The Political Analyst’s Toolbox
Chapter 2
The Four I’s: Issues, Interests, Institutions, and Information

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1. What You Will Learn in this Module

You will learn:

1. The four questions that begin a practical political analysis.
2. The participants in policy making, and how they change over the issue life cycle.
3. What motivates the people who participate in policy-making.
4. What is political ideology and how it differs between political elites and ordinary citizens.
5. The big four political institutions, and how they change over the life cycle of an issue.
6. The importance of information and ideas in politics.

Key Concepts

By the end of the module you should be able to define:

Issues
The issue life cycle
Law making
Regulation writing
The Administrative State
Implementation
Interests
Principle
Insiders
Outsiders
Issue networks
Policy arenas
Political Ideology
Ideological Constraint
Institutions
Political Power
Information
Asymmetric information

2. Four Key Questions in Practical Political Analysis

How do you begin a piece of practical political analysis? What’s the starting place?
There are lots of possible starting places, but experience shows that a good place to begin are four simple questions. These four questions present themselves at the beginning of virtually every piece of practical political analysis, whether the setting is Capitol Hill, the United Nations, the board of a nonprofit organization, or even around the family dinner table.

Here are the four key questions:

1) **Who participates** in the issue?
2) What determines each player’s stand on the issues?
3) **How does the decision process arrive at a decision?**
4) What determines each player’s relative power in the process?

**Figure 1. Four Questions to Get Started**

So: what’s the issue and who are the players; what do the players want and why; how does the decision process work; how powerful are the players, and why. If you can’t answer these questions, you can’t begin to formulate or implement a plan to get the policy outcomes you want.

The “Four I’s” is a heuristic to remember **Issues, Interests/Ideology, Institutions, and Information.** The Four I’s are intended to help you focus on the four key questions that begin a practical political analysis. Let’s walk through the Four I’s one by one.

### 3. Issues and the Life Cycle of Issues

The first “I” stands for “issues.” Here is a definition of “issue”:

**A political issue is a social, economic, scientific or other topic perceived by political actors to be relevant to their interests.**

From the viewpoint of political analysis, issues are defined by the way politically engaged actors define them. If the politically engaged actors don’t perceive a given topic as an issue, it isn’t an issue. In fact, getting political actors to perceive a topic as an issue is often hard work, and the meat-and-potatoes of “policy entrepreneurs.”

//Add an example (gay rights? Women’s rights? Consciousness raising etc)_CSS

//Add an example (gay rights? Women’s rights? Consciousness raising etc)_CSS
Not surprisingly, the way political actors perceive an “issue” is often different from the way lay people perceive issues, because political “issues” are filtered through existing policies, the interests of the actors, and their expert knowledge. For example, it may seem natural to think of “climate change” as an issue. But to the relevant political actors, climate change involves many different issues, including (for instance): the modification and maintenance of the energy grid, the encouragement and diffusion of solar power and wind power, enabling the shift away from coal to natural gas for electricity generation, the encouragement/discouragement and regulation of nuclear power, subsidizing or re-training displaced coal miners, setting corporate auto fleet emissions standards, creating and enforcing carbon taxes, creating and running carbon trading schemes, setting building standards and retro-fitting for energy conservation, negotiating and enforcing international carbon treaties, requiring mandatory carbon offsets for firms and encouraging voluntary ones for airplane travelers, and dozens more – and each of these issues is pretty bulky as well. And, for each of these issues, the 4 I’s will be somewhat different.

The Life Cycle of Issues
Political scientists often talk about the life-cycle of issues, as shown in Figure 2. You should take this idea with a grain of salt since there is nothing deterministic about the emergence or progression of issues. Some issues do progress as shown in the figure. Some skip stages or just stall out.

Figure 2. The Life Cycle of Issues and Political Strategy
Nonetheless, the life cycle concept highlights several worthwhile points. First, one can draw a distinction between 1) issue creation or emergence, 2) policy creation, 3) policy elaboration, 4) enforcement or policy implementation, and 5) policy feedback. Second, the stages typically involve different actors and different institutions, and require different strategies.

To illustrate, let’s look more closely at how political strategies change over the issue life cycle. Are you trying to create an issue, get people to pay attention? Then you need strategies to affect issue
development. These include getting organized as an interest group, lobbying from the grassroots and in legislative offices, and developing media strategies that exploit events or lucky breaks.

Has the issue become real and made it onto agendas? If so, the critical focus is policy creation. The thrust becomes crafting concrete policy alternatives, advocating effectively for the preferred ones, lobbying against bad alternatives, and building and breaking coalitions. Legislative politics is usually where the action is and the political calculations of legislators vital.

Has a law been enacted? Then the policy work has just begun! An agency might need to be created, or a new bureau staffed and funded. Agency interpretation of the statute is critical, for the agency will typically write quite fine-grained regulations that turn broad statutory warrants of authority into specific actionable commands or prohibitions with the force of law. This is the meat-and-potatoes of what is often called “the Administrative State,” that is, law created not by elected legislators but instead by bureaucrats in public agencies. If you are a firm or organized group your strategy at this stage of the life cycle will aim at influencing the content of regulations, the funding of the agency, its personnel decisions, and its design. So you will lobby the agency, lobby Congress, participate in rule-making by commenting on proposed regulations, and possibly sue the agency over its regulations.

Finally, agency policy and regulations must be implemented and enforced, for example, by delivering services or creating capital goods, by contracting for services from others and making sure they are delivered properly, by inspecting firms, by cutting checks and distributing them to the right people, by suing individuals or firms, and so on. In other words, making things happen on the ground! If are a firm or a group affected by agency implementation, again you will lobby the agency, lobby the legislature, possibly sue the agency. You may also craft a media strategy to publicize agency performance to put heat on it either directly or through elected officials.

But, as regulation writing and implementation unfold, there is a feedback loop: Does implementation create blow-back or interest mobilization that returns the issue to the legislature for further policy change? Sports fans like to quote the old saying, “It ain’t over ‘til the fat lady sings.” In American politics, a cardinal rule is: It’s never over.

