I study the political economy of institutions and development from an international perspective. This research agenda fits into political economy and international relations broadly defined and engages with comparative politics, international security, and development economics. My research largely centers on answering the question: how can different types of foreign transfers affect politics across various institutional settings? Broadly, answering this question has generated scholarship on “authoritarian globalization.”

Methodologically, an important feature of my research is its attention to causal inference and, in several instances the development of formal models to clarify the causal logic. Guided by this approach, my research has generated several original and substantive insights on the relationship between international finance, dictatorship, and democracy. For example, my work expands the concept of unearned income to include various types of foreign transfers and probes its political implications; demonstrates the heterogenous effects from increases and decreases of such transfers on institutions and governance; and how these effects vary across institutional settings and historical processes. More specifically, my research theorizes and empirically evaluates how foreign aid, migrant remittances, sovereign borrowing, and foreign direct investment (separately and together) can affect corruption, vote-buying, institutions, political survival, and civil war across democracies and dictatorships (and regime types in between). This research can be categorized into three themes (see the table below), which includes two books and extensive solo authored work (approximately 45 percent).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Research theme</th>
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<td>Financial transfers and governance</td>
<td>[1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]*</td>
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<td>Political violence and institutions</td>
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Notes: The numbers in brackets correspond to the ordering of publications at the end of this statement. * = denotes work in progress or research under review. * = denotes a book.

My research makes four scholarly contributions to understanding the economic and political welfare implications associated with foreign transfers. First, by studying many foreign transfers together (e.g., [7], [16]), such as foreign aid and remittances as a form of unearned foreign income (e.g., [1], [5]), one can gain novel insights on how governments can harness various financial inflows to their political benefit. Second, I show with both formal models and causally identified empirical methods how the quality of a country’s existing political environment (e.g., institutions, electoral competition) can influence whether foreign transfers impact governance in ways that are salubrious (e.g., [4], [12], [17]) or pernicious [e.g., [2], [3], [6], [7], [16], [19]). Third, my research reveals the analytically distinct channels through which each type of financial transfer may affect a country’s political economy; including, for example, by generating “spillovers” (e.g., [11], [12]), altering a government’s strategic spending decisions on patronage and public goods (e.g., [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [16]), and/or changing the incentives and conditions for individuals to mount opposition to incumbents (e.g., [4], [10], [17], [19]). Fourth, I show how a country’s governance can be shaped directly from its reception of foreign transfers (e.g., [1], [7], [16], [17]), and/or in confluence with historical processes, such as the Cold War and the expansion of Islam (e.g., [8], [9], [10]).
In the remainder of this statement, I describe the progression of my research and its scholarly contributions, and then sketch my current research agenda.

**Foreign transfers and governance**

My first line of research studies the conditions under which different types of international financial transfers harm democratic governance. This research builds on my “three paper” doctoral dissertation and has culminated in a book, *The Perils of International Capital* [7] published with Cambridge University Press in 2020. The book argues international capital offers opportunities to strengthen nondemocratic politics, primarily by prolonging the political tenure of dictators. It makes two substantive contributions in international relations and political economy.

First, the book advances a unified theoretical framework that shows how strategically oriented governments leverage three distinct types of foreign transfers – aid received by governments, remittances received by households, and foreign direct investment (FDI) received by private firms – to finance two important instruments of nondemocratic politics: repression and patronage. In this regard, governments are not viewed as passive to financial globalization; rather, they can act strategically to harness foreign capital to their benefit. Through a combination of distinct channels (e.g., a “substitution”, “rentier”, and “income” effects associated with remittances, FDI, and foreign aid respectively), I argue foreign transfers can expand a government’s revenue base, particularly in less democratic settings. As a result, foreign transfers can prolong dictatorial rule; for example, by weakening the quality of governance (e.g., via corruption and political repression) and political institutions (e.g., reducing constraints on executive authority).

Second, the book introduces creative ways to turn the observable world into a quasi-experimental laboratory. The book’s methodological approach takes serious concerns of causal identification by exploiting plausible exogenous variation in foreign transfers to more precisely estimate and track their effects. The identification strategy in chapter 6, for example, exploits the as-if random nature of oil discoveries to generate stochastic variation in inward FDI (associated with prospective oil production) to study patterns of military spending and coup propensity in dictatorships (relative to democracies). Other effects studied include the deterioration of political rights (funded by foreign aid in chapter 4) and the expansion of a dictator’s political authority (induced by remittance income in chapter 5). To further triangulate and validate these empirical findings, these chapters also contain a qualitative case study that traces the hypothesized arguments.

