The Russian empire's eventual displacement of the thirteenth-century Mongol ulus in Eurasia seems self-evident. The overthrow of the foreign yoke, defeat of various khanates, and conquest of Siberia constitute core aspects of the narratives on the formation of Russia's identity and political institutions. To those who disavow the Mongol influence, the Byzantine tradition serves as a counterweight. But the geopolitical turnabout is not a matter of dispute. Where Chingis Khan and his many descendants once held sway, the Riurikids (succeeded by the Romanovs) moved in. *1

Rather than the shortlived but ramified Mongol hegemony, which was mostly limited to the middle and southern parts of Eurasia, longterm overviews of the lands that became known as Siberia, or of its various subregions, typically begin with a chapter on "pre-history," which extends from the paleolithic to the moment of Russian arrival in the late sixteenth, early seventeenth centuries. *2 The goal is usually to enable the reader to understand what "human material" the Russians found and what "progress" was then achieved. Inherent in the narratives -- however sympathetic they may or may not be to the native peoples -- are assumptions about the historical advance deriving from the Russian arrival and socio-economic transformation. In short, the narratives are involved in legitimating Russia's conquest without any notion of alternatives.

Of course, history can also be used to show that what seems natural did not exist forever but came into being; to reveal that there were other modes of existence, which were either pushed aside or folded into what then came to seem irreversible. Suppose, in that light, one tried to understand Eurasia during, say, the period 1200-1800, without knowing that in the nineteenth century a railroad would be built and millions of Slavic settlers would be moving in. Rather than projecting nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideas and outcomes backward, suppose one sought instead to conceptualize types of political power as they existed over a long time, albeit within a deliberately chosen limited area. One could begin such an inquiry by questioning commonly used conceptual categories, and by making horizontal comparisons as well as long durée juxtapositions. Such is the goal of this tentative essay. *3

Many previous commentators, taking off from suggestions in the "source materials" generated over the centuries, have compared Siberia's part in Russia's imperial rise to the European discovery and conquest of the New World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *4 and to the nineteenth-century westward spread of the United States across North America. *5 In other words, Siberia, or north Asia, has been viewed as combining the experience of external colonial conquest with that of a (moving) internal frontier. Siberia was thus a "colony" in the dual sense of the term: someone else's territory to be exploited and a (new) place to be settled. Since the
breakup of the Soviet Union, Siberia remains an integral part of Russia, but also a place apart, with its own distinct, if vague, identity. *6* Traces of the former Mongol ulus and its offshoot khanates also animate the land. What precisely is involved in imagining that the Mongol ulus across Eurasia came to be supplanted by the Russian entity known as Siberia?

**Mongol Ulus 1200-1400**

In the early thirteenth century, in the forests around Lake Baikal and the steppe of the northern Mongolia, various tribes that had been warring among themselves were molded into a fighting force that went on to conquer the rest of the Mongolian plateau, the oases of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia, the Caucasus, the various principalities of Rus', and China -- all within the span of a single lifetime. Unlike previous nomadic incursions into settled areas, the rise of the Mongols was sudden and spectacular, and covered a vast area, from the Pacific to the Adriatic. *7*

During the reign of their celebrated "unifier," Chingis Khan (c.1155-1227), the Mongols acquired a writing system by adopting the Uighur script, but they left behind a modest primary record. From the thirteenth century only the texts that comprise the so-called "Secret History" survive (preserved in a Chinese transcription). *8* Most of what we know about the Mongols comes from Chinese, European, Armenian, Syrian, Persian, and Arabic secondary accounts, which contain first-hand observations as well as passages from Mongol writings that have been lost. *9* There are also a few examples of Mongol diplomatic correspondence with Pope Innocent IV and King Louis IX, *10* and some archaeological evidence associated with burial sites and towns, though on the whole nomads build few monuments to posterity. Accordingly, interpretations of the yeke Mongghol ulus (great Mongol ulus) have been inordinately dependent on what non-Mongols of the time chose to record. Representatives of the Medieval Arab and Persian civilizations, for example, emphasized the unprecedented destruction that the Mongol "barbarians" wrought, and for the longest time the prevailing image of the Mongols was narrowly martial and negative. Not until Henry Howorth's great-game inspired multivolume study in the nineteenth century did a more balanced view emerge of the Mongols as also facilitators of cross-cultural contacts and trade. *11* And not until the Soviet Orientalist Boris Vladimirtsov's analysis of social organization did it become possible to understand what internal circumstances permitted the Mongol rise. *12* With regard to Mongol political organization and its evolution, however, to this day there are many problems of interpretation.

Beyond dispute is the fact that the greater ulus formed by Chingis, and bequeathed to his sons, was founded on kinship. The great khan or chief of the amalgamated ulus, as well as the heads of major ulus within the whole, was by law a direct descendant of Chingis (the wives were often Turkic speakers). The Chingisid principle, or "golden" lineage, was laid down in the great khan's laws (iasa), the fictive legal code created after Chingis's death and attributed to him. *13* The texts of the "Secret History" were written and compiled to justify Chingisid rule. *14* Even the fourteenth-century upstart Tamerlane did not try to violate this rule by having himself named Great Khan. *15* Kinship allowed Mongol conquest to be converted into political relationships, though
it could also be manipulated by outsiders. A second unassailable point is that the Mongol modus operandi was to demand complete submission by anyone they encountered in their roaming, wherever that took them. They tolerated no other sovereigns (though they sometimes failed in an attempt at conquest). Those who offered resistance were usually annihilated, while those who submitted willingly were incorporated into the expanding ulus (and ranked according to the sequence of their submission, with the Uighurs the first and highest). All subjects were made to contribute to Mongol prosperity, usually by performing labor and/or paying tribute. Resist and be crushed, submit and serve, or try to flee -- these were the options for all who found themselves in the Mongols' path.

Inquiring into the motivations behind the Mongol conquests, however, presents certain difficulties. Examining the papal correspondence, Eric Voegelin has argued that the Great Khan's rule was said to be derived from "God," and as such afforded theoretical dominion over the entire "world." Thus, word of the existence of hitherto unknown peoples would elicit a Mongol demand for submission and instructions on how to do so. If the newly discovered people obeyed, they would join the empire, usually retaining their internal organization. If they disobeyed, the Mongols sent a punitive expedition, an act not of God, as it were, to enforce divinely ordained rule. Since ever more peoples were being "discovered," the Mongol realm was an Empire-in-the-Making (imperium mundi in statu nascendi). Felicitous as it is, Voegelin's formulation begs the questions of what the Mongol's understood by the notions of "God" and "world." Igor de Rachewiltz, noting that in the Secret History Chingis Khan is said to be descended from "heaven" (as well as from a bluish wolf), glosses the references as signifying both the supreme sky-god of the shamanistic Turco-Mongol peoples of Inner Asia and the Chinese Son of Heaven, a notion absorbed indirectly from Sinicized Turks (Orkhons) and directly from Chinese advisors. Invocation of heaven-sanctioned rule, Rachewiltz concludes (echoing Voegelin), implies an idea of universal rule and a "mandate," indeed a duty, to conquer the earth. In ostensible support of this view, foreign visitors to the Mongols came away convinced that they held notions of universal empire.

That representatives of Islam and Christendom, both aspirants to universality, should have looked on the Mongols' successful expansion as driven by a desire for universal rule could be misleading. At least initially, the Mongol "conquests" may have arisen out of the nomads' need for extensive and protected grazing lands, followed by a grasping for Chinese and Muslim wealth. The Mongols' expansion along the great caravan routes underscores their opportunism. But besides the logic of steppe existence and the temptations of sedentary wealth, there does appear to have been a sense of mission in the Mongols' expansion, which was cast as a Mandate of Heaven. The idea that Chingis Khan and his descendants had a coherent cosmology and welcomed the efforts of Turkish and Chinese advisors at court to legitimate Chingisid rule through Chinese ideas of universalism seems credible. What the Mongols understood to be "the world," however, remains problematic. Despite a certain evolution, Mongol leaders may not have come to think in terms of an empire or state with a territory, but continued to think in terms of winter and summer quarters, military recruitment, tribute, plunder, and control over trade routes. In the Mongol language an ulus was the term for a variety of kin groups united by allegiance to a chief; Chingis Khan was proclaimed lord "of all the peoples dwelling in felt tents." The territory used by an ulus was known as nutug (yurt). An ulus referred to people.
The Mongols' "world" may have been unbounded, stretching as far as their armies could reach, but it does not appear to have included the concept of demarcated territory.

