

From Defeat to Dogmatism: Democratic Responses to President Trump*

Sharan Grewal and Matthew Cebul

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How does electoral defeat shape voters' willingness to compromise? Exploiting surveys conducted immediately before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, we find that Democrats became less willing to compromise following Hillary Clinton's electoral defeat. We also find that this increase in dogmatism occurs primarily among Democrats with policy preferences farthest away from President Donald Trump, as opposed to those most shocked by the results, those who might feel personally vulnerable under a Trump administration, or those who were more dogmatic prior to the elections. We infer that the mechanism connecting an electoral loss to greater dogmatism may not be an emotional reaction of shock, anger, or fear, but rather a more rational rejection of the incoming administration's agenda. While elections have been thought to help adjudicate political conflict, these results suggest that in polarized contexts, elections may instead enflame political tensions and instability.

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*Ph.D. candidates at Princeton and Yale, respectively. For helpful comments, we thank David Mayhew, Rory Truex, and Ali Valenzuela.

1 Introduction

Election night in 2016 left Democrats across the United States in a state of shock, anger, and fear. The unexpected victory of President Donald Trump forced Democrats to confront what political scientists have long established: losing hurts. Especially in presidential, winner-take-all elections, losing has been found to increase sadness (Pierce et al., 2016), disillusionment with democracy (Anderson et al., 2005; Craig et al., 2006; Blais and Gélinau, 2007; Dahlberg and Linde, 2016; Rich and Treece, 2016; Grewal and Monroe, 2018), demands for institutional change (Bowler and Donovan, 2007), protests (Anderson and Mendes, 2006), and even violence (Fjelde and Høglund, 2016).

Unexplored, however, is whether losing an election affects voters' willingness to compromise with the electoral winners. In a well-functioning democracy, partisans may polarize during electoral campaigns, but should come together after elections to pass legislation and tackle the nation's problems (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2006; Gutmann and Thompson, 2010). Without this "post-election depolarization" (Cigler and Getter, 1977) democracy would only produce gridlock and obstructionism, and fail to fulfill its function as a peaceful means of resolving conflict (Rustow, 1970; Przeworski, 1991).

In contrast to this ideal-type model of democracy, we find that losing an election may decrease, rather than increase, voters' willingness to compromise. We conduct surveys the day before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which, given the unexpectedness of Trump's victory, provides a unique case of an exogenous electoral shock. Employing both matching and panel analysis of respondents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), we find that individuals who self-identified as Democrats became more dogmatic after their electoral defeat, as measured by a five-question dogmatism scale adapted from Altemeyer (2002). This measure of dogmatism also strongly correlates with more direct policy measures of compromise, including respondents' desire to obstruct Trump's agenda and to impeach him.

The data show that this increase in dogmatism is driven by Democrats with the most

liberal policy preferences. Contrary to expectations, the increase is not driven by those Democrats who were most surprised by Trump’s victory, those who were most dogmatic prior to the election, or even those who may expect to personally suffer under a Trump presidency. This suggests that the mechanism by which an electoral loss induces greater dogmatism may be more than an emotional reaction of shock or outrage, but may instead be a rational response to the policies that the electoral winners are expected to pursue.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section offers a brief background on elections and compromise and previews our main arguments. The third details our research methods, while the fourth presents our results. The final section explores how our findings speak to concerns about polarization in America and to the study of democratization beyond our shores.

2 Polarization, Elections, and Compromise

American politics have grown increasingly polarized. There is widespread agreement that Congress has become more polarized over the past several decades (i.e., [Poole and Rosenthal, 1984](#); [Hopkins and Sides, 2015](#); [Lee, 2016](#); [McCarty et al., 2016](#)). Growing polarization may not just be an elite-level phenomenon, as political divides appear to be widening among the electorate more broadly ([DiMaggio et al., 1996](#); [Layman and Carsey, 2002](#); [Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008](#); [Levendusky, 2009](#); [Mason, 2018](#); [Settle, 2018](#)).¹

