PART V

CONCLUSION
We began this volume proposing that the experiences of Spain and Latin America in the nineteenth century are relevant for those countries undergoing the process of state building today. We noted that many of the same problems and challenges faced by contemporary states-in-the-making were common in the Iberian world: divided societies, improvised and often flawed institutional designs, and public organizations with responsibilities far above their capacities. In order to explore the contradiction between performance expectations and organizational realities, we identified four different forms or categories of state power: territorial, economic, infrastructural, and symbolic. Using these forms or categories of state power as an analytical scheme, we conclude the book with a summary of where our cases find themselves 200 years after independence, and how the patterns therein provide clues about the relative importance of each form of power. By linking contemporary states to their precedents, we hope to suggest how historical legacies help determine present outcomes, and to explain the relative lack of success of state-building projects in Latin America and Spain during the nineteenth century.

Looking at our cases, we first need to consider the differences between Spain and Latin America. In the first section of this conclusion, we discuss the background for the successful Spanish state development during the twentieth century, an achievement arguably without parallel among Latin American countries. We will claim that some of the key factors for the later development of Spain are to be found at the turn of the century, a crucial period for state building in Europe as well as in the Americas. The failures of modern state building in Latin America are clearly felt today. In the second section of the conclusion, we will discuss and summarize some of the results of the book’s chapters as applied to the different forms or categories of state power in Latin America in our days. In the third and last section, we discuss what may be the central political deficit in much of the continent today.
THE SPANISH DIFFERENCE

The “Spanish miracle” in the second half of the twentieth century is certainly remarkable. While Spain and Latin American countries shared many characteristics up until the end of the nineteenth century, soon afterward their paths began to diverge drastically. We can see this through a variety of metrics. For example, the confidence of the financial markets in the Spanish state rose strongly at the beginning of the twentieth century. The differential yield between Spanish government bonds and those of the United Kingdom had been higher than those of Latin American countries as late as 1888. By the start of World War I, Spain had to pay a much smaller premium on its debt than any country in Latin America. Interestingly, at the same time, Spain was undergoing a major democratization as the percentage of the population at least nominally enfranchised increased substantially, while the enfranchised population in most Latin American countries remained largely the same. Also at the turn of the century we see a significant decline in the percentage of the Spanish population not attending school, a trend accelerated with the Second Republic and then continued from the late 1950s onward.¹

The increasing confidence of global markets in Spanish government bonds, as well as the positive results in education and other public policy areas, point to an increase of state capacity at the beginning of the twentieth century. This was in fact the case. Particularly as regards infrastructural power, those decades set the basic configuration for the development of the Spanish state during the rest of the century. Whereas Spain may have been an “invertebrate” country at the beginning of the twentieth century, as Ortega famously put it,² the modernization of state and society progressed markedly in the following decades.

In any case, as Knöbl makes clear in Chapter 3 of the present book, it is a common mistake to think that other European states consolidated their infrastructural and other types of state power during the nineteenth century. In fact, many of the features and achievements that define the “strong” European modern state were the product of the first half of the twentieth century. This is equally valid for less powerful states as it is for the great powers in Europe, such as France, Germany, or the United Kingdom.

Therefore, the first decades of the twentieth century were a crucial period for state building across the Western World. The study of this period offers essential clues in order to understand the very different results in terms of development of state structures between Spain and Latin America. In the context of this comparison, the contrast between Argentina and Spain is especially revealing.


As is well known, for the first decades of the twentieth century Argentina seemed most clearly poised among Latin American countries to become a modern developed nation in the near future. What went wrong compared to Spain? Argentina and Spain began to develop and consolidate extensive expert bureaucracies toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The historical background, as discussed by Herrera and Ferraro in Chapter 8, was not favorable in either case for the professionalization of state institutions. Patronage practices among the elite evolved during the second half of the nineteenth century into massive spoils systems both in Spain and Argentina. The recruitment of public employees depended on political loyalty, while professional capacity or merit represented a secondary consideration in the best of cases.

The creation and consolidation of expert bureaucracies in Argentina is described by Salvatore in Chapter 11 of the book. Meritocratic recruitment and bureaucratic autonomy were the foundation for new strategic public policy programs, as was most clearly the case in education. Argentina’s Council for National Education, created in 1881, was given financial autonomy and a certain degree of independence from the executive power. A similar development occurred in Spain at about the same time, and new bureaucratic structures were created in order to consolidate a national system of public education. The creation of public institutions for the development of education was a relatively common pattern in all countries undertaking serious modernizing efforts at the time in the Iberian area, such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, which have been discussed in Chapters 9, 10, and 12 of the book. But Spain and Argentina were clearly the two most successful cases in the region. However, the design of bureaucratic structures showed significant variations in every one of the countries mentioned, and these disparities were to have lasting consequences for the wider goal of state building.

