"The more the immigrants enter into the religious life of America, the better and quicker they become Americans," observed historian Philip Hitti in 1924 (121). He intended the statement as a criticism of the early Syrian immigrants to the United States, whose churches—Maronite, Melkite, and Orthodox—he feared were perpetuating sectarian conflicts among the immigrants and isolating them from other Americans. In Detroit and its suburbs today there are dozens of Arab churches and mosques. Chaldean, Maronite, and Melkite Catholics have their own congregations, as do Egyptian Copts and Syrian, Greek, and Antiochian Orthodox Christians. Among Muslims, the Sunni-Shi'a distinction is only the most obvious divide running through more than two dozen predominantly Arab mosques. The strength, diversity, and overall viability of these houses of worship have led today’s scholars to draw conclusions different from those of Hitti. Andrew Shryock and Nabeel Abraham, for example, argued that Detroit’s churches and mosques encourage immigrants and the American-born to interact with one another in a complex dynamic that serves to "mobilize immigrants, provide them with social services, and connect them to the political mainstream" (2000, 202). They take for granted the idea that American immigrant and ethnic communities are "entering the religious life of America" precisely by building religious institutions that are
Our findings suggest that the religious experiences of Arabs in greater Detroit exist somewhere between these two realities. Neither uniformly poor nor structurally marginal, two factors to which Andrew Fuligni (1998) and Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut (1996) attributed the isolation of some immigrant congregations, Arab Detroit’s houses of worship better resemble those described by Michael Foley and Dean Hoge (2007), Peggy Levitt (2007), and Stephen Warner and Judith Wittner (1998), for whom economic diversity and a mix of immigrant generations greatly enhances the social, economic, and political incorporation of worshippers. Concern about the religious participation and political incorporation of Arab Americans nonetheless remains, and focuses on two not unrelated questions. First, many scholars have argued that some of Detroit’s Christian churches, especially Maronite and Chaldean ones, have worked to isolate their congregations from Arabs and Arab identity, weakening the overall sense of ethnic cohesion and solidarity among Arab Americans (Sengstock 1999; Jones 2000; Ahdab-Ychia 1983) and thereby weakening the political empowerment of Arab Detroit as a whole. Second, since the 1980s, especially observers have suggested that several of Detroit’s Arab congregations, especially the mosques of recently arrived immigrants, are marginal for political or ideological reasons rather than (or in addition to) socioeconomic ones. Less is known about how sociopolitical conditions shape the incorporation of immigrants as religious communities, especially those from Arabic speaking countries.

Scholars have paid close attention to the role of religious institutions in the political mobilization of nonimmigrant citizens as well (Harris 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Wuthnow 1999). Sidney Verba, Kay Scholzman, and Henry Brady (1995) found that churchgoers are more likely to be engaged in political activities. Churches can potentially increase individual levels of civic skills, political efficacy, and political knowledge. “The acquisition of such civic skills,” they wrote, “is not a function of SES [socioeconomic status] but depends on the frequency of church attendance and denomination of the church one attends” (1995, 82). Some studies posit that instead of merely increasing levels of civic involvement, religious institutions can also serve as conduits for direct political mobilization. Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen argued that involvement “in organizations...promotes political participation by making people susceptible to mobilization. Politically, organization...
sensitive political contexts in which Arab American belonging is promoted and challenged. Although this challenge is deeply historical and has long targeted Muslim Americans more directly than Christians, its political ramifications have intensified since 9/11, affecting Arab Americans as a whole and accounting for much of the bifurcation of Muslim and Christian identities that is now visible in Detroit (see Hitti 1924; Naff 1985; Suleiman 2007).

Neoconservative commentators who make alarmist claims describing American mosques as sites of anti-American political and religious radicalization were, in the post-9/11 period, embraced by the Bush administration and other shapers of mainstream political thought; their influence in the mainstream media and within the homeland security establishment was also considerable (Horowitz 2004; Pipes 2003). Daniel Pipes went so far as to describe all forms of Muslim organizational life in the West as part of “lawful jihad,” asserting that by “working through the school system, the media, the religious organizations, the government, businesses and the like you can promote radical Islam” (Andrea Elliot, “Battle in Brooklyn,” New York Times, April 28, 2008, 1). Religiously oriented political activism can direct itself toward many opposing political ends both for mainstream American believers and among immigrant or other minority populations (Tamney 2007; Green 2007; Prashad 2000), a point Muslim critical theorists in the West are especially eager to illustrate (Majid 2007; Mamdani 2004), but in Pipes’s extremist perspective no Muslim American activity is palatable or beyond suspicion. In this state of hegemonic paranoia about Islam and Muslims, everyday practices like building mosques or meeting regularly for prayer are taken as insurgent acts rather than as steps taken toward religious and social incorporation.

Scholars working in multiethnic immigrant terrain argue, as did Peggy Levitt, that those “who care more about holy sites and shrines make different kinds of political choices than the person who puts the national flag first and foremost” (2004, 154). But Arab Americans—especially Muslims whose national belonging is challenged, even those who seek to engage in mainstream politics in its most nationalistic and flag-waving varieties, supporting “our troops” or raising funds for presidential candidates, for example—are often questioned about their sincerity or blocked from participation (Howell 2000b; Shryock 2002). Thus, for Arab Americans the links that exist between piety, congregational participation, religious and ethnic identification, and political incorporation are extremely consequential, precisely because they are also dichotomized, difficult to reconcile, and suspect (Joseph 1999; Naber 2005).

We argue in this chapter that the war on terror, by singling out Muslims and Muslim institutions as potential threats to national security, has intensified the distinction between Muslim and Christian Arabs in Detroit, where, in public contexts at least, some Christian populations tend to downplay the Arab content of their ethnic and ethnoreligious identities, and others continue to identify strongly as and with Arabs. Muslims, on the other hand, have found themselves and their mosques under intense public scrutiny; they have seen their religious charities shut down and fellow Muslims detained by law enforcement officers for simple religious observances, like praying in public. Muslim congregations, simply put, have fewer means by which to escape the stigma now associated with Arabness and Islam in America. For both populations, religious piety and congregational participation influence their social incorporation as American citizens, sometimes in contradictory ways. In the pages that follow, we explore the role churches and mosques play in the Americanization process and ask if it has become more difficult for Muslim Arabs to participate as citizens. We also consider how Arab Detroits, both Muslim and Christian, both observant and nonpracticing, participate in local houses of worship, asking, as Philip Hitti did several generations ago, whether this participation encourages or discourages their incorporation as cultural and political citizens of the United States.