Example

Issue Emergence: Massacres, Assassinations, and Gun Control

Prohibition unleashed spectacular gun violence, such as the infamous Saint Valentine’s Day Massacre in Chicago, on a shocked nation. Moreover, 1933 saw a bloody assassination attempt on Franklin Roosevelt. These incidents put gun control on the congressional agenda and led to the enactment of the National Firearms Act of 1934. This act prohibited the sale of automatic weapons like the Thompson submachine gun, the gangster’s weapon of choice. Prior to the 1934 enactment, one could buy submachine guns at local hardware stores – and notoriously Al Capone did.

The assassination of JFK in 1963 led to the discussion of new gun control legislation, but the
legislation failed in Congress. However, the rapid fire (sorry about that) assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy did lead to the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968. This law prohibited the mail order of rifles (such a weapon had been used by JFK’s assassin).

In 1981, an almost successful assassination attempt on President Reagan led to the severe and permanent injury of his press secretary, James Brady. Brady’s wife Sarah became instrumental in organizing pro-gun control groups. A background check bill was introduced in Congress in 1987 but failed of enactment. The so-called Brady Bill was finally enacted in 1993; it established a system of mandatory background checks on gun buyers.

The gun massacre at Columbine High School in 1999 again put the issue on the agenda, but no legislation was forthcoming (a bill did pass the Senate). Anti-gun groups organized a “million man march” on Washington in 2000 but again no legislation was forthcoming.

A severe gun massacre at Virginia Tech led to amendments to the Brady Law, slightly strengthening background checks. In July 2012 a gun massacre at a movie theater in Colorado (the Aurora Theater massacre) by a clearly deranged individual put the issue back on the public agenda. The Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre in Newton Connecticut in December 2012 further heightened attention. In response, the Obama Administration made gun legislation a top legislative priority, but the effort failed in Congress in 2013. Further massacres in 2015, including the shocking murder of parishioners in a black Charleston Church by a neo-Nazi who had evaded a background check, again raised the issue.

In short, high profile assassinations and gun massacres receive intense media attention. The shocking events and intense media attention then place gun control on the public agenda. Whether these issues move forward into legislation, regulations, and programs is another matter.

As the gun control example illustrates, regularly occurring events quite predictably boost attention to specific issues. Economic recessions provide another example of this phenomenon. During recessions, issues such as unemployment, unemployment compensation, budget deficits, and public works force themselves into the headlines and onto the public agenda. Whether these issues move forward into legislation, regulations, and programs is another matter.

Less predictable is policy feedback, or blowback.
As enacted in 1965, the Medicare program (the government health insurance for the elderly, a part of Social Security) failed to cover catastrophic hospital, physician, and drug costs. In other words, coverage was capped so if one became severely ill the cost of care would not be covered beyond the caps. Fearing the possibility of financial ruin, by the mid-1980s about 70% of seniors bought supplementary private insurance -- so-called Medigap policies -- to cover these catastrophic costs. But less affluent senior citizens could not afford the supplementary policies and so went without the additional coverage, risking financial destitution in the event of a truly severe illness.

In 1988, Congress moved to plug this gaping hole in Medicare. The principal movers were not the elderly themselves. After all, the most aware and active seniors had solved the problem for themselves by purchasing private Medigap policies. Rather, technocrats in the Department of Health and Human Services, liberals in Congress, and staffers at the AARP moved to fix a major flaw in a program they revered. The problem the reformers faced was funding. In the Reagan era, increasing taxes was anathema. Therefore the standard financing mechanism for Medicare and Social Security – the payroll tax – was out of bounds. So, the designers came up with a clever alternative: finance the additional coverage with a supplemental premium paid by the elderly themselves. Seniors would be required to pony up for the valuable new coverage, just like most did already for Medigap policies (for them, the new coverage would replace their existing Medigap policy). The problem was the poor elderly for whom the new premium would be a genuine hardship. To help them, the designers made the supplementary premium progressive: the affluent elderly would pay it but the poor elderly would not. In essence then, all seniors would receive the valuable new catastrophic coverage but the affluent elderly would be “taxed” to pay for the benefit going to the poor.

This financing strategy was a radical departure for Social Security. Heretofore, the financing mechanism had always been, sock the young to help the old, yielding tremendous windfalls for current retirees who got the benefits but had never had to pay for them while working.

The proponents of the new coverage were quite coy about the financing mechanism, skipping over the gory details when they described the proposed legislation. The financing was indeed aired in congressional debates, but most seniors remained unaware of the details. And, the AARP endorsed the legislation. Not surprisingly, Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Care Act of 1988 with huge majorities in both chambers and President Reagan signed it into law.

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1 This example is drawn from Richard Himelfarb, *Catastrophic Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988* (Penn State Press 1995). I thank Doug Arnold for calling my attention to this excellent (and wonderfully succinct) case study.

2 Medicare did not then and does not now cover long-term nursing home care. This was the catastrophic event most-feared by seniors. But long-term care insurance scarcely existed in the 1980s (it remains very expensive today). The standard practice for someone requiring such care is to “spend down” -- exhaust all one’s savings and resources, become bankrupt, and then receive coverage under the state-federal welfare program Medicaid.

3 The American Association of Retired Persons, the largest interest group representing the elderly. In the late 1980s, about 28 million seniors belonged to the AARP, making it a Washington powerhouse.
At that point, the proverbial substance hit the fan. Suddenly, affluent seniors woke up to find themselves hit with a new premium, effectively a tax. An unscrupulous mail-order oriented group, the notorious National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, boosted it previous opposition to the program, flooding seniors with horrifying (and often mendacious) scare letters. Apoplectic seniors began calling congressional offices.

Critically, less affluent seniors – who were receiving a tremendous benefit at no cost – made zero effort to defend the program. Public opinion polls showed the less affluent elderly were deeply confused about the new coverage and just as upset as the affluent elderly. Nor did the now-silent AARP support the program it had once endorsed. As controversy mounted, other groups joined the opposition.

Perhaps the low point occurred when Dan Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the key Ways and Means Committee, was literally assaulted by enraged geezers, who surrounded his car at a town meeting in Chicago pounding on the windows while screaming “Impeach!” A horrified “Rosty” fled on foot – a scene re-played many times on national television.

Less than 18 months after it enacted the law with huge majorities, Congress repealed the Medicare Catastrophic Act of 1988 with equally large majorities. Policy blowback killed a program that many health policy analysts saw as a substantial improvement in Medicare. Except for drugs, catastrophic care under Medicare remains skimpy to this day.

