PART I

INTRODUCTION
I

Republics of the Possible

State Building in Latin America and Spain

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INTRODUCTION

Latin American republics were among the first modern political entities designed and built according to already tried and seemingly successful institutional models. During the wars of independence and for several decades thereafter, public intellectuals, politicians, and concerned citizens willingly saw themselves confronted with a sort of void, a tabula rasa. Colonial public institutions and colonial ways of life had to be rejected, if possible eradicated, in order for new political forms and new social mores to be established in their stead. However, in contrast to the French or American revolutions, pure political utopias did not play a significant role for Latin American institutional projects.

The American Revolution was a deliberate experiment; the revolutionaries firmly believed that they were creating something new, something never attempted before. The French revolutionaries dramatically signaled the same purpose by starting a whole new official calendar from year one. In contrast, Latin American patriots assumed that proven and desirable institutional models already existed, and not just as utopic ideals. The models were precisely the state institutions of countries that had already undergone revolutions or achieved independence, or both: Britain, the United States, France, and others such as the Dutch Republic. Therefore, long before the concept was coined in the twentieth century, Latin American countries were embarking on a very similar enterprise to the one that we describe in our days as state building. Aware of the weakness and instability of their existing institutional arrangements, independent Latin American republics attempted to develop stronger state organizations and stable political regimes by adjusting modern institutions already tried and proven elsewhere to local conditions. Most of such attempts were not successful, neither according to the standards of the time nor to those of our own. Nevertheless, the question of what kind of adaptation can be possible for modern state institutions, in view of local circumstances, was clearly recognized and debated by the middle of the nineteenth century in Latin American public and scholarly opinion. The issue of institutional possibility,
which forms the core of state-building theory and practice in our days, became dominant in Latin American public life. The repeated failures of institutional projects made clear that it was critical to establish new republics in the realm of the possible.

Spain was paradoxically undergoing very similar developments to those affecting Latin American countries, most of them its former colonies, at the same time as they became independent. Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and the ensuing War of Liberation triggered, after 1808, a strong break with the past on both sides of the Atlantic. The Bourbon monarchy was dissolved and replaced by Napoleon’s brother as King of Spain, a brutal change of regime that local elites attempted to resist in many areas through experiments in self-government. Nevertheless, explosive episodes of popular mobilization and popular insurgency against the French took even the more combative local elites by surprise. New forms of national consciousness developed along popular mobilization. The meeting of a national assembly in Cadiz, and the passing of the first constitution in 1812, was made possible by the revolutionary situation created in the wake of the French invasion.

As a consequence of those years’ upheaval, Spain began to address the issue of how to construct more effective state institutions almost simultaneously with Latin American countries. The fragility of the ancien régime was made clear by its utter collapse when confronted by the French invasion. The catastrophe fueled the perception of national decadence, which had been a matter of public concern since at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. Decadence was not only the result of Spain’s repeated military defeats in conflicts with other European nations; there was a manifest failure to develop modern public institutions and a successful economy in Spain. Therefore, the Spanish public debate focused from the beginning on the issue that was to plague Latin American countries after a few years of independent life: the perception of backwardness and the subsequent need to “catch up.”

In sum, the weakness of state institutions and the failures of public policy projects were very much in the public attention during the nineteenth century in Latin America and Spain. The sense of “falling behind” pervaded Latin America even before the wars of independence were over, particularly in comparison with the United States. Despite the early promise, visitors and inhabitants were soon bemoaning the lack of relative progress and even regression visible throughout the continent. In his *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville went so far as to note that “no nations upon the face of the earth are more miserable than those of South America.”1 The perception of backwardness when contrasted with other European nations was similarly strong in Spain during the whole period, and it became overwhelming at the end of the century. As the famous liberal philosopher José Ortega y Gasset described the problem a few years later, Spain could only be described as invertebrate – that is to

say weak and backward – compared to other, advanced European nations.\(^2\)

Unsurprisingly, a similar idea of the state as invertebrate, or hollow at the core, has kept recurring in analysis of the problems and setbacks for state building in Latin America.

It is true that at the end of the nineteenth century, Spain as well as the more successful Latin American countries could boast of many symbols of modernity and of diverse successes in the field of public policy and infrastructure. Yet, public institutions remained peculiarly weak. They showed their weakness on diverse levels: fiscal capacity was low, mainly dependent on the kind of taxes that are most easy to collect, such as custom revenues. Internal conflicts in the form of local rebellions, guerrilla warfare, and endemic banditry remained widespread, particularly in areas far from the national capitals. Economic policy was typically precarious and shortsighted: national economies were organized on the basis of the dependence on foreign capital and markets, often focusing on a single commodity, thus dangerously exposed to global market fluctuations. Ortega underlined a common factor resulting in low state capacity and deficient public policy on both sides of the Atlantic: instead of progressively building an elite of highly trained and permanent civil servants, after each election governments massively filled the higher and lower echelons of the public bureaucracy with political partisans. National versions of the spoils system were not just strong; they remained almost hegemonic in the Iberian world at the time.

Then again, political elites in Spain and Latin America would have regarded what they had achieved as particularly significant, and this could even make up for many failures and disappointments. After countless and for the most part violent struggles during the first half of the nineteenth century, liberalism had been finally adopted as the official ideology of Spanish and Latin American political institutions and economic policy at the end of the century. Perhaps understandably, however, the implementation of liberalism showed many fragilities and contradictions: lack of economic infrastructure and industrialization, mere entrepôt economies in some cases, as well as democracies that, under the pretense of universal suffrage, were run by oligarchic groups that manipulated elections through massive clientelism and fraud. Beginning with the Mexican Revolution and on through the Spanish Civil War, the political compromises and economic dependencies that had developed during the nineteenth century came apart and ended in political violence, civil war, authoritarian military dictatorships, and widespread economic depression. Liberalism’s inconsistencies when confronted with the development of mass democracies

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and its lack of convincing success as economic doctrine concluded with its wholesale collapse in the Iberian world by the 1930s.

