National and international media often turn their attention to Detroit when exploring connections between the United States and the Middle East. So too do federal authorities. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the "special relationship" between Arab Detroit, the media, and law enforcement agencies intensified significantly. America was in crisis, and prevailing anxieties were felt by and projected onto Arab and Muslim citizens in unique ways. The Detroit suburb of Dearborn, with its heavy concentration of newly arrived Lebanese, Iraqi, Yemeni, and Palestinian immigrants, was an early target of investigation and concern. Here, journalists and Arab community leaders were already on a first-name basis, fear of a backlash was palpable, and an alleged sleeper cell was identified and raided within days of the attacks. Working-class mosques, colorful Arabic storefronts, women and girls wearing headscarves, and Arabic speakers gathering to watch al-Jazeera broadcasts made Dearborn an alluring backdrop for initial coverage of the war on terror. The images these stories purveyed, whatever the intentions of the reporters and their agencies, encoded two contradictory assumptions: that Detroit's Arab communities and their experiences after 9/11 were somehow representative of the experiences of Arab Americans nationwide, and that Detroit's Arab communities, by virtue of their visibility, accessibility, and attenuated otherness, were in fact exceptional to national patterns. In this
chapter we examine the post 9/11 backlash in Detroit in light of both assumptions.

The tension between Detroit as representative of Arab America and Detroit as exceptional to Arab America has a long history among Arab American activists and Arab Americanist scholars (Shryock and Abraham 2000). Like so much else concerning Arabs in America, this tension acquired a political urgency after 9/11 that has not waned. When President George W. Bush uttered his famous challenge on September 20, 2001, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” many in Michigan felt that the statement targeted their community quite specifically. Were local Arabs with us, or with the terrorists? County, state, and municipal officials, business leaders, and clergy rushed in to assure Arab Americans that their loyalty was not in doubt and that discrimination against local Arabs and Muslims would not be tolerated. Arab Detroiters donned protective American flags, held large, televised memorial services for the victims of the attacks, and issued strongly worded condemnations of the attacks and the motivations behind them. Although thousands of suddenly vulnerable Arabs suffered insults or abuse at the hands of their fellow citizens, thousands more received gestures of goodwill and support from non-Arab neighbors. These local experiences of protection and solidarity contrasted sharply with events transpiring on the national stage, where the president’s challenge appeared to elicit a different response, where the USA PATRIOT Act was swiftly passed by Congress, and where Arab and Muslim Americans (as well as those who resembled them) suddenly found themselves humiliated on airplanes, detained and deported (if lacking citizenship) without legal counsel, and subjected to unprecedented surveillance and governmental scrutiny. It appeared that the federal government and national media both had less certain, and certainly less affirmative, answers to the president’s challenge than leaders in Detroit had.

To frame Arab Detroit as exceptional, we must go beyond portraying it as a demographic anomaly and ask instead whether the local experience of the 9/11 backlash was qualitatively different from that experienced elsewhere. If the answer is yes, it is also imperative that we consider how and why Detroit achieved this exceptional status. In his cautionary analysis of the myth of American exceptionalism, Seymour Lipset pointed out that the city on the hill was never a beacon of freedom to all; rather, the rights and privileges of American citizenship have always been distributed unequally, based on racial and class formations held in place by dominant ideologies and by violence (1996). We argue that Detroit’s exceptionalism is also a double-edged sword that defies binary representations of Arab Americans as either proof of the American dream—of egalitarianism, the rule of law, and tolerance—or proof of the American nightmare—of discrimination, violence, and bigotry. Rather, it suggests a complex amalgam of both realities, in which ignorance, fear, and exploitation live side by side with solidarity, expediency, and progress. Arab Detroit is exceptional, we argue, because of the power of a local community—with its own local history and political culture—to insulate itself from a national public culture that sees Arabs (and Muslims) as a problem and has difficulty separating “good” Arabs from “bad.”

Michigan’s Arabs, through the work of myriad individuals and the efforts of many successful ethnic institutions, have been incorporated to a remarkable degree into local structures of economic, social, and political capital. At the national level, by contrast, Arabs have found their efforts to organize and influence governmental policies, especially foreign policies, blocked (Samhan 2006; Suleiman 2006). This power differential between local and national arenas, which has become more critical since 9/11, gives special significance to the question of Detroit’s role as an Arab American community versus its role as exemplar of the Arab American community. Drawing on data from the Detroit Arab American Study, from national surveys, from conversations with Arab American community leaders, and from our observations of local events, we will examine the social, political, and economic repercussions of the war on terror in Arab Detroit. Insofar as Detroit’s experience in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was a departure from the norm, what are the factors that account for this difference? More critical, what are the consequences of this difference? Has the crisis experienced in Detroit since 9/11 threatened the security of this community’s hard-won political profile? Given the size, longevity, and genuine incorporation of this diverse community, the question of its representational status has profound implications for the future of Arab and Muslim communities nationwide.

SETTING THE DEMOGRAPHIC STAGE: “MICHIGAN IS OUR NEW YORK”

Among scholars and Arab American community leaders, Detroit’s exceptional nature has been highlighted for multiple, often conflicting purposes. On the one hand, Detroit, and specifically Dearborn, is cast as the golden city of assimilationist desires, where, in the late 1990s, Arab Americans included in their
ranks the CEO of Ford Motor Company, a U.S. senator, and the head of the United Auto Workers. At the same time, however, Detroit is home to a large number of recently arrived Arabs. Many have found success as professionals, or as gas station and liquor store owners. Many languish in low-income jobs, cleaning the homes of others, working as busboys in Detroit’s casinos, providing nonunionized labor to Detroit’s shrinking industrial sector, or driving ice cream trucks. Dearborn is often viewed as little more than an Arab ghetto, where pressure to Americanize is minimal and almost all one’s social and consumer needs can be met in the Arabic language. Alternatively, Dearborn’s thriving Lebanese business district has become a tourist destination for non-Arabs eager to sample the enclave’s wares. Affluent suburban Arabs flock to Dearborn on weekends to shop for bargain vegetables, freshly butchered halal meat, and the delicacies of a half dozen bakeries. The Dearborn enclave has also produced two of the oldest, most influential mosques in America, along with the country’s most celebrated Arab American community organization: ACCESS (the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services). These organizations have gained for Dearborn Arabs a measure of political clout and influence at the state level that is unrivaled elsewhere.

Arab Detroit is distinctive nationally largely because of its unique immigrant characteristics, bringing together old, well-established populations with a high percentage of the recently arrived. Chapter 2 analyzed some of the internal components of Arab American identity formation in Detroit, but Arab Detroit is unlike Arab America at the national level in many other ways as well. We explore several of Detroit’s distinguishing features and analyze how these demographics have contributed to an exceptionally well-enfranchised ethnic American enclave.