4. Interests (and Ideology)

The second “I” stands for “interests” (also “ideology”). The second “I” is supposed to make you ask: Who participates and (critically!) what do they want?

Who Participates

Who participates in policy making? Here are some key participants clustered by institution and “society”:

Congress (4)
House Party leaders (e.g., Speaker of the House)
Senate Party leaders (e.g., Senate Majority Leader)
Committee chairs
Other members

Presidency (5)
President
White House operatives (e.g., White House Chief of Staff, Political Advisor)
Central executive political appointees (e.g., head of Office of Management and Budget)
Central executive career civil servants (e.g., staffers at OMB and OIRA)
Department of Justice appointees (e.g., Attorney General, Solicitor General, head of Office of Legal Counsel)\(^4\)

**Bureaucracy (4)**
- Agency heads
- Political appointees
- Career civil servants
- Contractors

**Courts (2)**
- Supreme Court Justices
- Judges on the D.C. Circuit

**Media (1)**
- Editors and Reporters

**Society (9)**
- Firms
- Activists
- Interest group members (including trade associations and private sector unions)
- Public sector union leaders
- Wealthy individuals
- Policy entrepreneurs
- Think tank members
- Academics
- General public

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\(^4\) Standard accounts of the presidency do not include these figures from the Justice Department as part of the presidency. But they are key parts of “management,” determining the Administration’s internal legal policies (e.g., on torture and surveillance) and representing the Administration before the Supreme Court. So, while not formally housed in the White House or the Executive Office of the Presidency, they can be seen as the President’s “men” (and of course women) just like the political appointees in OMB.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage in Life Cycle</th>
<th>Key Players</th>
<th>Key Activities</th>
<th>Key Institutions</th>
<th>Key Analytic Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue Emergence</td>
<td>Activists/entrepreneurs, Interest group members, media/reporters, political candidates, public</td>
<td>Framing issues, claiming attention, mobilizing groups</td>
<td>Interest groups, media, parties</td>
<td>Collective action analysis, media analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Creation</td>
<td>Congressmen, president, firms, interest groups, Supreme Court justices (high court), academics &amp; policy entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Creating alternatives, setting legislative agendas, lobbying, building &amp; breaking coalitions, enacting statutes, litigating statutes (constitutional interpretation)</td>
<td>Congress, presidency, Supreme Court, think tanks</td>
<td>Interest group configuration, Coalition appraisal, persuasion model, legislative pivotal politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Elaboration</td>
<td>Agency civil servants, agency political appointees, central executive political appointees, legislators, firms, interest groups, executive lawyers, administrative law judges</td>
<td>Writing regulations, lobbying regulations (statutory interpretation)</td>
<td>Operating agencies, independent regulatory agencies, Presidential management agencies, Congress, interest groups, Department of Justice, DC circuit court, US Supreme Court</td>
<td>Regulatory pivotal politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Implementation</td>
<td>Agency civil servants, agency political appointees, central executive political appointees, subcontractors, interest group activists, public sector union leaders, firms, legislators, president, reporters</td>
<td>Administering programs (organizing, budgeting, staffing, operating, contracting), managing crises, creating policy blowback, managing policy blowback</td>
<td>Operating agencies, Congress, presidency, interest groups, public sector unions, media</td>
<td>Performance management, media analysis, collective action analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Participation and the Issue Life Cycle

This list includes 25 actors or classes of actors, which may seem like a lot. However, not all are involved with every policy at any given moment. (A few are only rarely important, e.g., academics.) Rather, which actors are important depends hugely on the life stage of an issue. I’ve arrayed participants by stage in the issue life cycle in Table 1, which you should study.

Broadly speaking though:

- **Activists** and the **media** are important during issue emergence;
- **Legislators** are the key actors in policy creation, though the **president** and his minions can be influential as well;
- **Civil servants** and **agency political appointees** are the central actors during policy elaboration, though **courts** (who rule on the legality of agency regulations and actions) play a significant role as well;
- **Civil servants**, **agency political appointees**, and **contractors** are important during implementation, but so are legislators, the president’s central managers, and the president on occasion;
- **Interest groups** and **firms** are powerful actors during policy creation, policy elaboration, and policy implementation. So they get not just one, nor even two, but three distinct bites at the policy apple.

But where’s the general public, the good old average American voter? The general public periodically chooses legislators and the president but otherwise plays little direct role in policy making at the federal level. In some western states influenced by the progressive movement (most notably California), citizens may vote directly over crafted slates of policies in referenda. But there are no national referenda. And average citizens rarely march, protest, or even call their representative to voice opinions – except when they need help with a government program.

But – and this is a very big but! -- legislators constantly worry about the impact of policy on their re-election chances. In fact, **obsess** might be a more accurate word than **worry**. As a result, the public – at least as imagined or perceived by congressmen⁵ -- remains a player in the policy making game. Things are more complex with presidents. As we shall see later, when it comes to policy making presidents tend to see public opinion as something to be exploited when favorable and manipulated when not. So, the public is again a kind of a player though usually a rather peripheral one.

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⁵ An interesting recent study of state legislators finds that their perceptions of public opinion in their districts were usually about right, though rarely spot-on. For example, the authors found that on certain issues (like gay marriage, universal health care, and abolishing welfare) both Democratic and Republic state legislators over-estimate the conservativeness of opinion in their districts. See David Broockman and Christopher Skovron “What Politicians Believe About Their Constituents,” [https://people.stanford.edu/dbroock/sites/default/files/broockman_skovron_asymmetric_misperceptions.pdf](https://people.stanford.edu/dbroock/sites/default/files/broockman_skovron_asymmetric_misperceptions.pdf).
Insiders, Outsiders, Policy Networks and Policy Arenas

Another way to categorize policy participants distinguishes “insiders” – those in government, like congressmen and staffers, presidents and governors, political appointees, career bureaucrats, and judges – from “outsiders” – those outside government, like firms, interest groups, trade associations, wealthy individuals, private sector unions, public sector unions, activists, non-profit organizations, professional lobbyists, political parties, members of the mass media, and (oh wait!) voters.

But the insider/outsider characterization in some sense misses the reality of life “inside the Beltway.” An alternative characterization invokes “policy networks.” The idea here is two-fold. First, many political actors float back and forth between the inside of government and its outside. Second, many people specialize in particular policies or so-called policy arenas. These are clusters of issues and policies with a relatively stable set of actors who interact with one another repeatedly and frequently over time.

