Pre-Communist and Communist Developmental Legacies

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This article discusses two distinctive approaches for thinking about historical legacies in the post-communist context. The first approach, which builds on the work of Ken Jowitt, emphasizes the distinctiveness of Leninist socioeconomic and political legacies, while the second approach, rooted in the writings of Andrew Janos, highlights the significant and resilient pre-communist, communist, and post-communist diversity of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The empirical evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that both types of legacies continue to matter after a quarter-century of post-communist transitions. Thus, whereas we can still discern a distinctive and fairly uniform communist imprint in areas such as primary education and the importance of the state sector in the economy, in other areas of socioeconomic development, either communism was unable to reverse longer-term intraregional differences (e.g., with respect to GDP/capita or the size of the agrarian sector) or its initially distinctive developmental imprint has been fundamentally reshaped by post-communist economic reforms (as in the case of the massive increase in income inequality in a subset of ex-communist countries). In political terms, there is an interesting contrast between institutional trajectories (such as regime type), which largely follow pre-communist developmental differences, and individual political attitudes and behavior, where communist exceptionalism generally trumps post-communist diversity.

Keywords: Eastern Europe; historical legacies; communist development; post-communist transition

Over the past decade the study of historical legacies has made a significant comeback in the study of post-communist politics and of comparative politics more broadly. In the process, authors have proposed a number of useful distinctions that can guide our understanding of how the communist and pre-communist past shape post-communist politics. However, for the discussion about whether and how “Eastern Europe” and “post-communist countries” more broadly are analytically useful categories, a crucial question is what type of variation historical legacy–based arguments emphasize. At the most basic level—and simplifying a fair bit—we can distinguish between explanations that draw on communist legacies to account for the continued distinctiveness of the former Soviet bloc compared to various non-communist countries, and studies that link divergent post-communist political and economic trajectories to longer-term institutional and developmental differences and
therefore treat the communist experience as a relatively short-lived historical episode that may not be particularly consequential for understanding post-communist politics.

A first type of explanation, exemplified most prominently by Ken Jowitt’s discussion of “Leninist legacies,” emphasizes the important cultural, developmental, and institutional imprint of several decades of communism on the countries of the former Soviet bloc. While acknowledging the existence of variation in pre-communist backgrounds and communist ruling methods, works rooted in this tradition tend to emphasize the intra-regional commonalities among the ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, while at the same time emphasizing the cross-regional distinctiveness of the former Soviet bloc.

The alternative approach to studying historical legacies in post-communist Eastern Europe, which is rooted perhaps most clearly in the work of Andrew Janos, emphasizes the significant pre-communist socio-economic and political diversity among the East European and Eurasian countries and highlights the remarkable extent to which these differences survived several decades of communist developmental efforts and then played a crucial role in shaping the post-communist trajectories of the region. While Janos does not deny the developmental distinctiveness of late-communist Eastern Europe, in his framework these differences are embedded in much longer-term unequal developmental patterns reflecting the North-West to South-East economic and cultural gradients (Wirtschafts- und Kulturgefälle) on the European continent dating back to the agricultural revolution starting in the fifteenth century. In this view, even though communist regimes attempted to overcome the massive economic differences separating Eastern and Western Europe through an aggressive developmental push, while at the same time trying to reduce the significant economic disparities within the communist bloc, judging by economic output ratios these efforts were at best moderately successful until the early 1980s, and most of these gains were lost and even reversed as a result of the economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s.

Even though both of these approaches emphasize longer-term historical legacies, rather than short-term consequences of post-communist political developments, they have fundamentally different implications for our understanding of the meaning and analytical utility of the term Eastern Europe for the political analysis of contemporary phenomena in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. From a “Jowittian” perspective, the shared Leninist legacies provide a powerful rationale for analyzing the ex-communist countries as belonging to a coherent (though not necessarily uniform) set of empirical cases that can be meaningfully compared to other sets of countries. In this sense, Eastern Europe can still be plausibly used in line with Cold War usage to include countries as diverse as Poland and Slovenia on the one hand, and Azerbaijan and even Kyrgyzstan on the other. By contrast, for those embracing a “Janosian” view of legacies, Eastern Europe may not be a particularly useful category, both because it arbitrarily dichotomizes what is essentially a much more
continuous gradation between center and periphery on the European continent, and because at least in its maximalist definition (mentioned above) it comprises countries with such dramatically different developmental legacies as to make it difficult to draw meaningful comparisons.10

