

APPENDIX:
Economic Self-Interest, Information, and
Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence
from an Experiment in Tunisia

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A Survey Description

Our survey in Tunisia was conducted by One to One Research and Consulting and led by Imen Mezlin. It was part of a larger project analyzing public attitudes of 4,986 individuals toward international trade and cross-border investment in Tunisia. The trade and investment samples were drawn independently. Tunisian enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews in Arabic through computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). The survey was based on a complex sample design, which included stratification and clustering. Each sample was first stratified by governorate and interviews were distributed proportional to population size (PPS) based on the 2014 Census (*Statistics Tunisia: National Institute of Statistics 2014*). At the second stage, delegations were selected followed by sectors at the third stage, both using PPS. At the fourth stage, blocks were randomly selected within each sector. Households were randomly selected within each block. Within each household, individuals were selected randomly using a Kish table informed by a gender quota. The PSU size was 10.

To determine their employment sector, we matched individual jobs with sectors based on industry-level trade data from COMTRADE (*United Nations 2015*). We observed whether an industry in Tunisia was net importing or net exporting by taking the average current account balance for each product at the HS 2 digit level from 2005 to 2015. For trade in services, we determined export and import-competing sectors from the 2015 WTO Tunisia Trade Profile.¹ We provide the full mapping of employment sectors in table A1.

Among the 2,491 respondents in the trade sample, 456 people were classified in the export-oriented sector and 495 subjects in import-competing industries. The three experimental groups were divided equally across each sector. For exporters, 178 received both sectoral and effects cues,

¹“Tunisia,” World Trade Organization. Retrieved from <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=TN&Language=S>.

142 received only sectoral cues, and 136 subjects were told no information. For respondents in import-competing industries, 202 were told both sector and effects, 148 sectoral information only, and 145 no information. The remaining 62 percent were either in industries that were non-tradable (1,030) or employed in the public sector (510). This is in line with trends found in Tunisia’s national statistics. In our sample, 40.6% were currently employed with 70.7% having worked sometime in the past. Moreover, 45% of respondents were their family’s main income earner; for the other roughly 55% we used the main family income earner’s information to categorize our respondents.

As described in the paper, we classified all private sector (non-micro) business owners and managers as high skilled along with professionals such as those engaged in science and technology, health, and business administration. Senior officials and managers in the public sector and junior or senior military officer were also classified as highly skilled workers. High education types are college graduates who completed a bachelor’s degree or above. Close to 80% of the sample are lower skill or did not finish college, as expected in a developing country.

We also classified respondents into industries categories in and outside of global value chains using the OECD’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) dataset. In order to determine GVC participation, we used the sum of the average forward (*Domestic Value-Added Share of Gross Exports*) and backward (*Foreign Value-Added Share of Gross Exports*) linkages from 2005-2011 (the last year available). During our time frame, the top three industries with GVC involvement were Electrical Machinery and Apparatus (57%), Fabricated metal products (56%), and Computer, electronic and optical equipment (51%). The lowest among import-competers was financial intermediation (6%). We then reclassify all of our export-orientated and import-competing respondents into the GVC or non-GVC category using a 25% cut-off point.²

²We used the `concordance` package in R to match industry codes in the TiVA dataset to HS 2-digit product codes. For products that match to multiple industries, we used the initial question asked in the survey about industry of the respondent to match each respondent to one industry.

Table A1: Classification of Sectors

Sector	Industry	Sub-Industry	Trade
Agriculture	Edible vegetables	n/a	Export
Agriculture	Fish and crustaceans	n/a	Export
Agriculture	Forestry	n/a	Export
Agriculture	Fruits and nuts	n/a	Export
Agriculture	Products of animal origin	n/a	Export
Manufacturing	Chemical and allied industries	Explosives, matches, and pyrotechnic products	Export
Manufacturing	Chemical and allied industries	Fertilizers	Export
Manufacturing	Chemical and allied industries	Inorganic chemicals; isotopes	Export
Manufacturing	Foodstuffs	Other food and beverage manufactures	Export
Manufacturing	Leather, fur, skin and raw hide	Articles of leather or gut	Export
Manufacturing	Machinery and electrical products	Computers	Export
Manufacturing	Machinery and electrical products	Electrical machinery, equipment and parts	Export
Manufacturing	Machinery and electrical products	Telecommunications equipment	Export
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Clocks, watches and parts thereof	Export
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Toys, games and sports equipment	Export
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Works of art, antiques and collectors' pieces	Export
Manufacturing	Stone, glass and ceramic products	Ceramic products	Export
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Clothing and apparel manufactures	Export
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Footwear and related products	Export
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Headgear and related products	Export
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Umbrellas, walking sticks, whips and related products	Export
Manufacturing	Transportation	Ships, boats and floating structures	Export
Manufacturing	Vegetable products	Animal or vegetable fats, oils or waxes	Export
Manufacturing	Vegetable products	Milling industry products (incl. flour)	Export
Manufacturing	Vegetable products	Other manufactured vegetable products	Export
Manufacturing	Vegetable products	Vegetable plaiting materials (incl. bamboo, reeds, kapok, etc.)	Export
Manufacturing	Wood, paper and cork products	Cork and articles or cork	Export
Services	Communications, telecommunications and IT	Communications	Export
Services	Communications, telecommunications and IT	Information technology and software engineering	Export
Services	Communications, telecommunications and IT	Telecommunications	Export
Services	Travel Services, tourism and hospitality	n/a	Export
Agriculture	Cereals	n/a	Import
Agriculture	Coffee, tea, mate, spices	n/a	Import
Agriculture	Dairy, eggs and honey	n/a	Import
Agriculture	Live animals	n/a	Import
Agriculture	Meat and edible meat offal	n/a	Import
Agriculture	Oil seeds, grain, plants and straw	n/a	Import
Manufacturing	Chemical and allied industries	Organic chemicals	Import
Manufacturing	Chemical and allied industries	Other chemical	Import

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Table A1 – Continued from previous page

Sector	Industry	Sub-Industry	Trade
Manufacturing	Chemical and allied industries	Pharmaceutical products	Import
Manufacturing	Foodstuffs	Animal feed and residues from food industries	Import
Manufacturing	Foodstuffs	Sugar and confectionery goods	Import
Manufacturing	Foodstuffs	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	Import
Manufacturing	Leather, fur, skin and raw hide	Furskins and artificial fur manufactures	Import
Manufacturing	Leather, fur, skin and raw hide	Raw skins and leather	Import
Manufacturing	Machinery and electrical products	Machinery and mechanical appliances (incl. engines)	Import
Manufacturing	Machinery and electrical products	Nuclear reactors and boilers	Import
Manufacturing	Metal products	Base metals, tools, cutlery	Import
Manufacturing	Metal products	Copper, nickel, aluminum and articles thereof	Import
Manufacturing	Metal products	Iron, steel and articles thereof	Import
Manufacturing	Metal products	Lead, zinc, tin and articles thereof	Import
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Furniture	Import
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Musical instruments	Import
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Optical, medical and other...	Import
Manufacturing	Other miscellaneous	Other miscellaneous industries	Import
Manufacturing	Plastic and rubber products	Plastics and articles thereof	Import
Manufacturing	Plastic and rubber products	Rubbers and articles thereof	Import
Manufacturing	Stone, glass and ceramic products	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos	Import
Manufacturing	Stone, glass and ceramic products	Glass and glassware products	Import
Manufacturing	Stone, glass and ceramic products	Pearls, stones and precious metals	Import
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	Import
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Manufactured fabrics and textile fibres	Import
Manufacturing	Textiles, footwear and apparel	Other textile products	Import
Manufacturing	Transportation	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof	Import
Manufacturing	Transportation	Autos, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles	Import
Manufacturing	Transportation	Railway and tramway related products	Import
Manufacturing	Wood, paper and cork products	Other wood products	Import
Manufacturing	Wood, paper and cork products	Paper and paper products	Import
Manufacturing	Wood, paper and cork products	Wood and articles of wood	Import
Mining	Coal, oil and petroleum	n/a	Import
Mining	Ores slag and ash	n/a	Import
Mining	Ores slag and ash	n/a	Import
Services	Salt, sulphur, earth and stone; lime and cement	Banking	Import
Services	Finance	Financial Services	Import
Services	Finance	Insurance	Import
Services	Public utilities and transport services	Transport services	Import
Agriculture	Other	n/a	Non-Traded
Mining	Other	n/a	Non-Traded
Services	Commerce (incl. retail and wholesale trade)	n/a	Non-Traded

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Table A1 – Continued from previous page

Sector	Industry	Sub-Industry	Trade
Services	Construction and real estate	Construction	Non-Traded
Services	Construction and real estate	Real Estate	Non-Traded
Services	Other	n/a	Non-Traded
Services	Other private practice professional services	n/a	Non-Traded
Services	Public utilities and transport services	Public utilities	Non-Traded
Government	Education	n/a	Public
Government	Federal government bureaucracy	n/a	Public
Government	Health	n/a	Public
Government	Local government bureaucracy	n/a	Public
Government	Other	n/a	Public
Military	n/a	n/a	Public

A.1 Sociocultural Variables Construction

Below are further descriptions of the individual components of our two composite measures, religiosity and conservative Islam. For religiosity, we constructed a composite measure to gauge how important religion is for their daily life such as praying regularly,³ fasting during holy periods, attending religious classes in their place of worship, listening or reading the holybook of their religion, and, for Muslims, if they prayed *Fajr*⁴ on time. In order to do this, we first drew upon a question that asked respondents to self-report how “devoutly religious” they are and created an indicator for those who said they were devout or somewhat devout.⁵ 82.8% of our sample reported being at least somewhat devout. We then looked at a series of behavioral measures about religion in their daily life. We created separate indicators for people who said they always or often participate in daily prayer, attend religious classes,⁶ fast during holy periods such as Ramadan, Lent, or Yom Kippur,⁷ and listen to or read the Quran, Bible, or Torah.⁸ For Muslims, we also asked how often they pray Fajr on time.⁹ From these responses, we created a composite measure by taking the mean value of each response and created a three-level ordinal variable for religiosity where 2 were responses in the 75th percentile, 1 indicated responses between the 25nd and 75th percentiles, and 0 were responses in the lowest 25th percentile. For the subgroup effects reported in appendix Table A27, we first created a PCA of these individual measures and then used an indicator for “high religiosity” participation for those respondents above the mean value.