Let me try to make the cast of characters in a policy arena more concrete. Let’s put a face on an in-and-out.

Example

Actors in a policy network: “Jane Janowitz”

Jane Janowitz (a fictitious “composite” as journalists would say) is a graduate of a Midwestern university and a Washington-area law school. After working as a campaigner on a congressman’s election campaign (outsider), Jane becomes a staffer for the congressman (insider) and then a staffer on a committee that her congressman chairs (insider).

After a few years, Jane switches jobs and becomes an attorney in a Washington law firm – say, Williams & Jensen, or Patton Boggs. But actually she acts as a lobbyist for the firm’s clients, representing them before the same committee where she used to work (outsider).

A new administration then comes in and Jane receives an appointment to a significant policy job in an executive agency or as a commissioner of a regulatory agency (insider). And so on, back and forth.

To label Jane an “insider” or an “outsider” is rather arbitrary, depending mostly when one happens to look. In some sense, Jane and the people like are the government.

An important point is that “Jane” is a policy specialist. At any given moment, she may be inside the government or or outside it, but she always focuses on (say) health care finance, or transportation, or defense, or savings and loan regulation.

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6 The I-495 loop circling the District of Columbia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inside_the_Beltway
7 Two of the top lobbying shops in Washington http://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-top-lobbying-firms-2012-8?op=1
There are good reasons why many actors specialize in policy arenas. Many policy arenas display mind-boggling complexity. They are just stunningly complicated. Mastering the details of problems and the ins-and-outs of programs can take years. In addition, knowing the right people and being trusted by them is critical – critical not only for influence but critical for the aggressive unflagging unrelenting career management necessary for someone like Jane. Mastering a social network and building personal relationships takes years and one doesn’t walk away from that investment lightly. There are exceptions such as super lobbyists, but most of the people in policy networks remain within given policy arenas.

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**Example**

**“The Blob”**

Former Senate staffer, Clinton Administration official, investment banker, and highly paid Washington lobbyist Jeff Connaughton introduces “The Blob.”

“The Blob (its really called that) refers to the government entities that regulate the finance industry – like the Banking Committee, Treasury Department, and SEC – and the army of Wall Street representatives and lobbyists that continuously surrounds and permeates them. The Blob moves together. Its members are in constant contact by e-mail and phone. They dine, drink, and take vacations together. Not surprisingly, they frequently intermarry. Indeed, a good way to maximize your family income in DC is to specialize in financial issues and marry someone in The Blob. Ideally, you and your spouse take turns: One of you works for a bank, insurance company, or lobbying firm while the other works for a government entity that regulates, or enacts legislation for, the financial sector. Every few years, you reverse roles: ‘Sally Striver, staffer on the Senate Banking Committee,’ you might read a typical notice in *Roll Call*[^8], “today announced her departure to work for the Financial Services Roundtable”; inevitably, she’s replaced with someone from the financial industry because, so runs the justification, the committee needs people familiar with the issues. What you and your spouse do all the time is share information. After all, no lobbying restrictions yet promulgated can prevent pillow talk between Blob spouses. Actually, marrying The Blob isn’t even necessary. A Blob member can simply take his or her non-Blob spouse to Blob parties – convivial gatherings of lobbyists and Wall Street emissaries, SEC and Treasury Department officials – to help gather and disseminate intelligence. It’s a weekly, and sometimes nightly, occurrence in Washington.”[^9]

This pattern of interactions creates “policy arenas,” stable issue networks with quite specialized players and organizations.

[^8]: *Roll Call* is the trade newspaper covering Capitol Hill.

Example

The Structure of Policy Arenas: Health Policy in the 1970s

In the 1970s, sociologists Edward Laumann and David Knoke set out to map the structure of policy arenas in energy and health care. To do so, they first identified a set of topics, using newspaper coverage and suggestions from policy experts. Then they identified a group of actors active in health policy and energy policy. Finally, they surveyed the actors asking them which issues they were involved with and which issues they were not involved with. Network analysis then allowed Laumann and Knoke to identify which issues “went with” other issues and which did not. Figure 3, reproduced from their book The Organizational State, shows the resulting issue clusters in health care.

Health care experts are apt to see the logic of this description.

Arenas in Health Policy, 1970s

Because actors in a policy arena tend to interact with each other over a long period of time (though often in shifting roles), they develop reputations. An actor may develop a reputation for honesty and truthfulness, a reputation for fairness and moderation, a reputation for ideological purity and policy commitment, or a reputation for ruthlessness when crossed or betrayed. Such reputations affect how other actors treat you. ¹⁰

¹⁰ We will return to reputation when we examine rules for lobbying and persuasion. A classic analysis of presidential efforts to build and maintain a reputation is Richard Neustadt Presidential Power.
What Do They Want? Passions and Interests
The other part of the second “I” involves: What do the participants want?

By this point, you should understand that the participants in policy making are not “regular” people. Even in direct democracy, like the ballot initiatives and referenda in states like California, the people who write the initiatives, the people who collect the signatures, who pay for political advertising, who determine its content, who run get-out-the-vote drives, who take the initiatives to court, and who interpret the meaning of their provisions – none are ordinary people. Of course, it is ultimately voters who defeat the initiative or send it to victory; its voters who opt for one candidate for office over another – at least from among the choices they are offered. But at every step in the policy-making game, the people who create the issues, define the debates, shape the choices, write the laws, craft the regulations, determine their legality, and implement the programs are unusual people.

So, what motivates these unusual people?

Two very different motivations impel the people involved in policy-making. You need to understand BOTH of these motivations. People who understand only one will be continually puzzled, misled, surprised and shocked by what happens in policy making.

The first motivation is MONEY.

Government programs, if they do anything, almost invariably transfer wealth from one group of people to another. Getting your hands on this money or influencing where it goes can be extraordinarily lucrative.

The brute fact is: politics is a business, and government programs and public policies are ways for some people to make money. (Think about the predatory for-profit schools, or the sugar producers). These people want the money, they are in it for the money, and money-seeking and money-protecting determine what they do. This sounds cynical; it is coldly realistic.

