

“A Liberal International American Foreign Policy Under Trump? Maybe Down but Not Out¹”

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Introduction

An ongoing debate among prominent scholars of international relations concerns the future direction of American foreign policy. In particular, scholars, pundits, and commentators wonder whether the United States will continue to pursue a liberal internationalist stance. At its core, liberal internationalism entails international engagement, not isolationism. And despite the ‘liberal’ terminology, it is not a policy skewed towards Democrats or political liberals and away from Republicans and political conservatives. Instead the liberal component of internationalism embodies many bi-partisan principles: support for freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press, as well as an open world economy for the movement of goods, services, people, and ideas. Not surprisingly, an amazing amount of ink has been spilled on what the election of Donald Trump as President means for the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy and a possible break from liberal internationalism.

In this article we argue that the Trump administration and a Republican-controlled Congress will find it *in its own interests* to maintain many existing elements of U.S. foreign policy—which will continue to have substantial liberal internationalist components. In part, this is because liberal internationalism still advances America’s vital national interests. America’s many allies help it coordinate its defense and security and, for a price, make America more powerful; they help extend American influence and assist in the fight against global problems like terrorism. The trade and investment agreements the United States has negotiated and its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments help ensure a fairer and more open world economy in which the American economy can prosper. The international institutions the U.S. created after World War II, such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, still enable it to influence—though not determine—the structure of all international economic and political relations. Exiting or ending these agreements will not enhance U.S. power or security; renegotiating them may give the U.S. a bit more leverage in the short run, but in the longer run may also destroy any good will the country possesses. Moreover, disengaging from

¹ Corresponding author: Dustin Tingley, dtingley@gov.harvard.edu. We would like to thank Maria Pachon and Dominic De Sapia for research support and Bob Jervis for the invitation to join a discourse with our colleagues on H-Diplo. We benefitted from excellent comments from the Yale International Relations research workshop, Robert Jervis and Robert Keohane. This is an updated version of a piece originally written in the months after the 2016 election.

the world will only leave it more susceptible to the influence of other powerful countries that might not have America's interests at heart, like China or Russia.

Some scholars have argued that liberal internationalism is no longer in the United States' national interest² and that the government should pull back from its foreign commitments, abandoning its allies and treaties, and even pursue a policy of economic nationalism. While these policies may appear cheaper in the short run, it is not clear they will provide more security, prosperity, or peace in the medium to long run. One can imagine a world of spheres of influence where Russia and China dominate much of the world, leaving the U.S. with few friends or markets.

The many problems the Trump administration seeks to remedy are least of all caused by global forces and most of all self-inflicted by domestic politics. The financial crisis had few international sources; inequality is deeply related to tax and fiscal policy in the U.S. and also technological change; the Iraq war was one of choice. Changing America's international relations is unlikely to fix any of these problems, and most likely to make dealing with our interdependent world even more costly. America's allies and its multilateral engagements help it project its influence and make the country more secure and prosperous.

The crux of our argument is about two sets of constraints on Trump's foreign policy actions.

First, domestic politics and the institutions that shape American foreign policy will be powerful constraints on Trump's ability to depart completely from a liberal internationalist foreign policy. The individuals that have influence over American foreign policy have a wide array of heterogeneous policy preferences, and they inhabit institutional positions that give them powerful tools to resist radical changes. No matter the energy of the President and his policy team, politics in the American democracy, with its many checks and balances, is hard and time consuming, and policy directions that are deeply ingrained are difficult to change.

Second, structural factors of the international system will continue to position the United States as most likely to benefit from liberal internationalist policies. The U.S. occupies a favored position in many international institutions, which already allow it to enjoy favorable policies. Abandoning these institutions will be costly and painful for the United States—for its public, its economy and firms, its military, and its political elites. The loss of a leadership position in world affairs will not be costless, and the loss of legitimacy abroad will have consequences that make achieving American goals harder. Moreover, countries can retaliate if the U.S. adopts extreme policies that hurt them. The importance of international pressures has been evident many times before and after the end of the Cold War.

² Randall Schweller, "A Third-Image Explanation for Why Trump Now: A Response to Robert Jervis's 'President Trump and IR Theory'", *H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Series*, 8 February 2017, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5m-third-image>; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 95:4 (July/August 2016); Barry R. Posen, "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 92:1 (January/February 2013), 121, 125.

We note at the outset that we are intentionally optimistic in this article, much more so than many of our colleagues. On those optimistic about American foreign policy in the wake of Trump's election, Philip Stephens recently quipped that "there are precious few of them around these days."³ We simultaneously recognize that Donald Trump, as President of the United States of America, along with the millions of Americans that voted for him, desires change. But as the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. So we would urge the Executive Branch and all policymakers to recognize the tremendous opportunities available to President Trump (that is, *not candidate Trump*) and to continue the ongoing process of engagement that continues to make America great.

Our intentional optimism might turn out to be misplaced. Many of our arguments and predictions were penned in late December/early January of 2016-2017. We nevertheless stand by them. We updated these arguments to include data and information from the first 8 months of the Trump Presidency. While some data were supportive of our argument, while others were inconsistent with our argument, we still stand by our overall contentions. The first 8 months, while undoubtedly tumultuous and fast-paced, have, on balance, made us more confident in our stance. More often than not, the constraints we describe have blunted efforts to move away from liberal internationalism.

We lay out a set of arguments that *we hope* provide positive reasons for following a path forward that recognizes America's important role in the world. Our country has a mandate, not just for making America great. But also everyone else.

We recognize this is a tall order. We also recognize that in the coming years bipartisan and nonpartisan forces in Congress, in the courts, in cities, and in dining rooms will be necessary to check, and guide, the awesome power of the President of the United States of America. Democracy is about disagreement, reasoned argumentation, and the upholding of core principles that are not beholden to one set of partisans.

Our analysis unfolds as follows. First we provide a brief overview of the concept of liberal internationalism and then discuss whether or not it declined during the Obama Presidency. Then we point out the domestic and international constraints that make deviating from liberal internationalism more difficult for any American President. We analyze several policy areas, like trade and immigration, to explore whether or not we should expect a retreat from liberal internationalism. We consider this first from a domestic political-economy perspective and then from a more international strategic view.⁴ We then consider an issue area that might seem particularly imperilled by the Trump administration: global climate change. A final section concludes.

³ Phillip Stephens, "Trump presidency: America First or America Alone?" *Financial Times*, 10 January 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/ae092214-d36f-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b4c0>.

⁴ For a similarly structured argument, see Robert Jervis, "President Trump and IR Theory," *H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Series*, 2 January 2017, <http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5B-Jervis>.

1) *Liberal Internationalism: An Overview*

Often lost in prognostications about Trump's future foreign policy is that Trump's election is but the latest data point in an ongoing debate among academics and pundits over the past, present, and future of liberal internationalism.⁵ This debate seems especially urgent today because Trump's election has also coincided with watershed events like Brexit, the Matteo Renzi Italy referendum, and the rise of populist movements in a range of Western countries, such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

As is often required of debates over concepts that have been used over long periods of time, it is helpful to first isolate what we mean by liberal internationalism. First, there is the internationalist component of liberal internationalism. Many scholars seem to agree on what this element of the concept means.⁶ Does the U.S. engage abroad or not? Is it willing and does it feel responsible for dealing with the major problems around the world, or should it let others take care of their own problems? Such engagement is the opposite of isolationism and a retreat from global affairs. A key question is: how much of what type of engagement? The U.S. has many policy instruments it can use.⁷ And it can employ these singly or in combination to pursue many different types of goals. An internationalist foreign policy is one that actively tries to use those policy instruments to deal with myriad problems outside the country, and even ones that do not directly threaten its core national security. Internationalism in today's context means similar things to what it meant in President Woodrow Wilson's time.

The question then is whether the internationalist foreign policy the U.S. has followed since World War II will continue. Will the U.S. maintain its alliances and build coalitions or leave others to fend for themselves and go it alone? Will it maintain its commitments to international institutions or abandon them? Will it support an open world economy or turn to protectionism?

The liberal component has been more contentious to define, but is essential to understanding the direction of policy. President Vladimir Putin and Russia today seem to be following a much more internationalist foreign policy than since the fall of the Soviet Union, but it is not a liberal one. As discussed above, this is not an antonym to conservatism. Instead we take the term to

⁵ Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin Tingley, "The Center Still Holds: The Potential for Liberal Internationalism Survives." *International Security* 35:1 (Summer 2010): 75-94, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00003; Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley, "The Contested State of U.S. Foreign Policy: Liberal Internationalism and American Politics" in *H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable 2:4* (2011): 15-31, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/2-4-is-liberal-internationalism-in-decline>; Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States," *International Security* 32: 2 (Fall 2007): 7-44, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.7>; Kupchan and Trubowitz, "The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism's Revival." *International Security* 35:1 (Summer 2010): 95-109, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00004; Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten, "Off-Center: Misplaced Emphases in Debates about Liberal Internationalism" in *ISSF Roundtable 2:4* (2011): 6-14; Brian C. Rathbun, "Was There Ever a Bipartisan Ideological Consensus?" in *ISSF Roundtable 2:4* (2011): 32-35.

