Modern Police Tactics, Police-Citizen Interactions, and the Prospects for Reform

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High-profile incidents of police misconduct have led to widespread calls for law enforcement reform. But prior studies cast doubt on whether police commanders can control officers, and offer few policy remedies because of their focus on potentially immutable officer traits like personality. I advance an alternative, institutional perspective and demonstrate that police officers—sometimes characterized as autonomous—are highly responsive to managerial directives. Using millions of records of police-citizen interactions alongside officer interviews, I evaluate the impact of a change to the protocol for stopping criminal suspects on police performance. An interrupted time series analysis shows the directive produced an immediate increase in the rate of stops producing evidence of the suspected crime. Interviewed officers said the order signaled increased managerial scrutiny, leading them to adopt more conservative tactics. Procedural changes can quickly and dramatically alter officer behavior, suggesting a reform strategy sometimes forestalled by psychological and personality-driven accounts of police reform.

The war on drugs and the adoption of “broken windows” law enforcement tactics (Wilson and Kelling 1982) that aggressively target so-called quality of life crimes have made frequent contact with police a fact of life for millions of Americans, especially Americans of color (Alexander 2010; Gottschalk 2008; Sampson and Loeffler 2010; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). As a spate of high-profile episodes of police violence has demonstrated, unlike contact with other bureaucrats, encounters with police present unique psychological and physical risks to the citizen ranging from inconveniences to humiliation, injury, and death. Negative contact with law enforcement has also been shown to depress political participation and erode views of the state (Burch 2013; Lerman and Weaver 2014a, 2014b) and place significant economic burdens on citizens (Howell 2009; Meredith and Morse 2015). Moreover, as the net cast by the criminal justice system has widened in recent decades while crime rates have generally fallen, the correlation between contact with police and criminal guilt has grown “increasingly tenuous” (Lerman and Weaver 2014a, 3). These trends not only harm citizens but inhibit police work, as perceptions of unfair policing diminish support for, and cooperation with, law enforcement (e.g., Tyler and Wakslak 2004). Calls for reform and oversight of police organizations are now widespread (Martin 2014; Schmidt 2015; Vitale 2014).

But even if social movements aimed at reforming policing garner victories in courts and legislatures, reforms will have to be implemented within police organizations. Decades of research on police misconduct and administration suggests that police managers may find it difficult to control the behavior of their officers. Scholars of organizations and public bureaucracies have long understood management issues in public institutions as principal-agent problems and have debated the degree to which monitoring coupled with the credible threat of sanctions causes workers to comply with managerial directives (Downs 1967; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Miller 2005). While these approaches have proved promising in a number of settings (e.g., Olken 2010), police scholars have long expressed doubts about the ability of rules and supervision to shape officer behavior, citing officer “predispositions” (e.g., Brehm and Gates 1999) and the difficulty of observing police activity as powerful impediments (Davis 1971; Goldstein 1960; Wilson 1968). But prior empirical tests of these claims have been hampered by a...
lack of high-resolution data on officer behavior and research designs that were ill equipped to facilitate valid causal inferences. In addition, many studies in this arena have focused on reducing officer “shirking” and examine productivity-based outcomes such as arrest rates regardless of whether arrests are warranted (Engel 2000), outcomes that are uninformative for investigations centered on the fairness of police-citizen interactions.

This study overcomes these limitations by identifying a rare case where granular, high-frequency records of police officer behavior were recorded before and after an unanticipated procedural reform to a highly controversial tactic, “stop, question, and frisk” (SQF) in New York City. This tactic has been widely criticized as inefficient and over zealously applied and driven by racial profiling (Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007). In March of 2013, the New York Police Department (NYPD) suddenly mandated that officers provide thorough, narrative descriptions to superiors justifying the reasons for stops of criminal suspects. Original interviews show that this directive convinced some officers that commanders would now be further scrutinizing their judgement on the street and were “trying to find a reason to penalize” officers for misconduct surrounding the tactic (officer 1). With this new perceived risk of sanction for questionable stops, many officers began limiting stops to instances where the probability of criminal activity appeared relatively high. Using millions of observations of police-citizen encounters contained in the NYPD’s SQF database, an interrupted time series analysis supports this qualitative account and shows that the rate of stops which produced evidence of the crime suspected by the officer sharply and immediately increased following the new directive. A range of robustness checks reported below indicate that the change is very unlikely to have been caused by reporting bias or data manipulation. Further, contrary to claims that a reduction in SQF activity (due to reforms such as this one) have led to a surge in violent crime in New York City (e.g., Parascandola et al. 2014), I find no discernible change in violent crime following this procedural reform.

