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Grigore Pop-Eleches, Graeme B. Robertson

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In February 2014, Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych fled the presidential palace in the face of violence in the streets. This was not the first time that street demonstrations had led to a change of power in Ukraine. In fact, it was not even the first time that Yanukovych had been forced by mass protests to give up his claim on the presidency. He had already been “ousted” once before—during the 2004 Orange Revolution when protesters successfully contested his purported win in the presidential election that year. Although Yanukovych is unusual in having twice been forced from power in this way, civic revolts in the name of democracy are not a Ukrainian idiosyncrasy; rather, they have become a key characteristic of politics in the twenty-first century, taking place in contexts as diverse as Serbia, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Mauritania.¹

If the existence of a wave of “civic” revolts in the post–Cold War era is unquestionable, the results of such uprisings are much less certain. While some apparently prodemocratic revolutions have indeed yielded democratic progress (as did Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution in 2000), others have resulted in truly horrific outcomes (as was the case in Libya and Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings). Moreover, even in the best-case scenarios, outcomes vary considerably across countries and across different dimensions of democracy within countries.² This recent experience contrasts with the predominantly successful outcomes of the “third wave” of democratization that began in southern Europe in the 1970s. The “color revolutions” that removed authoritarian leaders in

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a number of postcommunist countries in the early-to-mid 2000s brought a new surge of democratic optimism, but this has been overtaken by fears of authoritarian retrenchment and pushback.³

The waves of optimism and pessimism about democracy’s prospects in the world are a reminder that the process of democratization is shaped by long-term factors as much as by short-term political changes. In this essay, we focus on the long term and the structural conditions most conducive to further democratization. We look at three key structural factors widely believed to affect a country’s prospects for democratization—income, ethnic or religious fragmentation, and state quality. By tracing the changes in the distribution of structural advantages and disadvantages across regime types since the end of the Cold War, we can see two interesting and visible changes in regime patterns emerge: The proportion of both democracies and autocracies that have relative structural advantages has increased over time; by contrast, the hybrid regimes thought by many scholars to be the most “available” for democratic progress seem to face greater structural challenges today than they did during the immediate post–Cold War period.

Why do these patterns of structural advantage and disadvantage matter? According to our findings, structurally advantaged autocracies and democracies are more stable than their structurally disadvantaged counterparts. Furthermore, democratization is more likely to falter in hybrid regimes with multiple structural disadvantages than in hybrids in better circumstances. These patterns are bad news for anyone hoping for a new wave of democratization, but they also suggest that a full-blown authoritarian reversal is equally unlikely.

In Samuel Huntington’s famous formulation, the third wave of democratization began in the 1970s, starting in southern Europe and Latin America before sweeping across the communist bloc and the whole global South. As many have pointed out, however, this widespread weakening of existing authoritarian regimes led to the emergence not just of new democracies but also of a vast and varied array of so-called hybrid regimes—countries that feature some open and legitimate political competition but fall short on other measures of being full-fledged democracies.⁴ This has forced scholars and policy makers to abandon a worldview based on a simple dichotomy between autocracy and democracy, and to develop new analytical tools that respond to the increasing complexity in the way that politics works around the world. One of the simplest and most influential tools for analyzing political regimes is Freedom House’s ranking of countries as Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. Indeed, taking this simple approach, hybrid (or Partly Free) political regimes are now the modal category of nondemocracies, rising from 36 percent of nondemocracies when Freedom House began collecting data in 1972 to 55 percent in 2013.

Understanding what this changed landscape means for further democratization is important but complicated. Some scholars are opti-
mistic, arguing that hybrid regimes are more likely to become democratic than other varieties of authoritarianism. By that reasoning, if today there are many more hybrids and fewer closed authoritarian regimes than before, then the odds of a new wave of democratization ought to be much greater. This optimism is not unanimous, however. In the eyes of many, the last few years have been marked by backsliding toward authoritarianism rather than by continued progress toward democracy.