⁶ See, for example, Brian C. Rathbun, "Was There Ever a Bipartisan Ideological Consensus?" in *ISSF Roundtable 2:4* (2011): 32-35.

⁷ Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, *Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

derive from the traditional political theory notion of liberalism, and thus in foreign policy to be about valuing and promoting democracy—especially liberal democracy—as well as human rights broadly construed and an open world economy. A liberal internationalist policy is actively trying to use policy tools to forward these types of goals. We further add that liberal internationalism does not foreclose the use of military force when it comes to protecting and promoting these values.

In light of this, how should we interpret Trump’s expressed foreign policy views? Are Trump’s expressed positions the antithesis of liberal internationalism? A useful starting point is to ask: does his slogan of ‘America First’ mean isolationism? The answer is no. Trump is often talking about renegotiation, not withdrawal. Wanting a ‘better deal’ does not mean abandoning all existing agreements or severing all relations. On many occasions, he and his policy team have emphasized searching for better deals within existing international institutions. For example, he has expressed, at times, a desire to take disputes with China to the World Trade Organization. And while calling for an end to US intervention abroad, Trump agreed in August 2017 to deepen US involvement in Afghanistan by increasing American troops there.⁸ Domestic political pressures and the international system may prevent Trump from any hasty move to end American engagement with the rest of the world.

Similarly, his evaluations of existing foreign policies have focused on transactional cost-benefit analysis. As evidenced by the approach of his transition teams, he has asked ‘what does this foreign policy cost us and what do we get in return?’ While that question often belies a skepticism that the benefits may not justify the costs, the question itself does not imply a departure from liberal internationalism. As much as past politicians might have protested otherwise, liberal internationalism in American foreign policy has never been about benign charity for the world beyond U.S. borders. It has been a calculated policy to protect and advance American interests.

It might be argued that Trump’s view is antithetical to liberal internationalism because he sees the world in purely zero-sum terms and only wants a short-term transactional relationship with other countries that entirely benefits the U.S. In contrast, liberal internationalism, it is argued, implies a positive-sum worldview and a more diffuse, long-term reciprocity norm among countries. John Ikenberry’s work on liberal internationalism might be construed this way.⁹ However, as any businessman who has made deals knows, voluntary agreements occur only if both sides gain something. How much each side gains is a matter of negotiating power, but both sides must get enough to accept the agreement. And as we note above, characterizing liberal internationalism as failing to maximize the gains the U.S. gets from any agreement seems naïve.

⁸ Nakamura, David and Abby Phillip, “Trump announces new strategy for Afghanistan that calls for a troop increase,” *Washington Post*, 21 August 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e-868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html?utm_term=.dc06a33431e1

⁹ John G. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). See also John G. Ikenberry, “Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order,” *Perspectives on Politics* 7:1 (March 2009): 71-87, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592709090112>.

The U.S. built the postwar system to maximize its influence over the long run. Hard but polite bargaining with other countries has been the norm, despite Trump's unsupported claims to the contrary.

Trump's commitment to liberal policies is less clear. Promoting democracy and human rights has not to date been a cornerstone of Trump's foreign policy remarks. He does not appear likely to support the International Criminal Court (ICC), especially if it moves forward with its investigations into torture committed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Trump also appears unlikely to commit the U.S. to new obligations, such as the long-standing UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or a new climate change treaty. He has been unmoved by criticism of his positive overtures towards those with poor human rights records, like President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines.

Yet, even during purported periods of the 'heyday' of liberal internationalism, the United States regularly violated principles of democracy promotion and human rights in its policies.¹⁰ Even before Trump, the U.S. had failed to ratify international agreements like the UN Law of the Sea Convention, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol. These failures to engage have largely been due to domestic politics and failure of Congress to ratify the agreements.¹¹ Casting Trump as a major deviation might be a mistake.

2) *The Decline of Liberal Internationalism?: The Obama Administration*

During the decades of debate over liberal internationalism, there has been a strong temptation to select particular windows of time or events and extrapolate from them broad temporal trends and predictions. This approach discounts the extremely slow-moving nature of ideological changes in American foreign policy. Our entries into previous debates¹² over liberal internationalism were well-timed to demonstrate this phenomenon. In 2010, we wrote about trends in the politics of liberal internationalism, ending in the mid-to-late years of the George W. Bush administration. We revisited this debate in 2011, with more emphasis on predictions regarding the Obama administration.

In 2011, many predictions were dire. One side of the debate (not ours) argued that deepening political polarization meant that American foreign policy was turning its back on liberal internationalism. For example, Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz argued:

“In contrast, the Obama administration has backed away from this [liberal internationalist] agenda. As we predicted in “Dead Center,” growing income

¹⁰ Roger Cohen, “Pax Americana Is Over,” *New York Times*, 16 December 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/trumps-chinese-foreign-policy.html>.

¹¹ Erik Voeten, “Where is U.S. Multilateral Leadership?” (paper presented at the Political Economy of Emerging Market Countries, Princeton University Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance, Georgetown University India Initiative, and the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata, Shantiniketan, and New Delhi, India, 30 December 2016-7 January 2017), <http://ncgg-new.princeton.edu/file/291/download?token=zKXhN0n2>.

¹² “Is Liberal Internationalism in Decline?” *ISSF Roundtable 2:4* (2011), <https://issforum.org/roundtables/2-4-is-liberal-internationalism-in-decline>.

inequality and economic troubles at home have curtailed the appetite for further liberalization of U.S. foreign trade, particularly among Democrats sensitive to trade union support.”¹³

The fear was that Obama was abandoning America’s long standing role in world politics. Ironically, much angst over Trump’s current trade policy surrounds his willingness to roll back the gains of the Obama administration’s later years. President Barack Obama received trade negotiating authority from Congress (admittedly after a drawn-out fight with Republicans), negotiated several major free trade agreements and ratified several Preferential Trade Agreements.¹⁴ To be fair, our own prediction was also wrong, because it was so understated. In early 2011, we wrote that Obama’s ability to “avoid rampant protectionism against the backdrop of the current global economic climate” was evidence that his administration would stay the course on free trade.¹⁵ Clearly, he far surpassed that low hurdle with his concrete actions to deepen free trade, even as the economic recovery remained less than stellar.

In terms of international institutions, Obama forged ahead in some areas and resisted retrenchment in others. For example, the New START treaty with Russia was ratified with bipartisan support, as thirteen Republicans crossed the aisle to vote for it. He decreased the leftover animosity towards the ICC from the Bush administration, even offering military assistance in locating suspect Joseph Kony.

Obama’s record on the use of force to promote liberal internationalist ideals is more difficult to assess. Much like the Trump campaign, his record provides a screen on which pundits can project their own leanings, with Obama having done too much or too little depending on the particular commentator. His drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq tended to be too slow for those on the Left, while his increases in troop deployments in response to changing conditions on the ground were too little, too late for those on the Right. His refusal to commit troops to Syria was either prudence or cowardice depending on the commentator. Some might call this an illiberal decision since he refrained from an opportunity to promote democracy in Syria and overthrow a dictator. Others might give him liberal credit for at least not helping Syrian President Bashar al-Assad destroy the rebels. In Ukraine, some might fault Obama for failing to prevent the decidedly illiberal annexation of Crimea, while others might credit him for a tough sanctions

¹³ Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism’s Revival,” *International Security* 35:1 (Summer 2010), 104. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00004.

¹⁴ Obama signed the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement on October 21, 2011. In addition, the U.S. concluded negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 countries in October 2015 and has continued on-going negotiations with the European Union over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). During his administration, the U.S. also ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) in January 2015, finalized a new version of the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) in December 2015, and participates in ongoing discussions around the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). See Office of the United States Trade Representative. “Free Trade Agreements,” <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements> and Mary A. Irace and Rebecca M. Nelson, *International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 115th Congress*, 21 December 2016, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44717.pdf>.

¹⁵ Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley, “The Center Still Holds,” 30.

regime that hurt Russia. In Libya, NATO forces helped speed the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, yet then also failed to stay and build peace. (Again, ironically, following a policy trajectory in which the U.S. wins a war over regime change and then loses the peace, as occurred during the G. W. Bush administration.)

In sum, the Obama administration was marked by some distinct victories for liberal internationalism, especially on trade and climate change, but also was checkered in areas like democracy promotion. What is clear, however, is that the historical record of the Obama administration cannot be characterized as an abandonment of the liberal internationalist agenda, driven by partisan rancor. Rather, it was generally favorable towards liberal internationalism, with significant strides forward in certain areas. Yet, it was also decidedly transactional in other areas, making cost-benefit calculations about each decision based on the facts on the ground of a particular issue. Sound familiar?

3) *The U.S. Political System Prevents Isolationism, Encourages Liberalism*

While the pessimists often point to partisan rancor as a constraint on pursuing liberal internationalism, they also overlook how the diversity of interests and opinions in domestic politics, combined with democratic institutions, are powerful constraints on attempts to roll it back. It is extremely difficult to turn the battleship of American foreign policy; there are many captains, each tugging in different directions on the steering wheel, and each representing constituencies with particularist interests.