*The Perils of International Capital* draws on insights from several articles I published. One insight is the concept of unearned foreign income. In “The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, remittances, and government survival” [1] published in the *American Political Science Review* (and from which elements were published as a chapter in an edited volume, [5]), I argue remittances in conjunction with foreign aid inflows comprise unearned foreign income that can empower governments in autocracies to stay in power longer by affecting both the level and composition of their revenues to finance patronage. The paper makes two original contributions to the political economy of public finance.

First, remittances are cast as a potential form of nontax (or “unearned”) government income akin to revenue received from oil and other commodities. This is noteworthy, as remittance income does not flow directly to governments. Second, the paper presents causal evidence that aid and remittances can lengthen the duration of autocratic rule. The paper leverages a quasi-natural
experiment of oil price driven aid and remittances flows received in Muslim-majority nondemocracies to show that receipts of unearned foreign income reduce the probability that a government will lose office.

In two subsequent articles, I probe the channels through which foreign aid and remittances can separately affect authoritarian governance. In “Remittances deteriorate governance” [2], published in the Review of Economics and Statistics, I leverage a quasi-natural experiment to demonstrate that remittances can cause corruption, primarily in countries with “weak” (nondemocratic) institutions. Remittances do so via a substitution effect: remittances can permit governments in less democratic settings to spend less on various welfare goods in order to finance patronage-based corruption.

In “Does foreign aid harm political rights?: Evidence from U.S. aid” [3], published in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, (and a subsequent chapter in an edited volume, [6]), I show how foreign aid can empower another instrument of authoritarian politics: repression. More specifically, I demonstrate how foreign aid from the world’s biggest bilateral donor (the United States) constitutes a form of nontax revenue that can reduce a government’s tax effort and diminish its need to be accountable to its domestic population. In doing so, US aid can harm the quality of political rights. To mitigate concerns with endogeneity, the paper introduces an original instrumental variable based on the domestic politics of US aid allocation (i.e., the “fragmentation” of the US Congress interacted with the probability a country receives US aid) to quantify a causal relationship.

Together, The Perils of International Capital and associated papers ([1], [2], [3], [6]) point to the politically pernicious effects of foreign transfers in nondemocracies. This raises the possibility that in less autocratic settings, foreign transfers may be less politically harmful. To probe this conjecture, in “Do Remittances Benefit or Hurt Incumbents?: Theory and Evidence” [4], published in Economics and Politics, I reconcile two divergent effects of remittance income in a more democratic setting. On the one hand, remittances raise household income thereby lowering the marginal utility of target electoral transfers by political parties, especially by an incumbent. Thus, remittances weaken the efficacy of vote buying. On the other hand, remittances make individuals wealthier and lead them to believe the national economy is performing well, which voters may positively attribute to this to the incumbent (according to models of retrospective voting).

Building on these insights, the paper develops a formal model of vote buying in which the confluence of these divergent channels generates a surprising result: at increasingly higher levels of dissatisfaction, a remittance recipient is more likely to vote for an incumbent than a non-remittance recipient. Using nationally representative survey of individuals, this prediction and the underlying channels are substantiated across a sample of 18 remittance receiving Latin American democracies in which vote buying is a salient feature of electoral politics.

Political violence and institutions

While The Perils of International Capital and associated papers demonstrate how buoyant levels of different types of international capital can sustain dictatorship, this research is agnostic to the political consequences from reductions in foreign transfers. Motivated by this question, I probed it systematically in a series of articles ([8], [17], [19]), which in turn inspired a second book project, Conquest and Rents: A Political Economy of Dictatorship and Violence in Muslim Societies ([10]). The book advances an original argument linking a critical juncture in history with temporal variation in foreign transfers to explain the prevalence of dictatorship and civil war in many
contemporary Muslim-majority (hereon, Muslim) societies. In contrast to existing scholarship on this topic, the book introduces insights from international political economy and historical legacies to study pernicious politics in Muslim societies.