Strong resistance of conservative elites to public education seemed to be a feature of Spanish and Spanish American societies during the whole nineteenth century. Some countries were more successful than others in facing this challenge. This phenomenon was considered by Alvarez Junco for the case of Spain in Chapter 15, and thoroughly discussed by Soifer for the case of Peru in Chapter 12 of the book.

The creation of the Ministry for Public Instruction in 1900 was a fundamental step for the development of a national education system in Spain. Soon after its creation, the ministry began a program of sweeping reforms. One of the first was to finance all teachers’ salaries in Spain from the central state budget and to organize payment of salaries directly by central offices in each region. In Argentina, the Council for National Education initially had a similar role in distributing large subsidies for education to the provinces. Later on, the

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Miguel A. Centeno and Agustin E. Ferraro

council proceeded to systematically establish national schools in Argentina’s provinces, schools directly financed and operated by the central state. Thus both in Argentina and Spain, significant organizational reforms challenged the resistance of local elites, and the success of the central state led to very positive results for the public policy programs implemented.4

In contrast to Spain and Argentina, in Perú the central state could not, or did not want to, prevail over conservative local elites in order to establish a national education system. As a consequence, public policy programs failed to achieve substantial results. As described by Soifer in Chapter 12, the process began in 1895, when the liberal Civilista coalition launched a series of reforms in the area of education. At first, the coalition seized hold of the implementation of policy in the regions and overrode local elites. Education policy was centralized, and a specific public bureau, the General Direction of Public Education, was put in charge of the system after 1909. The bureau had a serious design flaw, however, because it lacked any kind of independence from the executive power. Nevertheless, as Soifer makes clear, for the first years the results were remarkable, with a sharp increase in the number of schools in Perú, as well as improvements in the quality of teaching.

A wave of peasant revolts in the southern highlands of Perú between 1915 and 1924 changed the political situation. The liberal coalition abruptly lost nerve and began to conciliate conservative local elites in order to guarantee their support for the repression of the peasants. Control of education was officially devolved to the regions, and modernization efforts stopped. Lacking financial and operational autonomy from the administration’s political leadership, the General Direction of Public Education was rapidly neutralized.

Of course, bureaucratic organizations without organizational and financial autonomy are entirely powerless to continue with public policy programs without the political support of the administration. In such a situation, a political whim can quickly destroy programs and structures, as well as the results previously achieved.

Lack of political independence became also a serious problem for the Council of Education in Argentina. However, in Argentina’s case, the liberal elite did not abandon its commitment to modernization. Argentina’s liberal elite remained committed to public education and ignored or successfully fought against local resistance to the creation of a national education system. Nevertheless, although the Council of Education had financial autonomy in the form of earmarked taxes, its board of directors was appointed by the executive power. Only the appointment of the chairman of the board required approval by the Senate. Political influence on the Council of Education did not lead,

4 Argentina began with an illiteracy rate of 31.5 percent in 1900, measured among army recruits, and was able to reduce the illiteracy rate to 16.3 percent in 1930. Spain began with an illiteracy rate of 35.4 percent in 1900, similarly measured among army recruits, and achieved a rate of 11.5 percent in 1930. Data for Argentina from Table 11.1, Chapter 11 of the present volume. Data for Spain from Núñez, “Educación,” 231.
as in Perú, to its neutralization or to the abandonment of public policy programs in the area. Instead, as described by Salvatore in Chapter 11, what happened in Argentina was an increasing politicization of the system of national education. As opposed to recruiting managers, inspectors, school directors, or even secondary school teachers on the basis of publicly proven merit, in Argentina those positions began to be filled with political appointees. In other words, the powerful and well-financed system of national education came to be treated as part of the political spoils. Parliamentary denunciations in 1913 and 1914 already made clear that massive clientelistic appointments enormously increased education costs through inefficiency and waste, and they reduced the quality of teaching.

Notwithstanding parliamentary denunciations by minority groups in Congress, the eradication of the spoils system was not a top political priority for the major political forces in Argentina at the time. The coming to power in 1916 of the Radical Party, that is, the radical wing of the liberal opposition, did not substantially change the practice of massive clientelistic appointments in the national bureaucracy. Of course, such political practices, known in Argentina as política criolla, had very negative consequences on the progress of state modernization in the country. Infrastructural power depends essentially on the growth of expert bureaucracies recruited on merit and invested with operational autonomy. Advancements in this area represented the key difference between state-building processes in Argentina and Spain.