Example

Interests in Action: Sports Stadiums

The construction of sports stadiums often presents an amazing mix of public and private interests. Here are some amusing examples, courtesy of the wonderful political satirist John Oliver (profanity alert).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xcwJt4bcnXs

At times, the sheer venality of some political actors can scarcely be believed.
Example

Interests in Action: Jack Abramoff

Perhaps the most notorious lobbyist in the early 2000’s was Jack Abramoff. Abramoff specialized in transactional lobbying, buying and bribing his way through Congress and the White House. Though he enriched himself, his spectacular fall brought jail time and disgrace to him and his associates. Here is Wikipedia’s capsule summation of his career (I’ve removed the citations and links):

“He was at the center of an extensive corruption investigation that led to his conviction and to 21 people either pleading guilty or being found guilty, including White House officials J. Steven Griles and David Safavian, U.S. Representative Bob Ney, and nine other lobbyists and Congressional aides.

Abramoff was College Republican National Committee National Chairman from 1981 to 1985, a founding member of the International Freedom Foundation, allegedly financed by apartheid South Africa, and served on the board of directors of the National Center for Public Policy Research, a conservative think tank. From 1994 to 2001 he was a top lobbyist for the firm of Preston Gates & Ellis, and then for Greenberg Traurig until March 2004.

After a guilty plea in the Jack Abramoff Native American lobbying scandal and his dealings with SunCruz Casinos in January 2006, he was sentenced to six years in federal prison for mail fraud, conspiracy to bribe public officials, and tax evasion. He served 43 months before being released on December 3, 2010.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Abramoff

At his peak, Abramoff was making more than $20,000,000 annually. Here is a 60 Minutes program based on interviews with the now somewhat contrite ex-felon in which he describes how transactional lobbying works.


The second motivation is PRINCIPLE.

Politics is also about idealism. Government programs can lift up the poor, heal the sick, educate the unlettered, protect the weak, punish the wicked, and reward the virtuous. Good public policy provides the essential scaffolding for science, industry, commerce, the arts, personal liberty, personal safety, and the good life. As a result, some people become involved in policy making because they want to make the world a better place. This sounds naïve; but it is also coldly realistic.

A moment’s thought will bring to mind America’s great civic heroes, people like Abraham Lincoln, or Martin Luther King, or . These are remarkable models of principled people – but because they are so extraordinary they may seem an impossible ideal. So let me offer a somewhat humbler example.
Principled Public Service: Robert Ball

Obituary: http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/obituaries/articles/2008/02/01/robert_ball_championed_bolstered_social_security/

Ball rose from clerk in Social Security to become “chief operating officer of Social Security,” serving from 1950 to 1972. He continued to advise policy makers well into the 1980s. He dedicated his life to the concept of social insurance and worked tirelessly to assure Social Security was cleanly administered and financially stable. A byword for personal dignity and integrity, he never made much money. But he was far more effective as a policy maker than Abramoff.

Figure 4. The Two Faces of Policy Motivation: Jack Abramoff versus Bob Ball. Political analysts need to understand both faces of motivation. Washington is full of Jack Abramoffs but it also has the occasional Robert Ball.

The two motivations – money and principle -- seem at opposite poles. Who could be more different than the loathsome Abramoff and the almost saintly Ball? But in practice the two motivations often
The Four I’s

intertwine in complicated ways. A cynical observation about Washington animals like our composite character Jane Janowitz is: “She came to do good and stayed to do well.” How true! But even the do-wellers can sometimes be do-gooders, and even the most dedicated do-gooders want to do well. Policy making involves both kinds of people; it also involves the same people acting under different motivations at different times.

Let me offer what I jokingly call “the political analyst’s koan,” after the paradoxical sayings beloved in Zen Buddhism: “Who knows the one motivation in policy making? Who knows two?” Answer: “A fool knows the one motivation; the wise analyst knows two.”

My joke is too heavy-handed to be really funny; but perhaps it will help you remember the point, which is serious.

The Structure of Preferences: Ideology

Before we leave this extraordinarily capacious “I” there is one more topic we need to discuss: political ideology.

Definition. Ideology is a relatively abstract and far reaching conceptual dimension that supplies a yardstick against which political objects and their shifting political significance over time can be evaluated. Typically, we mean a liberal-conservative, left-right dimension.

Political ideology is a topic we will return to in depth when we analyze legislative policy windows, using the tool of pivotal politics. But there are a few big points to understand immediately.

First, the way political elites perceive the policy world is heavily structured by a left-right ideological framework. Elites have no difficulty identifying themselves as “very liberal,” “somewhat liberal,” “moderate,” “somewhat conservative,” and “very conservative.” And, they share a clear understanding of what those labels mean in terms of specific policies affecting specific issues like abortion, gun control, gay rights, health care finance, marginal income tax rates, foreign aid, environmental regulation, minimum wages, immigration, capital punishment, and so on and on. Discover that a congressman (say) is “very conservative” on any one of these issues, and it is highly likely she will be “very conservative” on many of the others as well.11

If you are interested in American politics and follow it avidly, the way sports fans follow their favorite teams, the idea of a clearly structured left-right ideological spectrum surely seems normal to you. This is the way politically sophisticated elites think. Do you think this way yourself?

In Political Science, there is a cottage industry devoted to measuring the ideology of political elites like congressmen, presidents, Supreme Court justices, state legislators, interest groups, even news outlets. These measures place actors on a left-right scale, and often do so with considerable accuracy and

11 At times there are issues that don’t fit neatly onto this spectrum. For example, in the 1940s and ‘50s, many Democratic congressmen from the South were economic liberals but racial conservatives; one needed two dimensions to capture this fact (Poole and Rosenthal). Libertarians, who have quite an elaborate ideology, don’t fit comfortably on the traditional left-right spectrum.
remarkable precision. Good ideology scores turn out to be incredibly useful in practical political analysis. Later on, we’ll use some of them. Just as an appetizer, Figure 5 shows you the ideological distribution of members of the House of Representatives in a recent House. The scores are the most widely used such measures, the so-call NOMINATE scores derived from all roll-call votes.

Source: Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, and Christopher Hare

**Figure 5. The Ideological Distribution of Members of the 114th House of Representatives (2015-2016).** Several prominent House members are also shown. Democrats are shown in blue, Republicans in red. The scores are the widely used NOMINATE scores, derived from all roll-call votes. The fact that the distributions of the party members do not overlap at all is unusual historically but very distinctive of today’s hyper-polarized elites.