Cross-nationally, polarization, whether along ethnic, economic, or ideological lines, is associated with democratic backsliding and breakdown ([Sani and Sartori, 1983](#); [O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986](#); [Horowitz, 1993](#); [Linz and Stepan, 1996](#); [Diamond, 1999](#); [Boix, 2003](#); [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006](#); [Welzel and Inglehart, 2007](#)). Though democratic breakdown may be unlikely in the United States, polarization has still led to gridlock, frustration, and disillusionment with democracy ([Layman et al., 2006](#), p. 100). One mechanism through

¹ For contrasting views, see [Fiorina et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Hill and Tausanovitch \(2015\)](#).

which polarization produces these negative outcomes is a reduced ability to compromise. If major political parties cannot find common ground, politics produces only obstructionism and ineffective governance.

In the ideal-type model of democracy, elections are thought to be a means of reducing polarization. While polarization is a natural and often useful element of campaign season, election night should in theory be followed by a period of “post-election depolarization” (Cigler and Getter, 1977; Gutmann and Thompson, 2010). Losing an election should force defeated partisans to recognize that alternative perspectives are favored by a large proportion (usually, a majority) of the population, and thus encourage them to empathize with the winners.² Beasley and Joslyn (2001, p. 524) contend that the cognitive dissonance induced by “the inconsistency of the losing voters’ preferences and that of the electorate” tends to moderate losers’ evaluations of the winning candidate after the elections. “Thus a political process that tends to agitate existing cleavages ends in an outcome that returns the electorate to a more moderate state of mind” (Beasley and Joslyn, 2001, p. 538). In their acceptance speeches, presidents-elect universally announce their intention to “bring the country together,” while losing candidates similarly implore their supporters to recognize the legitimacy of the election and move beyond the polarizing campaign. Indeed, following Donald Trump’s victory, some Democrats attributed their defeat to their neglect of “flyover country,” and began to express greater interest in rural Americans’ perspectives on politics.

On the other hand, there are many reasons to expect that elections may actually decrease, rather than increase, losers’ willingness to compromise. Existing cross-national literature finds that especially in high-stakes, winner-take-all style contests, elections may not legitimate the system. Losers tend to become disillusioned with democracy (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais and Gélinau, 2007; Dahlberg and Linde, 2016; Rich and Treece, 2016; Grewal and Monroe, 2018), more likely to protest (Anderson and Mendes, 2006), and more likely to

² By sending a signal that one’s side only constitute a minority, elections may also deter democratic breakdown into violence and civil war (Przeworski, 1991; Cheibub and Hays, 2017).

seek electoral reform (Bowler and Donovan, 2007). They also tend to report lower levels of political trust (Craig et al., 2006) and happiness (Pierce et al., 2016). But scholars have yet to examine whether elections decrease losers’ willingness to compromise.

Willingness to compromise is a difficult concept to measure, and most scholars end up probing attitudes toward a specific compromise (see, e.g., Ryan, 2017). We instead propose to measure general feelings toward compromise and its opposite concept, dogmatism, defined as an unwillingness to compromise from one’s preferred policy positions. Dogmatic individuals have a “relatively unchangeable, unjustified certainty” in their beliefs (Altemeyer, 2002, p. 713), tend to dismiss alternative viewpoints out of hand as either misguided or immaterial, and are unwilling to see issues from their opponents’ perspective. We will therefore examine whether losing an election increases or decreases voters’ unwillingness to compromise, or dogmatism.

3 Methods

To explore the lessons that electoral losers learn from their defeat, we rely on two online MTurk surveys. The surveys were conducted immediately before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections (Nov. 7 and Nov. 9), approximating an interrupted time-series (ITS) design. The pre-election surveys provide a baseline level of Democrats’ willingness to compromise, while the post-election surveys then capture the change in their willingness to compromise following Hillary Clinton’s defeat. The close proximity of these surveys to the election helps to control for unobserved confounders, isolating the effect of an electoral loss on losers’ attitudes.