As part of a progressive reform of the whole national bureaucracy, a career civil service was created in Spain for the Ministry for Public Instruction in 1911, following similar reforms in other ministries. The new regulations were typical for rational bureaucracies as defined by Weber. Public competitions for admissions and promotions in the civil service were introduced, tenure was granted to the civil servants thus recruited, and political dismissals were made extremely difficult. In 1918, the career system was extended to all employees in the national public administration. The reform was successful in putting an end to the spoils system in Spain, that is to say, to the recruitment of public employees based on political criteria.

Needless to say, the whole process of state modernization in Spain was brutally cut short by the fascist dictatorship that took power in 1939. Public school teachers were massively dismissed or in numerous cases summarily executed for being natural supporters of the Spanish Republic; career civil servants not loyal to the fascist dictatorship were similarly dismissed or killed. All the same, when the Franco dictatorship saw itself compelled to modernize the structures of government and public policy in the early 1960s, the professionalization of the public bureaucracy was carried out on the basis of the major civil service reform of 1918. The modernization of the structures of government and

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public policy in the 1960s was followed by fast economic growth, and both changes pointed the way to political democratization. In this as in other areas, the social and political modernization of Spain between 1900 and 1936 laid out the foundations for the successful democratic transition after 1975.

In Spain as well as in the United States, the decline of the spoils system toward the end of the nineteenth century, as well as the development of professional bureaucracies, were supported by wide political movements with a strong cultural impact. *Regeneracionismo* in Spain and the Progressive Movement in the United States made the end of the spoils system part of a cause of “national renewal” with a strong ethical and democratic appeal. Interestingly, a similar political and cultural movement developed in Argentina at the time, and it was represented by the liberal opposition of the Radical Party. However, the focus of Argentina’s reformers was electoral corruption; their main goal was to establish and consolidate legal guarantees for transparent elections. As mentioned earlier, civil service reform was not the movement’s priority.

In the terminology employed by Mahoney in Chapter 10, a political and cultural movement focused on political clientelism and fighting for civil service reform can operate as a “trigger” or generative cause for rapid, punctuated change in the area of state modernization. From systems of political spoils, where corruption and bureaucratic mismanagement were seen as endemic, the United States and Spain were able to create professional bureaucracies in the relatively short period of two or three decades. In both cases, the punctuated character of the change becomes a topic in the literature by being associated with a single moment or single legal reform. For the United States, that particular moment is the passing of the Pendleton Act of 1883, and for Spain it’s the civil service reform or Estatuto Maura of 1918. Of course, in both cases it took much more than a singular reform to change administrative practices from the spoils of office to bureaucratic professionalism. Those single reforms are mainly symbolic moments but important ones nonetheless. As symbols, they express the fact that such profound transformations, completed in only two or three decades, were quite fast in terms of state building.

This can be confirmed by considering the cases of Chile and Costa Rica, two of the countries in Latin America where the consolidation of the modern state was most clearly successful. Successful state modernization can be roughly gauged in our days by governance indicators and other measures of bureaucratic quality. Chile and Costa Rica are usually the two countries in the region that have been on the top of every measure since such data began to be systematically collected in the 1990s.6

Analyzed by Jaksic in Chapter 9, the central state in Chile early on developed the practice of employing nonpartisan experts to run relatively independent

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areas of public policy. In some well-known cases such as Andrés Bello or Domingo Sarmiento, the nonpartisan character of such experts was reinforced by their being nonnationals. The practice probably originates with the success of Andrés Bello as a leading public intellectual and state reformer since his arrival to Chile in 1829. Later on, the practice of hiring nonpartisan experts for leading positions in the state bureaucracy was enlarged and supported by the Chilean Congress as a mechanism for the oversight and control of the executive power. In this way, the growth of a spoils system in Chile was kept in check by the strong separation of powers.

The role of nonpartisan public experts leading relatively autonomous bureaucratic organizations had a strong impact on public education in Chile, a key area for social and state modernization. The first strong impulse to public education came with the creation of the University of Chile in 1842. From the moment of its creation, the university was put in charge of the direction and supervision of primary education. Andrés Bello was appointed rector, a position that he kept until his death in 1865; the length of tenure confirmed the nonpartisan character of his appointment as a public policy expert. In the following years, the number of new schools and the student population grew rapidly. The consolidation of a national system of public education was further advanced with the creation of a specific public agency in 1882, the Inspección General de Instrucción. Again, a nonpartisan expert was appointed to this strategic public policy position, José A. Núñez. For the four years previous to his appointment, Núñez had been commissioned by the Chilean government to travel across European countries and the United States in order to study primary and secondary school systems. Interestingly, Domingo F. Sarmiento had been commissioned by the Chilean government to do a similar research trip in 1845. What we see, in the career of Núñez and other top officials of the Chilean state, is the systematic acquisition of expert knowledge and the deliberate training of a nonpartisan public policy elite. Length of tenure confirming again the nonpartisan character of his appointment, Núñez remained in office for fifteen years until 1897. And the relative bureaucratic autonomy of the Inspección General is amply confirmed by its frequent conflicts with successive ministers of Education.  