None of the above is intended to underestimate Mongol administrative abilities. They were able to conduct a census of their subjects from China to Central Asia, Persia, and Rus, an enumeration, instituted by Ogedei (Chingis Khan's successor) that served as the key to facilitating the mobilization of the human (and financial) resources of their subjects. Numerous taxes were collected. Mongol postal stations were established over astonishing distances, forewarning the khans of attacks and providing other intelligence. The military aspect was prominent (even in China Mongol rule resembled a huge military encampment). But it has been said of the European state during the thirteenth to eighteenth centuries that it was "a war state, which expand[ed] its administrative and taxation mainly in order to be able to wage war." The Mongol efforts to create an administration and regularize taxes appear as an impressive example of a general pattern.

Already by the late fourteenth century, however, most vestiges of the greater Mongol ulus, including the national dynasties in China and Persia, had been "overthrown." What accounts for this impermanence? One scholar has argued that Mongol rule could not last indefinitely because it did not generate an internal surplus. She notes that the only way for Mongol rulers to increase revenue was to raise levees on existing tribute-payers -- thereby perhaps "killing the goose" -- or by ever-new conquests. Mongol rule was thus inherently unstable. Others have noted, however, that even though the Mongols proper traded little of their own goods within the vastly increased commercial activity their Pax Mongolica made possible, the wealth that they were able to tax or plunder was extraordinary. In fact, what undermined Mongol rule, especially in China and Persia, was precisely the absence of sufficient pasture lands to support a Mongol-style existence. All inner Asian nomadic political entities, as Charles Halperin has noted, faced a dilemma: to control sedentary peoples they had to establish urban garrisons, but the garrisoned troops could not practice the way of life that enabled them to refine their horseback archery and thus maintain their superiority over sedentary armies. In China, the Mongols could not even feed the vast supply of horses necessary for cavalry warfare and the strategic postal system. Far from being the "achilles" heal of Mongol rule, therefore, pastoral nomadism was its underlying strength. Among the largest "fragments" of the greater Mongol ulus, the one known as the ulus of Juji, which retained its predominantly nomadic way of existence, lasted the longest.

**Ulus of Juchi 1240-1560s**

Juji died even before his father Chingis, so the bequeathal passed (in left and right wings) to Juji's sons Orda and Batu. After rampages through the southern principalities of Rus beginning in 1223, conquest of Rus (1237-40), and a foray into Europe from the Hungarian plain, Batu withdrew his rightwing forces in 1242 back to the "wild steppe" between the Dnieper and the Altai. His dominant half of the ulus eventually set up a winter base at Sarai (1250s) on the Volga River. During the 1260s hierarchical ties to the Mongol "metropole" -- by then transferred from Karakorum (on the Orkhon River) to Khanbalik or Peking -- became a formality, and Juji's descendants set about incorporating other steppe peoples and exercising suzerainty over the principalities of Rus to the north.
Batu did not directly occupy or garrison Rus. None of the Rus principalities (subdued in a mere three years) could compare in wealth to Persia or China. Most of Rus lay amid timberland and bog, its towns being clearings separated by thick forests and swamps (reclaimed land was ploughed). But south of the forests was the forested steppe, and farther south lay the pure grasslands, drained by great rivers -- territory ideal for nomads, who moved up and down the river systems according to the season. In other words, Batu's ulus did not reside in a land with an ancient and highly developed settled civilization, but in the Pontic and Caspian steppe. One of Batu's successors, Berke, imported skilled artisans from Byzantium and Egypt, while another, Uzbeg, adopted Islam (in the fourteenth century). Partly under the influence of Islam, a new capital, also called Sarai, was built (1330s) with palaces, mosques, caravansaries, baths, and a "bureaucracy." But everyone outside Sarai still roamed.

When Tamerlane of Transoxania sacked and destroyed New Sarai in the 1390s, the documents burned, so that what we know of Batu's ulus and its relations with sedentary peoples comes largely from archaeological evidence, numismatics, and foreign commentators, especially the Russian chronicles. And among the most striking aspects of the Russian treatment of Juji's ulus has been the designation of its inhabitants as "Tatars." Were the Mongols Tatars? What lies behind this term?

First it is necessary to clarify the origins of the name "Mongol," about which opinions differ. According to Chinese annals, this was the name of Chingis Khan's tribe. But Isaac J. Schmidt, a nineteenth-century Moravian missionary who learned the Mongol language, argued that because Chingis Khan brought together different tribes, he had adopted the term Mongol to impart a sense of unity. Schmidt added that the etymology of Mongol signified "brave, fearless, excellent," a prideful appellation. A subsequent researcher, accepting Schmidt's supposition, has slightly modified his reading of "Mongol" to mean the "secure backbone" of Chingis Khan's power (i.e. his soldiers or people). Such a reading, which seems plausible, betrays nineteenth- and twentieth-century notions of how "states" are held together -- i.e., as a "nation." The "Mongols" were everywhere far outnumbered by their subjects (one researcher estimates the thirteenth-century "Mongol" population at 700,000 -- at a time when Mongol-controlled China had at least 75 million people). Rather than a nation the Mongols were a ruling caste in the broader ulus. The Chingisid principle was the "unifier," not nationhood. Flowing out from the Chingisid principle was the military organization of society, or, to put it another way, the convertibility of civilian into military existence. That in turn was founded on a way of life, nomadism.

The category of "Mongol" is further troubled by the evident assimilation of Mongol speakers. According to one scholar, Batu commanded 370,000 people, of whom maybe one-third were "Mongols." Another scholar acknowledges, however, that the number of Mongols proper remains a mystery. Indeed, the great Russian orientalist Vasilii Bartol'd emphasized that the majority of Mongol speakers probably returned to the traditional lands of Mongolia (for example, once Batu's European campaign was halted in the 1240s). In addition, Bartol'd concluded, "those Mongols who stayed behind in the conquered countries quickly lost their nationality," as the language of the "empire" underwent Turkification in the steppes and Central Asia. Logically, such assimilated Mongols might then merit the designation "Tatar," which would seem to signify Turkified Mongols as well as other long-ago Turkified peoples the Chingisid-led troops incorporated. The Tatars proper were not Turks, however,
but a tribe or group of Tungusic tribes who lived in northeastern Mongolia and fought incessantly with the Mongols (Chingis Khan's father appears to have been ambushed and killed by a Tatar). The Mongols never called themselves Tatars. It was the Chinese who used the name "Tatar" to refer to all their northern neighbors, and it seems that the European travelers to Mongol-ruled China, as well as Arab and Persian visitors, adopted and spread the generic Chinese designation. Note that the term Tatar was rooted in an opposition -- the barbarians north of China; the non-sedentary, nomadic peoples. It was in this oppositional sense that the west Europeans and Russians adopted "Tatar." The term Tatar, no less than "Mongol" or "Turk," expresses political relations.

An imposition that expressed fear and condescension, "Tatar" as a name implied a sense of unity and cohesion within the Mongol realm. Juji's ulus was never a unified or integrated entity, however. Rather, it was made up of various semi-independent ulus led by Batu's brothers and other relatives. At no point did all the parts unequivocally recognize the superordinate authority of Sarai, even if they sometimes stopped short of going to war. By the second half of the thirteenth century, internal wars became endemic. Tamerlane applied the coup de grace. Sometime thereafter, the ulus "fragmented," meaning that even nominal allegiance to a single khan ceased. This produced, in the east, various components independent of Sarai (and the object of contention among Kirghiz and Uzbegs), and in the west, several so-called "khanates" (Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimea), as well as other offshoots, among which was the Siberian "khanate." The "fragments" had always been fragments; what changed was the appearance, and to an extent the practice, of allegiance to a single authority.