The critical assumption that motivates ITS designs is that the “treatment” (in this case, the electoral loss) is exogenous. In this context, exogeneity requires that the soon-to-be electoral losers do not anticipate their defeat; if they did, then respondents’ pre-election attitudes would already reflect their upcoming loss. While not all elections meet this standard,

the 2016 U.S. presidential election presents an unusually strong case for an exogenous electoral shock. Nearly all major pre-election polls predicted a sizable electoral college win for Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton; pundits and voters alike were anticipating a Clinton victory. In our post-election survey, 75% of Democrats reported being “very shocked” by the electoral results (the highest value on a 4-point scale) and only 1 respondent selected “not at all shocked.” Even Republican respondents were surprised: 75% of them recorded at least some shock at the results, with over 50% registering moderate or high levels of shock. In short, the unexpectedness of Trump’s victory across party lines helps to assuage concerns that Democrats’ pre-election attitudes were colored by their imminent loss.

Our research involved both a cross-sectional and a panel analysis. In the cross-sectional analysis, 402 respondents were surveyed one day prior to the 2016 elections, compared to 192 new respondents surveyed one day after the elections. While the pre and post-election groups are already similar on demographic characteristics, we use matching techniques to minimize any bias in the comparison (see appendix for covariate balance plots).³ We generate covariate balancing propensity scores (Imai and Ratkovic, 2014) and employ full matching, although results are robust to alternative matching procedures.

We also invited all pre-election respondents to re-take the survey after the elections. Of the 402 invited, 77 individuals retook the survey, generating a small panel to supplement the results of the main cross-sectional analysis. Figure 4 (appendix) shows that the 77 who retook the survey were similar to those who did not on almost all demographic characteristics, but were slightly more educated (0.4 on a 1-6 point scale). Because the panel has a relatively low N, the figures and tables below are drawn from the cross-sectional analysis, but we show that these findings are broadly supported by the panel analysis as well.

³ We match the entire sample, with partisanship included among the covariates to balance on. Results are robust to matching each party separately.

Table 1: Sample Sizes and Party Affiliation

Sample	N	% Democrat	% Independent	% Republican
Cross-Section				
Nov. 7 (Pre)	402	55.2	22.9	21.9
Nov. 9 (Post)	192	48.4	24.5	27.1
Total	594	53.0	23.4	23.6
Panel				
Nov. 7 & 9-10	77	57.1	18.2	24.7

Note: Partisanship was asked on a 5-point scale: strong Democrat, leaning Democrat, independent/third party, leaning Republican, strong Republican.

We acknowledge that MTurk samples are not representative of the broader U.S. population. Respondents on MTurk, for instance, tend to be more liberal than the average American (Huff and Tingley, 2015). Our MTurk sample is similarly skewed (see Table 1). While MTurk samples are therefore inappropriate for observational analyses of the American public at large, Clifford et al. (2015) demonstrate that the liberals and conservatives recruited from MTurk “share the same psychological dispositions as their counterparts in the mass public,” making MTurk “a valid recruitment tool for psychological research on political ideology” (p. 1). Accordingly, in comparing the same survey experiments conducted on MTurk and on national probability samples, Berinsky et al. (2012), Mullinix et al. (2015), and Coppock (2017) all find a high degree of correspondence. Moreover, oversampling Democrats grants us better leverage over that subset of the population. Since we are primarily interested in determining the quasi-experimental effect of an electoral loss on Democrats’ political attitudes, MTurk is an appropriate venue for this study.

3.1 Dogmatism Scale

Our primary dependent variable is dogmatism, or unwillingness to compromise. To measure this concept, respondents were asked a condensed version of Altemeyer (2002)’s DOG scale, a battery of 20 questions. To accommodate space constraints in a larger survey, we reduced the DOG scale according to the following criteria. First, we removed questions referring to

“the truth” or “the fundamental issues in life,” which may have captured religious dogmatism as opposed to political dogmatism. Second, we removed questions with small standard deviations in Altemeyer’s studies, as they were unlikely to generate separation among respondents. Finally, we included a mix of pro-trait and con-trait questions. This left five core questions:

1. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.
2. The people who disagree with me may well turn out to be right.
3. My opinions are right and will stand the test of time.
4. It is best to be open to all possibilities and ready to reevaluate your beliefs.
5. I am so sure I am right about the important things in life, there is no evidence that could convince me otherwise.