**ROUTES TO INCORPORATION**

The Detroit area is home to several of America’s oldest Arab churches and mosques. It has long been at the fore of campaigns to foster public acceptance of Muslim and Eastern Christian religious traditions. The emigration of the first Christian Arabs to Detroit from the Ottoman province of Syria was set in motion in the late nineteenth century by their encounters with French and American missionaries active in the region. After arriving in the United States, these Arabic-speaking immigrants were able to worship in American churches decades before they built institutions of their own. Some of the first Maronite families to settle in Detroit, for example, joined Christ Church, an Episcopal congregation in the heart of the city. Many of their descendants worship there to this day. For the most part, however, Arabic-speaking Christians were quick to build their own churches. St. Maron’s Catholic Church (established 1916), St. George’s Antiochian Orthodox Church (established 1918), and Our Lady of Redemption Melkite Catholic Church (established 1929) kept Detroit’s Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian communities alive during the immigration
dry spell that extended from 1924 to 1965, Iraqi Chaldeans established their first parish, the Mother of God Church, in 1947. Today, the Detroit area is home to more than a dozen churches with Arabic and Aramaic-speaking congregations.

Muslim immigration to Michigan, by contrast, began to accelerate at the start of World War I, just as immigration to the United States was becoming more difficult. This pattern effectively held Muslim numbers below a few thousand until the 1960s (Naff 1985; Elkholy 1966). The smaller size of their communities made it difficult for Muslims to build viable religious institutions of their own. Their first effort, the Moslem Mosque of Highland Park, opened its doors to great fanfare in 1921. It was considered an exotic novelty by some, a beacon of Islam in the West by others. With no tradition of supporting a mosque independently and no precedent for resolving sectarian and ethnic disputes among worshippers of diverse origins (Syrian, South Asian, Turkish, and Albanian), the Highland Park mosque closed within a year. Sunni and Shi’a Arabs established separate institutions in Dearborn and Highland Park in the 1930s (Howell 2007a, 2007b). The largest mosques to emerge from these early efforts, the American Moslem Society (established 1938) and the Islamic Center of America (established 1961), have in recent decades become, once again, majority immigrant institutions. Radically altered and reinvigorated in the process, these mosques have given rise to more than a dozen rival and sibling institutions, many of which are now undergoing their own population shifts and ideological upheavals.

Both Christian and Muslim Arabs became religious outsiders when they arrived in the United States. Moving from a region with a Sunni Muslim majority to a nation-state in which Protestant Christianity was dominant, both traditions—Islam and Eastern Christianity—became minority traditions. Laurence Moore first used the term religious outsiders to illustrate how sectarian, minority, and immigrant traditions have challenged Protestant hegemony in the United States. The claim to outsider status on the part of any faith community, he argued, is simultaneously a demand for mainstream rights and acceptance (1986, 46). According to this logic, outsider status has not disempowered immigrants from Arab Muslim societies; rather, it has sharpened their attention to the dynamics of ethnoreligious solidarity and buffered them from the religious (and secular) mainstream. Despite the many factors that set Arab Muslims apart from Arab Christians, and distinguish both from other Americans, their churches and mosques have played a significant role in the creation of American citizens. By insisting on the right to practice Islam and Eastern Christian rites in the United States, by mirroring American Protestant styles of congregational worship and institutional organization, and by expanding the contexts in which non-Protestant and non-Christian religious practices are accommodated in the American public sphere, Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslims have contributed significantly to the religious pluralism of the United States.

This process has not unfolded in the same way, however, for Muslim and Christian Arabs. Arab-majority churches, both Catholic and Orthodox, made this journey, as Philip Kayal pointed out, in several stages: “Christians in the Middle East, it must be remembered, traditionally defined themselves as members of religious nations rather than citizens/members of secular states. Assimilation then would commence for them after a new identity emerged here which was recognizable to the host society” (1973, 111). Thus Arabic-speaking Christians had to accept a generic Syrian-Arab ethnoreligious identity that overlooked their historical and liturgical differences before they were able to acculturate as American Christians. They had to make similar accommodations within Catholicism by adapting Latin rites in the 1950s, and within Orthodoxy by joining with Greek and Russian patriarchates in the same period. In the 1950s, Arab Muslims established the Federation of Islamic Associations in the United States and Canada, a group that sought to represent and unify Muslims, of diverse national and theological origins, in a similar religious framework. Muslims were such a tiny minority until recent decades, however, that their visibility and influence were marginal. With practices that sometimes differ markedly from those of Christianity (such as Friday rather than Sunday collective worship, holidays that shift dates and even seasons with each calendar year, distinct fasting traditions, unique food and clothing traditions, and fixed times for multiple, distinctive, and very visible daily prayers), Muslims have faced many obstacles to the accommodation of their religious practices by mainstream institutions.

Today, Christian and Muslim Arabs in greater Detroit find their status as majority or minority traditions dramatically reversed relative to their status in the Middle East. More than half (58 percent) of Detroit’s Arabs are Christian, whereas in the Arab world less than 5 percent are. Proportions for sectarian affiliations are also reversed: 42 percent of Detroit’s Arabs are Catholic, whereas in the Arab world only a minority of the Christian population are. Orthodox Christians are the majority among Christians in the Arab world,
but make up only 13 percent of Detroit’s Arabs and only 23 percent of its Arab Christians. Similarly, the second largest sectarian population in Arab Detroit is Shi’a, at 23 percent, who make up more than half (56 percent) of Detroit’s Arab Muslim population. In the Arab world, only 15 percent of Muslims are Shi’a, and globally an even smaller percentage are. Sunni Muslims are by far the largest faith community in the Arab world, yet in the Detroit area they represent only 35 percent of Arab Muslims, and among Arab Americans as a whole, only 15 percent. As noted earlier, these populations also arrived in the United States at different times. Two-thirds of Catholics arrived in the United States before 1979 or are the children and grandchildren of immigrants. Two-thirds of Detroit’s Shi’a, by contrast, immigrated after 1979, and only 18 percent are second-or third-generation Americans. Orthodox Christians made up a solid 33 percent of the migration before 1970, but by the 1990s were less than 10 percent. Of Detroit’s Muslim population, only 13 percent were part of the pre-1970 migration (6 percent were Sunni). Of immigrants arriving after 1995, 32 percent are Sunni.

