Indian State Counterinsurgency Policies: Brief Historical Summaries

Jacob N. Shapiro, Oliver Vanden Eynde, Katherine Ingram, Emefa Addo Agawu

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1 Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. Director, Empirical Studies of Conflict Project.
2 Associate Professor, Paris School of Economics. Research Fellow, CNRS.
3 Graduate Student, Princeton University.
4 Program Associate, New America Foundation.
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes major policy changes since 1990 in India’s efforts to combat its communist insurgency.

The Naxal insurgency in India originated in a 1967 uprising in West Bengal by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Most of the modern Maoist groups evolved from splinter groups of CPI-Marxist.\(^5\) Two of those splinter groups united in 2004 to form CPI-Maoist, the primary force in today’s conflict. CPI-Maoist and all other Naxal groups are designated as terrorist organizations. The conflict is concentrated the Eastern part of the country, particularly an area known as the Red Corridor. As of 2017, 104 districts in 13 states are affected by Naxal violence, down from a 2009 high of 195 districts in 16 states.\(^6\)

Under India’s Constitution, maintenance of public order is the responsibility of States.\(^7\) The affected States have approached the insurgency with a mixture of policies including negotiation, development programs, and security programs. The Center government has also instituted programs to assist affected states, primarily through funding State programs.\(^8\)

The following table summarizes how different states have adopted different strategies at different points in time.

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8 Two major initiatives are the Integrated Action Plan, which funds economic development programs in affected States, and the Security-Related Expenditure program, which subsidizes security improvements in affected states.
Table 1. Summary of state counterinsurgency policy changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Surrender/ Demobilization Program</th>
<th>State-Level Elite Forces</th>
<th>Offer of Peace Talks</th>
<th>State-Level Peace Talks</th>
<th>State-Level Economic Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>2001, 2009</td>
<td>1988-89, 2009</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2006&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2003&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa (Odisha)</td>
<td>2006, 2012</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remainder of this report describes these policy changes in detail on a state-by-state basis.

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9 Scheme to redistribute land, intended to benefit tribal peoples
10 Aapki Sarkar Aapke Dwar – builds schools, roads, health centers, etc.
11 Food Security Act – eligible families receive rice, flour, and other goods at subsidized prices
12 Saranda Action Plan – distributes land as well as household goods such as solar lamps and bicycles
13 The Gaonbandi scheme financially rewards villages that ban the entry of Naxals
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3 NATIONAL EVENTS AND POLICY CHANGES

Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996

- Date: 24 December 1996
- Key actor(s): Central Government, state government, tribal population
- Type of event: Constitutional Amendment
- Likely effect on the conflict: Intensification due to non-compliance

The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996\textsuperscript{15} or PESA was enacted on 24 December 1996 to cover the "Scheduled areas", which are not covered in the Panchayati Raj Act of the Indian Constitution (73rd amendment)\textsuperscript{16}. The act provides for extending the provisions of Indian Constitution’s Part IX\textsuperscript{17} relating to the Panchayats in the Scheduled Areas.

Simply put, PESA strengthens local self-governance through the Gram Sabha or village councils in the resource-rich Schedule V areas of the country. Most of the LWE-affected districts in the country fall under Schedule V of the Constitution and therefore, the relevance of this act is magnified.

The historical system of village level governance in tribal areas in undivided Bihar, called Manki Munda system was practiced in the present day Jharkhand also. This was an effective system wherein elections were held fairly regularly to the Gram Sabha and the traditional system of Gram Sabha presiding over important decisions related to the village development. The four major tribal groups in Jharkhand, Santhal, Oran, Ho and Munda too had their traditional systems of local self-governance soundly in place. However, successive governments in Jharkhand not only diluted these systems significantly but also failed to comply with PESA completely leading to mass exploitation of tribals and their resources.\textsuperscript{18}

The problem of Naxalism has intensified in Jharkhand and other states because of the systemic neglect of PESA. Issues of access to lands and forests, fair wages, unfair and exploitative practices in the agriculture sector, neglect of other peasants, awareness of basic rights, as guaranteed by the Constitution are some of the major concerns of the local people. Over the years, the Naxalites have used these issues to garner support of their struggle by mobilising the weaker sections of the society in Jharkhand, including tribals. As a consequence of increasing

\textsuperscript{16} The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act of 1992, Parliament of the Republic of India (1992), \url{http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend73.htm}
\textsuperscript{17} Constitution of India, Part IX, Republic of India, \url{http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%20Pg.Rom8Fs%2013%2029.pdf}
violence between the Naxalites and the state, many locals have chosen to side with the insurgents due to either fear or disillusionment with the state policies. Jharkhand state’s consistent failure to implement protective laws like PESA has added to this ferment.\(^1\)