In our days, despite a strong wave of democratization for the past thirty years and many efforts toward the construction of successful market economies, the weaknesses of states in Latin America remain no less visible. The concept of *brown areas*, formulated by O’Donnell, has become a widely accepted characterization of the phenomenon. Most Latin American states are unable to enact effective rules and regulations across the whole of their territories—the only partial exceptions being Chile and Costa Rica. Many peripheral areas remain subject to systems of local power, which are personalistic and patrimonial and open to arbitrary and even violent political practices. The same happens in the national capitals themselves: some extremely poor neighborhoods are clearly outside of the rule of law. Crime is rampant, and police interventions in these areas tend to be unlawful themselves. The strong Spanish economic and social development beginning in the 1960s and consolidated after democratization in the 1970s, sometimes described as the “Spanish miracle,” tells a different story, but well until the mid-twentieth century the weakness of the modern state in the Iberian Peninsula was not less visible.

**LIBERALISM AND THE STATE PROJECT**

The present book addresses the politics and techniques of state building. Unlike much of the current literature focused on contemporary developments and crisis, we discuss the lessons of history for a better understanding of present-day predicaments. The book reconstructs state-building ideas and practices developed and implemented during the nineteenth and early twentieth century in the Iberian world, the first region where state building was carried out as a deliberate national project. What is more, it was a very specific political group, the Liberals, that attempted to put into effect those political and institutional projects. Therefore, we trace the politics and techniques of state building from the beginning of independent life to the debacle of liberalism that took place in the first third of the twentieth century in most parts of Latin America and Spain. We argue that, in order to understand the travails of the state in our days, it is necessary to analyze the previous period of liberal hegemony, the long nineteenth century. These are the cases that offer us the best historical opportunity to understand the frustrations and disappointments experienced by large parts of the world with the consolidation of a modern democratic state in our days.

The process and time period in question suggest a number of parallels with the challenges facing new states since then. First, states arise in most cases following the collapse of previous authority and the economic infrastructure of societies. They often begin their institutional lives in chaos and economic

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deprivation. Specifically, the domestic context into which states were built in the Iberian world was one of deep inequality and social or ethnic heterogeneity. As with many contemporary cases, many of these states were expected to manage far too large territories, with far too varied a population, with far too few resources. Another shared element between those early state-building projects and the current efforts involves a legacy of international recognition and noncompetition for territory, which allowed them to avoid the semi-Darwinian geopolitical struggles characteristic of early state building in Europe. Much as in the contemporary era, these states were “deprived” of the opportunity to develop their institutional muscle through military confrontations for survival. Nowadays, the international community flatly refuses to recognize territorial expansion by conquest, so such wars have become impossible or at least very rare. For different reasons, but with the same result, Latin American states in the nineteenth century did not try to wrest vast territories from their neighbors – as was instead considered appropriate in Europe until the first decades of the twentieth century. Spain’s territorial integrity was not threatened either during the nineteenth century: the country was not involved in major foreign wars from the end of the Napoleonic invasion to the War of Cuba in 1898. The international community restrained Spain’s only aggressive neighbor, France. The purpose and focus of the Spanish military was therefore political power as well as internal repression, much as in Latin America during the same period.

Finally, again as in the contemporary globe, states in the Iberian world arose with a set of normative expectations regarding their obligations to their populations and the manner in which they ruled. In general, the development of new states in the nineteenth century was characterized by what Laurence Whitehead – following Francois Xavier Guerra – calls precocity: having to meet challenges and attain goals far ahead of their institutional development. The same problem of high normative expectations against low institutional development has affected state-building projects ever since.

The chapters included in this volume attempt to provide a historical foundation for understanding key processes and challenges of today. We address several questions, taking if possible some steps toward their answer. To what extent do historical legacies determine the capacity and reach of states? What are the obstacles to and paths toward the effective organization of political power? How can states best design and create the institutions meant to provide the basic services now associated with citizenship? How can we put together notions of community that include diverse groups and cultures within a single identity while also respecting the integrity of particular traditions? The Iberian world in the nineteenth century was arguably the first regional stage on which these organizational and political dilemmas that still haunt states today were faced. In order to begin confronting these issues adequately, it is necessary to discuss the circumstances in which many of them arose.

The first widely accepted account of the fragility of states in the Iberian world was provided by the “black legend” of a cultural curse that can be found
already well developed in the nineteenth century, and which had its proponents in and out of the Iberian world – the work by Claudio Vélez would be the best contemporary example. For Spain, the “national character” explanations of Iberian exceptionalism have had many advocates, from Unamuno to Sánchez Albornoz. Around the fifties in the twentieth century, a *dependiente* critique of this perspective began to develop. Simplifying what was always a fairly heterogeneous school, this perspective held that Latin America’s relative failure came from not having broken enough with a colonial, as opposed to an Iberian, past. The political and economic models, which dominated the discussion for several decades, were derived from the region’s position in the world capitalist system. A parallel argument placed Spain and Portugal in a similar marginal position.