Denominational and sectarian populations are also divided along national lines. Seventy percent of Catholics are Iraqi Chaldeans, the majority of whom arrived in Michigan between 1970 and 1995. Twenty percent are of Lebanese/Syrian origin and are largely of the second and third generation. Only 30 percent of Lebanese Catholics are immigrants. Muslims, again, are more recent immigrants. Half of the Sunnis are Yemenis whose migration has gradually increased since the 1970s. Twenty percent of the Sunni population and the vast majority, 80 percent, of Shi’a are Lebanese immigrants, many of whom came in the 1980s in response to the Lebanese civil war and Israel’s 1978 and 1982 invasions of Lebanon and subsequent occupation of the south. A quarter of the Lebanese Shi’a, however, have arrived in the past fifteen years. The other Shi’a are Iraqis, almost all of whom came in the 1990s after the first Gulf War.

Given that Arab Christians have been in Detroit longer, they tend also to be wealthier, better educated, and more integrated into the American middle class than Arab Muslims. One-third of Muslims have not graduated from high school, and Muslims are less likely to have college education than Christians. Muslims are twice as likely, at 34 percent, to have an annual household income of less than $20,000. Thirty-eight percent have incomes of $50,000 or more, which is comparable to the national Muslim average of 41 percent. Detroit’s Muslims, however, are unlike Muslim Americans as a whole, who have much higher education (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2007). The majority of Christian households, in contrast, earn $50,000 or more. Seventy-nine percent of Muslims live in or near Dearborn or Detroit, which are both home to large Arab enclaves. The city of Dearborn, in particular, with a population of 99,000, is now 35 percent Arab American (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007). Christians, however, are spread fairly evenly throughout the western, eastern, and northern suburbs of Detroit.

Both Christian and Muslim Arab communities are deeply aware that life in the United States makes new identities for them possible and that these new identities need not be strictly religious. Chaldeans, for example, who are a small Catholic minority in Iraq, have been alternately persecuted and protected by the Iraqi government. With a cultural heritage that predates Islam and a language (Aramaic) that ties them to the earliest Christian communities, Chaldeans are free to reject Arab identity once they settle in the United States, where Arabness is often stigmatized rather than privileged. As a result, Chaldean ethnonationalism is thriving in southeast Michigan, a trend that has produced a Chaldean ethnicity unique to Michigan that is both part of and opposed to the sociopolitical dynamics of the region’s Muslim and (non-Chaldean) Christian Arab communities (Sengstock 1999). One question we are interested in concerns whether Chaldean rite churches actively promote this dynamic.

Arab Christian identities in the United States are not always antithetical to Arab nationalism. Orthodox Christians tend to be proud of their status as Arabs. In the DAAS survey, 84 percent of Orthodox Christians identified as Arab American, compared to 54 percent of other Arab Christians. Palestinians in particular, who have a history of colonization, discrimination, and occupation different from that of Iraqis, do not dispute the Arabness of their identities. Local churches where Palestinians predominate, including a Lutheran congregation in Dearborn, are adamantly nationalist on questions of Palestinian statehood. In addition, they provide excellent Arabic language classes for their children, something most Arab-majority churches (and many mosques) in Detroit have long forgone. Do these churches then actively promote Arab solidarity to any measurable extent?

Among Muslims, these processes have evolved differently. A relatively small and isolated population until the 1970s, Arab American Muslims have embraced Islam and their Arab ethnicity interchangeably (82 percent of Muslims in the DAAS population embrace the term Arab American). The Islamic revivalism that began in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the 1970s played a pivotal role
in reconfiguring how Americans, including Muslim Americans, came to view Islam and its place in North American society. The early Muslim immigrants had worried primarily about the loss of their children to Christianity. They were less concerned about the inherent compatibility of Islam with American values, institutions, foreign policies, or social mores (Assey 1978; Maldini 1959; Wolf 1960). For immigrants who arrived after 1970, however, the compatibility of Islam and American culture has been a pressing issue (Bukhari et al. 2004; Leonard 2003). This issue was made more urgent by the presence of ethnic Arabs who had, over several decades, become American Muslims. To newly arrived immigrants, the approaches to Islamic practice favored by Americanized Muslims appeared lax at best and often seemed deviant or heretical (Abraham 2000).

Today, as in the early decades of the twentieth century, Arab Muslims in Detroit are the largest and most visible population of Muslims in a faith community that also includes Africans, African Americans, Bosnians, Albanians, Turks, and South Asians (Bagby 2004; Howell 2007b). Arab Muslims find themselves asking and answering questions about Islam and American life within this larger, multicultural Islamic context, an environment that is often as vexed about Arab nationalism and ethnicity as the larger society is. With the intensification of U.S. diplomatic and military involvement in the Middle East in recent decades, the repercussions of publicly identifying as Arab or Muslim in America have shifted in ways both subtle and obvious. Islam has come to represent not simply the exotic and new but something far more ominous in the collective imagination of Americans (Naber 2008; McAlister 2001; Said 2000; Suleiman 1992). Especially since the 9/11 attacks, the suspicion and stereotyping faced by Arabs have been directed most intensely at Islam and Muslims. Heightened terror alerts and inflammatory news stories that focus on Muslims as a potential threat dominate the popular media.