Due to constant political turmoil, Jharkhand state authorities have not been able to conduct Gram Sabha elections mandated under PESA. In fact, the state specific Panchayat Act in Jharkhand placed additional limits on the Gram Sabha’s authority.\(^2\)

This has led to large scale poverty, erosion of tribal land due to rampant mining activities and landholding practices. Case in point is the issue of sale of land in Schedule V tribal areas which cannot be acquired by any entity from non-scheduled areas. However, acquisition of tribal land by corporates has been going on flouting both PESA and various land acquisition legislations. Since the initiation of Indian economic liberalization in 1991, the transfer of land to corporates became even more common adding to the dissatisfaction of an already repressed populace. In some cases, this leads to ‘enclavement’, where tribal groups move back from non-tribal incursion and retreat into interior areas.\(^3\) This forces the tribals to leave their home and hearth behind. PESA is intrinsically designed to prevent such marginalization but in states like Jharkhand, it has failed due to lack of implementation. Despite a legislation enacted for the protection of the indigenous communities, the already skewed balance of power has further tilted in favour of the state and private corporations. This is one of the major reasons for the violent naxal conflict to have emerged in the state and sustained for so long.

**Poor compliance with Forest Rights Act**

- Date: 2006
- Key actor(s): Central Government, state government, tribal population
- Type of event: Tribal law
- Likely effect on the conflict: Intensification due to non-compliance

The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act was enacted in 2006 to address tribal complaints resulting from colonial-era Indian Forests Acts (IFA). IFA disrupted tribal life by regulating and taxing forest activities, including banning


\(^2\) Ajay Dandekar and Chitangada Choudhury, “PESA, Left-Wing Extremism and Governance: Concerns and Challenges in India’s Tribal Districts,” *Institute of Rural Management Report*, 2010. See, for example, Jharkhand’s 2001 Gram Panchayat Act

agriculture and livestock grazing. The Indian government continued to restrict use of the forests after independence.\(^{22}\)

The Forest Rights Act (2006) recognized the rights of forest dwellers and established a process for people to prove their legal claims. The Act, however, has faced criticism for its implementation. In particular, poor awareness and distrust among forest dwellers, conflicts with other legislation, and inadequate staffing at the Ministry of Tribal Affairs have hampered implementation.\(^{23}\)

**Formation of Naxal management Division in MHA**

- Date: 19 October 2006
- Key actor(s): Central Government
- Type of event: Change in COIN strategy
- Likely effect on the conflict: Decline in conflict owing to a more development oriented approach

This Ministry of Home Affairs created the Naxal Management Division on October 19, 2006 (renamed LWE Division in 2015) in the Ministry to centralize the strategy to address Left Wing extremist insurgency in a comprehensive manner. The LWE Division implements security related schemes aimed at capacity building in the LWE affected States.\(^{24}\) It is the nodal agency for planning, implementation and monitoring of anti-LWE measures taken at the Centre as well as state level. It also coordinates the implementation of various development schemes of the relevant ministries and departments in LWE affected States. As of June, 2017, the LWE affected states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. The Ministry of Home Affairs designates certain districts as LWE Violence-Affected making them eligible to receive Center support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2008(^{25})</th>
<th>2009(^{25})</th>
<th>2010(^{25})</th>
<th>2011(^{25})</th>
<th>2012(^{26})</th>
<th>2013(^{26})</th>
<th>2014(^{27})</th>
<th>2015(^{28})</th>
<th>2016(^{29})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
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<td>Bihar</td>
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<td>Chhattisgarh</td>
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<td>Jharkhand</td>
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<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
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<td>Odisha</td>
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<td>Telangana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The LWE Division has been instrumental in changing the government’s approach in dealing with the problem from that of a law and order perspective, which would make it a state subject, to an insurgency, which makes it a central subject. This effectively means that since the formation of the LWE Division, no state can deal with this insurgency in an isolated manner. Intelligence sharing has become easier and so has using combined resources.

Under the functioning of this division, the Prime Minister holds an annual meeting with the Chief Ministers of all affected states along with the Home Minister of India. In this meeting, issues related to LWE are taken up and decisions on a cohesive strategy, intelligence sharing and development approaches are taken which direct counterinsurgency measures at both, state and central level. This comprehensive mechanism has substantially streamlined India’s strategy in dealing with LWE. This inclusive approach has shown positive results.

The districts that are considered eligible vary from scheme to scheme. Most of the schemes base their districts on the Security-Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme. This plan was reformulated to address Naxal violence in 2005. At that time it covered 76 Naxal-affected districts in 9 states. By 2012, it had expanded to 106 districts in 10 states. The districts have not changed since 2012.

