Monitoring, Money and Migrants: Countering Post-Accession Backsliding in Bulgaria and Romania

Article in Europe Asia Studies - May 2010
DOI: 10.1080/09668131003647838

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Monitoring, Money and Migrants: Countering Post-Accession Backsliding in Bulgaria and Romania

PHILIP LEVITZ & GRIGORE POP-ELECHES

Abstract
Using cross-national governance indicators and evidence from a recent Bulgarian survey, this essay examines political reforms in Bulgaria and Romania since EU accession and, in particular, the ‘backsliding’ hypothesis—that these countries have abandoned or reversed the reforms they introduced in order to qualify for membership of the European Union. It finds no systematic evidence either that these countries have been backsliding or that their trajectories differ significantly from their first-wave Central and East European neighbours, though governance reforms have slowed after accession. The second part of the essay focuses on the mechanisms responsible for the lack of significant backsliding, emphasising the role of continued conditionality through the safeguard clauses, EU funding and increasing linkage between new and old EU members, including opportunities for East Europeans to work and travel in Western Europe.

THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) ACCESSION PROCESS IS widely understood to be among the most powerful forces for the international promotion of democracy and the rule of law.¹ In Central and Eastern Europe, EU enlargement has been closely associated with the region’s rapid post-communist movement toward stable democratic institutions, decreasing corruption, increasing protections for minorities and other political reforms (Vachudova 2005; Pop-Eleches 2007; Schimmelfennig 2007). Yet, even as the enlargement process culminated in the admission to the EU of the first eight Central and Eastern European countries in May 2004, and then of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, observers of the region were left with two basic concerns about the new EU members: first, that despite their progress, many of the new members—and particularly Bulgaria and Romania—had not yet reached EU governance standards at the time of their admission; and, second, that further progress in governance reforms was uncertain in the post-accession period in the absence of what had been one of the strongest reform incentives for East European governments in the post-communist period: the golden goal of EU membership.

¹See, for instance, Whitehead (1996).
The first problem, as one Commission official recently put it, was that political preparation for membership and implementation of the *acquis* was ‘not an easy thing’. Implementation of EU regulations and the basic standards of democracy and rule of law required by the Copenhagen Criteria of membership were by no means perfectly in place at the time of admission, and this seems to have been especially true in the ‘laggard’ applicants, Bulgaria and Romania.

The second concern was directed at the future of governance reforms in the new EU members, and in particular the possibility of ‘backsliding’ after EU accession, or in other words, that the new member countries would abandon or reverse the reforms they introduced in order to qualify for membership in the European Union. The fear can be summed up this way: EU candidates psychologically set on their ‘return to Europe’ and facing the powerful economic incentives of EU membership did whatever they needed to assure admission to the Union—rushing through provisions of the EU’s *acquis communautaire* and other reforms expected of EU members—but, upon admission, the incentive for continued reform was weakened substantially as the ‘prize’ of membership had been won, and thus there was a temptation to ease up on (or even turn back from) the reforms that were pushed through before accession.

Several scholars predicted backsliding as a rational response to the weakened incentives of the post-accession period in Central and Eastern Europe, and some international observers, including those contributing to Freedom House’s *Nations in Transit* project expressed serious doubts about the political direction of the region after accession, pointing to cases such as the Kaczyński twins’ administration in Poland, the inclusion of the far-right, nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS, Slovenská národná strana) and Vladimír Mečiar’s People’s Party–Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L’S–HZDS, Ľudová strana—Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko) in the Slovak governing coalition established in 2007, the failure to form a government for months in the Czech Republic and the 2006 riots in Hungary.

Nonetheless, backsliding was by no means a requisite result of accession and leading experts on EU enlargement and Central and Eastern European politics have generally rejected the claim that the region overall is backsliding. Recent

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2See, for example, Gati (2007) and Rupnick (2007).

3We conducted interviews with the following Commission officials in Brussels and leading experts in Central and Eastern Europe in 2007 and 2008: Franz Cermak, Deputy Head of Unit, DG Enlargement, European Commission, 28 January 2008, Brussels; Pavol Demes, Director, German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 30 October 2007, Bratislava; Joerg Forbrig, Senior Political Officer, German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 30 October 2007, Bratislava; Michael Leigh, Director General for Enlargement, European Commission, 29 January 2008, Brussels; Mary Teresa Moran, Desk Officer, DG External Relations, European Commission, 25 January 2008, Brussels; George Strongylis, Principal Administrator, DG Environment, European Commission, 12 October 2007. Our respondents generally preferred not to have their names attached to specific quotations or views. Our interviews demonstrated a virtual consensus that ‘backsliding’ was an inappropriate descriptor of the political situation in Central and Eastern Europe after EU enlargement. Many compared political problems there to analogous problems in the old member states, and cited the ability of the new members to self-correct, as in Poland’s rejection of the strident rhetoric of the Kaczyński twins in the 2007 elections.
academic studies have also begun to cast doubt on the backsliding hypothesis. Falkner and Treib (2008) have argued that the pattern of non-compliance with EU law in the new post-communist member states so far fits a pattern similar to that of some existing members, rather than reflecting some unique post-accession backlash. Sedelmeier (2008) added that compliance with EU law was actually significantly better than average in the new members joining in 2004 in their first few years of membership. Drawing on the work of a number of colleagues for a special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy*, Epstein and Sedelmeier (2008) further noted that factors aside from the simple incentive structure of EU enlargement might have been underemphasised in earlier interpretations of the political consequences of EU accession.