In the United States and the Arab world alike, many people now believe that a clash of civilizations is occurring (see chapter 8, this volume), rather than a conventional geopolitical struggle over resources, rights, and political power (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006). Thus the 9/11 attackers are widely seen as representing Islam, and U.S. and British ground forces fighting Islamic insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are seen as representing Christianity or the West. In this new geopolitical space, Muslim Americans, like Muslims in Europe, are a social anomaly (Cesari 2004; Dudziak 2003; Modood 2005). They are also subject, much more so than Arab Christians, to special invest-

In 2005, for example, the FBI announced that it had driven specially-equipped radiation detection vehicles by Detroit mosques (Niraj Warikoo, "Nuclear Search Targets Muslims," Detroit Free Press, December 24, 2005). They made no similar claim about local Arab churches. In this climate, belonging to an outsider faith tradition has taken on new meanings that weigh heavily on Muslim American congregations, especially Arab ones. Although Arab Christians might argue that their congregations moved beyond their outsider status a generation or more in the past—sentiments our findings both support and contradict—few Arab Muslims would argue the same.

**RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND CHURCH OR MOSQUE ATTENDANCE**

Turning our attention to the DAAS findings, we now examine how religious piety and congregational participation affect the political engagement of Arab Americans, their sense of belonging and discrimination, and their identification as ethnic or religious Americans. To guide our understanding of why people participate in religious institutions and how seriously they draw on the lessons taught there, we created a religious commitment (piety) scale that includes three items: praying daily, frequent study of scripture, and tithing or paying zakat. Those who value all three practices we refer to as having a high level of piety or religious commitment; those who value one or two of them we describe as having medium commitment; and those who do not value any of them we refer to as having low commitment or as being more secular. We also looked at frequency of church or mosque attendance for purposes other than weddings or funerals. Among Arab Detroiters, levels of piety and church or mosque attendance vary significantly by sectarian affiliation and ethnonational background. Before attempting a detailed analysis of these variations and their effects on political incorporation, we first look at more general patterns in the data.

More than one-third of Christians (38 percent) express a high level of personal commitment to their faith, valuing daily prayer, studying the bible, and tithing to their churches. As the regression on table 4.1 shows, those with high commitment are more likely to be women, to be more recently arrived immigrants, and to have less formal education than other Christians. Conversely, those with low commitment (12 percent of Christians) are better educated and have higher income than those with high or medium commitment (50 percent). Younger Christians and those who have been in the United States longer tend to be more secular and to show less commitment. Those who were born
Table 4.1 Religious Attendance and Religious Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attend Religious Institutions (Christians)</th>
<th>Attend Religious Institutions (Muslims)</th>
<th>Religious Commitment (Low-High) (Christians)</th>
<th>Religious Commitment (Low-High) (Muslims)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-0.348** (0.131)</td>
<td>0.534*** (0.164)</td>
<td>0.171** (0.069)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.059)</td>
<td>-0.045 (0.070)</td>
<td>-0.026 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.025 (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.102 (0.090)</td>
<td>-0.033 (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant cohort</td>
<td>-0.046 (0.105)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.134)</td>
<td>0.154** (0.060)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>-0.451* (0.219)</td>
<td>0.272 (0.203)</td>
<td>0.064 (0.133)</td>
<td>-0.168 (0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.595*** (0.390)</td>
<td>-3.036*** (0.459)</td>
<td>-0.957*** (0.229)</td>
<td>-1.400*** (0.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R²</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Detroit Arab American Study 2003.
Note: Parentheses contain standard errors.

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.

in the United States, however, are more likely to be in both the highest and lowest commitment categories, a pattern found among immigrant populations generally (Levitt 2004; Warner and Wittner 1998). Lebanese and Syrian Christians are more likely to be in the secular category than others, whereas Iraqis, especially Iraqi Chaldeans, tend more toward the high commitment category, perhaps because their populations are somewhat more recently arrived than Syrian and Lebanese Christian populations are.

In terms of church attendance, 48 percent of Christians attend church almost every week or more than once a week, and those who are most committed to practicing their faith are also more likely to be in this high attendance category. Christians in the most secular category tend to attend church a few times a year or less often than that. Church attendance in general, however, is not linked solely to piety among Christians. The least educated attend the most frequently, and attendance tapers off with higher education. Older adults attend church much more frequently than young adults, and more recently arrived immigrants attend more frequently than those who have been in the United States longer. Recent immigrants attend much more frequently than those who were born here, with Lebanese and Syrians somewhat more likely to attend than others. Chaldeans, despite their high commitment, and Palestinians are the least likely to attend church frequently. When we break this down according to denomination, Catholics and Orthodox express similar patterns in terms of both personal commitment and frequency of church attendance.

Personal religious commitment and frequent mosque attendance work very differently for Arab Muslims than they do for Arab Christians. A larger percentage of Christians (48 percent) attend church frequently than Muslims attend mosque (26 percent), whereas Muslims are more likely to express high personal commitment to their faith (52 percent high, 38 percent medium, and 10 percent low).

Muslims in the highest personal commitment category are found across the demographic spectrum, with gender contributing more than any other single factor to the extent of individual piety. Roughly half of both men and women are highly committed, but women by a margin of 10 percentage points are more likely than men to be less committed. Additionally, those with high personal commitment are found in the income extremes, but those who are more secular are found more in higher income brackets. Younger Muslims are much more likely than others to express high personal commitment to Islamic practices, and young adult Christians are more likely to be secular, both findings that mirror national patterns (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2007). The most recently arrived and those born in Palestine and Yemen are also more likely to be in the high commitment category. Iraqis are not more likely to be highly committed, but they are least likely to be secular.

In terms of mosque attendance, women are more likely to be in the highest attendance categories, a pattern that defies expectations, given that participation in congregational prayers is considered more of an obligation for men than for women and that many of Detroit’s mosques do not accommodate women as readily as they do men. Wealthier Muslims are also more likely to attend religious services frequently, and those with the lowest incomes are more likely
to attend infrequently if at all. Young adult Muslims attend more frequently than their elders, just as they show higher levels of commitment. Those born in the United States are also more likely to attend frequently, as are Yemeni Americans. Lebanese and Syrian Muslims are less likely to do so, but Iraqis, who have arrived more recently and who have fewer and less well-established mosques, also attend much less frequently than other Muslims. Sunnis are much more likely to attend mosque services frequently and to be in the high commitment category than their Shia counterparts, a finding confirmed by historical studies of Arab Detroit (Elkholy 1966; Wasfi 1971) and by national findings among Muslim Americans (Bagby 2004; Pew 2007). Unlike their Christian coethnics, Muslims in the most secular category of our scale rarely attend religious services, and those with a high level of religious commitment attend much more frequently. In other words, Muslim attendance at religious services is much more directly related to individual piety and less to social or other factors than church attendance is for Arab Christians (see table 4.1).