The truth is that hybrid regimes are a diverse lot, differing not just in the nature of their political systems but also along a whole host of other dimensions that matter for a country’s prospects for democratization. Moreover, whether a particular country becomes more democratic or more authoritarian in the future depends not just on the nature of its current political regime but on its overall configuration of democracy-promoting and democracy-inhibiting factors. Consequently, aggregate global democratization and de-democratization trends are likely to be shaped by the distribution of such factors. Here, we have chosen to focus on three factors—income, ethnic or religious diversity, and the quality of the state—that scholars have long thought to have a significant impact on prospects for democracy.

The Three Factors

Why income levels in a country matter is the subject of some debate—whether it is because having high incomes makes democracies more stable or because income levels also correlate with factors such as education that shape social preferences over time. But that democracy tends to correlate with higher levels of income is hardly in doubt. Although exceptions exist—there are rich authoritarian states such as Kuwait and poor democracies such as Mongolia—the relationship between a country’s income level and the nature of its political regime is perhaps one of the few things that political scientists feel they know for sure. Consequently, when evaluating the possibilities for democratization in any contemporary authoritarian state, the level of income is one of the key issues to consider.

A second structural element that affects democracy’s prospects is the nature and severity of ethnolinguistic or religious cleavages in a country. While ethnic homogeneity is neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy, ethnic diversity exacerbates the tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal emphasis on minority protections, and thus complicates institutional-design efforts in new democracies. In looking at prospects for democratization, we therefore consider the potential impact of changing patterns of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fragmentation in nondemocratic states.

Finally, we consider changing patterns of state capacity. Some schol-
ars argue that there is no real possibility of democratization in the absence of an effective state that can discipline social forces. Only after a relatively stable and autonomous state apparatus exists is democracy possible.9 While Huntington’s foundational work was focused mainly on developing countries, recent historical studies have applied this insight to the early democratizers too, stressing the role of state development in what was, in reality, a drawn-out and highly contingent process.10 As the authors of these studies are quick to emphasize, the existence of a high-capacity state is neither necessary nor sufficient for the introduction and maintenance of democracy, but the absence of such a state makes it much harder to establish and maintain the civil liberties and political rights that undergird democracy.

Drawing on these three major strains in the literature on democratization, we compare countries with different types of regimes along these three structural dimensions at two historical junctures two decades apart: the mid-to-late 1980s, when the third wave had started to spread from Southern Europe to Latin America and other parts of the world, and the second half of the 2000s, when—despite the promise of the color revolutions—the predominant global trend among regimes was one of stagnation.11

For each dimension, we divide countries based on whether their structural conditions are advantageous, neutral, or disadvantageous. There is no consensus about particular benchmarks dividing good from bad structural conditions. Therefore, in order to enable comparison across dimensions and to keep things simple, we have defined the three categories so that the country-year observations in our data-set are divided into three roughly equal groups: The lowest third are classified as disadvantaged, the middle third as neutral, and the upper third as advantaged.12 We analyze the time period for which data are available for all three indicators (1984–2009), and we use five-year averages to smooth out year-to-year variation. This provides us with a comparison of global structural trends from the final years before the collapse of communism to the late 2000s. Because the categories are defined over the entire 25-year span, this approach captures not only compositional changes in each regime category but also temporal change within countries.13

To classify regimes, we define democracies as countries rated Free by Freedom House (those with combined civil-liberties and political-rights scores averaging between 1 and 2.5, with 1 being the best-possible score) and authoritarian regimes as those rated Not Free by Freedom House (countries with average combined scores between 5.5 and 7, with 7 being the worst-possible score). Given the broad range of regimes included in the Partly Free category, we distinguish between illiberal democracies (with scores between 3 and 3.5) and other hybrid regimes, which we call semiauthoritarian (with scores between 4 and 5).14
Figure 1 illustrates the results. Each bar in Figure 1 shows the percentage of countries in a particular regime type that have disadvantageous (dark gray), neutral (diagonal lines), and advantageous (light gray) structural characteristics. The rows show the proportion for each dimension separately (GDP per capita, ethnic or religious fragmentation, and government quality). The graphs in the left column show the
situation in 1984–89, while those in the right column show the situation in 2004–09. The first notable pattern in Figure 1 is that the biggest differences in both time periods are between full democracies and all the other regime types, rather than within the different kinds of nondemocracies. The distribution of both illiberal democracies and semiauthoritarian regimes across the categories is more like the distribution of authoritarian regimes than that of democracies. This is true for all three structural factors. Countries that are poor, ethnically diverse, and badly governed, which account for roughly half the authoritarian and hybrid regimes, are still rare among the world’s democracies. Conversely, few nondemocratic regimes, even illiberal democracies, have structural characteristics resembling those of the modal liberal democracy, which tends to be relatively prosperous, ethnically homogenous, and well-governed.