Religion
Arab Detroit has far more Muslims than Arab America as a whole, and a larger percentage of Shi’a Muslims in particular. About 58 percent of Arabs and Chaldeans in Detroit identify as Christian, and 42 percent as Muslim. Among Arab Christians, Catholics are the largest group (73 percent), followed by Orthodox (24 percent), and Protestants (3 percent). Arab Muslims have a Shi’a majority (56 percent) and a Sunni minority (35 percent), though Sunnis make up the majority of Muslims in the Arab countries and worldwide. Arab Christians outnumber Arab Muslims in Detroit, as they do nationally, but the margin locally is not large. Muslim Arabs represent less than a third of Arabs nationwide (23 to 33 percent).5

Concentration
Arab Detroit contains America’s best-known Arab immigrant enclave, Dearborn, where a large number of mostly Muslim Arabs live in very high concentration. No other American city includes such a highly visible and large Arab enclave. Arab Detroit is not famous simply for the size and diversity of its Arab communities. It is known primarily for the high concentration of Arabs, a solid 35 percent of the city’s 99,000 residents who live in Dearborn (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007). The adjacent township of Dearborn Heights and several Detroit neighborhoods that abut Dearborn are also home to sizable populations of Arabs. This immigrant enclave, with its thriving business districts, residential neighborhoods that are more than 90 percent Arab, and new mosques, multitude of community activists, and well-known organizations has put Dearborn at the center, nationally and locally, of all things Arab American. This singular enclave, however, is by no means the totality of Arab Detroit. In fact, only 29 percent of the DAAS sample live in Dearborn and Dearborn Heights. Nine percent live in Detroit and Hamtramck, an enclave of growing significance, but the majority of local Arabs (62 percent) are scattered throughout Detroit’s suburbs, typically in much smaller concentrations. In general, Muslims and Christians tend not to live in the same neighborhoods. About two-thirds of Arab Muslims (64 percent) live in the Dearborn area, whereas very few Christian Arabs (only 5 percent) do.

Affluence and Poverty
Arabs in Detroit are both richer and poorer than the general population. Compared to other Arab Americans nationally, those living in Detroit are less well educated and more recently arrived. Although nationally Arabs have achieved high educational and economic success, the heavily immigrant Arab population in Detroit (75 percent of adults), often arriving from rural and war-torn regions of the Middle East, makes the economic and educational profile of Detroit distinctive. Only 72 percent of Arab Detroiters have high school degrees, compared to 88 percent of Arabs nationwide, and where more than 43 percent of Arab Americans nationally have a bachelor’s degree or higher, only 23 percent in the Detroit area do (Arab American Institute Foundation 2006). The relatively high number of Arabs and Chaldeans without a high school degree is reflected in income figures. Twenty-four percent claim an annual family income of less than $20,000, compared to 18 percent of the general Detroit population.6 On the other hand, 25 percent report annual
family incomes of $100,000 or more, compared to only 16 percent in the larger population. Arabs and Chaldeans born in the United States are more affluent still: 36 percent report an annual family income of $100,000 or more, and only 7 percent report less than $20,000. Finally, Arabs and Chaldeans own their own businesses in greater numbers (19 percent and 14 percent respectively) and are more likely to be self-employed (31 percent and 16 percent). When compared to Arab Americans nationally, however, 37 percent of whom own their own businesses, Arab Detroiters look more like others in Detroit and less like Arab Americans in general (Arab American Institute 2002).

The socioeconomic gaps that divide those educated in the Middle East from those educated in the United States are stark and have led to a higher poverty rate among Arabs in Detroit than elsewhere. Yet the presence of an Arab working class in Detroit has had positive consequences for the population as a whole. Low-income Arabs have two effective, increasingly prominent organizations that lobby for their concerns. ACCESS and the Arab American and Chaldean Council (ACC) opened their doors in the early 1970s in reaction to new immigration from distressed Arab countries and a series of economic downturns in the auto industry that had left immigrant workers vulnerable. Both ACCESS and ACC have built successful alliances between Arab immigrants in need, Arab immigrant professionals and human service providers, and American-born Arabs committed to community-based activism. Although many Arab and Chaldean service organizations have developed since the 1970s, ACCESS and ACC have the strongest track records. Each has an annual operating budget of more than $12 million, and each is well connected to state and local governments. These organizations bring together rich and poor, immigrant and American born, enclave dwellers and suburbanites, Christians and Muslims. More significant, they collaborate extensively with non-Arab organizations and governmental agencies in the Detroit area and nationally as well. They have done significant work to bring Arab Americans into the mainstream of local public culture (Howell 2000; Shryock 2004).

Public Service

Arab Detroit has an unprecedented number of elected officials, law enforcement officers, appointed government officials, and other public servants. Arab Detroitors are uniquely situated in positions of local power and influence. The City of Detroit, for example, is a border town, home to the Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, which carry between them nearly one-third of all traffic crossing the U.S.-Canada border (Canada-U.S.-Ontario-Michigan Border Transportation Partnership 2004). The Ambassador Bridge is rare among American border crossings in that it is privately owned and operated. It is rarer still for being owned by an immigrant from Lebanon, Manuel Maroun. Likewise, when international travelers arrive at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, they pass through a terminal bearing the name of another Lebanese American, former Wayne County Road Commissioner Michael Berry. Flight schedules and ground traffic at the airport are managed by Hassan Makled, director of Airfield Operations, who, like Berry, is a member of the Islamic Center of America. All this coming and going is carefully monitored by Detroit and Wayne County Homeland Security Task Forces, both of which are led, in part, by Lebanese American law enforcement officers who are also Shi'a Muslims. These men are among more than sixty deputized Arab Americans in Wayne County alone, where Azzam Elder, a Palestinian American, was recently named deputy Wayne County executive and his wife, Charlene Makled Elder, a Lebanese American Muslim, now serves as a circuit court judge. The Elders are two of at least thirty-six Arab Americans in Michigan to hold political appointments, and the state is home to at least twenty-three Arab American judges and elected officials. This list, with its perhaps surprising inclusion of Arab Americans who work for Homeland Security task forces, is perfectly mundane in Detroit. It does not include the much larger number of Arab Americans who sit on the boards of local hospitals and the United Way, serve as regents of state universities, or are active participants in the local ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), UAW (United Auto Workers), Civil Rights Board, or many of the state’s important nonprofit organizations. Although no other state can rival Michigan’s high number of Arab public servants, similar patterns of community service by Arab Americans can be found across the United States.

Clearly, Detroit is quite unlike Arab America as a whole. It is more recently arrived, more bilingual, more Muslim, less well educated, has a higher percentage of economically marginal households, is home to the largest, most visible Arab American enclave, and its members have a higher level of representation in municipal, county, and state government. In the words of Ismael Ahmed, former director of ACCESS, “Michigan can and should be a model of political participation” (2006, 50), making it, in the words of another well-known Arab American activist, James Zogby, “our New York.” But do these differences make Detroit exceptional to Arab America in other ways as well? Given,
for instance, that many of Detroit's distinctive demographic features are associated nationally with increased vulnerability to hate crimes and discrimination, it should follow that Arab Detroiters were more vulnerable to the 9/11 backlash than other Arab Americans. We show, in the section that follows, that this was not the case. Likewise, we might assume that the federal crackdown on Arab and Muslim transnational networks, fueled in part by the PATRIOT Act (Howell and Shryock 2003), would have had a greater impact on Detroit's larger immigrant and Muslim population. Our findings do not contradict this assumption, but suggest that the impacts are ambiguous and difficult to assess.