In previous work, we subjected the backsliding argument to a first systematic test across a broad range of democracy and governance measures, and we found no quantitative evidence of genuine backsliding among the new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe (Levitz & Pop-Eleches 2010). While reforms did appear to slow down compared to the candidacy period, our analysis revealed that backsliding fears were in fact overstated in the years after the 2004 enlargement. We then used a combination of cross-national statistics and public opinion data to identify some of the mechanisms responsible for reducing the impact of the loss of accession conditionality in the new member states. We showed that much of the EU’s impact prior to accession was due to financial leverage (such as EU aid) and growing linkage between applicants and existing EU members (through increased travel and migration), and since these types of leverage and linkage have generally increased since accession, they have arguably filled in much of the void left behind by the end of direct membership conditionality.

However, most of the backsliding analysis thus far has relied heavily on the experience of the 2004 entrants, which have a longer post-accession track record than the two countries that joined later. A crucial open question is to what extent this analysis applies to the laggards that failed to gain admission until 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, especially given the concerns about these countries expressed by the Commission in their post-accession reports. These two newest members of the Union share a number of characteristics that make their situation different from that of the other Central and Eastern European member states, and potentially more susceptible to backsliding.

From the perspective of historical legacies, Bulgaria and Romania are probably farther from the European core both culturally and geographically than any of the 2004 entrants. Both are historically Eastern Orthodox states, unlike the predominantly Catholic and Protestant East Central European states that joined before them. Only Transylvania in northwestern Romania has a history as part of the Habsburg empire, whereas the rest of Romania and all of Bulgaria were largely in the spheres of influence of the Russian and Ottoman empires. This cultural divide was reinforced by an economic divide, as the historical wealth gradient persisted despite the regional equalisation efforts of the communists and the turmoil of the post-communist transition (Janos 2000). Several years of rapid growth after 2000 notwithstanding, Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU considerably poorer than the 2004 entrants. Thus, in 2006, the average GDP per capita for the eight 2004 EU entrants was still
roughly 80% higher than for Bulgaria and Romania.\textsuperscript{4} Perhaps more importantly for post-communist governance, in Bulgaria and Romania these cultural and socio-economic legacies were reflected in a more traditional form of power relations between the state and society (Janos 2000). Also distinctive were their communist-era bureaucracies in which patronymic practices were much more prominent than in East Central Europe (Kitschelt 2003), creating greater challenges for the adoption of legal–rational bureaucracies required by European integration.

Given these unfavourable legacies, it is perhaps unsurprising that both Bulgaria and Romania entered the Union at a lower starting point on most measures of governance and democracy than the Central and Eastern European countries that joined three years earlier. Even though the more immediate fears about respect for basic democratic rights had been largely assuaged by 2006, Bulgaria and Romania consistently ranked last among the new EU members across a wide range of governance indicators, including the World Bank’s control of corruption and rule of law indices, and the Nations in Transit measure of judicial framework and independence.\textsuperscript{5}

Many observers thus claimed that Bulgaria and Romania were, in 2007, still not ready to join the EU.\textsuperscript{6} A leading member of the European Parliament, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, explained: ‘We decided to let them in too early ... We said [yes] before the reforms were really implemented’ (Condon \textit{et al.} 2007). In a recent interview, one Commission official (who preferred to be unnamed) even argued that by allowing accession prematurely, ‘we’re cheapening the process’ of enlargement. Thus, even though Bulgaria and Romania ultimately avoided the punishment of having their membership delayed until 2008 (in line with an option established by the Commission in 2004), it is unclear whether this decision reflected the merits of Bulgaria and Romania’s readiness for membership or was largely due to political considerations.

Therefore, the post-accession political trajectories of the two newest—and least developed—EU members have important theoretical and practical implications. In theoretical terms, Bulgaria and Romania represent important test cases in the debate about the relative importance of historical legacies and international influence in driving political reforms. If Bulgaria and Romania indeed experienced greater backsliding than their first-tier Central and Eastern European neighbours, this would imply a long-term ‘revenge’ of legacies over the temporary—and possibly fake—progress of the EU accession period. If, on the other hand, governance progress has continued and even accelerated in these countries even after accession, then that would suggest that sufficiently powerful external incentives can actually break the domestic

\textsuperscript{4}The figure is based on GDP per capita statistics with purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustment (in constant 2005 international dollars) from World Development Indicators. The unweighted average for the EU-8 countries was $18,002, compared to $10,044 for Romania and Bulgaria. The differences were even larger when using non-PPP income statistics.

\textsuperscript{5}Freedom House (2008); World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators’, available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~pagePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.html, accessed June 2009. T-tests indicate that the differences in average scores for the two tiers of new EU entrants were statistically significant at the 95% level in 2006 for the indicators mentioned above.