Question order was randomized and each question was answered on a 9 point scale (from -4, strongly disagree, to 4, strongly agree). We transformed each answer to 0-8 (8 indicating high dogmatism) and used the average of the five questions as our main dependent variable. Results were substantively similar when using the first principal component, which explained 53% of the variation in the five questions (see appendix, Figure 7).

4 Results

Figure 1 presents the average dogmatism score for self-identified Democrats, Independents, and Republicans pre- and post-election in the matched cross-sectional analysis.⁴ We find that Democrats became significantly more dogmatic upon losing the election. Table 2 demonstrates that Democrats’ increase in dogmatism is highly statistically significant ($p < .01$), a

⁴ Results are substantively similar when using self-identified vote choice (see appendix, Figure 8).

finding that holds when controlling for all demographic characteristics, including: age, gender, marriage, income, education, strength of partisanship, religion, family religion, piety, and urban/suburban/rural hometown. Independents remained at about the same level of dogmatism pre- to post-election. Republicans appeared to become less dogmatic, though not significantly so, and this decrease disappears when examining Trump voters rather than Republicans (appendix, Figure 8).

Figure 1: Change in Dogmatism in Matched Cross-Section




Table 2: Change in Dogmatism in Matched Cross-Section (OLS)

<i>DV: Dogmatism Scale</i>						
	Democrats		Independents		Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.425*** (0.161)	0.415** (0.164)	0.052 (0.246)	0.015 (0.248)	-0.212 (0.268)	-0.303 (0.269)
Covariates		✓		✓		✓
Constant	2.853*** (0.090)	3.096*** (0.710)	2.766*** (0.144)	2.517** (1.017)	3.854*** (0.152)	1.309 (1.579)
Observations	311	311	137	137	140	140
R ²	0.022	0.145	0.0003	0.324	0.005	0.273
Adjusted R ²	0.019	0.070	-0.007	0.187	-0.003	0.128

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

The panel sample provides similar evidence of an increase in dogmatism among Democrats (see appendix, Figure 5). On average, Democrats’ dogmatism scores in the panel increased from 2.8 pre-election to 3.14 post-election, a difference that is suggestive ($p=0.2003$) in a two-sided t-test and approaches significance ($p=0.1001$) in a one-sided t-test. Independents, by contrast, remained the same (2.69 to 2.53), as did Republicans (3.42 to 3.39). In short, across both the cross-sectional and panel samples, Democrats appeared to become more dogmatic after losing the elections. While our design does not permit us to determine how long these effects last, they are in contrast to the ideal-type, “post-election depolarization” model, and in line with the literature on electoral losses.

4.1 Real-World Measures of Dogmatism

To demonstrate the validity of our measure of dogmatism, we now show that the compressed DOG scale parallels two real-world policy questions: whether Democrats should try to work with Trump, and whether they should try to impeach him. Post-election, respondents were asked:

Do you think the Democrats should reach out to President-elect Donald Trump and attempt to work together on issues of mutual interest, or should instead adopt an oppositional approach, rebuffing invitations to work together and attempting to block Trump’s agenda?

Respondents could answer “work together”, “block Trump’s agenda”, or “don’t know.” Respondents were also asked whether Trump should be impeached, with possible answers of “yes”, “no”, or “don’t know.” Answers for each question were coded dichotomously as work together/yes = 1, otherwise 0, though results are robust to using a 3-point scale with “don’t know” as a middle category.

Table 3 presents the results, pooling together all post-election surveys (cross-sectional and panel). The dogmatism scale among Democrats correlates strongly with both a reduced

willingness to work with Trump (columns 1-2) and a desire to impeach him (columns 3-4). This suggests that the compressed dogmatism scale successfully captures respondents' willingness to compromise on real policy issues.