The last decade has witnessed an explosion in creative studies of colonial legacies and their consequences. A significant group of scholars has debated the reasons for the relative difference in “performance” between the ex-Spanish and British colonies. Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff began the debate with their argument over factor endowments. In an interesting twist on Whig history, they proposed that the small farmer settlements focused on grain in North America – as opposed to commodity production in Latin America – provided the critical basis for two foundations of later success: less inequality and racial homogeneity. These in turn contributed to a more responsive and institutionalized form of democratic rule. Yet, as North, Summerhill, and Weingast point out, the factor endowments perspective fails to take into account the political chaos that most of the Iberian world suffered during the nineteenth century. Moreover, it fails to explain the subsequent transformation of other cases suffering from not dissimilar endowment legacies such as the postbellum and particularly post-1950 U.S. South, and, of greater relevance, the Spanish transformation after the 1950s. North and his colleagues focus much more on the failure of Iberian institutions to resolve the various political dilemmas

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8 The parallels between parts of Latin America and the U.S. South are intriguing: plantation economies, racial divides, persistence of rural oligarchies, and so forth. We have not been able to find a political economic comparison of the two regions, but we hope one will soon appear.
facing them in the nineteenth century. The emphasis here is on the absence of order necessary to construct a viable society. The Latin American societies as well as Spain in the nineteenth century quite nicely fit into what North, Wallis, and Weingast have more recently termed limited access societies where an equilibrium was established in which threats of violence, political patronage, and economic rents precariously balance one another without an underlying institutionalized and impersonal order.9

None of these perspectives succeed in opening up the black box of institutional failure. The Iberian world was transformed from 1810 to 1900, yet many of the same governance challenges persisted. Coatsworth has noted that despite the considerable economic progress seen in the region during the nineteenth century, “legal codes, judicial systems, fiscal burdens, commercial regulation, and governing structures” as well as even more basic state capacities were vastly underdeveloped.10 Payne has offered an excellent summary of the reasons for liberal frustration in Spain that sound remarkably like the problems facing Latin America during the same time period. Among other factors, Payne discusses the unwillingness of the elite to reform the political system in keeping with the economic and social development of the country; from the 1890s on, the governing oligarchies of the Liberal and Conservative parties utterly failed to expand and reform themselves, or to incorporate new goals and interests.11 Spain had a relatively large middle class at the time, actually larger than in half the countries of Europe, but the middle class displayed a characteristic lack of entrepreneurial, bourgeois, or modernizing psychology. It was further weakened by the divisions caused by the increasingly antiliberal stance of the Catholic Church, which had a considerable following among the middle and upper classes and to some extent in the government.12

In Latin America and Spain the state remained fragile for the whole nineteenth century, and it remains weak in Latin American countries to this day. As mentioned previously, the standard explanations for state weakness in the Iberian world are partial and unsatisfactory. The present book explores the question and tries to offer some answers of its own. We begin in the next section by providing a theoretical account and analysis of what states, as institutional actors, are supposed to do. The account is organized around diverse tasks and basic public policy programs that states can either carry out or fail to do so.

12 Ibid., 599, 604.
Why is it important to focus on the state? Obviously, the state matters when it uses illegal violence against either its own population or that of another state. Few would question the importance of states in times of international conflict or internal oppression. But the state fulfills basic roles in areas where its participation may not be obvious at first sight. To begin with, markets are impossible without states. For even the most basic markets to work, some authority must exist that guarantees property rights and enforces contracts. Modern states are capable of using their control over violence in a territory to guarantee that exchanges can take place with some degree of assurance and predictability. Sometimes the state itself becomes a source of unpredictability, but we only stress here that states are capable of guaranteeing contractual exchanges, not that they always do. Second, without states there can be no citizens and no personal rights. It is commonplace to think of the repressive power of the state as limiting individual autonomy and freedom. However, the state’s collective force also serves to guarantee the basic rights of citizens. Without a state there can be no courts in which to exercise civil rights; without a state there are no organized contests for leadership in which to exercise electoral rights; and without a state those most in need of social protection and support will have to depend on the kindness of strangers.

If the proposition that effective states are essential for promoting broad-based development is now widely accepted, we still do not understand well what makes states effective. The political and sociological literature regularly uses the concept of state capacity and related terminology and ideas, such as strength, power, and stability. The notion of state capacity has existed for decades and was obviously a central element in much of nineteenth-century German social theory, but it became a regular part of developmental literature only in the 1980s. The notion of state capacity is self-evident and deceptively simple: the problem comes from attempts to use it in a systematic manner across a variety of cases. What is it that states do, and how can we trace the development of these various capacities across a century in Latin America and Spain? Combining a variety of proposed typologies, from Weber to Bourdieu and Mann, we discuss four different types or categories of state capacity and state strength.

The first we call territoriality and involves the classic Weberian notion of monopoly over the means of violence. Note that we explicitly do not specify the legitimate use of that violence as we wish to distinguish between a simple capacity to coerce from the much more complex notion of justifying such coercion. This is Michael Mann’s despotic power at its most fundamental; the power that state elites are able to exert over civil society without having
to enter into routine negotiations with other actors. The concept of despotic power captures the common perception of power as the capacity to issue and impose – successfully – commands and order. This form of state power or capacity is the simplest to wield, as it merely requires the acquisition and utilization of enough relative coercive force to impose one’s preferred order. This is the state as disciplinary institution. It takes place on two fronts: first, in relation to other states defining sovereignty and, second, against internal or domestic rival claimants and subjugated groups.

The second form of state capacity is economic and involves two different but usually connected processes. First, this is about the state promoting the general prosperity of a society. Prior to the Keynesian revolution, states mostly contributed to this in the course of the unification of an economic space through the creation of a national market. Of arguably greater relevance for our cases, the states may also increase their economic strength by creating the physical and legal infrastructure supporting the insertion of their domestic economy into a global system of exchange. A second aspect of economic power involves the control over and appropriation of resources through the establishment of an efficient fiscal system.

In many ways, these two forms of state strength are the ones on which the seminal collection edited by Tilly on the formation of national states in Europe focuses. For these authors, stateness consisted of consolidation of territorial control, differentiation from other forms of organization, the acquisition of autonomy, and centralization and coordination of resources. From this perspective, the process of state building may be – perhaps too simplistically – reduced to the coercion-extraction cycle; the state is very much an organization of control: over money, over bodies, and over behavior. Note that for most scholars, there exists a circular causality between territoriality and economic power.