\textsuperscript{6}For a critical review of this conventional wisdom, see Moravcsik (2006).
political gridlock underlying poor governance in much of the developing world. From a more practical policy perspective, the answers to these questions have important implications for the institutional design of future EU enlargement waves, including the types of countries that should be considered as candidates, the relative timing of accession, and the types of incentives that need to be emphasised both before and after accession.

In this essay we address these questions by first putting the post-accession political trajectory of Bulgaria and Romania in broader comparative perspective, and then identifying a number of mechanisms that can help us explain these patterns. More specifically, using a combination of cross-national governance indicators and survey evidence from a nationally representative survey in Bulgaria, we find no evidence that Bulgaria and Romania have been backsliding since their EU accession, nor that their trajectories differ significantly from their first-wave Central and Eastern European neighbours. (However, it does appear that, like in other new EU member states, governance reforms did slow down after accession, and this deceleration is arguably more problematic in Bulgaria and Romania due to their worse overall governance records at the time when they joined the EU.) In the second part of the essay we focus on the mechanisms responsible for the lack of significant backsliding, and we emphasise the role of continued conditionality through the safeguard clauses, the large (and growing) importance of EU funding, and the increasing linkage between new and old EU members, particularly through the growing opportunities of East Europeans to work and travel in Western Europe.

**Backsliding in Bulgaria and Romania: empirical evidence**

To what extent do the events of the two years after accession bear out the widespread concerns among observers and EU officials at the time that the premature admission of Bulgaria and Romania would further undermine their tenuous governance reform progress? And, more to the point, did the two EU latecomers experience more pronounced post-accession backsliding than their structurally advantaged neighbours of East Central Europe? The anecdotal evidence in this respect is mixed. The harsh reviews in both countries’ post-accession progress reports and the subsequent cut in Bulgaria’s EU funds after the summer 2008 report, as well as the sacking in April 2007 of Romania’s Justice Minister Monica Macovei, whose energetic anti-corruption campaign had been widely credited with Romania’s anti-corruption progress after 2004, suggest backsliding may well be a serious problem in Bulgaria and Romania.

To answer this question more systematically, we start with a broad overview of the pre-accession and post-accession evolution in governance in Bulgaria and Romania compared to the track record of the eight Central and East European countries (CEE-8), which joined the EU in 2004. Table 1 presents the unweighted average annual changes for the two groups of countries during three distinctive periods of

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7A public opinion survey in Bulgaria was commissioned by the authors and carried out by Alpha Research in July 2008 among a nationally representative sample of 1,200 adult Bulgarian citizens.

8According to EU Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini in 2006, ‘a big part of the success of Romanian accession will have been achieved thanks to Ms Macovei’ (Trandafir 2006).
post-communist reforms: the pre-candidacy period (prior to the start of formal accession negotiations), the candidacy period (from the start of negotiations until the year before accession) and finally—and most importantly for the current analysis—the post-accession period (2004–2009 for CEE-8 countries and 2007–2009 for Romania and Bulgaria).

A comparison of the trends shown in Table 1 suggests that, as far as broad democracy and governance indicators are concerned, there is no evidence that the post-accession trajectories of Bulgaria and Romania differ systematically from those of the most advanced reformers of the first post-communist EU accession round. Even though Romania and Bulgaria under-performed after accession compared with their first-wave peers, in terms of corruption (due to Bulgaria’s decline), of their judicial framework (due to Romania’s decline) and of democracy (as measured by Freedom House), none of these differences were statistically significant. Moreover, Romania and Bulgaria actually outperformed the first-wave entrants in terms of progress on some of the other governance indicators, especially the political stability and voice and accountability measures (and for the latter the difference was, in fact, statistically significant). Moreover, when comparing the pre-accession and post-accession performance in the two countries, we find a statistically significant slowdown for corruption and judicial independence, but in neither case was the post-accession decline statistically significant, which means that we cannot properly speak of backsliding.

Overall, the analysis so far suggests that despite their structural disadvantages and more modest prior reform achievements, Bulgaria and Romania did not experience a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-candidacy</th>
<th>Candidacy</th>
<th>Post-accession</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bulgaria and Romania CEE-8</td>
<td>Bulgaria and Romania CEE-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Democracy</td>
<td>0.95 0.66</td>
<td>0.14 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>0.09 0.04</td>
<td>0.01 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations in Transit Electoral Process</td>
<td>0.25 0.17</td>
<td>0.04 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Political Stability</td>
<td>0.08 0.01</td>
<td>−0.02 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>0.22 0.12</td>
<td>0.03 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nations in Transit Judicial Framework</td>
<td>0.13 0.18</td>
<td>0.09 −0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Rule of Law</td>
<td>−0.02 0.01</td>
<td>0.00 0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Control of Corruption</td>
<td>0.06 0.07</td>
<td>0.03 0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures show the average score changes for Bulgaria and Romania combined and for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia combined.