Given these fundamental differences, the obvious question to ask is which of these two visions has greater support based on the political developments and social scientific findings of the past quarter-century. While an exhaustive answer to this question would require a book-length manuscript, for the remainder of this article I offer some tentative answers focusing primarily on how pre-communist and communist developmental legacies have shaped post-communist political outcomes in a number of areas. Before doing so, however, I want to discuss two caveats.

The first caveat is of a theoretical nature. Even though the two perspectives presented above emphasize different legacies and generate different theoretical predictions, they need not be mutually exclusive. For example, in my own work on post-communist regime change I find support for both types of legacy arguments: on the one hand, intraregional differences in democratization conform closely to developmental differences at the time of the communist collapse, which in turn reflect pre-communist developmental patterns,11 but on the other hand when placing the former communist countries in comparative perspective we can identify a democratic deficit that affects not only the well-known democratic underperformers from the original pre–World War II Soviet republics but also (albeit to a smaller extent) the East European satellite states.12 Furthermore, at least some of the theories linking post-communist political outcomes to pre-communist developmental differences explicitly incorporate the communist ideological and developmental project and thus propose mechanisms that are highly specific to the Leninist system. Thus, Darden and Grzymała-Busse’s13 argument about the link between pre-communist literacy and anti-communist vote shares in the first post-communist elections emphasizes the role of national identity (promoted to varying degrees through pre-communist education systems) in “inoculating” East Europeans against the political indoctrination project pursued by communist education systems. A similar logic underlies the theoretical argument in Pop-Eleches and Tucker,14 which conceives of communist exposure as a distinctive (though not necessarily uniform) mode of political socialization but at the same time allows for the possibility that different individuals (or social groups or even countries) would exhibit stronger resistance against this socialization for reasons that are often linked to pre-communist economic and political developmental differences.15

The second caveat is methodological and concerns the choice of samples/case universes. In a sense, this point is fairly obvious: analyses focusing exclusively on post-communist countries should be expected to be more likely to emphasize intraregional diversity of outcomes and, therefore, to highlight the role of pre-communist or communist differences rather than the common Leninist experience of different East European countries. While this correlation between sample choice and type of
legacy argument is by no means perfect—after all one can use intraregional comparisons to highlight communist legacies that apply uniformly across very different East European countries—this observation nevertheless highlights a certain “post-communist studies paradox,” namely, that by highlighting intraregional cross-country differences, scholars of post-communist politics may inadvertently undermine their justification for comparing these countries in the first place. By contrast, highlighting the shared distinctiveness of communist legacies requires systematic comparisons to other regions and/or types of countries. Somewhat surprisingly, with the partial exception of comparisons between Eastern and Western Europe in the context of EU enlargement, such studies have been much less frequent than intra-regional comparisons and in many cases were not primarily driven by a theoretical concern with communist legacies.

**Communist Development in Comparative Perspective**

In this section, I provide a brief sketch of how communist socioeconomic development efforts affected intraregional developmental differences between (and within) East European countries and how the Soviet bloc compared to other regions, and particularly Western Europe / Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and Latin America. While part of the analysis relies on historical development statistics to capture certain geographic and temporal patterns, I complement the fairly narrow picture provided by such statistics with an effort to discuss some of the more difficult-to-quantify peculiarities of the nature of communist modernization.