BACKLASH PART 1: ARAB AMERICAN SECURITY

9/11 occurred on a Tuesday. By Wednesday we started receiving phone calls in our mosque, at our parochial school on Ford Road, threatening to come bomb our buildings, kill the school kids in retaliation for 9/11. I have to admit that I got a little scared myself. . . . That was Wednesday. We shut the school down in the middle of the day. . . . By Thursday morning, then Sheriff Robert Ficano became aware of the threats that were being made to the most visible place probably in the country—Arab American Dearborn. . . . ACCESS started getting phone calls making threats, the mosques did, several of the mosques, some of the other organizations. You know the temperament of the country was—you had to take them seriously. . . . So Ficano and myself and a few other Arab officers got together and we called a meeting of the imams of all of the mosques in Dearborn and some of the surrounding mosques that border Dearborn in Detroit. . . . Ficano offered to set up protection for the mosques for the prayer that was coming up on Friday, the next day, and it was agreed. What we did is we went out and sought volunteers from the sheriff's department who would work a few hours every Friday, beside their regular shift, at the various mosques. We did that and we were able to put at least two police officers at every mosque in Dearborn for the Friday prayer and every mosque that requested it. (Ronald Amen, former Wayne County deputy sheriff, interview, January 8, 2005)

When we examine the post 9/11 backlash data from the DAAS and national studies we find stark contrasts between Detroit and Arab America as a whole, contrasts that suggest the efforts of Ron Amen, Robert Ficano, and thousands of concerned and well-placed citizens like them did indeed make a tremendous difference throughout the Detroit area. The percentage of DAAS respondents who reported having a bad experience after the 9/11 attacks because of their race or ethnicity was 15 percent, significantly less than the 25 percent reported in a national Zogby poll (Arab American Institute 2002). The majority of these discriminatory acts (61 percent) involved verbal insults or threats. Some 43 percent of DAAS respondents reported worrying more about the future facing their families in the United States after the attacks, but this number is also significantly lower than the 66 percent who reported such worries nationwide. The gap between Arab Detroit and the rest of Arab America also extends to questions regarding willingness to exchange civil liberties for more security. By and large, the national Arab American community was much more likely (at 49 percent) to selectively forgo their civil liberties than Arabs in Detroit were (20 percent).

These numbers suggest that Detroit fared better after 9/11 than Arab America as a whole, a finding that alternately surprised, disturbed, and reassured the Arab Detroiters we shared it with, especially those who work in frontline occupations directly affected by the backlash and the war on terror. Rena Abbas-Chami, deputy director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in Michigan, reported that the number of discrimination complaints her office received skyrocketed from four to five a week to several hundred in September and October of 2001 (interview, February 7, 2005). ADC's staff was so overwhelmed they began referring their clients directly to their national office and to a hate crimes hotline they established with Wayne County immediately after the attacks. "Dearborn seemed to be the epicenter of the threats to avenge 9/11," reflected the former Wayne County deputy sheriff Ron Amen in an interview on January 8, 2005. Dearborn and Arab Detroit more generally were indeed vulnerable. The public visibility the community gained in the 1990s, when multicultural inclusion was the order of the day, now made Arab Americans feel exposed and prone to attack. Rumors flew about young men being dragged from their cars and beaten up on the outskirts of Dearborn. People stayed at home as much as they could. One Detroit Free Press story, which circulated nationally, claimed that Dearborn was placed under martial law (Niraj Warikoo, "Rumor Mill Spins Fast and Furious: Some Are Harassed," September 12, 2001, 12A). Law enforcement agencies in Michigan were also concerned about the vulnerability of Arab Americans and responded, especially in Dearborn and Wayne County, with unprecedented patrols of Arab American neighborhoods, business districts, and houses of worship to provide a sense of security and calm (Thacher 2005).
Likewise, the number of DAAS respondents who reported gestures of kindness from non-Arabs after the attacks was twice as high (33 percent) as those who reported discrimination (15 percent). This informal support was matched by local officials, corporate leaders, educators, and other opinion makers. Imad Hamad, director of ADC-Michigan, found himself meeting with Dearborn Mayor Mike Guido and Chief of Police Greg Guibord just before noon on September 11 to discuss the possibility of a backlash and how best to thwart troublemakers while reassuring the community at large (interview, April 31, 2005). These local policing efforts were highly successful, with only two hate crimes reported in Dearborn (with a population of roughly 34,000 Arabs) in 2001 and 2002. Human Rights Watch call these local campaigns exemplary and has since encouraged other cities to follow Dearborn’s lead (Singh 2002). It seemed as though every elected official in the state issued a statement about tolerance. The breadth and depth of public support shown to Arab Detroit went a long way toward making Dearborn residents feel, in the words of Maysoun Khatib, a Michigan Civil Rights Commission program officer, that the city were an “invisibility cloak” protecting it from hostility and attack (interview, February 19, 2005). “People know us,” explained attorney Bill Swor. “My intuition, my experience tells me that because the Arab community in Detroit has been here 100 years, 120 years, has been a greater part of the fabric of the city for a longer period of time and is integrated in the [local] infrastructure . . . then I guess you buy the good as well as the bad and it is harder, even if you don’t like the guy, it is harder to be overtly hostile” (interview, November 9, 2004).

By examining which parts of Detroit’s Arab community were most vulnerable after the attacks, and which witnessed the greatest solidarity from non-Arabs, we can illustrate how the public outpouring of support for Arab Detroiters after 9/11 helped ensure the security of this population. Nationally, it was immigrants and Muslims who reported the largest percentages of bad experiences after the attacks (immigrants 29 percent and Muslims 42 percent), or those with a poor command of English (Zogby International 2002). In Detroit, however, despite its unusually large percentage of foreign-born and Muslim Arabs, the numbers look very different. Not only was the overall backlash in Detroit less severe, but Michigan’s most vulnerable populations fared better than their counterparts in other states (on vulnerable Arab populations in California and Illinois, see especially Naber 2006; Cainkar 2006). Foreign-born Arabs in Detroit reported fewer bad experiences (14 percent) than their U.S.-born counterparts (19 percent) (see figure 3.1).

Likewise, the percentage of negative experiences reported by Muslims, 20 percent, though higher than those reported by Arab Christians (13 percent) is less than half of those reported nationwide, 42 percent (Muslim) and 16 percent (Christian) (DAAS 2003, Zogby International 2002). And, in an unusual turn of events, the more fluent in English DAAS respondents were, the more likely they were after the attacks to report having had a bad experience related to their race or ethnicity (see figure 3.2).