9In this case, however, the difference is not due to any decline in Bulgarian or Romanian Freedom House democracy scores but because most of the first-tier EU members were upgraded by one point in 2004.
greater reform backlash after EU accession than the CEE-8. Since cross-national comparisons of aggregate governance scores suffer from a number of limitations (Kurtz & Schrank 2007), we now turn to public opinion data to establish whether the trends presented above are in line with citizens’ perceptions about the pace of post-accession reforms. One of the most promising sources of survey data for such an analysis is the Global Corruption Barometer, which tracks citizens’ responses to a variety of corruption related questions. It was conducted in both 2006 and 2007 in over 60 countries including Bulgaria, Romania and a number of other old and new EU members. However, since, unfortunately, the wording of several key questions changed substantially between the 2006 and the 2007 survey, we will only present the comparative responses to one question, which asked respondents to rate the extent of corruption in a country’s political parties and parliament (ranging from ‘not at all corrupt’ to ‘extremely corrupt’) (see Table 2).

While these survey results confirm that the vast majority of Romanians and Bulgarians view their top political institutions as greatly affected by corruption, there is no evidence of post-accession backsliding. In the Bulgarian case, corruption evaluations stayed unchanged for both political parties and parliament (though admittedly at rather high overall levels), while Romania actually experienced modest improvements in citizens’ view of political institutions after accession. Nor are the two Balkan countries complete outliers compared to other EU members: with the partial exception of Bulgarians’ concern about corruption in parliament, citizens’ corruption perceptions in the two newest EU members were not that different from first-wave entrants such as Poland or even from some of the older EU members, such as Greece and Italy. While the cross-national comparability of such survey responses is somewhat limited in the absence of anchoring vignettes (King et al. 2003), the Global Corruption Barometer nevertheless suggests that Bulgaria and Romania did not suffer from a significant corruption surge in the wake of their EU accession, and even that the pervasiveness of corruption in the two laggards is not dramatically greater than in some of the other old and new EU members.

A second source of survey data (which will also be used in later sections of the essay) is a public opinion survey we commissioned from Alpha Research, one of the leading survey research firms in Bulgaria, in July 2008. The survey consisted of 1,200 face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of adult Bulgarian citizens. As part of the survey, respondents were asked to evaluate how the pace of political reforms had changed after Bulgaria’s EU accession in January 2008 (ranging from ‘reforms have been reversed’ to ‘reforms have continued at a faster pace’). The question focused on four key areas of political reforms: democracy, minority rights, corruption control and the rule of law. The findings are summarised in Table 3 below.

Overall, the public opinion data in Table 3 confirm earlier cross-national statistical patterns in rejecting the backsliding hypothesis, but nonetheless identifying a certain slowdown in reforms. Thus, even though of the four reform areas respondents were
least satisfied with progress in fighting corruption and establishing the rule of law, only between 12% and 15% of them agreed with the strong backsliding statement (that reforms had been reversed after accession), while another group of between 21% and 24% answered that the reforms had stopped. In both areas, roughly similar proportions of Bulgarian citizens held the opposite view and thought that reforms had either continued at the same pace or actually accelerated after 2007. The modal response for both corruption and rule of law, which accounted for almost one third of stated opinions, was that reforms had continued at a slower pace after accession.

Moreover, assessments were significantly more positive with respect to minority rights and to a lesser extent overall democracy, which confirms that basic democratic freedoms are sufficiently stable so as not to be greatly affected by changes in post-accession conditionality.

Finally, it is worth noting that the records of Bulgaria and Romania on transposition and infringement of EU law thus far are among the best in the EU. While not purely an issue of democracy and governance, the ability of the countries to successfully implement EU law is an important reflection of government effectiveness, and, according to the logic of backsliding, might be expected to weaken substantially after accession. Yet, in the crucial internal market area, for which extensive data are

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Minority rights</th>
<th>Fighting corruption</th>
<th>Rule of law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reforms have reversed</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms have stopped</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms have continued at a slower pace</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms have continued at the same pace</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms have continued at a faster pace</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public opinion survey in Bulgaria commissioned by authors and carried out by Alpha Research in July 2008 among a nationally representative sample of 1,200 adult Bulgarian citizens.
available, as of November 2008, the ‘transposition deficit’ of Bulgaria and Romania (the percentage of directives not yet transposed into national law) stood at 0.4% for both countries, just 0.1% more than for top performers, Denmark and Malta. Bulgaria was also (if briefly) the first member state ever to have no deficit, as of May 2008. Romania, meanwhile, had the smallest number of open internal market infringement proceedings of any member state as of November 2008, and Bulgaria stood close behind in third place (European Commission 2008b, 2009). While formal compliance may of course hide weak application of the law (Sedelmeier 2008, pp. 822–23), this record of compliance is nevertheless impressive.

**Leverage and linkage after accession**

While the corruption, organised crime and judiciary issues highlighted in the EU’s recent monitoring reports for Bulgaria and Romania make clear that these two countries have seen their share of post-accession problems, the data in the previous section nevertheless lead us to the question of why the post-accession backlash has in fact been limited, even in the two new EU members that, based on their historical legacies and prior reform trajectory, seemed to be the most likely candidates for significant post-accession backsliding. To address this question, we rely on the theoretical framework developed in earlier work (Levitz & Pop-Eleches 2010) and focus on the extent to which the loss of leverage due to the end of accession conditionality was counterbalanced by alternative sources of leverage as well as by the growing linkage between the new EU members and the pre-2004 (EU-15) member states.11

Past research on the effects of European integration on democracy and governance in the Central and Eastern European region has focused largely on the leverage of the EU accession incentive itself.12 In recent work, we have shown that, while this leverage is substantial, it is but one of a number of forms of leverage and linkage associated with the EU enlargement process that have helped to drive political reforms in the region, some of which endure—or even strengthen—after accession (Levitz & Pop-Eleches 2010). These alternate forms of leverage and linkage include EU aid and trade; migration and travel in the European Union; and elite-level interactions that could support socialisation in European norms through peer pressure.