Unlike our religiosity measure which captures the frequency of religious participation, our con-

³Five times a day at the right time for Muslim respondents and daily prayer for Christian and Jewish respondents.

⁴According to established Islamic conventions, Fajr is a obligatory prayer at dawn.

⁵Specifically, we asked “In general, would you describe yourself as devoutly religious, somewhat religious, or hardly religious?”

⁶Only 11% of respondents often or always attend religious classes, the majority said that they rarely (15%) or never (60%) participate.

⁷The vast majority (93%) said that they always participate in fasting during their holy period.

⁸72.8% always or often participate in daily prayer (five times a day for Muslims and once a day for Christian and Jewish respondents), more than 95% report fasting during their holy month, and less than half (48.4%) always listen or read their holybook.

⁹28% reported always participating in Fajr on time, whereas 38% said they sometimes or often do, and about 34% said they rarely or never pray on time.

servative Islam measure looks at the degree to where people thought economic activities that violate Islamic conventions should be banned or encouraged. Specifically, we draw upon three questions in the survey. We first asked if banks that charge interest in violation of Islamic teachings should be banned. About 31% said they strongly agreed with the statement, with another 27% at least somewhat agreeing. Next we asked if foreign firms importing “impermissible” things — implying products such as pork or alcohol — should be banned. A smaller percentage, roughly 22% strongly agreed with this statement, and about 26% agreed at least somewhat. Finally, we asked if FDI by non-Muslim firms should be encouraged “regardless of our religious customs”. Similar to the first two questions, the majority (59%) did not think Tunisia should encourage these types of investment. From these responses, we created a PCA and took the first component as a composite measure of orientations toward conservative Islam. For the triple interactions reported in appendix Table A26, we dichotomized the PCA at its mean and used values above the mean as indicator for conservative Islam.

We also probed an additional question that asked people about their preference for secular or Islamic government. Specifically, respondents rated their political ideology from 0 to 10, where 0 represented favoring a secular government and 10 meant favoring an Islamic government. The mean for our sample was 5.05 with a standard deviation of 3.71. We then dichotomized the measure where anyone above the mean was coded as 1 to represent their preference for an Islamic government and those favoring a secular government were coded as 0. Approximately 60% of respondents were classified as preferring a secular government. There were no meaningful differences between people in export-oriented and import-competing industries (57% and 58% as secular, respectively). We included this measure as a separate covariate (not shown) and our results do not change.

For nationalism, we asked respondents for their views on the statement, “My Tunisian identity is more important than any other identity.” Those who answered “strongly agree” were coded as

nationalist and the others coded as not. Approximately 84% of respondents strongly agreed with the statement with no significant differences among sectors.¹⁰

Finally, we explored the effects of Tunisia’s colonial legacy on trade preferences. Respondents placed themselves on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 meant having a pro-West orientation and 10 an anti-West orientation. We dichotomized the measure at its mean for the subgroup effects reported in appendix table A28 and see 56% our sample adopted pro-West attitudes. Exporters were more pro-West than import-competers, with 61% supportive compared to 53%.

B Full Variable Descriptions

We provide below the exact question wording for individual questions below:

1. **Trade Views** (binary) Response to the question, “Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on trade of foreign goods and services?”. (0 = Favor limits on foreign trade; 1 = Oppose limits on foreign trade). This question follows any treatment condition. We transform the binary variable from 0 to 100 in order to use OLS for ease of interpretation. Robustness checks were conducted using a logistic regression with the original coding (0/1). Results are very similar regardless of model used.
2. **Age** (continuous) How old are you? [demo1]
3. **Age²** (squared-term)
4. **Female** (binary) 1= Male; 2 = Female [setup1b]
5. **Education** (ordinal for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis)
 - (ordinal) What is the highest level of education you have completed? (1 = Illiterate/no education, 6 - MA degree or higher) [demo10]
 - (binary) 1 = No College; 2 = College
6. **High Skill**
 - (binary) High Skill if respondent or main income earner is a senior official, professional or managers in the public sector (`emp6gov == 1, 2, 3`), non-micro business owner, manager, or any professional in the private sector (`emp6prv == 1 or 2 & emp10 == 2, 3, 4, 5, 6` or `emp6prv == 3`), or a military officer (`emp6mil == 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17`).
7. **Income**
 - (ordinal) “In Tunisian dinars, how much [do / did] you make on average in a given month?”. Ranges from 0-400 = 1 to more than 4,500 dinars =12. We log-transform this measure to smooth the overall distribution.

¹⁰82% of export-oriented and 83% of import-competing strongly agreed with that statement.

8. **Nationalism** (ordinal for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis) “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘My Tunisian identity is more important than any other identity.’ ”

- (ordinal) (low) 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’; 2 = ‘Disagree’; 3 = ‘Agree’; 4 = ‘Strongly Agree’.
- (binary) Nationalism (low) 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’ / ‘Disagree’; Nationalism (high) 2 = ‘Agree’ / ‘Strongly Agree’.

9. **Sociotropic** (ordinal for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis)

- (ordinal) “Do you think opening Tunisia’s market to foreign trade is very good, good, bad, or very bad for each of the following: ... ‘The Tunisian economy’ [gind2] ’ (5 = ‘Very Good’; 4 = ‘Somewhat Good’; 3 = ‘No effect’, 2= ‘Somewhat bad’, 1= ‘Very Bad’)
- (binary) 2 = ‘Very Good’; 1 = (‘Somewhat Good’, ‘No effect’, ‘Somewhat bad’, ‘Very Bad’)

10. **Conservative Islam** (continuous for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis) PCA of following questions, first component used:

- “The opinions of Islamic jurists and religious scholars differ with regard to their interpretations of certain issues of Islam. I want to ask you to what extent you agree or disagree with some of these issues. Banks charging interest contradict the teachings of Islam and should be banned.” (1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree (reverse coding)) [islam1]
- “The opinions of Islamic jurists and religious scholars differ with regard to their interpretations of certain issues of Islam. I want to ask you to what extent you agree or disagree with some of these issues. Foreign companies that import things that are not permissible by Islam, like alcohol and pork, should be banned from the country.” [islam2] (1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree (reverse coding)) [islam2]
- “The opinions of Islamic jurists and religious scholars differ with regard to their interpretations of certain issues of Islam. I want to ask you to what extent you agree or disagree with some of these issues. In order to benefit from the world economy, foreign investment by non-Muslim firms and countries should be encouraged, even if they bring non-Islamic practices and products into the country.” (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree (original coding)) [islam3]

Binary value is 1 = At or below the mean of the first component of the PCA; 2 = Above the Mean.

11. **Religiosity** (ordinal for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis) “Please indicate how often you participate in the following religious activities:...”

- ... “Prayer”
- ... “Fasting during [holy week]”
- ... “Attend religious classes in [worship place]”
- ... “Listen to or read the [holybook]”
- ... “Pray Fajr (dawn prayers) on-time (before the sunrise)”

(Reverse coding so 1== Never, 5 == Always). Then mean centered and 0 is the lower quartile, 1 = the middle two quartiles, and 2 = upper quartile. [relig3_1-relig3_5]

12. **Anti/Pro-West** (continuous for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis) Response to “In politics, people talk about pro-West and anti-West orientations. Suppose there was a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means having a pro-West orientation and 10 means an anti-West orientation. Where on this scale would you place...yourself.” Dichotomized at its mean [PolIdeo3]
13. **Union Member** (binary) Response to “Are you a member of UGTT?” (1=No, 2 = Yes) [js2b/js2bmie]
14. **Informal** (ordinal for main effects / binary for subgroup analysis) Formal workers are defined as those who are employed and who answered yes to both “Do/did you have social security from your [current/former] job” and “[Do/Did] you have work contract?” [inf1 & inf2]. Informal workers are defined as those who are “unemployed”, “Out of the market (i.e, said they were a ‘homemaker’ or ‘retired’””, or were employed but did not have a contract or social security. Ordinal is 1 = Formal; 2 = Out of Market/Unemployed; 3 = Informal. Binary (1= Formal, 2 = Informal, Unemployed, Out of the Market). [emp1, inf1, inf2, bin_all] .
15. **GVC Participation** (binary) Sum of the average forward (**Domestic Value-Added Share of Gross Exports**) and backward (**Foreign Value-Added Share of Gross Exports**) linkages from 2005-2011 for each industry using **OECD.Stat (2016)** data. GVC participation defined as at least 25 percent of products in that industry engaged in either forward or backward linkages. (1 = outside of GVCs and 2 = GVC participation).
16. **Foreign Firms** (continuous) Number of foreign-invested companies by governorate in 2012 from **Statistics Tunisia: National Institute of Statistics (2014)**. We log-transform this measure to smooth the overall distribution.
17. **Off-shoring** (binary) Sectors where more than 20% of firms are offshore. We use the calculation of the percentage of firms engaged in off-shoring by (Baghdadi, Kheder and Arouri 2017) as described in appendix section G.