While this new directive caused far fewer suspects to be detained by police for crimes they did not commit, this reform was not a panacea. There is no evidence that racial disparities in the rate of stops producing evidence that existed prior to the intervention were eliminated, and while the hit rate improved on average, there is modest evidence that improvements were most pronounced in neighborhoods with higher shares of white residents. In addition, while the reform did not result in any detectable increase in violent crime or immediate decrease in the number of weapons recovered, it may have resulted in fewer weapons being taken off the street in the months and years that followed. Despite these limitations, the results show that, contrary to prominent claims in the policing literature, officers are highly responsive to rules and supervision, suggesting that institutional changes offer a promising, straightforward avenue for police reform that has been forestalled by a focus in both scholarship and popular discussion on potentially immutable officer traits as the culprits of police behavior and misconduct.

AN INSTITUTIONAL PATH TO POLICE REFORM

Volumes of research in sociology, psychology, and criminology have advanced a “rotten apple” theory of police misconduct (Bonnano 2015) explaining variation in police behavior with individual-level officer traits. For example, scholars have posited that police officers have distinct personalities characterized by “machismo, bravery, authoritarianism, cynicism, and aggression,” as well as bigotry (Balch 1972; Skolnick 1977; Twersky-Glasner 2005, 58), and some argue that police work itself fosters authoritarian personality traits (Laguna et al. 2009; McNamara 1967; Niederhoffer 1967). Police behavior has also been linked to aggressiveness (Hargrave, Hiatt, and Gaffney 1988), conservative ideology (Christie et al. 1995; Fielding and Fielding 1991), and substance abuse (Sellbom et al. 2007). A related strand of research explores the influence of racial bias on police performance and decision making, showing that officers apply lower evidentiary thresholds (Gelman et al. 2007; Glaser 2014; Goel et al. 2016) and a greater propensity to use force (Correll et al. 2007; Eberhardt et al. 2004; Legewie 2016) when dealing with nonwhite suspects.

It seems virtually indisputable that such officer-level traits influence the way that officers do their jobs. But for the reformer, this line of research has, to date, offered few viable policy remedies. Interventions including racial, cultural, and gender-based sensitivity training, as well as calls to diversify police forces, are often proposed (Cioccarelli 1989; Levine et al. 2002; Lockwood and Prohaska 2015, 88; Roberg 1978), but evidence for the effectiveness of these interventions is sparse. Smith (2003) shows that the level of racial diversity in a police force fails to predict the rate of police-caused homicides in that jurisdiction. Christie et al. (1995) show that the effect of training thought to reduce authoritarian and conservative tendencies was eclipsed by the countervailing effects of experience on the job among Australian police.

1. Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, interviewed officers were granted anonymity. Each officer is referred to by an ID number throughout the text.
When studies do show promising results, they are typically plagued by flawed research designs. In an expansive review of over 985 reports on prejudice reduction efforts in a variety of settings, including police departments, Paluck and Green (2009) noted that “entire genres of prejudice-reduction interventions, including diversity training, educational programs, and sensitivity training in health and law enforcement professions, have never been evaluated with experimental methods” (360). The authors concluded that, “we currently do not know whether a wide range of programs and policies tend to work on average” (357). Thus, while research on the microlevel causes of police performance and misconduct remains vital to the study of criminal justice, and while efforts to reduce prejudice should continue to be developed, this line of research faces limitations when it comes to generating effective and actionable policy solutions.

An alternative approach is offered by a vast, multidisciplinary literature on bureaucracies and organizations. Police officers have long been viewed as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980), whose preferences may differ systematically from those of their superiors (Brehm and Gates 1999). This presents police managers with a principal-agent problem. Managers have incomplete information as to how their officers spend their shifts and must find ways to ensure their compliance with directives. Scholars of organizations have long debated whether a combination of incentives, monitoring and credible threats of sanctions can shape the behavior of workers even in the face of such difficulties (see Miller [2005] for a review of this expansive literature). In the context of bureaucratic organizations, many scholars have shown that an array of institutional actions, such as rule making, budgeting, and the threat of sanctions, can alter the behavior of bureaucrats (Carpenter 1996; Huber and Shipan 2002; McCubbins et al. 1987; Olken 2010).

Despite such evidence, police scholars have long expressed skepticism when it comes to the efficacy of rules and supervision in police organizations for several reasons. For one, police officers often work out of sight from supervisors and their job often entails dealing with unanticipated events in an array of physical locations, all of which makes verifying noncompliance with directives relatively daunting compared to other bureaucratic settings (Goldstein 1960). Unlike other bureaucrats who handle a repetitive set of office tasks each day, the work of a patrol officer is defined by spontaneity, making it difficult for commanders to craft viable orders and verify that they are followed. In addition, the vagueness of many statutes means that a police administrator’s “ability to control the discretion of his subordinates is in many cases quite limited” (Wilson 1968, 227), especially with regard to “order maintenance” tasks, a category of police work that includes stopping suspicious individuals for questioning.2

Applying principal-agent theory to police organizations, Brehm and Gates (1999) paint a portrait of a supervisor constrained not only by time and resources but by the dispositions of her workers. “Getting the incentive structure ‘right’ may not be enough,” they write (40). “In prior principal-agent models, one sees compliance from the subordinates if the supervisor’s punishment poses a credible threat. In our model, one sees compliance when subordinate predispositions favor the policy” (44). In an empirical analysis of police brutality, Brehm and Gates (1999) find no evidence that policies or sanctions curbed police violence (168). “We would not go as far . . . to call the coercive power of supervision a ‘fiction,’” the authors conclude, “but the results . . . do suggest that it is an awfully short story” (171).