Judging by the broad regional economic trajectories in Figure 1—based on GDP per capita statistics from Maddison—communism did not fundamentally change the region’s fortunes relative to the rest of the world. Even though until the 1960s the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent its East European satellites grew faster than Western Europe and particularly Latin America, starting in the 1970s the communist bloc countries started to lose ground against their West European “rivals.” The first post-communist transition decade further exacerbated this trend, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and despite making up some ground during the 2000–2008 boom, the East European countries emerged from forty-five to seventy years of communism and two decades of post-communist reforms exhibiting both intraregional and interregional developmental gaps that very closely mirrored pre-communist patterns. These findings broadly mirror the communist urbanization trends discussed by Pop-Eleches and confirm the general consensus that after some impressive initial achievements, which triggered serious concern in the West in the context of Cold War rivalry, communist modernization efforts largely failed to close the historical development gap that has separated the Western from the Eastern side of the European continent.
Judging by Figure 2, communism also failed to alter fundamentally the relative development gradient within Eastern Europe. Thus, despite the significant overall growth and some noticeable temporal differences (such as Romania’s rapid growth in the 1960s, or Poland’s stagnation in the 1980s), the relative per capita incomes of the five East European countries in Figure 1 remained largely unchanged from 1950 to 1989. This persistence of intraregional inequality among the socialist “comrades” suggests that the cross-national redistributive effects of Soviet bloc membership were quite modest. Economic redistribution was more effective within countries, as communist development efforts tended to target traditionally disadvantaged areas, but traditional economic differences (e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks or between Slovenians and Serbs) were still clearly discernible in 1989 and regional redistribution efforts were at least partly to blame for the disintegration of multiethnic states in Eastern Europe.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the centrality of economic redistribution to Marxist-Leninist ideology and the resulting emphasis on equitable growth, communist regimes appear to have been much more effective in reducing domestic economic inequality. While the absence of reliable income distribution data for the pre-communist and early communist period makes it difficult to establish the relative timing, magnitude, and the key mechanisms underlying this phenomenon, the cross-national inequality patterns in Figure 3 suggest that by 1960 at the latest, communist countries had flatter income distributions than all but the most egalitarian European
Even though income inequality increased slightly in the late 1980s as a result of partial economic liberalizations, inequality in East Europe was still quite low at the outset of the transition, especially when compared to other developing countries (particularly Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa).

However, this important communist legacy, which applied quite consistently across different East European countries in 1989 and set them apart as a group from most other regions, had a surprisingly short half-life. While a certain rise in inequality was probably inevitable given the far-reaching neoliberal reforms that most countries in the region underwent in the 1990s, what is striking is the dramatic divergence of inequality trajectories among different transition countries. Thus, as Figure 3 illustrates, whereas inequality in Hungary (and most other East-Central European countries) increased moderately during the first transition decade but then stabilized and even declined in recent years, in Russia (and much of the former Soviet Union) income inequality exploded in the first five years of post-communism and has since stabilized at levels that are closer to Latin America’s notoriously unequal societies than to their East European counterparts. While it is unclear whether these sub-regional differences in economic inequality can be traced back to pre-communist developmental legacies or whether they are the result of relatively contingent post-communist political developments, it is obvious that the legacy of communist egalitarianism no longer applies uniformly to the entire region. Instead, the contrast between the low to moderate inequality in East-Central Europe and the Balkans and the high inequality in large parts of the former Soviet Union is likely to reinforce the
Another area in which communism should be expected to have left a distinctive developmental imprint is education. Whereas in the pre-communist period public education access and literacy levels ranged from under 20 percent in Albania, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, to more than 90 percent in much of East-Central Europe and the Baltics, by 1989 primary school enrollment was quasi-universal and illiteracy had been largely eradicated across the Soviet bloc. As a result, intraregional differences in basic education virtually disappeared and the communist countries clearly outperformed most of the developing world and even many considerably wealthier countries. Furthermore, pre-primary and secondary school enrollments were dramatically expanded across the region, and while progress with respect to higher education enrollment was less impressive compared to the rest of the world, differences between various communist countries did not neatly replicate historical developmental divides. Intra-regional uniformity arguably trumped diversity also with respect to the nature of communist schooling, including the heavy emphasis on vocational training and technical education and the efforts to use education systems for political socialization/ideological indoctrination purposes. While the net effects of communist education on post-communist political change are an open question—some observers saw communist modernization as a harbinger of democratization while others worried about the pernicious effects of perverted modernization—these patterns suggest that education is an area where we should see a relatively uniform common legacy of communism.
How were these educational achievements affected by the economic upheaval of the post-communist transition? Perhaps not surprisingly, given the wide range of overall economic and political trajectories, the effects were quite heterogeneous across the region. While enrollment in basic education continued to be quasi-universal in most of the region, secondary education enrollment held up better and even increased in East Central Europe, the Baltics, and much of the Balkans, while in the most of the interwar Soviet republics secondary education declined by about 50 percent during the 1990s and then recovered partially and unevenly in the last decade. Meanwhile, tertiary education enrollment, which had been comparatively low in communist Eastern Europe, increased significantly in East-Central Europe but to a much lesser extent in the former Soviet Union, thereby opening an intraregional higher education gap that had not existed under communism. If we complement these enrollment patterns with educational quality considerations, which declined in most of the region (but probably more sharply in the former Soviet republics that experienced deeper and longer economic contractions), we get an overall picture whereby the traditional educational advantages of ex-communist countries in primary and secondary education are slowly eroding particularly in the former Soviet Union. However, we should expect the higher basic education “stock” to set the region apart from countries with comparable economic development for at least another generation. At the same time, the great heterogeneity of transition trajectories is also reflected in educational trends, and should be expected to further deepen or at least perpetuate the differences in economic and political development between different subregions of the former Soviet bloc.