Table 3: Cross-Sectional and Panel Post-Election Surveys among Democrats (logit)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Work with Trump?		Impeach Trump?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dogmatism Score	-0.433*** (0.152)	-0.533*** (0.196)	0.368** (0.146)	0.347* (0.182)
Covariates		✓		✓
Constant	2.197*** (0.563)	-3.431 (2.738)	-1.863*** (0.533)	4.088 (2.645)
Observations	133	132	133	132
Log Likelihood	-79.200	-59.744	-82.322	-63.783
Akaike Inf. Crit.	162.399	167.489	168.644	175.565

*Note:** $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

5 Which Democrats Became More Dogmatic?

The results in the previous sections established that Democrats became more dogmatic after losing the 2016 election. This section examines who among the Democrats are driving this effect. While one could generate several plausible hypotheses, our data allowed us to test the following four:

1. **Shock:** Democrats who were more shocked by the electoral results will become more dogmatic.⁵ This hypothesis accords with anecdotal accounts of stunned Democrats residing in major cities, i.e. “liberal bubbles” insulated from pro-Trump sentiment. To gauge shock, post-election respondents were asked to indicate how shocked they were at the electoral results on a 4-point scale.
2. **Dogmatic Reinforcement:** Democrats who were more dogmatic pre-election will see the largest increase in dogmatism following Trump’s win. The logic is that an electoral defeat would entrench and magnify defensive tendencies in those already predisposed to dogmatism, while more open-minded individuals would be less affected.
3. **Personal Vulnerability:** Democrats with the most to lose personally from a Trump presidency will become more dogmatic.⁶ Given candidate Trump’s rhetoric (and behavior) toward women and minorities, these vulnerable groups may feel that any compromise with Trump poses unacceptable risks.
4. **Policy Defense:** The most liberal Democrats (i.e., those farthest away from Trump’s policy preferences) will become more dogmatic, for similar reasons to the personal vulnerability hypothesis. Respondents were asked about four contemporary policy issues: Muslim immigration, abortion, taxation, and the legalization of marijuana.


⁵ Grewal and Monroe (2018) find that the most shocked electoral losers became the most disillusioned with democracy in Egypt and Tunisia.

⁶ For this hypothesis in the media, see Dara Lind, “Fear is a totally rational reaction to the Donald Trump presidency,” *Vox*, November 9, 2016, <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/9/13575042/donald-trump-minorities-afraid-president>.

For each issue, respondents chose their preferred policy from a list of 6-8 positions (see appendix). Their preferences were averaged to generate a measure of respondent’s policy preferences, with larger values indicating more liberal policies.⁷

Surprisingly, the data provide support only for the fourth hypothesis. Table 6 (appendix) presents a regression analysis of this hypothesis using the matched cross-sectional sample. The interaction between the post-election dummy and policy preferences is positive and significant, indicating that the increase in dogmatism pre to post-election is larger for Democrats with more liberal policy preferences. Figure 2 offers another illustration, splitting Democrats into moderate and liberal groups at the median of the aggregate policy preference variable (5.5 on a 1-7 scale) to show that liberal Democrats were more affected by their electoral loss than their moderate counterparts.

Figure 2: Change in Dogmatism among Democrats in Matched Cross-Section



⁷ Results are substantively similar when using the first principal component, which explains roughly 47% of the variation in these four policy questions. Results also hold when using self-identified “strong” and “leaning” Democratic partisanship.

The panel analysis corroborates this finding (appendix, Figure 6). Among panelists, the most liberal Democrats saw an increase in dogmatism from 2.61 to 3.15 in the panel, a difference which is marginally significant ($p=0.087$) in a two-sided t-test and significant in a one-sided t-test ($p=0.043$). By contrast, moderate Democrats’ dogmatism scores in fact decreased from 3.35 to 3.13, although this difference is not statistically significant. In short, across both the cross-sectional and panel analyses, the increase in dogmatism among Democrats appears to be driven by those with the most liberal policy preferences.

The remaining hypotheses are not supported by the data. Regarding “Dogmatic Reinforcement,” liberal democrats saw the largest increase in dogmatism post-election, even though they were relatively more open-minded pre-election (see Figure 2 above).⁸ Similarly, in the panel analysis, pre-electoral dogmatism was negatively, rather than positively, correlated with an increase in dogmatism (see appendix, Table 7).