We think that the U.S. domestic political system and economy will help to prevent a turn to isolationism. While the Republican Party has unified control of government, this does not mean that pro-isolationist forces will have unlimited freedom to enact favored policies. The Republican Party has long supported free trade, an open world economy and democracy abroad, as emblemized by President Ronald Reagan. Nor does it mean that the incentives of individual legislators—of both parties—will be the same as the President’s. As the *Wall Street Journal* pointed out in “The Burden of One-Party Government,” “...controlling the White House and Congress is no guarantee of success. As often as not, presidents who have enjoyed one-party rule have found themselves at war with their fellow partisans on Capitol Hill.”¹⁶

Following the framework in Milner and Tingley’s book *Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy*,¹⁷ we discuss several “foreign policy tools” and how their use is conditioned by the incentives created by American political institutions.¹⁸

Trade

¹⁶ David Greenberg, “The Burden of One-Party Government,” *Wall Street Journal*, 21 January 2017. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-burden-of-one-party-government-1484932621>.

¹⁷ Milner and Tingley, *Sailing the Water’s Edge*.

¹⁸ For an opposite prediction, see Daron Acemoglu, “We are the Last Defense against Trump,” *Foreign Policy*, 18 January 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/18/we-are-the-last-defense-against-trump-institutions/>.

International trade, almost without exception, has attracted the ire of presidential candidates on the campaign trail. Often forgotten in prognostications about Trump is that President Obama also called for a renegotiation of NAFTA during his primary battle with Hillary Clinton, who herself expressed displeasure with the agreement.¹⁹ While we have no doubt that Trump will attempt to be more antagonistic towards trade than his predecessor, it is unclear how significant and different his policy will be.

The main reason is that many other parties beyond the Oval Office have influence over trade policy. Congress has always been extremely assertive on trade issues since the Constitution gives it the legislative power over trade. It was not easy for President Bill Clinton to pass NAFTA because of legislators in his own party. And there is ample reason to suspect that many Republican legislators have substantial interests in remaining in an agreement much like NAFTA. As with Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and every other free trade agreement in modern history, it has been the Republican Party driving free trade policy. And while no one would suggest that the Republican Party is the same as it was in 1993 when NAFTA passed, free trade still featured prominently in the 2016 Republican platform.²⁰ While at times aimed at undermining passage of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), this Party document clearly cements the importance of trade liberalization to the Republican Party.

Vast portions of the U.S. economy depend on free trade.²¹ According to one estimate, imports and exports play important roles in more than 41 million American jobs.²² Trade also has an outsized impact on the economics of many traditionally Republican states. According to the Farm Bureau, “one in three acres of America’s farms is planted for exports.”²³ Thus while the Republican platform states that “Republicans understand that you can succeed in a negotiation only if you are willing to walk away from it,”²⁴ individual legislators whose constituents depend on the economic gains from trade will not readily support high tariffs, rancorous renegotiations and other policy changes that would have devastating consequences for their states and districts.

¹⁹ Jacob L. Shapiro, “The American President’s Power over NAFTA,” *Geopolitical Futures*, 9 September 2016. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-american-presidents-power-over-nafta/>.

²⁰ Committee on Arrangements for the 2016 Republican National Convention, *Republican Platform 2016*, 2-3, <https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf>.

²¹ On the importance of trade and trade agreements to the U.S. economy, see Chad P. Bown “The Truth about Trade Agreements—and Why We Need Them,” *Peterson Institute for International Affairs*, 21 November 2016, <https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/truth-about-trade-agreements-and-why-we-need-them>.

²² Trade Partnership Worldwide, LLC, *Trade and American Jobs: The Impact of Trade on U.S. and State-Level Employment: 2016 Update*, January 2016, <http://tradepartnership.com/reports/trade-and-american-jobs-the-impact-of-trade-on-u-s-and-state-level-employment-update-2016/>.

²³ American Farm Bureau Federation, “Fast Facts about Agriculture,” <http://www.fb.org/newsroom/fast-facts>. On the consequences of proposed trade policies on U.S. agricultural exports, see “Trade Punishment for Trump Voters,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 February 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trade-punishment-for-trump-voters-1486686758>.

²⁴ *Republican Platform 2016*, 3.

Thinking about NAFTA specifically, Republican Senators have much to lose from a trade war with Mexico. Corn is a major export to Mexico and has been mentioned as a likely target for Mexican retaliation.²⁵ The top five corn producing states in the United States are represented by five Republican Senators.²⁶ During the spat over trucking duties, Mexico retaliated against U.S. apple exports.²⁷ Michigan and Pennsylvania, states of clear importance on the electoral map, are two of the top four states in apple production.²⁸

Over the first 8 months of the Trump presidency, a pattern has emerged in which the President or one of his spokespeople will float particularly hostile proposals regarding NAFTA, only for supporters of the agreement, often Republicans, to immediately reiterate the importance of the agreement. At his infamous Arizona campaign rally in August of 2017, President Trump restated his willingness to terminate NAFTA. Republican Senators from states that would be significantly harmed by withdrawal quickly talked down the desirability or feasibility of withdrawal. As Trump floated proposals to remove the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions of NAFTA, powerful business lobbies, like those of the traditionally Republican-aligned gas and energy sector, immediately pushed back on this. The Business Roundtable, National Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce made this explicit in a letter to the Trump administration stating that their support of any NAFTA renegotiation hinged on retaining ISDS.²⁹

Beyond Mexico and NAFTA, Trump's other favorite target, China, is responsible for trade that is tremendously beneficial for many legislative districts. Even crucial members of his Cabinet have benefited from exports to China. For example, Terry Branstad, former Governor of Iowa and current Ambassador to China oversaw a deepening of trade relations with China in agricultural products. China is Iowa's second biggest export destination (behind Canada) with \$2.3 billion in exports in 2015.³⁰ This is a large number for a state with an estimated GDP of approximately \$150 billion.³¹ Iowa and Indiana are also major soybean producers, a product that

²⁵ "Donald Trump's Presidency is About to Hit Mexico," *The Economist*, 14 January 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21714397-protectionist-entering-white-house-mexico-ponders-its-options-donald-trumps>.

²⁶ Rob Cook, "States That Produce The Most Corn," Beef2Live, <http://beef2live.com/story-states-produce-corn-0-107129>.

²⁷ "Donald Trump's Mexico-bashing hurts American interests too," *Financial Times*, 18 January 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/434e7c5e-dd73-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce>.

²⁸ "U.S. Apple Production and Utilization, by State, 1980-2010," USDA, <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1825>.

²⁹ See Air-Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Institute, et al, "Air-Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Institute, et al. to Robert Lighthizer, et al," 8 August 2017, http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/letters/2017-08-08%20Business%20Letter%20on%20ISDS%20in%20NAFTA_0.PDF

³⁰ "Iowa," The U.S.-China Business Council, <https://www.uschina.org/reports/us-exports/iowa>.

³¹ "Iowa GDP," Department of Numbers, <http://www.deptofnumbers.com/gdp/iowa/>.

has been mentioned as a likely target for Chinese retaliation against trade barriers.³² Boeing, another target mentioned by China, employs thousands of workers in red states and swing states like Missouri and Pennsylvania.³³ In the first 8 months of his Presidency, Trump has explored a Section 301 investigation into Chinese trade practices. This provision of the 1974 Trade Act would allow the President to implement significant unilateral restrictions on trade with China, if China is found to be in violation of Section 301. The investigation will likely take a year or more, and it's outcome is difficult to predict.

The political reality of trade policy is already setting in on Trump's plans for tariffs and renegotiations. One Republican Senator has introduced legislation to limit the President's ability to implement tariffs.³⁴ This is particularly noteworthy given the fervor with which Trump vowed to retaliate against politicians who withheld their endorsements during the campaign.³⁵ Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan has already stated that he opposes efforts to raise tariffs.³⁶ Stock market and business analysts also think Trump's limitations on trade will ultimately be muted.³⁷

In his first week in office, Trump faced the constraints of Republican legislators whose districts stood to lose from antagonistic trade policy. To follow through on his campaign promise to build a wall on the US-Mexico border and make Mexico pay for it, Trump's spokesperson described an idea that was widely interpreted as a 20% tariff on imports from Mexico.³⁸ Senators John Cornyn, Lindsey Graham, Benjamin Sasse, and John McCain, and several Republican Representatives quickly and publicly objected to the plan. In less than 24 hours, Trump stopped emphasizing this proposal.

Foreign Aid

³² Edward Alden, "The Roots of Trump's Trade Rage: The Davos set ignored the warning signs for years. Now, the global elites are rightly worried about what comes next," *Politico*, 16 January 2017, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/the-roots-of-trumps-trade-rage-214639?cmpid=sf>.

³³ Boeing, "Employment Data," <http://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/>.

³⁴ Patrick Gillespie, "Republican Senator Aims to Curtail Trump's Tariff Power," *CNN Money*, 13 January 2017, <http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/13/news/economy/trump-trade-senator-mike-lee/index.htm>.

³⁵ Alexander Burns, Jonathan Martin, and Maggie Haberman, "Donald Trump Vows Retaliation as Republicans Abandon Him," *New York Times*, 9 October 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us/politics/republicans-trump.html>.