I first started this research agenda by assessing how foreign aid can help “buy” political stability. In “Aid and the Rise and Fall of Conflict in the Muslim World” [19], published in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Eric Werker and I strive to explain why many Muslim countries are prone to civil war (e.g., Afghanistan, Syria). Leveraging a quasi-natural experiment of oil price-induced aid disbursements which favored Muslim countries over non-Muslim countries, our paper establishes two causal relationships. First, a foreign aid windfall to poor non-oil producing Muslim countries during the twin oil crises of the 1970s allowed their governments to become more repressive and stave off rebellion. Second, when oil prices fell in the mid-1980s, the windfall subsided, and recipient countries experienced a significant uptick in civil war. A substantive implication of our paper points to the pernicious political ramifications associated with increases (repression) and decreases (civil war) in foreign aid.

The windfall in financial transfers was not necessarily unique to Muslim aid recipients. The oil price shocks in the 1970s led to other capital flows, particularly of cheap credit in the form of “petrodollars” that ended up in many developing countries outside of the Muslim world (e.g., Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa). In “The Political Transfer Problem: How Cross-Border Financial Windfalls Affect Democracy and Civil War” [17], published in the Journal of Comparative Economics, Daniel Schwab, Eric Werker and I investigate the political implications of these financial transfers in a global perspective. The paper makes two contributions. Our first contribution is empirical. Using case studies and statistical analysis, we show that following a rise in oil prices in the 1970s, several developing countries received a significant boost in foreign transfers and became less democratic. When those transfers ended, some recipients of these transfers (mainly in Latin America and Eastern Europe) eventually democratized as part of the “Third Wave” while others (mainly Muslim aid recipients) languished as violent autocracies. These divergent political outcomes raise a theoretical puzzle: how can declines in external transfers foster democratization in some cases, but heighten dictatorship and civil war in others?

Motivated by this puzzle, our second contribution is theoretical. We develop a unified framework (formal model) to reconcile this contradiction. Our formal model demonstrates that autocratic incumbents can become more repressive with higher levels of transfers and either experience civil conflict or democratize at lower levels of transfers. In the formal model, whether a decline in transfers facilitates peace or violence hinges on the quality of pre-existing institutions. Societies with a stock of less egalitarian institutions (e.g., stemming from historical processes, ethnic fragmentation, etc.) are more prone to experience civil strife when transfers decline. We then argue that Muslim aid recipients had pre-existing institutional features that were less egalitarian (relative to non-Muslim countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe).

The claim that Muslim societies tend to have a stock of less egalitarian institutions begs the question why? In “Muslim conquest and institutional formation” [8], published in Explorations in Economic History, I offer a plausible explanation. The article argues the expansion of Islam via military conquest (from 632 to 1100 CE) changed governing institutions and associated political coalitions that set “conquest societies” on a trajectory of nondemocratic and less egalitarian governing institutions through to the contemporary era. Empirically substantiating the initial step in
this argument is challenging as data on medieval political institutions is scant. I tackle this challenge by leveraging information on state centralization (dating back to the year 0) and a differences-in-difference research design to provide evidence that Muslim conquest centralized political authority in conquered territories (which in the medieval period implied dictatorship).

Taken together, the theoretical and empirical implications from these articles suggest that financial transfers may have affected patterns of dictatorship and civil war differently in Muslim and non-Muslim societies around the world. In my book, Conquest and Rents: A Political Economy of Dictatorship and Violence in Muslim Societies ([10]), I provide an original explanation for why. The book is grounded in a positive political economy approach that advances a formal theory that is tested in a historical and contemporary setting.

Conquest and Rents argues that contemporary Muslim societies tend to be less developed, less democratic, and more conflict prone on average. However, there is considerable variation within the Muslim world depending on how Islam was spread. Territories where Islam spread via military conquest developed institutions and practices that led to political regimes more impervious to democracy and, in response to declines in rents, more prone to civil war. In contrast, societies in non-conquered territories – including some Muslim societies, such as Indonesia and Malaysia – developed governance structures more susceptible to economic and political (democratic) development and where declines in rents provided opportunities for transitions to democracy.