Similarly, although Muslims in Detroit (71 percent) and elsewhere (82 percent) report greater worries about their future in the United States than Christian Arabs (39 percent in Detroit and 57 percent nationally), Michigan Arab populations overall report significantly less (43 percent) than the national average (66 percent). Christians nationally (58 percent) and in Detroit (30 percent) were more willing to trade civil liberties for security than Muslims were, presumably because they did not feel as implicated in the 9/11 attacks (see chapter 7). Detroit Muslims, however, were significantly less likely (6 percent) to accept this compromise than Muslims nationwide (35 percent). Finally, although the percentage of foreign-born Arab Detroiters (55 percent) who worry about their future is greater than that of the American-born (46 percent),
this percentage is still significantly lower than national figures. Only 19 percent of Detroit's foreign-born Arab population was willing to trade civil liberties for security, less than half the national average of 51 percent (DAAS 2003, Zogby International 2002).

DAAS findings suggest that participation in ethnic associations correlates directly to greater empowerment among Arab Detroiters. Of DAAS respondents, 39 percent report being involved in an Arab ethnic association, including advocacy groups like ADC, the Yemeni Benevolent Association, or the Chaldean Federation. These organizations act as gateways to a larger political world, linking local residents to mainstream institutions at the local, regional, and national levels. Police departments, elected officials, service providers, churches, universities, marketers, and many others go through Detroit's community organizations when hoping to reach local Arab Americans. Sometimes ethnic associations act as surrogates for the communities they represent, monopolizing contacts and resources, but they also act as conduits through which incorporation is pursued (Howell 2000; Jamal 2005; Shryock 2004). Among DAAS respondents, participation in ethnic associations is linked to both positive and negative post-9/11 outcomes. The 39 percent who reported participating in ethnic associations had different experiences than those who reported active membership (or regular attendance) in churches, mosques, or village clubs. For example, when compared to nonmembers, members of ethnic associations were 15 percent more likely to have reported experiencing an act of solidarity by a non-Arab after the 9/11 attacks (43 percent to 27 percent), less likely to express confidence in the federal government (43 percent to 59 percent), and less likely to think Arabs and Muslims accused of supporting terrorism could receive a fair trial (44 percent to 55 percent). Nonetheless, members of ethnic associations were also far more likely to contact a government official to express an opinion on a political issue (16 percent) than Arabs who do not belong to such groups (6 percent). Membership in an Arab ethnic association brings with it greater skepticism about the American political system. It also brings increased opportunity to engage, sometimes productively, with mainstream political institutions (see figure 3.3).
Overall, our data suggest that Arab Detroit weathered the post-9/11 backlash with fewer scars than the Arab American community nationwide and that Arab Detroiters, relative to their counterparts elsewhere, are more confident about their future in the United States and more assertive of their rights as citizens. These findings are most pronounced among those Arab populations—immigrants and Muslims—that are most vulnerable nationwide.

BACKLASH, PART 2: THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENDA

Everybody saw George Bush go to the mosque in Washington, D.C., and take his shoes off and enter the prayer room, the masjid area, as a show of solidarity with the Muslims in this country. And certainly, initially, we all thought that was a really good thing for him to have done and we appreciated that and really looked to him to defend our civil rights. And then it all appeared to be a dog and pony show. As the situation evolved a few weeks later we started to see Muslims and Arabs just disappearing from the country. Actually they were being arrested, incarcerated, held without charge, without contact, without an attorney, just kind of disappearing... And then, the infamous PATRIOT Act came into existence and we could actually see in black and white that all those things that George Bush said to us when he was running for office prior to 9/11, about how he was going to do away with profiling, about how he was going to do away with secret evidence, turned out to be a lie. Not only did he not do away with those things, he actually put his attack dog, John Ashcroft, in a position to strengthen those violations of our civil rights as Arab Americans, as Muslim Americans. (Ronald Amen, former Wayne County deputy sheriff, interview, January 8, 2005)

When Arab Detroiters talk about the impact of the 9/11 attacks, their greatest concern, echoing Ron Amen, is the erosion of their civil liberties and the profiling of their communities by law enforcement and the media. They speak of the silencing effect on those who want to criticize Israeli and U.S. policies in the Middle East. They worry about the constriction of economic and cultural flows that connect the United States and the Arab world, and the simultaneous expansion of U.S. military campaigns in the Muslim world. It is not always easy to see but, in Washington and in U.S. national media, Arab Americans are portrayed as potential threats to American security and as potential assets in the Bush administration’s campaign to reshape the Middle East and fight the war on terror (Hagopian 2003). This situation has yielded a heady mix of opportunity and constraint for Arab Americans, just as it has delivered an especially violent mix of opportunity and destruction to the Arab world. Nowhere in America has the two-edged nature of increased federal attention been more apparent than in Detroit’s well-established and recently arrived Arab communities. If Arab Detroit’s exceptional nature sheltered it from angry, intolerant individuals bent on revenge, did it also protect Arab Americans from ill-informed federal agents who saw culprits and conspirators around every corner? Did it situate Detroit’s Arab organizations to capitalize on new economic and cultural possibilities that followed (and were a part of) the backlash or did it force them to redirect their energies toward defensive educational and legal campaigns? Did it empower Arab Americans to influence policy on the national level now that many Arab ethnic associations were working closely with federal agencies? We next explore how Detroit has responded to what Hussein Ibish, former spokesperson for ADC, has described as the Bush administration’s message to Arab Americans: “Private citizens should not and cannot discriminate against Arabs and Muslims, but we [the federal government] can and will” (2003).

The Hunt for Terrorists in Detroit Courtrooms

In the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and local law enforcement agencies rounded up and detained without charge more than 1,100 Arab, South Asian, and Muslim men as part of Investigation NTBLO (which sought out individuals who were suspected, on the most speculative of evidence, of having pre-knowledge of the 9/11 attacks or planning additional terror attacks (U.S. Department of Justice 2003). For the most part, these men were held without charges and in complete secrecy, often in solitary confinement. More than half were eventually deported, though none have been linked, directly or indirectly, to the 9/11 conspiracy. As the investigations widened over several months, the numbers grew to more than 5,000 detained, 155 of them in Detroit (Cole 2003). Detroit may not have been the epicenter of the public backlash against Arabs and Muslims in the United States, but it was in many ways the epicenter of the Justice Department’s campaign to apprehend terror suspects and reassure the public that it was doing all it could to hunt down and prosecute those with terrorist ties. On the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, for example, Mark Corallo, a Justice Department
Spokesman in Washington, announced that the FBI office in Detroit had more than doubled in size, that their agents were receiving full cooperation from "wary community leaders acting as cultural guides into the local Arab world," and that the Detroit office was at the forefront of "the largest investigation in the history of the United States" (Tamar Audi, "Secret Sweep: Detroiters Caught in Widening Investigation," Detroit Free Press, November 12, 2002, 1A). This vast deployment of man hours and new powers of surveillance yielded not the terrorists Bush was hoping for, but a tripling of the arrest rate of local Arab and Muslim petty criminals and visa overstayers (Greg Krupa and John Bebow, "Immigration Crackdown Snare Arabs," Detroit News, November 3, 2003, 1A). As Detroit Attorney Bill Swor, who has worked on several prominent terrorism-related cases, pointed out to us, these investigations had a chilling effect on the community: "When every federal investigation involving an Arab, whether a citizen or a resident alien, is vetted through the terrorism unit . . . and every illegal act treated as a federal offense . . . and each case is charged at grotesque levels, finding the most serious charges we can bring, the community remains traumatized because the community knows that it is being not only watched, but targeted" (interview, November 9, 2004).