Exactly when Muscovy ceased paying tribute to the Mongol-Tatars cannot be established, because the grand prince continued to collect it from his own people and no chronicle ever mentions that the payments to the ulus had stopped. Most analysts take the military date of 1480 (the so-called Stand on the Ugra). Such a dating is entirely retrospective, as is the very name of the entity from which Moscow would later declare itself "liberated." In the 1370s the Russians did not call the inhabitants of Kazan Tatars, but Kazanites. The inhabitants of Kazan became "Tatars" in the course of Moscow's struggle to conquer them, following the downfall of Sarai. Similarly, although some Russian chronicles of the thirteenth century did occasionally refer to a "Horde" (orda), just as often they wrote of Tataria. The use of the designation Horde became more frequent by the end of the fourteenth century, yet it was not definitively established until the so-called Kazan chronicle (Kazanskaia istoriia) written after Ivan IV took Kazan. In that sixteenth-century text we encounter for the first time the expression Golden Horde (zlataia orda). During the "Golden Horde's" existence, it was named variously in foreign sources and even in its own diplomatic correspondence -- but never the Golden Horde. Sometimes the reference would be to a specific ruler and his "Tatar" peoples. Sometimes the designation Tatar would be used to indicate a geographic location, as for example on extant Italian and Spanish maps of the fourteenth century where we find "Tataria." (Marco Polo wrote only of the "western" khan).

For a long time Russian sources wrote of the Tatars without directly acknowledging their subordination. By a close reading of extant sources, Charles Halperin has demonstrated that Muscovy and other principalities were deeply familiar with Tatar
politics and society. Russian princes, nobles, clergy, and merchants visited often. Russians rulers and clerics had to be expert in Chingisid dynasties as a condition of their power. They invoked the Chingisid principle when it was to their diplomatic advantage, and could not help but be impressed by earlier Mongol success in forging an empire. The Russians adapted many institutions, including the jam (postal network), tamga (tribute system), kazna (financial or budgetary system), organization of the field army, diplomatic etiquette and procedures, and bureaucratic organization. But subordination to the Mongols had no place in Muscovite ideology, which invoked Orthodoxy and autocracy, both of which were traced back to Kievan Rus.

Halperin adds that "the Muscovite state, though it depended heavily on institutions borrowed from the Tatars, did not come to resemble the Mongol state." Russia remained Christian and agricultural. "At the same time, however, Russia became multiconfessional. Muscovy had conquered and acquired various "Russian" principalities, many of which long retained specificities of their own (Novgorod, for example, kept its own currency). But the taking of "Tatar" Kazan served as a turning point, incorporating peoples professing faith in a powerful and distinct religious tradition. This confrontation, between Orthodox Christianity and Islam, provided Moscow an opportunity to articulate a providential mission (most ambitiously expressed in the notion of the Third Rome). It also enabled Moscow to turn the tables: among the more important dimensions of Moscow's justification of its conquest of Kazan was the assertion of its right of investiture of the khans -- the exact reverse of Muscovy's relationship with the Golden Horde. Eventually, Moscow would admit the period of its own subordination. The phrase "Tatar Yoke" (tatarskoe igo), however, does not appear before the seventeenth century. By then, references to "the Golden Horde" had become a means to glorify Muscovite expansion.

Scholars have not been able to fix the "borders" of the Golden Horde, or have done so only very vaguely using geographical information supplied by Arab sources in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (there is also a Chinese map from the fourteenth century). On European maps of Asia, various political entities are duly noted, but there is no effort to indicate the "borders" separating them. Nonetheless, one historical geographer has pressed forward, noting that the Mongols signed agreements with Riazan recognizing episcopal spheres and the right to collect church duties (divided among the Sarai and Riazan metropolitans), and that they seem to have maintained guards at some kind of "border" with the Rus principalities. At the same time, however, this scholar admits that many steppe peoples migrated, seeking to create "neutral zones" between themselves and the Mongols, a process the Mongols welcomed. All of this suggests that the effort to establish the Golden Horde's borders is anachronistic because they had no such concept. As Howorth wrote, "among nomadic races, territorial provinces are not so well recognized as tribal ones. A potentate distributes his clans, not his acres, among his children. Each of these has of course its camping ground, but the exact limits are not to be definitely measured."

Juji's ulus, notwithstanding its Islamicization, was less a state with borders than a perpetual standing army, an agglomeration of peoples for whom military and civilian life were not clearly distinguished. There were notions of extremities and of lands that were located beyond those that were conducive to pastoralism, but no fixed state boundaries. The ulus was "nonbounded." Its rule, although nominally exclusive, did
not preclude multiple sovereignty (some peoples levied by the Horde could wind up paying tribute to others). There were intermediate zones of interaction, what in the case of the American Indians has been called "middle ground." *46

**Russian "Conquest" 1580-1760**

In narratives of Siberia conquest, the earliest orthodoxy was set down by Gerhard Mueller in the early eighteenth century (and codified by Sergei Solov’ev in the nineteenth). It emphasized the military-political dimension, and the state's supposed leading role. *47 To this was added, in the early nineteenth-century, reinforced nationalist celebrations of the "Cossack" Yermak (who in fact had conquered nothing and then died). *48 Then, in the early twentieth century Sergei Bakhrushin used the local sources Mueller had consulted to demonstrate the role of merchants and traders, from the Stroganovs on down. *49 Finally, groups of Soviet historians (most prominently Viktor I. Shunkov) stressed the contribution of peasants. *50 Whether led by the autocracy, the "bourgeoisie," or the "people", the idea of a forward march of history was challenged only by nineteenth-century Siberian patriots, who directed attention to native peoples and to Moscow's exploitation of Siberia, but without displacing the larger narrative of conquest. *51

Perhaps the most persistent historiographic controversy swirled around whether the brigand Yermak acted on his own initiative, or was a hireling of the Stroganov family. Whatever the case, the key point is that Moscow had its attention turned elsewhere (toward what it considered as the far bigger prize of the Baltic). Thus, far-reaching powers were accorded to the Kama-based family of salt merchants known as the Stroganovs, whose private votochina (two-thirds the size of sixteenth-century England) acted in the name of the state -- a situation analogous to the British East India Company. The Stroganov-financed forays, which renewed earlier explorations of the Novgorodians, *52 were a matter of garnering personal profits and expanding state revenues, in the name of forestalling raids. *53 Opportunism, more than aggrandizement of the tsar's realm, may have served as the main motivation.

More successful raids followed Ermak's. "Russians," who included Livonians, Poles, Latvians, Mordvinians, and others, poked their way into unmapped lands where most of the indigenes lived in small agglomerations. *54 Some "tribes" were little more than elaborate extended families led by elders (the leaders of larger groupings were referred to by the Russians as princelings [kniazhtsy]). Prior to the Russian arrival, many tribes fought each other over hunting and fishing grounds or to settle vendettas, while a few extracted tribute (iasak) from others. The Russians' modus operandi was akin to that of a powerful tribe: seize or demand hostages (preferably elders), and command an oath of loyalty to the tsar plus tribute for the Russian state as well as "gifts" for themselves. The Russians also helped themselves to native women, and pressed the natives into labor service or slavery. If the natives refused, the Russians employed gunpowder -- in the name of God and tsar.

Similarities with the Mongols jump to mind. Everything the Russians did was predicated on their uncompromising certainty in their mandate to rule, and thus in compelling submission of anyone they came across. The harshest methods -- assassination, massacre -- were considered as legitimate, although eliciting voluntary compliance was preferred. Like the Mongols, the Russians appropriated everything
they found. And like the Golden Horde khans (or the Ching emperors, for that matter), Russian soldiers insisted on symbolic forms of obeisance, such as the removal of one's hat when the name of the tsar was mentioned. But once formal poddanstvo was settled, the Russians usually did not interfere in internal affairs, relying on natives to "rule" themselves. Indeed, encountering the absence of a strong native leader, the Russians usually promoted one who would never be able to overthrow them but could control his own people and insure tribute payments (while himself reaping rewards). Trade, from which native rulers prospered, encouraged their comprador status and the dependence of their tribes on Russian rule. The Russians also proved adept at pitting one tribe against another. In short, the Russians, were (of necessity) flexible in practice while unequivocal in principle.

