CHAPTER 6
CHANGING PATTERNS OF IDEOLOGY AND PARTISANSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA
Grigore Pop-Eleches

INTRODUCTION

Most contributions to this volume analyze the inclusionary turn in Latin America from the perspective of what governments in the region have done (or failed to do) to expand or implement de jure rights to benefit a range of previously marginalized and under-served groups. This chapter focuses on a slightly different set of questions: to what extent has this inclusionary turn been accompanied by a growing congruence between the ideological platforms of parties and the social bases of their political support? Applied more specifically to leftist political parties, this question can be reformulated as follows: to what extent have leftist parties managed to secure a relative electoral advantage among their “natural” allies from the poor and marginalized sectors of society? And relatedly, how can we explain the variation in the ability of leftist parties to attract poor and marginalized voters?

These questions are potentially important complements to the discussions of the patterns and drivers of particular policy changes that have characterized the inclusionary turn of the last three decades, such as the expansion of participatory opportunities (Goldfrank, Mayka and Rich, this volume) and the extension of social policy spending (Garay, this volume). From the perspective of the outcomes that are the main focus of this chapter – the congruence between leftist ideological appeals and electoral support from socio-economically disadvantaged groups – the chapters in this book offer a rich set of hypotheses for explaining cross-national and cross-temporal variations in the extent to which the poor in Latin America support leftist parties. While the analysis in this chapter can offer at best a preliminary test of different explanations, in the last
part of the chapter I outline the logic of the link between several inclusionary policies and the changing patterns of electoral representation I document in the third section of this chapter. The links between inclusionary policies and electoral outcomes are important for the broader discussion about the nature and mechanisms of democratic representation in Latin America (Collier and Handlin 2009, Johannessen 2019) and beyond (Achen and Bartels 2016). Which types of inclusionary policies trigger changes in partisan support patterns, and how lasting are such partisan reorientations?

Conversely, understanding when and where particular marginalized groups become core constituencies of leftist parties is also important for assessing the continued political feasibility of the inclusionary policies discussed in this volume. If the poor, informal sector workers, and other marginalized groups do not electorally reward the typically (though not necessarily) left-leaning political parties driving these inclusionary policies, then the political feasibility of the inclusionary project may be jeopardized by electoral turnovers that bring to power parties and politicians with different ideological commitments and/or core constituencies. Even if and where leftist parties manage to stay in power, their policy choices are likely to be affected by their perceptions about the types of policies that voters reward at the polls.¹

Finally, the nature of the link between inclusionary policies and the evolution of partisan support patterns in Latin America has implications for the likely legacies of this inclusionary turn for the politics of the region in the context in which, electorally at least, the Left wave appears to have crested in much of the region. To the extent that more inclusive participatory institutions and social policies have produced strong partisan attachments between the poor and leftist

¹ For example, Johannessen (2019) shows that PT mayors in Brazil shift from participatory and redistributive policies to more visible types of public spending (typically infrastructure) once they realize that such projects are more effective in securing electoral support than healthcare or education spending, despite the fact that voters claim to prefer the latter to the former.
parties, we should expect the legacies of the Left wave of the past 15-20 years to leave a strong imprint on Latin American party systems and societies along the lines of the first wave of labor incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991). If, on the other hand, the region’s Left turn and the adoption by many left-leaning governments (among others) of pro-poor policies just happened to occur simultaneously, then the political legacies of the inclusionary turn discussed in this volume may have much shorter half-lives once the left loses power.

To answer these questions, this chapter proceeds as follows: first, I briefly discuss the significant data and measurement challenges inherent in creating cross-nationally and cross-temporally comparable indicators of ideology and partisan attachments. In the following section I trace the changes in ideology-partisanship congruence for various potential socio-economic constituencies of leftist parties in ten Latin American countries: the eight political party systems from Collier and Collier (1991) and two Andean cases (Bolivia and Ecuador). In the fourth section I identify and evaluate a number of hypotheses that may explain the significant cross-national variation in the extent to which leftist parties have been able to secure the support of poor/marginalized voters. The final section concludes.

Overall, the chapter shows that the Latin American Left wave has resulted in a significant realignment of poor/marginalized voters with ideologically left-leaning parties in most of the ten countries analyzed in this chapter. However, the extent of this realignment differed considerably by sector: whereas leftist parties made significant inroads among the poor and informal sector workers, we observe no comparable congruence increases among the more traditional leftist power bases (the formal working class and public sector employees.) Among the possible explanations for the cross-country differences in realignment, I found weak support for the role of structural factors (such as inequality and natural resources) but at least tentative evidence of
the importance of leftist governance reinforced by patronage-based appeals. Taken together, these findings call into question the durability of the leftist realignment of the poor in the context of the electoral resurgence of the Right in some recent Latin American elections.

**IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN SUPPORT: MEASUREMENT AND INTERPRETATION CONSIDERATIONS**

The most important empirical challenge for broad cross-national comparisons of ideological and partisan realignment patterns lies in the difficulty of constructing cross-nationally and cross-temporally valid and reliable indicators of party ideological orientations and partisan support patterns. In this section I briefly discuss a few key sources of data on party orientation in Latin America, followed by a discussion of the methodological challenges and trade-offs inherent in constructing and interpreting this data. Next I propose an approach and a series of indicators for measuring the partisan support base of different parties along a series of socio-economic dimensions.