But while the idiosyncrasies of policing and officers’ preferences surely constrain management, there have been significant changes to the policing environment since the time of several of these foundational studies. The prevalence of smart phone cameras, open data policies (James 2015), and civilian review boards have made police behavior much more visible. Recent decades have also seen an explosion in the rate of police-citizen contacts (Gelman et al. 2007; Goel et al. 2016; Lerman and Weaver 2014a) and high-profile law suits brought by watchdog groups, which have forced improved record keeping inside police agencies. In turn, the perceived threat of sanctions to officers for noncompliance with directives is now arguably more credible than ever, since noncompliance is far more likely to be discovered by management (Fisher and Hermann 2015). These changes, coupled with widespread calls for reform and new high-resolution data sets on police-citizen interactions, necessitate a rigorous empirical reassessment of the responsiveness of police officers to institutional directives.

**A SUDDEN PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK CITY**

Though it has long been a part of police work, the legal authority for SQF comes from Terry v. Ohio (1968), a Supreme Court case that ruled officers who observe articulable facts that are indicative of criminal activity may temporarily detain, question, and potentially search that individual in order to investigate further. As Alexander (2010) notes, since Terry, “stops, interrogations, and searches of ordinary peo-

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2. As Wilson (1968) states, “to get the patrolman to ’do the right thing’ when he is making ’street stops’ . . . the administrator must first be able to tell him what the right thing is. This is seldom possible” (64).
ple driving down the street, walking home from the bus stop, or riding the train, have become commonplace—at least for people of color” (63–64).

In time, “stop, question and frisk,” once considered to be an optional investigative tool, came to be regarded as a measure of an officer’s productivity in the NYPD (Rayman 2013). During much of the 2000s, many officers claimed that failure to report sufficient numbers of stops could result in an array of punishments and career setbacks (Rayman 2013). In this organizational climate, rates of stops by police soared, growing by 603% between 2002 and 2011, reaching nearly 700,000 stops in 2011 (Lerman and Weaver 2014a, 36–37). According to the data analyzed in this study, a summons was not issued and an arrest was not made in nearly 90% of stops made in New York City from 2008 through 2012. In addition, roughly 90% of stopped suspects in that period were nonwhite, though more than 40% of city residents are white.

Stops are recorded in the NYPD on “UF-250” forms, which are filled out by officers. These forms, which at the time under study, consisted of short fields and check boxes (see fig. A2; figs. A1–A5, B1–B5, C1–C3, D1–D5, E1–E5, available online), convey the date, time, and location of each stop, as well as the reason (suspected crime and other circumstances), suspect attributes, and various outcomes such as whether a weapon was found or an arrest was made. Critics of SQF had long alleged that this form was insufficient to establish the legality of a stop. With the trial for a class action law suit concerning the policy, David Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, set to commence, plaintiffs in the case filed a memo dated March 4, 2013, in US District Court asking for several reforms, among them the following request: “the UF-250 form should be modified to: (i) include a narrative portion for police officers to justify the basis for stops, frisks, and searches” (Center for Constitutional Rights 2013a, 17). Though NYPD patrol guide documents show that officers had long been required to “enter details” about each stop in their activity logs (notebooks), there was no requirement that these notes be turned in to supervisors along with UF-250 forms after each shift. According to media accounts, the plaintiffs did not expect a policy change from the NYPD after filing this brief, since this reform was something they had “been asking for for ten years” without success (Devereaux 2013b).

But on the very next day, March 5, 2013, the NYPD’s then-Chief of Patrol James P. Hall issued a memo to the commanders of all patrol units (see fig. A1), essentially mandating this exact reform. In addition to reinforcing the mandate that officers record notes on the details of stops in their activity logs, the memo contained a new order requiring officers to photocopy and submit these narrative descriptions of the reasons they stopped suspects to supervisors after each shift. As the evidence below will show, this intervention suddenly increased the perceived level of supervision being applied to officers’ decision making on the street.4

In court testimony, Hall said the proximity of the memo to the Floyd trial was a coincidence (transcript from Floyd, May 16, 2013, 7684) and that the memo was modeled off of a previous memo disseminated in a patrol borough in Queens earlier that year.5 But Darius Charney, the plaintiffs’ lead attorney in Floyd, called the memo “gamesmanship pure and simple,” since it was released just one day after the plaintiffs’ brief requesting the same reform (Horan 2013). The directive may have been a legal tactic meant to persuade the court that reforms to SQF being sought through litigation could be handled internally (Horan 2013). The fact that the directive may have been a strategic response made to a brief filed just one day earlier is important, since it implies it was not long-planned or anticipated by NYPD officers. This serves to mitigate concerns about anticipatory behavior on the part of officers that could otherwise hamper the unbiased estimation of the directive’s impact.