It is interesting to consider, comparing bureaucratic practices in Chile and Argentina, that the most celebrated expert on public education in both countries, Sarmiento, was the first appointed president (superintendente) of the Council of Education in Argentina in 1881. However, he remained in office less than a year and was forced to resign due to disagreements with the minister.  The episode corroborates the extreme political vulnerability of bureaucratic agencies in the latter country.

The development of an expert bureaucracy, relatively autonomous from the government’s political leadership, was a lengthy and gradual process in Chile. This was a case of incremental bureaucratic expansion, as defined by Mahoney

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in Chapter 10. Although slow, incremental change gives the modernization process stability and strength. The role of public policy experts in Chilean state management became during the nineteenth century a part of the country’s informal constitution; it came to represent, in other words, a regulating principle in the dynamics of the separation of powers. It is a fundamental political value in Chile, regularly reflected and confirmed by political practice up to our days, that the executive is not allowed by Congress to appoint mere loyalists or partisan hacks to crucial public policy positions, as happens all too often in other Latin American countries, with disastrous effects on public policy.

A similar process of incremental change is described by Mahoney for the case of Costa Rica. Bureaucratic modernization was a slow but continuous development from 1875 onward. Through the creation of specialized public agencies for key public policy areas and other reforms, the state bureaucracy was able to gain increasing autonomy from the particular administration in power, the military, and the economic elite. Again, bureaucratic modernization was particularly strong in the area of education, including the appropriation of considerable economic resources for this public policy area. Exceptionally among countries in Latin America, by the early twentieth century Costa Rica employed more resources in education than in the military.

The ample majority of countries in Latin America were not able or not willing to follow a consistent path of bureaucratic modernization at any point during the twentieth century. Even countries where economic and human resources were readily available, such as the case of Argentina, did not allow for expert bureaucracies to assume control of public policy areas. Lack of bureaucratic development had a primary impact on infrastructural power. In fact, as defined by Mann, infrastructural power is based on an array of relatively autonomous bureaucratic organizations variously linked to power networks in civil society, that is to say, embedded professional bureaucracies. But lack of bureaucratic modernization had a significant impact on the other forms or categories of power as well. Territorial power depends on the effectiveness of the police and the military, which are of course bureaucratic organizations that have to be run by experts in order to be fully operative. The intrinsic link between economic power and bureaucratic rationalization was very clearly described by Max Weber. Indeed, this specific connection has been called the “Weberian state hypothesis.” Finally, even the development of the state’s symbolic power depends on bureaucratic rationalization. It is not just that public policy enjoys much more credibility, and produces better results, when formulated by non-partisan experts. National consciousness itself, which was the product of relatively leisured intellectual and artistic elites in the first half of the nineteenth century, became a matter of systematic development by vast professional

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9 Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 58, 475.
bureaucratic organizations, that is to say, by the public education systems during the second half.

In Latin America, incomplete or fragmentary bureaucratic modernization resulted in weak states on all fronts. States in the region developed as partially hollow structures, lacking the capacity to deliver basic public policy results that are typically expected of modern political entities – Leviathans, but only on paper. In the next section, we will discuss how this legacy affects the performance of contemporary states in the region.

PAPER LEVIATHANS

The geographical and effective reach of the different contemporary Latin American national states is quite different across the region. Whereas Latin American countries were able to assure their territorial sovereignty and basic geographical shape by the mid-nineteenth century, they faced a much greater test from internal challengers. The nominal authority of the centralized state was, in most cases, assured by 1900. The most prominent exception, as detailed by Needell in Chapter 4 of this book, was Brazil, but even here national unity was purchased with a significant political price.

Conflicts that followed were rarely about the geographical definition of the nation or even about ethnic/nationalist claims, but about the distribution of national riches between classes, individuals, institutions, and regions. In many cases, these struggles have yet to be resolved; and as a region, with few exceptions, Latin America has never been able to establish the Weberian monopoly over the use of violence in its territory. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, and Ecuador have been the most successful. In the case of the first, however, governmental writ is shallow and thin in the outer reaches of the countryside and in the core of many cities, whereas in the rest of the Southern Cone, the “dirty war” and the autonomy enjoyed by the repressive apparatus would make it difficult to say that the countries were truly pacified until the 1980s. Peru and Colombia have suffered through extended periods during which the command of the state over significant parts of the territory was very much in question. Even under military rule, the capacity of the Bolivian state to impose its writ through violence was limited (no matter its intentions).