**Measuring Party Orientation**

Analyzing party orientation is a significant challenge for cross-national and cross-temporal studies due to the scarcity of comparable data and the differences in countries’ party systems and economic orthodoxy. Since most cross-national sources of data on party orientation are regional in scope, the problems are particularly acute for cross-regional studies (Pop-Eleches 2008). But even if we limit our scope to Latin America, we run into a variety of problems with the coverage, quality, and comparability of different data sources.
While there are a number of sources that can be used for coding political parties in Latin America, to the best of my knowledge, the party orientation measure used in this chapter is the first effort to code by combining three different types of information. The first type of data consists of a series of expert-based ratings, typically (but not always) in the form of expert surveys. The second source is the Party Elites in Latin America (PELA) project coordinated by the University of Salamanca, which has surveyed MPs in a large and growing number of Latin American legislatures since 1994. Since the surveys include questions about how respondents evaluate the left-right position of their own party and of other legislative parties in their country, the answers can be used to calculate party positions for a given legislative period (Alcántara Sáez and Rivas 2006, Saiegh 2009). The third source are public opinion surveys, such as the Latinobarómetro survey series. Since most of the surveys include questions about party preferences (vote intention/partisan affiliation) as well as questions about left-right positioning and a variety of social and economic policy preferences, it is possible to aggregate the responses of supporters of different parties and use these aggregates as estimates of where the particular parties stand (see e.g. Colomer 2005).

Table 6.1. Temporal Coverage of Party Orientation Sources (1980-2012)

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<td>Huber-Inglehart</td>
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<td>PELA</td>
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<td>Latinobarómetro</td>
<td>L</td>
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Note: H = high coverage (most parties/years); M = medium coverage (many parties/years) L = low coverage (a few parties/years). DPI=Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al), PELA= Party Elites in Latin America, LAPOP= Latin American Public Opinion Project.
a – coverage based on extensions of Coppedge’s classification scheme by various authors (Lodola & Queirolo 2005, Pop-Eleches 2008, Murillo et al. 2010)
While these measures differ in both methodology and coverage (see Table 6.1), they nevertheless produce reassuringly similar estimates of party positions. This is particularly true for different types of expert-based ratings (see Figure 6.1).\(^2\) However, Figure 6.2 suggests similar patterns when we compare expert-based ratings to the PELA elite surveys. Thus, to expand the geographic and temporal scope of the analysis I constructed an index that incorporates information from all the different sources available for a party in a given year.

\(^2\) Not surprisingly, correlations were lower for the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) measure (at least in part because it only offers a three-point scale) but even there they were around .8.
Measuring Partisan Support

To establish the changing congruence between ideology and partisan support for those parties among citizens, are evolving, beyond the ideological left-right positions of parties we also need to capture the partisan bases of support for particular parties. To establish the partisan basis of a parties’ political support I focused on two groups that were traditional supporters of leftist parties – formal-sector workers and state sector employees and two groups that had been largely excluded from the initial incorporation but which have featured prominently in the political discourse surrounding the inclusionary turn of the past three decades: the poor and informal sector workers. Specifically, I relied on survey data from the Latinobarómetro. My approach was to use the “Sunday vote intention” question to create a set of dummy variables that identified
self-declared electoral supporters of particular parties, and then compare the support for these parties among four different social groups. First, I created an objective poverty index on the basis of a battery of questions about the ownership of a broad range of assets (ranging from refrigerators to automobiles and houses), and then differentiated between respondents below and above the median in each country. The remaining groups were defined on the basis of their occupational status based on their responses to the Latinobarómetro surveys: informal sector workers, formal-sector working class respondents, and public sector employees (irrespective of job type.)

**Measuring Ideology-Partisanship Congruence**

The final methodological challenge is to devise a cross-nationally and cross-temporally comparable indicator of the socio-economic basis of support for parties with different ideological orientations. To do so, I first used the Latinobarómetro surveys to calculate the proportion of voters for a given party who belong to a particular socio-economic group (e.g. informal sector workers). This measure allows me to compare how successful parties were at attracting the support of a particular group in a given country in a given year. The second step is to analyze

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3 Since the purpose of this exercise was to compare parties to each other, this part of the analysis was restricted to respondents who expressed a party choice. However, in future iterations and for the purposes of cross-national comparability it may be worth dealing more explicitly with nonvoters/undecided voters. Thus, if in some countries poor voters decide to abstain because the mainstream parties are too far to the right to attract their votes, then excluding these respondents from the analysis might exaggerate the extent of poor support for the mainstream parties.

4 The indices consistently had alpha statistics above .8, suggesting high coherence.

5 Obviously, the median voters were objectively poorer in some countries than in others. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I was primarily interested in the relative position of different respondents in the country’s economic hierarchy.