The third form of state capacity is related to what Mann calls infrastructural power, but we define it somewhat differently from Mann. On simple terms, infrastructural state capacity involves the organizational and technical power to process information, build organizational structures, and maintain transportation and communication systems. According to Mann, infrastructural power refers to the capacity of the state to coordinate society by means of the diffusion of law and administration in many areas of social life that, before the huge expansion of this type of power in the nineteenth century, had remained outside the scope of state concern. The infrastructural power of the state can be measured along several dimensions. We can start by measuring the success of public policies: how effective is the state in promoting or defending public order, economic prosperity, public services, or inclusion? A second approach is geographical: how deeply into a national territory does the state’s writ travel?

A third divides the population by hierarchical categories of class, race, gender, ethnicity, and other and asks to what extent does the state’s regulatory power only apply to those on the bottom, or to what extent does its protection and services only apply to those at the top?

Infrastructural capacity is what makes modern states unusually strong, and it grew exponentially, together with civil administration, during the nineteenth century. Moreover, infrastructural strength is closely connected to what Laurence Whitehead calls the cognitive capacity of the state through which it amasses information and establishes categories and standards; in James Scott’s language, this is how the state makes society legible. The state concentrates, treats, redistributes, and unifies. The expansion of bureaucratic organization substantially increased the penetration of the state in terms of infrastructural power. However, according to Mann, such an increase in infrastructural power did not imply, as Weber mistakenly assumed, an increase in the despotic power of a central state elite. Infrastructural strength does not involve centralization of power; rather, the contrary is the case. First of all, modern state administrations have rarely been monocratic; they develop as an array of bureaucratic organizations variously linked to power networks in civil society. Secondly, the expansion of infrastructural penetration predictably goes both ways: as a result of the embeddedness of relatively autonomous bureaucratic organizations, civil society’s capacity to bring influence to bear on the state also increases. The expansion of infrastructural power occurs simultaneously with the widespread politicization of civil society.

The final form of state capacity is what Bourdieu calls symbolic power or what Weber discusses as legitimacy. What is critical here is the concentration of what had been diffuse social rituals and practices of deference and conformity to authority into an objectified and bureaucratic process; it is about the monopoly, not over violence or even over identity, but over the judgment of truth claims. The Weberian tradition, which includes of course Tilly, has described a linear progression away from arbitrariness. To illustrate this point, Tilly quotes Balzac’s famous dictum in La Cousine Bette: “L’arbitraire c’est la démence du pouvoir”; arbitrary rule is power gone mad. But we might best understand symbolic power as the capacity to make the arbitrary seem not mad. In Woody Allen’s Bananas, for example, we know the new dictator of San Marcos is mad when he declares the official language of this Latin American country to be Swedish. Yet, how much more arbitrary or “mad” is that than any nineteenth-century effort to homogenize and standardize a population according to some perhaps arbitrarily chosen lingua franca? The real difference may not necessarily be in the level of madness of the command, but in the symbolic strength of who is doing the commanding. As Bourdieu notes, “what appears to us today as self-evident, as beneath consciousness and choice, has quite often been the stake of struggles and instituted only as the result of...
dogged confrontations.” The study of the state’s symbolic capital is the history of how it constructed its own sense of inevitability. It is the quality that places the authority of the state, as such, out of the bounds of contention. Joseph Strayer seems to assign a central role to what he calls “loyalty” and a “shift in the scale of loyalties” and a new “priority of obligation” or what he later calls a “cult of the state.”

Although closely connected, symbolic power and nationalism or nation building are not exactly the same. Symbolic power is not so much about the creation of a community but about the monopoly of legitimacy by the state apparatus. With a very different set of intentions, this is what Corrigan and Sayer are after: the rituals of ruling and the construction of “reasonableness.” Again, this is not about identity but about the unquestionable allegiance to a set of institutions defined by and as the state; it is not about love of country but obedience to country. Nevertheless, nationalism provides the ideological linkages that serve to create collectives that view themselves as such and that provide the foundational legitimacy for state claims to power.

THE IBERIAN STATE

How does this theoretical exercise reflect or summarize the present book’s approach to state building? Most importantly, the theoretical perspective described earlier allowed us to divide state-building projects into four, not necessarily sequential or linear, parts or components. The first two involve the consolidation of organized physical force, that to a certain extent had been accomplished in most Latin American cases and in Spain by 1860, and the creation of economic capital through insertion into the global economy, which was attempted from 1860 to 1930 with relative success. Both phases or components of state building correspond to the standard partnership of an oligarchic liberalism with the economic liberalism of global integration. The two typically liberal dimensions of state-building projects, territorial and economic, have served as the focus for much of the bibliography of the period. They are considered and discussed by the essays in the second part of the book, after this introductory part. The next two types of state power, infrastructural and symbolic, have been relatively neglected by the state-building literature until now. All chapters of the book consider infrastructural and symbolic state power to some extent, whereas the chapters of the book’s third and fourth parts focus primarily on their development as a component of state-building projects in Latin America and Spain.

To begin at the beginning, historical narratives agree that a major difficulty facing the newly independent nations was the absence of a political order. The uncertainty of the outcome regarding the continent’s territorial division and the domestic order underlying it led to a perpetual militarization that lasted much longer than the actual wars. Equally important, the collapse of imperial authority saw a veritable explosion in banditry and brigandage. For good reason, the states in the first half-century of independence privileged order above all else.