The record is particularly negative if we think of threats to territoriality as not stemming from rival political projects but simply from the absence of a single enforcement institution. In Mexico, the past five years have seen the toll of drug murders approach 50,000. In Venezuela and most of Central America, violent crime has made normal urban life very difficult. Two hundred years after independence, the state does not necessarily rule over the entire continent.

In terms of economic power, we again have a wide distribution but some common themes. The relative economic decline of Argentina is infamous whereas Brazil is now one of the world’s major economies, and Chile could soon enjoy wealth levels of the lower tranche of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Mexico is arguably the most
interesting case as it has combined a significant manufacturing sector with continued fiscal dependence on oil production. Despite (or because of?) NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), it has not been able to grow dramatically over the past twenty years and its income per capita ratio to the United States remains a stubborn quarter to a third. Some countries have experienced dramatic booms and busts, such as Peru, while others have been relatively more consistent. But, with some prominent exceptions, the economies in the twenty-first century look very much like their nineteenth-century counterparts. For example, in a world where it is increasingly important to both develop export markets and to participate in high-value-added production, many of the countries in the region find themselves in the worst possible category with relatively low levels of trade and high dependence on primary exports (or in some cases remittances from migrants). Dependence on a few markets continues with the United States still dominant but China exerting considerable influence on the regional economy.

The persistent and world-leading levels of inequality not only have political and social consequences (in the violence described previously and collective cohesion discussed later in this chapter), but also establish a ceiling for the development of domestic consumer markets. Again, there are exceptions, and certainly Brazil, Mexico, and Chile have made significant strides, but these have been accompanied by very high levels of household debt, making the economic dynamic very fragile. Much as in the nineteenth century, income is concentrated at the top and a far smaller amount of it is reinvested domestically. Much as was the case with nineteenth-century opera houses, the skyscrapers of the major cities obscure the tenuous nature of much of the region’s development.

As already mentioned in the previous section, most Latin American countries were not able or not willing to develop modern professional bureaucracies during the first decades of the twentieth century, a crucial period for state building in Europe and the Americas. As a result, with the exception of Chile and Costa Rica, all other countries in the region see local versions of the spoils system define the public administration to this day. This means that every new elected government appoints vast numbers of political loyalists to high- and medium-level management positions, or even to the lower ranks of the public bureaucracy. Considering measurements from the past ten years, in extreme cases like Mexico or Argentina each new administration is expected to appoint tens of thousands of political loyalists, up to more than 10 percent of total public employment. Political appointees are not always incompetent in the area of public policy they are assigned to, but competence is not the main reason for their appointment in any case.

Nevertheless, there has been a significant development in the “cognitive” capacity of the state. As Loveman describes in Chapter 16, censuses were employed during the nineteenth century as a tool to create imaginary homogeneous populations and hide or deny racial diversities. Censuses expressed the rejection of the elites toward the human community of their own countries (more on this later). During the second half of the twentieth century, there have been substantial advances in this area, censuses becoming more honest and representative. Public discussions and mobilizations by civil society groups have been particularly significant in Brazil, leading the way for Brazil and other Latin American countries to acknowledge and sometimes embrace racial diversity. In any case, decennial censuses are now standard throughout the region, and many countries have created sophisticated national registry systems.

In many countries, electoral systems are as good as anywhere in the world, although this is a fairly new development. One area in which the challenges to state capacity are clearest is in the production of accurate cadastral surveys and land registries. This reflects the continuing rural inequality throughout the region as well as the capacity of local elites to resist efforts to document resources. The pictures painted by Soifer in Chapter 12 and by Loveman in Chapter 16 remain very relevant.

Perhaps the area where the infrastructural capacity of the state has been least developed is taxation. Overall, Latin American countries tax their economies at roughly half the level of OECD countries. There are exceptions (Argentina and Brazil), but the majority of countries extract 20 percent or less from their economies. Moreover, a significantly greater amount of government revenue comes from indirect taxation including consumption taxes. These do not only tend to be more regressive, but they are much easier to administer and require less developed enforcement mechanisms. In several countries these are augmented by the, again, relatively administratively easier collection of royalty revenue from natural resource extraction. The low levels of taxation have important political and social consequences: the levels of government service delivery remain low in many countries, and the fiscal legitimacy of the state is perpetually in question.