The “Shock” and “Personal Vulnerability” hypotheses also do not see support. Liberal Democrats were not any more shocked by the results of the election than other Democrats, and level of shock was not correlated with dogmatism. In the panel analysis, shock was positively correlated with an increase in dogmatism, though not significantly so (see appendix, Table 7). Similarly, in both the cross-sectional and panel analyses, gender and race among Democrats were not correlated with the increase in dogmatism, nor were liberal Democrats disproportionately women or minorities.

6 Conclusion

Exploiting surveys before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, we find that Democrats became more dogmatic following their electoral defeat. These results add to the litany of negative effects of losing an election, including sadness, disillusionment with democracy, and

⁸ Though we cannot be sure why liberal Democrats were less dogmatic than moderate Democrats in our pre-election survey, we speculate that either liberal Democrats are accustomed to compromising on their policy objectives in a relatively conservative American context, or liberals actually take their pluralistic and tolerant principles to heart.

willingness to protest. In contrast to the ideal-type model of post-election depolarization, electoral losers appear to become less, rather than more, willing to compromise. While we cannot speculate as to how long these effects last, if they do persist, they may contribute to further partisan gridlock and obstructionism on both sides of the aisle.

Our results also shed light on the mechanism through which electoral defeat triggers dogmatism. Media outlets (particularly right-wing sources) have characterized liberals' visceral response to President Trump as an emotional outburst. While this may be partially accurate, our data show that those most opposed to cooperating with Trump are those with policy preferences farthest from the Trump administration's. This finding suggests that dogmatism may be more than just an emotional reaction, but rather a calculated response to an administration pushing policy positions far from respondents' ideal policies.⁹ A dogmatic refusal to compromise may simply be smart strategy.

Our findings also speak to concerns about worsening political polarization by suggesting that elections themselves may be reinforcing this trend. In a polarized America with ideologically-homogeneous parties, elections are increasingly consequential, as they empower a winner with an agenda diametrically opposed to the loser's preferences. After previously lambasting Republicans under President Barack Obama for refusing to even consider Democratic legislation, the elections have pushed many Democrats to now encourage the same strategy.¹⁰ Democrats appear far more concerned with impeaching Trump through alleged collusion with Russia than with working with him. To the extent that norms of cooperation and compromise are important for democratic governance, our findings reveal a troubling

⁹ This finding may also suggest that Democrats' increase in dogmatism may not have been as large had a more moderate Republican, like John Kasich, defeated Hillary Clinton.

¹⁰ See, e.g., David Faris, "It's time for Democrats to fight dirty," *The Week*, December 1, 2016, <http://theweek.com/articles/664458/time-democrats-fight-dirty>; Ezra Levin, Leah Greenberg, and Angel Padilla, "To Stop Trump, Democrats Can Learn From the Tea Party," *New York Times*, January 2, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/opinion/to-stop-trump-democrats-can-learn-from-the-tea-party.html>; and Charles Homans, "The New Party of No," *New York Times*, March 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/magazine/democratic-party-election-trump.html?_r=0.

trend in American democracy: liberal Democrats may be learning that the best response to a loss is a dogmatic rejection of the incoming government's agenda, even if doing so triggers gridlock and increasing frustration with government.

Lastly, our findings have important cross-national implications for the study of democracy. In contrast to a core assumption viewing elections as producing legitimacy and stability, these findings would suggest that the opposite may occur under certain circumstances. In polarized contexts, elections may breed greater conflict and animosity rather than legitimize the winner's rule. The detrimental effects of elections in polarized contexts may be strongest among plurality and presidential elections rather than proportional representation and parliamentary ones (Stepan and Skach, 1993; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994), though future research would be needed to directly test the impact of different types of electoral systems on losers' willingness to compromise.

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7 Appendix

Balance Plots

Figure 3: Balance Plot, Cross-Sectional Analysis





Figure 4: Balance Plot, Panel Analysis



Tables

The first two tables reproduce Tables 2-3 in text but now with the covariates shown. Table 6 shows that the electoral loss increased dogmatism more among Democrats with the most liberal policy preferences.