³⁶ Lindsey McPherson, "Ryan Bucks Trump, Says Congress Will Not Raise Tariffs: Speakers Comment Breaks from President-Elect's Promise to Impose 'Border Tax'," *Roll Call*, 4 January 2017, <http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/ryan-bucks-trump-says-congress-will-not-raising-tariffs>.

³⁷ Max Ehrenfreund, "Why Wall Street Still Isn't Taking Donald Trump Seriously," *Washington Post*, 9 December 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/12/09/why-wall-street-still-isnt-taking-donald-trump-seriously/>.

³⁸ Spokesman Spicer's actual intent is unclear; many think his remarks were about corporate tax reform. However, they were widely reported as a 20% tariff on Mexican imports.

Foreign aid was not a key issue in the Presidential campaign, even though it is well positioned to be cut as part of any budgetary retrenchment. To the extent that Trump weighed in on the topic during the campaign, it was in contradictory ways. At times he criticized aid, preferring that funds be spent at home, but at other times he highlighted its importance for strategic and humanitarian purposes. His transition team's initial questions regarding Africa seem to fall more in line with the former, with some questions explicitly asking whether expenditures on aid in Africa could be better spent at home or whether initiatives like PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) were simply "entitlement programs."³⁹

Foreign aid does not have as strong a political backing behind it, although there are non-trivial numbers of supporters, many of whom are Republican. The major foreign aid initiatives of the last Congress were mostly bills sponsored by Republicans.⁴⁰

Republican support for foreign aid is often founded on the same objectives that characterized the Trump electoral campaign. For example, the last major pieces of foreign aid legislation focused on accountability and mitigation of corruption and misuse. Strong Republican support for foreign aid also stems from its role in helping combat Islamic extremism, which is a goal that is clearly in line with the Trump campaign's preferences.⁴¹ Foreign aid also finds direct support in the 2016 Republican convention platform, which lauds aid as a tool for advancing U.S. security and business interests.⁴² A large amount of foreign assistance is spent on products and services provided by U.S. firms. Some academic research has suggested that major foreign aid donors use aid as a way to slow migration into their countries, an objective that clearly fits with Trump's goals.⁴³ The powerful backers of foreign assistance in the Republican Party are often connected to public health campaigns supported by evangelicals, the very same segment of the Republican base that spurred Trump's choice of Indiana Governor Mike Pence as a running mate.

What is most likely are changes in priorities. Support for programs that deal with climate change, LGBT issues, family planning will probably be challenged. But much foreign aid continues to be money spent by U.S. companies. On the one hand, there is substantial consensus internationally that such "tied aid" can be inefficient.⁴⁴ On the other hand, proponents of foreign aid at least gain

³⁹ Helene Cooper, "Trump Team's Queries about Africa Point to Skepticism About Aid," *New York Times*, 13 January 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/world/africa/africa-donald-trump.html>.

⁴⁰ George Ingram, "Congress Finds Bipartisan Support for Foreign Aid and Aid Reform," *Brookings Institute*, 11 July 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/07/11/congress-finds-bipartisan-support-for-foreign-aid-and-aid-reform/>.

⁴¹ David Francis, John Hudson, Dan De Luce, "Will Foreign Aid Get Cut on Trump's Chopping Block," *Foreign Policy*, 23 November 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/will-foreign-aid-get-cut-on-trumps-chopping-block/>.

⁴² *Republican Platform 2016*, 52.

⁴³ Sarah Blodgett Bermeo and David Leblang, "Foreign Interests: Immigration and the Political Economy of Foreign Aid," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, College Station, Texas, 13-14 November 2009). <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e025/d301ac0dac2a2e7ec09c8950dd88a7ffddf.pdf>.

⁴⁴ OECD, "Untying Aid: The Right to Choose," <http://www.oecd.org/development/untyingaidtherighttochoose.htm>.

a domestic interest group. Promises to ‘drain the swamp’ have not exactly been followed by government consultancies and lobbyists shutting down their shops. We think foreign aid will continue roughly in the same size because it supports U.S. national interests, but with different primary aims and targets. In May 2017 Trump proposed a 30% reduction on US foreign aid; this would have cut many different programs across the board. The proposed cuts and foreign policy budget were soundly rejected by Congress, however.⁴⁵ In his first 8 months, thus Trump made cuts to foreign aid for Egypt for geopolitical reasons, but has not been able to significantly cut foreign aid.

Immigration

Immigration was clearly a major campaign issue. But here too domestic political forces will make it difficult for Trump to deliver major anti-immigration policies.

First and foremost are simple demographic realities. Demographic trends point to rising percentages of Latino voters and a shrinking White population. Before Trump’s victory, Republican strategists and candidates recognized their need to court votes from minorities, and especially Latinos/as, with whom they often shared similar views on social issues. In the primary, several Republican candidates touted their credentials as Spanish-speakers or their ability to empathize with Latino/a voters.

But then Trump won the election despite winning less than a third of Latino/a voters.⁴⁶ While some within the Republican Party see this as proof that they need not work so hard to court minorities, others see Trump’s success as one-off, and they do not think Republicans can ever go back to a perceived lack of attention to minority voters. Henry Barbour, a RNC member who co-authored a 2013 RNC strategy guide that explicitly emphasized the need to improve the GOP’s standing with Latino/a’s, described this as still a “fundamental truth,” even after Trump proved that he could win without strong minority support.⁴⁷

Because of demographics, the Republican Party simply cannot afford to cede 70% of the Latino vote to the Democrats with policies and rhetoric that continually antagonize immigrants and recent-generation citizens. The successful strategies of the GOP over the last few electoral cycles—gerrymandering and voter restriction laws—are tools whose effectiveness may wane over time in part due to more organized Democratic responses. At some point, Republicans will have to make a positive case to these citizens to attract their votes.⁴⁸ Social issues seem to be

⁴⁵ Torbat, Yeganeh, “Republicans push back against Trump plan to cut foreign aid,” 23 May 2017, *Reuters* <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-foreign-aid-idUSKBN18J2DC>.

⁴⁶ Asma Khalid, “Latinos Will Never Vote For a Republican, And Other Myths About Hispanics From 2016,” *NPR*, 22 December 2016, <http://www.npr.org/2016/12/22/506347254/latinos-will-never-vote-for-a-republican-and-other-myths-about-hispanics-from-20>.

⁴⁷ “GOP Prescription of Minority Outreach Forgotten With Trump,” *Associated Press*, 18 January 2017, <http://wtop.com/dc/2017/01/gop-prescription-of-minority-outreach-forgotten-with-trump/>.

⁴⁸ Of note is the fact that immigrants prefer increased immigration. Andrew Dugan, “U.S. Support for Increased Immigration Up to 25%,” *Gallup*, 10 August 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/184529/support-increased-immigration.aspx>

sufficient to sway approximately 30% of these voters, but alienating the other 70% cedes millions of votes to the Democrats.⁴⁹ Even Newt Gingrich has recognized this reality, urging (unsuccessfully) Trump to include at least one Hispanic person in his Cabinet.⁵⁰

Second, many of the constituencies Trump has emphasized his support for, such as the high-tech industry, desperately need to fill high skill jobs with immigrants. Trump's campaign initially mentioned H1-B visas with contempt, arguing that they were overused. However, Trump's inner circle is also comprised of many who advocate for *increased* H1-B visa use⁵¹ and Trump has also signalled a more positive position.⁵² They recognize that the program brings in highly skilled individuals for jobs that many Americans are not qualified for, and that the overall economic effect is net-positive for American jobs.

In our initial writing of this piece, we wrote that "Trump might deliver on his promises to target Muslims, preventing their entry into the United States or even curtail the civil rights of American Muslims." The former has already been proven correct, as President Trump has signed an Executive order barring entry for non-U.S.-citizens (and eventually green card holders) originating from several Muslim-majority countries. The order also suspended immigration for refugees from those countries for a certain period of time.

This is clearly illiberal. And it is misguided. Terrorism is an issue that has to be dealt with, but not with blanket policies against a community that by and large respects the values and principles of America. It may in the short term be tempting to ban immigrants but in the long run this can create damaging results.

The political reaction to the Executive Order has been mixed, to put it mildly. On one hand, some polls show a slight majority disapproving and others a slight majority approving of the policy.⁵³ On the other, the policy has triggered massive protests. And while the most common response from Republicans has been silence, many have spoken out against the ban. The influential politically active billionaire Koch brothers have spoken out against the ban. The intensity of the criticism of the ban makes it likely that it will not be renewed when the 120 day time period elapses for most countries. Trump would do well to claim improved scrutiny of immigrants and their vetting procedures and move on.

⁴⁹ "GOP Prescription of Minority Outreach Forgotten With Trump."

⁵⁰ Josh Dawsey and Tara Palmeri, "Trump Under Pressure to Pick a Hispanic for His Cabinet," *Politico*, 21 January 2016, <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/donald-trump-hispanics-gingrich-cabinet-232907>.