How Religious Commitment and Church or Mosque Attendance Matter

We now pay closer attention to how religious commitment and church attendance affect political participation, ethnic identity, and perceived levels of discrimination among Arab Detroiters. Does attending a church or mosque encourage people to identify as Arab American? Are the secular or the pious more likely to participate in political protests? Does either piety or attendance contribute to one’s sense that Arab Americans or Islam are treated unfairly in the media? We explore these questions using four indicators of political participation: voting, contacting a public official to express a political opinion, participating in a social or political demonstration (in the past year), and contributing financially in support of a political candidate to measure our first set of dependent variables. For Christians, neither religiosity nor church attendance systematically explains greater levels of political participation. Those with stronger religious commitment are more likely to have made contributions to a political candidate. The most systematic factors explaining greater levels of political participation among both Christians and Muslims are education, citizenship, and time in the United States. Those who are more educated, are U.S. citizens, and have lived in the United States longer are more likely to be politically active, regardless of how frequently they attend religious services. More frequent mosque attendance and a high religious commitment among Muslims also encourage political protesting and petitioning, activities that bespeak Muslim frustration with the political system rather than, or in addition to, their active engagement as citizens. This is especially true of both high commitment and more secular Muslims. Those with less religious commitment also vote more frequently when they regularly attend mosques (see tables 4.2 and 4.3).

To look at religious and ethnic identity, our second set of dependent variables, we constructed two indices. The first measured religious identity and the second Arab American ethnicity. Each is constructed using three questions. For religious identity, we included three statements: “I identify with other Muslim/Christian Americans”; “being Muslim/Christian American is a major factor in my social relations”; and “for others to know me as I really am, it is important for them to know that I am Muslim/Christian American.”

Table 4.2 Political Participation Among Christians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Petition</th>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>Contribute</th>
<th>Written</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attendance</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.547**</td>
<td>0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.548**</td>
<td>0.450**</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.390***</td>
<td>0.573**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.427***</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.779***</td>
<td>0.359**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>-0.656**</td>
<td>-1.355**</td>
<td>-0.588</td>
<td>-0.808***</td>
<td>-1.090**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cohort</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>3.512***</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.029)</td>
<td>(0.654)</td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
<td>(1.092)</td>
<td>(1.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.176)</td>
<td>(0.982)</td>
<td>(1.961)</td>
<td>(1.630)</td>
<td>(1.303)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations   | 479      | 481      | 481     | 481        | 481     |

Source: Detroit Arab American Study 2003.
Note: Parentheses contain standard errors.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
of ethnic identity, we first ask if the term Arab American describes the person. If the answer was yes, we asked if the person agreed with the following statements: "I identify with other Arab Americans"; "being Arab American is a major factor in my social relations"; and "for others to know me as I really am, it is important for them to know that I am Arab American." The question about strength of identification as Arab American was not asked of those who do not identify this way (30 percent). Christians with a high level of religious commitment and those who attend church frequently are much more likely to identify as Christian Americans and to identify strongly with other Christians. The same is true of Muslims who are highly committed and attend mosque frequently. They are more likely to identify as and with Muslim Americans. Contrary to expectation, however, strong religious commitment and frequent church attendance have little bearing on Christian identification with Arab American ethnicity. Pious, mosque-attending Muslims, by contrast, are much more likely to identify strongly as and with Arab Americans. Religiosity among Muslims reinforces Arab American and religious identities simultaneously, but among Christians religiosity and church attendance have mixed consequences for Arab American identification (see table 4.4).
Additionally, we look at how religious commitment and church attendance structure attitudes about discrimination, tapping four dependent variables. One asks whether respondents worry more about their futures in the United States since the attacks of 9/11. One asks whether Muslims and Arabs can obtain a fair trial in the United States since the attacks. The final two ask if the media is biased against Arab Americans, or against Islam and Muslim Americans. Among Christians, church attendance correlates with less worry about the future. In general, neither church attendance nor religious commitment contributes to increased concern about Arabs or Muslims obtaining a fair trial in the United States, except among moderately committed Christians for whom frequent church attendance encourages the perception of media bias against both the Arab community as a whole and Muslims and Islam in particular. Among Muslims, those with a high religious commitment worry more about their future in the United States and are more likely to believe that Muslims and Arabs cannot obtain fair trials. Even controlling for mosque attendance, we find that higher religious commitment contributes to a strong perception of discrimination among Muslims. In other words, mosque attendance may provide Muslims with increased opportunities to express frustration over discrimination or unpopular political policies, but this frustration tracks more to religious piety than to mosque attendance or worship. Arab Muslims in Detroit found the post-9/11 American political climate hostile to Islam and to Muslims, and the more committed they were to the practice of their religious beliefs, the more likely they were to perceive this hostility (see tables 4.5 and 4.6).

ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN DISTINCTIVENESS
It is easy to assume that Arab Christians and Arab Muslims represent unified blocs, when in fact they vary internally in systematic and often contradictory ways. Among Catholics, for example, those who attend church more often are also more likely to vote, and high commitment Orthodox are more likely to have contributed to a political campaign. Among both Catholics and Orthodox, piety and frequent church attendance encourage stronger identification as Christians, but have little bearing on Arab American ethnic identification. High commitment Orthodox are more likely than high commitment Catholics to worry about their futures in the United States, perhaps because the Orthodox feel more distant from the religious mainstream. Orthodox Christians are also much more likely than Catholics to identify as Arab Americans, a pattern that may contribute to their heightened sense of vulnerability.

| Table 4.5 Worry, Discrimination, and Bias Among Christians |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                  | Worry | Fair Trial | Media Bias Against Arabs | Media Bias Against Muslims |
| Church attendance | 0.208** | 0.075 | 0.139 | 0.239*** |
| Religious commitment | 0.191 | 0.254 | 0.119 | 0.101 |
| Gender (female) | 0.351 | -0.403 | 0.403 | -0.081 |
| Education | -0.134 | -0.021 | 0.135 | -0.009 |
| Income | -0.015 | -0.038 | 0.314*** | 0.141 |
| Immigrant cohort | 0.159 | 0.291 | -0.512** | -0.676*** |
| Citizen | -0.198 | 0.307 | -0.093 | 0.032 |
| Constant | -1.363 | -0.041 | -2.616*** | -0.769 |
| Observations | 377 | 455 | 471 | 456 |

Source: Detroit Arab American Study 2003.
Note: Parentheses contain standard errors.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.