B.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

	<i>N</i>	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Trade Views	2429	61.26	48.73	0.00	100.00
Age	2491	43.67	15.65	18.00	93.00
Female	2491	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00
Education	2489	3.02	1.49	1.00	6.00
High Skill	2480	1.21	0.41	1.00	2.00
Income	2271	4.99	2.92	1.00	12.00
Nationalism	2490	3.80	0.50	1.00	4.00
Sociotropic	2437	4.44	0.77	1.00	5.00
Cons. Islam	2384	-0.00	1.32	-2.82	2.26
Religiosity	2486	0.97	0.64	0.00	2.00
Anti-West	2436	3.24	3.08	0.00	10.00
Union Member	2479	1.09	0.29	1.00	2.00
Informal	2491	2.09	0.63	1.00	3.00
GVC Participation	2491	1.32	0.47	1.00	2.00
Foreign Firms	2491	936.14	1709.85	5.00	5915.00
Off-Shoring	2491	1.10	0.30	1.00	2.00
Observations	2491				

C Correlation Matrix

As mentioned in the paper, a valid concern is that these measures of religious attitudes might be highly correlated. To investigate this, we report a correlation matrix between all of the sociocultural variables in appendix Table A3. The correlations between sociocultural variables are small and rarely significant. Religiosity — a composite of responses that look at frequency of religious practices — and conservative Islam — questions which probe one’s attitudes toward economic activities that might contravene conservative Islamic principles are positively and significantly correlated. However, these two covariates measure distinct attitudes and their relatively weak correlation provides support for the inclusion of both covariates in our analysis. Understandably, conservative Islam is also positively correlated with political ideology — a preference for Islamic government.

Table A3: Correlation Matrix: Sociocultural Variables

	Educ	High Skill	Ln(Income)	NatIism	Sociotropic	Cons. Islam	Religiosity	Anti-West	Union Mem	Informal
Educ	1.00									
High Skill	0.46 (0.00)	1.00								
Ln(Income)	0.49 (0.00)	0.07 (0.00)	1.00							
NatIism	-0.07 (0.00)	-0.07 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.01)	1.00						
Sociotropic	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.98)	-0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.03)	1.00					
Cons. Islam	-0.22 (0.00)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.16 (0.00)	0.03 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.15)	1.00				
Religiosity	-0.06 (0.00)	0.03 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.41)	0.02 (0.28)	0.03 (0.20)	0.17 (0.00)	1.00			
Anti-West	-0.02 (0.43)	0.00 (0.91)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.60)	-0.07 (0.00)	0.17 (0.00)	0.06 (0.00)	1.00		
Union Mem.	0.19 (0.00)	0.23 (0.00)	0.19 (0.00)	0.02 (0.44)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.00)	0.06 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.94)	1.00	
Informality	-0.24 (0.00)	-0.33 (0.00)	-0.24 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.38)	0.03 (0.12)	0.02 (0.23)	-0.06 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.87)	-0.25 (0.00)	1.00

Note: P-values in parentheses

D Balance Tests

As stated in the article, the random assignment of the experimental treatments was done within each sector, not across the entire respondent pool. We conducted balance tests for each treatment group across a range of demographic and sociocultural covariates. Table A4 reports balance tests using a series of logistic regressions with the dependent variable as an indicator for each sector. In line with standard economic theory, we found the type of respondents within each sector to be unbalanced on a range of demographic and geographic covariates. We found that the exporters, on average, were significantly more female, older, less well educated, and concentrated in distinct regions; in contrast, respondents in import-competing industries were more male and younger than the rest. Exporters were concentrated in the governorates of Ben Arous, Monastir, Naebeul, and Sfax, whereas large numbers of import-competing respondents came from Gabes, Jendouba, Kairouan, Mahdia, Manouba, Siliana, Sousse, and Zaghouane. Other research on Tunisia has found that regional differences are important (Berman and Nugent 2017, Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012, Nucifora, Rijkers and Funck 2014). We control for this imbalance by including demographic covariates for gender, education, and skill in our models. Governorate fixed effects were also used to control for geographic heterogeneity.

Table A4: Balance Tests (Governorate)

	Exports b/se	Import-Comp. b/se	Non-Traded b/se	Public b/se
Age	-0.013*** (0.005)	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.006)
Female	0.568*** (0.127)	-0.226* (0.119)	-0.274*** (0.103)	0.644*** (0.157)
Education	-0.153*** (0.053)	-0.065 (0.054)	-0.012 (0.045)	0.245*** (0.069)
High Skill	0.047 (0.195)	-0.337* (0.193)	-0.738*** (0.151)	1.010*** (0.190)
Income	-0.106*** (0.029)	0.010 (0.026)	-0.027 (0.021)	0.148*** (0.028)
Nationalism	-0.235** (0.113)	-0.133 (0.113)	0.147 (0.097)	0.232 (0.186)
Sociotropic	0.186** (0.092)	0.052 (0.079)	-0.079 (0.064)	-0.133 (0.094)
Cons. Islam	-0.075 (0.046)	0.030 (0.047)	0.026 (0.039)	-0.007 (0.058)
Religiosity	-0.224** (0.106)	-0.146 (0.092)	0.145* (0.083)	0.167 (0.123)
Anti-West	-0.030 (0.020)	0.021 (0.018)	0.005 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.025)
Union Member	0.213 (0.225)	-0.301 (0.221)	-0.584*** (0.195)	0.459** (0.224)
Informal	-0.046 (0.109)	0.005 (0.096)	0.917*** (0.087)	-1.854*** (0.123)
Beja	0.088 (0.521)	1.329*** (0.409)	-1.142*** (0.368)	0.053 (0.651)
Ben Arous	0.773** (0.388)	0.744* (0.391)	-0.874*** (0.292)	0.015 (0.493)
Bizerte	0.575 (0.398)	0.372 (0.402)	-0.674** (0.295)	0.164 (0.520)
Gabes	-0.300 (0.507)	0.754* (0.416)	-0.741** (0.320)	0.655 (0.485)
Gafsa	-1.559** (0.790)	0.472 (0.468)	-1.300*** (0.356)	2.261*** (0.532)
Jendouba	-0.694 (0.480)	0.996** (0.398)	-0.818*** (0.306)	1.112** (0.478)
Kairouan	0.337 (0.400)	0.646 (0.393)	-1.012*** (0.293)	1.002** (0.461)
Kasserine	0.299 (0.435)	-0.073 (0.454)	-0.949*** (0.313)	1.484*** (0.465)
Kebili	-1.244 (1.051)	0.052 (0.685)	-0.160 (0.463)	0.919 (0.624)

Continued on next page

Table A4 – *Continued from previous page*

	Exports b/se	Import-Comp. b/se	Non-Traded b/se	Public b/se
Le Kef	0.601 (0.433)	-0.600 (0.608)	-0.842** (0.332)	1.181** (0.479)
Mahdia	0.531 (0.420)	0.666 (0.420)	-0.860*** (0.307)	0.412 (0.478)
Manouba	0.383 (0.472)	0.797* (0.429)	-0.484 (0.346)	-0.762 (0.574)
Mednine	0.442 (0.433)	0.223 (0.447)	-0.658** (0.324)	0.741 (0.549)
Monastir	1.029** (0.400)	0.124 (0.453)	-0.933*** (0.306)	0.341 (0.518)
Nabeul	1.008*** (0.371)	0.471 (0.385)	-0.794*** (0.286)	-0.268 (0.482)
Sfax	0.997*** (0.357)	0.654* (0.360)	-1.185*** (0.265)	0.189 (0.433)
Sidi Bouzid	0.362 (0.425)	0.613 (0.406)	-1.017*** (0.306)	1.044** (0.484)
Siliana	-0.706 (0.621)	0.657 (0.477)	-0.649* (0.352)	1.115** (0.533)
Sousse	0.076 (0.405)	0.960** (0.375)	-0.325 (0.297)	-0.830* (0.485)
Tataouine	0.372 (0.693)	0.811 (0.580)	-0.596 (0.499)	-0.475 (0.803)
Tozeur	0.120 (0.829)	0.896 (0.692)	-0.389 (0.652)	0.071 (1.074)
Tunis	0.159 (0.374)	0.535 (0.359)	-0.378 (0.261)	0.068 (0.444)
Zaghouane	0.448 (0.561)	1.006* (0.526)	-0.445 (0.414)	-1.688 (1.229)
Constant	-1.075 (0.872)	-1.258 (0.807)	0.769 (0.676)	-4.143*** (1.070)
N	2121	2121	2121	2121
AIC	1928.389	2077.659	2615.485	1407.615
BIC	2132.136	2281.406	2819.232	1611.362

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

E Robustness Tests

In the paper, we demonstrate that exporters, who received informational cues about their sector of employment and the effects of trade liberalization, are more likely to express support for trade openness. By contrast, those respondents employed in import-competing industries failed to respond to the treatment.