⁵¹ Patrick Thibodeau, "Trump Turns to H-1B Advocates for Advice," *InfoWorld*, 19 January 2017. <http://www.infoworld.com/article/3159075/h1b/trump-turns-to-h-1b-advocates-for-advice.html>.

⁵² Nick Gass, "Trump softens opposition to H1B visas," *Politico*, 3 March 2016, <http://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/2016/03/trump-immigration-h1b-visas-gop-debate-220233>.

⁵³ Philip Bump, "Do Americans support Trump's immigration action? Depends on who's asking, and how," *Washington Post*, 2 February 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/02/02/do-americans-support-trumps-immigration-action-depends-on-whos-asking-and-how/>.

Other Domestic Political Constraints

Finally, it is important to consider two additional constraints that we have not emphasized: the electorate and the judicial branch. With respect to the ‘voice of the people,’ there are signs that overall support among the public for liberal internationalism has not plummeted. While the media has a tendency to cover communities that appear to have been negatively impacted by trade, on the whole the public still supports trade and immigration. A YouGov 2016 nationally representative survey showed a majority of Americans (and individuals from 19 other countries) supporting trade.⁵⁴ Similar majorities showing positive attitudes to other liberal internationalist policies, such as immigration and U.S. engagement, can be found in other surveys.⁵⁵

Our analysis has also largely focused on lawmakers, yet the judicial branch will undoubtedly have a large say in the legality of many of Trump’s policies, just as they were involved in much Obama’s signature policy initiatives, like the Affordable Care Act. Legal challenges to the immigration ban began almost immediately, and immigration is one of the areas that we’ve covered in which the President is thought to have the *most* legal discretion.

Withdrawal from treaties and agreements is a murkier legal question. The President can clearly withdraw from ongoing negotiations of agreements and treaties that have not yet been signed or ratified, for example the TPP. The President also has broad discretion in withdrawing from mutual defense pacts (for example, Jimmy Carter’s withdrawal from a defense pact with Taiwan). Withdrawal from Congressional-Executive Agreements, of which NAFTA is the best known example, or formally ratified treaties like the U.S. accession to the World Trade Organization are a legal grey area, and the courts have generally preferred that the other branches reach a compromise on these political situations, rather than intervening judicially. Raising tariffs is also possible, but constrained by a dense set of laws that govern the conditions under which the President can raise tariffs and by how much.

So far, the Trump administration seems to be willing to take actions even if their legality is not clearly established by previous precedent. Ultimately, the judicial branch may prove to be an ineffective constraint on President Trump’s ability to change foreign policy, especially in the short to medium run. He will likely win some cases, and even defeats often take years to play out in the courts.

⁵⁴ The other countries were: Great Britain, France, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, India, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Matthew Smith, “International Survey: Globalisation is Still Seen as a Force for Good in the World,” YouGov, 17 November 2016, <https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/11/17/international-survey>. A 2015 Pew survey showed similar results on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, with more Americans who expressed support for the agreement than not. Travis Mitchell. “2015 U.S.-Germany Survey Data,” *Pew Research Center*, 1 March 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/03/01/2015-u-s-germany-survey-data/>.

⁵⁵ Kavitha Surana, “America Actually Likes Immigrants and a Global Role, Survey Finds,” *Foreign Policy* 8 December 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/america-actually-likes-immigrants-and-a-global-role-survey-finds-trump-populism/>; Dina Smeltz, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, “America in the Age of Uncertainty,” *The Chicago Council on Global Affairs*, 6 October 2016, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/america-age-uncertainty>.

International judicial bodies, like the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), are also unlikely to be particularly constraining in practice. WTO disputes take years to resolve, and the ultimate enforcement mechanism is retaliation by other member states. Those states will likely resort to retaliation before waiting for the full DSU process to play out, meaning that the threat of international legal sanction likely does not add additional constraint.

4) *The World Prevents Isolationism*

In addition to these domestic constraints, American presidents face international pressures that support an ongoing liberal internationalist foreign policy.⁵⁶ We think that liberal internationalism remains in the United States' best national interests. This means that policies that go against it will have great costs, ones that outweigh the benefits, for American security and the national economy. In part this is because the way in which other countries react to American policies or threaten to react to them can create costs and benefits for the U.S. that change its foreign policy calculus. Actions that seem to have net benefits for the U.S. at first, such as decreasing funding for an international organization, may trigger reactions from foreign countries that make the policy very costly for the U.S. in the end. Most of all, American withdrawal from the international system will open the doors to the influence of other countries that do not share American priorities, such as China and Russia.

First, the United States benefits a great deal from the institutions it set up after World War II. These institutions help the U.S. coordinate policies globally and engender willingness to share burdens with other countries. Were it to exit these institutions, other countries might take them over and make them-or replace them with ones- much less beneficial to the U.S. Second, American behavior that creates serious costs for other countries can be met by all sorts of retaliatory behavior. The United States cannot just count on other countries to do nothing if it drastically changes its policies toward them. And these reactions can be very costly. Finally, it is not clear that if the U.S. retreats and leaves foreign problems for others to deal with that it will not be hurt by its failure to engage. For instance, ignoring poverty and war in other countries may seem smart until it leads to the massive migration of people into the U.S. or global epidemics that infect the U.S. as well. A closer example is Mexico; the biggest forces driving immigration from there into the United States are the disparities between the two countries' economies. Putting America first and making its economy boom at the expense of the Mexican economy—if it is even possible to decouple the two in this age of interdependence—is simply going to create massive pressure for migration into the United States. Climate change may be another example of this, as we discuss later. We elaborate on each of these below.

4.1 *Benefits from Institutions*

⁵⁶ For one analytical approach to the relationship between the pressures of the international system and individual states' policy choices, see Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang, "International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Theories with Empirical Models in International Relations," *International Organization* 69:2 (Spring 2015): 275-309, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000356>.

Doubters of a liberal internationalist future for the U.S. might suggest that a Trump administration will end or substantially reduce U.S. participation in forums like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, NATO, the UN, and the World Health Organization. Trump's constant refrain regarding these institutions is that they no longer promote U.S. interests, are obsolete, and that a better deal awaits. He wants to bargain for a new relationship or to try to bilaterally negotiate a new deal with each partner. It remains to be seen how close this is to the thinking of Prime Minister Theresa May and her Brexit supporters in the UK.⁵⁷

We suspect the Trump administration will eventually realize a very different picture: that many of these institutions were designed with American interests very much at their heart. Lofty rhetoric of past administrations aside, these institutions were shaped and supported by the U.S. predominantly because they furthered American interests, not because of an altruistic worldview. The U.S. negotiated hard in each case and got much of what it wanted, as the most powerful country in the world. Other countries joined in these multilateral deals because they too gained. One feature of media coverage and punditry regarding these international institutions is that they are quick to highlight the times in which foreign nations and their actions in these institutions diverge from American interests. However, these events are generally the exceptions that demonstrate the rule. For example, it is not headline-grabbing or noteworthy to say 'The International Monetary Fund again makes a decision that is clearly based on U.S. interests.' Nevertheless, a wealth of scholarly evidence demonstrates how American interests shape the recipients, amount, conditionality, and enforcement of IMF loans.⁵⁸ Moreover, if one believes that the U.S. is actually weaker today than in the past, then one should not renegotiate these deals since the United States will only get a worse outcome.

Trump's Cabinet picks have frequently mentioned the recent United Nations resolution condemning Israeli settlements as an example of the UN run amuck. Yet the resolution's significance for U.S. foreign policy lies not in the fact that nations abroad condemned Israel, a regular occurrence, but rather that the Obama administration declined to veto the resolution. Defunding or defanging an institution where the U.S. has complete veto power over the most meaningful institutions will not advance U.S. interests. The United States' Security Council veto ensures that absolutely no policy can get through that body if the U.S. decides that it is not in its interests. There is no way to re-negotiate that deal to make it any sweeter on paper. Abdicating a leadership role in them will simply open up opportunities for other countries to occupy a position of greater power and even rewrite the rules in their favor.

Furthermore, other countries need to agree to any arrangement posed for a new bargain to be struck. The terms of a bargain get more favorable as a party's bargaining power increases, and it is not clear that the U.S. is in a better negotiation position today compared to the 1950's when

⁵⁷ George Parker, "Theresa May to emphasise value of EU and Nato to Trump," *Financial Times*, 21 January 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/4c0781b8-df37-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce>.

⁵⁸ Randall W. Stone, "The Scope of IMF Conditionality," *International Organization* 62:4 (Fall 2008), 589-620, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080211>; Stone, "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 98:4 (November 2004): 577-591, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540404136X>.

these institutions were created. The Trump administration has focused on its willingness to walk away from institutions as their source of leverage, and few would argue that it has failed to convey this willingness at top volume. But Trump also presides over a country that has seen its soft power, another important component of bargaining leverage, decline because of the Iraq and Afghan wars as well as the United States' role in the global financial crisis. The Trump administration has focused solely on its stick, ignoring its paucity of carrots. The most effective strategy will be able to use both tactics.