The book builds on my related articles ([8], [17], [19]) but includes many new and original insights. There is a rich historical narrative detailing how Muslim conquest fostered a trajectory of nondemocratic and nonegalitarian institutional structures and governing coalitions in “conquest societies” (chapters 3 and 4). In chapter 5, this is accompanied with new statistical analysis that traces the conquest equilibrium over time; the compilation of original sub-national data from medieval Spain that documents how the duration of Muslim rule at the provincial level delayed the emergence of “first parliaments” between 1000 and 1500; and an analysis of survey data that contrasts the role of conquest versus a society’s religiosity which emphatically refutes arguments that Islam is inherently anti-democratic.

Conquest and Rents also introduces new insights on the so-called political resource curse that links unearned government rents (e.g., revenues from oil production, foreign aid) to dictatorship and civil war. For example, in chapter 2, I identify several tensions in extant theoretical accounts (e.g., why rents can extend the tenure of dictatorships but paradoxically also elevate the prospect for internal rebellion) and then develop a formal model to reconcile it. Empirically, I argue in chapter 6 that “geopolitical rents” have been crucial to the longevity of many dictatorships in the Persian Gulf. Drawing on archived US State Department cables and corroborative statistical analysis, I show how the provision of an implied US security guarantee to many Persian Gulf petrostates (e.g., Saudi Arabia) has buttressed their dictatorships by thwarting internal rebellion. Chapters 7 and 8 trace the effects of unearned foreign transfers on dictatorship, democratic transitions, and civil war in non-oil producing conquest and non-conquest societies.

A central takeaway from Conquest and Rents is that neither Islam nor aspects of Muslim culture are the root cause of dictatorship and civil strife in many contemporary Muslim societies. Rather, it is due to the interplay of two factors: (1) the path dependent political effects (e.g., institutions, governing coalitions) attributable to societies that experienced Muslim conquest and (2) increases and decreases in various types of rents (e.g., oil revenues, foreign aid) in those societies. By linking
these two factors – conquest and rents – to patterns of civil war, dictatorship (and democracy), the book’s theory and empirics contribute to scholarship in international political economy, institutional economics, historical legacies, and the resource curse. The book’s topic and approach should appeal to scholars in political economy, comparative and international politics, as well as policymakers interested in understanding why many Muslim societies are economically and politically underdeveloped.

International development and governance

While the core of my research to date examines how international finance can affect various aspects of governance, in collaborative work, I have studied other topics in international development and governance (such as international law). These projects have allowed me to broaden my research and teaching expertise.

My research in international development has an explicit public policy focus. Drawing on fieldwork in Bangladesh while consulting for the World Bank (in 2012 and 2013), Anne Greenleaf, Audrey Sacks and I examine the relationship between corruption, clientelism, and industrial policy. In “The Paradox of Export Growth in Areas of Weak Governance: The Case of the Ready Made Garments Sector in Bangladesh” [14], published in World Development, we argue poor governance may not necessarily be detrimental for economic growth. In another paper, “What do non-governmental organizations do?” [22], published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Eric Werker and I describe the industrial organization of non-government organizations that work in international development and attempt to evaluate their effectiveness. Finally, in “How is Foreign Aid Spent?: Evidence from a Natural Experiment” [21], published in the American Economic Journal – Macroeconomics, Charles Cohen, Eric Werker and I evaluate how aid affects economic growth and trace its effects through a country’s economy. We find that aid has little effect on growth but tends to increase government consumption and imports.

My research in international law can be split in two areas. One strand of research explores how the recent weakening of sovereign immunity norms in debt management can affect financial markets. This research probes how litigation by domestic firms against sovereign governments affects sovereign debt markets. In “Empires and Lawsuits: On the enforcement of sovereign debt in Latin America” [11], published in Law and Contemporary Problems, Laura Alfaro, Noel Maurer and I argue that legal decisions involving private firms have not established a credible legal regime. In a follow up paper, Laura Alfaro and I provide a systematic analysis of how such litigation can affect sovereign default risk. In “Market Reactions to Sovereign Litigation” [12], published in a special edition on sovereign debt in Capital Markets Law Journal, we collected an original data set of litigation “events” involving private firms following Argentina’s 2001 sovereign default. Using an event-study setup, we find that litigation decreases abnormal returns on Argentine sovereign bonds, but has a countervailing effect on bonds from other Latin American countries. These results imply that litigation increases default risk in Argentina, with opposite spillover effects cross the rest of Latin America.