On September 17, 2001, five days after the attacks, the FBI raided a house in Detroit. They were looking for Nabil Almarabah, a noncitizen whose name had appeared on a pre-9/11 terrorism watch list. Almarabah was not in Detroit, but his four noncitizen housemates were each detained after a cache of false identity papers and other "suspicious" Arabic documents were found in their apartment. They were quickly dubbed an "operational combat sleeper cell" of "al-Qaida terrorists" by John Ashcroft, a label referenced frequently in news stories about Detroit for the next several years. Farouk Ali-Haimoud, Ahmed Hannan, Karim Koubriti, and Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi were eventually indicted on terrorism charges when a former housemate testified, in exchange for a plea bargain, that they had attempted to recruit him for a terrorist cell. Ali-Haimoud and Hannan were acquitted of terror-related charges in 2003, but a year later, to much public fanfare, Elmardoudi and Koubriti were convicted of conspiring to provide material support and resources to terrorists. The case was not yet closed, however. The convictions were overturned a few months later and the charges against both men were thrown out when the U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit was forced to admit that their former lead prosecutor, Richard Convertino, had withheld "impeachment and exculpatory material" from the defense (U.S. Attorney Stephen Murphy, personal communication, May 20, 2005). Convertino quickly resigned, but after three years of unprecedented investigative work and relentless international publicity, the government had failed to prove that anything remotely resembling a sleeper cell of al-Qaida terrorists had resided in Detroit. 12

A former Special Agent in Charge of the FBI in Michigan admitted that in 2001 and 2002, the Detroit FBI office strongly encouraged the public to volunteer terror-related tips, many of which proved to be misleading and to have been motivated by personal vendettas. "Terrorism is the hot button right now," said John Bell. "If you want to get law enforcement on someone, you accuse him of being a terrorist" (Bay Fang, "Under Scrutiny, Always," U.S. News and World Report, December 30, 2002, 26). Bill Swor described the resulting legal cases as both "frivolous and insidious, a waste of resources . . . a witch hunt" (personal communication, 2004). In its own defense, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit claims to "have had a number of other successful prosecutions that are aimed at disrupting terrorism that have not specifically charged crimes of terrorism, per se, but nonetheless, helped prevent terrorist attacks. These prosecutions generally fall into two categories: cases based on intelligence information, and cases that protect vulnerabilities in our homeland security" (Stephen Murphy, personal communication, 2005). When pressed for information on the number of such cases tried in Detroit, or anywhere else for that matter, local officials have been unwilling to provide further answers. The White House has been less cautious about reporting such numbers. In 2005 President Bush claimed that more than half of the 400 suspects against whom terrorism-related charges had been filed since 9/11 had been successfully convicted. His use of these numbers drew heavy criticism. On June 14, 2005, the Washington Post asserted that only 39 people, not 200, had been convicted of crimes related to terrorism or national security, and only a few of these cases involved plots against the United States. The overwhelming majority of cases involved convictions on minor crimes, such as making false statements or violating immigration law. The median sentence meted out regardless of the charges brought to trial was eleven months, a sentence that seemed unlikely to deter people genuinely involved in campaigns against the United States or its allies (Dan Eggn and Julia Tate, "In Terror Cases, Few Convictions," The Washington Post, June 12, 2005, A01). To date, six Arab Americans with ties to Detroit have been found guilty on charges related to providing material support for terrorism. All had connections to Hizbullah, not al-Qaida. 13
Although Arab Detroiters were relieved to see the sleeper cell convictions overturned, they are nonetheless alarmed by the prejudicial manner in which these cases and many others like them have been handled and by the inflammatory news coverage that accompanied each arrest and trial (Jamal 2004). The FBI's local antiterrorism unit, renamed the national security unit in 2006, continues to surface when Arab or Muslim Americans are under investigation for offenses unrelated to terrorism. In August of 2006, for example, five young men who were buying large quantities of discounted cell phones for resale in other markets were also accused of providing material support to terrorists. That all five were Arab Muslims did not go unnoticed by attorneys or the media. In one case, the men were in possession of photographs of the Mackinac Bridge. News headlines accused them of plotting to blow up the famous Michigan landmark. The other young men were found with a manual from Royal Jordanian Airlines in their car and, on the basis of this, were accused of plotting to infiltrate the airline, also for terror-related purposes. The manual, like the car, belonged to an employee of the airline, the mother of one of the accused. All charges against each of the five men were eventually dropped, but not before damming headlines, such as “2 Dearborn Men Linked to Terrorism” (Detroit Free Press, August 10, 2006) or “3 Arraigned on Terror Charges” (Detroit Free Press, August 13, 2006) had done their work. Local Arab and Muslim leaders in Detroit were furious with federal authorities for how the cases were handled and very publicly bungled, accusing law enforcement agents and those who reported on the young men as being equally guilty of racial profiling (see Detroit Free Press articles from August 10 to August 16, 2006).

These cases, based on the flimsiest of circumstantial evidence, have done little to strengthen public trust in federal agencies that now regularly justify their investigations, prosecutions, and deportations of Arab and Muslim defendants with intelligence reports that are not made public. The U.S. Attorney for Eastern Michigan, Stephen Murphy, admitted that “it would not be surprising to learn that the arrest rate of Arab Americans has increased since 9/11 in light of our investigative priorities” (personal communication, May 20, 2005). And, rather than tapering off over the years as investigations in Detroit have yielded scant return on the money and man hours invested, or as Congress and the Supreme Court have finally begun to challenge the Bush administration’s interpretations of First Amendment protections, homeland security and antiterrorism are considered among the few growth sectors in Michigan's rapidly shrinking economy. In 2006, shortly after the White House revealed its program of domestic surveillance and wiretapping operations, the FBI announced another doubling—the third since 9/11—of the number of their Michigan agents who are pursuing terror-related investigations. They also broke ground on a new facility in Detroit in 2007, planning to triple the square footage of their local office space and increase their security (Joe Swickard, “FBI to Have New Offices in Detroit,” Detroit Free Press, August 29, 2006, 1A). The U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit, likewise, added two attorneys to their terrorism unit in 2006 (Paul Eggnan, “Terror Unit to Boost Staffing,” Detroit News, March 21, 2006, 1B), and Governor Granholm has made attracting new homeland security jobs to the state a key anchor of the state's 21st Century Jobs Fund (State of Michigan 2006). The growth of this economic niche has Arab leaders in Detroit worried that federal agencies are interested in their communities only insofar as they are useful for “propaganda purposes,” military recruitment, and “spying” (Caroline Drees, “In Terror War, American ‘Outreach’ Has US Muslims Wary,” Reuters, May 2006).