Like the Golden Horde in its dealings with Rus, the Russians did not seek to appoint one of their own (Riurikid or Romanov relative) to rule the tribes from whom they collected tribute. Thus Russian rule resembled the indirect style of the Horde rather than the direct style of the earlier greater Mongol ulus. But unlike the Horde, the Russians occupied the harsh lands they claimed to have conquered. To facilitate the collection of what the Russians (adopting the preexisting name) called iasak, they built a series of enlarged winter cabins (zimov'e) and forts. The latter, strategically located on a bluff that usually overlooked a river, were connected by defense lines. But the forts were vulnerable, especially in spring and summer, when the Russian population went out to fish and farm. And though the garrisoned troops farmed to feed themselves, for a very long time they remained dependent on an imported food supply. Indeed, if the appeal of furs can be said to have drawn the Russian east, once their presence had been established, the search for food became the force driving them all the way to America and Japan. This made the Russian "conquest" precarious for a long time.

The Russians had better weapons than most of the peoples they encountered, but they were, like the Mongols, vastly outnumbered. The only way for the Russians to have held their positions or gained new ones was by co-optation. Just as the Golden Horde armies were full of Slavs, Circassians, Magyars, among others, so the "Russian" armies were made up of numerous indigenes commanded by Europeans. Moreover, though the Russians may have seemed reckless, for the most part they acted cautiously whenever they encountered serious resistance. Frequently, while dealing with one group, the Russians were raided or assaulted by another. Formal submission by the natives, in other words, had to be permanently enforced and was occasionally reversed. For quite some time, many native chiefs understood submission to the tsar as a military alliance rather than an act of subordination. Seventeenth-century Siberia has been called "a large military camp." But Siberia more closely resembled a largely untouched expanse criss-crossed by an archipelago of poorly connected forts, from which Russian troops conducted raids.

Russia's eastward lurch across the Urals began with the "overthrow" of something they called the Siberian khanate, which along with the Tobol khanate, seems to have been "formed" towards the end of the fifteenth century from remnants of the Golden Horde. Gobbling up its Tobol neighbor, the Siberian khanate claimed suzerainty over an area bounded by the Tobol, Tura, Irtys, and Om' Rivers. It seems to have become very extensive by the mid-sixteenth century (its "power" extended west into the land of the Mansy, and north into the lands of the Khanty). Because it occupied forested
areas, its inhabitants did not have large livestock herds. Hunters and fishers (with some primitive farming), they did not require large grazing territories and thus concerted military-political action. According to an analysis of fur-tribute returns, the "khanate" had a population of around 5,000 at the time of contact with the Russians. Other sources indicate a figure of 30,000 (probably including their non-Tatar subjects).

The Siberian khan directly ruled only a small number of ulus. Most commoners were subordinated to their own princelings, who were technically vassals, and occasionally relatives, of the khan. Paying iasak to the khan that they collected from their own people, these princelings exercised independent authority in their ulus. Some vassals were more like allies of the khan and at the least sign of trouble, they deserted or betrayed him. When the Russians finally defeated Kuchum (a Chingisid) in the 1580s, his vassals hurried to offer their service to their new masters. Even more than not having to face these troops in battle, Moscow was glad to be able to employ them for iasak collection in the name of the Russian state. The native troops became known as "service Tatars." By the 1660s, their privileged positions were declining, and they rose up, perhaps dreaming of a return to their own "khanate," which they had helped destroy.

Once the Siberian khanate had been pushed aside and its troops co-opted, Russians penetrated deeper by means of the remarkable river systems. There were two basic routes. The first was northerly into the taiga, with its rich fur-bearing animals, a path that led to the establishment of Berezov (1593), Mangazeia (1601), and Turukhansk (1607). Direct expansion into the frigid, forested, sparsely populated northern lands marked a departure, for although the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Mongols had encouraged the revitalization of the fur trade in the thick forests of northern Asia, they themselves rarely ventured there. No sooner had the Russians opened up this northern route, however, than they closed it down, apparently fearing that it would be used by foreign powers, especially the English, approaching from the Arctic Sea. Thus, Russia came to rule the far north indirectly. It was the more southerly route into the forested steppe and the steppe proper, with their denser populations, that the Russians sought most actively to follow.

Traveling on the Ob, they founded Surgut (1594), Narym (1598), and -- during the smuta -- Tomsk (1604), the latter established only with the active collaboration of Tatars. By the mid-seventeenth century Tomsk had 1,045 inhabitants, a majority of whom were "service personnel" (meaning all manner of hobo and hooligan). Despite its favorable natural setting, however, Tomsk was slow to develop. The territory of the wider Tomsk uezd continued to be the object of a fierce struggle between the administration of the city and the neighboring nomads for the right to exploit the local hunters and fishermen. A path across to the Pacific was traversed, but the south and southeast were blocked. True, the Russians founded Kuznetsk (1618), but its paltry number of peasants were unable to farm more than a few kilometers from the fort. And the next Russian effort to found a fort further south (on the Biia River) was unsuccessful. Tomsk and Kuznetsk, even more than other Siberian forts, remained "islands of Russian power in a wide alien sea."

Territorially, Kuznetsk uezd, which grew significantly over the seventeenth century,
was one of the smallest in all Siberia in area, yet its total population was equal to the
grandiose Tobolsk uzed, and greater than almost all the other uzeds of Siberia. The
meager number of Russians and their Tatar collaborators in Tomsk and Kuznetsk had
no choice but to "tolerate" iasak collection by other groups among the natives. The
powerful indigenous nomads roamed in the areas north of Kuznetsk, cutting it off
from other Russians forts and subjecting it (and Tomsk) to raids, while many tribes
nominally subject to Russian iasak eluded collection parties by temporarily migrating
south, beyond reach of Russian soldiers. *70 Though the Russians received instructions
to map their "annexed territories" as early as 1626, across the entire south they were
unable to define a state border. *71

It bears recalling that, following the taking of Kazan and Astrakhan in the 1550s, the
Russians had encountered stiff resistance in their eager efforts to penetrate further
southeast below the Urals. It was not until the establishment of the Orenburg fort and
defense line in the 1730s, after nearly a century of warfare and precarious open-steppe
settlement, that the southeastern steppe frontier was "secured" (and then, only with
the help of large contingents of "native" forces). *72 Much the same can be said about
the course of events following the (less momentous) vanquishing of the Siberian
"khanate" in the 1580s. In their drive across the Urals towards the Irtysh, Ob, and
Enisei, the Russians moved quickly through the north and then part of the way south,
but they were then "stalled" in the south for more than a century. Only the forced
departure of the Kirgiz in 1703 to Jungaria -- present-day Altai and northern Sinkiang
-- opened the way for Russians. *73 Taking advantage of the Kirgiz disappearance as
well as Jungarian struggles with China, the Russians finally built a series of forts on
the Irtysh (Omsk, Semipalatinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk), and belatedly founded
Bikatunsk (later Biisk) in 1709, followed by Chausk (later Kolyvan) in 1713 and
Barnaul in 1739. Yet Jungaria continued to claim the territories in which Russians
built their forts, and the southern border, although extended, remained ambiguously
defined.

Most general accounts maintain that the Russians faced no rivals until they reached
the fringes of the Chinese empire, but the Russians were confronted by the formidable
nomad-warriors of the steppe. In the Kirgiz lands (Kirgizskaia zemlia), a sort of loose
assemblage of tribal principalities, the Russians pressed the nomads to pay iasak. *74
The Kirgiz answered that they did not pay, only their vassals did. Russian officials
wrote to Moscow begging for more troops. Meanwhile, the Kalmyks (also called
Oirats), *75 who were more populous than the Kirgiz and roamed from Astrakhan to
China, presented an even more formidable challenge, riding into battle with a
mobility reminiscent of the thirteenth-century Mongols. *76 As the extent of Kirgiz
and then Kalmyk military capabilities became clearer, Moscow instructed the Tomsk
voevoda to be cautious and prohibited Kalmyk and Kirgiz leaders from traveling to
the Russian capital as emissaries, lest they learn the route and then return to pillage.
It was also stipulated that the nomads not be let into Siberian forts, lest they inspect the
fortifications. *77 Stubbornly refusing to retreat from its insistence on nothing less than
the Kalmyks' complete submission, Moscow perforce fell back on a complicated
diplomacy of playing off the Kirgiz, Kalmyks, Kazakhs, and Chinese. *78 Muscovy's
garrisons in Siberia remained small, poorly equipped, and targets for the more
numerous Kalmyks.