The result of the low professionalization and lack of resources is a spotty provision of social services, with a great deal of between- and within-country variance. On the former, the countries in the Southern Cone tend to do a much better job delivering basic services such as water, sanitation, basic health, and primary education. This is not simply a function of relative wealth (although that is of course relevant), but it reflects the more extensive development of state infrastructures and particularly political commitment to welfare policies for large parts of the twentieth century. Again, it is important to emphasize that wealth in and of itself does not guarantee services: both fairly wealthy

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Mexico and Venezuela rank lower than poorer countries such as Costa Rica. The within-country differences betray the underdevelopment of the state even more starkly. As in much of the less developed world, national figures disguise a great deal of variance. In the right neighborhoods, the quality of life and services is on par with Western Europe. However, significant parts of even the capital cities exist without any basic services. Most urban centers are surrounded by a ring of misery where running water, schools, and health clinics are scarce and where the reach of the state of law is severely constrained. This is a result, not only of the structural deficits of the state, but of the continuing failure of many of these states to secure their monopoly of authority in their territories.

We now come to the fourth type of power that we discussed in the introduction and the one that we would argue is least developed in Latin America. Measuring something as diffuse and ill-defined as symbolic capital may be difficult and frustrating, but that does not mean that the underlying factors behind the concept do not matter. Social science does experience the classic problem of only looking for one’s lost keys under the light as that will be the only place where they can be seen. This is a sensible strategy, but it would be absurd to then claim that the keys could not be anywhere else. Similarly, the difficulty in getting concrete measures of symbolic capital should not prevent us from considering how the underlying historical relationship between the national government and the population shapes and has shaped the capacity of the Latin American state.

Central to the notion of symbolic capital is its “taken for grantedness.” Similar to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, it implies the absence of alternatives or a lack of questioning the fundamental order of things. Note that this does not necessarily mean agreement with any or all policies, but rather an acceptance that the state is here to stay and one has to respect its wishes. The expression “you can’t fight city hall” is assumed to betray a cynical and reluctant conformity. It may, however, actually demonstrate more a basic faith in the centrality and sovereignty of city hall. The latter is what we mean by symbolic power. This may be expressed in the three different operational ways: degrees of patriotism/nationalism, legitimacy of the state, and levels of trust in the government. We will examine the contemporary evidence on all three.

How nationalist is Latin America? As with many such questions, it all depends on how one defines nationalism. Based on the often-portrayed seas of flags accompanying national football (soccer) teams and the often-irascible public response to perceived transnational (and especially American) encroachments on national sovereignty, we might classify Latin America as extremely nationalistic. However, this nationalism is often a sentiment that only expresses a “love of place.” As López-Alves points out in Chapter 14, a specific form of nationalism in Latin America focuses on the natural endowments of the land as the main source of national pride. In contrast to the typical forms of nationalism discussed in the literature on the subject, in Latin America geographical and natural characteristics often take priority over the human communities
as a source of emotional attachment. Therefore, as López-Alveez states, more
ten than not human influence on the nation is seen as damaging and
egative. The point is amply confirmed in Chapter 18. Appelbaum studies the
work of Colombia’s Chorographic Commission, one of the most ambitious
gographic surveys carried out in nineteenth-century Latin America. Many
documents such as maps and travel writings, produced by the commission,
were extensively reproduced and employed for atlases and schoolbooks, thus
substantially contributing to the configuration of a Colombian national imagi-
nary. The maps and other materials such as watercolors display the beauty
of landscapes and the bounty of natural resources in a very positive way. But
watercolors or reports depicting humans often show tensions and flaws. These
are often of a racist nature, depicting blacks or Indians as problematic; but
whites or light-skinned people are also sometimes shown as languid, weak,
and slothful. In contrast to the invariably positive resources and beauty of the
land, a source of strong pride, the human community is often seen as deficient
in Latin American national imaginaries.

No doubt, Latin American countries show a strong tradition of anti-imperialist
feelings and have concerns with national sovereignty. Of course nationalism in
the region includes some kind of psychological bond between people, and a
conviction of their identity and differentiation from others; it refers also to
a perceived and identified community. We can easily detect such sentiments
in Latin America, and this is the reason why observers continue to argue that
national identity “continues to be a significant factor in the lives of many Latin
Americans.”

However, we would like to differentiate from this psychological national-
ism, or from the specific Latin American nationalism of natural endowments,
a more political kind of bond. Usually designated as patriotism in political
philosophy, this is a very different political animal. It is a political force, and it
has to be understood in reference to the state as a political entity. It involves
the identification with a state and the recognition of no higher duty than advanc-
ing its interests. This is less a matter of celebration of identity and more of what
Anderson notes as “colossal sacrifices” made in its name. This communal
“commitment” to the state is what often underlies the “horizontal camarader-
ies” that are so central to patriotism.