These results are robust to a number of alternative modifications such as using logistic regression or whether or not we included fixed effects. Table A5 presents the results of logit estimates using the original binary dependent variable where 0 means support for new limits on foreign trade and 1 for no new limits. We find similar results as when estimating these models with OLS. The same holds true for the difference-in-differences as reported in Table A6.

Later, we demonstrate that the main results are robust to estimating the models without governorate fixed effects (appendix tables A11 and A12), albeit the effects are more attenuated.

E.1 Logistic Regressions

Below we report logit estimates for the original coding of the dependent variable where 0 = support limits on imports and 1 = to no limits on trade. We find the results to substantively and statistically similar to the main effects reported in the paper. In tables A7 and A8 we show that these results are robust to estimating the models without governorate fixed effects. Later, in tables A9 and A10, we demonstrate that the results hold when we estimate the models using only the sub-sample that passed the manipulation check.

Table A5: Logit - Main Effects - Support for Trade

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-0.227 (0.157)	-0.277 (0.175)
Exports	-0.117 (0.236)	-0.246 (0.254)
Imports	-0.033 (0.184)	-0.173 (0.211)
Non-traded	0.153 (0.245)	0.072 (0.280)
Treatment \times Exports	0.670*** (0.236)	0.840*** (0.255)
Treatment \times Imports	0.100 (0.233)	0.244 (0.254)
Treatment \times Non-traded	-0.099 (0.226)	-0.036 (0.254)
Age	-0.052*** (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.019)
Age ²	0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Female	0.162 (0.099)	0.265** (0.106)
Education	-0.133*** (0.038)	-0.166*** (0.043)
High Skill	-0.196 (0.227)	-0.192 (0.236)
Nationalism		0.011 (0.117)
Sociotropic		0.126 (0.079)
Cons. Islam		-0.248*** (0.047)
Religiosity		0.055 (0.102)
Anti-West		-0.000 (0.012)
Union Member		-0.009 (0.194)
Informal		0.013 (0.053)
N	2416	2273
AIC	3070.595	2855.783
BIC	3140.073	2964.631

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Logistic estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown.

Table A6: Logit - Main Effects - Support for Trade

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	0.570** (0.22)	0.600*** (0.21)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	0.770*** (0.22)	0.880*** (0.22)
Exporters vs. Public	0.670*** (0.24)	0.840*** (0.25)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	0.200 (0.25)	0.280 (0.23)
Import-Competing vs. Public	0.100 (0.23)	0.240 (0.25)
Non-Traders vs. Public	-0.100 (0.23)	-0.040 (0.25)

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from logistic estimates reported in Table A5. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown where indicated. For example, $DID = [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Exporters}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Exporters}}] - [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Import-Competers}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Import-Competers}}]$. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

Table A7: Logit - Main Effects (without Fixed Effects)

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-0.206 (0.157)	-0.262 (0.179)
Exports	-0.215 (0.213)	-0.350 (0.226)
Imports	-0.074 (0.184)	-0.227 (0.219)
Non-traded	0.121 (0.243)	0.025 (0.272)
Treatment \times Exports	0.634*** (0.226)	0.817*** (0.240)
Treatment \times Imports	0.073 (0.250)	0.233 (0.266)
Treatment \times Non-traded	-0.102 (0.221)	-0.030 (0.255)
Age	-0.046** (0.018)	-0.054*** (0.019)
Age ²	0.000** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Female	0.142 (0.092)	0.244** (0.098)
Education	-0.141*** (0.041)	-0.171*** (0.042)
High Skill	-0.208 (0.216)	-0.213 (0.226)
Nationalism		0.025 (0.128)
Sociotropic		0.094 (0.085)
Cons. Islam		-0.239*** (0.045)
Religiosity		0.062 (0.093)
Anti-West		-0.004 (0.010)
Union Member		-0.006 (0.195)
Informal		0.032 (0.053)
N	2416	2273
AIC	3189.125	2965.742
BIC	3264.394	3080.319

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Logistic estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories.

Table A8: Logit - Main Effects (without Fixed Effects) Difference-in-Differences

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	0.560** (0.25)	0.580** (0.24)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	0.740*** (0.21)	0.850*** (0.21)
Exporters vs. Public	0.630** (0.23)	0.820*** (0.24)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	0.180 (0.26)	0.260 (0.24)
Import-Competing vs. Public	0.070 (0.25)	0.230 (0.27)
Non-Traders vs. Public	-0.100 (0.22)	-0.030 (0.25)

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from logistic estimates reported in Table A7. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. For example, DID = [Treatment_{Exporters} - Control_{Exporters}] - [Treatment_{Import-Competers} - Control_{Import-Competers}]. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

Table A9: Logit - Main Effects (Passed Manipulation Check)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-0.307 (0.203)	-0.416** (0.203)	-0.287* (0.166)	-0.398** (0.170)
Exports	-0.435 (0.343)	-0.555* (0.300)	-0.326 (0.351)	-0.457 (0.311)
Imports	-0.305 (0.223)	-0.428* (0.235)	-0.285 (0.225)	-0.394 (0.243)
Non-traded	0.086 (0.242)	0.017 (0.275)	0.094 (0.213)	0.028 (0.254)
Treatment × Exports	0.877** (0.372)	1.146*** (0.320)	0.864** (0.338)	1.144*** (0.289)
Treatment × Imports	0.176 (0.297)	0.382 (0.286)	0.171 (0.256)	0.382 (0.248)
Treatment × Non-traded	-0.019 (0.263)	0.102 (0.263)	-0.031 (0.244)	0.105 (0.240)
Age	-0.038* (0.023)	-0.047** (0.021)	-0.048** (0.022)	-0.055** (0.022)
Age ²	0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Female	-0.045 (0.119)	0.032 (0.119)	-0.009 (0.126)	0.061 (0.132)
Education	-0.138** (0.058)	-0.177*** (0.058)	-0.144** (0.058)	-0.191*** (0.064)
High Skill	-0.164 (0.201)	-0.140 (0.207)	-0.221 (0.212)	-0.196 (0.212)
Nationalism		0.135 (0.147)		0.133 (0.144)
Sociotropic		-0.019 (0.099)		0.015 (0.098)
Cons. Islam		-0.196*** (0.049)		-0.200*** (0.054)
Religiosity		-0.085 (0.127)		-0.096 (0.137)
Anti-West		0.003 (0.015)		-0.001 (0.016)
Union Member		0.134 (0.225)		0.137 (0.222)
Informal		-0.077 (0.106)		-0.128 (0.114)
Fixed-Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	1271	1196	1271	1196
AIC	1684.701	1576.593	1615.162	1515.985
BIC	1751.619	1678.327	1676.932	1612.633

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Logistic estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects for models 3 & 4 not shown.

Table A10: Logit - Main Effects (Passed Manipulation Check)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	0.700** (0.29)	0.760*** (0.26)	0.690** (0.28)	0.760*** (0.25)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	0.900*** (0.29)	1.040*** (0.29)	0.900*** (0.30)	1.040*** (0.29)
Exporters vs. Public	0.880** (0.37)	1.150*** (0.32)	0.860** (0.34)	1.140*** (0.29)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	0.190 (0.25)	0.280 (0.25)	0.200 (0.25)	0.280 (0.25)
Import-Competing vs. Public	0.180 (0.30)	0.380 (0.29)	0.170 (0.26)	0.380 (0.25)
Non-Traders vs. Public	-0.020 (0.26)	0.100 (0.26)	-0.030 (0.24)	0.110 (0.24)
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from logistic estimates reported in Table A9. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown where indicated. For example, $DID = [Treatment_{Exporters} - Control_{Exporters}] - [Treatment_{Import-Competers} - Control_{Import-Competers}]$. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

E.2 No Fixed Effects

In this section, we report estimates from our main effects models with no governorate fixed effects. In tables [A11](#) and [A12](#), we demonstrate that the main findings are robust to these alternative specifications. However, in view of the imbalance across governorates as demonstrated from the balance tests reported in table [A4](#), we have higher confidence in the main effects models reported in the paper.

Table A11: Main Effects (without Fixed Effects)

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-5.006 (3.795)	-6.211 (4.193)
Exports	-5.006 (5.074)	-8.063 (5.208)
Imports	-1.703 (4.355)	-5.232 (5.036)
Non-traded	2.672 (5.679)	0.398 (6.164)
Treatment × Exports	14.638** (5.247)	18.425*** (5.366)
Treatment × Imports	1.895 (5.987)	5.528 (6.252)
Treatment × Non-traded	-2.052 (5.157)	-0.396 (5.797)
Age	-1.060** (0.408)	-1.214*** (0.398)
Age ²	0.010** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)
Female	3.292 (2.103)	5.575** (2.144)
Education	-3.312*** (0.967)	-3.936*** (0.945)
High Skill	-5.053 (5.208)	-4.987 (5.272)
Nationalism		0.525 (2.920)
Sociotropic		2.160 (1.987)
Cons. Islam		-5.421*** (0.961)
Religiosity		1.381 (2.114)
Anti-West		-0.096 (0.236)
Union Member		-0.250 (4.559)
Informal		0.796 (1.246)
N	2416	2273
R ²	0.027	0.048

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories.