Russia was not strong enough to enforce its will over the "khanate" of Jungaria
(1630s-1750s), which had up to 200,000 households (about 50,000 had migrated to the Volga). But fortunately for the Russians, the Kalmyks/Oirats were pressured from the east (China) and the west (Turkic peoples), fighting the Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Altyn (Golden) Khan, and others. Despite desperately wanting Russian military help against China, the Jungarian khan refused to declare himself a subject of Russia. In the 1750s, after a century of constant warfare, the Manchu Ching took advantage of the latest in a long line of Jungarian succession crises. Intrigues among the Jungarians over the throne led to an opportunity for Chinese intervention, which resulted in the near total destruction of the Oirat people. The Ching sent a huge army, perhaps 200,000 men, slaughtered the population, divided the territory into provinces, and left. Altogether, the Ching reduced the Oirats from perhaps 600,000 people to 30-40,000, the latter being those who managed to flee into Russian territory. Kazakhs competed with the Russians to carry off surviving Oirat livestock.

Jungarian refugees, and former peoples subject to them, sought refuge on territories the Russians considered their own, and Russia made little effort to interdict and turn them back. Yet the Russian commander in Siberia had advised the tsarist government against the reception of Jungarian refugees, since with the pursuit of the Chinese Russia faced the spread of Chinese power throughout Turkestan, Kazakhstan, and the rest of Central Asia. The Ching, however, halted their march! Their expansion beyond eastern Turkestan was not precluded by Russian might, but by Ching fears of a possible uprising in their Mongolian (Khalka) rear. With the Ching army gone and the Oirats virtually exterminated, the Russians moved finally advanced south, consolidating their hold on southern Siberia up to the mountains (on the other side of which lay the Mongolian plateau). In the southern regions of west Siberia, the Chinese, far from providing the principal resistance to Russian advance (as in the Amur), removed the menacing nomads.

The Chinese accomplished what the Russians could not (smash Jungaria), without doing what the Russians feared (replacing Jungaria with an even stronger power). But having sought to overcome their centuries-long torment at the hands of nomads, the Chinese now had to confront a power less densely populated and less fierce in battle, yet more organized politically. For the Chinese, the Russians were, in a way, more manageable than the nomads, however, since they too possessed notions of fixed borders (as the Russians demonstrated in the 1850s treaties establishing the Russian annexation of the Amur). Notwithstanding Muraviev's exploit, expansion and warfare were not inherent to the Russian way of life, but a matter of political ambition. The Russians and Chinese could understand each other. Their actions, proceeding from opposite ends of the continent, formed a kind of collaboration. Beginning with the Chinese eviction of the Mongol Yuan dynasty and the Russian victories of the Golden Horde and its remnants (the Kazan and Siberian khanates), China and Russia together battered and finally subdued the nomads of Eurasia in the geopolitical space carved out by Chingis Khan.

From Tartary to Siberia
When the Dutchman Nicolaas K. Witsen, who served as a diplomat in Russia in 1664-54 and 1667, published his map of that great country's eastern regions, he called them "Tartary." Even to the Russians -- for whom in the early eighteenth century it was still unclear how far their eastern regions extended (perhaps they connected to America) -- eastern natives were all thought to be "Tatars," and references were made
to the land of Great Tartary. *83 Yet Russia's conquests in north Asia came to be known not as Tartary but as Siberia.

As a geographical term Siberia is mentioned in the fourteenth century among Arab writers, as both Sibir and Ibir. In Russian manuscripts the word Sibir can be found in 1407 and again in 1483. But there is no consensus on its origins or meaning. In the seventeenth century, Savva Esipov claimed that the term derived from a population point on the shores of the Irtysh River, a tributary known as the Sibirka. Later, others said it was a Tatar word. Still others, that it was Mongol term, meaning swamp. In fact, the Mongols used "Shibir" in the thirteenth century Secret History as the name of a people, not a place. *84 The linguist Pavel I. Shafarik, in the nineteenth century, wrote that the term came from the Gunsk tribe known as the "sabir" or Seber, known to the Byzantine chroniclers. *85 Other scholars have also argued that the word designated a people, the Sybyr, from the Irtysh basin. *86 In other words, the name of a people from the Irtysh, variously known as the Sypyr, Siopyr, Sabir, became a geographical designation, "Sibirkaia zemlia," for the area inhabited by descendants of the Sypyr. *87 Some part of this area was conquered by "Tatar" descendants of the Golden Horde, who in turn were conquered by the Russians. For the lands east of the Urals, rather than "Tartary" -- the name that became known in western Europe -- the Russians adopted and then propagated the name Siberia. At first it had a limited application, but subsequently spread with the Russians across north Asia to the Pacific Ocean.

Such naming, however "fortuitous," opens up many questions, for which comparisons with the New World may be illuminating. Russia's eastern drive took place about sixty years after the Spanish conquest of Mexico, and twenty years before the first French and English colonies in North America. In the New World, disease, particularly smallpox, proved to be the most formidable, albeit inadvertent weapon, in clearing the space for the creation of Neo-Europes. *88 Thanks in part to the Mongols, the Eurasian steppe nomads had never been as cutoff from other centers of civilization as the inhabitants of the New World. In Siberia smallpox played a role (usually in the more isolated far north), but Russian-spread germs did not cause a catastrophic "great dying" as in the Americas. Indeed, the peoples of Eurasia had assimilated many influences of older civilizations, Turkic, Mongol, and Chinese -- differentiating them from native Americans and Australian aborigines. *89 Entering these realms, the Russians recorded and used the various "indigenous" names, including Siberia. "Unlike the discoverers of New Spain, New England, and New France," one researcher has written, "the seventeenth-century Russian Cossacks did not endeavor to dissolve [their] new world into the old by renaming, destroying, or converting it."

Russian motivations remain a matter of dispute. For the formation and layering of Russia's imperial mentality, the fall of Kazan was a conceptual turning point. Here the conquest narrative appears in full force, as does the defeated foil (the "Tatars"), against which to glorify Orthodoxy's mission. With the push into Siberia we find a similar story of "conquest," beginning almost immediately with the "overthrow" of the Siberian khanate. But the Siberian case is more ambiguous, less assured, than that of Kazan. Rather than a single, dramatic oppositional culture or political entity that is overcome, we find the pursuit of private gain and Moscow's greedy acceptance of vast fur wealth (perhaps one-third of all state revenues *81). Among Muscovite ruling
circles in the seventeenth century, there may have arisen ideas about a possible sea route from Mangazeia to India, and even of the conquest of China, as well as less preposterous yet still grand illusions about becoming middlemen in trade between Europe and Asia (like the Dutch, Portuguese, and English). But Siberia was no India, and though the founding of Orenburg and the disappearance of Junagaria did finally open a path to Bukhara, Russia did not manage to move aggressively into Turkestan, let alone India, until the middle of the nineteenth century.

In many ways Siberia and the transcontinental Russian empire were more a creation of the eighteenth century than the late sixteenth or seventeenth. Peter the Great changed Muscovy's name and proclaimed Russia an imperia in the 1720s (following the victory over Sweden). In the 1730s Vasilii Tatishchev moved the Europe/Asia boundary from the Don River to the Urals. Crucially, the efforts begun in the 1740s to link Siberian forts by means of post stations gave way by the 1760s to the Great Siberian Post Road (Trakt) from Moscow to Iakutsk (eventually). The precursor to the Transsiberian Railroad, the Post Road consumed innumerable lives and rubles as a swath was cut through the taiga and given a surface regular enough to accommodate wheeled-traffic. But the flow of hardy peasant migrants who braved the frontier increased substantially. This was a demographic and human-geographic turning point. [See table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1622</td>
<td>173,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>196,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1662</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>393,000</td>
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<td>1709</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>229,127</td>
<td>429,227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>297,810</td>
<td>527,810</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1796-97</td>
<td>363,362</td>
<td>575,800</td>
<td>939,162</td>
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<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>434,000</td>
<td>1,100,500</td>
<td>1,534,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>648,000</td>
<td>2,288,036</td>
<td>2,936,036</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>870,536</td>
<td>4,889,633</td>
<td>5,760,169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>972,866</td>
<td>8,393,469</td>
<td>9,366,335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The path was cleared for peasant settlers to appropriate and convert to agriculture the prized nomad grazing lands, whose milder climate and rich soils were ideal for farming.