In the remainder of this essay, we consider how these alternate channels of EU influence may have helped Bulgaria and Romania keep potential backsliding in check, despite their relatively weak structural conditions in comparison to the CEE-8. We first consider the ways in which greater leverage was maintained in Bulgaria and Romania after accession through the distinctly strong terms of the safeguard clauses they faced. We then discuss the large aid flows received in these two states both before and after accession. Finally, we consider the importance of migration flows and elite interactions in these two countries.

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11Way and Levitsky (2007, p. 48) define linkage as the ‘density of a country’s economic, political, organizational, social, and communication ties to the European Union and the United States’.

12For some major works utilising this approach, see: Kelley (2004), Vachudova (2005) and Grabbe (2006).
Post-accession conditionality: the role of safeguard clauses

In explaining the lack of substantial backsliding in Bulgaria and Romania, one fact immediately stands out. In response to the fears associated with admitting the two Balkan states, the EU subjected these two countries to certain concrete admission criteria not required of the CEE-8. As EU applicants, Bulgaria and Romania were faced with a unique safeguard provision allowing their membership to be postponed for an additional year if necessary. Moreover, while technically all the new members are subject to safeguard clauses requiring continuing adherence to the EU’s basic economic, internal market, and justice and home affairs criteria, Bulgaria and Romania were the only new member states to be subject to continued EU monitoring with respect to corruption, organised crime and judicial function for three years after accession, with the potential for sanctions (cuts in EU aid) or non-recognition of judicial decisions, if sufficient progress was not recorded. The Commission argued that this qualification was necessary in order to ‘facilitate and support [a] smooth accession while . . . safeguarding the proper functioning of EU policies and institutions’. 13

Initially, there was some uncertainty about the credibility of the threats in Bulgaria and Romania (Barber 2008). There was a reluctance to turn to ‘penalties’ despite poor performance, which suggested that the EU’s threats of sanctions might well be empty ones. Indeed, interim Romanian Justice Minister Teodor Melescanu said outright, ‘in my opinion there isn’t the smallest element so far that should make us be concerned over the triggering of the justice clause on Romania’, despite all the criticism expressed in the first year’s progress reports. 14 Meanwhile, others called the safeguard clauses ‘toothless’ and noted that related enforcement possibilities such as cuts in agricultural and regional policy funds might be legally ‘tenuous’ (Condon et al. 2007).

Nevertheless, in the summer of 2008, after yet another round of harsh reports, the Commission implemented its first cuts to aid for Bulgaria, claiming unacceptably slow progress in controlling corruption and organised crime, and limited progress in securing an independent, effective judiciary. The reports were published in the midst of ongoing criticism from NGOs, the media, and other sources, focusing particularly on the continuing, and, some claimed, increasing prevalence of corruption and organised crime in the country (European Commission 2008c, 2008d). The role of the mob and corruption in Bulgarian (and Romanian) politics is nothing new, and was a defining feature of the post-communist landscape from the beginning, as well as a major factor delaying Bulgaria and Romania’s admission to the EU. However, the summer of 2008 proved to be a crucial turning point, strengthening the credibility of the EU’s threat to punish new members’ failings, and perhaps thereby (rather counter-intuitively) helping to clarify the reasons for Bulgaria and Romania’s lack of systematic backsliding. By presenting a credible threat of aid cuts, the Commission may have helped control just the kinds of problems it was punishing, which may—in line with the statistical

findings—be more a matter of reform slowdown and the continuation of pre-accession corrupt practices than of significant backsliding.

The sense that EU influence in the new member countries has not been significantly weakened after accession is also confirmed by evidence from our Bulgarian Survey from July 2008. Thus, despite the fact that the Bulgarian government no longer had to worry about being denied EU membership, most Bulgarians did not think that the EU’s leverage over their country’s government had diminished as a result. In response to a question about the change in EU influence in Bulgaria since Bulgaria’s accession in 2007, only 8% of respondents thought that it had decreased, whereas 38% reported no change, and 54% actually noted an increase in EU influence (including 21.5% who thought that it had increased a lot). While these views arguably reflect the relatively recent events surrounding the suspension of EU funding, they nevertheless provide very clear evidence that East European citizens do not view EU accession as the end of EU leverage over their governments’ policies.

The role of EU funding

While part of the impact of EU sanctions against non-compliant member states may be due to their public shaming function and its associated domestic and international political costs for the government in question, the leverage inherent in such sanctions is likely to depend to a significant degree on their likely economic impact. If the economic costs of non-compliance are high in relative terms, we should expect the threat of sanctions to have much greater effect, both because they would deprive the government of important additional revenues and because it could be used by the domestic opposition to illustrate the very real costs of the government’s policy failures.