**A Damper Against Discrimination?**

A tally of abuses meted out by government agencies against Arabs and Muslims and legal briefs filed in response would say little, however, about the larger transformations Arab institutions have undergone in reaction to the war on terror and the new political realities it has generated. It is often difficult to determine whether these changes are driven by rewards or punishments, by a sense of belonging or exclusion. Amid the profiling and attempts to marginalize Arab Americans as a political constituency that prevails at the national level, changes taking place on the ground in Michigan have often had positive effects, strengthening an Arab community that was already confident and well connected before September 2001.

Churches and mosques in Michigan, like those across the country, have made a concerted effort to welcome outsiders, hosting film crews, open houses, and ecumenical events. They have also strengthened their support for one another. Human service organizations like ACCESS and ACC have provided hundreds of cultural sensitivity workshops for journalists, law enforcement agencies, corporations, lawyers, and school districts. The list is long and impressive and includes training for State Department officials and the U.S. military. ADC-Michigan, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), and the Michigan Civil Rights Commission now provide regular workshops on civil rights issues of relevance to Arabs and other citizens. Although many of
Together with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, these otherwise local organizations hosted an event in 2003 called the U.S.-Arab Economic Forum. Intended to increase trade between the Arab Gulf states and Detroit, the event drew heavy criticism from local activists. "The feeling in the region that the United States is on a crusade against Arabs and against Islam is as bad as I have ever seen it," said Osama Siblani, publisher of the Arab-American News. "This is not the time to be having this summit. . . . Who in his right mind is going to come and invest from the Arab world when he knows if he comes here he's going to be stripped, searched and humiliated at the airport?" (Jennifer Brooks, "Division Cloud Promise Surrounding Arab Forum," Detroit News, September 26, 2003, 1A). Forum organizer Ahmed Chebani adamantly defended the project, arguing that "peace and prosperity go hand in hand. By using Arab-Americans as a business vehicle, we will establish a real, meaningful dialogue and create a basis for long-term dialogue" (Brooks 2003).

In a political climate where actual economic ties between everyday American citizens and their relatives and communities in the Middle East were being seriously curtailed and support for Islamic charities was dwindling due to U.S. seizures and political posturing (Howell and Shryock 2003), this optimism proved difficult to sustain. Even Wayne County Executive Robert Ficano could mention only another round of seven digit contributions to the Arab American National Museum, a division of ACCESS, as a tangible, realized benefit of this partnership (Haimour 2005). "We do not wish to judge others. We do not wish to preach to others. We certainly do not wish to coerce others. We wish to help others, and by so doing, help ourselves," said Colin Powell in his address to the forum (2003). Yet his speech also cautioned Arabs, both American and foreign, to check their criticisms of Israel and opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq at the door. If coercion does not account for this partnership, then the opportunism of community leaders offers little solace to those who are left on the margins of the post-9/11 boom in all things Arab American.

Just as Arab organizations have been met halfway in their educational and civil liberties campaigns by concerned foundations, corporations, public institutions, and government agencies, Arab Americans have also met federal law enforcement agencies halfway—some would say more than halfway—in their many investigations in the Arab American community. Within a week of September 11, 2001, more than 4,000 Arabs from Detroit called to volunteer their services to the FBI and CIA as translators of stockpiled communications intercepts ("Arabic Speakers Answer U.S. Need," Detroit Free Press,
September 19, 2001, 7A). Arab Americans were no less eager to catch genuine terror suspects than other Americans. They had a special interest and often specialized skills that could be of help in this regard. It was in this spirit that ADC-Michigan pulled together a coalition of fifteen Arab American organizations for monthly meetings with the regional leadership of the FBI, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and an additional dozen federal agencies after the 9/11 attacks. Imad Hamad, director of ADC-Michigan, and John Bell, then special-agent-in-charge of Detroit’s FBI office, had already worked together through the National Conference for Community and Justice. It was through this relationship that Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity (BRIDGES) was established as a forum for dialogue where “both sides” could communicate freely (Imad Hamad, personal communication, July 6, 2005).

The first major accomplishment of this task force was to create a series of best practice guidelines that the FBI in Michigan followed in November 2001 when it began questioning more than 500 of the state’s Arab and Muslim noncitizens as part of a national effort that included 7,600 noncitizens nationwide. ADC was able to monitor these investigations locally, both in 2001 and on the three subsequent occasions the FBI repeated the process, making pro bono attorneys available, providing a helpline for those with questions, ensuring that interviewees received advance letters to explain the program’s voluntary nature, providing translators, and insisting that federal agents not confront respondents at school or in the workplace. U.S. Attorney Stephen Murphy asserted that the process also enabled law enforcement to conduct these investigations without alienating the Arab community, and to be more efficient and effective by pairing federal agents with local law enforcement officers (John Bell, personal communication, July 9, 2005). Although the process was inherently discriminatory—profiling informants along religious and national lines—and the best practice guidelines were reached only after extensive and heated debate, the execution of these interviews in Michigan was significantly less disruptive of individual lives and community-law enforcement relations than elsewhere. In particular, Eastern Michigan was one of only four districts in which letters were uniformly mailed in advance to interviewees and one of only two districts in which the U.S. Department of Immigration and Naturalization was kept out of the interview process (Ramirez, O’Connell, and Zafar 2004, 24).

In 2005, several of the people we interviewed for this project were cautiously, if also strategically, optimistic about the benefits that flowed from the BRIDGES alliance, pointing to a sustained dialogue between the state and the community that enabled all parties to clarify legal, linguistic, and cultural matters in ways that improved the application of federal laws on the ground. Arab leaders argued that the process made the law enforcement community more accountable to Arab concerns, and law enforcement agreed, adding that it also brought greater trust and public support. Both sides recognized that the familiarity encouraged by an ongoing airing of principles, concerns, and grievances was able to produce better law enforcement and greater cooperation among those involved and provided a list of Arab Americans who sought and received assistance from law enforcement agencies. Several individuals, for example, had their names removed from federal no-fly lists, several hate crimes against Arab Americans were prosecuted with speed and efficiency, and a few federal detainees who posed no threat or flight risk were freed while their cases were pending trial (Imad Hamad and Stephen Murphy, personal communication, May 20, 2005).