Table A12: Main Effects (without Fixed Effects) Difference-in-Differences

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	12.740** (5.72)	12.900** (5.37)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	16.690*** (4.59)	18.820*** (4.47)
Exporters vs. Public	14.640** (5.25)	18.420*** (5.37)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	3.950 (6.05)	5.920 (5.50)
Import-Competing vs. Public	1.890 (5.99)	5.530 (6.25)
Non-Traders vs. Public	-2.050 (5.16)	-0.400 (5.80)

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from OLS estimates reported in Table A11. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. For example, $DID = [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Exporters}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Exporters}}] - [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Import-Competers}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Import-Competers}}]$. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

E.3 Passed Manipulation Check

As mentioned in the paper, it could be that respondents failed to understand the treatment, which could influence our non-finding for people employed at import-competing firms. We ran the same models on a subset of respondents who passed a manipulation check about their sector’s relationship with international trade.¹¹ 77.5% of our sample passed the manipulation check. For those respondents told of the possible effects from trade, we asked an additional manipulation check by sector; for export-oriented and import-competing workers, we asked if they thought exports or imports would increase, decrease, or be stable. We again found that 77.5% of respondents passed these manipulation checks, with little difference across sectors: about 91% of exporters, 82% of import-competing, 68% of non-tradable, and 80% of public sector workers passing. We wanted to test whether the more than 20% of respondents who failed this manipulation check influenced the results. Appendix Tables A13

¹¹Specifically, we asked them “Previously we told you that the sector [you/MIEperson] [work/works/worked] is in the [industry]. Did we say that this sector was heavily involved in international trade or is it not traded?”

and A14 reveal that they did not. Exporters were still significantly more willing to support an open trade policy than respondents in import-competing, non-tradable, or public sectors.

Table A13: Main Effects (Passed Manipulation Check)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-7.375 (4.902)	-9.769* (4.789)	-6.489 (3.817)	-9.020** (3.844)
Exports	-10.209 (8.228)	-12.878* (6.989)	-7.230 (8.081)	-10.144 (6.970)
Imports	-7.120 (5.300)	-9.885* (5.403)	-6.347 (5.117)	-8.889 (5.401)
Non-traded	1.671 (5.472)	0.100 (6.026)	1.795 (4.607)	0.234 (5.376)
Treatment × Exports	20.313** (9.052)	25.985*** (7.659)	19.011** (7.769)	24.590*** (6.585)
Treatment × Imports	4.252 (7.236)	8.955 (6.900)	3.939 (5.964)	8.670 (5.792)
Treatment × Non-traded	0.107 (6.033)	2.769 (5.968)	-0.215 (5.325)	2.684 (5.227)
Age	-0.871 (0.508)	-1.068** (0.467)	-1.058** (0.484)	-1.199** (0.468)
Age ²	0.008 (0.005)	0.010** (0.004)	0.010** (0.005)	0.012** (0.004)
Female	-1.046 (2.758)	0.716 (2.690)	-0.220 (2.797)	1.412 (2.894)
Education	-3.213** (1.359)	-4.064*** (1.336)	-3.198** (1.307)	-4.173*** (1.398)
High Skill	-4.005 (4.797)	-3.348 (4.792)	-4.999 (4.832)	-4.450 (4.688)
Nationalism		3.055 (3.470)		2.764 (3.252)
Sociotropic		-0.432 (2.230)		0.362 (2.144)
Cons. Islam		-4.446*** (1.083)		-4.381*** (1.171)
Religiosity		-1.908 (2.890)		-2.025 (3.035)
Anti-West		0.050 (0.340)		-0.005 (0.354)
Union Member		2.994 (5.163)		2.793 (4.828)
Informal		-1.737 (2.471)		-2.719 (2.536)
Constant	103.274*** (15.780)	99.931*** (18.621)	120.003*** (15.258)	118.976*** (15.377)
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	1271	1196	1271	1196
R ²	0.025	0.044	0.076	0.090

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown.

Table A14: Main Effects (Passed Manipulation Check): Difference-in-Differences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	16.060** (6.9)	17.030** (6.04)	15.070** (6.36)	15.920** (5.55)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	20.210** (6.84)	23.220*** (6.62)	19.230** (6.46)	21.910*** (6.32)
Exporters vs. Public	20.310** (9.050)	25.980*** (7.66)	19.010** (7.77)	24.590*** (6.58)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	4.150 (5.92)	6.190 (5.68)	4.150 (5.49)	5.990 (5.40)
Import-Competing vs. Public	4.250 (7.24)	8.950 (6.9)	3.940 (5.96)	8.670 (5.79)
Non-Traders vs. Public	0.110 (6.03)	2.770 (5.97)	-0.210 (5.33)	2.680 (5.23)
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from OLS estimates reported in Table A11. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown. For example, $DID = [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Exporters}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Exporters}}] - [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Import-Competers}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Import-Competers}}]$. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

E.4 Stolper-Samuelson and Income

A common assumption of SS posits that trade preferences are dependent on individual incomes and personal welfare. We test this assumption by including the log of the respondent or main income earner's monthly income in dinars. As reported in table A15, the coefficient on income is never significant whereas the the interaction between treatment and exporters is consistently and significantly positive. At the same time, education and conservative Islam is consistently negative.

Table A15: Main Effects - Support for Trade (With Income)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-5.334 (3.870)	-6.304 (4.223)	-4.881 (3.618)	-6.038 (3.901)
Exports	-4.716 (5.183)	-8.422 (5.392)	-2.139 (5.486)	-6.126 (5.811)
Imports	-1.132 (4.443)	-4.392 (5.167)	0.022 (3.920)	-3.361 (4.576)
Non-traded	4.156 (5.771)	1.763 (6.213)	4.747 (5.496)	2.017 (6.042)
Treatment × Exports	14.593** (5.405)	19.182*** (5.482)	13.737** (5.217)	18.014*** (5.514)
Treatment × Imports	4.843 (6.835)	7.587 (7.140)	4.677 (6.279)	7.152 (6.668)
Treatment × Non-traded	-3.882 (4.854)	-2.359 (5.426)	-3.977 (4.662)	-2.292 (5.121)
Age	-0.886* (0.456)	-1.068** (0.447)	-1.022** (0.451)	-1.178** (0.459)
Age ²	0.008* (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)
Female	2.680 (2.095)	5.139** (2.207)	3.305 (2.161)	5.619** (2.391)
Education	-3.113*** (0.946)	-3.748*** (0.961)	-2.874*** (0.879)	-3.514*** (0.968)
High Skill	-4.987 (5.355)	-4.521 (5.456)	-4.580 (5.678)	-3.932 (5.780)
Log(Income)	0.480 (2.124)	0.122 (2.001)	0.731 (1.856)	0.094 (1.840)
Nationalism		1.235 (3.104)		0.914 (2.838)
Sociotropic		2.184 (1.953)		2.647 (1.796)
Cons. Islam		-5.701*** (0.983)		-5.559*** (0.969)
Religiosity		1.593 (2.205)		1.342 (2.285)
Anti-West		-0.212 (0.239)		-0.150 (0.280)
Union Member		-0.767 (4.527)		-0.612 (4.317)
Informal		0.797 (1.382)		0.467 (1.421)
Constant	94.188*** (14.177)	82.251*** (17.032)	107.143*** (14.628)	95.772*** (15.428)
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	2216	2098	2216	2098
R ²	0.025	0.049	0.067	0.090

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown where indicated.

Table A16: Main Effects - Support for Trade (With Income) Difference-in-Differences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	9.750 (6.350)	11.590* (6.08)	9.060 (5.65)	10.860** (5.24)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	18.470*** (5.15)	21.540*** (4.95)	17.710*** (5.16)	20.310*** (4.99)
Exporters vs. Public	14.590** (5.41)	19.180*** (5.48)	13.740** (5.22)	18.010*** (5.51)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	8.730 (6.73)	9.950 (6.13)	8.650 (6.49)	9.440 (5.76)
Import-Competing vs. Public	4.840 (6.83)	7.590 (7.14)	4.680 (6.28)	7.150 (6.67)
Non-Traders vs. Public	-3.880 (4.85)	-2.360 (5.43)	-3.980 (4.66)	-2.290 (5.12)
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from OLS estimates reported in Table A15. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown where indicated. For example, $DID = [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Exporters}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Exporters}}] - [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Import-Competers}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Import-Competers}}]$. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

E.5 Multiple Imputation

In our main effects models, 143 observations drop to non-responses to some economic and socio-cultural questions. To ensure that these possibly non-missing at random values do not bias our estimates, we impute the missing values using the *Amelia* package in R for five imputed datasets. In tables A17 and A18, we find that the main results are robust to imputation.