From a leverage perspective, the EU seems ideally positioned to influence political decisions in the new member states. Since most of the newcomers—and Romania and Bulgaria in particular—were significantly poorer than the EU average, they were well placed to be among the main beneficiaries of EU funding from a number of sources, including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF). Romania and Bulgaria, along with a few other ex-communist countries with large and relatively unproductive agrarian sectors, were also prime candidates for rural development funding under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). To illustrate the importance of EU financial assistance in the new member states, Figure 1 presents the financial commitments from the main sources of structural funding to the Central and Eastern European countries for the 2007–2013 funding cycle.

The comparative statistics in Figure 1 suggest a number of conclusions. First, there can be little doubt that even this incomplete list of committed EU funds represents an important contribution to the new EU member countries relative to the size of their economies. On average the 10 new EU members were eligible to receive about 4% of annual GDP in various EU funds between 2007 and 2013.15 Second, the relative dependence on EU funds is roughly in line with the relative economic development of

15Of course, in reality the actual figures will depend on growth rates in the region, and even more importantly on the extent to which the countries can actually absorb the committed funds.
the new members, with Slovenia and the Czech Republic likely to receive the lowest
contributions, while Bulgaria and Romania are expected to have the greatest
dependence on EU funds. Finally, while the lack of consolidated and comparable
statistics of EU funding to the new member states makes it difficult to assess the
temporal trends in EU funding to the Central and Eastern European countries, it is
safe to assume that the overall levels of financial support have increased substantially
from the pre-accession period and are likely to increase further during the first few
years of membership as the new members improve their absorptive capacity.

Thus, it appears that Bulgaria and Romania are highly dependent on EU financial
largesse in both absolute terms and compared to their first-wave Central and Eastern
European counterparts, and that this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future. The strong compliance incentives suggested by this dependence should be an
important brake against backsliding tendencies, as long as the EU is willing to monitor
implementation and sanction non-compliance. However, the emphasis on monitoring
and enforcement is crucial, given that the development literature suggests that foreign
aid is often ineffective in improving governance (Knack 2000), and in some cases may
make matters worse since it encourages corruption and the development of rentier
states. While the greater conditionality inherent in EU funding may mitigate some of
these problems, the recent scandals surrounding the misuse of EU funds in Bulgaria
suggest that the sharp increase of funds following accession offers significant
temptations to corruption for both private sector actors and public officials. Moreover,
while this concern is particularly salient in the new EU members, it cannot be simply
written off as a transitional problem since it also affects some older
EU members which have struggled with persistently high corruption and recurrent
scandals surrounding the misuse of EU funds.

Source: Rosenberg and Sierhej (2007).
Note: Data for 2002–2004 are not available for Bulgaria and Romania.
Migration and increased linkage after accession

In addition to the uniquely strong post-accession monitoring and large conditional EU aid flows after accession, there is one more reason to believe that the political evolution of Bulgaria and Romania will not confirm the most pessimistic post-accession scenarios. In previous work, we have shown that both travel and work abroad—particularly in EU-15 countries—is a strong predictor of political reform progress in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. The role of international exposure was particularly strong for rule of law and corruption, which were precisely the areas of governance where Bulgaria and Romania experienced the most problems. While the results should be understood in light of the limited data available, both the number of international tourist departures per capita and the proportion of Euro-area migrants in the population were statistically significant determinants of corruption control in the post-accession period. The results were also strongly significant for the World Bank’s rule of law measure in the case of the migration proportion variable, and more weakly significant for international tourist departures (Levitiz & Pop-Eleches 2010).

The importance of migration and travel abroad in explaining political outcomes in the new EU members was also a common theme expressed in expert opinions about the consequences of weakened EU leverage after accession. Commission officials in Brussels and policymakers in Central and Eastern Europe were quick to point out the degree to which the peer pressure of membership in the Union strengthens as the degree of linkage between new and old members grows, notably through travel, work and study opportunities abroad. For example, Pavol Demes, a leading Slovak intellectual and current director of the German Marshall Fund’s Central and Eastern European office, spoke of the overthrow of the Kaczyński twins’ Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) government in Poland’s 2007 elections, and the influence of the many Poles who had lived elsewhere in the Union in the outcome of those elections, as a reflection of a growing regional trend. Results from the 2009 Romanian presidential elections suggest a similar trend in the sense that the candidate most closely associated with an anti-corruption agenda—President Băsescu—won the overall election in the second round due at least in part to his overwhelming victory among diaspora voters, who opted for him by a 78–22% margin.16

While increasing linkages with advanced Western European democracies are a likely antidote against backsliding in post-accession governance across the new EU member states, we should expect their effect to be proportional to the extent of such exposure. As it turns out, according to data recently released by the Commission, Bulgaria and Romania are also the two new EU members that have seen the most migration to the EU-15 countries, which seems natural for the two new EU members with the lowest per capita GDP.17 While statistics on the number of Central and Eastern European

17European Commission data suggest that, among the new EU members, Bulgaria and Romania have been leading sources of EU-15 migrants, with Poland, the Baltic countries and Slovakia highest among the CEE-8 (European Commission 2008a).
citizens living and working abroad are notoriously unreliable due to the newly open EU borders, and the significant numbers of temporary, seasonal and informal sector workers, in November 2008 the Commission released estimates of numbers of migrants for the years 2003–2007, as shown in Figure 2.