The spread of agriculture was fundamental. Agriculture appears to have been introduced into northern Eurasia sometime around 2000 B.C.E. The Chinese, and later their Mongol overlords, provided a considerable boost, importing seeds, implements,
and labor power (the lands of the Mongolian plateau seem to have served as a kind of laboratory for the crop cultures that were then transplanted farther north and west). This cultivation took place in the southernmost regions of Siberia, namely the Amur basin, Minusinsk hollow (between the Kuznetsk Alatau and Tian-Shan Mountains), as well as in the lowlands of the Altai (the ancestral home of Turkic-Mongol peoples). But with the end of the Pax Mongolica and the turning inward of China, Siberian agriculture ceased to develop further and in many places disappeared (to be discovered only by archaeologists). At the time of the Russian arrival, only the "Tatars" in far western Siberia were engaged in plough [pashennoe], as opposed to hoe [motyzhnnoe] cultivation. The Russians would completely transform north Asia into a predominantly agricultural region.

In the seventeenth century, however, Russian farming in Siberia was concentrated mostly in the Upper Tura-Tobol basin, just east of the Urals. True, each Russian fort further along the river system toward the Ob and then Enisei had small forest-cleared fields, but they were surrounded by bogs and beset by a horrendous climate (at Narym in 1639, for example, frosts wiped out the crops before they could be harvested, and the absence of seeds delayed the resumption of agriculture). Only with the defeat of southern nomads and the clearing of the Siberian Post Road did Russian agriculture expand beyond the inhospitable areas far north of where pre-Russian agriculture had been developed. With the Post Road, Tobolsk ceased to be the primary site of Siberian farming, as the center of gravity shifted toward the Altai. Here, south of Tomsk, no less than in St. Petersburg, the foundations of Russia's imperial reach were laid.

Beyond agriculture there were minerals. Following the construction of forts at Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk (1716-1720) that helped make the left tributaries of the upper Ob accessible, copper ore was discovered. In 1726 the Urals-based Akinfii Demidov received the tsar's permission to open mines and a smelting factory in the south Siberian region named Kolyvan-Voskresensk. In 1747, Demidov's valuable property was outright confiscated by the dynasty, which was intent on pumping out the recently discovered region's gold and silver (in the hopes they would replace the formerly abundant fur as a source of revenue). The imperial mines needed an enormous labor force, which they found in the agricultural settlers who made their way to the rich Altai. Peasants of the entire region were attached (pripiisany) to the mines (and later factories) of Kolyvan. The peasants paid for the "right" to work the land with seasonal labor service for the mining administration. By 1800, the Kolyvan had grown to be larger than England, Holland, and several other European countries.

Like Orenburg, at one end of the open steppe, Barnaul, at another, became an axis of Russian imperial power. In the 1850s, Petr Petrovich Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, the chairman of the Russian Geographical Society for forty years (1873-1914), who had studied in Berlin 1850s (von Humboldt and Karl Ritter) and traveled to Switzerland, undertook expeditions to the Jungarian Alatau and Tian-Shan mountains. They were virtually terra incognita for Europeans (plenty of information was available in Chinese sources). Semenov portrayed Omsk as a military city (Sparta) and Barnaul as its opposite -- highly cultured, with a flourishing population of cultivated mining engineers. He conceded, of course, that nineteenth-century Siberia was a long way from Ancient Athens. But he neglected to mention that the mining and (separate)
forest administration personnel of the Altai wore military uniforms and had military ranks. "It was a military regime, a form of politics and economy that was clumsy, heavy-handed, self-defeating, but not altogether unable to achieve its goals. In short, it was Russia. But what was "Russia"?"

Just as in the New World (or in the European colonies of Asia), most Russian officials in Siberia relied on native women, whom they bedded, as translators and go-betweens, and with whom they had children. Beyond the Siberian elite, there appears to have been a significant, if hard to quantify, incidence of intermarriage and concubinage, producing mestizo children. "Women were needed in large numbers," wrote one nineteenth century commentator. "And Russian women were in extremely short supply." During armed conflicts as well as the normal course of business, Russians in Siberia took native women and girls into custody as prisoners of war or hostages. (Moscow's written prohibitions against maintaining female slaves testified to the practice, and did nothing to curtail it.) Many women were taken for profitable sale. Females of all ages appeared on the markets in the major Siberian urban centers, including Tomsk. "It is likely that native women not only bore mestizo children, but raised many of the children of European parents."

To be sure, the Russians did not assimilate into the native settings to the degree that the Mongols had during their earlier sweep across Eurasia in the other direction. Most Russians remained speakers of the Russian language and Orthodox Christians. And unlike the Mongols, the Russians sought to convert the natives from shamanism to Orthodoxy. But missionary zeal in Siberia did not approach the level in the Americas. Relatively few Siberian natives converted, and even those who did often did not break with their shamanistic practices. For their part, the Russians did not always push the matter, since converts acquired the right to stop paying iasak. (Anyway, in the Altai, the site of the most extensive Orthodox mission, there were tens of thousands of Russian Old Believers who rejected Orthodoxy and had emigrated or been deported to Siberia.) In short, there was Russification of the natives, but it was less than total, and at the same time, there was a degree of "Eurasianization" of the Russians -- the hierarchy and domination notwithstanding. In southern Siberia -- Kuznetsk, Biisk, and Barnaul uezds -- the mixing appears to have been extensive, judging by the "strange" Russian spoken by the "Russians" there.

Nikolai Iadrintsev famously asserted that European-native intermarriage, combined with unique environmental conditions, had resulted in the advent of a Siberian "ethnic type," distinguished by its physical features, dialect, hardiness, and attitude or spirit -- an argument not dissimilar to portrayals of the settlers on the American frontier. But Iadrintsev advanced his claims just as the railroad was about to bring millions of Slavic settlers from European Russia who would overwhelm the natives and the Eurasianist populace. By the time "Eurasianism" as a rallying cry was invented in the second decade of the twentieth century, it served as little more than a justification for Russian imperialism. All the same, despite the devastation that the Russians effected, their empire in Siberia, in contrast to the Americas, was not predicated on extermination. Siberian natives were brutalized and pushed off the land, but many managed to survive, and they retained a sense of their non-Russianness. Some Siberian peoples even flourished. The Russians, for their part, incorporated manifold indigenes into armies and administration. Quite simply, the Russians could not have gotten by without the native manpower, or the women. Their "conquest" of Siberia...
was not, and could not be, a sudden and near-total displacement. In sum, whereas the New World populations mostly disappeared, Russian conquest left an ethnic and linguistic mosaic -- different from the one they encountered, but a mosaic all the same. Siberia was not, in that sense, America.

**Closing Remarks**

Not long after the Kolyvan area had been opened to mining and Russian settlement, Gerhard Mueller paid a visit. Mueller's mid-eighteenth-century travels to put Siberian administrative archives in order and write a history signified the onset of a more vigorous posture in north Asia by Russia. In the strategic Kolyvan region, Mueller noted the presence of numerous Mongol/Tatar burial sites. *108 Had the Russians in effect replaced the Mongols? Looking over the period 1200-1800 from the vantage point of the center of Eurasia, such questions themselves begin to acquire a history.