6 Alternatively, one could analyze the proportion of a given socio-economic group attracted by different parties. However, I would argue that such an approach would capture primarily the relative popularity of different parties – a party with a 50% vote share should capture more of the poor than a party with a 10% vote share – rather than whether its support comes disproportionately from the poor (or some other marginalized group.) However, given that in most countries discussed in this chapter the vote share of
the relationship between these proportions and the ideological positions of particular parties. This can be done graphically by inspecting the slopes of the bivariate scatterplots of party ideology vs. partisan composition such as in the graphs presented in the following section. Alternatively, if we are interested in comparisons across countries, time periods or socio-economic groups, we can calculate regression-based slopes using standardized proportions of different socio-economic groups. Such an approach allows for a more systematic quantitative comparison of the congruence between party ideology and party electoral support across countries, time periods and issues. However, we need to be cognizant of the limitations imposed by the small number of parties per country, as well as by the noise inherent in both the ideology measures and the partisan share measures, which are in some cases based on a relatively small number of survey respondents for the smaller parties.

IDEOLOGICAL AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: BROAD PATTERNS

The next five sets of figures illustrate the nature and extent of ideological realignment in Latin America between 1995 and 2010 for the four dimensions of partisan attachment described above. For each figure, the horizontal axis in each country panel captures the left-right ideological orientation of each party based on the combination of expert and elite surveys discussed in the section 2.1. The vertical axis represents the proportion of that party’s supporters.

leftist parties increased from 1995-2010, the patterns presented in the next section would probably be even stronger using this alternative measure.

7 For space reasons this approach is only discussed in the electronic appendix. However, the basic idea is to calculate at the country-year (i.e. party system) level the expected change in the share of support from a particular socio-economic group associated with a one-unit change in party ideology and then normalize this change by the standard deviation of the variable identifying that group in the Latinobarómetro surveys for that particular year.

8 I chose 1995 because it is the earliest year for which the Latinobarómetro had surveys for most of the countries in my sample, and 2010 because it represents the peak of the Left wave in the region.

9 I included any parties for which I could find ideological orientation data from any of the expert surveys and data on partisan support from the Latinobarometro.
who belong to the particular socio-economic group analyzed in the figure. To reiterate, these proportions, which were calculated using the 1995/96 and 2010 waves of the Latinobarómetro, capture the relative mix of the supporters of different parties rather than the mix of party preferences for different social groups. Therefore, to the extent that poor Latin Americans vote in accordance with their class/occupation-based economic interests, we should expect to see negative correlations (i.e. declining slopes) in these figures, as poor/working class voters should favor leftist parties. Moreover, steeper negative slopes indicate that voters from the particular socio-economic group examined in the figure are more responsive to differences in the ideological (left-right) orientation of political parties.

**Fig. 6.3a: Ideology vs. Vote by Poor (1995)**

![Graphs of Ideology vs. Vote by Poor (1995) for various countries including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador.](image)
Judging by Figure 6.3a during the Washington Consensus of the mid 1990s poor Latin Americans were no more likely to endorse leftist parties and in fact were often more likely to endorse center or center-right parties in most of the countries analyzed in this chapter. For example, in Argentina poor voters were a larger share of voters for center-right clientelist parties like Menem’s Peronist party (PJ) than for center-left parties like the Radical Party (UCR), while in Brazil the poor were overrepresented among those who voted for the right-of-center Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and Liberal Front Party (PFL) while being underrepresented among supporters of the leftist Workers’ Party (PT). Even in Mexico, where the slope is in the “correct” direction, the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) received comparatively less support from the poor than the ruling center-right Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the one case where electoral support
conforms to standard economic interest-based expectations was Chile, where the poor were much more important for the leftist Socialist Party (PS) than the right-of-center Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN).

However, Figure 6.3b reflects a fairly significant region-wide voter realignment: by 2010 correlations clearly pointed in the “correct” direction in six of the ten countries. The switch was particularly striking in Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela, where leftist parties were able to reverse their erstwhile disadvantage among poor voters. Even in the remaining outliers – Uruguay and Argentina – the trends were flatter, suggesting that at least a partial reorientation of the poor towards left-leaning parties had taken place. However, it is worth noting that in Chile the tight link between poverty and leftist voting appeared to have weakened considerably by 2010, driven by the PS’s declining success among poor voters.