Table A17: Main Effects - Support for Trade (MI)

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-4.774 (3.576)	-4.104 (3.503)
Exporters	-2.519 (5.206)	-3.640 (5.088)
Import-Competing	-0.551 (4.181)	-0.870 (4.122)
Non-Traded	3.819 (5.305)	3.831 (5.273)
Treatment × Exporters	13.334** (5.058)	14.416*** (4.983)
Treatment × Import-Competing	1.953 (5.323)	2.269 (5.332)
Treatment × Non-Traded	-2.517 (5.024)	-3.186 (4.895)
Age	-1.148*** (0.397)	-1.183*** (0.367)
Age ²	0.011** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)
Female	3.461 (2.045)	5.128** (2.212)
Education	-2.946*** (0.936)	-3.776*** (0.890)
High Skill	-4.601 (5.081)	-4.815 (5.064)
Nationalism		1.028 (2.296)
Sociotropic		2.293 (1.698)
Cons. Islam		-5.636*** (0.895)
Religiosity		1.181 (2.032)
Anti-West		-0.072 (0.270)
Union Member		-1.594 (4.227)
Informal		0.277 (1.081)
Constant	110.332*** (14.279)	97.351*** (15.044)
N	2491	2491

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS estimates across five imputed datasets with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Public Sector are reference categories.

Table A18: Main Effects - Support for Trade (MI) Difference-in-Differences

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Exporters vs. Import-Competing	11.380** (5.09)	12.150** (4.75)
Exporters vs. Non-Traders	15.850*** (4.52)	17.600*** (4.58)
Exporters vs. Public	13.330** (5.06)	14.420** (4.98)
Import-Competing vs. Non-Traders	4.470 (5.54)	5.450 (5.33)
Import-Competing vs. Public	1.950 (5.32)	2.270 (5.33)
Non-Traders vs. Public	-2.520 (5.02)	-3.190 (4.90)

Notes: * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Difference-in-Differences (DID) between sectors, calculated from OLS estimates reported in Table A17 across five imputed datasets. Control and Public Sector are reference categories. For example, $DID = [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Exporters}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Exporters}}] - [\text{Treatment}_{\text{Import-Competers}} - \text{Control}_{\text{Import-Competers}}]$. A positive coefficient in this case would indicate that Exporters are more supportive of trade than those in the import-competing group.

F Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Tables A19–A28 introduce threeway interactions between treatment group, sector, and demographic and sociocultural variables. This allows us to investigate heterogeneous responses to the treatment. Overall, we do not find consistent patterns of subgroup effects, save for sociotropic attitudes. Table A25 demonstrates that import-competers and non-traders who adopted higher levels of sociotropism were more likely to express more support for trade.

Table A19: Subgroup Effects: Education

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-9.246 (5.777)	-11.801 (6.305)
Exports	-6.107 (4.269)	-10.299* (4.518)
Imports	-3.882 (4.289)	-8.046 (4.893)
Non-traded	-0.290 (5.264)	-2.923 (5.851)
Treatment × Exports	21.721** (6.282)	26.419*** (6.568)
Treatment × Imports	6.555 (7.081)	11.570 (7.676)
Treatment × Non-traded	2.056 (7.544)	4.865 (7.919)
High Education	-14.846* (6.802)	-17.306* (6.389)
Treatment × High Education	9.872 (9.680)	12.067 (8.838)
Exports × High Education	18.590 (13.127)	23.582 (11.923)
Imports × High Education	11.465 (11.368)	16.407 (11.638)
Non-traded × High Education	14.517 (8.472)	15.835 (8.180)
Treatment × Exports × High Education	-38.010** (13.111)	-46.468** (12.978)
Treatment × Imports × High Education	-13.331 (12.077)	-19.469 (12.449)
Treatment × Non-traded × High Education	-11.964 (12.276)	-14.641 (12.404)
High Skill	-6.751 (5.124)	-6.834 (4.959)
Age	-1.044* (0.401)	-1.163** (0.406)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.013** (0.004)
Female		6.891** (2.155)
Nationalism		0.207 (2.652)
Sociotropic		2.818 (1.758)
Cons. Islam		-5.053***

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Table A19 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Religiosity		(0.947) 0.824
Anti-West		(2.263) 0.039
Union Member		(0.279) -0.386
Informal		(4.353) 0.474
Constant	96.383*** (11.631)	75.327*** (1.254) (15.014)
N	2418	2275
R ²	0.069	0.091

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A20: Subgroup Effects: Skill

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-4.561 (6.032)	-5.792 (6.816)
Exports	-3.251 (5.897)	-5.999 (6.440)
Imports	0.021 (5.654)	-3.066 (6.531)
Non-traded	4.425 (5.847)	2.612 (6.701)
Treatment × Exports	16.441* (7.804)	19.659* (8.393)
Treatment × Imports	2.242 (8.021)	5.625 (8.865)
Treatment × Non-traded	-3.840 (7.617)	-2.244 (8.083)
High skill	-3.077 (5.875)	-3.342 (6.145)
Treatment × High skill	-0.810 (8.381)	-0.882 (8.538)
Exports × High skill	7.515 (13.804)	6.738 (14.231)
Imports × High skill	-2.754 (10.381)	-1.434 (10.292)
Non-traded × High skill	-7.463 (11.816)	-6.468 (12.261)
Treatment × Exports × High skill	-10.545 (17.969)	-11.864 (18.733)
Treatment × Imports × High skill	-4.014 (13.182)	-3.910 (14.201)
Treatment × Non-traded × High skill	13.101 (14.492)	12.469 (15.115)
Education	-3.250*** (0.792)	-3.682*** (0.926)
Age	-1.152** (0.403)	-1.285** (0.405)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)
Female		5.835* (2.206)
Nationalism		0.155 (2.555)
Sociotropic		2.699 (1.783)
Cons. Islam		-5.499***

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Table A20 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Religiosity		(0.950) 1.197 (2.237)
Anti-West		0.014 (0.269)
Union Member		-0.023 (4.259)
Informal		0.223 (1.220)
Constant	99.079*** (11.295)	81.040*** (14.509)
N	2416	2273
R ²	0.073	0.094

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A21: Subgroup Effects: Gender

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-14.370**	-14.101**
	(4.170)	(4.249)
Exports	-0.749	-2.126
	(7.717)	(7.973)
Imports	-3.494	-4.456
	(5.096)	(5.481)
Non-traded	1.865	0.291
	(7.001)	(7.951)
Treatment × Exports	31.331**	34.863***
	(9.512)	(9.064)
Treatment × Imports	13.427	15.295
	(8.021)	(7.693)
Treatment × Non-traded	5.236	6.629
	(6.575)	(6.708)
Female	0.707	5.045
	(4.816)	(5.053)
Treatment × Female	17.461**	14.893*
	(5.362)	(6.180)
Exports × Female	-3.342	-5.818
	(7.767)	(8.553)
Imports × Female	5.536	1.411
	(5.804)	(6.424)
Non-traded × Female	2.565	2.260
	(6.809)	(7.484)
Treatment × Exports × Female	-27.061*	-26.865*
	(12.875)	(10.968)
Treatment × Imports × Female	-21.595	-19.430
	(12.461)	(13.395)
Treatment × Non-traded × Female	-13.333	-13.521
	(10.345)	(10.890)
Education	-3.019**	-3.692***
	(0.859)	(0.921)
High Skill	-4.947	-4.819
	(5.302)	(5.312)
Age	-1.135**	-1.253**
	(0.400)	(0.403)
Age ²	0.011*	0.012**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Nationalism		0.165
		(2.552)
Sociotropic		2.915
		(1.758)
Cons. Islam		-5.385***

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Table A21 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Religiosity		(0.973) 1.302 (2.188)
Anti-West		0.015 (0.277)
Union Member		0.114 (4.367)
Informal		0.006 (1.287)
Constant	102.898*** (14.639)	91.496*** (15.353)
N	2416	2273
R ²	0.077	0.097

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A22: Subgroup Effects: Union Membership

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-5.153 (3.917)	-4.421 (3.949)
Exports	-4.579 (5.206)	-6.381 (5.297)
Imports	-2.111 (4.544)	-4.395 (4.741)
Non-traded	2.257 (5.367)	1.347 (5.650)
Treatment × Exports	18.187** (5.189)	19.156*** (4.922)
Treatment × Imports	2.229 (5.800)	4.257 (5.904)
Treatment × Non-traded	-1.460 (5.678)	-1.905 (5.797)
Union Member	-3.002 (6.394)	0.757 (7.106)
Treatment × Union Member	-1.559 (11.974)	-8.297 (12.824)
Exports × Union Member	19.014 (10.078)	13.333 (10.813)
Imports × Union Member	8.752 (11.868)	8.708 (11.665)
Non-traded × Union Member	2.485 (12.458)	1.617 (11.712)
Treatment × Exports × Union Member	-38.028 (21.651)	-28.589 (20.243)
Treatment × Imports × Union Member	1.508 (23.567)	1.770 (23.455)
Treatment × Non-traded × Union Member	-10.745 (18.228)	-0.899 (17.202)
Education	-3.119** (0.843)	-3.707*** (0.944)
High Skill	-4.413 (5.309)	-4.570 (5.348)
Age	-1.138** (0.397)	-1.265** (0.404)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)
Female		5.802* (2.284)
Nationalism		0.062 (2.617)
Sociotropic		2.974