Table 4: Change in Dogmatism, Matched Non-Panel (OLS)

	<i>DV: Dogmatism (0-8)</i>					
	Democrats		Independents		Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.425*** (0.161)	0.415** (0.164)	0.052 (0.246)	0.015 (0.248)	-0.212 (0.268)	-0.303 (0.269)
Age		0.011* (0.007)		0.019* (0.011)		-0.003 (0.013)
Female		0.224 (0.164)		-0.582** (0.236)		0.163 (0.275)
Pray		0.042 (0.062)		0.121 (0.102)		0.150 (0.100)
Married		0.081 (0.180)		0.319 (0.271)		0.123 (0.284)
White		0.113 (0.203)		-0.703** (0.313)		-0.733* (0.388)
Income		-0.085 (0.054)		0.091 (0.076)		0.041 (0.086)
Education		-0.025 (0.082)		-0.082 (0.133)		-0.316** (0.144)
Partisanship		-0.132 (0.162)				0.935*** (0.295)
Rural		-0.267** (0.115)		0.070 (0.193)		-0.132 (0.241)
Religion FE		✓		✓		✓
Family Religion FE		✓		✓		✓
Constant	2.853*** (0.090)	3.096*** (0.710)	2.766*** (0.144)	2.517** (1.017)	3.854*** (0.152)	1.309 (1.579)
Observations	311	311	137	137	140	140
R ²	0.022	0.145	0.0003	0.324	0.005	0.273
Adjusted R ²	0.019	0.070	-0.007	0.187	-0.003	0.128

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Cross-Sectional and Panel Post-Election Surveys among Democrats (logit)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Work with Trump?		Impeach Trump?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dogmatism Score	-0.433*** (0.152)	-0.533*** (0.196)	0.368** (0.146)	0.347* (0.182)
Age		0.076*** (0.029)		-0.056** (0.027)
Female		-0.731 (0.636)		1.115* (0.630)
Pray		0.202 (0.231)		-0.247 (0.220)
Married		1.072* (0.617)		-0.701 (0.594)
White		0.872 (0.578)		-1.432** (0.584)
Income		0.042 (0.165)		0.066 (0.161)
Education		0.198 (0.289)		-0.501* (0.284)
Partisanship		0.561 (0.581)		-0.400 (0.559)
Rural		-0.086 (0.405)		-0.338 (0.398)
Religion FE		✓		✓
Family Religion FE		✓		✓
Constant	2.197*** (0.563)	-3.431 (2.738)	-1.863*** (0.533)	4.088 (2.645)
Observations	133	132	133	132
Log Likelihood	-79.200	-59.744	-82.322	-63.783
Akaike Inf. Crit.	162.399	167.489	168.644	175.565

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Change in Dogmatism among Democrats, Matched Non-Panel (OLS)

	<i>DV: Dogmatism (0-8)</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Post-Election*Policy Preference	0.345** (0.148)	0.258* (0.154)
Post-Election	-1.464* (0.801)	-1.028 (0.841)
Policy Preference	-0.447*** (0.092)	-0.365*** (0.108)
Age		0.007 (0.007)
Female		0.131 (0.164)
Pray		0.024 (0.062)
Married		0.118 (0.177)
White		0.108 (0.199)
Income		-0.087 (0.053)
Education		-0.028 (0.081)
Partisanship		-0.253 (0.164)
Rural		-0.211* (0.114)
Religion FE		✓
Family Religion FE		✓
Constant	5.275*** (0.507)	5.395*** (0.975)
Observations	311	311
R ²	0.093	0.179
Adjusted R ²	0.085	0.100

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Panel Analysis

Figure 5: Change in Dogmatism, Panel (Nov 7-10)




Figure 6: Change in Dogmatism among Democrats, Panel (Nov 7-10)




Table 7: Which Democrats Became More Dogmatic? Panel (Nov 7-10)