I don’t want to suggest everything is cut-and-dried about ideology, even though it is easy to measure at least among elites. There are plenty of mysteries. Here’s a good one: why do some topics fall on one end of the scale and not on the other, when the exact opposite placement seems just as plausible? For instance, why do conservatives, who typically lean against government regulation, favor strong government regulation of abortion, while liberals who usually take the opposite stance on regulation oppose tight restrictions on abortion? And, why do some polices migrate over time from the liberal end of the spectrum to the conservative end (or vice versa) – for example, internationalism versus isolationism?

Well, we probably don’t have to worry too much about deep questions like that, at least in this course. But there is something else that is very important for you to know about political ideology and the left-right spectrum.

The left-right liberal-conservative spectrum is baked into the mental framework of elites, but it is NOT the way many ordinary Americans think about politics. This fact has been well-understood by political scientists since at least the early 1960s, when scholars really dug into survey data. But this basic fact is often not known, or ignored, or glossed over by political elites and the media. They are so used to thinking in left-right terms, and often so ignorant of basic social science and seemingly so unfamiliar
with ordinary people, that they just can’t conceive of a world in which the left-right spectrum doesn’t rule.

Let me be a little more specific about the way ordinary people think about politics. Well, the first big point – which we will return to when we talk about persuasion – is that most Americans don’t particularly like thinking about politics, don’t know much about government, and simply don’t spend much time on this subject. Other things, yes -- family, work, sports, celebrities, church synagogue or mosque, hobbies. But, government and public policy – not so much. As a result, many Americans lack what political scientists call “ideological constraint.” In practical terms, many average Americans can’t reliably identify a given policy as “liberal” or “conservative.” They just don’t get it. And, they sometimes mix and match their preferred policies from the left and right ends of the spectrum in a way that no member of the political elite would ever do. So, for example, an ordinary person might vehemently reject an assault weapons ban (a conservative position) – but favor expanding Social Security and raising taxes on wealthy people (a liberal position). Or, she might support restricting immigration from non-English speaking countries (conservative), but also support raising the minimum wage (liberal). It wouldn’t occur to her that these combinations are strange and don’t go together.

The take-away points are twofold: first, American political elites show tremendous ideological constraint; second, ordinary people, not so much.

5. Institutions: Power and the Rules of the Game

The third “I” stands for “institutions.”

We finally come to the rooms “where it happens!” Policy making and implementation take place in the committee rooms of legislatures; in the offices of mayors and presidents; in the halls of bureaucracies; in the squad rooms of police departments; in the nation’s courthouses and law offices. Of course, there is nothing special about the rooms, they are just places. But there is something very special about the institutions associated with the rooms – Congress, the presidency, bureaucracies, the judiciary.

There are many definitions of political institutions, most not very helpful. Let me be pithy:

Institutions = The Rules of the Game

Institutions structure the rules of the policy-making game; in some sense, the institutions are the rules. And to play the game, you must understand these rules, even if they seem a little crooked at times. If you don’t understand the rules, you will surely come out a loser.

The Games and the Institutions
What are the “games” we are talking about?

• **Legislative Process**: How a bill becomes a law

• **Regulatory Process**: How a proposed rule becomes a regulation (with the force of law)
The Political Analyst’s Toolkit

- **Legal Process**: How a dispute becomes a judgment (perhaps making new law)
- **Administrative Process**: How a program becomes “boots on the ground”

Given these games, the core policy making institutions are legislatures, executives, public agencies, and courts. Of course, many other institutions, like the media, think tanks, political parties, and the system of contracted government are also important in policy making and implementation. But we can think of policy making as involving the Big Four, plus others.

Not surprisingly, the importance of each institution for a given issue depends on where the issue is in the life-cycle – recall Table 1. At the risk of being repetitive, let me summarize.

Roughly speaking, the key institution during **issue emergence** is the media, with activists and interest groups using it to spark interest in their hobby-horse.

During **policy creation**, hands down the most important institution is Congress, the 800 pound gorilla that enacts statutes. However, the presidency has become increasingly important during policy creation because it pushes and supports congressional law-making. In addition, the President can take unilateral action directly, for example, using executive orders. Courts can be somewhat important, as they can strike down laws or interpret them in new ways. But pride of place remains with Congress.

The situation is rather different during **policy elaboration**. Now the key institution is the bureaucracy, which churns out rules and regulations like sausage. Courts are important here too, for they can – and with any important regulation almost invariably do – review the regulations for procedural regularity and sometimes for substance. Presidents increasingly assert themselves here as well, trying to control the content of regulations. And Congress sometimes intervenes too, for instance, by de-funding specific regulatory activities or generally threatening or pressuring rule writers. Playing in all these institutions are interest groups and firms. They participate formally in the rule-making process, sue agencies over regulations, and operate behind the scene with Congress and the Presidency.

During **implementation**, the central institution remains public agencies – though because so much of American government is contracted out, this actually may mean contractors and the system that picks and evaluates contractors. Almost all the other institutions can get involved as well, for example, agencies frequently are sued and courts then demand that an agency do, or not do, certain things. Agencies need budgets, so the legislature has a chance to put its oar in. The chief executive is nominally in charge and will intervene opportunistically. Sometimes the media is important, publicizing scandals in agency operations or horrific implementation failures – exploding space craft, poisonous tap water, rogue police men. And organized groups may play into this, highlighting terrible implementation and trying to pressure the agency to change.

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12 Elections are institutions too. They are important in policy making because they select key players and may affect what the players believe or see as important.
So, for a given issue we need to 1) **identify** the critical institution at this point in the issue cycle, 2) **understand** the decision process in the key institutions, and 3) **appreciate** who has real power in the decision-making process. The answer to the latter question can sometimes be surprising.

**Power and Institutions**

It would be nice if we could all just agree to agree, to share the same desires or, if not, to sweetly compromise and arrive at an obviously fair and just outcome. Naive people often express this wish – though probably they really mean, why can’t other people just agree with me, since I am obviously right? Alas, in the real world the lion does not lie down with the lamb – except to make lamb chops. People disagree, disagree intensely, and will not stop doing so. So the question becomes: Who is to prevail? Who has **power**? And, who doesn’t?