The most important trend shown by Figure 1, however, is the significant deterioration in the structural conditions of hybrid regimes, and particularly illiberal democracies, between the 1980s and 2000s. The first row in the figure shows the share of countries with advantageous, neutral, or disadvantageous income levels for each regime type. Both democracies and authoritarian regimes saw substantial increases in the share of states in the high-income category. At the same time, the share of authoritarian states in the disadvantaged category dropped from 57.1 to 41.5 percent. During this same period, however, more semiauthoritarian regimes moved into the economically disadvantaged category, while illiberal democracies were largely stagnant. As a result, by the end of the last decade hybrid regimes had a less promising economic profile compared not only to democracies (as was the case in the late 1980s) but also to fully authoritarian regimes.

The second row of graphs in Figure 1 reveals a similar pattern for ethnic and religious heterogeneity. In the heyday of the third wave, hybrid regimes (and illiberal democracies in particular) were more diverse than democracies but noticeably less diverse than autocracies. Two decades later, they faced greater diversity challenges than both democratic and fully authoritarian regimes. Finally, while a decline in government quality is apparent across all three regime types, there was a significant decrease in the share of well-governed hybrid regimes and a similarly large increase in the share of badly governed ones. Overall, Figure 1 suggests that along all three structural dimensions illiberal democracies and semiauthoritarian regimes looked like much less promising candidates for democratization in the last decade than they did in the 1980s.

So far, we have argued that today’s crop of hybrid regimes looks much less promising for democratization than did their counterparts before the end of the Cold War. But does this matter? After all, even if studies have found long-run connections between regime outcomes and economic development, ethnic diversity, and good governance, we have
not yet shown a direct connection between these structural conditions and political change. In order to do so, we examine how the combined effects of multiple structural advantages and disadvantages are related to political change.

We began by placing countries into five categories based on their combined scores on the three structural dimensions—GDP per capita, ethnic heterogeneity, and quality of government. The category Multiple Structural Disadvantages includes countries that scored low on at least two of the three dimensions (without scoring high on the remaining one). At the other extreme is the category multiple structural advantages, which includes countries that had two or more “good” scores (without scoring low on the remaining one). The three intermediate categories consist of countries with a single structural disadvantage, a single structural advantage, or a neutral mix of structural conditions.16

We then calculated the average change in combined Freedom House political-rights and civil-liberties scores in the four years following the measurement of the structural conditions (with higher scores indicating more democracy). In Figure 2, we report these averages (with 95 percent confidence intervals) for the entire 1984–2009 period.17

Doing so allows us to look within each regime type to see how different combinations of structural advantages and disadvantages shape
regime trajectories over time. Figure 2 also illustrates the effects of structure across regime types. In making such comparisons, however, it is important to bear in mind that Freedom House scores have maximum and minimum values; the picture at the extremes therefore tends to be distorted. Autocracies with the worst Freedom House score cannot deteriorate further on the scale even if conditions in the country actually worsen. This constraint produces a “floor effect” and means that average changes are likely to be positive. For democracies, the problem is reversed: Those countries with the best Freedom House score cannot improve further on the scale. This constraint produces a “ceiling effect” that makes average changes more likely to be negative.