DATA AND METHODS

The current study is designed to overcome several weaknesses in prior empirical work measuring the ability of rules and supervision to influence officer behavior. Many prior studies focus on reducing “shirking” and examine productivity-based outcomes such as arrest rates (Engel 2000) or the length of police-citizen encounters (Allen 1982) that are of limited use for investigations centered on the fairness with which citizens are treated by police. In addition, studies in this area often don’t leverage randomized or as-if randomized interventions, leaving behind the substantial threat of omitted variable bias.6 Finally, a lack of readily available administrative data has led researchers to rely on relatively small convenience samples.

3. Periodic audits of officers’ notebooks began “in or around 2008.” Plaintiffs argued these audits showed frequent noncompliance with the order to record the details of stops (transcript from Floyd, March 18, 2013 25, 53; Center for Constitutional Rights 2013b).

4. According to court testimony from Inspector Juanita Holmes, commanding officer of the department’s 81st Precinct, this new requirement streamlined the supervisory process (transcript from Floyd, May 9, 2013, 6546).

5. A request to the NYPD for all SQF-related memos by the Queens North commander in that time period was denied. A request to discuss the results of this analysis made to the NYPD’s public information office on May 11, 2015, was not returned.

often gathered via participant-observation methods such as “squad car anthropology” (Allen 1982, 92), a technique highly vulnerable to demand effects (Orne 1962).

In contrast, the primary source of quantitative data in the current study is the NYPD’s publicly available SQF database (2008–15), which contains over 3 million records of police-citizen interactions. This study tests whether a procedural change inside the NYPD increased the citywide rate of stops of criminal suspects that produced evidence of the crime suspected by the officer. In a legal sense, a stop can be justified even if evidence of a crime is not uncovered. But determining whether the officer’s suspicion was correct is important. To the extent that officers make stops because they mistakenly perceive criminal activity or, upon making stops, discover crimes unrelated to their motivating suspicion, SQF can devolve from a potentially useful investigative tool to a frequent, largely arbitrary, and potentially dangerous intrusion into the lives of the policed. In keeping with other recent work, this study therefore uses an outcome-based measure to determine whether the suspicion motivating a stop was accurate (Ayres 2001; Hernandez-Murillo and Knowles 2004; Knowles et al. 2001; Persico and Castleman 2005; Persico and Todd 2006; cited in Engel and Knowles 2004; Knowles et al. 2001; Persico and Todd 2006). Specifically, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether a stop that occurred due to the suspected crime of “criminal possession of a weapon” in fact produced a weapon (Goel et al. 2016), a version of a statistic commonly known as the “hit rate.” This metric conveys both the efficiency and fairness with which the tactic was applied.

This version of the hit rate was chosen for several reasons. First, criminal possession of a weapon (CPW) is the most common suspected crime in the SQF data (it accounts for roughly 26% of stops in pretreatment data) and also corresponds to one of the NYPD’s chief goals for SQF, pulling illegal weapons off the street (Devereaux 2013a). Achieving a higher weapon recovery rate is therefore theoretically appealing to both police and citizens. Second, unlike other versions of the hit rate, such as arrest rates, this measure explicitly links the suspected crime to tangible evidence of that crime that is difficult to falsify, providing an objective basis for determining whether a police officer’s suspicion was warranted.

To determine whether the memo induced an improvement in the hit rate, this study employs an interrupted time series analysis, a variety of regression discontinuity designs (RDD) in which the running variable is time (Morgan and Winship 2014; Shadish et al. 2002). The SQF data are ideal for this approach because of the high frequency of measurement and well-defined moment of the intervention—the former alleviates concerns about unobserved confounders which change levels during long intervals between observations, and the latter guards against researcher discretion in coding treated and untreated units. The primary quantity of interest is the immediate change in the probability of recovering a weapon during a stop on March 5, 2013, represented by \( \tau \) in the following ordinary least squares models:

\[
\text{weapon} = \alpha + \tau \text{memo}_i + s(d_i) + \varepsilon_i, \quad i = 1, 2, \ldots, N; \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, 4.
\]

In equation (1), weapon, is an indicator of whether each stop, \( i \), resulted in a weapon being discovered, \( \alpha \) is an intercept, memo, is an indicator for an observation falling on the day of the intervention or later, \( s(d_i) \) are various functions that model time trends on either side of the discontinuity using the running variable, \( d_i \) —the distance in days, from the day the memo was issued, which can be positive or negative—and \( \varepsilon_i \) is an error term. The model is specified to either estimate a simple difference in means (in which case the function \( s(\cdot) \) simply omits \( d_i \), from the model) or to model separate linear, quadratic, or cubic functions on either side of the treatment boundary by interacting various orders of \( d_i \) with \( \text{memo}_i \).