They faced three possible threats. First was the threat they faced externally from Spain’s refusal to accept the end of empire and then from later claimants to be the successors to such an empire. They also faced competition from one another for control of relevant territories. Despite significant exceptions, these threats were relatively minor and not as critical as in the European cases from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Much more serious were the threats posed by intra-elite competition, either contesting the authority of the central state or fighting to gain dominion over it. These often-violent struggles were not really resolved until well into the nineteenth century. Finally, there were the threats from below, from those for whom the benefits of independence and nationhood were few and scarce and who sought a social revolution paralleling the political one. Arguably, much of Latin America is still dealing with the challenge to build a democratically integrated social and political order.

The Spanish experience in the first half-century of liberalism in many ways resembles that of the majority of Latin America. The conflicts featured initial opposition from a monarch attempting to reestablish absolutism, then a popular revolt against what may be described as “secular modernity,” and internal struggles within the Liberals producing two clear wings: moderate and “progressive,” all leading to perpetual government instability and increasing military politicization.

After 1860, the Liberal states in Latin America and Spain were able to impose much greater control over the countryside and to begin to consolidate their monopoly over the means of violence. In Latin America, military campaigns were fought against three potential rivals: autonomous Indian tribes, regional powers, and brigands. All were defeated. By 1900, the national capitals reigned supreme – even if the reach of the rule remained limited.

In terms of economic power, the independence wars and the victory brought about huge economic costs and the disarticulation of production and exchange networks. Postindependence civil wars made the situation worse. Economically, Spain failed to grow until after 1850 and fell progressively back behind Britain and France – for example, in 1850, when these countries and the United States already had railroad mileage in the thousands, Spain had a total of 28 kilometers connecting Madrid with Aranjuez.

The economic performance of the Iberian countries improved considerably in the last third of the nineteenth century and on through the Great Depression. The engine for both economic development and state expansion was the boom in international trade. The economies of the Iberian world participated in the
so-called Second Industrial Revolution. Between the last third of the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth, many of these countries – including Spain – saw exports increase by factors of 4 to 6. Yet, the development of a national infrastructure lagged behind. The state penetrated the society in order to accelerate its integration into the global system, but not in order to integrate society to itself. The lack of transport and communication infrastructures made the development of internal markets very difficult and fragmentary. Even worse was the poor fiscal reach of the state, and hence its poor capacity to finance itself through fiscal revenues instead of loans.

As noted earlier in this chapter, much of the scholarly attention has been devoted to the territorial and economic aspects of state development in the region. Much less has been devoted to the development of what we, following Mann, define as infrastructural power. As a rule, the process of securing territorial power was characterized in the Iberian world by accommodations made with local elites in order to assure that control flowed not just from above, but also and often mainly from below to the center. That is, rather than imposing itself on its national territory, the central state authority negotiated control over regions and other parts of the political territory with local elites. This partnership was cemented by an economic policy focusing on external commodity trade, which tended to benefit local elites. The legacies of this accommodation were to haunt the states’ efforts to develop both infrastructural capacity and political legitimacy.

A basic requirement for the development of infrastructural power is the creation and consolidation of autonomous bureaucratic organizations staffed by career civil servants, in other words, a professional state bureaucracy. The growth of mass democracies and electoral machines during the nineteenth century transformed public bureaucracies. State administrations had been run until then by a few learned patricians, clerics, and clerks, but mass democracy and the consolidation of electoral machines turned public bureaucracies into vast systems of political clientelism. The transformation took place during the second half of the nineteenth century in Latin America as well as in Spain and in the United States – in the latter case it began earlier. Only in Spain and the United States wide political movements, with popular support and the active contribution of parts of the academic elite, were able to counteract and restrain the massive manipulation of public office for political purposes. Regeneracionismo in Spain and the Progressive Movement in the United States succeeded in discrediting and outlawing massive political clientelism in the timespan between 1890 and 1930. The turning points usually mentioned in the literature are the Pendleton Act of 1883 for the United States and the Estatuto Maura of 1918 in Spain. In both cases, the creation of professional state bureaucracies was the result of a protracted political struggle; it was much more than just a technical reform from above.

Besides confronting electoral party machines, the development of career civil services had to contend with the arrangements with local elites, which secured the national state’s territorial power in the first place. The state could
only command obedience in the regions if the local elite decided to actually institute its directives. However, for many reasons the local elites were strongly set against the creation of professional bureaucracies – patronage was one of their basic instruments of power. Without a serious determination to confront the power of electoral machines and local elites, central states in Latin America remained during the nineteenth century – remain mostly to this day – incapable of creating a national career civil service. Legislative assemblies, of course, pass civil service acts regularly, but they are hardly ever implemented and often circumvented as a matter of fact. Again, Chile and Costa Rica represent partial exceptions in the Latin American context, as discussed by specific chapters in the book.

From infrastructural power we move to symbolic power, discussed in the fourth part of the book. The chapters in the fourth part analyze symbolic power in terms of political legitimacy and the development of national consciousness. The nation represents a crucial source of symbolic power and legitimacy for the state, and this connection plays a decisive role for state building. There seems to be broad agreement with John Lynch’s judgment that before the 1850s most Latin American countries had, at best, “an incipient nationalism almost entirely devoid of social content.” And despite many efforts, one could argue that state nationalism – as opposed to the chauvinism of the World Cup and mis montañas son mejores que tus montañas – had not developed very far.

The key factor here may be the inherent contradiction between the commitment of the Liberals to social and political equality – at least in principle – and their aversion to a strong bureaucratic state. Without a powerful administrative machinery, they could not remake society, even if they had truly wished to do so. Without a unified society, a national state project was doomed to failure. As much in Spain as in Latin America, there was a fundamental fear of nationalism from below among the elites. Thus none of the main models of nationalism were consolidated on either side of the Atlantic. Elites were not able to create a sense of shared ethnic or cultural community, nor could a republic of citizens consciously sharing in a collective political project be developed. In Spain and Latin America, vast social and ethnic exclusions made the consolidation of both models of national community extremely difficult or impossible during the nineteenth century.