Fig. 6.4a: Ideology vs. Informal Sector Vote (1995)
Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 illustrate the electoral realignment of individuals differently placed in the labor market. Figures 6.4a and 6.4b focus on the electoral choices of informal sector voters. We might have expected significant realignment among these workers given that they had not been included in the first-round of incorporation, and therefore were “up for grabs” during the most recent round of democratization. These expectations are largely borne out by the evidence: in line with the patterns for poor voters, in much of the region informal sector workers were more likely to support rightist parties during the mid-1990s. Two exceptions were once again Chile and Mexico, but the “ideologically correct” pattern was also visible in Uruguay, where the Frente Amplio had a relative electoral advantage among informal workers compared to the two traditional oligarchic parties in 1995. By 2010 the informal sector appears to have been incorporated into the electorate of leftist parties in eight of the ten countries analyzed in this
In addition to Chile and Uruguay, more left-leaning parties also had disproportionate support from the informal sector in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and, somewhat surprisingly, Colombia. The only exceptions were Mexico, where after a decade of controlling the Presidency the PAN seems to have made significant inroads among informal workers at the expense of the leftist PRD, and Ecuador, where the right-leaning populist PRIAN was more effective in attracting informal sector support than the leftist governing party PAIS.
Whereas poor and informal sector voters became more prominent constituencies of leftist parties in most Latin American countries as the “neoliberal consensus” of the 1990s weakened and the Left turn accelerated into the first decade of the 21st century, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 suggest that the situation is quite different for two of the more traditional constituencies of leftist parties: the formal sector working class and public sector employees. With respect to the former, Figures 6.5a and 6.5b largely suggest that the partisan ties between leftist parties and the formal sector working class weakened from 1995-2010. Thus, in Brazil and Mexico the greater formal working class support for the Left in the mid-1990s had reversed a decade and a half later, while in Uruguay and Venezuela it persisted but appeared to be less pronounced. The remaining six countries had largely unchanged working class support patterns, but this meant a clear leftist advantage among formal sector workers only in the case of Chile.
Fig. 6.6a: Ideology vs. Public Sector Vote (1995)

Fig. 6.6b: Ideology vs. Vote by Public Sector (2010)

6.6a and 6.6b reveal a similar dealignement with respect to public sector employees. Thus, Figure
6.6a suggests that in eight of the ten countries under study public sector workers tended to be overrepresented among voters of leftist parties in 1995, with only Argentina and Venezuela deviating from this pattern. However, even as other natural constituencies of leftist parties appeared to experience an electoral realignment that brought their voting patterns more closely into line with income/class-based expectations, public sector employees moved in the opposite direction between the mid-1990s and 2010. According to Figure 6.6b by 2010 only in Peru did public sector employees continue to be significantly more loyal to leftist parties. In most of the remaining countries the fit lines were virtually flat, perhaps reflecting a dissipation, by 2010, of the political aftershocks of the partisan conflict triggered by the massive privatization drives of the early to mid-1990s. The one notable exception was Venezuela, where we see a significant increase in the Left’s ability to attract public sector workers. However, in this instance the exception really does prove the rule: after all, Venezuela was the country where the economic importance of the state sector grew most during the last decade.

Overall, the empirical patterns in the figures presented in this section suggest a few main conclusions. First, in broad regional terms, we find fairly strong evidence that the inclusionary turn in Latin America was accompanied by a growing congruence between the ideological platforms of political parties and their political support among groups that had not been included in the previous round of labor incorporation. Thus, compared to the so-called neoliberal consensus of the mid-1990s, by the end of the following decade the poor and informal sector workers represented more prominent electoral constituencies of leftist political parties. However, the growing congruence triggered by this realignment was partially offset by the weakening presence of formal sector workers class and public sector employees among the supporters of the Left.
Second, while acknowledging the complexity of the patterns and the limitations of the data, we can nevertheless identify some fairly clear cross-national differences in the nature and intensity of the electoral realignment of particular socio-economic groups in the past two decades. To highlight these differences, Table 6.2 summarizes the changes in the correlations between party ideological orientations and partisan support (from different socio-economic groups) for the two types of socioeconomic cleavages where we do see an overall trend of greater congruence between leftist ideology and the nature of partisan support: poverty and informal sector employment.
### Table 6.2. Overview of Realignment Patterns by Country and Issue

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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Left-Strong</td>
<td>Left-Moderate</td>
<td>Leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Right-moderate</td>
<td>Left-Strong</td>
<td>Left-Moderate</td>
<td>Leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Right-moderate</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Left-Moderate</td>
<td>Left-Weak</td>
<td>Leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Right-moderate</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Left-Weak</td>
<td>Partial leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Left-Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Right-Strong</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Left-Weak</td>
<td>Partial leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Right-Strong</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Left-Weak</td>
<td>Partial leftist realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Right-Strong</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Weak leftist realignment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Left-Moderate</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Left-Moderate</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Left-Strong</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Right-weak</td>
<td>Left-Weak</td>
<td>Partial dealignment</td>
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Examining the evolution this way offers a basis for sorting the ten countries under study into five groups in terms of the degree of their ideology-partisanship realignment. The first group, consisting of Peru, Bolivia and Brazil experienced a consistent leftist realignment along both dimensions, which resulted in leftist parties getting noticeably greater support from the poor and informal sector employees by 2010. The second group, exemplified by Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina also experienced a growing propensity of disadvantaged groups to support left-leaning parties but the alignment patterns by 2010 were less consistent across different cleavage types, and they are therefore classified as having experienced partial leftist realignment. The third category, exemplified by Uruguay, exhibits some increase in support for the left from one group (the poor), but the process was far from complete by 2010: in that year neither the poor nor informal sector workers were over-represented among those voting
for the leftist *Frente Amplio*. This category will thus be termed *weak leftist realignment*. As discussed above, the last two cases, Mexico and Chile, had exhibited considerably greater ideology-partisanship coherence than in other Latin American countries during the 1990s. However, Mexico made no further progress on either dimension over the next decade and a half, and is therefore labeled as a case of *stagnation*. In Chile, a modest increase in the leftist preferences of the informal sector was outweighed by the significant weakening of the initial over-representation of the poor among supporters of leftist parties. Therefore, Chile represents a case of *partial dealignment*.