Given this estimation strategy, the key assumption necessary to attribute any immediate change in the hit rate at the moment of the procedural reform to the reform itself is that no other factor which affects the hit rate also systematically changed at the same point in time. If the data had been aggregated by month or year, as is often the case with administrative records, this would be a strong assumption, as we would undoubtedly be conflating myriad events in the time series with the introduction of the treatment. But given the granularity of the SQF data, we are able to isolate the change in the hit rate on the specific day of the reform and can therefore make the much more plausible assumption that leading candidate omitted variables such as criminal activity in the city and department personnel are not also changing suddenly on March 5, 2013.

In order to estimate these models, two broad strategies are applied. The first uses data on all weapon stops from 2008

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7. The authors of Goel et al. (2016) generously shared their merged SQF data file covering the period through 2013. Data on 2014 and 2015 were appended. See the appendix for details on data cleaning and merging.

8. Most weapons recovered via SQF are knives. Among weapon stops, less than 12% of stops that produced a weapon in the pretreatment period yielded firearms.

9. For example, the linear model is specified as \( \text{weapon} = \alpha + \tau \text{memo}_i + \beta_1d_i + \beta_2\text{memo}_i + \beta_3d_i + \varepsilon_i \). See app. A for more details on model specifications.

10. More formally, we must assume continuity in the potential outcome functions at the treatment boundary (de la Cuesta and Imai 2016).
through 2015, an approach that enhances the precision of estimates due to the large sample size but runs the risk of omitted variable bias since it allows other events in the time series to influence estimates of the treatment effect. The second approach aims to minimize such bias by subsetting to a narrow temporal sliver of observations before and after the memo was released, thereby eliminating the influence of events far from the intervention date. The trade-off of this second approach is that the sample size is greatly decreased, meaning that estimates will be less precise. To assure results are not being driven by particular modeling choices, models using narrow temporal windows are estimated using several model specifications and bandwidths (Eggers et al. 2015; Gelman and Imbens 2014; Hall 2015; Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Additionally, when all weapon stops are used and the risk of bias is more pronounced, models control for potential time-varying confounders using year, month, and day-of-week indicators, and the prior day’s hit rate.11

Quantitative analyses were supplemented with several qualitative sources. The first was a set of court transcripts from the aforementioned class action trial, David Floyd et al. v. The City of New York, in which the intervention was discussed in detail. These transcripts are particularly valuable since they were produced just weeks after the intervention and provide testimony given under the penalty of perjury. Phone interviews were also conducted in early 2015 with six NYPD officers who worked for the department during the time of the intervention. This is obviously not a large or representative sample of NYPD personnel—the sample size was limited by the difficulty of locating individuals who would speak candidly about a controversial policy—but does include both uniformed and plain-clothes officers, as well as officers from various types of units (e.g., patrol, street narcotics). These conversations proved illuminating, provided a working knowledge of the process of making and recording stops from an officer’s perspective, and shed light on potential causal mechanisms.

RESULTS
Of the nearly 3.2 million stops recorded from 2008 through 2015, close to 830,000 listed CPW as the suspected crime. For the aforementioned reasons, the core analysis below is performed on these roughly 830,000 observations. Of these stops, around 3.5% produced a weapon in the pretreatment period on average, and this rate was remarkably stable for several years leading up to the intervention. However, as figure 1 shows, the hit rate appears to have increased discontinuously on the day of the intervention, and ascended sharply in the months that followed. This visualization provides striking prima facie evidence that the new directive causally affected officer behavior. As Shadish et al. (2002) note, when effects in an interrupted time series are, “immediate and dramatic . . . most threats to internal validity are usually implausible” (176).

In addition, as figure 2 makes plain, the increase in the hit rate at the treatment threshold was caused by an immediate drop in the number of weapon stops being performed (the hit rate’s denominator), not by an increase in the number of stops producing a weapon (the hit rate’s numerator), a fact that will inform the discussion of the likely causal mechanism below. Finally, it is also worth noting that considerable temporal variation in the total number of stops being made in the pretreatment period did not correspond to meaningful changes in the hit rate. For example, though the total number of weapon stops sharply declined in 2012, just before the in-

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11. Similar results using the rdrobust R function developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titunik (2014), which applies an “optimum” bandwidth, appear in the appendix.
12. Throughout this study, 95% confidence intervals were computed using the maximum of conventional and robust HAC standard errors (Andrews 1991), unless otherwise stated. See the appendix for results with standard errors clustered by precinct.
intervention—possibly due to mounting controversy surrounding the tactic which caused supervisors to relax demands for stops (Goldstein and Ruderman 2012)—the hit rate remained more or less stable. This is important, since it demonstrates that factors which led officers to simply make fewer stops were insufficient to improve the rate of stops producing evidence of the suspected crime. This suggests that simply removing the alleged quota system reportedly in operation during the pretreatment period (i.e., allowing officers to make fewer stops), without imposing the reporting requirements contained in this directive, would have been insufficient to increase the hit rate on its own.