As demonstrated by Brexit, brinkmanship with international counterparts is a high-risk, low-reward strategy. The potential gains are often minimal. The U.S. pays approximately \$10 billion annually to the United Nations. Its annual military budget is close to \$600 billion, and its annual government spending is almost \$4 trillion. Even if Trump cut U.S. contributions in half, with no strings attached, a savings of \$5 billion is a drop in a drop of the bucket for the United States. Yet, consider the consequences when other countries call your bluff and you are forced to follow through on withdrawal or defunding. As the UK is learning, your bargaining power evaporates and you are forced to start from square one. The situation with international institutions is even worse for the United States than Brexit is to Britain; there are other countries like China who would happily step in to cover those contributions in exchange for greater influence. The international institutions the U.S. created are part of the global balance of power; they shape that balance in ways that are favorable to the U.S.

A bilateral approach to dealing with the issues covered by these international institutions, with the hopes of gaining better bargaining power, would be ineffective and extremely time consuming. Banding together with other countries that share some common interests with the U.S. enables it to get a lot of what it wants, while sharing some of the burdens of paying for these institutions.⁵⁹ This sets up a classic tradeoff that we have studied elsewhere.⁶⁰ Going it alone gives you more control over policy, but you lose burden sharing. The Trump administration may try to navigate mechanisms for contributing less while retaining the same power. This may at times be effective, but it will be less effective in contexts like the IMF where power is nominally linked to contributions. The same will go for other institutions like the World Bank, which has long played a role in foreign aid and economic development.

Furthermore, foreign aid is increasingly dispersed by a range of multilateral actors, and new bilateral actors like China. Recent work suggests that this increased competition will only make it harder for the U.S. to use foreign aid to influence the policies of other countries.⁶¹ Thus bilateral approaches to aid that try to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals will become harder, not easier, than multilateral engagement.

⁵⁹ John G. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁶⁰ Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, "The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy," *The Review of International Organizations* 8:3 (2013): 313-341, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9153-x>.

⁶¹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, "Competition and Collaboration in Aid-for-Policy Deals," *International Studies Quarterly* 60:3 (2016): 413-426, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw011>.

A similar set of considerations applies to the role of the U.S. in the world militarily. Continuing the discussion about multilateral institutions, the same burden sharing versus control tradeoff obtains.⁶² Take NATO for example. During the campaign Trump actively used rhetoric about NATO ‘ripping’ the U.S. off, claiming that other countries did not pay their fair share. While in a campaign these types of statements might persuade individual citizens who do not know the details of United States’ and other country’s contributions to NATO. But as President, Trump will face the facts at the negotiating table. U.S. *direct* contributions to NATO are calculated based on gross national income.⁶³ As such, contributions across all members are now proportionate to their economies and do change over time.⁶⁴ Instead of being focused on dramatically renegotiating NATO as an institution, his focus seems to be on others spending more on their own militaries overall.⁶⁵ But if countries like Germany, Italy and Canada spend more on their militaries due to this push, the U.S. should expect these countries to demand a greater say in NATO. In the first few months of his presidency, Trump antagonized Chancellor Merkel of Germany, in particular, for Germany’s alleged debts to the United States. These moves were widely panned, and so far, have not moved past posturing to anything concrete.

It will also be interesting to see how Trump handles playing hardball on this while still maintaining the United States’ role as the world’s top arms exporter: pull back from its alliances and see these American jobs evaporate?⁶⁶ U.S. arms sales abroad are measured in the tens of billions of dollars. Changes in foreign purchasing decisions would offset any gains from renegotiation.

4.2 Retaliation

⁶² Abraham Newman and Daniel Nexon, “Trump says American allies should spend more on defense. Here’s why he’s wrong.” *Vox*, 16 February 2017. <http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/2/16/14635204/burden-sharing-allies-nato-trump>.

⁶³ Glenn Kessler, “Trump’s Claim that the U.S. Pays the ‘Lion’s Share’ for NATO,” *Washington Post*, 30 March 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/03/30/trumps-claim-that-the-u-s-pays-the-lions-share-for-nato/>.

⁶⁴ We assume Trump does not want the U.S economy to decline while other foreign country economies improve in order to get the United States to directly contribute less to NATO, and other countries to contribute more to NATO.

⁶⁵ Trump has indicated a desire to negotiate other things that relate to NATO, such as European countries spending more on their militaries in general. We suspect to see not a pivot away from NATO but a recalibration, though the extent of this calibration will depend on how and whether relations with Russia change and the willingness of European partners to go along with it, we suspect. See “Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Speech,” Trump Pence 2016, <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-foreign-policy-speech>.

⁶⁶ Put differently, how easy it will be to remain the #1 arms dealer in the world without an active role in alliances and fulfilling treaty commitments, and international engagement writ large. And it is an open question if the American people are willing to stomach the sales of these arms to often less than liberal regimes if there are not liberal principles at least guiding U.S. foreign policy. And while the arms trade might be an industry that many U.S. citizens oppose, it is a source of many U.S. jobs. Walk away from our overseas alliance commitments and watch those jobs be lost to other suppliers. See Thom Shanker, “U.S. Sold \$40 Billion in Weapons in 2015, Topping the Global Market,” *The New York Times*, 26 December 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/us/politics/united-states-global-weapons-sales.html>.

The preceding section presumed that U.S. partners abroad would demand a greater say in return for greater burden sharing. However, a more direct way in which the international system can exert pressure on the United States is via retaliatory measures. These measures need not be explicit nor directed to the same area and often they are not. But they can change the cost-benefit calculus of policies. For instance, in the G.W. Bush administration, the attempt to reduce steel imports in 2002 met with retaliation by the Europeans against key products exported from the United States. The Europeans were particularly savvy. They targeted key congressional districts with their retaliatory measures and they took the case to the WTO. They targeted oranges from Florida, motorcycles from Ohio, and textiles from South Carolina—all states of electoral importance. Once the Bush administration understood the political implications of these measures, it recalculated the benefits of steel tariffs.⁶⁷ In 2003 just as the European measures were coming into play after the WTO had ruled against the U.S., the Bush administration gave up on the steel tariffs. Such direct, explicit retaliation is rare in international politics; more often it is tacit and aimed at other areas, and thus harder to pinpoint as the cause of a policy reversal. But retaliation and its threat are potent sources of international constraint on states.

One way to think about retaliation is to put it in the context of the many large, multinational, firms that constitute a sizable part of the U.S. economy. These multinational companies have huge globally distributed production chains.⁶⁸ Analysts expect that the Chinese might target retaliation to include major U.S. manufacturing firms like Boeing and Caterpillar, as well as the agricultural exports mentioned above. Apple also seems to be in the crosshairs, perhaps because of Trump's praise of the company during the campaign.⁶⁹ Indeed, in his "summit" with technology leaders Trump pledged he would help these firms.⁷⁰ It would hardly be in Apple's interest, for example, to have its global supply chains disrupted, which would happen if retaliatory tactics were used.

Finally, even if the U.S. did not face retaliation for applying tariffs on imports, efforts to punish importers will punish the big U.S. exporters: "While it might sound like a good idea to punish

⁶⁷ It is unclear what lessons the Trump administration will draw from this experience. Wilbur Ross, Trump's choice for Secretary of Commerce, advocated strongly for the Bush steel tariffs. See David Iaconangelo, "Why Wilbur Ross could have the toughest job in Trump's cabinet," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 January 2017, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2017/0118/Why-Wilbur-Ross-could-have-the-toughest-job-in-Trump-s-cabinet>.

⁶⁸ For example, in the U.S., the imported intermediate input content of exports reached more than 12% by 2011. "Trade Input-Output Tables," OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/trade/input-outputtables.htm>. See also Lindsay Oldenski, "Reshoring by US Firms: What do the Data Say?" *Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief*, no. PB15-14: 2. <https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb15-14.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Sri Jegarajah, "Boeing and Beans on China's Blacklist if US Trade Tensions Worsen," *CNBC*, 20 January 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/boeing-and-beans-on-chinas-blacklist-if-us-trade-tensions-worsen.html>.

⁷⁰ During the meeting, Trump told executives: "We want you to keep going with the incredible innovation. There's nobody like you in the world... Anything we can do to help this go along, we're going to be there for you... You call my people, you call me. It doesn't make any difference. We have no formal chain of command around here." Jack Nicas and Rolfe Winkler, "Donald Trump Strikes Conciliatory Tone in Meeting with Tech Executives," *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 December 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/top-tech-execs-to-meet-trump-to-talk-jobs-regulations-1481724004>.

firms that import and help firms that export, the fact is that most exporters, and certainly the biggest exporters, are importers too. (Likewise, most of the biggest importers are big exporters). Therefore, there is no way to punish importers without hurting the top U.S. exporters.”⁷¹ The most recent economics research on the subject highlights just how interconnected all of these flows are for the largest, most global firms. Their choices of sourcing for inputs as well as their ability to export are interrelated, meaning that disruptions or changes on one margin—say a U.S. tariff on imports of steel, a key intermediate good—have widespread reverberations in sourcing and exporting decisions that may reduce profits and hurt employment.⁷²

4.3 Externalities

A failure by the U.S. to engage is likely to have consequences back home. Many global problems have externalities that will affect the U.S. directly. Allowing countries to fail and then become havens for drug production, terrorists, and crime is likely to enable those forces to become stronger and more threatening to the United States. This is the sad story of Afghanistan for the past 30 years. But it is also important in other areas such as global health, where the U.S. wants and needs other countries to prevent epidemics and control them if they start; immigration, which can spike if a country descends into violence (witness Syria) or is plagued by poor development⁷³; and financial regulation, where crises can spread globally and undermine the global economy. For example, if the United States makes Mexico’s economic situation worse, and takes away opportunities for jobs there (including ones by foreign firms), then it makes disparities between the countries larger. The temptation to migrate increases. While a retreat into isolationism may appear costless and appealing, it will actually have many costs and few benefits in the interdependent global system.

