culture. Furthermore, contrary to some popular accounts, Chapp’s evidence suggests that, at least in presidential campaigns, “the rhetoric of a culture war has not been on the rise since 1980” (p. 75). Second, Chapp’s experimental research suggests that while civil religion may work to activate identity in many Americans, there is a deep, “alienating effect of civil religion” that may, for some groups, be “stronger than previously thought” (p. 120). Indeed, this marginalization may not only lead towards alienation from the candidate using the civil religion rhetoric, but also may “lead to negativity towards the country more generally” (p. 121). These insights, as well as many others like them, make Chapp’s book an important read for anyone interested in the interplay and effects of contemporary American religion and presidential campaigns.

SARA A. MEHLTRETTER DRURY
Wabash College


“Why do they hate us? Why does the world hate the US?” Scholars—from history to political science, from anthropology to literature—have tried periodically to answer what seems like a perpetual question. Like anti-Americanism itself, which has appeared throughout history in ebbs and flows, scholarship on anti-Americanism has emerged in waves. The latest wave, born out of the horrific events of September 11, 2001, produced a plethora of works dissecting whether anti-Americans react to what we are or what we do and probing whether anti-Americanism is a systematic bias or a response to U.S. power—for instance Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane’s edited volume Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 2006) and Giacomo Chiozza’s Anti-Americanism and the American World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). In one way, Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations is part of that enquiry, tracing the evolution of the shifting concept of anti-Americanism over time and across several continents. In another way, however, Max Paul Friedman has crafted here a highly original, and excellent, investigation of anti-Americanism cast in a brand new light.

The main question addressed in Rethinking Anti-Americanism is not where anti-Americanism comes from or what is really anti-Americanism. Instead, Friedman focuses on the impact that the identification of the concept, or “myth,” of anti-Americanism by Americans themselves has had on U.S. interests. The central, provocative argument is that this impact has been overall quite negative: by impeding clear thinking, poisoning political discourse, and
distracting from the real sources of the problems, the political and public emphasis on anti-Americanism has ended up damaging American interests instead of protecting them.

To say that anti-Americanism is a myth and focus on the consequences of perpetuating that myth does not mean that anti-Americanism is imaginary. In the first chapter, Friedman does acknowledge that “many people in many lands at many times have said or written ill-informed, derogatory, and even false and defamatory things about the United States” (p. 19). But according to the sensible definition of anti-Americanism given in the book—particularized hostility and generalized hatred of the United States, or hating the country more than any other and hating everything about it (p. 5)—not many people qualify as genuine anti-Americans, including many prominently labeled anti-American throughout history, such as Jean-Paul Sartre (France), Carlos Fuentes (Mexico), and Günter Grass (Germany).

Yet the standard American view of anti-Americanism, represented in the media and policy circles, has been much more generous in seeing evil motives and irrational resistance against American freedom, democracy, and modernity everywhere. Anti-Americanism is, in this view, a corollary to American exceptionalism. Scholars, too, have contributed to perpetuating the myth of anti-Americanism by selectively cataloguing anti-American actions—for instance Paul Hollander in Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990 (Oxford University Press, 1992) and Russell Berman in Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem (Stanford University Press, 2004). Friedman refers to them as the “anti-anti-Americans.” The problem is, this Manichean view, by design or not, has constricted the policy discourse and prevented policymakers from drawing helpful information from abroad. Ironically, Friedman shows that the “anti-Americans” have often provided useful advice while the “pro-Americans” have been harmful to U.S. interests. By over-labeling others as anti-Americans, Americans have often shot themselves in the foot.

This remarkable book, fluidly written and very enjoyable to read, is based on thorough historical research in United States, Latin American, and Western European archives. It casts old, seemingly familiar episodes, in a new light. Particularly convincing in supporting the central argument are the two French examples. Indeed, France is often recognized as the oldest and most vocal anti-American country in the world, a country where anti-Americanism preceded even the creation of the United States itself, as noted in the authoritative tome by Philippe Roger, The American Enemy: The History of French Anti-Americanism (University of Chicago Press, 2006). The French bore the brunt of accusations of anti-Americanism in the run-up to the Iraq war in early 2003, leading to the now infamous episodes of French-bashing, “freedom fries,” and French wine poured down the drain. The advice offered by French policymakers at the time,
which seems sensible and even-handed a decade later, was discredited because it was attributed to anti-American motives. This is a case of history repeating itself, as we see in chapter 5, in which Friedman reconstructs eerily similar warnings by De Gaulle in the 1960s against U.S. involvement in Vietnam and similar accusations of anti-Americanism in order to discredit his advice.

SOPHIE MEUNIER  
Princeton University


Few books are entirely without merit, and *Strength in Numbers* has several merits. It is well-written, the case studies are interesting and on-point, and its core point—that diffuse interests “win” in politics more often than a naïve Chicago-style model might predict—is clearly correct.

Still, it is hard not to find the book frustrating. There are several confusions (or intentional muddling-togethers-for-simplicity—I cannot tell) that limit the book’s impact on anyone not already convinced of its message.

First, there is the mischaracterization of Mancur Olson’s core theory in *The Logic of Collective Action*. Parson Malthus is often mischaracterized in just this way. Malthus never said, in his “Essay on the Principle of Population,” that there would be famines. He said that famine would be the natural state of mankind unless social norms could be marshaled and society managed by rational principles.

Olson makes an analogous point in *Logic*. He never claims that effective groups do not form. Rather, he says that successful groups either manage to put together selective incentives for participation, or else manage to use ideology and social connections to organize. The economic logic of group interest equaling private action fails; it takes something else. So the interesting question (and I heard this from Olson’s own mouth, many times) is: Why so many large groups do in fact form, when pure economics predicts that they would fail?

But Gunnar Trumbull can be forgiven this point. The caricature of Olson is common among those who disagree with him, and Trumbull’s description is a central claim in the literature. The second and more-damaging problem is the strange conflation of Olson with the Chicago model of regulatory capture, which is an entirely separate argument. Olson’s work is best considered as an original text for the Indiana Institutional school, led by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom (the latter won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2009). In this view, transactions costs and diffuse interests are the problem, and institutions are the solution. The Ostroms showed a Darwin-like delight in cataloging the diversity