The first set of formal tests of whether this apparent discontinuity is discernible from zero are displayed in table 1. These OLS estimates, fit to the entire corpus of weapon stops from 2008 through 2015, feature four functional forms with various levels of flexibility. The first two models estimate the mean difference in the probability of discovering a weapon before and after the intervention, while the remaining six models fit separate linear, quadratic, and cubic functions to the data on either side of the intervention date (i.e., allowing officers to make fewer stops), without imposing the reporting requirements contained in this directive, would have been insufficient to increase the hit rate on its own.

The next set of tests were conducted on narrow bandwidths of data in order to reduce bias while avoiding model-dependent results that hinge on the bandwidth chosen by the researcher. Figure 3 displays the estimated treatment effects using six different functional forms. Similar to the results using all weapon stops, the estimated treatment effects using only data close to the date of the intervention are concentrated in the range between roughly 1 and 5 percentage points. Because far fewer observations are being used for estimation, the confidence intervals are larger, especially for the highly flexible estimators. Despite this, the estimates are still statistically significant in many cases, and across all tests there is not a single negative point estimate. In sum, there is robust evidence for a large and immediate improvement in the weapon recovery rate the day of this procedural change.

**THE MECHANISM BEHIND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE**

With well over 30,000 officers, the NYPD is the nation’s largest municipal police department, and the volume of memos circulating its halls is considerable. What about this particular memo caused such an abrupt change in officer behavior? A plausible explanation was supported by officer interviews: the memo increased the perceived probability of being scrutinized and sanctioned for making a wrongful stop, leading to a more conservative use of the tactic. Whereas before the intervention officers occasionally faced

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13. In very narrow bandwidths, not all parameters could be estimated in some model specifications because the covariate matrix was not of full rank. Estimates are omitted from fig. 3 in these cases.

14. While interviewed officers were not unanimous on this point, it was a recurring theme in several interviews.
scrutiny over SQF by those outside the department via sus-
pect complaints and law suits, the memo signaled to of-
ficers that heightened scrutiny would now be coming from su-
pervisors. “They’re really watching us now,” one officer re-
called thinking when the memo was released (officer 2).

Another officer added that before the memo, supervisors
would only look at [memo book entries] if someone made
an allegation . . . or you had to go to court . . . Now . . . it’s
basically like they’re looking at it . . . without any sort of
allegation being made . . . They’re trying to find a reason to

Table 1. OLS Estimates of Discontinuity, All Weapon Stops 2008–15

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Note. Maximum of homoskedastic and HAC standard errors in parentheses.

* Includes controls for year, month, day of week, and prior day’s hit rate.

Figure 3. Estimates of the change in probability of recovering a weapon the day of the intervention using various model specifications and bandwidths. Vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals for each estimate.
penalize us” (officer 1). Supervisors “obviously look at these things with a fine-tooth comb,” said another officer. “We need to protect ourselves” (officer 3).

According to interviews, this perception of increased risk led some officers to aggressively forego making stops unless they observed something highly incriminating. “It’s forcing people to not get involved in things that otherwise, a few years ago, they would have,” said one officer (officer 3). But while the incentives to make low-probability stops were perceived as declining, incentives to make stops in which the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity was likely to be validated by the outcome remained, especially for weapon-related stops. According to interviews, one of the most prestigious achievements in the NYPD is to pull an illegal firearm off the street. “I’ve often heard bosses and cops judge a unit based on how many gun collars they get,” said one officer (officer 6).

The immediate decrease in the number of weapon stops at the treatment boundary portrayed in figure 1—and the apparent stability of the number of stops producing a weapon at that point in time—is consistent with the intervention causing officers to avoid stops with a low probability of a hit. To quantify these changes, I summed both quantities at the day level and estimated the six model specifications used in the global discontinuity models, and the results are displayed in table 2.15 While the number of weapon stops dropped by as many as 120 the day the memo was released, the number of stops producing a weapon remained stable on that day.

It is worth noting that in more recent years, the number of weapons recovered has fallen to low levels, as figure 1 shows. We cannot credibly attribute this decline to the reform in question, since intervening events such as the NYPD’s loss in the Floyd case, the departure of Mayor Michael Bloomberg and the policies of a new police commissioner could all be responsible for that subsequent decline. Only changes at the treatment threshold can be attributed to the intervention with reasonable confidence. However, we also cannot rule out the possibility that the reduction in recovered weapons that occurred in the months and years following the intervention was due to a lagged treatment effect. What we can say is that in the short term, where we have the most leverage for a valid causal inference, this intervention appears to have spared many individuals from being needlessly investigated by police while doing little to impede the recovery of weapons.