Communist central planners placed heavy emphasis on industrialization for a variety of reasons, including an ideological commitment to promoting an industrial proletariat, and because development of heavy industry was seen as an essential part of military competition with the West. By comparison, services and agriculture received considerably less attention, even though the latter sector initially accounted for a large part of economic output and for the bulk of employment in much of the region particularly outside of East-Central Europe. The legacy of these economic policies at the outset of the transition was an underdeveloped service sector that accounted for only 44 percent of regional GDP in 1989 (compared to 54 percent for Latin America and 65 percent in the OECD countries) and a fairly large agricultural sector, which accounted for roughly 18 percent of GDP and 30 percent of employment, roughly twice the Latin American average. Not surprisingly, the relative importance of agriculture was noticeably higher in Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of the Balkans, a pattern that reflected pre-communist developmental legacies. Even though the overall share of the industrial sector in the late communist period was comparable to Latin America and the OECD, the developmental imprint of communism becomes clear when we look at the much lower energy effectiveness of East European economies, which captures the greater share of Stalinist energy-intensive industries in the region. As
illustrated in Figure 4, this problem was considerably more pronounced in the former Soviet republics but also set most of the other East European countries (with the partial exception of Hungary and the former Yugoslavia) apart from other regions.

As a result of the significant structural transformation and international orientation of East European economies after 1989, their sectoral profiles also changed considerably. The regional share of the service sector rose from 45 percent in 1989 to 55 percent in 2012, while the share of agriculture declined to just under 9 percent of output and 21 percent of employment. While these changes did not amount to full convergence towards either Latin American or OECD patterns, these regional averages mask significant differences between East Central European and Baltic countries, which had largely converged to West European sectoral profiles by 2012, and several much more heavily agricultural countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of the Balkans (including Albania and Romania). A similar pattern can be discerned with respect to the energy effectiveness statistics in Figure 4: thus, whereas the new East European EU members had largely converged to OECD levels by 2011, progress has been much weaker in the former Soviet Union, which retains a distinctively post-communist energy profile (at least partially due to the continued availability of subsidized Russian energy).
Finally, no discussion of the developmental legacies of communism would be complete without focusing on what was arguably the most distinctive hallmark of the communist economic system: the state’s control over and ownership of most of the economy. Despite some regional variation due to idiosyncratic factors such as Poland’s failed collectivization of agriculture, the East European countries entered the 1990s with state sectors ranging from 70–95 percent of GDP. Despite the massive privatization efforts that most countries initiated in the 1990s, according to European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimates, the size of the state sector still averages between 25 and 30 percent in most in East European countries (EBRD 2013), which is considerably higher than most of the non-communist world. Moreover, there is little evidence of further convergence over the past few years, and in a few countries (including Russia) the trends have actually been reversed. While the interwar Soviet republics generally retained larger state sectors, except for a couple of notable exceptions the intra-regional differences have been less pronounced than in other areas, as even several new EU members (including Slovenia, Latvia, and Romania) had state sectors around 30 percent of the GDP by 2010 (Table 1).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Communist Convergence</th>
<th>Communist Distinctiveness</th>
<th>Post-comm Divergence</th>
<th>Post-comm Distinctiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Low/moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>Low/moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy / primary education</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education type</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral profile</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distorted industrial</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State sector size</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, then, the developmental patterns discussed in this section conform to varying degrees to the two legacy conceptions discussed in the introduction. In a number of areas that set communist countries most clearly apart before 1989—particularly the ubiquity of basic education access and the high prevalence of state ownership—the countries of the former Soviet bloc still stand out quite clearly from their non-communist counterparts and do not differ greatly from each other. For a second set of factors—particularly GDP/capita and the relative size of agrarian sector—both the region’s relative backwardness and the patterns of intra-regional differences can
be traced back quite clearly to pre-communist developmental patterns, which were only partially muted by communist developmental efforts and then reinforced by the early post-communist recessions.