Over and above the relative weakness of nationalism in the region, in the decades after independence there was the loss of the significant and genuine legitimacy that the colonial regime had enjoyed. This was particularly true prior to the Bourbon reforms. Note that many of the post-1808 revolts began with calls to the supreme legitimacy of pre-Napoleonic order. This political view of the world was shattered in the process of independence and further

discriminated during the fight between Liberals and Conservatives in Spain. And certainly by midcentury nothing similar in terms of symbolic power had yet taken its place.

Part of the symbolic deficit was the obvious contradiction between what the state said and what it did. Much as with the assurance of skill, the key is not to promise more than one delivers. As Charles Hale has put it, the transformation of liberalism after 1870 “can be seen in part as the inadequacy of the ideal of the small property holder in countries made up of latifundia owners and dependent rural peoples, whether slaves, peons, hereditary tenants or communal Indian villagers. In an era marked by the resurgence of export economies, the elites could and did conveniently hold to the formalities of Liberal social philosophy while neglecting its earlier spirit.”\(^{20}\) The fate of democratic commitment was a little different. Here the letter of the law was followed while the spirit was violated constantly, creating what some call a “fictitious Liberalism” or an “antidemocratic pluralism.” The result of this new liberalism was a continuation and a deepening of the social dualism that characterizes much of the Latin American continent to this day. Originally a Spanish topic, the notion of the two Spains has been variously applied to Latin American countries, such as in the concept of Bel-india famously coined by Edmar Bacha in the seventies to describe Brazil: a first-world Belgium in certain small areas of the industrial south and southeast, surrounded by masses of unfortunates living in a third-world India.

These divisions led to what has been called the “weak nationalization of the masses.” Many of the countries began institutionalizing a set of national symbols, which were supposed to give concrete symbolic expression to the national community. But such efforts were mired in part by the deeply racist attitudes of elites to their migrant, ex-slave, or Indian subalterns. Whatever state authority was used was implemented to augment the consequences of inequality and to benefit those in power. Rather than being a vessel for individual liberty or a guardian of the nation, the state was often no more than a more or less effective elite protection mechanism. Following John Coatsworth on Mexico, instead of a liberal ideal of a “limited government with effective institutional constraints on government predation,” what the Iberian world received was institutionalized cronyism producing economic growth by guaranteeing protection to a small elite of the politically connected.\(^{21}\) That those below found their voices in increasingly radicalized political movements should have come as no surprise. Rather than being brought into the state by “really existing” suffrage or through social reforms, or united by external enemies, non-elite sectors increasingly opted out of the system. Because the political game was clearly fixed against them, they would not buy into it.


These countries all sought to develop new forms of community centered on the state, but these efforts ran into the kind of difficulties that we have already found in our discussion: elite divisions, limited infrastructural capacity, and historical legacies of deep racial and class divisions. One of the dominant characteristics of Latin America from the very beginning of its modern history up to the present day has been its social and political fractionalization. Collective identities that do exist are not congruent with the nation-state; they are often developed in opposition to it. In fact, some of the most salient collective identities did in fact arise out of opposition to the nation-state in the first place. Divisions along just about every possible line characterize the region. The different parts of Latin American society peer at one another through barricades: few from the privileged venture beyond their protected areas, and the underprivileged rarely get even basic recognition from the privileged, much less access to their world. Over much of Latin American history, the explicit goal and hope of a wide range of political projects has been that progress of one sort or another would lead to a social convergence. One version of this vision saw the historical mingling of groups as inevitably leading to a new form of nation. This is best epitomized by the Mexican ideology of the *raza cósmica* arising from the various conflicts and combinations. A more liberal vision expected that with enough economic progress, these fissures would be closed. This was at the very heart of the *concertación* discourse in Chile. But material, social, racial, and political progress have yet to close these gaps.

As mentioned earlier, throughout the present book we have tried to include in the analysis a key deficiency of state development in Latin America, relatively neglected by the literature: the fragmentary consolidation of infrastructural and symbolic power. Much as with the liberal vision and the liberal political projects of the nineteenth century, most of the research on state building has until now focused almost exclusively on the coercive and economic powers of the state. In fact, much of the literature on state building continues to emphasize the development of “power over.” The experience of the Iberian world in the nineteenth century would indicate that this is not sufficient; that the state has to not just repress, but also create.

**PLAN OF THE BOOK**

In the next chapter of this introductory part, Chapter 2, Frank Safford offers a general overview of the process of state building in five of the most important national cases in Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. Safford presents a summary and comparison of the development of state strength on the basis of seven variables in each case. Four of the variables correspond to the classic territorial and economic dimensions of state power. They are (1) economic geography including resources and integration; (2) political geography including transportation; (3) foreign trade and fiscal capacity; and (4) military and political strength in relation to foreign powers. The three remaining variables are related to symbolic and infrastructural
power. They include (1) constitutional arrangements and their acceptance by citizens, a crucial component of what we designate as legitimacy; (2) agreement and conflict with the church as a symbolic and political power; and (3) control over the military, the first and only state bureaucracy whose modernization and professionalization was consistently promoted by the political leadership of the state in most Latin American countries during the second half of the nineteenth century.

The third and last chapter of the book’s introductory part focuses on the development of state strength in European countries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Wolfgang Knöbl argues that standard accounts over-emphasize the transformative capacities of European states during the time period. He shows that it actually took quite a long time for even the most successful European states to incorporate their citizens and to transform the structures of their societies. A comparison between state building in Europe and Latin America in the liberal era should not exaggerate the differences between these two macroregions, but rather explore how each dealt with particular challenges.

