TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY

1 POLITICAL VIOLENCE
1.1 The puzzle
1.2 Argument
1.3 Evidence
1.4 Contributions
1.5 Roadmap

2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Political violence in Muslim societies
2.2 Political economy of rents
2.3 Model
2.4 Empirical implications
2.5 Summary

PART II: CONQUEST

3 THE CONQUEST EQUILIBRIUM
3.1 Foundations of Muslim military conquest
3.2 Governing institutions
3.3 Persistence of centralized autocracy
3.4 Islam in non-conquest societies
3.5 Final remarks

4 CONQUEST FOSTERED AUTOCRATIZATION
4.1 Measurement
4.2 Tracing the effect of Muslim conquest
4.3 Autocratization during Muslim conquest
4.4 Evaluating the channel
4.5 Autocratization after Muslim conquest
4.6 Summary
5 THE AUTOCRATIC LEGACY OF MUSLIM CONQUEST
5.1 Un-doing Muslim conquest: Evidence from medieval Spain
5.2 Conquest and democracy in the long-run
5.3 Tracing the conquest equilibrium
5.4 Decomposing Muslim conquest
5.5 Final remarks

PART III: RENTS

6 FUELING AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE
6.1 Oil and political regimes
6.2 Fueling stable dictatorship
6.3 Oil and domestic peace
6.4 Transitions to democracy in non-conquest petrostates
6.5 Summary

7 AIDING POLITICAL VIOLENCE
7.1 Identification strategy
7.2 Preliminaries: Aid and political (in)stability
7.3 Causal estimates
7.4 Authoritarian resilience
7.5 Final remarks

8 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN NON-CONQUEST SOCIETIES
8.1 Foreign transfers and democratic transitions
8.2 Corroborative statistical evidence
8.3 Cross-national causal evidence
8.4 Summary

PART IV: IMPLICATIONS

9 CONCLUSION
9.1 Political violence in Muslim societies
9.2 Rents and development
9.3 The legacy of Muslim conquest