Although some are encouraged to see Arab American complaints handled in this face-to-face terrain where justice can occasionally be facilitated, BRIDGES has not yet been able to challenge the status quo in which the presumption of innocence seems to have been reversed and due process is lacking for Arab and Muslim defendants. As time passes, the volatility of the BRIDGES alliance has made it less effective and less easy to sustain. Kenwah Dabaja, then Michigan field director of the Arab American Institute, described BRIDGES as too inconsistent in its efforts, meeting less and less frequently, often in reaction to the latest crisis (personal communication, 2007). Even when the group met according to schedule, outside events frequently sidetracked their discussions. In September 2006, for example, the head of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, Assistant U.S. Attorney Wan Kim, was scheduled to address BRIDGES members in a public forum. After he outlined the progress his department had made prosecuting hate crimes and other forms of discrimination against Arabs and Muslims since 9/11, the meeting was completely overrun by comments about the cell phone cases mentioned earlier and angry complaints about a raid on Life for Relief and Development (LIFE), an Islamic charity headquartered in the Detroit area that took place the day before the BRIDGES meeting and just before the onset of Ramadan. Daniel Roberts, special agent in charge of Detroit’s FBI office, argued that the raid had been timed to take place before rather than during this month of fasting and charitable giving to be “sensitive to community concerns.” LIFE was not closed down, nor were its assets frozen, but it took the FBI most of the month of Ramadan to issue a public statement to this effect. Dabaja summed up the
FBI's participation in the BRIDGES alliance saying, "I don't get the feeling they are listening" (Kenwah Dabaja, personal communication, May 19, 2007).\(^9\)

Despite these tensions, BRIDGES is now considered an ideal model of community-law enforcement relations by observers outside Michigan, and it is being replicated in other parts of the country (Ramirez, O'Connell, and Zafar 2004), a process that is supported by Arab American activists and by the Department of Justice alike. In a study of such community-law enforcement initiatives nationwide, the Soros Foundation attributes the success of BRIDGES to the remarkable degree of institutional incorporation the Arab community in Michigan has achieved. The BRIDGES story is the latest chapter in a long history of local activism in which Arab Americans have made political gains by working with city hall, as it were, while actively fighting against it (Ahmed 2006; Terry 1999). Imad Hamad lamented the fact that BRIDGES, though replicated in other locations, has met with only local success in eastern Michigan and has been able to intervene positively only on a case-by-case basis. "Of course, the dialogue needs to be with policy makers and not just those who implement policies," he argued. "For BRIDGES to make a difference outside Michigan, we need to communicate with those in D.C. and not only those who are in Detroit" (interview, July 6, 2005).

CONCLUSION

Imad Hamad's appeal was echoed by each of the Arab Americans we interviewed, who suggested that the federal government, especially the law enforcement agencies managing the state of exception created by our ongoing crisis, would benefit tremendously from the insight of Arab and Muslim professionals, not simply as translators, role-playing actors, field agents, or civil rights watchdogs, but as intelligence officers, presidential advisors, and policymakers.\(^{20}\) Arabs in Michigan have achieved genuine political incorporation. At the state level, they shape the way social services are delivered, health data is collected, automobiles are designed and manufactured, world music is packaged, homeland security measures are implemented, and gasoline, milk, and other goods are distributed and sold. As in other ethnic communities, most of this work is accomplished without reference to collective identities, and ethnic institutions stand by to carefully catalog and augment these efforts, ensuring that Arabs are a political constituency local governments must acknowledge and support. This process has been decades in the making, but the events that transpired on and after September 11, 2001, compelled officials to recognize that the fate of Michigan and of Dearborn in particular are intertwined now with the fate of their Arab citizens. This is why the public backlash in Michigan was significantly less severe than in other communities.

At the national level, Arabs have not achieved this sort of inclusion, and until they do, the exceptional privileges they have gained in Detroit will remain fragile. Arab leaders in Detroit are acutely aware of the limitations of this status, as is Imad Hamad, whose sensitivity to the difference between the local and the national is rooted in personal experience. In September 2003, the FBI in Washington sought to recognize Hamad's singular contribution to the BRIDGES effort by awarding him its highest civilian honor, the Exceptional Public Service award. Hamad soon found himself slandered by a national media campaign that described him as "a man who supports terrorism and was himself a suspected terrorist" (Schussel 2003). He was further humiliated when the FBI declined to award him the honor they had already announced to the media. As the public controversy around the award escalated, Arab American members of the BRIDGES alliance threatened to withdraw. Hamad was forced to defend his past, reassure the public that he is not a terrorist, and plead with BRIDGES partners to continue their collaboration with a government agency that was clearly ambivalent about Hamad and insensitive to the community he represents.\(^{21}\)

Awareness of the difference between local and national politics is keen among Detroit's Arab American institutions, each of which has found itself performing the defensive maneuvers described earlier—defending their pasts and promoting their institutional histories, investing vast resources in reassuring the public that they are not and do not support terrorists, and urging their constituents to not lose faith as they collaborate in increasingly complex ways with the FBI, CIA, Department of State, and other federal agencies that are interested in Arab Americans only as potential threats to U.S. security or potential allies in the U.S. war on terror. In Arab Detroit today, local social service providers, arts presenters, civil liberties advocates, and Muslim charities find themselves working closely with, and often accepting the patronage of, federal agencies that specialize in security issues, foreign and domestic espionage, criminal investigations, and other forms of governmental discipline and control. Occasionally, Arab American groups are enlisted, mostly as window dressing, in U.S. campaigns to transform the Middle East, economically, politically, and militarily.\(^{22}\) This work stands at a remove from the bread and butter efforts of Detroit's Arab ethnic associations to provide services and address
community needs, activities that have garnered them strong grassroots support. When Arab organizations are included in public diplomacy and community policing efforts but are not treated as full partners with a voice in setting agendas and negotiating strategies, they risk weakening their grassroots strength and eroding Arab confidence in American public institutions and government. The new status quo suggests that, at the national level, Arab Detroit is being reconfigured as a constituency defined not by its genuine integration with a city and its society, but by its imputed associations with foreignness and danger. If this odd feature of Arab Detroit's political incorporation continues to receive institutional support, it may produce tragic (and unintended) consequences for a community that has withstood the 9/11 backlash and now looks forward, longingly, to a more stable era of acceptance.

NOTES

1. An earlier, and lengthier, version of this chapter was published in Being and Belonging: Muslims in the United States Since 9/11, edited by Katherine Ewing and published by the Russell Sage Foundation in 2008.


3. Bill Swor, Rena Abbas-Chami, Maysoun Khatib, Ron Amen, and Imad Hamad participated in lengthy interviews with Sally Howell. Most of these conversations were recorded on tape. Several others, who prefer to remain anonymous, provided details and helped formulate the ideas in this paper. Barbara McQuaid, from the U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit, responded helpfully to an earlier draft of this paper. Steven Murphy, U.S. Attorney, Eastern Michigan region, and John Bell, former FBI Special Agent in Charge, Detroit, both replied in writing to questions we submitted to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit. We thank each of the individuals, named and unnamed, who contributed to this research and analysis.