The second part of the book, from Chapter 4 to Chapter 8, covers the strategies and struggles carried out by Latin American states to consolidate their territorial and economic strength. In the first two chapters of this part, Joseph L. Love and Jeffrey D. Needell analyze the other recognized – if partial – exception to the general failure to build strong states in Latin America from a contemporary perspective: Brazil. Needell argues in Chapter 4 that the alliance between the crown and the socioeconomic elite secured Portuguese America’s wide territorial reach and a stable social order under the parliamentary monarchy. Despite a series of initial conflicts, the majority of the elite came to accept the established political regime by 1850. The state supported the economic power of slave-plantation owners and their allied domestic interests and produced significant infrastructural, financial, and communications reforms. Increasing state autonomy, however, slowly drove a wedge between monarch and elite. The resulting struggles left the monarchy vulnerable to a positivist militants’ coup under military aegis. Joseph L. Love’s Chapter 5 takes up the story with his discussion of the Old Republic. He argues that the new federal regime offered critical advances in the area of fiscal reach – extracting and spending more at all levels of government – public health, and education. The creation of a cohesive Brazilian territorial state was the achievement of the centralized empire, but the country only “held together” after the creation of the republic in 1889 by meeting the regional demands of Sao Paulo and other southern states. Decentralization led to very much higher tax efficiency, better public services, and other indicators of state strength. The rapid economic growth of Brazil during the republic, however, may have been attained at the expense of intensified regional economic differences: the advance of some regions was paralleled by increasing poverty in other regions. The Old Republic was not prepared to confront radically unequal economic development among the states.
Moving to Mexico, Alan Knight analyzes in Chapter 6 the strength of the Mexican state during the Porfiriato (1876–1911) and early revolution (1910–1930). While the socioeconomic changes brought about by the Revolution of 1910 are a matter of hot dispute, there is greater consensus that the political realm was substantially transformed. Knight first notes shifts in the public transcript, or official discourse, of the two regimes. There were much more marked shifts in political practices, because the revolution generated extensive popular mobilization, a brisk circulation of elites, a new populist style of politics and a measure of genuine popular empowerment. The new politics of the revolutionary regime, however, perpetuated the great gap between public transcript and political practice – hence, the rule of law, for example, remained highly imperfect.

Focusing on Nicaragua in Chapter 7, Salvador Martí Puig analyzes the weak state building under both Conservative and Liberal political regimes. He argues that in Nicaragua modernizing measures lacked the presence of social forces that could guarantee both the restructuring and articulation of local interests and the development of state strength. The dreams of the Nicaraguan ruling class revolved around another endeavor: the building of the interoceanic canal. For that project to crystallize, however, a foreign power was needed that would mediate and assume the costs the work entailed, and that inevitably involved limitations on the sovereignty of the incipient state.

Chapter 8, the last chapter of the second part of the book, connects fiscal capacity to infrastructural power, discussing the weakness of tax systems and the development of spoils systems in Spain and Argentina as the result of compromises with local elites. Claudia E. Herrera and Agustín E. Ferraro analyze the parallel development of massive political clientelism in Spain and Argentina. Informal political practices showed not only many correspondences on both sides of the Atlantic, even the language employed by the actors to describe such practices was the same: terms like empleomanía, oligarquía, and caciquismo were simultaneously in use in Spain and Latin America at the time – some of this vocabulary remains very much in use to this day.

The chapters of the third part of the book study the development of infrastructural power in Latin America. Iván Jaksic examines in Chapter 9 the role of Andrés Bello as a nonpartisan expert for two key areas of state building in Chile: the creation of a public education system and the reform of civil legislation to replace the colonial law system. Bello’s contribution was extremely significant in itself. More than that, however, his influence on public life reveals that Chile’s political elite recognized early on the need to incorporate nonpartisan experts into leading roles in public policy formulation and implementation. This organizational feature of the Chilean state was unique at the time in Latin America, and it helps to explain the unusual strength and effectiveness of public institutions in the country. Moreover, Jaksic shows that the institutional strength and stability of the Chilean state was not based on the concentration of power in the executive; this is an old myth, which continues to receive wide currency even in our days. Quite the contrary, the stability and strength of
Chilean public institutions were the result of a robust separation of powers: the Chilean Congress was a major actor in politics and public policy during the whole period.

James Mahoney examines in Chapter 10 similarities and differences in state-building processes among five Central American countries. During the late nineteenth century, political elites implemented policies to modernize the state and stimulate export agriculture. In all five countries, this period saw large increases in exports, providing governments with access to new resources. These new resources, however, were not mainly used to build effective states run by professionally trained career civil servants. Instead, they were put toward building up the military. Thus, during the liberal reform period, the region launched a general pattern of state militarization without bureaucratization. Only in Costa Rica were conditions present that linked the interests of politicians to gradually pursue real bureaucratic development.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Argentina had developed considerable expert bureaucracies with well-defined public policy objectives, particularly in elementary instruction and public health. Ricardo D. Salvatore examines in Chapter 11 the successful contribution of expert bureaucracies to the provision of public goods in Argentina. The evidence indicates considerable accomplishments throughout the period in question. Yet, although initially successful, efforts to establish professional state structures were undercut by massive political clientelism or empleomanía, as the massive appointment of political partisans for public office was designated at the time in both Spain and Latin America. To further public education, the state created large bureaucratic structures, but many of these positions were soon turned into political spoils: politicians began to distribute management and professorial jobs among their political clientele without much regard for merit or expertise. Something very analogous happened concerning the public health campaigns. As a result, the efforts to develop infrastructural power were seriously handicapped. The success and the limits of education polices in Peru had certain parallels to the problems and difficulties of bureaucratization in Argentina, as discussed by Hillel D. Soifer in Chapter 12. After decades of severe crisis, Nicolas Piérola came to power seeking social peace and political stability through a broadly liberal project of social transformation and state building. One component of this effort was increased central oversight of primary education. The subsequent two decades marked the most significant progress in the history of Peruvian schooling to date, which was instituted against the objections of local elites who opposed the education of the rural poor. In the longer run, however, as rural unrest rose, Lima needed to rely on these local elites to bring social peace, and this led to the undermining of the Liberal education reforms.