The third group of factors consists of several “signature” communist developmental aspects—including low levels of economic inequality, widespread secondary and relatively restricted tertiary education access, and low energy effectiveness—whose post-communist resilience varied considerably across different countries. While in all three areas East European countries ended up with more favorable outcomes—lower inequality, more widespread secondary and tertiary education, and greater energy efficiency—the implications for our two legacy explanations are ambiguous. Thus, we cannot simply conclude that communist legacies were uniformly “stickier” in some countries, since the Soviet republics had greater continuity in tertiary education and energy inefficiency, while Eastern Europe preserved communist-era low income inequality and high secondary education access. On the other hand, except for education, these patterns cannot be readily traced back to pre-communist differences.

From Developmental Legacies to Political Outcomes

While this article has been primarily concerned with the developmental legacies affecting post-communist Eastern Europe, the obvious next question is how these legacies have shaped the politics of the last twenty-five years. While an exhaustive answer to this question is beyond the scope of the current article, I sketch out some tentative answers building on a few prior studies and propose a research agenda that may help address some of the many unresolved questions about the historical roots of post-communist political development. In doing so, I focus on three types of outcomes: institutions, political attitudes, and political behavior.

For a variety of theoretical and normative reasons, one of the issues that received the most attention in the past two decades has been the transition to democracy or, more accurately, the transition away from communist one-party states. Given the dramatic and persistent contrast between the democratic progress in East Central Europe, the Baltics, and (albeit more slowly and unevenly) in the Balkans and the mix of semi-authoritarian and fully authoritarian regimes in most interwar Soviet republics,35 historical legacy arguments on this issue have primarily emphasized intra-regional diversity, including urbanization, energy intensity and economic development levels. However, given the high multicollinearity between different factors, it is difficult to disentangle developmental legacies from other structural factors, such as ethnic diversity or statehood challenges,36 as well as from non-legacy explanations like European integration37 or geographic diffusion.38 Since the predictive power of individual legacies varies substantially as a function of how democracy is defined and measured—for example, whether we focus on formal institutions, or the respect for certain political rights and civil liberties, or more demanding
indicators of democratic governance—this discussion would benefit from a more careful theoretical and empirical focus on the mechanisms underlying these broad correlations. Why, for example, have many of the Balkan states largely converged to East-Central European (and for that matter West European) standards with respect to basic political rights and civil liberties, while consistently lagging behind in terms of corruption and rule of law?

Despite a growing recent concern about authoritarian backsliding among the erstwhile East European democratic success stories (especially Hungary), there has been surprisingly little systematic analysis about the extent of this post-communist democratic deficit and its link to communist legacies. Pop-Eleches shows that even prior to the current political crisis, ex-communist countries were less democratic than their socioeconomic development levels would lead us to expect. The study also finds that the effects of developmental indicators, such as education, on FH democracy vary systematically between post-communist and non-communist countries. This finding adds credence to the idea that the different nature of communist modernization is reflected in different political repercussions and thus suggests the need to rethink the mechanisms underlying modernization theory. However, we need significantly more work both cross-nationally and sub-nationally to identify whether these patterns also apply to other institutional outcomes and to pinpoint more precisely which aspects of communist modernization are particularly unsuitable to democratic governance. Given that the post-communist democratic deficit is greater in the original pre–World War II Soviet republics—countries like Russia and Belarus are remarkably authoritarian given their socioeconomic development—there are good reasons to expect that a promising research venue would be a closer look at the interaction between pre-communist legacies and the communist developmental blueprint. Such research could build on earlier works highlighting communist institutional diversity but would benefit from a simultaneous emphasis on the important commonalities of communist regimes.