While the results of such a simple exercise are more illustrative than conclusive, Figure 2 indicates that structural conditions have played a role in driving regime trajectories over the past quarter-century. Panel A of Figure 2, which focuses on the evolution of autocracies, reveals a general tendency toward slight improvement (about 1 point on the 13-point scale) in civil liberties and political rights in autocracies over a four-year period. This tendency, as noted above, is due partly to floor effects. Yet the subgroup of autocracies with multiple structural advantages seems immune to this broad trend. Those autocracies that are richer, more homogenous, and better-governed (or have at least two of these features) are more likely to remain just as repressive of civil liberties and political rights four years from now as they are today. In other words, good structural conditions are good for autocratic stability. It is worth noting that this group of autocracies—which includes oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as well as countries less dependent on natural resources, such as Chile in the early-to-mid 1980s and Tunisia in the late 1990s and early 2000s—represents only about 7 percent of all authoritarian regimes, and the proportion has not changed significantly over the past two decades.

Panels B and C of Figure 2 show patterns of changes in civil liberties and political rights for semiauthoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies, respectively. The graphs again reveal the importance of structural factors, but the patterns differ from those exhibited by authoritarian regimes. Rather than improving, hybrid regimes, particularly those illiberal democracies with multiple structural disadvantages, are likely to suffer a decline in civil liberties and political rights over a four-year period.

Zambia in the early 1990s provides a good example of a country with multiple structural disadvantages, in this case all three—low GDP per capita, high ethnic fragmentation, and low-quality government. Following the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1991 and the departure from power of Kenneth Kaunda, the only president Zambia had known since gaining independence in 1964, the country struggled to achieve democracy, sinking rapidly back into semiauthoritarian rule under Kaunda’s successor, Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD). Since the MMD lost control of the presidency in 2011, politics in Zambia has become more competitive, and Zambia is currently classified as an illiberal democracy, though it remained structurally disadvantaged in terms of wealth and ethnic division.

By contrast, hybrids and illiberal democracies with multiple structural advantages are more likely to see fairly substantial improvements. Examples include Argentina in 2001, Taiwan and Slovakia in the mid-1990s, and Turkey in the early 2000s. The main difference between illiberal democracies and semiauthoritarian regimes is that the latter (like their fully authoritarian counterparts) tend to experience statistically significant political liberalizations, whereas the former experience authoritarian backsliding when they have neutral or only slightly disadvantaged structural backgrounds.

From the perspective of prospects for further liberalization and democratization, the bad news becomes apparent when we compare the structural profiles of hybrid regimes: For the most recent period (2004–2009), fully 40 percent of illiberal democracies and 45 percent of semiauthoritarian regimes had multiple structural disadvantages, up from about 33 percent in the 1984–89 period. Meanwhile, only 7 percent of hybrids had multiple structural advantages in 2004–2009, down from 8.5 percent in 1984–89. In other words, the group of hybrids with promising or neutral prospects for liberalization or democratization is increasingly eclipsed by the much larger group of hybrids whose multiple structural disadvantages make them more likely candidates for authoritarian backsliding.

Finally, Panel D of Figure 2 shows the effects of structural advantages and disadvantages among democracies. The ceiling effect—the impossibility for many countries of improving on the scale—means that the average trend among democracies on civil liberties and political rights is downward. Nevertheless, countries with multiple structural advantages and disadvantages again stand out. Democracies with multiple advantages such as Uruguay and Chile tend to be very stable, showing a small positive trend in civil and political rights. Moreover, the group with multiple advantages comprises a majority of democracies—fully 59 percent of democracies in the 2004–2009 period, up from 51 percent in 1984–89.

By contrast, democracies with multiple structural disadvantages experienced on average significantly larger deteriorations in political rights and civil liberties than did other democracies (which may help to explain why they accounted for only 6 percent of all democracies in our overall sample from 1984–2009). Democracies with multiple structural disadvantages include Malawi in the mid-1990s, Nepal in the early 1990s, and Papua New Guinea in the early 2000s. But even countries with just one disadvantageous structural factor or with neutral structural conditions were significantly more likely to experience backsliding than
their wealthier, more homogenous, and better governed counterparts. Such countries jointly accounted for almost 20 percent of democracies (in our overall sample from 1984–2009) and include cases such as Bolivia in the early 2000s, Fiji around the turn of the century, Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, and, in recent years, Mexico.

