Most importantly, when Theseus declares that the Heracles before him is not the famous Heracles but a sick man (ὁ κλεινός Ἡρακλής οὐκ εἰ νοσῶν, 1414),136 Heracles demands that Theseus acknowledge the forces of disorder behind his own façade of civilizing and civic masculinity:


136. οὐκ εἰ νοσῶν Wilamowitz, printed by Diggle, Bond, Kovacs. ποῦ κείνος ὃν L.
In eliciting from Theseus recognition of Theseus’ own fragile areté, Heracles decisively undermines the idea that the misfortunes constitutive of embodied identity can be forgotten. It is an idea that Theseus, ultimately, cannot accept. In the king’s laconic imperative, πρόβαινε, which commands the protagonist to get on with the exit to Athens, Euripides registers the radical challenge that Heracles’ encounters with lussa and lupē pose to civic philia.

Heracles does move forward. For Athens, in the end, is the only future that the tragedy allows to him. Miasma no longer binds Heracles to his family but rather comes to stand between them, since he, their killer, cannot conduct their burial. The weight of Heracles’ grief and his acknowledgment of the porous, labile body revealed by madness are thus shifted onto the figure who had earlier played the mourning bird-mother while his son slept (ὁ δ’ ὤξ τις ὀρνις ἄπτερον καταστένον / ωδίνα τέχνον πρέσβυς, “here comes the old man like some bird lamenting the wingless chick, her labor-pang,” 1039–40). It is Amphitryon who emerges in the closing lines as the alastor, unable to forget and unforgettable.

Amphitryon plays this role in part because he takes on the task of burying the children, who have become the hypostasis of Heracles’ difficult-to-bear pain (δυσκόµιστ’ ἄχη, 1422). Yet he is also the guardian of memory on account of his awkward role as the survivor of Heracles’ rampage. The life spared by Athena in the name of the father paradoxically leaves us with one father too many, who competes with Athena herself qua Athenian civic parent. Thus it is Amphitryon who haunts Heracles’ exit from Thebes. As Heracles, turning for the last time to go, reminds him to bury the children, he demands to know, “Who will bury me?”

This proves a rather difficult question to answer. The exchange that follows is riddled with textual problems. These may be seen as symptomatic of the difficulty of getting rid of Amphitryon:

Heracles: Bury the children just as I told you.
Amphitryon: But who will bury me, son?
Heracles: I will.
Amphitryon: When will you come?
Heracles: When you die. [or: when you bury the children.]


Amphitryon: [How?  
Heracles: I will have you sent (?) from Thebes to Athens.]

One burial thus creates the problem with another. The conundrum of the text arises from a pair of apparent impossibilities. On the one hand, Heracles the exile cannot return to Thebes, a return that has been cast in these final lines as a kind of regression. On the other hand, Amphitryon cannot be integrated into Athens, not only because he was traditionally buried at Thebes, but also because his role in the tragedy seems to be to stand for all that Thebes represents. Regardless of how we treat these lines, each possibility, Heracles’ return to Thebes or Amphitryon’s arrival in Athens, complicates the polarization of these two imaginative spaces in the dynamics of “going forward” and “turning back.” If the theatrical space of Thebes ends up intersecting Athens in *Heracles*, these spaces become contiguous not only when Theseus arrives on stage, as Rush Rehm has argued (1999: 371), but also at that future moment when the dead Amphitryon exercises his demand for recognition.

Amphitryon the *alastôr* is not an agent of vengeance, as in the House of Atreus or among the Labdacids. I would suggest rather that he is the imperative to remember the tragic encounter as such. The magnetism of this encounter certainly stems from ritual crisis and kin-murder. But for the Heracles coming to terms with what he has done unwittingly, that crisis is also created by the eruption of the symptom and, with it, the vulnerable and daemonic body. Whereas Theseus denies his lapsed masculinity in the name of civilizing virtue, Amphitryon incarnates not only mortal weakness, but also the weakness of fathers, both the mortal father and the immortal one, whose mastery has proved finite. Much weight has been laid on the exit of Heracles, leaning on Theseus for support, to Athens. Yet the audience watches Amphitryon exit, too. As he re-enters the house, we are reminded that Heracles’ decision to go to Athens bears within it the imperative to remember what happened in Thebes.

**CONCLUSION**

We do not need to deny that madness comes from outside of Heracles to recognize the insufficiency of such an explanation of his disease and its aftermath. For there is strong textual support for both divine causality and its limitations.

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139. The line 1420 has been bracketed on stylistic grounds: the antilabe after the monosyllable (πικεκαπεις) is unparalleled. But more problematic is the tradition that Amphitryon was buried at Thebes (Pl. N. IV.19–20; P. IX.81–83) and 1364–65. The exchange also contradicts 1420, which implies Heracles will return to Thebes himself. I am inclined to follow most editors in deleting the lines, since Euripides seems to leave open—indeed, to lay weight on—the possibility of Heracles returning to Thebes, a task that becomes analogous to Heracles’ assuming the burden of his arrows again. Yet given how innovative Euripides seems to have been in bringing Heracles to Athens, it is not out of the question that he would find a way to bring Amphitryon there, too. On the extra-tragic implications of Athens’ claim to Heracles as a hero, see Kowalzig 2006: 94–95.
The symptom, I have argued, enables Euripides not only to introduce the force of Hera’s anger into the plot but also to explore multiple perspectives on the eruption of disorder from within: different worldviews, on the one hand, and explanations that vary in their understanding of how much the patient is implicated in his disorder, on the other.

In *Heracles*, some of the major tenets of medical and ethical perspectives on human nature form part of the imaginative world in which Heracles’ vulnerability takes on meaning. These include a strong sense of the inner body as hidden, daemonic space, the concept of a causal chain in which the body (or an analogically imagined soul) becomes complicit in the production of the symptom, and the importance of the unfortunate encounter as a catalyst for disaster. The tragedy stages the arrival of the Heracleian body as a threat to the civilizing virtue described in the first half of the tragedy, as well as to the civic identity that Theseus requires of his future Athenian hero, suggesting a contemporary opposition between rational self-mastery and the body of uncontrollable, inhuman forces and passions.

Yet the final scene makes it clear that neither the world of impersonal bodies nor that of angry gods is self-contained within *Heracles*. Heracles’ and Theseus’ competing strategies of partial secularization bifurcate the concept of the alastôr in order to distribute the weight of the crime asymmetrically. By denying the power of the alastôr among philoi, Theseus displaces Heracles’ culpability, with all its implications, onto the divine plane, thus isolating it outside the boundaries of the polis. Heracles’ refusals—his refusal to believe in Theseus’ gods, his refusal to ignore the corpses of his sons, his refusal to remember the right way, his refusal to disavow the kainos Heracles—keep the alastôr in play in his own sphere of experience as a force that is realized in and through the body as lupê and eventually taken on by the mortal father Amphitryon. It is this inhuman dimension of the subject that gives rise to an understanding of vulnerability that is deeply human and deeply tragic. Euripides thus commits Heracles’ identity to the truth and the consequences of his madness. In so doing, he succeeds in bringing not only Heracles but also the knowledge that he comes to embody to Athens.

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