Another important area where we would expect communist legacies to affect political institutions is with respect to political parties. Despite some minor variations in the extent to which the minor opposition parties were tolerated, communist regimes were very similar in their emphasis on the undisputed political dominance of the Communist Party, thereby wiping out the pre-communist party systems. Despite the reintroduction of multiparty elections in most of the region after 1990, East European party systems have retained a number of distinctive features, including the central role played by Communist successor parties and the rapid rise and fall of the parties. At the same time, however, there has been a fair amount of diversity within Eastern Europe in the electoral success of different types of parties: while some explanations of this diversity have emphasized diverse late-communist legacies, others have stressed the role of post-communist political strategies (Table 2).

Given the sustained political socialization efforts of communist regimes, we should expect to find a distinctive communist legacy with respect to political attitudes and
behavior. Indeed, a number of recent studies have shown that post-communist citizens report weaker support for democracy and markets, are more supportive of welfare states and redistribution, and are more leftist in ideological terms than citizens of non-communist countries.\textsuperscript{46} Other studies have shown that post-communist citizens are less likely to belong to civic organizations,\textsuperscript{47} and to participate in a variety of political activities, including protests.\textsuperscript{48} Given that most of these differences applied surprisingly uniformly across different ex-communist countries and since preliminary evidence suggests that individual socialization experiences are crucial in explaining variation in both attitudes and participation,\textsuperscript{49} it seems safe to assume that communist education played an important role in driving this process. However, this question would also greatly benefit from additional focus on a variety of institutional intermediaries, such as churches, unions, and informal institutions, which have been shown to play an important role in the transmission of legacy effects.\textsuperscript{50} Given the aforementioned persistence of large state sectors in Eastern Europe, another promising explanation of post-communist exceptionalism builds on Rosenfeld’s\textsuperscript{51} finding that democratic support is lower for middle-class respondents who are economically dependent on the state rather than the private sector.

Post-communist countries also seem to stand out in terms of the interaction between political values and political participation: whereas in most non-communist countries citizens with low democratic support levels are also significantly less likely to be politically active, in ex-communist countries non-democrats are at least as politically mobilized as democrats.\textsuperscript{52} This outcome is consistent with communist political strategies, which mobilized the lower classes in support of the regime while suppressing potentially threatening middle-class mobilization but this explanation raises a host of additional questions about the mechanisms through which these mobilizational patterns have persisted in the post-communist period, and likely requires closer attention to the role of political parties, including Communist successor parties, in reproducing these patterns.

### Table 2

**Overview of Communist Political Legacies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Communist Convergence</th>
<th>Communist Distinctiveness</th>
<th>Post-communist Divergence</th>
<th>Post-communist Distinctiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic participation</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low/moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political attitudes</td>
<td>Moderate/high Variable</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude-behavior constellations</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>Moderate/high</td>
<td>Low/moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the same time, however, we can also find significant variation within the former Soviet bloc along a variety of attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, and these differences are often rooted in pre-communist and/or communist legacy differences. Thus, the post-communist democratic support deficit was more pronounced in the former Soviet republics, arguably at least in part because the effects of communist socialization were stronger in countries with low pre-communist literacy and weak pre-communist democratic traditions. Similarly, patterns of post-communist partisan support have been traced to pre-communist differences in church institutions and educational systems. Meanwhile, others have emphasized the role of variation in communist institutional legacies for explaining different patterns of post-communist protest activity.

Conclusion

In this article, I have discussed two distinctive approaches for thinking about historical legacies in the post-communist context. The first approach, which builds on the work of Ken Jowitt, emphasizes the distinctiveness of Leninist socioeconomic and political legacies, while the second approach, rooted in the writings of Andrew Janos, highlights the significant and resilient pre-communist, communist and post-communist diversity of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The two approaches are theoretically distinct and have different implications for the continued analytical utility of the term Eastern Europe (in its Cold War connotation as referring to the countries of the Soviet bloc), and therefore it is important to distinguish more clearly between them when analyzing historical legacies in the former communist countries.