Consider the results of two questions from the Latin American Public
Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. In one, respondents are asked about
their sense of pride in being of a certain nationality. In the other, they are asked
about their pride in the political system of that country. Consistently, more

14 Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a . . . ,” Ethnic and Racial
Studies 1, no. 4 (October 1978): 377–383.
15 Nicola Miller, “The Historiography of Nationalism and National Identity in Latin America,”
16 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
17 LAPOP 2008.
than 90 percent express a great deal of pride in being of a certain nationality, whereas the numbers for the political system are a small fraction of this (with exceptions such as Costa Rica). We want to suggest that the first is a general measure of nationalism, while the second is closer to a measure of state patriotism. Obviously, this is no more than suggestive, but in the absence of concrete data on patriotic or nationalist sentiments, the consistent gap between the two represents the peculiar status of Latin American national consciousness. There is broad agreement in contemporary scholarship that in Latin America the link between any national community and the state as an institution was and remains weak, and that the legitimation of political authority as the voice of the nation has been limited at best.

The dominant characteristic of Latin America from the very beginning of its modern history through today has been its social and political fractionalization; Latin America is a permanently divided region with not very well developed "horizontal ties." \(^{18}\) We do not deny the existence of a multitude of collective identities based on ethnicity, class, region, and other criteria, \(^{19}\) nor are we arguing for an extreme individualized atomization, but we contend that few of these identities have been able to embrace the entire nation or society (or even existed in opposition to the state as such, in favor of a different definition of the territory). Efforts to create "nations," as documented by Appelbaum in Chapter 18, had serious difficulties with heterogeneity, often choosing to disguise or deny it.

Latin America is defined by intrastatal divisions much more so than by interstatal ones. We can begin with the obvious racial/ethnic legacy of the conquest that still defines so much of Andean and Mesoamerican societies, and that of plantation agriculture, which characterized much of the Atlantic Coast. There are also the regional gaps that pervade practically every country: plains and mountains, coasts and interior, and capital and provinces. There are also the class gulfs in this most unequal of regions, a fact that defines the rhetoric and struggles of politics. Finally, there are the ideological divisions of Left, Right, and in between. That many of these divisions are congruent and interact makes the schisms even starker.

What about legitimacy? Few concepts have been as consistently maligned as legitimacy, yet we return to it once again in order to explain differences in behavior that can have no other origin. We follow Juan Linz in defining

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legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that may be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience.” 20 Various projects have attempted to compare levels of legitimacy within Latin America and between the region and other parts of the world. 21 The methodological rigor and robustness of the results indicate that these general findings do reflect an underlying reality.

The first observation is that there is a great deal of variance within the region. In practically every study the triumvirate of Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are leagues ahead of their neighbors whereas the Andean and Central American countries are at the bottom. Survey after survey demonstrates that the majority of citizens in these latter countries do not accept the political (not to mention the socioeconomic) rules of the game as reasonable, sensible, and justifiable. Too many political conflicts are not about who will run the machinery of the state, but about the need to dismantle it. In general, while populations might offer diffuse support for general principles (but even support for democracy and the market are declining), they show much lower enthusiasm for the actual on-the-ground manifestations of the act of being governed.

In large part, this may be explained by the low levels of trust in the capacity of state governance. The absence of trust leads “citizens to become cynical about the political system and disaffected with the existing order.” 22 The consequences of this are greater than individual discontent or alienation; no system of governance is efficient and fair to all, all of the time. In fact, working systems may need to “fool” some of the people some of the time in order to function. Constraints on belief make it harder to deliver good governance or for the relevant groups to recognize it when they see it. So, for example, it is much more difficult for officials to remain honest and behave appropriately when nearly three-quarters of citizens feel that they are corrupt and expect them to behave that way. 23 There is something of a causal circularity involved in the relationship between trust and governance, which makes policy reform very difficult. Lack of trust reflects low quality of governance, but it may also retard efforts to improve it.

The results of various surveys mirror those on legitimacy. In general, Latin America is the least trusting region in the world. The military, police, courts, parties, and legislatures are trusted by less than 30 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{24} Within the region we find that Chile and Brazil have the highest indicators of trust. The Brazilian phenomenon is a relatively recent one with other studies indicating radical improvements in attitudes toward the state over the past decade. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and Peru are at the bottom. Some of the individual findings describe what can only be called a “rejected state”: only 6.6 percent of Argentineans have significant trust in the civil service, 19.2 percent of Peruvians trust “the government,” and 30 percent of Mexicans trust the police.\textsuperscript{25}

The image that comes through these figures is clear: with some exceptions, the Latin American state does not exert the expected monopoly over violence, generate effective development, or provide services at the levels one would expect. Perhaps more importantly, this failure is widely acknowledged in large parts of the population and shapes its image of the state. To what extent is this a historical legacy from the period analyzed in the book? We will discuss this point in the next and final section.