Utilising these Commission data, Figure 2 illustrates the estimated proportion of the population in Bulgaria and Romania resident in EU-15 countries in these years.\(^{18}\) The data make clear that, even before their EU accession, significant and growing numbers of Bulgarians and Romanians were moving abroad. In 2003, at least 2.3% of the populations of these two countries had migrated to EU-15 countries, and by 2006 the proportion had grown to 4.6%. In their first year of EU membership, the proportion jumped to 5.5%. These migrant population proportions in Bulgaria and Romania have stood well above those in the member states that joined the EU in 2004,\(^{19}\) even before their accession to the Union. In 2003, just 1.2% of the citizens of the 2004 entrants were living in the EU-15. By 2007, that proportion had grown to 2.7%, but Bulgaria and Romania’s percentages had also increased during this time period, so they still had more than twice as large a proportion of their population living in the EU-15 as the 2004 entrants. Given the temporary nature of much of this migration, the actual proportions of East Europeans who experienced living and working in the West are even higher: thus, as we will discuss in more detail below, our July 2008 survey indicates that almost 11% of Bulgarians had worked abroad at some point in the post-communist period.

While some observers have downplayed the magnitude and, by extension, the potential impact of migration from the new EU members to the older member states, noting that more migrants from outside the EU come to Western Europe than from

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\(^{18}\)These estimates are probably somewhat lower than the actual number of Romanians and Bulgarians living abroad, since stays are often temporary. However, they represent the best available estimates.

\(^{19}\)Included in the Commission’s data for 2004 entrant countries are Cyprus and Malta, as well as the CEE-8. These 10 countries are labelled in Figure 2 as the EU-10.
the new Central and Eastern European members, these numbers suggest, at least tentatively, that the potential political impact of migration should be more powerful in Bulgaria and Romania than in their Central and Eastern European neighbours. Despite their greater geographic distance from Western Europe, these two countries have had more citizens with longer-term exposure to EU-15 established democracies as a result of these labour migration patterns. As the often temporary migrants return (or visit) home, or simply interact with friends and families there, they are likely shaping the political culture in positive and important ways. Having experienced higher standards of governance and corruption control in Western European democracies, returning migrants bring back with them higher expectations for their own governments.

The importance of such international exposure is reflected in data from our Bulgarian survey. Thus 35% of Bulgarians who had travelled to the West identified corruption as their country’s most important problem, whereas only 22% of those who had not done so shared this concern. Bulgarians who had worked abroad shared this concern and were more critical of the government’s efforts to fight corruption. Thus, 44% of Bulgarians with foreign work experience thought the government did a very bad job in fighting corruption, compared to 31.6% of other Bulgarian citizens. Finally, it appears that exposure to the West was associated not only with greater dissatisfaction with the status quo, but also with a greater willingness to engage in the political process to bring about change: for example, Bulgarians with foreign work experience were much more likely than the average citizen to have contacted a politician (19.5% as opposed to 5.9%), or to have participated in a protest (26% as opposed to 19%) or in a strike (25% as opposed to 13.5%). Therefore, there are good reasons to believe that as more East Europeans travel and work in Western Europe as a result of the lower post-accession restrictions, they will hold their governments to higher governance standards than before, thereby raising the domestic political costs of corruption and weak rule of law enforcement. Already, citizens with direct or indirect exposure to the West represent a sizeable part of the population: thus, 10.6% of respondents in the July 2008 Bulgarian survey reported that they had worked abroad in the past and a remarkable 44.6% had either friends or family living abroad. Furthermore, over 21% of Bulgarians had travelled to the West at least once in recent years.

In addition, the increase in linkage after accession should also operate at the elite level. While migration can be important in aiding mass-level adjustment to democratic norms, the EU also provides ample opportunities for elite-level socialisation of the large number of Central and Eastern European officials now interacting with counterparts in Brussels and the governments of EU-15 member states. Recent research has shown that the biggest administrative improvements before accession in Romania were in the administrative sectors working most closely with (and therefore most closely observing) Brussels, such as the European integration departments in the various ministries, which created ‘islands of excellence’ within the Romanian government (Pridham 2007, p. 176). This process will only be strengthened after

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20 See, for example, Summa (2008).
21 As we show in our earlier work (Levitz & Pop-Eleches 2010) these differences are not due to self-selection of more active and critical citizens among foreign workers.
accession with the increased interaction with Brussels that joining the Union entails. And there may be even more room for growth in this area in Bulgaria and Romania than in the other member states in Central and Eastern Europe because the Bulgarians and Romanians began intensive interactions with the EU somewhat later than the others.

Conclusion

Bulgaria and Romania have seen their share of serious issues after accession, and we cannot know for sure if their problems of corruption and the rule of law will improve or further deteriorate in the next few years.22 However, this essay suggests there is reason for optimism. Although the post-accession data on Bulgaria and Romania are still quite limited, and continued monitoring of developments will be crucial, a systematic look at the data available to date does not suggest backsliding after accession. Neither statistics on governance nor a variety of public opinion data support the fears of the backsliding hypothesis, whereby the hurried and often superficial reforms of the pre-accession period would be reversed in the absence of accession conditionality, particularly in countries with more unfavourable historical legacies.