The fourth part of the book focuses on the development in Latin America and Spain of what we have called symbolic power. In Chapter 13, Roberto Breña discusses the role that liberalism played during the independence movements of Spanish America in 1808–1825. He stresses the influence of Spanish liberalism, a current of political thought developed during the debates over the
Cádiz Constitution, and he argues further that the influence of North American and French political ideas has been exaggerated by most of the literature on the subject. The connections in terms of political ideas and political movements between Spain and Latin America remained strong after independence, stronger than many classic historians have been willing to acknowledge. Breña concedes that liberalism in the region was fraught with inconsistencies and ambiguities. However, the point of the paper is not to show that Spanish America was “less” liberal than the rest of the Western world, but to adopt a more critical stance toward an ideology and a historical period of the Western world that has been frequently explained through dichotomies – absolutism versus liberalism, for example – that are practically useless.

From the standpoint of the core countries that dominated the global system of the nineteenth century, Latin America remained a distant “uncivilized” and conflictive region. In Chapter 14, however, Fernando López-Alves claims that the new republics represented something very different. While in Europe authoritarian, aristocratic, and imperial forms of rule were alive and well, in Latin America, elites had no choice but to innovate and experiment with new and modern forms of governance. In Latin America, the modern one state-one nation formula was adopted at the same time that states were being built. And, despite the early hesitation of countries like Mexico and the much more significant Brazilian exception, after independence republican arrangements were quickly established in the whole region as the norm. Paradoxically, in the name of modernity weaker states tried to “erase” and/or marginalize preestablished nations. Latin America is still living with the consequences of this paradox.

José Alvarez Junco explores in Chapter 15 the fragmentary and conflicting development of Spanish national myths from the Napoleonic invasion at the beginning of the nineteenth century to the aftermath of the cultural crisis triggered by the loss of Cuba in 1898. The chapter discusses the fact that, in clear contrast to Latin American and other European countries, the formation of national myths was not initiated or even supported by state institutions in Spain. Spanish governments were quite hostile to any ideology that could possibly mobilize the masses. The Spanish state was not only distrustful of modernism, but also its legitimacy was constantly questioned, it was perpetually in debt, and governments barely had the capacity to implement public policy. It was only after the crisis of 1898 that political elites began to show more interest in the question of national identity. The result was a late and frenzied construction of national myths. This came too late to have a lasting impact, and, in any case, the traditional right was never fully committed to the task.

It would appear then that Benedict Anderson was incorrect in assigning Latin America a primary role in the development of contemporary nationalism. 22 These countries all sought to develop new forms of community centered on the state, but these efforts ran into a similar set of difficulties that we have found

in our discussion earlier in this chapter: elite divisions, limited infrastructural capacity, and historical legacies of deep racial and class divisions.

Based on an analysis of official results from every national census conducted in Latin America from 1830 to 1930, Mara Loveman shows in Chapter 16 that Latin American state builders used national censuses to advance two distinct but related nation-making goals: (1) to make the case that they deserved to be recognized as legitimate members of the international club of “civilized nations”; and (2) to demonstrate the integrity of the nation as a whole through the careful delineation of its constituent parts. Even as large gaps and omissions in early national censuses revealed the tenuous infrastructural reach of Latin American states, the published volumes of census results presented the ultimate object of enumeration – the nation – as an already existing fait accompli. At the same time, censuses inscribed and reified certain kinds of divisions within the enumerated population, while hiding others from view. Through a close reading of official statistics as political and cultural artifacts, the chapter shows how those charged with producing Latin America’s early national censuses participated in constituting the national communities they were supposed to merely count.

Sarah C. Chambers focuses in Chapter 17 on Chile’s judicial sector, one of the most stable state institutions during the early decades of the nineteenth century in all of Spanish America. The chapter investigates how having access to courts, particularly for subaltern sectors of society, gave common citizens of the newly independent republic a stake in state building. No system of justice was free from prejudice and corruption, but the case of Chile shows how new states could gain legitimacy among those members of subaltern groups who won redress in court.

In the last chapter of the book’s fourth part, Nancy P. Appelbaum writes about Colombia’s Chorographic Commission, the region’s most extensive geographic survey in the nineteenth century. The author examines how the commission’s maps, texts, charts, and paintings provide insights into the elite’s nation-state building project and the tensions and contradictions that undermined it. The commission constructed the national territory as an aggregate of distinct regional spaces and peoples, a depiction that paralleled the elite’s radical federalist political project. At the same time, however, the commission portrayed the nation as undergoing a unifying racial mixture that was absorbing supposedly inferior – nonwhite – races and was creating a homogenous national race, and yet the commission’s chorographic approach also emphasized regional and racial differences. Ultimately, the commission constructed a regional and racial hierarchy that still marginalizes some places and peoples within the nation. Racialized hierarchical geographies also emerged in other Latin American countries, for example, Peru and Mexico, although the particular contours differed in each case.

At the end of the book, the conclusions seek to summarize and link the results of the chapters to the challenges confronting Latin American states in our days. We try to review, in our final contribution, how the authors have
advanced the understanding of the past trajectory of state and nation making in the Iberian world, discussing each type of state capacity and their historical sequencing. We seek thus to connect the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary state formation and contemporary state governance to the original institutional designs and political strategies carried out during the long nineteenth century. The conclusions attempt to make explicit the lessons and clues for the contemporary world that result from the successes, and from the many failures, of the liberal designs and strategies for state and nation building that were described and analyzed in each of the book’s chapters.