Given the focus of this book on the region’s inclusionary turn, the following section provides a preliminary effort to explain these different trajectories in ideology-partisanship congruence. It is important to keep in mind that the categorization just offered focuses on the nature of alignment changes between the mid-1990s and 2010, rather than on the end point of this transformation. If we focus on the latter, Chile and Mexico would rank ahead of some countries, such as Uruguay, Argentina or Ecuador, where despite the partial realignment since the mid-1990s the overall congruence between ideology and partisan support is still fairly modest.

### Explaining the Realignment: Some Preliminary Tests

What explains the significant variation in the realignment patterns identified in Table 6.2? In this section I discuss a few possible explanations drawing on the arguments from several other chapters in this book, as well as from other analyses of the Latin American left turn. The intuition underlying the analysis is that if the introduction of inclusionary policies induces

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10 One could also include Uruguay in the *partial leftist realignment* category. However, Uruguay did not end up with either the poor or the informal sector clearly backing the Left. Thus, its end point is sufficiently distinctive to justify separate treatment.
partisan support, we should see greater realignment in countries where leftist parties were better able to engage in inclusion. The analysis considers the importance of three types of explanations: supply-side factors that explain variation in the feasibility of the inclusionary turn, such as democratic resilience, the existence of horizontal constraints, and the availability of nature resource rents; demand-side explanations that focus on varying incentives for a more vigorous inclusionary turn, such as prior levels of poverty and inequality, and the nature and extent of the neoliberal reforms preceding the left turn; and elements of the political process through which the inclusionary turn in Latin America developed, including the type of leftist parties, the length of leftist rule and the relative reliance on patronage by different political parties.

I will discuss each of these possible explanations below and also summarize them jointly in Table 6.3. Before proceeding, however, I want to emphasize that this section should be interpreted as an exploratory effort to engage some of the ideas discussed in this book rather than either an exhaustive considerations of all the possible explanations of this realignment or a systematic empirical test of the relative explanatory power of different factors or of the nature of causal processes linking the different factors.\(^\text{11}\)

\[^{11}\text{Systematic hypothesis testing is limited by the small number of cases (ten countries) in the current analysis. The nature of causality is likely to be particularly problematic for the \textit{process} variables. For example, it may be that longer periods of being in power allow leftist parties to attract more of the previously excluded groups (like the informal sector); alternatively it could be that leftist parties stay in power longer when they are able to attract more marginalized voters. Therefore, the aim of the discussion of processual variables is largely to uncover certain patterns/correlations, rather than to making/testing causal claims.}\]
In line with the theoretical discussion in the introduction to this volume, as a first step I tested whether differences in democratic histories and trajectories could account for the different patterns of electoral realignment. As offered in the volume’s Introduction, this argument primarily focused on explaining the overall timing of the inclusionary term at the regional level. However, the logic of the argument nevertheless implies that we should see a more vigorous realignment in countries with longer democratic histories at the outset of the Left wave and/or in countries with fewer recent threats to democratic stability, since in such countries leftist parties could be expected to compete more vigorously to attract previously excluded groups.

To test this logic I coded the length of continuous democratic rule before 1995, as well as whether the country had experienced any coups from 1990-2010. The data in Table 6.3 suggest that no clear relationship exists between the length of democratic rule and realignment patterns: countries with more recent authoritarian pasts are represented almost symmetrically at both sides of the “realignment spectrum”.\textsuperscript{12} Even the more immediate experience of post-1990 coups does not seem to have acted as a deterrent against leftist realignment, as none of the countries with weaker realignment had recent coup experiences, while Peru experienced a significant reorientation despite Fujimori’s \textit{autogolpe}.

The next two supply-side factors I address in Table 6.3 represent additional reasons why some Latin American governments may have been more or less constrained in pursuing redistributive strategies to attract poor/disadvantaged voters. First, given the role of the commodity boom in providing the resources for the various economic and social initiatives by leftist regimes in Latin America (Weyland 2013, Mazzuca this volume, Campello 2015), we may

\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, while Chile and Mexico had short democratic track records and witness no further alignment increases from 1995 to 2010, it is worth noting that both countries had fairly strong electoral support for leftist parties among the poor in 1995, which goes against the logic about longer democratic spells facilitating the inclusionary turn.
expect leftist realignment to have been more intense in countries that experienced larger
improvements in the international market for their primary exports. To capture this variation, the
fifth column in Table 6.3 presents the average natural resource rents as a share of GDP from
1995 to 2010. These statistics confirm the uneven distribution of these resource rents, which
ranged from minimal in Uruguay to substantial Ecuador, Chile, and especially Venezuela.
However, there does not seem to be a strong correlation between natural resource rents and leftist
realignment, with both resource-rich and relatively resource-poor countries represented on both
ends of the realignment spectrum.