This distinction is even more important considering that the present review of developmental legacies and their political repercussions reveals that both types of legacies continue to matter after a quarter-century of post-communist transitions. Thus, whereas we can still discern a distinctive and fairly uniform communist imprint in areas such as primary education and the importance of the state sector in the economy, in other areas of socioeconomic development, communism was either unable to reverse longer-term intraregional differences (e.g., with respect to GDP/capita or the size of the agrarian sector) or its initially distinctive developmental imprint has been fundamentally reshaped by post-communist economic reforms (as in the case of the massive increase in income inequality in a subset of ex-communist countries). Similarly, while we need to be careful about making broad regional generalizations without incorporating contextual variations, individuals across much of the former Soviet bloc still share a wide range of distinctive political attitudes and political participation patterns that set them apart from their non-communist counterparts, and these differences have so far shown little sign of fading away. But at the same time we have witnessed a significant divergence of post-communist regime trajectories, which has closely tracked pre-communist developmental legacies.
These patterns present us with a puzzle about why the relative explanatory power of pre-communist and communist legacies varies so significantly across different issue areas. At the most basic level, it is conceivable that some development aspects matter more for mass attitudes, while others are more important in shaping elite choices or institutional performance. Identifying which legacies matter for what types of outcomes is a valuable theoretical exercise for post-communist politics and comparative politics more broadly. But perhaps the most exciting opportunities for future research in this area arise once we go beyond the notion of treating pre-communist and communist legacies as substitutes and instead try to identify how the two types of legacies interact with each other and with non-legacy factors to produce the complex and often unpredictable political patterns that have characterized the politics of post-communism in the last quarter century.

Notes


7. Janos, “Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe.”


9. Such comparative sets could of course be defined either regionally (e.g., Latin America) or in terms of shared political backgrounds (e.g., former fascist countries or postcolonial states).
10. Janos himself uses East-Central Europe, which for him includes not just the Visegrad Four countries but also the Balkans (though not the European former Soviet Union).
15. Beyond the pre-communist literacy levels discussed by Darden and Grzymała-Busse, we also include several other factors at both the country level (e.g., pre-communist democratic experience) and the individual level (e.g., religious denomination or pre-communist education).
16. See, e.g., Tucker’s (“Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999” [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006]) analysis of the link between economic conditions and votes for old vs. new regime parties in countries as diverse as Russia and the Czech Republic.
21. This may in part reflect resistance from national governments against Soviet regional economic designs but also the changing priorities of Soviet leaders gradually shifted from the initial post–World War II strategy of resource extraction from its East European satellites to a growing reliance on economic subsidies in an effort to prop up the increasingly vulnerable communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
25. Thus, higher education enrollment was higher in Kazakhstan than in either Hungary or Poland, and the unweighted average for the non-Baltic Soviet republics was marginally higher than the average for the East European satellite states. UNICEF, A Decade of Transition (Regional Monitoring Report, No. 8; Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2001).
28. Exceptions included temporary drops to about 80 percent in the mid-1990s in countries like Georgia and Moldova that experienced precipitous declines, as well as a more permanent reduction in Turkmenistan (though official enrollment ratios were still generally above 80 percent (UNICEF, A Decade of Transition).
32. Pop-Eleches, “Communist Development.”
33. Pop-Eleches, “Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change.”
34. These outliers are Belarus and Turkmenistan with state sectors of 70 percent and 75 percent, respectively (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], Transition Report 2013: Stuck in Transition?).
41. Pop-Eleches, “Communist Development.”
49. Pop-Eleches and Tucker, *Communism’s Shadow*.
51. Bryn Rosenfeld, “The Post-communist Middle Classes and Democratization: Bringing the State Back In” (paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Chicago, September 2013).
52. Pop-Eleches, “Communist Development.”
53. Ibid.
54. Pop-Eleches and Tucker, Communism’s Shadow.
55. Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political Loyalty; Darden and Grzymała-Busse, “The Great Divide.”

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