A Russian, a Mongol, a Tatar -- these are all, as we have seen, political categories, designations backed up with armies, tax or tribute extraction, and narratives, which were as much a structure of empire as bureaucratic mechanisms. Not only are all categories political, but they are utterly interdependent, defined in relation (usually opposition) to each other. In other words, categories are neither imaginary ideas that shape reality nor a mere reflection of realities, but themselves a reality. Indeed, to contrast the Mongol and Russian empires is itself a political act, a way of telling a story, ostensibly to explain or glorify Russia, for that is who came out on top and history is most often written backward, by the victors.

Writing forward rather than backward and stopping at 1800, however, it emerges that the "Russians," in the process of becoming the Russians, half-knowingly pushed -- simultaneously arrogant and circumspect -- into lands where the Mongols had once imprinted the idea of an integrated empire founded on kinship. But unlike the Mongols from whom they borrowed so much and against whom they learned to define themselves, the Russians sought to introduce a new weapon: the idea of territory, of defining borders, mapping. Moving east beginning with Kazan, Russia did not simply subordinate but "annexed" (in defending the Kazan annexation, the Russians created a story of land-holding precedents). The Russians, in other words, planted the flag (just as the Europeans did in the Americas). In far-off southern Siberia, however, Russian efforts to define borders and demarcate their territory long met little success. Not until the eighteenth century did the Russians break through in the south, and even then the process of defining boundaries was anything but clear cut. Here, the Russians were compelled to suffer multiple sovereignty in practice.

Russian power in valuable parts of Eurasia long remained indistinguishable from that of other regional tribute collectors. Yet with time differences made themselves felt, particularly owing to the "hordes" of peasant migrants -- hindered more than assisted by state power -- who helped to consolidate Russia's territorial claims. *109 Another key difference was Russian political organization. Russia's neighbor to the west, the great sixteenth-century Spanish monarchy -- the most powerful in Europe -- has been called not a single, centralized entity, but a kind of "federation" of members bound to a single sovereign but each with their own laws and institutions, even different
aspirations in international policy. Such a description fits the Golden Horde far more than it does post-Horde Muscovy/Russia, for despite the efforts of Chingis Khan, the Mongols could not sustain the kind of autocracy that the Russians built up - after the Golden Horde had disintegrated -- and managed to implant in far off Siberia. Russia's ability to cast the spell, symbolism, and political will of an integrated if chaotic realm over northern Eurasia enabled the imperial metropole, and its local officials, to take advantage of the transformation of the space effected by peasants.

Peasants had their own dreams, which overlapped, but only partially, with the autocracy's imperial mission. Many of the peasants who ended up performing involuntary labor services for the Kolyvan factories and mines had fled from European Russia, either for religious reasons, like the Old Believers, or to escape serfdom. Confronted by obligatory labor service, some fled again, into the Altai Mountains, looking for the fabulously rich and completely free country of legend, Belovod'a. But most made the best of their lot without the freedom, and with the riches largely appropriated by the state and its officers. As for the "native peoples" of Siberia, for whom there is no collective name (such as American Indians), many of them also harbored fantasies of escape, or of the return of their former "golden khan."

Peasant agriculture provided the indispensable scaffolding for the Russian imperial mission. Later, in the middle of the twentieth century, agriculture would be replaced by industry as the dominant form of existence in Siberia, and the region's center of gravity would shift yet again, from the Kolyvan to the coal-rich Kuznetsk basin. The imperial mission, which greatly inspired the push for Siberian industrialization, emerged considerably enhanced by the shift (for a time). Disaggregating the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, we can see that Russia's imperial trajectory was achieved far more haltingly and ambiguously than allowed by the contemporary or retrospective narratives. In particular, the conquest of Siberia added immensely to the size of Russia, and in Russia the size of empire was equated with political power, but there was also ambivalence, a fear of too much space and an inability to master it, a sense of drain, a curse as much as an opportunity.

Notes

1. Michael Charol, writing under the pseudonym Prawdin, pointed out that the geopolitical "heritage" of Chingis Khan was split between Russian and China, with (Outer) Mongolia as a kind of geo-strategic pivot in between. Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp. 518, 545-49. China's somewhat underappreciated role in facilitating Russia's eastern advance is addressed below.
2. For example, V. P. Zinov'ev, ed., Tomskaia oblast': Istoricheskii ocherk (Tomsk, 1994); or Istoriia Kuzbassa 3 vols. (Kemerovo, 1967-70). In a larger format, the single chapter becomes volume one. A. P. Okladnikov et al., Istoriia Sibiri, 5 vols. (Leningrad, 1968-69).
3. What follows forms part of the background for my research project on western Siberia entitled "Blacksmith Basin: Empire and Modernity on the Slavic/Inner Asian Frontier 1500-2000."
4. George V. Lantzeff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century (Berkeley: University
of California, 1943).
8. According to Boyle, assemblage of the texts of the Secret History may have begun around 1241 and been more or less completed in 1251-52. Boyle, The Mongol World Empire, pp. 136-37. There are translations into various European languages, including English. Francis W. Cleaves, trans., The Secret History of the Mongols, Part I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
11. Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century 4 parts (London: Longman, Green, 1876, 1880, 1888, 1927). Before Howorth there was J. Deguignes, Histoire generale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mongols et des autres Tatares occidentaux, ouvrage tire des livres chinois (Paris, 1756-58), and C. d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-khan jusqu'a Timour Bey ou Tamerlane 4 vols. (The Hague and Amsterdam: Les Freres van Cleef, 1834-35). For more recent overviews by specialists, see Bertold Spuler, History of the Mongols, Based on Eastern and Western Accounts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (Berkeley: University of

20. Vladimirtsov, Obshchestvennyi stroi, pp. 56, 97-100. V. V. Bartol'd argued that notions of political unity are "alien" to nomadic peoples. Sochineniia, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1968), pp. 22-23. I have slightly reformulated this point. For a discussion of the "stages" of nomad statehood that culminate in "feudalism," see German A. Fedorov-Davydov, Obshchestvennyi stroi zolotoi ordy (Moscow, 1973), pp. 16-17.
28. Historians disagree on why Batu ceased his European conquest. Most surmise that news of the death of the Great Khan Ogedei -- which reached Batu in 1242 -- prompted his withdrawal, for he needed to travel to Karakorum for the election of a new great khan. But Russian historians have speculated that Batu's forces were exhausted from the wars and the resistance they had met in the plains of southern Rus and elsewhere. These analysts point out that Batu did not, in fact, hurry back to Karakorum, but settled down in the steppes. In their reading, news of Ogedei's death merely served as an excuse for retreat. S. L. Tikhvinskii, "Tataro-Mongolskie zavoevaniia v Azii i Evrope," in Tataro-Mongoly, pp. 3-26. See also Boyle, "The Mongols and Europe" (1259) in The Mongol World Empire, pp. 339-40. Denis Sinor has suggested that the Hungarian plain could not sustain a large nomadic army. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History," Oriens Extremus, 19, 1972, pp. 171-83.
29. See the breakthrough study by Bertold Spuler, Die Goldene Horde: die Mongolen in Russland, 1223-1502 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965), originally published 1943.
30. It wasn't until F. K. Brun in 1878 that the existence of two different cities named Sarai was explained. Brun, "Chernomor'e," in Sbornik issledovanii po istoricheskoi geografii iuzhnoi Rossii, 2 vols. (Odessa, 1879-80). For the controversy, see G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, Obshchestvennyi stroi zolotoi ordy (Moscow, 1973), pp. 79-80.
32. Allsen, "The Yuan Dynasty," p. 245. William McNeill suggests that the Mongol population was ravaged in the fourteenth century by the Black Death, for whose spread the Mongols were inadvertently responsible. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1976).
33. M. G. Safargaliev, Raspad zolotoi ordy (Saransk [Mordovia], 1960), p. 35.
35. V. V. Bartol'd, "Istoriia turetsko-mongolskikh narodov," in Sochineniia, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1968), pp. 211-12; Fedorov-Davydov, Obshchestvennyi stroi
zolotoi ordy, p. 173. See also J. Von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte der Goldener Horde in Kiptschak (Pesth, 1840), pp. 32-33.

36. The Europeans added an "r," forming "Tartars," a pun on the mythological Tartarus or River of Hell, whence the Tatars were disparingly said to have originated. Howorth, History of the Mongols, Part I, pp. 25-26.