Chaldeans with a high commitment to their faith are more likely to write letters to their representatives, but not to engage in other forms of political behavior. For them, strong religious commitment contributes to the strength of their identification as Christians, but piety does not in itself discourage their identification as Arab Americans. Frequent church attendance also has little bearing on their political incorporation, though education and income do. Higher income Chaldeans are more likely to find the media biased against Arab Americans. Chaldeans who have been in the United States longer participate more in the political process, but are less likely to identify as Arab Americans, a point that backs up our earlier assertion that Chaldean distinctiveness from other Arabs is nurtured in Detroit, though not, as we had expected, by participation in Chaldean rite churches.
Table 4.6 Worry, Discrimination, and Bias Among Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Worry</th>
<th>Fair Trial</th>
<th>Media Bias Against Arab Americans</th>
<th>Media Bias Against Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mosque attendance</td>
<td>0.024 (0.131)</td>
<td>0.023 (0.107)</td>
<td>-0.236* (0.103)</td>
<td>-0.181 (0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious commitment</td>
<td>1.017*** (0.270)</td>
<td>-0.375 (0.219)</td>
<td>0.142 (0.208)</td>
<td>0.556** (0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.553 (0.314)</td>
<td>-0.483 (0.265)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.272)</td>
<td>0.511 (0.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.466*** (0.152)</td>
<td>-0.328*** (0.117)</td>
<td>0.484*** (0.112)</td>
<td>0.593*** (0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.326 (0.207)</td>
<td>-0.564*** (0.158)</td>
<td>0.322** (0.137)</td>
<td>0.516*** (0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant cohort</td>
<td>0.377 (0.286)</td>
<td>-0.512** (0.236)</td>
<td>-0.307 (0.233)</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>0.319 (0.382)</td>
<td>0.293 (0.328)</td>
<td>-0.293 (0.326)</td>
<td>-0.497 (0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.773*** (1.157)</td>
<td>3.421*** (0.985)</td>
<td>-0.788 (0.894)</td>
<td>-2.321*** (0.960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Detroit Arab American Study 2003.
Note: Parentheses contain standard errors.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.

Lebanese and Syrian Christians, on the other hand, are more likely to contribute to political campaigns when they have a high commitment to their faith. Those who attend church more frequently vote in higher percentages than others. High religious commitment also encourages strong Christian identification. Church attendance, however, discourages concern about Arabs receiving a fair trial in the United States. Thus we see that, among Lebanese and Syrian Christians, churches can indeed act as a slight wedge between Christian and Muslim concerns, whereas among Palestinian Christians no such effect is present. Palestinian Christians look like Christians as a whole on the question of political incorporation. Education, income, and time in America—rather than personal religious commitment or church attendance—drive political participation.

Given that Arab Christians are much less likely than Muslims to be immigrants, especially recently arrived immigrants, their churches do not play an active role in inhibiting their political incorporation, as Philip Hitti once feared. Where church attendance does play a role in incorporation, it correlates always to increased activity, especially among Catholics, either in the form of increased political protest for highly committed Catholics, increased voting for Lebanese and Syrians, or increased letter writing among Chaldeans. Frequent church attendance also plays a role in creating solidarity between Christians and Muslims, at least among those moderately committed to their faith and among the Orthodox. This solidarity is expressed in a shared sense of media bias against both the Arab community as a whole and against Muslims and Islam in particular. Moderately pious Christians are also more concerned about the civil liberties of Arab Americans when they attend church frequently than when they do not. Syrian and Lebanese Christians, however, contradict this pattern somewhat. For them, frequent church attendance decreases their perception of media bias against Muslims. Among Chaldeans, concern for media bias against Muslims is low overall.

National origins and sectarian affiliations also influence the impact religious piety and mosque attendance have on the political incorporation of Muslims, their identification as Arab Americans, and their perception of discrimination. Among the Sunni, for example, religious attendance encourages political protest and identification as Arab American. Sunni women and more educated Sunnis are also more likely to identify strongly as Arab American. Those with a high level of religious commitment are more likely to worry about the future, which might explain why, for them, frequent mosque attendance encourages political protesting and petition signing. As further evidence that this particular part of the Muslim community feels distress, mosque attendance also contributes to their sense of bias in the mainstream American media against both Islam and Arab Americans.

Among the Shi'a, a different pattern holds sway. Mosque attendance is linked again to political protest, letter writing, and greater worry about the future. Education also matters for the types of political activity Shi'a engage in, encouraging either political contributions or letter writing. Neither longer residence in the United States nor American birth seems to encourage political activities such as voting or making political contributions, as they do among
Arab Christians, but they do reduce concerns about the future. Although none of these factors contribute significantly to whether Shi’ia Americans also identify as Arab Americans, those who do identify as Arabs and are also more pious, attend mosque more frequently, and have higher incomes.

Lebanese and Syrian Muslims, who are majority Shi’ia, are also affected by frequent mosque attendance, which encourages their participation in political protests, and by high levels of religious commitment, which encourages greater concern about the future and a stronger sense that the media is biased against Muslims and the Arab American community. Education and income influence the political incorporation of this group far more than either religious commitment or mosque attendance. In this respect, they resemble Arab Christians. The wealthier and better educated they are, the more likely they are to participate across the political spectrum and the more likely they are to be concerned about Arabs receiving fair trials and about media bias against the Arab community and Muslims. For the Lebanese, the longer one has lived in the United States and having been born in the United States both contribute greatly to political participation as well, mirroring patterns found among Arab Christians. Piety and attendance, for this group, also contribute to their identification as Muslims.