Of course, the recovery of weapons is just one measure of the public safety impact of this intervention. Some critics have argued that the decline of SQF in New York has led to increases in violent crime (Parascandola et al. 2014, 2015). Prior research shows little evidence for this claim. Using precinct-year panel data, Rosenfeld and Fornago (2012) find no robust relationship between stop activity and burglaries and robberies within precincts. An internal NYPD report came to a similar conclusion regarding shootings (Parascandola 2015).16

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15. Because aggregating the data by day drastically reduces the sample size, I used a 100-day bandwidth for these models. In models with controls, the lagged hit rate is replaced with the lagged number of hits or stops, respectively.

16. MacDonald, Fagan, and Geller (2016) conclude that “saturating high crime blocks with police helped reduce crime in New York City, but that the bulk of the investigative stops did not play an important role in the crime reductions” (1).
Homicides are a useful measure of crime to examine when assessing how crime changed post-treatment, since the severity of the crime ensures that the rates at which they are recorded by the city should not depend on the fact that fewer stops were being made via SQF. As figure 4 shows, homicide levels have remained near a decades-long low since the year of the intervention. For a more fine-grained test of whether this procedural reform affected violent crime in the city, I examine weekly homicides around the time of the intervention.17 As figure 5 shows, there is no evidence of a discontinuous increase in homicides at the moment of the intervention. While we cannot rule out whether homicides would have been even lower after the intervention had the rate of stops been maintained, in the weeks that followed, the overall level of homicides remained at or below the typical range in data going back to 2010, especially once seasonality is accounted for. In short, we see no evidence of a surge in violent crime.18

HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS
Exploring the heterogeneity of these effects is especially important in light of allegations of racially biased policing practices, and given that crime rates vary markedly within New York City. I therefore estimated the differences in treatment effects between census block groups with high and low shares of white residents, precincts with high and low homicide rates, and between stops made of white and nonwhite suspects.19 Using the full corpus of weapon stops, there was some evidence that treatment effects were larger in low-crime precincts, in block groups with higher shares of white residents and among white suspects. But estimates in local bandwidths, where the potential for bias is reduced, were extremely imprecise, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions (see app. C; apps. A–E available online). Still, these results highlight that this intervention was not a panacea: it likely did not improve the hit rate to the same extent in various locations and for various groups of suspects, and there is no evidence it closed the historic disparities in the hit rate across racial groups that previous scholars have cited as evidence of racially biased policing.

REPORTING BIAS
Reporting bias is always a concern whenever records are generated by those who stand to benefit from their content (McCubbins et al. 1987). However, not all forms of reporting bias are problematic for this study. For example, if the rate of some type of data manipulation remains constant at the treatment boundary, it would not impose bias. However, if immediately after the intervention, in the absence of finding a weapon, officers began to apply a different suspected crime category (other than CPW) to stops that would previously have been labeled weapon stops, the weapon recovery rate could be artificially inflated. Fortunately, this type of behavior should be observable.

First, if recategorization of this sort were occurring, we might expect to see an increase in the frequency of stops labeled under some other crime category after the intervention. But as the top left panel of figure 6 shows, the daily frequency of stops across all suspected crime categories declined with the intervention. Second, recategorization of failed stops should lead to a decrease in the hit rate among nonweapon stops, since such behavior would flood the denominator of the hit rate among nonweapon stops with “misses.” The middle four panels of figure 6 show that nearly all point estimates of the discontinuity at the treatment threshold among nonweapon stops are at or near zero, indicating no change in the weapon recovery rate among these stops.20 Third, while it may be plausible that officers began to systematically recode the suspected crime field of their forms after the intervention, it is highly unlikely that officers would be able to correctly adjust the levels of the correlates of the suspected crime category (e.g., suspect race, suspect age, location type, whether a suspicious object was observed), so as to preserve all covariances in the data and mask their behavior. If this multivariate recategorization is not occurring but crime category recategorization is present, then

17. See app. A for information on the data quality of weekly crime statistics.
18. See table B4 in the appendix for the results of formal tests for a discontinuity.
19. Census block groups and precincts at or above the median are coded as “high.”
20. The hit rate among nonweapon stops in the pretreatment period was 0.4%.
nonweapon stops just after the intervention should look more like weapon stops than the nonweapon stops just before the intervention, in terms of their covariates. This change should be reflected in the distributions of predicted probabilities of being labeled a weapon stop among pre- and post-treatment observations, as generated by a logit model predicting having CPW as the suspected crime.  

The top right panel of figure 6 shows that, based on the levels of their covariates, nonweapon stops just before and after the intervention had nearly the same predicted probabilities of being labeled a weapon stop. Taken together, the results strongly refute the reclassification hypothesis.

Another form of reporting bias would occur if officers started to hide failed stops from supervisors after the intervention altogether. Though some stops surely go unreported, there are reasons to suspect the rate of this behavior did not increase with the intervention. If the desire to avoid discipline was motivating officers, failing to report stops—that is, lying to supervisors—would potentially be a larger risk than reporting a stop that did not produce evidence of a crime. This is especially the case since, as one interviewed officer noted, “there’s basically a camera on every block,” in New York (officer 3). It also requires more labor and physical risk to make and hide stops than to not make stops in the first place.