5) *Emerging Areas for Liberal Internationalism: Global Climate Change*

When it comes to foreign affairs, the next four years will not just be about trade, foreign aid, immigration, and the role of the U.S. military. Key emerging issues like climate change will come up. While the President and his director of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

⁷¹ J. Bradford Jensen, “Importers are Exporters: Tariffs Would Hurt Our Most Competitive Firms,” *Peterson Institute for International Economics Trade & Investment Policy Watch*, 7 December 2016, <https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/importers-are-exporters-tariffs-would-hurt-our-most-competitive>.

⁷² Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott, “Global Firms,” *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 22727* (October 2016), <http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22727>.

⁷³ Indeed, some research looks at how countries use one tool of Liberal Internationalism, foreign aid, to help stem the demand for immigration. Sarah Blodgett Bermeo and David Leblang, “Migration and foreign aid.” *International Organization* 69:3 (Summer 2015): 627-657, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000119>. The implication for the current context is that pulling away from LI will just exacerbate some of the same problems the Trump administration wants to address.

are climate sceptics,⁷⁴ there are some reasons to suspect that this scepticism will be moderated when it comes to policy outputs.

On the domestic political economy side (analogous to the discussion in Section 4), there are several forces at play. Most important is the fact that the development of low-carbon technology is a source of growth and jobs. The fact that Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton proposed a detailed path forward on this,⁷⁵ rather than President Trump, does not undermine the economic arguments.⁷⁶ Does the Trump administration want China to control the market in green technology?⁷⁷ Second, local level (state and city) efforts that the Federal government will struggle to overturn⁷⁸ are already highly developed.⁷⁹ These movements have only become stronger in the face of Trump's rhetoric against climate change abatement efforts. Third, the U.S. military, a non-partisan institution, has repeatedly called climate change a major issue that is not just a projection, but an existing reality.⁸⁰ Fourth, deniers that humans are causing climate change are in the minority, a result replicated across numerous public opinion polls.⁸¹ It is not

⁷⁴ Perry, at least, has backed off his climate change denial in his confirmation hearing. See Timothy Gardner and Valerie Volcovici, "Trump's Energy Pick Perry Softens Stance on Climate Change," *Reuters*, 19 January 2017. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/trumps-energy-pick-face-jobs-climate-questions-120142477--finance.html>.

⁷⁵ "Hillary Clinton's Plan for Combatting Climate Change and Making America the Clean Energy Superpower of the 21st Century," Hillary for America, <https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2016/10/10/hillary-clintons-plan-for-combatting-climate-change-and-making-america-the-clean-energy-superpower-of-the-21st-century/>.

⁷⁶ James Stewart, "Elon Musk Has Trump's Ear, and Wall Street Takes Note," *The New York Times*, 26 January 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/business/elon-musk-donald-trump-wall-street.html>.

⁷⁷ "China leads as green energy investment plans hit record high," *Reuters*, 24 March 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-renewables-investment-idUSKCN0WQIU>.

⁷⁸ Justin Gillis, "Weak Federal Powers Could Limit Trump's Climate-Policy Rollback," *The New York Times*, 2 January 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/science/donald-trump-global-warming.html>.

⁷⁹ Climate CoLab, "2020 Cities By 2020: America's Mayors Taking Charge On Climate Change," Climate CoLab, <http://climatecolab.org/plans/-/plans/contests/2015/united-states-climate-action-plan/c/proposal/1323518>. See also, Jeff Biggers, "Cities and States Lead on Climate Change," *The New York Times*, 30 November 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/opinion/cities-and-states-lead-on-climate-change.html>; Bernadette Ballantyne, "Cities are Stepping up Climate Change Efforts C40 Summit Reveals," *Infrastructure Intelligence*, 6 February 2014, <http://www.infrastructure-intelligence.com/article/feb-2014/cities-are-stepping-climate-change-efforts-c40-summit-reveals>.

⁸⁰ "Theatrical Premiere: The Age of Consequences," The Center for Climate & Security: Exploring the Security Risks of Climate Change, <https://climateandsecurity.org/>; U.S. Department of Defense, *National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate*, 23 July 2015, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-implications-of-climate-change.pdf>.

⁸¹ Allison Kopicki, "Is Global Warming Real? Most Americans Say Yes," *The New York Times*, 1 June 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/02/upshot/is-global-warming-real-most-in-US-believe-in-climate-change.html>; Jon A. Krosnick, "The Climate Majority," *The New York Times*, 8 June 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/opinion/09krosnick.html>; Matto Mildener and Dustin Tingley, "Beliefs about Climate Beliefs: Second-Order Opinions in the Climate Domain," Working Paper, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/climatebeliefs_distribution.pdf; Tingley and Michael Tomz, "Conditional Cooperation and Climate Change," *Comparative Political Studies* 47:3 (2014): 344-368.

just American scientists, or scientists throughout the world, or publics across the world, it is also the American people who want solutions.

Nevertheless, Trump's reluctance about acknowledging the connection between human fossil fuel emissions and climate change is perhaps justified by a desire to protect the livelihoods of individuals working in coal and related industries. Here we find an opportunity. In separate work, Tingley is studying support for what he provisionally calls "Climate Adjustment Assistance" (CAA). Analogous to Trade Adjustment Assistance, this program would help workers in these sectors transition away from these industries and retrain. It is not the fault of American citizens working in coal or other carbon intensive industries to be in an industry that contributes to health and other problems, just like it was not the fault of those working in asbestos when it was outlawed. In a recent nationally representative poll, Tingley finds dramatic bipartisan support for this policy.

During the first 8 months of his term, Trump announced his desire to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement. This step was decidedly contrary to liberal internationalism, and one of the largest data points contradicting our overall assessments. However, we think that the future for the United States with respect to cooperation over climate change is brighter than it currently appears. While we have no doubt that the next three-plus years will be less favorable towards international cooperation on climate change, that does not portend an indefinite collapse. The United States' position could drastically change, sooner rather than later: the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not take effect until 2020, a day after the next US presidential election. If Trump loses the next election, the incoming President could decide to rejoin the agreement.

Bipartisan agreement on climate change is possible. To take another example, efforts to support a carbon tax as long as it offsets income or payroll taxes has long appealed to conservatives and liberals (including former Vice President of the United States Al Gore).⁸² We suspect there might be a larger gap between Congress and some of Trump's Cabinet/his advisers than between Congress, President Trump, and the American people. This gap also appears to be shrinking with the intense turnover in the Trump cabinet. The first 8 months of 2017 saw the departure of Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka, two advisors who strongly advocated against the "globalist" agenda. Bannon, in particular, was credited with persuading Trump to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, over the protests of other cabinet members.

The structure of the international system also creates an impetus for U.S. leadership on climate change. Whether or not efforts to reduce climate changes operate through government regulations via the EPA, market mechanisms that capture the negative polluting effects of coal,

⁸² Bob Inglis and Arthur B. Laffer, "An Emissions Plan Conservatives Could Warm To," *The New York Times*, 27 December 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/opinion/28inglis.html>; "Conservatives," Carbon Tax Center, <https://www.carbontax.org/conservatives/>; James A. Baker, III, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Martin Feldstein, George P. Shultz, Ted Halstead, Thomas Stephenson, N. Gregory Mankiw, and Rob Walton, *The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends*, Climate Leadership Council, 2017, <https://www.clcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TheConservativeCaseforCarbonDividends.pdf>.

investment in safe nuclear energy,⁸³ geoengineering,⁸⁴ and/or other bipartisan ways to deal with this complicated issue, U.S. leadership is a must.⁸⁵ The quickest way for the United States to get a bad deal on global climate change initiatives is to stay out of them, and let other countries lead and control the future markets for energy technology, which may be a major source of jobs and profits.