In collaboration with William Howell, another paper investigates whether the US Supreme Court “rallies around the flag” by supporting the President during wartime. In “Voting for the President: The Supreme Court during War” [20], published in the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, we argue and present evidence that Supreme Court justices are more likely to vote for the US government in cases that the President “cares about the most.” The paper’s innovation is to
use cases explicitly argued by the US Solicitor General (the President’s official government lawyer) in front of the US Supreme Court to identify the cases that most directly implicate the President.

On-going and future research

My scholarly interests in the political economy of institutions and development underlie three active research agendas.

Crony Globalization. The first agenda investigates how governments may manipulate their investment and trade policies as a strategy of political survival. In one paper, “Crony Globalization” [16], Adeel Malik (Oxford University) and I probe how authoritarian politics can stunt the degree and pace of international economic liberalization. We contextualize our argument for the case of many contemporary Muslim-majority societies that tend to exhibit robust authoritarian structures. Empirically, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment (using the World Trade Organization’s establishment in 1995 as an exogenous shock to trade liberalization worldwide) and original sector-level data on political connections and tariffs from Egypt and Tunisia to argue that many Muslim societies have adopted a more hesitant and partial approach to de jure economic globalization (e.g., policies to reduce tariffs and liberalize the capital account) as a strategy to preserve authoritarian governance.

Whereas prominent explanations for pernicious political economy in Muslim societies focus on domestic level factors (e.g., resource endowments, ethnic heterogeneity, colonial history), our findings suggest that partial liberalization in international economic commerce is also an important explanation. In future work, Adeel and I plan to expand our theoretical account by incorporating the effects of migrant remittances and sovereign borrowing in the political calculus of governments and collect and analyze additional micro-level (i.e., firm, sector) data from more countries. We envision writing more papers and – drawing on additional case evidence from our field work in various Muslim countries – plan to expand our arguments to a book-length project.

Geopolitics and political violence. A second strand of my on-going research explores how geopolitics affects political violence, largely from a historical perspective. For example, in “From grievances to civil war: The impact of geopolitics” [9], I argue and present causal evidence that countries with greater political grievances during the Cold War were more likely to experience civil war after the Cold War. I probe several plausible channels finding compelling evidence that changes in the credibility of external support to both governments and rebels affected this uptick in conflict onset in aggrieved countries.

Substantively, the article’s findings challenge existing scholarship arguing that the Cold War’s termination had no meaningful effect on the outbreak of civil war after 1990. This finding has prompted further inquiry. In early work, I am probing how superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War may have planted the seeds for future political instability. One plausible channel is through the provision of military and economic assistance to client states (and often covertly). This endeavor has required compiling information from Soviet era archives at the Hoover Institution; a process I started as a fellow there. I plan to use his archival data in future work that will theorize and document how geopolitics can “aid” current and future political violence.
Political economy of international bureaucrats. My third strand of active research probes how international bureaucrats can affect economic and political outcomes (e.g., bilateral trade, UN resolutions). One stream of this work examines whether and how bureaucrats in international organizations (IO) can affect IO productivity. For example, in early work, I apply an empirical framework from corporate finance to study how Secretary Generals at the United Nations (UN) can influence the passage of UN resolutions by Security Council members. The evidence suggests this is achieved through the Secretary General’s agenda setting power (e.g., by organizing meetings).

A second stream of this research agenda probes how diplomats can affect international trade. Funded by a research grant from Princeton University in 2015, I have collected detailed data on ambassadorial postings (e.g., duration, dates of entry and exit, biographical information) for the United States and United Kingdom dating back to the early 1800s. In collaboration with one of my former doctoral students, Alexander Slaski, we investigated how ambassadors can influence bilateral trade. In “Ambassadors as CEOs: Evidence from Trade Data” [18], we exploit detailed monthly-level data on ambassadorial vacancies as a measure of reduced diplomatic influence. We present robust evidence that US ambassadorial vacancies reduce US exports, with magnified effects in partner countries with weak governance where “cheating” on bilateral trade arrangements is more likely. In contrast, US ambassadorial vacancies do not affect imports to the United States.

Building on this paper, I plan to investigate whether its main finding holds for UK ambassadors; with other measures of international commerce (e.g., foreign investments, contract breaches); and is affected by the “quality” of diplomats (e.g., educational background, political contributions, etc.). Ultimately, I envision writing several papers – and possibly a book – examining how diplomats have helped “negotiate” and “manage” globalization since the 19th century.
Cited works