In addition, interviewed officers agreed that plain clothes officers were more likely to fail to report stops than uniformed officers who have their identities on display to stopped suspects. When officers’ identities are on display, interviewed officers said, suspects who feel they were mistreated are able to make much more credible complaints to the city. If, in the course of investigating that complaint, it is discovered that no stop was ever reported by the officer, it is very likely that the officer will be found to be at fault and face disciplinary action, interviewed officers said. This suggests an additional robustness check: estimating the hit rate among stops made by officers in uniform (roughly 70% of the data), where the chances of this sort of data censoring are very low. When this is done, estimated treatment effects, displayed in the bottom four panels of figure 6, look nearly identical to those in the full sample. While data censoring cannot be completely ruled out, there is little indication that it is responsible for the observed increase in the hit rate.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

As Lerman and Weaver (2014a) note, being “stopped by foot patrols as they make their way to jobs and homes” is one of the most common ways in which law-abiding citizens come into contact with law enforcement agents (30). The expansion of this practice has led to a host of negative social and political consequences, including depressed political participation, an erosion of trust in law enforcement and a rapid growth in the size of the carceral state (Alexander 2010; Burch 2013; Lerman and Weaver 2014b; Tyler and Fagan...
2008). The results above indicate that a simple procedural change to the protocol for reporting the reasons for stops reduced the rate of unnecessary police-citizen interactions. These results are consistent across several estimation strategies and are buttressed by qualitative evidence from a variety of sources, including some of the very NYPD officers who experienced this shift in policy. These results have significant implications for police reform. Despite persistent claims that police officers are largely autonomous actors who can shirk their duty and defy directives with impunity, we observe instead an immediate change in officer behavior in response to a relatively modest procedural change. This suggests that an array of institutional changes could produce desirable outcomes in terms of police-citizen interactions.
despite the obvious force of the officer traits and preferences which have been the focus of so much prior work and debate surrounding police behavior and misconduct.

There are, of course, some necessary caveats. Though analyzing the immediate discontinuity in the hit rate at the moment of the intervention provides valuable causal leverage, it also confines inferences about this intervention’s effectiveness to the short term. The high hit rate observed post-intervention persists and appears to grow through the end of 2015. But we cannot attribute this persistence to the new directive with much confidence, as intervening events could be responsible. This study also examines data from a single city, and the efficacy of similar reforms should be tested and validated in other settings. Future work that selectively implements similar interventions experimentally across multiple departments could test the robustness and persistence of these effects.

The intervention was also followed by a sharp reduction in the number of stops producing a weapon. While we cannot attribute this change to the reform with confidence—since there was no immediate change in this outcome at the treatment boundary, and intervening events could have easily been responsible for future changes—we also cannot rule out the possibility that this reduction was due to a lagged treatment effect. If the treatment did cause this decline, that would represent an important public welfare trade-off. However, it is also worth noting that the primary purpose of removing weapons from the street according to proponents of SQF is to reduce violent crime. As the results show, the intervention did not lead to any detectable increase in homicides or robberies, a result that is consistent with earlier work finding no robust evidence that increases in SQF activity reduced crime rates in New York (Rosenfeld and Fornag 2012).

Despite the stark impact of this reform, the difficulty of improving the quality of police-citizen interactions should also not be understated. Officers still enjoy immense power and discretion as well as substantial barriers to prosecution in the event of wrongdoing (Alexander 2010; Lerman and Weaver 2014a). The effect observed here is limited to a single aspect of police work, and it is possible that performance of other tasks that do not generate reports—or ones performed in environments where the press and public are less able to scrutinize police behavior—would be much more difficult to improve. And even if similar interventions lead to widespread improvements in policing nationwide (a best-case scenario), it may still take years, if not decades, to rebuild the atrophied levels of trust between residents of overpoliced communities and law enforcement personnel.

But as solutions to the problems facing law enforcement continue to be sought, these findings should underscore for reformers the strong influence of institutional factors on police behavior. The trope of the “rogue cop” in discussions surrounding police misconduct has led to an individuation of social justice problems that, to a large extent, have institutional support. To be clear, this article does not dispute that individual-level factors such as racial bias and personality affect police-citizen interactions but rather that such results, at present, suggest few policy-based remedies. Even if some prejudice reduction strategies are effective, police organizations have often failed to demonstrate this by scientifically evaluating them during implementation. Indeed, the failure to adequately assess the merit of these initiatives may indicate a willful ignorance and illustrate the resistance of institutions to more sweeping structural remedies (Paluck and Green 2009, 343–44). Announcing prejudice reduction initiatives while failing to properly evaluate them may allow political leaders to appear concerned about injustice while distracting attention from the fact that the institutions they control play a substantial role in shaping police behavior.

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