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Table A22 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Cons. Islam		(1.843) -5.492***
Religiosity		(0.964) 1.046
Anti-West		(2.240) 0.043
Informal		(0.274) 0.177
Constant	104.251*** (13.571)	85.145*** (15.899)
N	2406	2273
R ²	0.074	0.095

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A23: Subgroup Effects: Informality

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-5.142 (5.944)	-5.779 (6.274)
Exports	4.387 (12.731)	0.754 (12.341)
Imports	-11.612 (8.866)	-9.245 (8.449)
Non-traded	0.547 (10.306)	1.954 (10.331)
Treatment × Exports	1.349 (20.745)	6.497 (22.929)
Treatment × Imports	20.041 (15.075)	17.927 (16.411)
Treatment × Non-traded	0.302 (11.821)	0.416 (11.358)
Informal	4.103 (6.143)	4.789 (5.989)
Treatment × Informal	-0.400 (8.325)	-1.563 (8.660)
Exports × Informal	-9.007 (13.042)	-8.314 (12.704)
Imports × Informal	10.879 (9.750)	4.757 (9.585)
Non-traded × Informal	1.276 (8.761)	-2.292 (9.177)
Treatment × Exports × Informal	15.470 (20.584)	13.697 (22.575)
Treatment × Imports × Informal	-19.533 (15.159)	-12.969 (16.282)
Treatment × Non-traded × Informal	-2.070 (12.585)	0.033 (11.691)
Education	-2.989** (0.815)	-3.547*** (0.924)
High Skill	-3.901 (5.046)	-4.162 (5.166)
Age	-1.047* (0.399)	-1.207** (0.402)
Age ²	0.010* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)
Female		5.271* (2.117)
Nationalism		0.183 (2.615)
Sociotropic		2.713

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Table A23 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Cons. Islam		(1.782) -5.452***
Religiosity		(0.953) 1.259
Anti-West		(2.223) 0.032
Union Member		(0.275) 0.640
Constant	98.045*** (13.929)	81.299*** (4.292) (16.001)
N	2416	2273
R ²	0.073	0.093

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A24: Subgroup Effects: Nationalism

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-32.210*	-25.439
	(13.540)	(12.411)
Exports	4.311	2.384
	(20.272)	(18.219)
Imports	28.870	28.427
	(21.054)	(17.423)
Non-traded	13.441	9.867
	(12.580)	(11.375)
Treatment × Exports	33.237	24.643
	(26.894)	(25.677)
Treatment × Imports	-26.456	-29.200
	(28.449)	(27.566)
Treatment × Non-traded	43.460*	35.203*
	(16.793)	(15.931)
High Nationalism	13.811	10.550
	(13.215)	(11.834)
Treatment × High Nationalism	26.947	18.912
	(13.200)	(12.111)
Exports × High Nationalism	-7.010	-7.949
	(19.629)	(17.711)
Imports × High Nationalism	-31.069	-33.554
	(22.296)	(18.880)
Non-traded × High Nationalism	-10.802	-8.744
	(11.348)	(10.066)
Treatment × Exports × High Nationalism	-17.682	-5.950
	(25.563)	(24.079)
Treatment × Imports × High Nationalism	30.543	36.721
	(30.010)	(29.382)
Treatment × Non-traded × High Nationalism	-45.980**	-36.141*
	(14.770)	(14.273)
Education	-3.230***	-3.639***
	(0.825)	(0.948)
High Skill	-4.218	-4.421
	(5.173)	(5.332)
Age	-1.154*	-1.274**
	(0.411)	(0.416)
Age ²	0.011*	0.012**
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female		5.893*
		(2.276)
Sociotropic		2.807
		(1.754)
Cons. Islam		-5.375***

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Table A24 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Religiosity		(0.978) 1.038
Anti-West		(2.256) 0.026
Union Member		(0.272) 0.083
Informal		(4.153) 0.130
Constant	90.565*** (17.908)	75.658*** (14.918)
N	2415	2273
R ²	0.075	0.095

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A25: Subgroup Effects: Sociotropic

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	5.865 (4.958)	5.240 (5.715)
Exports	-0.945 (7.526)	-3.700 (8.126)
Imports	3.760 (6.811)	1.738 (7.280)
Non-traded	6.990 (7.626)	4.997 (8.404)
Treatment × Exports	7.124 (6.184)	12.711 (6.684)
Treatment × Imports	-8.787 (7.837)	-7.522 (8.579)
Treatment × Non-traded	-15.264 (7.511)	-14.032 (8.022)
High Sociotropic	10.187 (4.981)	8.424 (4.413)
Treatment × High Sociotropic	-24.658** (8.339)	-24.110** (8.573)
Exports × High Sociotropic	-5.128 (7.818)	-3.602 (7.409)
Imports × High Sociotropic	-11.148 (7.527)	-9.913 (7.398)
Non-traded × High Sociotropic	-8.969 (5.520)	-7.013 (5.563)
Treatment × Exports × High Sociotropic	19.505 (10.855)	14.975 (11.639)
Treatment × Imports × High Sociotropic	24.849* (10.039)	26.324* (11.257)
Treatment × Non-traded × High Sociotropic	28.731** (9.884)	27.611* (9.864)
Education	-3.247*** (0.845)	-3.731*** (0.966)
High Skill	-4.155 (5.111)	-4.255 (5.326)
Age	-1.130* (0.411)	-1.273** (0.403)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)
Female		5.855* (2.227)
Nationalism		0.329 (2.582)
Cons. Islam		-5.475***

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Table A25 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Religiosity		(0.929) 1.264
Anti-West		(2.228) -0.038
Union Member		(0.265) 0.305
Informal		(4.300) 0.442
Constant	98.581*** (14.545)	91.868*** (17.477)
N	2382	2273
R ²	0.076	0.094

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A26: Subgroup Effects: Conservative Islam

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-3.256 (5.820)	-5.352 (5.782)
Exports	-4.776 (8.028)	-4.795 (7.318)
Imports	-5.531 (6.232)	-6.502 (6.222)
Non-traded	-1.356 (6.635)	-2.503 (6.723)
Treatment × Exports	16.400 (10.160)	16.752 (9.362)
Treatment × Imports	-1.964 (9.346)	0.688 (9.608)
Treatment × Non-traded	1.070 (6.873)	3.778 (6.998)
High Cons. Islam	-14.729* (6.091)	-14.977* (5.965)
Treatment × High Cons. Islam	-4.296 (10.380)	-2.652 (10.065)
Exports × High Cons. Islam	1.474 (10.529)	-0.675 (9.643)
Imports × High Cons. Islam	6.209 (7.703)	5.396 (7.349)
Non-traded × High Cons. Islam	7.130 (5.535)	7.333 (5.440)
Treatment × Exports × High Cons. Islam	2.429 (17.400)	3.499 (16.482)
Treatment × Imports × High Cons. Islam	11.434 (13.592)	9.009 (13.496)
Treatment × Non-traded × High Cons. Islam	-4.642 (11.570)	-7.295 (11.223)
Education	-3.973*** (0.817)	-3.440*** (0.906)
High Skill	-4.152 (5.372)	-4.384 (5.315)
Age	-1.204** (0.408)	-1.277** (0.419)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)
Female		5.311* (2.230)
Nationalism		-0.061 (2.535)
Sociotropic		3.072

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Table A26 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Religiosity		(1.718) 0.937
Anti-West		(2.291) -0.062
Union Member		(0.296) -0.668
Informal		(4.256) 0.393
Constant	115.191*** (13.640)	93.486*** (15.159)
N	2333	2273
R ²	0.084	0.090

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A27: Subgroup Effects: Religiosity

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-1.202 (6.914)	-0.578 (7.178)
Exports	3.994 (6.736)	1.907 (7.253)
Imports	3.303 (5.651)	2.107 (7.146)
Non-traded	1.211 (6.367)	2.263 (7.193)
Treatment × Exports	4.075 (9.931)	8.728 (10.370)
Treatment × Imports	-2.919 (11.156)	1.370 (10.406)
Treatment × Non-traded	-0.615 (6.850)	-2.198 (7.950)
High Religiosity	3.846 (6.015)	8.943 (6.336)
Treatment × High Religiosity	-7.537 (10.078)	-10.485 (9.957)
Exports × High Religiosity	-12.208 (8.020)	-13.737 (8.041)
Imports × High Religiosity	-7.625 (7.946)	-10.595 (8.783)
Non-traded × High Religiosity	2.807 (8.085)	-1.909 (8.084)
Treatment × Exports × High Religiosity	20.258 (13.958)	17.641 (14.051)
Treatment × Imports × High Religiosity	8.274 (14.236)	6.782 (12.842)
Treatment × Non-traded × High Religiosity	-0.654 (9.252)	4.270 (10.307)
Education	-3.433*** (0.858)	-3.790*** (0.955)
High Skill	-3.531 (5.373)	-3.620 (5.529)
Age	-1.190** (0.407)	-1.336** (0.409)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.013** (0.004)
Female		5.983* (2.299)
Nationalism		0.356 (2.656)
Sociotropic		2.878