The political incorporation of Yemenis, however, who tend to have arrived more recently and are uniformly Sunni, does not appear to be influenced by religious commitment or mosque attendance. High commitment Yemenis worry about the future and are less likely to believe that Muslims and Arabs can obtain a fair trial. High commitment Yemenis and those who attend mosque frequently, like other Muslims, are more likely to both identify as Arab American and have a strong sense of their religious identity. Yemenis with more education vote less, perhaps because fewer well-educated Yemenis are citizens, but education does, as in other populations, encourage other forms of political participation as well as higher concern about media biases against both Arabs and Muslims.12

These findings confirm that piety and regular attendance at religious services have consequences for the incorporation of Arab Americans, but these consequences do not encompass the population as a whole, nor do they show Christian or Muslim populations to be consistently unlike each other. In chapter 2, Shryock and Lin describe two zones of identity construction for Arab Detroit: one that is predominately Christian, suburban, and likely to identify as white and a second that is largely Muslim, residing in or near Dearborn or Detroit, and likely to identify as other. In the first zone, religious attendance and religious commitment contribute occasionally to increased voting, donating money to campaigns, and protesting. Sometimes they instill greater confidence in the future. In the second zone, however, they are much more likely to intensify concern about discrimination and media stereotyping and to encourage political activity that is correspondingly more oppositional in nature, such as protesting and petitioning. Yet our findings also highlight the internal diversity of these zones. In many ways, different Arab ethnonational and sectarian populations are charting their own routes to incorporation. This is especially relevant when we consider how religious commitment and church-mosque attendance augment pan-Christian or pan-Muslim identities, but have different effects on the overarching Arab American identity that transects both of Arab Detroit’s dominant identity zones.

CONCLUSION

Detroit’s churches and mosques are organized around beliefs and practices that lend a sacred quality to ethnic and national identities. By emphasizing religious traditions linked to a history of immigration, Arab American churches and mosques connect their members to Arab homelands, to believers around the globe, and to other Americans. Religious observances create communities of shared suffering and co-responsibility (Webner 2001); they enact the grief and joy that fill ritual calendars, strengthening bonds to the living and the dead with an immediacy that secular forms of Arab American ethnicity can seldom reproduce. They also contribute to the identities, sectarian and ethnonational, through which Detroiters engage the political process.

Our findings suggest that for Arabs in greater Detroit, the relationships between piety, ethnic identity, and political incorporation are difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, it appears that Arab Christians are already well along the path to full American citizenship, regardless of whether they identify as Arab Americans, Chaldean Americans, as some other ethnic appellation, or simply as Americans. Their churches play little role in encouraging or discouraging their participation in the American political process; in this respect, they resemble other Detroiters who, on average, attend church with slightly higher frequency than Arab Christians but whose church attendance has limited bearing on their political participation when viewed in the aggregate (Baker and Boudens 2008). Among pious Arab Christians generally, and among Chaldeans in particular, church attendance does little to encourage...
identification as Arab American, but it also does little to discourage this panethnic identity. Among those with a moderate religious commitment, however, and among the Orthodox in particular, church attendance does lead to greater solidarity with Arab and Muslim Americans.

Arab Muslims, by contrast, are in a very different sociopolitical location. They experience a greater sense of exclusion, a not-quite-us status, whether they identify as Arab Americans or not. Muslims with a higher commitment to the practice of Islam feel a greater sense of discrimination than other Muslims do. Local mosques do not necessarily foster this sense of stigma. Mosque participation does, however, encourage Muslims to express their political dissatisfaction with American policies through demonstrations and petitioning. Overall, levels of political participation are slightly lower among Arab Muslims than among Arab Christians, a tendency we attribute to the more recent arrival of most Muslim immigrants. Yet these findings are somewhat ambiguous given that the DAAS survey was administered just before and during the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. This event led to heated political activity on the part of Arab Detroiters who expressed strong views for and against the war (see chapter 8). Not surprisingly, Arab Christians were more likely (5.5 percent) and Arab Muslims much more likely (14.8 percent) to participate in demonstrations and political protests in the year before the DAAS survey than residents of the Detroit area generally were (3.8 percent). Our evidence cannot tell us whether the same pattern would emerge in less eventful calendar years.

Our findings suggest that Arab churches today are not the zones of political and ethnic isolation Philip Hitti criticized several generations ago, nor are they sites of accelerated incorporation. In this regard, they resemble other churches in the Detroit area. It is harder to describe mosques in this way. Arab Muslims, despite their commitment to becoming U.S. citizens, find themselves subject to the widespread belief they are not in fact citizens, that their civil liberties can be infringed upon, that their political opinions do not matter, and that they are potentially a threat to other Americans. In short, Muslims do not have the same access to the benefits of citizenship as other Americans, and they are keenly aware of this inequality. Some Muslim populations (Yemenis, for example) are indeed associated with ethnic and religious isolationism, whereas others (Lebanese) are not, but congregations of both frequently play host to politicians who are running for office in local, state, and national elections. Governor Jennifer Granholm and Senator Debbie Stabenow were both on hand in 2005 for the opening of the Islamic Center of America, a predominately Lebanese American mosque that is arguably the largest in North America. The day before, both governor and senator had attended the opening of the American Moslem Society’s renovated and expanded facility, where they were welcomed by a congregation that is predominately Yemeni American. Congressmen John Dingell and John Conyers are familiar faces at local mosque dinners, as is Senator Carl Levin. In greater Detroit, mainstream politicians cannot afford to ignore Muslim voters, and they are more likely to attend the fundraising banquets of large mosques than to attend events hosted by Arab or Chaldean churches.