The final supply-side factor touches on one of the democratic paradoxes discussed in the
volume’s Introduction, and focuses on Mazzuca’s argument about how a weak rule of law
facilitates some of the more ambitious populist redistributive schemes in Latin America. Judging
by the WGI rule of law scores for 1996 in Table 6.3, it does indeed appear as if leftist parties
were more successful in attracting poor and informal sector voters in countries with weaker rule
of law constraints. While the relationship was not monotonic – Venezuela only experienced a
partial realignment despite very weak rule of law in 1996 (and further declines until 2010) –
Table 6.3 nevertheless suggests that countries with stronger rule of law (such as Chile and
Uruguay) clustered towards the bottom of the realignment spectrum.

**Demand-side Explanations**

With the second set of factors I hope to tap into some of the reasons why demands for
greater inclusion – and hence the ability of leftist parties to attract marginalized groups to their
redistributive agenda – may have been greater in some countries. One prominent explanation,
highlighted in the volume Introduction and building on a rich literature on the political
repercussions of Latin America’s notoriously unequal income distribution (Portes and Hoffman
is that we may expect a stronger inclusionary turn, and thus leftist realignment, in countries with greater income inequality. For similar reasons, we may expect countries with greater extreme poverty\(^{13}\) to provide a richer electoral reservoir for leftist parties.

The patterns in Table 6.3 provide moderate support for both of these hypotheses: the three countries with the most significant leftist realignment – Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil – featured inequality and poverty rates that in the mid-1990s were high even by regional standards. Meanwhile, the countries with weak or no leftist realignment – Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay – had lower inequality and/or poverty rates than those of most of their regional peers (though Mexico’s high poverty and Chile’s high inequality fit less well.)

An alternative demand-side explanation traces the roots of the inclusionary pressures and the resulting electoral realignment to political reaction to the massive neoliberal reform push of the early to mid-1990s. While the original arguments along these lines (Silva 2009, Silva and Rossi and Silva 2018) focused primarily on explaining the common regional trend towards greater inclusionary pressures, the logic of their arguments nevertheless leads us to predict a stronger reaction and hence more powerful leftist realignment in countries with more extensive neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. Table 6.3 presents the liberal economic reform scores at the peak of these reforms in 1995-7 based on Lora (2001). As with the other two demand-side explanations, there is moderate support for this hypothesis: the two countries with the most extensive leftist realignments - Peru and Bolivia - had also experienced the most drastic neoliberal reforms before the start of the left turn, while two of the three countries with weak or no realignment – Mexico and Uruguay – were below the regional average in terms of economic

\(^{13}\) I measure extreme poverty as the proportion of the population living on less than $3.10 per day (using data from the World Development Indicators.)
liberalization in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, as in the case of inequality, Chile is an outlier, given that its extensive reforms should have created greater redistributive reactions.

**Process-based Explanations**

While some are important, factors shaping the political constraints on inclusionary politics, and driving the demand for greater inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups, are insufficient for understanding the dynamics of the inclusionary turn and the related process of partisan realignment. After all, many of these factors (such as high inequality and poverty, or variations in rule of law or natural resource rents) had been present well before the inclusionary turn but had largely failed to produce either inclusion or the incorporation of the poor and other marginalized groups by leftist political parties. Therefore, this final empirical section briefly discusses, in a very exploratory way, a few factors that capture the political dynamics of the intertwined processes of inclusion and realignment. The goal of the analysis is simply to identify correlational patterns between the realignment dynamics discussed in the previous section and a few explanations of Latin America’s inclusionary turn advanced in this volume and elsewhere in the literature.

The first set of explanations starts where the discussion of demand-side factors ended: the legacies of neoliberal economic reforms in the late 1980s and early-to-mid 1990s. As Roberts (2012, 2015) has persuasively argued, what mattered for party politics in Latin America was not just the nature and extent of the economic reforms but also the political orientation of the parties initiating/overseeing the reforms. Where such reforms were overseen by right-leaning parties/governments and opposed by leftist oppositions, such as in Brazil or Uruguay, such reforms reinforced the ideological patterns of party competition and thus reinforced the stability of party systems (Roberts 2012). By contrast, where reforms were the result of bait-and-switch
tactics of leftist/populist parties that had campaigned on an anti-reform platform (Stokes 2001, Campello 2015), such reforms tended to lead to less coherent party systems, in part by creating political openings for more radical newcomers on the left of the political spectrum (Roberts 2012).

The implications of this argument for the changes in partisanship-ideology congruence discussed in this chapter are somewhat more ambiguous. The straightforward prediction would be that, at least in the short-term, we should see more consistent congruence between leftist parties and economically disadvantaged groups in countries where neoliberal reforms were championed by the right (and, thus, where party systems were reinforced). However, given our main focus here on two groups that were not part of the core coalition for the traditional left in most Latin American countries (the poor and informal sector workers), it is also possible that the political incorporation of these groups by the Left was facilitated by the entry of new left-leaning political parties (in cases of party-system dealignment). For a preliminary test of these predictions, I coded the political orientation of the political party overseeing neoliberal economic reforms (based on Roberts 2012:1437), as well as whether the main leftist party in 2010 was a political newcomer or not (see columns 10 and 11 of Table 6.3).