While we find evidence of a certain post-accession slowdown in governance reforms, it does not appear significantly worse than that in the other new—and even some old—member states. These findings are confirmed by interviews with leading Commission officials, most of whom were quick to point out that the issues in the new member states—even Bulgaria and Romania—were not so dissimilar from, for instance, the corruption long endemic in Greece or Italy. In the new members, one such official admitted, ‘there are lots of issues’, but so too are there ‘issues’ in the other EU members.

To explain the absence of significant backsliding so far, even in the two hardest test cases to date—Bulgaria and Romania—this essay has emphasised three factors that help counter the potential backsliding that could occur following the end of pre-accession reform incentives. The first of these is the EU’s continued conditionality (and therefore leverage) after accession, in the form of the special safeguard clauses in the admission agreement of these two countries, including the continued monitoring of corruption, judicial performance and organised crime, with concrete and credible consequences for non-compliance. The second is the two countries’ disproportionately strong dependence on EU funds. A third factor is the high importance of migration in Bulgaria and Romania, which seems to facilitate social learning and contributes to greater domestic pressures for better democratic governance.

Our analysis suggests that international incentives tied to EU integration can help countries overcome some of their unfavourable historical legacies. Despite the greater cultural, historical and geographic distance of Bulgaria and Romania from the European core, and their substantially lower economic development, these countries have been able to adjust well in the post-accession period so that the slowdown in their

22 This is particularly true in light of the global economic downturn beginning in late 2008, which may encourage a populist backlash against certain reforms.
political reform has not been significantly worse than that seen in the countries of the first wave of post-communist EU expansion. This suggests that with the proper precautions, such as later accession dates and the use of appropriate safeguard clauses and post-accession monitoring, the EU can adjust to weaker legacies in aspiring member states.

However, two important caveats are in order. First, it is important to remember that Bulgaria and Romania still lag behind the other EU members in most aspects of governance, and the post-accession slowdown in reform means that it may take a while for the two countries to close the remaining gap. Second, we need to be careful about extrapolating from the Bulgarian and Romanian experiences to conclude that the right external incentives can overcome any type of domestic economic and political legacies. Ultimately we still do not have a clear understanding of the scope of the conditions under which EU conditionality can be genuinely effective, or about how the interaction between different types of domestic legacies affects the prospects for the types of political reforms required for successful European integration. Therefore, it is unclear whether the ‘possibilism’ suggested by the present analysis applies to the other current or future EU candidates such as the countries of the Western Balkans, which, with the exception of Croatia, face even more significant developmental challenges than Bulgaria and Romania. In particular, Bulgaria and Romania have a much longer record of independent statehood than most of the remaining former communist EU candidates, and as a result, they were spared much of the political instability and violence associated with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, as well as the challenges of creating state institutions from scratch. Therefore, even though other potential EU candidates from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union may have had similar bureaucratic cultures as Bulgaria and Romania during the pre-communist and communist periods, the interaction between such cultural legacies on the one hand and state-building and nation-building challenges on the other, may be much harder to overcome by EU conditionality.

Finally, our analysis points to three main policy implications emerging from the three factors that have helped to counter the potential for post-accession political backsliding in Bulgaria and Romania. The first factor—the imposition of post-accession safeguard clauses—shows there are ways the EU can maintain active leverage even after countries join the Union. Such precautions, combined with the continued monitoring of developments after accession, can be utilised whenever there are reasons for continuing concern about new members. They are likely to be useful in future waves of expansion in current candidate countries with even more problematic legacies than those in Bulgaria and Romania.23

For current candidates, the post-accession slowdown in the reform of governance emphasises the need for effective administrative capacity-building before membership, and suggests that applicants should not be granted membership for reasons other than their readiness to take on its obligations. The good news is that the need to build administrative capacity before accession was probably the most common lesson learned from the experience of Bulgaria and Romania, and the Fifth Enlargement more broadly, judging by our interviews at the Commission. One senior Commission

23On this point, see Summa (2008).
official explained: ‘you can’t leave these issues to the end of the process’, while noting that he and his colleagues were responding accordingly in current enlargement negotiations.

With respect to the post-accession importance of Commission aid funds for countering backsliding, the findings of this essay are somewhat more nuanced. While we suggest that EU aid can make a valuable contribution to effective political adjustment in new members like Bulgaria and Romania, we also recognise the potential corrupting influence of such funds. This suggests a need for a strong, credible threat that the money will not be forthcoming if it is misused, as well as careful monitoring of the money’s use. The approach utilised in the case of Bulgaria and Romania should be effective here, and in future enlargement especially since the credibility of the EU’s threat was confirmed in the summer of 2008. Finally, this essay has also highlighted the importance of the high migration rates of Bulgarians and Romanians for countering backsliding by promoting a more politically active and critical citizenry.

Thus, problematic legacies need not exclude potential EU members like Bulgaria and Romania from joining the Union in a timely manner, without serious post-accession problems. By maximising post-accession forms of both leverage and linkage, serious backsliding may be avoided. Without question, Bulgaria and Romania have a way to go in reaching the highest EU standards of governance, judicial quality and corruption control, but the slowdown (not backsliding) after accession ought to be addressed as a problem with several possible solutions, rather than a reason to give up hope in the enlargement process.

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