We cannot conclude with certainty that Muslim isolation, when it does exist, is due primarily to the recent arrival of immigrants, to a political climate in which Islam is denigrated and treated with suspicion, to the religious and ideological understandings of Muslim Americans themselves, or even to variable combinations of such factors. The complexity of this situation can be seen, with disturbing regularity, in Detroit’s popular media, where numerous stories highlight the difficulty Muslims encounter when they try to engage fully in American electoral politics. In May of 2008, for instance, Ali Jawad, a prominent Lebanese American business leader in Dearborn, was pressured to step down as chairman of the Michigan finance committee for U.S. presidential candidate John McCain after a local blogger accused Jawad of being an agent of Hizballah. Two months later, Mazen Ashahi, an advisor to the Barack Obama campaign, was forced to resign under even more egregious circumstances because of his past membership on a mainstream Muslim American financial investment board. Christian Arabs are less likely to attract this sort of negative attention, which is one reason Michigan’s Christian Arab politicians have been more successful over time. Citing a long history of setbacks like the one Jawad suffered, Muslim activists are sometimes reluctant to go public with their support of candidates lest they (and the candidates they endorse) become targets of slanderous accusations and political blacklisting.

If some Christian Arabs in Detroit are prone to shy away from the public embrace of Arab American identity, it is often because this identity is commonly associated with Islam and Muslims. Whether they are Christian or Muslim, most Arab Americans agree that national media are biased against Islam, and 41 percent of Detroit’s general population share this belief. In explaining lower levels of cultural membership among those who identify as Arab Americans (see chapter 6), and especially among those who identify as
Arab Muslims, it would be premature to argue that mosques and churches are somehow to blame, whereas anti-Arab prejudice and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East are not. Higher education, greater income, and increased time in America actually contribute to a sense of marginalization among Muslims (and among some Christians as well). Religious piety and attendance at Friday prayers or Sunday services play a less important role. The latter trends suggest an ironic truth: as Arab Muslims become more American culturally, their awareness of not being accepted as Americans by their fellow citizens grows more acute. As a result, this sensibility comes to occupy a central place in the American identities that Arab Muslims, and by extension all Arab Americans, can make for themselves.

NOTES

1. For an example of a sincerity challenge, see Andrew Shryock (2002). During his 2008 presidential campaign, volunteers for Senator Barack Obama’s campaign in Detroit barred two hijab-wearing Arab Americans from sitting on the podium where they would be visible to television cameras recording the senator’s speech.

2. In 2006, for example, a high profile incident of this nature drew national media coverage. Six religious leaders who were returning home from a conference were pulled off a plane, detained, and questioned by Homeland Security personal after a fellow passenger raised concerns about them in response to seeing them pray at the airport (see Jessica Bennet and Matthew Philips, "Flying While Muslim,” Newsweek, November 22, 2006).

3. In the Ottoman Province of Syria, which was home to Detroit’s first Arab Muslims, mosques were supported by religious endowments rather than by local congregations.

4. It can be argued that Chaldean and other more recently arrived Assyrian communities are in the midst of reproducing this process today, opting for an Assyrian identity in order to avoid association with either Arab or Syrian panethnics. In Detroit these populations have long participated in organizations and activities associated with the empowerment of Arab Americans as a whole, like the Arab World Festival and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, while striving to preserve Chaldean (and other forms of) particularity.

5. The national sample of Muslims shows that only 21 percent have not completed high school, compared to Detroit’s 34 percent (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2007).


7. The Cronbach’s alpha for these three variables stands at .8934 for Muslims and .8242 for Christians. These high reliability scales tell us the variables are tapping into similar dimensions of religious piety. Note also that our measure is slightly unusual in that it leaves off attendance at Sunday (for Christian) and Friday (for Muslim) religious services to facilitate comparability between Muslim and Christian attendance patterns. Eighty-three percent of Christians, compared to 46 percent of Muslims, said it is important for them to attend weekly services.

8. Our questions about religious practice were designed to include both Muslim and Christian practices and not to tease apart the nuances of either tradition.

9. Our attendance measure refers to mosque attendance for purposes other than weddings and funerals and is thus not a measure of Friday prayer attendance as other surveys tend to be. On the question of Friday congregational prayer attendance, 46 percent of Muslims believe that it is important to attend Friday prayers, 35 percent of women and 57 percent of men. Eighty-three percent of Christians believe it is important to attend Sunday services.

10. The alpha reliability scale is .7880 for Christians and .7876 for Muslims.

11. The alpha reliability scale is .8769.

12. Because of space limitations only the regression results with the categories of Muslim and Christian are reported here. The regression models for ethnic, national, and sub-religious identities are available upon request.

13. Using a different measure of congregational participation, Ronald Stockton came to a similar conclusion about both Christian and Muslim Arabs for whom “congregational involvement appears to be linked to an 'oppositional' culture and a love-hate relationship with power” (2006, 62).

14. Spencer Abraham, for example, is a former U.S. senator and served as secretary of energy in the George W. Bush administration. Mike Bouchard, Oakland County sheriff, lost his race for the U.S. Senate in 2006 but is now considered a viable gubernatorial candidate for 2010. The state’s highest ranking Muslim official, Ismael Ahmed, holds an appointed position, secretary of the Department of Human Services, rather than an elected one. For more information on greater Detroit’s Arab politicians, elected and appointed, see chapter 3.
REFERENCES


Arabs in Detroit take great pride in their traditions, customs, and values. The region is home to Arabs from across the Arab world, including Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Egypt, the Gulf, and North Africa. Cultural values and traditions are a unifying force for this heterogeneous population. Consider, for example, the Dearborn Arab International Festival. Held each summer, and attracting more than 300,000 visitors, the festival embraces the area’s diversity with its Arab traditions. Dance and Dabke troops, art, food from falafel and shawarma to hummus and baked delicacies, Arab music, henna booths, coffee cup readings, and Arab merchandise are a few of the ways in which Arabs share their traditions with one another. Underlying these vibrant cultural traditions are deep-rooted values. But are the values that unite the diverse Arab population also the root of divisiveness between Arab Americans and mainstream American society?

This question has been present explicitly or implicitly in private worries, public debates, and scholarly discourse about the place of Arabs and Muslims in American society, especially since 9/11. For example, as noted in Chapter 1, many Americans express concerns about the compatibility of Arab Americans and other Americans, indicating less acceptance of Arab Americans than any other group, including whites, African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics (Farley, Krysan, and Couper 2006). Some scholars draw sharp symbolic boundaries,