Four Trajectories

Taken together, the trends illustrated in Figure 2 suggest four main regime trajectories, depending on a regime’s starting point and its constellation of structural conditions. In the first group, we find a fairly large number of hybrid regimes with multiple structural advantages in which stable democracy is the most likely regime outcome. The experiences of Poland and Taiwan in the late 1980s and early 1990s illustrate how such countries are prone to move in a more liberal direction and eventually to join the ranks of full democracies. As Figure 2 shows, once they become democratic, such structurally advantaged countries are unlikely to experience significant authoritarian slippage—a finding that is consistent with the democratic stability of the vast majority of European countries in the last two decades.18

In the second group, we find a much smaller number of structurally advantaged autocracies, such as Saudi Arabia, where these advantages may actually help to consolidate authoritarian regimes. This is probably because both affluence (which allows for enhanced welfare benefits) and relative ethnic homogeneity reduce their potential for popular mobilization. Moreover, where positive inducements are insufficient to prevent mobilization, authoritarian incumbents in such states can use the relatively capable state apparatus to neutralize democratic challengers, as happened in Bahrain during the Arab Spring.

In the third group, we find a large number of countries with multiple structural disadvantages that seem destined to oscillate between unstable authoritarianism and equally unstable hybrid regimes (and, occasionally, fragile democracies). A good example from this group is Kyrgyzstan. Upon independence from the USSR, Kyrgyzstan under President Askar Akayev rapidly established itself as the most promising case for democratization in Central Asia. In the end, however, economic underdevelopment, corruption, and particularist politics (running along lines of ethnic and regional cleavage) eventually scuttled democratization in the country.

Ironically, these very same structural weaknesses undermined Akayev’s efforts at authoritarian consolidation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and eventually led to his overthrow in the 2005 Tulip Revolution. After the revolution, the democratic opening was once again short-lived, as new president Kurmanbek Bakiyev exploited ethnic and regional divisions and deeply entrenched patronage networks in order
to consolidate power. Bakiyev himself was overthrown in 2010 by an opposition mobilized along ethnic and regional lines that took advantage of the extreme weakness of the Kyrgyz state. Kyrgyzstan’s cycle of weak authoritarian rulers may be extreme, but the general pattern of severe challenges to the consolidation of any regime—authoritarian or democratic—is typical for structurally disadvantaged hybrids.19

Finally, in the fourth group we find countries with neutral (that is, mixed) structural conditions. Judging by Figure 2, such countries stand a good chance of escaping full-blown authoritarianism and may even rise through the ranks of semiauthoritarian regimes. If they do become illiberal or even full democracies, however, they are much more vulnerable to backsliding than countries with more uniformly favorable conditions. In other words, they tend to experience regime oscillations similar to those of countries with multiple structural vulnerabilities, though of a smaller magnitude and for a shorter time.

Thailand’s regime trajectory over the past quarter-century illustrates this pattern. Fueled by a combustible mix of corruption, regionally based patronage politics, and a politically interventionist military, the country has gone through multiple cycles of political liberalization under a hybrid regime (in the mid-1980s, mid-1990s, and 2004–13), followed by brief intervals in the lower range of democratic regimes (1989–90, 1998–2004) that were cut short by similarly short-lived military coups (in 1991, 2006, and most recently 2014). While Thailand’s political instability may be more severe than most, a number of other countries with mixed structural conditions—including Albania in the 1990s, Macedonia around the turn of the century, Nicaragua in the late 2000s, and Peru and Turkey in the early 1990s—have exhibited similar patterns.

What Do the Findings Mean?