Conclusion

The title of our article is “Maybe Down but Not Out” instead of “Business As Usual” because there are undeniably threats to liberal internationalism. Some Americans feel that liberal internationalism has caused their problems, or at least contributed in a major way to them. And Trump has responded to this sentiment by arguing for ‘America First.’ The effects of liberal internationalist policies create domestic winners and losers, even if they benefit the U.S. overall.⁸⁶ For instance, in addition to creating jobs and raising wages for some, freer trade has meant that some people lose their jobs; for others it has contributed to stagnant wages. Trade, like all other policies, creates winners and losers. But trade and international engagement are only partially responsible for the troubles Americans feel they face. Recent estimates, for example, suggest that technological change and automation have played a much larger role in determining these outcomes.⁸⁷ Moreover, inequality has grown worse in the United States than in other rich countries because of domestic policies related to taxes and spending. Solutions to

⁸³ Nuclear Energy Institute, “Clinton, Trump Both Support Nuclear Energy,” 19 October 2016, <https://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Clinton,-Trump-Both-Support-Nuclear-Energy>; “Trump, Clinton, Johnson and Stein’s Views on America’s Top 20 Science, Engineering, Tech, Health & Environmental Issues in 2016,” Science Debate, <http://sciencedebate.org/20answers>. Donald Trump sees his support for nuclear energy through the lens of energy independence. “It should be the goal of the American people and their government to achieve energy independence as soon as possible. Energy independence means exploring and developing every possible energy source including wind, solar, nuclear and bio-fuels.”

⁸⁴ Committee on Geoengineering Climate: Technical Evaluation and Discussion of Impacts, Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Ocean Studies Board Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council. *Climate Intervention: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Reliable Sequestration* (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2015); David Keith, *A Case for Climate Engineering* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).

⁸⁵ Lindsay Iversen, “Climate Change and U.S. Leadership Under President Trump,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://blogs.cfr.org/sivaram/2016/11/15/climate-change-and-u-s-leadership-under-president-trump/>.

⁸⁶ Helen V. Milner, *Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations* (Princeton University Press, 1997).

⁸⁷ Claire Cain Miller, “The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation,” *The New York Times*, 21 December 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html>. Andrew F. Puzder, Mr. Trump’s first pick for labor secretary and chief executive of CKE Restaurants, in an interview with *Business Insider* about employees “They’re always polite, they always upsell, they never take a vacation, they never show up late, there’s never a slip-and-fall, or an age, sex or race discrimination case” Kate Taylor. “Fast-food CEO says he’s investing in machines because the government is making it difficult to afford employees,” *Business Insider*, 16 March 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/carls-jr-wants-open-automated-location-2016-3>; Federica Cocco, “Most US Manufacturing Jobs Lost to Technology, Not Trade,” *Financial Times*, 2 December 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/dec677c0-b7e6-11e6-ba85-95d1533d9a62>; Douglas A. Irwin, “The Truth About Trade: What Critics Get Wrong About the Global Economy,” *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 2016). <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-06-13/truth-about-trade>.

America's problems will not come from abandoning liberal internationalism but from making domestic policy changes.

Inequality, and the dissatisfaction in Western democracies (not to mention other countries) it has generated, has resulted from many sources—technological change, tax policy, deregulation, economic crisis, the decline of unions, outsourcing, austerity, immigration, etc. Unfortunately policies to help those who did not gain and those who lost from globalization and technological change have been largely stymied. Republicans have prevented any such measures for many years by opposing programs like Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). For example, they incorporated their opposition to TAA into their stances on Trade Promotion Authority and the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement.⁸⁸ Such programs have been the cornerstone of what scholars called “embedded liberalism.”⁸⁹ And the numerous loopholes in the tax system that favor the wealthy made the tax system less progressive. So the rich got richer.⁹⁰

Trump's appeal was clearly driven by these frustrations, regardless of where the blame lay for them. But if Trump is serious about helping his fellow citizens working blue collar jobs, he will need to be serious about more than cutting one-off deals with particular firms, and instead develop policies to help U.S. workers be more competitive against foreign workers and automation and to ready them for new jobs that are coming. The trick will be to make sure that these new policies, be they re-negotiations of trade deals or other strategies, do not lead to others losing their livelihoods or cause spikes in prices for consumers purchasing U.S. manufactured goods (as happened in the “Carrier deal” where a US manufacturing company was compelled to keep some U.S. jobs from moving overseas).⁹¹

Retooling and retraining for the global economy of the next 20 years, or even 4, will not be easy (no matter the negotiating prowess of the President), especially for individuals closer to retirement. Fortunately, though, the years of experience these older workers often bring to firms are an asset in their own right.⁹² But for both them and younger workers, the changing industrial basis of the United States is not to be taken lightly. A key guideline for policy should be to

⁸⁸ “Finance Committee Republicans Warn President of Opposition to Including TAA in Korea Trade Agreement,” United States Senate Committee on Finance, 30 June 2011, <https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-30-2011.pdf>; Jonathan Weisman, “House Rejects Trade Measure, Rebuffing Obama's Dramatic Appeal,” *The New York Times*, 12 June 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/politics/obamas-trade-bills-face-tough-battle-against-house-democrats.html>.

⁸⁹ John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” *International Organization* 36:2 (1982): 379-415, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018993>.

⁹⁰ Qucotrung Bui, “40 Years of Income Inequality, In Graphs,” *NPR*, 2 October 2014, <http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2014/10/02/349863761/40-years-of-income-inequality-in-america-in-graphs>.

⁹¹ Kate Taylor, “The Manufacturer that Trump Convinced to Keep 1,000 Jobs in the US is Raising Prices,” *Business Insider*, 5 December 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/carrier-raises-prices-after-trump-deal-2016-12>.

⁹² Carol Hymowitz, “American Firms Want to Keep Older Workers a Bit Longer,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 16 December 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/american-firms-want-to-keep-older-workers-a-bit-longer>.

protect workers, not the industry they work in. The government should improve its assistance programs for workers who lose their medical benefits and pensions when firms fail or depart, it should find ways to make such programs portable so that mobility is less costly, and it should look at novel and more generous ways of helping workers train for and find new jobs, as some European countries do well. Negative income taxes or universal basic incomes might also be explored to see if they can help.

Yes, the United States' role in the world does change and fluctuate. But our argument is that there are structural global as well as domestic institutional forces that tether the U.S. to the rest of the world.⁹³ American policy may oscillate, but it seems unlikely that the American government is going to abandon liberal internationalism writ large. Some scholars like Kupchan and Trubowitz argue that large events like the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War would undermine the political consensus that supported liberal internationalism. They predicted “wide oscillations in policy as power changes hands between Republicans and Democrats.”⁹⁴ Those two events were as important as they come. Yet, they did not cause a U.S. withdrawal or rampant vacillation.

Liberal internationalism is still in the American national interest and because of this both domestic and international pressures will moderate any of Trump's preferences for drastic measures to change U.S. foreign policy.⁹⁵ We have tried to outline those constraints above. What is interesting from a scholarly perspective is that this administration will also provide us with evidence for the strength of such institutional and external pressures. We could be wrong of course. Trump and his team's preferences for isolationism and economic nationalism may be so strong and persistent that their aggressive and undiplomatic rhetoric alone poisons U.S. relations with allies, rivals, and enemies alike. Or it may be that domestic institutions with their checks and balances are undermined by other actions and policies, leaving the United States less liberal and presidential power more unchecked.

If Trump takes U.S. foreign policy on a dramatic new course, then we will need to reassess our theories about foreign policy and international relations. It may be the case that leaders and their preferences are far more important than many of our theories allow. Or it may be that we need much better theory to assess what is in the national interest and how we can discern it. We may also need a more refined model of the political economy of foreign policy, in which the losers from globalization have a far more outsized impact on policymaking than many of our theories expect. In any case, Trump's foreign policy will provide an interesting challenge for the study of international relations.

⁹³ See also “Trump presidency: America First or America Alone?”; David Brooks. “The Internal Invasion,” *The New York Times*, 20 January 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/opinion/the-internal-invasion.html>.

⁹⁴ Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, “The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism's Revival,” *International Security* 35:1 (Summer 2010): 95-109, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00004.

⁹⁵ Mark Landler, Peter Baker, and David E. Sanger, “Trump Embraces Pillars of Obama's Foreign Policy,” *The New York Times*, 2 February 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/world/middleeast/iran-missile-test-trump.html>

What we *do* expect to see, however, is an administration that makes some incremental changes in the directions it promised, with a very large amount of credit claiming. We have already seen this with the Carrier deal. According to the President-elect's rhetoric, he demanded and received a better deal from a traitorous U.S. firm seeking to move jobs abroad and convinced the firm to invest in its factories. Others say the job gains were minimal and that the company plans on using its investment to increase automation in its factories, which decreases jobs. What is clear, however, is that small-bore, one-off deals with particular companies will not have an outsized impact on jobs or trade in either direction. These single actions are not a policy.

There is similar low-hanging fruit in other areas that would allow Trump to claim credit, without radically altering the status quo. For example, a modest increase in funding for border patrol could be sold as an achievement to curb illegal immigration, setting aside that the U.S. Mexican border is already heavily patrolled and that Trump's estimates of the quantity of illegal immigrants are orders of magnitude beyond the actual numbers.⁹⁶

It will take something even more huge than the populist tide that swept Trump to the White House to dismantle the many positive aspects of U.S. liberal international engagement. And for now, we pray that our incoming President realizes that making America first does not mean making everyone else last. Good deals for the United States are good deals for others as well; if not, they will not sign or enforce them. And we hope that leaders throughout the country, from teachers to corporate decision-makers to Congress to Generals, realize how much they matter: yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

⁹⁶ Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, "More Mexicans Leaving Than Coming to the U.S.," *Pew Research Center* 19 November 2015. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/> (Accessed 20 January 2017).