	<i>DV: Change in Dogmatism (OLS)</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shock	0.255 (0.285)			
Pre-Election Dogmatism		-0.518*** (0.152)		
Women & Minorities			0.276 (0.434)	
Policy Preferences				0.376* (0.219)
Constant	-0.588 (1.063)	1.794*** (0.462)	0.157 (0.358)	-1.662 (1.185)
Observations	44	44	44	44
R ²	0.019	0.216	0.010	0.066
Adjusted R ²	-0.005	0.198	-0.014	0.043

*Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$*

Robustness Checks

Figure 7: Change in Dogmatism (PCA), Matched Cross-Section





Figure 8: Change in Dogmatism by Vote Choice, Matched Cross-Section



Note: “Other” includes 28 votes for Gary Johnson, 19 for Jill Stein, 16 other, and 54 did not vote. Only 11 Democrats (1.8%) in our sample voted for Trump; while only 16 Republicans (2.7%) voted for Clinton.

Policy Preferences

Below, we present the survey questions used to measure policy preferences (see section 5).

1. We would like to know how you feel about the issue of Muslim immigration. Please select the option below that most closely reflects your preferred policy:
 - (a) Permanently bar all Muslims from immigrating to the U.S.
 - (b) Bar all Muslims from immigrating to the U.S. for the next 5 years.
 - (c) Bar Muslims from states with elevated terrorist activity from immigrating to the U.S. for the next 5 years.
 - (d) Allow Muslims of any nationality to immigrate to the U.S., but require them to take an ideological screening test.
 - (e) Allow Muslims of any nationality to immigrate through existing procedures, but create specialized police forces to patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods.
 - (f) Allow Muslims of any nationality to immigrate through existing procedures.
 - (g) Allow Muslims of any nationality to immigrate through existing procedures, and create specialized immigrant outreach programs to help integrate new immigrants.
 - (h) Allow Muslims of any nationality to immigrate through existing procedures, create specialized immigrant outreach programs, and increase the cap on permanent immigrants that the U.S. accepts per year.

2. We would like to know how you feel about the issue of abortion. Please select the option below that most closely reflects your preferred policy:
 - (a) Abortion should be banned.
 - (b) Abortion should be banned, except for when the mothers life is in danger.

- (c) Abortion should be banned except for cases of rape or incest, in which case abortions should be limited to the first 20 weeks of pregnancy, or when the mother's life is in danger.
 - (d) Abortion should be permitted in the first 20 weeks of pregnancy, but only with the informed consent of the mother, parental consent in the case of a minor, and after a mandatory waiting period. Abortions after 20 weeks may still occur if the mother's life is in danger.
 - (e) Abortion should be permitted in the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. Abortions after 20 weeks may still occur if the mother's life is in danger.
 - (f) Abortion should be permitted in the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. Abortions after 20 weeks may still occur if the mother's life is in danger or if the baby suffers from a severe genetic disability.
 - (g) Abortion should be permitted.
3. We would like to know how you feel about the issue of income taxes. Please select the option below that most closely reflects your preferred policy:
- (a) Institute a flat tax, where everyone pays the same percentage regardless of their level of income.
 - (b) Decrease the tax rate on millionaires and billionaires to the same as households making \$200,000 a year.
 - (c) Leave income tax levels unchanged.
 - (d) Leave income tax levels unchanged, but close loopholes on capital gains and carried interest to ensure that the rich do not evade taxes.
 - (e) Close tax loopholes on capital gains and carried interest, and increase the tax rate on millionaires and billionaires.

(f) Close tax loopholes on capital gains and carried interest, and increase the tax rate on households making more than \$200,000 a year.

4. We would like to know how you feel about the issue of recreational marijuana. Please select the option below that most closely reflects your preferred policy:

(a) The recreational use of marijuana should be illegal and the penalties increased.

(b) The recreational use of marijuana should be illegal.

(c) The recreation use of marijuana should be illegal but the penalties decreased.

(d) The recreational use of marijuana should be legal for those over 21, but only in private homes.

(e) The recreational use of marijuana should be legal for those over 21.

(f) The recreational use of marijuana should be legal for those over 18.