These findings have two main implications. First, we may need to rethink how we analyze the link between structural conditions and regime change. Whereas most previous studies have implicitly assumed that structural advantages should translate into uniformly better regime outcomes, our study reveals a great deal of heterogeneity in regime trajectories. We therefore need to focus on the interaction between structural conditions (including but not limited to the three factors discussed here) and current regime type in order to understand the different effects. In autocracies, structural advantages appear to promote authoritarian stability. In democracies and hybrids, by contrast, structural advantages promote liberalization and democratization.

Second, the number of countries with structural conditions favorable for democratization has diminished considerably since the heyday of the late 1980s and 1990s, when countries such as Poland, Slovakia, and Taiwan were “ripe for picking” and eventually transitioned to full de-
mocracy. Recent years, by contrast, have been characterized by democratic stagnation and even backsliding. The proportion of structurally disadvantaged hybrid regimes has grown over time. Countries with multiple structural disadvantages now account for almost half of all semiauthoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies, leaving few “low-hanging fruit” with structural conditions that are promising for democracy. While there are a handful of countries left in this category (most notably, Singapore and Malaysia), they tend to be situated in the lower part of the semiauthoritarian range, and thus may actually demonstrate some of the authoritarian-stability effects shown in Figure 2. By contrast, there is now a greater proportion of hybrids with multiple structural disadvantages than before. In these countries, the dangers of authoritarian backsliding actually outweigh the potential for liberalization.

This pessimistic message is tempered by two countervailing factors. First, structurally disadvantaged countries like Kyrgyzstan and Mali, despite having poor prospects for democratic stability, are not doomed to experience lengthy spells of authoritarianism. For the very structural vulnerabilities that undermine their democratic progress also impede authoritarian consolidation. Second, the structural advantages of most existing liberal democracies make them unlikely to fail. This means that even if the third wave is now over, the future is more likely to see a rise in unstable hybrid regimes rather than full-blown authoritarian backsliding.

NOTES


11. The choice of these two time periods was driven in part by data-availability considerations, since the government-quality indicators that we use were not available before 1984.

12. Note that our cutoff for the high-income category is almost exactly the GDP per capita level identified by Przeworski and Limongi as the level above which no democratic country has ever experienced an authoritarian reversal.

13. For example, the larger overall share of rich countries in 2004–2009 versus 1984–89 reflects the positive growth experienced by most countries over the two intervening decades.

14. We get very similar patterns if we instead use a four-category classification scheme based on the distinction in Polity IV of autocracies versus closed anocracies versus open anocracies versus democracies. (Results available upon request).

15. GDP per capita statistics are adjusted for purchasing power parity PPP (see the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for 2013). Fragmentation is measured as the highest value of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization indexes in Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (June 2003): 155–94. Government quality is measured as the average of three International Country Risk Guide variables—“Corruption,” “Law and Order,” and “Bureaucracy Quality”—which were scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher quality of government; The PRS Group, “International Country Risk Guide, 2013,” ICRG, www.prsgroup.com. All three variables were retrieved from the Quality of Governance dataset (Jan Teorell et al., “The Quality of Government Standard Dataset,” version 20Dec13, University of Gothenburg, Quality of Government Institute, www.qog.pol.gu.se).

16. Note that for the purpose of assigning these categories, we allowed good and bad scores along two different dimensions to “cancel out.” Therefore, a neutral score could be the result of a country having either neutral scores for each of the three dimensions or of having a good, a neutral, and a bad score. While future research will need to ascertain the precise nature of these interactions between different structural conditions, we are reassured by the fact that our findings do not change if, instead of this averaging approach, we use simple counts of advantages or disadvantages. (Please contact the authors for further details.)

17. We do not separate out results for the early versus late period because doing so results in very small numbers of observations in many of our regime–structural conditions combinations. We have, however, found no evidence that the interaction between regime types and structural profiles differs significantly between the early and the late part of the time period analyzed in this essay.

18. The recent backsliding in Hungary represents a real—and quite unexpected—departure from this pattern, but it should be noted that despite noticeable infringements on media freedom and judicial independence, Hungary is still classified as democratic in Freedom House’s rankings.