4. Ismael Ahmed attributes the quote "Michigan is our New York" to James Zogby, adding that Arab Detroiters "can and should be a model of political participation" for Arab Americans nationwide (2006, 50).

5. The U.S. Census does not collect information on religion. The national breakdown cited here is drawn from surveys of Arab Americans conducted in 2000 and 2002 by Zogby International (see http://www.aaiusa.org/demographics and Zogby 2002).

6. Respondents were asked about the total family income for the respondent and all family members residing in the household.

7. Hassan Makled retired from his position at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport in 2006.

8. These numbers are the authors' calculation based initially on the Arab American Institute's 2007 "Roster of Arab Americans in Public Life" and updated as new appointments have been announced and approved. Ronald Amen provided the number of deputy sheriffs for Wayne County.

9. The DAAAS was conducted in 2003 and the Zogby International polls in 2002. It may appear that the Zogby poll numbers are higher than the DAAAS numbers because of the timing of these studies; however, hate crimes across the nation have been on the rise each year since 9/11, as reported by both ADC (2002, 2003) and CAIR (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006).

10. When Governor John Engler visited Arab American leaders in Dearborn on September 27, 2001, and assured them that "there is never any excuse for discrimination against anyone", the timing of his visit received local criticism, following, as it did, rather than preceding President Bush's visit with Arab American leaders in Washington ("Engler, Arab Americans Talk," Detroit Free Press, September 28, 2001, 3B).

11. This silencing effect predates the 9/11 attacks, but has become more pronounced since. It was especially apparent in the Detroit area during the 2006 Israeli-Hizbullah War when Arab American leaders were routinely described as Hizbullah supporters in the media and then dismissed. This smear campaign reached its peak when gubernatorial candidate Dick DeVos cancelled his planned appearance at an Arab American Political Action Committee (AAPAC) dinner in Dearborn after the editor of the Detroit Jewish News argued in an editorial that "no legitimate candidate for public office should go before the Dearborn-based [PAC] ... because its leadership has defended Hezbollah." (Robert Sklar, September 6, 2006, 7). The president of AAPAC was likewise introduced publicly by the head of Michigan's FBI Field Office, as a "supporter of Hezbollah" (Osama Siblani, personal communication, October 26, 2006).

12. Hannan and Koubriti were recently reindicted, this time on a charge of insurance fraud. The new case is pending.

13. The guilty pleas include U.S. v. Makki and U.S. v. Kourani. A third man, Nenr Ali Rahal, was arrested in May 2005 for raising $600 to support the families of suicide bombers connected to Hizbullah ("Dearborn Man to be Tried in Terror Case," The Detroit News, May 4, 2005, 3B). Finally, four men pleaded guilty in
Detroit in 2006 to a variety of racketeering and counterfeiting charges related to a money-making scheme intended to benefit Hezbullah—Youssef Bakri, Imad Hamadeh, Theodore Schenk and Karim Nasser. For many Lebanese and other Arabs, Hezbullah's status on the U.S. State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) is problematic. Hezbullah has had a violent past, but the organization's political party today plays a significant role in the Lebanese parliament and its social service arm has long aided the disenfranchised Shi'a of the South. Hezbullah is credited with forcing Israel, after a grueling twenty years, to end their occupation of South Lebanon, and with defending this same territory against the full force of an Israeli air, sea and land assault in 2006 (Deeb 2006). At a 2005 public forum in Dearborn, "Charitable Giving and Terrorism Sanctions," Chip Poncy, of the U.S. Treasury Department, warned Arab and Muslim Americans that they must regulate themselves to ensure that their charitable donations are not being routed to support terror. The audience objected to Hezbullah's inclusion on the FTO list along with other organizations that oppose Israel but are not seen as a threat to the United States or to American citizens.

14. This program was challenged in court by the ACLU of Michigan, with support from several of the Arab and Muslim organizations mentioned elsewhere in this paper. It was found unconstitutional in a Detroit courtroom ("Ruling on Wiretaps Faces Fierce Challenge," Detroit Free Press, August 18, 2006, 1A).

15. ADC Michigan and ACCESS, for example, joined the ACLU of Michigan in filing the first challenge to the USA PATRIOT Act in July of 2003 (ACLU Press Release, July 30, 2003) and have continued to advocate on behalf of local Arab and Muslim defendants in years since.

16. This exponential growth in mosque construction corresponds to a precipitous drop in the funds given to international Islamic charities. Six of the largest and best-known Islamic charities operating between the United States and the Muslim world have been closed and their assets have been frozen since September 2001 (David Ashenfelter and Joe Swickard, "Muslim Charity Suspect," New York Times, December 12, 2006, 24).

17. The FBI does not use volunteer labor. Between 2001 and 2005 the Detroit office of the FBI hired fifteen Arabic translators. Hundreds applied, but the hurdles to employment are many. The agency has no tests for competency in Arabic beyond their classical Arabic written exam (Laura Waters, Detroit FBI recruitment officer, personal communication, 2005). The Department of Homeland Security has also had a difficult time hiring and retaining Arab Americans in its Michigan offices, according to an anonymous former officer, although details have been impossible to track down. Independent security contractors have also sprung up in Michigan to handle work outsourced by federal agencies. They seem to have a better track record at hiring Arabic speakers. The former deputy director of ADC-Michigan, Rana Abbas, left her post in 2008 to become the co-director of one such private contractor, Global Linguistic Solutions.

18. For an excellent account of how the local and federal law enforcement purgings came about, how they were received by Arab activists, and the problematic role local police were able to play in this process, see also David Thacher (2005).

19. As of Ramadan 2007, six major Muslim charities in the United States have been closed and had their assets frozen, three from Michigan. Several others are under investigation. Very few charges have been levied against any of these agencies or their employees, and the evidence against them has not been shared with those under investigation. Muslim community leaders now assert that the Treasury Department is among the least forthcoming federal agencies, indicating the significance of this financial warfare to the operationalization of the war on terror (see Muslim Public Affairs Council 2007).

20. Iraqi Americans in the Detroit area are now regularly flown to U.S. military bases in several states to act the part of Iraqi insurgents, innocent civilians, and government ministers for military training exercises (see Associated Press story by John Milburn, October 15, 2007 or the New York Times story by Robert Worth, December 27, 2003).

21. Hamad's alleged crime was to support Palestinian nationalist aspirations—through legal channels—when he was not yet a citizen. Like the thousands of Arab and Muslim men who have been detained and deported since 9/11, Hamad's deportation proceedings and citizenship appeal dragged on for years, and the evidence used against him was kept secret for security reasons.

22. This trend has been especially pronounced in relation to the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq (see, for example, "Bush Shares Hopes for Iraqi Homeland," Detroit Free Press, April 29, 2003).

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