An outstanding scholar of organizational behavior, Stanford’s Jeffrey Pfeffer, offers the following observation, based on years of studying firms, non-profits, and other organizations:

> The inability to get things done [in organizations], to have ideas and decisions implemented, is widespread ... these [implementation failures] are, in many instances, problems in developing **political will and expertise** – the desire to accomplish something even against opposition, and the **knowledge and skills** to do so.

– Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Managing with Power*

Pfeffer points to a gap between **knowing or desiring** and **doing**: knowing the right answer to a problem, or desiring a particular outcome, is not the same as accomplishing that outcome. To put it bluntly: to make things happen, you need power.

Well, what is power and how do you get it?

**Power** is one of the most basic concepts in political science. Here is a standard definition:¹³

**Political power is a causal relationship between political preferences and political outcomes.**

From this perspective, power means something like “Actor A gets his way, and he gets it *because* he wanted it.”

Sounds simple and obvious but there are a few subtleties. First, power is a **relationship** (a relationship between preferences and outcomes), not an **attribute of an individual**, like her height or shoe-size. Nor is it like the charms you acquire in a computer role-playing game and carry around with you to use whenever you wish.

Instead, power is highly situational, it’s not absolute. As an Assistant Secretary of State you may be a mover-and-shaker in the State Department, but a weakling on Capitol Hill, a push-over in the White House, and a milk-toast at the dinner table. The President of the United States may be powerful in one

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¹³ This definition follows Jack Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*. It isn’t completely uncontroversial but it usually works well.
institutional context (e.g., administratively) but not another (e.g., legislatively). He may be powerful in one policy arena (international trade) but almost powerless in another (gun control).

Finally, formal titles and high positions do not necessarily translate into real power. Real power may be held by people with unimpressive titles. For example, in so-called street-level bureaucracies like police forces and social work agencies, the beat cops and individual social workers wield enormous power because they make consequential and often irrevocable decisions based on information superiors cannot obtain, and take actions that superiors cannot observe. Heads of such agencies may have nominal power but still find it extremely difficult to control the supposed subordinates.

**Power Tools**

Still, are there any generalizations we can make about how to acquire power in political organizations, based on social scientific theory and evidence? Let me highlight five tools for power-seekers: knowledge, reputation, resources, procedure, and self-awareness.

**Knowledge** – In a moment we’ll talk about the final “I,” Information. Suffice it to say, knowledge – of the institution, of the issue, of the people – is a huge power tool.

**Reputation** – When we discussed policy networks, I mentioned the importance of reputation, the way other people perceive you. The right reputation -- say, for competence, problem-solving, hard-work, fairness, or ruthlessness -- can be a big asset in the struggle for power.

**Resources** – I pooh-poohed formal authority, but resources can boost one’s influence and power. Staff (especially good staff) and money can buy information, expertise, and enhanced participation. For example, control of a committee chairmanship in Congress brings additional staff resources; control of the White House brings hundreds of staffers plus command of aircraft, access to the airwaves, and much more.

**Procedure** – Decision-making procedures typically give specific players the ability to set the agenda, to make proposals, and to veto or bottle-up proposals. Control of these critical decisional nodes confers power on those in the key positions. We will develop this insight in much more detail later on, when you explore legislative and regulatory pivotal politics.

**Self-awareness** – Various analysts point to personality attributes and individual traits, sometimes gender-related, that can help in acquiring power or exercising leadership in teams and organizations. In fact, advice on this is standard fare in the pop management books sold in airports, even the pretty good ones. In my estimation, what constitutes the “right personality” or “right management style” is highly situational again – what works in the Marine Corps might not work so well in a faculty meeting, and what works in either of those settings might port rather poorly to the Treasury Department or White House. Still, one personal attribute is likely to help in all those settings: a self-aware appreciation for power and attentiveness to it. In Richard Neustadt’s famous study of the presidency, he points out that

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14 I am drawing on organizational sociology, organizational economics, political economy, and political science, but in a pretty eclectic way.
only one person truly shares the president’s interests: the president himself. So, Neustadt concludes, the president must relentlessly guard his power prospects – for no one will do so. The same is true for anyone who wishes (in Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s famous words) to climb “to the top of the greasy pole.”

Example

Power in Institutions: Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate

Lyndon Johnson was famously effective as Senate Majority Leader. What made him so powerful? Needless to say, he exercised the formal powers of the office extremely adroitly. He also employed guile, manipulation, ruthlessness, physical energy, stamina, huge personal networks, and charm.

But even that is only part of the story. Consider Johnson before he became Majority Leader, when he held the hitherto “nothing” job of Assistant Party Leader.

Here is Robert Caro: “Senators wanted to know – needed to know – at what time a roll call vote would occur, so that they could be present, and have their vote recorded. They needed to know what day a bill in which they were interested would come to the floor, so that they could arrange to be present to argue for or against it; to offer, or oppose, amendments. Not infrequently, they needed to know at least the approximate hour it would come up, which meant knowing if amendments would be introduced to bills on the schedule ahead of it, and how much time might be consumed discussing the amendments. … [Senate Majority Leader] McFarland didn’t know. Overwhelmed by the responsibilities he had accepted, he seemed increasingly helpless as the pace of the session picked up …

[Democratic Party Whip] Lyndon Johnson began checking with the chairmen on the status of bills before their committees, and when senators asked about a particular bill, he knew the answer, or said he would find out. And in talking with senators, he acquired as well as provided information… His colleagues found him an attentive listener … There began to be, in the Democratic cloakroom, a realization that now, when a senator needed to know when a certain bill would come to the floor, there was, suddenly, someone he could ask. … The information wasn’t only about schedules. It was about votes. … The White House learned that if it wanted to know what would happen if it pressed for a vote on some major Administration measure, the best person to ask would be the Assistant Leader [Johnson]. Senators learned that if they wanted know what would happen on a vote on some minor issue, some intra-state issue important only to them, the best person to ask would be the Assistant Leader [Johnson]. In the world of the Senate, in which, for years now, nobody had known what was going on, an awareness was gradually growing that now, at last, somebody did…. No one could remember a whip ever really working at that “nothing job” before,

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15 Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power*.
16 On the attributes of people who are powerful in organizations and firms, see Jeffrey Pfeffer *Managing with Power*. 
but Lyndon Johnson was working it now. And he was making it into something it had never been before. ... The man [Johnson] who was to say, “I do understand power ... I know where to look for it” was looking for it now.”