HISTORICAL LEGACIES

The Spanish experience indicates that history is not destiny. Whatever its troubles in 2012, Spain has achieved levels of democracy and economic well-being that would have been impossible to imagine in 1939. Argentina in the same year had just begun to experience the almost continuous relative decline that has characterized the country’s last several decades. That Chile would be a political and economic success was not obvious on September 11, 1973, nor was it clear even twenty years ago that contemporary Brazil would experience a sharp decline in poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, as Mahoney has shown, where one starts does help determine where one ends.

There is much of our present that we can recognize in the historical case studies. An obvious example is the reality of Chilean exceptionalism since the middle of the nineteenth century, while the challenges facing the Peruvian state in the early twentieth century persist well into the twenty-first century. However, the question should not be how well the past predicts the future, but how to use it to understand the specific nature of political, social, and economic challenges.

In this we follow Guibernau, Jones, and Miller in their excellent introduction to the special issue of \textit{Nations and Nationalism} dedicated to Latin


America. They note three special characteristics of the region when comparing it to similar nation-states: race, warfare, and legitimacy. The legacy of colonial inequality haunts many of the accounts presented in this book. It is impossible to understand the relative fragility of Latin states without taking into account the extent to which they had to deal with consolidating not one nation but many, sharing territory and little else. The point is clearly made by Knöbl in Chapter 3.

The relative absence of interstate violence deprived (if that is the right word) the region of one of the most common stimuli for collective identification. Given initial divisions and the absence of cohesive experiences, is it any wonder that the region has not been able to establish secure political legitimacy?

This is not a new phenomenon. In many ways, these divisions are what defined the postindependence projects whereby a form of liberalism was attempted without the concomitant creation of a state able to foster political unity or a sense of nation that inspires cohesion. The nineteenth-century liberal project floundered precisely because it refused to do one of two things: impose an order or open the society to redefine what that order should be. Over much of its history, the explicit hope of a variety of political projects has been that progress of one sort or another would lead to a social convergence. One version of this vision saw the historical mingling of groups as inevitably leading to a new form of nation. This is best epitomized by the Mexican ideology of the *raza cósmica* arising from the various conflicts, or the creation of a generic post-racial *guajiro* identity in the Andes and the Caribbean. A more liberal vision expected that with enough economic progress, these fissures would be closed. This was at the very heart of the *Concertación* discourse in Chile. In actual fact, however, material, social, racial, and political progress have yet to close these gaps in the present.

Fractionalization in Latin America is a reflection of the failure of a post-conquest national hegemonic project on the continent. No side of any of the various divisions has been able to defeat the others so as to impose its own worldview or domination. Note that this is not necessarily a bad thing. The imposition of a hegemonic project and of a true class or racial domination is not a pretty sight and leaves destruction all around; the imagined national community has been too often produced by imposition in the past.

Latin America, however, has largely defied this tradition. Political violence has not customarily served as the handmaiden of such communities, nor have such sentiments helped to account for the level and type of conflicts seen in the region. One of the authors has already noted the failure to historically link martial prowess or even danger with a strong sense of nation in the region. In contemporary Latin America, we do have some cases where the classic

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war-nationalism dyad appears to have played out. On April 1982, for example, Argentineans almost unanimously signaled their support for the invasion of the Malvinas/Falklands. Despite its low legitimacy and support, the military regime appeared to have one more gasp of life as it sought to portray itself as the defender of national patrimony. This euphoria, however, did not last very long and, like the military dictatorship, could not survive the defeat. Similar popular sentiment may have helped bring down the Sánchez de Losada government in Bolivia in 2003 when it appeared to be accepting the now century-old Chilean control of the Pacific coastline. A much longer term dynamic has existed in revolutionary Cuba. Whereas many thought that the regime would follow its Soviet supporters into the dustbin of history, it has been able to survive four U.S. presidents since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is now widely accepted that it is precisely the American opposition and the nationalist core of the Cuban Revolution that best helps to explain its longevity.

As in much of the developing world, however, contemporary political violence in Latin America does not consist of conflicts between states, but struggles within them. In particular, the pattern in the region over the past few decades has been that states are not confronting well-articulated and institutionalized oppositions that seek to replace national governments as more amorphous forces that challenge the authority of the state without necessarily offering an alternative project. It is this form of threat that most developing nations face. In the face of this we would argue that the major lesson of Latin America is that the creation of a political sense of the nation may be the most important aspect of state building. It may be true that nations are impossible without states, but effective states may also be impossible without the bonds of human solidarity implied by a strong national community.

18 Of much longer (if not larger) import was the boost that the victory gave Margaret Thatcher.