38. After 1480 embassies continued to be exchanged, but their purposes are unclear. The last khan of the Horde died in 1505. Halperin, Tatar Yoke, p. 150.

39. At first a "horde" for the Mongols did not mean a state, but the headquarters of the khan, i.e., something narrower than an ulus. Only in the fifteenth century did it come to mean the entire "state." See Vladimirstov, Obshchestvennyi stroi, pp. 98-99; and Fedorov-Davydov, Obshchestvennyi stroi zolotoi ordy, pp. 43-51, 63-64, 112, 118-19. Von Hammer tried to explain the derivation of "horde" from hearth and yurt, so that an assemblage of yurts became known as an ordu or orda. Von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte, pp. 32-33.

40. Halperin, The Golden Horde, pp. 88-97. He clears away many myths, pointing out that far from isolating Rus, the Mongols facilitated an active caravan trade and contacts with Europe and the rest of the Orient. See also Howorth, The History, Part II, pp. 215, 348-49. For accounts of Persian, Arabic, and other traders and diplomats, as well as nineteenth-century Russian efforts to interpret the "Tatar yoke," see V. G. Tizengauzen, Sbornik materialov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii zolotoi ordy vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1884).


42. Halperin, The Tatar Yoke, pp. 21-22. As Halperin has written elsewhere, the Russians borrowed more extensively from the Golden Horde than the Chinese or Iranians from the Yuan and Ilkhanids. He emphasized not the slight Mongol influence on the Russians but, in comparative perspective, the slight Russian influence on the Mongols. Halperin, "Russia in the Mongol Empire," pp. 250, 261. Under Peter the Great, many of the various Tatar-inspired institutions were remodeled by conscious adaptations of western Europe examples.


47. G. F. Miller, Istoriia Sibiri, vol. 1 (Leningrad, 1937), chapter 1, pp. 169 ff. As Bakhruhin noted, Mueller was allowed to collect documents freely, but was subject to censorship and the guidelines of his patron, the Russian state. Bakhruhin, "G. F. Miller kak istorik Sibiri," in Istoriia Sibiri, vol. 1, pp. 5-55. Solov'ev distinguished between Russia's "natural" filling out of its European territories and the "colonization" process beyond the Urals, admitting the latter was akin to the European advance into the New World. But he maintained that


54. Butsinskii pointed out that many of the ethnic Russians who made their way to Siberia were inhabitants of northern regions of European Russia and had intermixed with non-Slav populations there. Butsinskii, Zaselenie, pp. 326-29.

55. P. N. Butsinskii, Zaselenie Sibiri i byt eia pervykh nasel'nikov (Kharkov, 1889), pp. 191-93.


59. A. Oksenov, Sibirskoe tsartsvo do epokhi Ermaka (Tomsk, 1888). The Siberian khans claimed to be descendants of Nogais (these were the so-called Pechenegs who came to be known by the name of their chief, Nogai). They were still pagans when conquered by Kuchum. Mueller, Istoriiia, pp. 171, 180.


62. Having been forced to flee, Kuchum eluded capture for a long time before he died. Even after his death several princes of his house tried to revive his authority. Ishim, who laid claim to the title Khan of Siberia, formed an alliance by marrying the daughter of the Torgut chief, Urluk, who had his camp on the Upper Tobol and exercised considerable power in the steppes in
the 1630s and 40s. J. E. Fischer, Sibirskaiia istoriiia s samogo otkrytiia Sibiri do zavoevaniia sei zemli rossiiskim oruzhiem . . . (St. Petersburg, 1774), pp. 444, 577.


68. The 1926 census established the existence of more than fifty villages in the Kuznetsk okrug dating from the seventeenth century. Spisok naselennykh mest Sibirskogo kraia, vol. 2 (Novosibirsk, 1929).


74. Prior to the thirteenth century, the Kirgiz are known through Chinese sources, which refer to a great empire in the ninth and tenth centuries, after which the Kirgiz appear to have settled on the Enisei north of the Sayan Mountains. They are mentioned in Arab and Mongolian sources of the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries "silence" ensues, until the arrival of the Russians and the clashes in the seventeenth century, from which time there are Kirgiz documents (written in Kalmyk). V. V. Bartol'd, Kirgizy (istoricheskii ocherk) (Frunze, 1927, 1943), reprinted in Sochineniiia, vol. 2 (1) (Moscow, 1963), pp. 471-543.

75. The name Kalmyk (or Kalmuck) appears to have been given to the Oirats by Turkic speakers, and may be a corruption of "kalpak" or fur hat (i.e., the Kalmyks did not wear turbans, a mark of Islam). Other tribes unrelated to the Kalmyks but also non-Muslims were called White Kalmyks (the Telenguts) or Black Kalmyks (Nogai). See Howorth, The History, Part I, pp. 492-98. Prior to the seventeenth century, the Kalmyks were considered as subjects by the Chinese. In the early seventeenth century, a large force of Kalmyks moved west into the upper Irtysh and Tobol basins, some crossing Urals and settling on the Don and Volga. In the scholarly literature, "Kalmyk" has come to be used only for those Oirats who lived west of the Urals.

76. See the seventeenth-century observations by the Croatian Jesuit Krizanic,
Many of the peoples in the Irtysh, Ob, and Enisei basins suffered three iasak overlords.

Because part of the Oirat tribes roamed to the west bank of Irtysh and then all the way to the lower Volga, there has been some speculation that they were inspired by Chingis Khan's example and were trying to "reinstate" the old "empire." It seems that they roamed more from desperate need, looking for pasture lands. It was external threats and pressures that compelled the formation of the Jungarian state and a certain internal "unity," a circumstance aided by the adoption of Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism). The western Oirats (Kalmyks) and Jungar remained in contact, with the former eventually seeking to return and join the latter, but that too was an act of desperation. See Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds, passim.


See S. A. Kozin, Sokrovennoe Skazanie: Mongol'skaia khronika 1240 g. Iuan' Chao bishi: Mongol'skii obydennyi izbornik, vol. 1 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941), p. 175.


There was to be no New Russia until well into the eighteenth century (north of the Caspian). Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 39-40.


Lantzeff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century (Berkeley: University of California, 1943), p. 17.


97. Sergei V. Kiselev, Drevniaia istoriia iuzhnoi Sibiri (Moscow, 1949; 2nd ed. 1951).


101. Kabo, Goroda Zapadnoi Sibiri, pp. 46, 94; Gromyko, Zapadnaia sibir', pp. 86-87. Aleksandr Radishchev, who was exiled to Siberia in the 1790s, thought that if a Siberian bank were opened, its headquarters ought to be located in Barnaul. Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniia, vol. 3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1952), p. 142.

102. Petr Petrovich Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, Puteshestvie v Tian'-Shan' (Moscow, 1958); and P. P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, ego zhiz' i deiatel'nost' (Leningrad, 1928). He met Fedor Dostoevs'kyi in Semipalatinsk, who told of his exile there and later visited the geographer in Barnaul, reading to him from a manuscript then in progress (Notes from the House of the Dead).


104. This is one of the principle unstudied problems in Siberian history. For a suggestive treatment of this question in another locale, see Jean Gelman Taylor, The Social World of Batavia: European and Eurasian in Dutch Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).


106. Iadrintsev, Sibir', kak koloniiia, passim.


109. As Marina Gromyko wrote, "the multi-year, arduous labor of hundreds
of thousands" of peasants allowed "the huge feudal state to incorporate new territories." Zapadnaia sibir', p. 250.


111. See V. V. Sapozhnikov, Po russkomu i mongol'skomu Altaiu (Moscow, 1949).


113. Into the early nineteenth century, the area surrounding Kuznetsk was called the north Altai. The name "Kuzbas" (Kuznetsk basin) seems to have been coined in the mid-nineteenth century by an explorer of the Altai, China, and Little Asia named P. A. Chikhachevyi. Ivan A. Balibalov, Kemerovo 3rd ed. (Kemerovo, 1962), p. 30; A. V. Volchenko, Iz istorii administrativno-territorial'nogo deleniia Kuzbassa 1618-1963 gg. (Kemerovo, 1963).