What did Johnson get himself from creating a new center of information? His policy preferences often were in accord with the party. By using information to coordinate others, he made his party more effective thereby advancing his own political objectives. But more than that, Johnson gained the right kind of reputation and the trust of others -- and they incurred obligations with him. He could call in these favors later, as he maneuvered for greater power in the Senate.

### 6. Information

A careful study of congressional hearings found that, when confronted with an issue, congressmen typically ask three questions:

1. *Why is this issue important?* Then:
2. *What can be done about it?* And,
3. *Will this policy work?*

Often left unexpressed and lurking in the background is another question: How does this issue or policy affect my interests, in other words, who wins and who loses and how much?

Answers to these questions hinge on *information*. Here are typical answers: This policy issue is important because X; the options to address the issue are Y; this solution will work because Z. And, this policy will affect your interests as follows: A-W. The answers X, Y, Z and A-W all depend on information.

An important kind of information is what social scientists call “asymmetric” information – the information one person knows that another does not. For example, a lobbyist knows who the key players are on an issue, what their interests are, and how congressional procedures operate. A naïve manufacturing firm from the Midwest does not know any of this. The lobbyist’s information advantage creates the opportunity for the lobbyist to charge the firm for advice and help.

Conversely, the firm knows or can reasonably estimate what a change in a tax break or IRS rule, an environmental regulation, or the minimum wage, will have on its willingness to employ laborers or, perhaps, to remain in the United States. Congressmen do not have this knowledge, so the firm’s knowledge is asymmetric. The information asymmetry creates the opportunity for the firm to persuade congressmen to keep or expand favorable policies or kill unfavorable ones.

Asymmetric information gives rise to lots of strategic action – bluffing, signaling, withholding information without quite lying, evading supervision or control, or laziness and shirking. Asymmetric information can sometimes be a source of power. The “Master of the Senate” mini-case demonstrated

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18 Burstein.
how Lyndon Johnson aggregated and centralized procedural information in the Senate and used it to coordinate his party’s actions. By helping his party, Johnson helped himself.

Closely related to information is another “I”, ideas. In his landmark study of the politics of regulation, based on extensive field work in multiple agencies, James Q. Wilson noted

> We must be struck at every turn by the importance of ideas. Regulation itself is such an idea; deregulation is another. The targets of antitrust investigations are selected in large part because of the ideas of lawyers and economists; the value of regulation by command-and-control as opposed to regulation by the alteration of market incentives requires an assessment of two competing ideas … To the extent an agency can choose, its choices will be importantly shaped by what its executives learned in college a decade or two earlier.19

New ideas take many forms. A new idea may involve a new policy instruments, like “tradeable emissions permits.” It may concern policy-making procedures, like “The White House should establish an office that oversees agency regulation-making in order to assure that presidential priorities and values are embedded in the regulations.”20 The new idea may involve new methods of administration, for instance, performance-based assessments of teachers, congestion pricing of bridges and city streets, or privatizing services. Coming up with new ideas is one of the few places where academics have some influence in policy making.

7. Introductory Case: Fat Politics
The following case illustrates the issue life cycle and the 4 I’s in action.

View the documentary: Fed Up
http://www.netflix.com/search/Fed%2520Up?jbv=70299287&jbp=0&jbr=0

Read: Eric Oliver, Fat Politics, pages: 36-53 (the obesity epidemic), 72-76 (anti-fat attitudes), 94-99 (sex and obesity), 116-120 (calories), 131-141 (junk food), 155-157 (exercise vs. diet), 160-166 (junk food in schools), 171-173 (food labeling), 173-180 (regulating junk food).
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/princeton/Doc?id=10233602

Here are updated versions of the “obesity maps”:

Recent on food labels (sugar calories): “Big Sugar in a Froth Over Proposed New Soda Labeling Rules,”

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20 I am describing OIRA, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, now housed in the Office of Management and Budget.
8. Nutshell Review of Chapter 2

1. Four questions start a political analysis:
   1) Who participates in the issue?
   2) What do the participants want and why?
   3) How does the decision process work?
   4) What determines each player’s relative power in the decision process?

2. The “4’I’s” stand for Issues, Interests, Institutions, and Information. The Four I’s help you focus on the four starting questions.

3. There are five broad stages in the issue life cycle: issue emergence; policy creation; policy elaboration; policy implementation; policy feedback. Across the stages, a) different groups of actors are important; b) the key institutions differ, c) the strategies of the actors shift.

4. At the issue emergence stage, activists are the key actor and media strategies are very important.

5. At the policy creation stage, Congress is the key institution. But also important is the executive branch, which tries to set the legislative agenda and push Congress toward its preferred legislation, and interest groups and firms who try to influence congressmen and the executive.

6. At the policy elaboration stage, agency actors – career civil servants and political appointees – are the key actors because they write the regulations and make the decisions turning broad laws into actual programs. But also important are the president’s central managers (who can veto or modify agency regulations), Congress (which can pressure the agency as it writes the regs and may de-fund a regulation), courts (especially the D.C. circuit court, which reviews the legality of important regulations), and interest groups and firms (who bring pressure to bear on all the involved actors).

7. At the policy implementation stage, agency actors are again the key actors. Also important are private sector contractors who do a great deal of the actual work. Policy blowback typically involves interest groups and firms, Congress, and the media.

8. Many actors move from inside government to outside and back again, in a very fluid way. But most actors specialize in particular policy arenas. Within a given policy arena, players interact with one another frequently and over time, and interact with players outside the policy arena much less frequently. This pattern of interactions creates a stable issue network and reputations for actors.

9. Actors display two motivations in policy making: 1) Money (personal gain), and 2) Principle (idealistic efforts to make the world a better place). Wise political analysts understand both motivations, not just one.

10. Policy elites structure policies with a left-right ideology, a framework they have deeply assimilated. But ordinary people often do not think this way, they have little “ideological constraint.” Some citizens combine extreme left and extreme right ideas in a way policy elites would not.

11. Power in institutions is situational not absolute. Power depends on the rules of the game in the key institutions. If you don’t understand the rules of the game, you will surely turn out a loser.
The Four I’s

12. Sources of power in institutions include knowledge, resources, reputation, control of key procedural check-points, and self-awareness.
13. Information, especially asymmetric information, is a vital resource in policy making and a source of power.

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