The patterns in Table 6.3 confirms the close empirical link between “unnatural” neoliberal reforms (implemented by leftist/populist parties) and the rise of successful new leftist parties. However, when looking at the link between these destabilized party systems and subsequent leftist realignments, it appears that by 2010 the region had experienced a “reversal of fortunes”: most countries where economic reforms driven by right-leaning parties had facilitated the survival of traditional leftist parties (Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay) experienced either modest or no leftist realignments among the poor or informal sector workers. Importantly, this lack of
realignment was not simply due to the stronger institutional ties between the Left and the formal working class, as only Chile continues to show a clear pattern in this respect by 2010 (see Fig. 6.5b). The picture is somewhat less clear at the opposite end of the spectrum: parties responsible for triggering significant leftist realignments included both a newcomer in Bolivia (Evo Morales’ MAS in Bolivia), an established leftist party (the Brazilian PT), and a mix of old and new leftist-populist parties in Peru (Alan Garcia’s APRA\textsuperscript{14} and the PNP under Ollanta Humala).

Nevertheless, the overall trend in Table 6.3 is still clearly one of leftist/populist newcomers being associated with more significant leftist realignments. The precise causal nature of this correlation is beyond the current discussion but should be explored in future work.

Given the overlap between the inclusionary turn and the widely discussed left turn of Latin America, another important set of process-based potential explanations has to do with cross-national and cross-temporal variations in the extent to which leftist parties have had a chance to govern, and how they governed once in power. As a first step in that direction, I coded the length of left government from 1995-2010. To the extent that leftist realignments among the poor and informal sector require extended opportunities to govern (in order to put in place redistributive/participatory institutions), we should expect stronger realignments in countries where the Left was in power longer before 2010. This expectation is not confirmed, however: judging by the patterns in Table 6.3, there is no discernible relationship between the length of left government and the strength of ideological realignment.

This lack of a clear pattern is further confirmed by the fact that several of the mechanisms that should underlie such a relationship do not seem to be very predictive of realignment

\textsuperscript{14} While Peru is coded as having neoliberal reforms implemented by populists, it is important to note that these reforms happened not under APRA, which had resisted such reforms in both the 1980s and 1990s (Pop-Eleches 2008) but under Fujimori’s Cambio 90. This may also help explain APRA’s (and Garcia’s) remarkable political comeback despite its disastrous governance record from 1985-90.
patterns. While Latin American countries have differed significantly in the magnitude and the nature of their social policy expansions of the past two decades (see Garay 2016, this volume), these social policy differences do not seem to translate straightforwardly into realignment outcomes. For example, countries with inclusionary social policy expansion models, such as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay, exhibit highly varying realignment patterns: while the countries with a stagnation/dealignment patterns exhibited restrictive models (Mexico and Chile), Peru’s very limited social-policy expansion is at odds with its significant realignment. A similarly mixed picture emerges for another prominent process that represents an important component of the “access” dimension of the inclusionary turn: the opportunities for and involvement in participatory democratic institutions by formerly marginalized groups (see Goldfrank this volume). While systematic cross-national data on popular involvement in participatory institutions is not available, even a cursory look reveals the lack of a tight correlation. The significant leftist realignment in Brazil was arguably reinforced by its widespread and fairly active participatory institutions, such a perspective has a harder time accounting for the strong realignment in Peru (where popular participation has been low despite ample institutional opportunities) or the more limited realignment in Venezuela, whose municipal councils boast the highest participation rates in the region (Goldfánk, this volume).

Alternatively, it is conceivable that the congruence between the partisan base and the ideological orientation of leftist parties is more responsive to short-term changes in government participation. Considering the data in column 13 in Table 6.3, which reflect whether a leftist party was in power in 2010, the short-term dynamics seem to be more predictive of realignment patterns in Latin America: two of the three cases with right governments in 2010 – Mexico and Chile – are at the bottom of the realignment spectrum, and none of the three had strong leftist
realignments. Moreover, the only country to experience dealignment – Chile – is the only one that shifted from a (center-)left to a right government between 1995 and 2010.\footnote{Mexico and Colombia had leftist governing parties neither in 1995 nor in 2010.}

Given the small number of non-leftist governments in 2010 and the fact that this chapter only focuses on two years (1995, 2010) the importance of these short-term dynamics needs to be analyzed in greater detail in future work. However, the suggestive evidence from Table 6.3 about the greater importance of short-term (rather than long-term) leftist governance raises interesting questions: what are some possible reasons for this pattern? I briefly discuss one possible factor here: the role of patronage. While the prominent role of patronage and clientelist politics in Latin America has been extensively documented (Stokes et al 2015), others have suggested that even in notoriously patronage-prone party systems like Brazil, there may be a shift from patronage to programmatic appeals (Hagopian et al 2009). A coincidence between these changing patterns of patronage and the Left coming to power in Latin America – e.g. by shifting government spending from pork to programmatic purposes – may help explain the greater congruence between leftist ideological appeals and the social bases of leftist parties. Alternatively, however, the Venezuelan case suggests a more cynical perspective, whereby the growing allegiance of poor voters to leftist parties could be buttressed by the Left’s ability to reinforce its ideological appeals with a heavy dose of patronage.