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Table A27 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Cons. Islam		(1.817) -5.322***
Anti-West		(0.964) 0.022
Union Member		(0.289) -0.529
Informal		(4.305) 0.571
Constant	102.736*** (12.975)	80.791*** (14.009)
N	2384	2248
R ²	0.072	0.093

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A28: Subgroup Effects: Anti-West

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	-8.113 (6.771)	-10.505 (7.168)
Exports	-7.913 (5.783)	-9.703 (5.656)
Imports	-2.784 (5.479)	-5.409 (5.708)
Non-traded	2.845 (7.121)	2.293 (7.284)
Treatment × Exports	24.510** (7.860)	27.650** (7.903)
Treatment × Imports	-0.240 (9.691)	4.622 (10.100)
Treatment × Non-traded	0.653 (9.181)	3.056 (9.820)
Anti-West	-6.255 (6.383)	-2.696 (6.135)
Treatment × Anti-West	7.576 (10.939)	8.803 (11.390)
Exports × Anti-West	14.007 (9.385)	12.417 (9.165)
Imports × Anti-West	4.616 (7.544)	4.184 (7.370)
Non-traded × Anti-West	0.608 (8.741)	-1.258 (8.250)
Treatment × Exports × Anti-West	-23.675 (12.590)	-25.295 (13.827)
Treatment × Imports × Anti-West	4.059 (14.485)	2.428 (14.369)
Treatment × Non-traded × Anti-West	-6.831 (14.320)	-8.187 (15.086)
Education	-3.286*** (0.851)	-3.805*** (0.949)
High Skill	-4.359 (5.267)	-4.177 (5.517)
Age	-1.144** (0.406)	-1.283** (0.406)
Age ²	0.011* (0.004)	0.012** (0.004)
Female		5.687* (2.179)
Nationalism		0.351 (2.606)
Sociotropic		2.860

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Table A28 – *Continued from previous page*

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Cons. Islam		(1.717) -5.510***
Religiosity		(0.982) 1.159
Union Member		(2.214) 0.020
Informal		(4.414) 0.026
Constant	106.848*** (13.463)	86.693*** (15.371)
N	2416	2293
R ²	0.075	0.096

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

G NNTT, Off-Shoring, and FDI

In addition to the GVC analysis presented in the article, we examine two alternative specifications, off-shoring and foreign direct investment. First, we follow [Baghdadi, Kheder and Aroui \(2017\)](#) and [Rijkers, Freund and Nucifora \(2017\)](#) in assessing the effects of Tunisia’s extensive set of off-shore policy incentives. Since the promulgation of the 1972 Investment Law (Law 72-38), Tunisia has sought to foster exports by providing tax incentives to exporting manufacturing firms or companies that sell products to them. Incentives include income tax and VAT exemptions and fewer custom duties. Scholars argue that this has led to a bifurcation of firms between those that fully export (offshore) versus ones that partially export (onshore). Onshore firms face a host of regulatory restrictions that have stunted growth whereas onshore firms have attracted the most foreign investment.

We explore this duality by creating an indicator for off-shoring. Using the Tunisian registry of firms, [Baghdadi, Kheder and Aroui \(2017\)](#) estimate the share of an industry engaged in off-shoring — defined as firms which solely export or sell more than 70% of their products to exporting firms. They find three sectors where more than 20% of the firms are classified as off-shore: 1) “transport equipment” manufacturing, 2) “computer, electronic, electrical equipment, machinery and optical products” manufacturing, and 3) “Textile, clothing, leather and footwear” manufacturing. We classify respondents in these three sectors as “offshore” and the balance of our sample as onshore. In view of the preferential treatment off-shoring companies receive, we anticipate that offshore firms would be the most supportive of trade. This is true even among import-competing firms, because offshore firms among import-competers sell to other domestic firms engaged in exports.

To explore these dynamics, we sub-sample to only exporters and import-competers and estimate the same models as in the GVC analysis. We expect that the coefficient on the interaction between Treatment, Import-Competing, and Offshore to be positive and less likely to respond to the treatment. As reported in table [A29](#), we find some support for this. The coefficient on the

triple interaction in the baseline model, without sociocultural controls, is positive and significant. When we include sociocultural covariates, however, the sign remains in the expected direction but the significance is slightly more attenuated.

Second, we evaluate whether **regions** that have more foreign direct investment are associated with less support for protectionism, even among import-competing industries. Areas with denser FDI are more likely to have Tunisian firms around them that are part of multinationals' global value chains. We use data on the number of foreign firms in Tunisia from *Statistics Tunisia: National Institute of Statistics (2014)*. The database covers the number of foreign-invested firms by governorate in 2012, the last year available before our survey.

We grouped governorates into four categories based on the number of foreign-invested firms by quartile. Despite efforts by the government for diversification, Tunisia's foreign investment remains geographically concentrated as depicted in Figure 1; most foreign investments are in the northeast region around the capital city of Tunis and its suburbs (67%) and the eastern coastal regions (27%). Internal western and southern regions attracted only 6% of foreign investments.¹²

NNTT expects that trade liberalization holds benefits for workers in import-competing firms if they are integrated into global value chains. Specifically, workers at import-competing firms in regions with high levels of FDI should be less supportive of protectionism than those outside international supply chains. While facing import competition, these firms also provide inputs into multinational and exporting firms in Tunisia, and they may also depend on imports in their sector as part of the value chain. We expect these individuals to be less responsive to the negative treatment about trade that we gave them.

To test these expectations, we restrict the sample to respondents in export-orientated and import-competing firms and adopt the same specification as the GVC analysis but now across Tunisia's gov-

¹²2017. 'Tunisia - Openness to and Restriction on Foreign Investment,' *Export.gov* 20 July. Retrieved from <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Tunisia-openness-to-foreign-investment>.

Table A29: Off-Shoring (Exporters & Import-Competers)

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	18.926***	21.590***
	(6.313)	(6.658)
Imports	2.117	-0.010
	(5.606)	(5.710)
Treatment \times Imports	-22.939***	-22.440***
	(7.095)	(7.832)
Off-Shore	6.984	5.252
	(10.089)	(9.972)
Treatment \times Off-Shore	-25.147*	-25.373*
	(13.903)	(14.380)
Imports \times Off-Shore	-9.726	-4.037
	(11.780)	(12.435)
Treatment \times Imports \times Off-Shore	42.347**	32.712
	(19.985)	(22.855)
Age	-1.616**	-1.659**
	(0.669)	(0.717)
Age ²	0.015**	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Female	-0.726	-0.426
	(3.329)	(3.573)
Education	-1.231	-1.315
	(1.305)	(1.368)
High Skill	-7.332	-8.093
	(6.928)	(6.958)
Nationalism		0.893
		(3.061)
Sociotropic		2.964
		(2.634)
Cons. Islam		-3.657***
		(1.110)
Religiosity		0.157
		(2.798)
Anti-West		0.328
		(0.517)
Union Member		4.930
		(5.354)
Informal		0.069
		(2.680)
Constant	109.331***	87.304***
	(17.766)	(18.468)
N	916	860
R ²	0.129	0.143

Notes: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS estimates with robust standard errors clustered by governorate. Control and Export-Orientated are reference categories. Governorate fixed effects not shown.




Figure 1: FDI in Tunisia. Number of Foreign Firms by Governorate, 2012 (Source: Tunisia Statistics).

ernorates classified by FDI received. We estimate the models using OLS but cannot use governorate fixed effects due to multicollinearity between the FDI and governorate variables. We expect regions where FDI is concentrated to elicit the least support for protectionism even when respondents are cued about the impact of trade on their import-competing sector. We expect those in governorates with the lowest FDI to be most protectionist when cued about trade's effects.

These results in Table A30 show that the coefficient estimates are in expected directions, but they are not statistically different from zero. Therefore, there is limited evidence that workers at import-competing firms in high FDI regions who are part of global value chains are much less supportive of protectionism than their counterparts in other regions without involvement in GVCs. As mentioned above, we could not run these estimates using a fixed effects specification and therefore have lower confidence in these results than the GVC results presented in the paper.

Table A30: FDI Firms (Export, Import-Competers)

	(1)	(2)
	b/se	b/se
Treatment	14.319 (16.183)	17.572 (15.369)
Imports	29.265 (17.398)	28.426 (17.092)
Treatment × Imports	-36.654* (19.311)	-38.901* (19.137)
Treatment × Foreign Firms	-0.794 (2.619)	-1.046 (2.396)
Imports × Foreign Firms	-4.967* (2.643)	-4.995* (2.616)
Treatment × Imports × Foreign Firms	4.387 (2.932)	4.814 (2.888)
Age	-1.401** (0.657)	-1.491** (0.675)
Age ²	0.013* (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)
Female	0.139 (2.522)	0.308 (3.132)
Education	-1.344 (1.217)	-1.659 (1.225)
High Skill	-7.656 (6.871)	-7.668 (6.845)
Nationalism		3.232 (3.859)
Sociotropic		1.750 (2.761)
Cons. Islam		-4.703*** (1.189)
Religiosity		-0.108 (2.779)
Anti-West		0.704 (0.426)
Union Member		5.054 (5.297)
Informal		0.042 (2.490)
Constant	97.954*** (21.714)	72.356** (28.681)
N	916	860
R ²	0.027	0.045

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses.

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