While systematic over-time data on the reliance of different Latin American parties on patronage is unfortunately not available, the last two columns in Table 6.3 provide estimates based on the Altman et al. (2009) expert survey of the prominence of patronage-based appeals in the platforms of the main leftist and rightist parties in the ten Latin American countries discussed in this chapter. Three conclusions emerge from these indicators: first, parties’ reliance on
patronage in the mid-to-late 2000s was largely unrelated to ideology in the region overall, even though in some countries either the Left or the Right were more prone to emphasize patronage. Second, there were significant (though not unexpected) cross-national differences in the salience of patronage, ranging from fairly low (e.g., in Uruguay) to high (e.g., in countries like Bolivia). Third, and most important for our present discussion, Table 6.3 reveals virtually no correlation between the patronage appeals of either leftist or rightist parties and the realignment trajectories of poor and informal sector voters. This lack of a relationship suggests that Hagopian’s et al.’s (2009) argument about the tradeoff between patronage and programmatic appeals does not extend to voters as well.

Of course, the lack of a straight-forward relationship between party patronage and realignment patterns does not mean that patronage does not matter for explaining why the poor support some Latin American leftist parties more than others. Indeed, it seems plausible that the interaction between leftist government and the reliance on (and availability of) patronage may help explain these differences: the strong realignment in Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela (all of which had patronage-reliant leftist parties in power in 2010) compared to the weaker realignment in Uruguay (where the Frente Amplio did not resort to patronage) are consistent with this expectation. However, a systematic analysis of this hypothesis is precluded by degrees-of-freedom limitations in the present chapter and would require a more extensive analysis based on a longer time-frame.\footnote{Preliminary analysis suggests that the realignment effects of having a left party in government are more pronounced where right-wing parties do not rely heavily on patronage and where leftist parties use more patronage.}

**Conclusions**
This chapter provided a preliminary “birds-eye view” assessment of the extent to which Latin America’s Left turn at the beginning of the 21st century resulted in a fundamental realignment of party politics along a specific – but arguably important – dimension: the extent to which the poor/disadvantaged represent core constituencies of leftist parties. Using a combination of expert-based assessments of party ideological positions and mass-survey based indicators of partisan support patterns, I have found that while on average the fit between ideological platforms and the composition of partisan support bases of Latin American parties improved noticeably after the heyday of the Washington Consensus, this trend was uneven across both socio-economic groups and countries.

In terms of socio-economic groups, this chapter documented a significant increase in the alignment between poor and informal sector workers and the leftist parties whose redistributive platforms should present a “natural” fit for their economic interests. On the other hand, among the more traditional constituencies of leftist parties – formal sector workers and public sector employees – the competitive advantage of leftist parties declined during this time period.

There were also significant differences in cross-national trajectories from 1995-2010. Thus, whereas Brazil, Peru and Bolivia, and to a somewhat lesser extent Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina and Venezuela, experienced significant realignments of economically disadvantaged groups towards leftist political parties, the realignment was much more limited in Uruguay, one of the countries where the initial labor incorporation had happened through traditional oligarchic parties (Collier and Collier 1991). Finally, support for Left parties in two of the most coherent party systems of the mid 1990s – Chile and Mexico – did not increase among economically disadvantaged groups (and may have even experienced slight declines).
In the final section I explored a few possible explanations for these cross-national differences in realignment patterns. The preliminary evidence suggests relatively weak support for most explanations emphasizing differences in the constraints on inclusionary policies, such as fears of democratic reversals or the availability of natural resource rents (although there was some evidence that the leftist realignment of marginalized groups was more pronounced in countries with weak rule of law). I found stronger support for demand-side explanations: countries with higher poverty and inequality rates, and those in which government had pursued more aggressive neoliberal reforms by the mid-1990s, tended to experience stronger realignments of poor and informal sector voters with leftist parties, though the patterns were far from consistent.

Among the process-based explanations, realignments were more significant where new leftist parties entered the political sphere, which in turn can be traced back to situations where neoliberal economic reforms had been initiated by traditionally leftist/populist parties, a pattern that represents a reversal of the short-term dealignment trends discussed by Roberts (2012, 2015). Furthermore, neither the length of governance by leftist parties, or the type of programmatic initiatives they undertook while in office, seemed to explain left parties’ varying success in promoting realignment. Instead, what seems to matter more are the short-term dynamics of having leftist parties in power at a given point, possibly in conjunction with the continued use of patronage.

To the extent that these findings are confirmed, they strike a cautionary note about the durability of this leftist realignment over the medium-to-long term, and about whether the Left has induced a second wave of popular sector incorporation (Silva and Rossi 2018). Part of the concern about durability stems from the fact that the realignment between Left parties and
disadvantaged voters has occurred primarily among informal sector workers, whose support is less institutionally mediated than that of formal sector workers, among whom the Left has been comparatively much less successful in recent years. Furthermore, given that poor voters primarily switched towards leftist parties when these parties were in the position to reinforce their ideological message with access to patronage, we are left with the obvious question about how durable this realignment will be once leftist parties are no longer in office or once the resources available for patronage are reduced with the fading commodity boom. For better or worse, the electoral losses of the left in Argentina and Brazil in recent years should offer ample opportunities to test these propositions in future research.
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