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31 Unstarred Question No. 447, Government of India Lok Sabha, August 6, 2013, http://164.100.47.193/Annexure_New/lsq15/14/au447.htm
The following schemes have been initiated by the Naxal Management Division over the years:

- **Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:** Under this scheme, the government provides funds for recurring expenditure relating to insurance, training and operational needs of the security forces, rehabilitation of Left Wing Extremist cadres who surrender in accordance with the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the State Government concerned, community policing, security related infrastructure for village defence committees and publicity material.

- **Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS):** SIS was approved in the national Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-12), with an allocation of Rs. 500 crore, to cater to critical infrastructure gaps, which cannot be covered under the existing schemes. These relate to requirements of mobility for the police and security forces by upgrading existing roads and tracks in inaccessible areas, providing secure camping grounds and helipads at strategic locations in remote and interior areas, measures to enhance security in respect of police stations outposts located in vulnerable areas etc. Now, this scheme has been expanded to provide funds for upgradation of infrastructure, weaponry, equipment and training of Special Forces for operations in LWE affected States.

- **Central Scheme for assistance to civilian victims/family of victims of Terrorist, Communal and Naxal violence:** The broad aim of the Scheme is to assist families of victims of Terrorist, Communal and Naxal violence. An amount of Rs. 3 lakh is given to the affected family under the scheme. The assistance given to those who are adversely affected by naxal violence under this scheme is in addition to the ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1 lakh paid under the SRE scheme.

- **Integrated Action Plan (Additional Central Assistance):** The Planning Commission is implementing the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for 82 Selected Tribal and Backward Districts for accelerated development. The aim of this initiative is to provide public infrastructure and services in 82 affected / contiguous Districts. Being one of the most important government measures by the Indian government in the Red Corridor, this plan is explained in detail later in this essay.

- **Road Requirement Plan for LWE areas:** RRP’s Phase-I was approved in February 2009 for improvement of road connectivity in 34 extremely LWE affected districts in eight LWE affected States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. The RRP-I envisages development of 1126 kms of National Highways and 4351 kms of State Roads (total 5477 kms), at a cost of Rs. 7300 crore. A length of 2750 kms has been built at an expenditure of Rs 3479 crores till 31 December 2013.

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33 The following program descriptions are taken from the Ministry of Home Affairs website. Left Wing Extremism Division, Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, Accessed 2013, http://mha.nic.in/naxal_new
Scheme of Fortified Police Stations: The MHA sanctioned 400 police stations in 9 LWE affected States at a unit cost Rs. 2 crores under this scheme.

Operation Green Hunt

- Date: July 2009-present
- Key Actor(s): Maoists, National Gov, State governments of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra,
- Type of Event: Counterinsurgency operations
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Increased military presence and establishes state authority in Maoist-controlled areas, occupying forces also exacerbate resentment

‘Operation Green Hunt’ is an on-going counterinsurgency operation run by the Ministry of Home Affairs, meant to liberate various forested areas through the Red Corridor from Maoist control. It involves the deployment of thousands of central paramilitary troops and Cobra Commanders in conjunction with State Police in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra. The operation began in July 2009 in the Abujmadh forest in Chhattisgarh. At first, the operation was not openly discussed by the Centre—‘Operation Green Hunt’ was named so by the Chhattisgarh government after a 2009 offensive in that state, and the media adopted the nickname. The Chhattisgarh operations reportedly resulted in hundreds of casualties among suspected Maoists and civilians, breeding resentment against the government. Operation Green Hunt resulted in a spike of retribution attacks. The centre’s reluctance to claim and endorse these military operations is due in part to their preference to be seen as combating the Maoist threat mostly through development schemes, rather than military action, which inevitably result in civilian casualties. Also, security sources have said that the opacity is designed to limit the flow of information to Maoist leaders.

Operation Green Hunt is an unofficial name for operations initiated by The Ministry of Home Affairs in September of 2009 intended to “flush out” insurgents in Maoist-concentrated areas on the borders of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra along the so-called Red Corridor. The secrecy surrounding the operations on behalf of the government was allegedly to control the flow of information to Maoist commanders. Various accounts suggested the joint forces were pursuing a clear-hold-build model, and there were many accusations of police brutality against civilians, including reports of widespread sexual violence against by

paramilitary forces.\textsuperscript{41} Anti-Maoist operations in subsequent years are inconsistently understood as being part of Operation Green Hunt.

Despite reticence from officials, troop deployment to many states has been widely reported by local and national press. In July of 2010, the central government reportedly allocated funds for 34 new battalions of paramilitary forces, 20 helicopters, 20 new counterinsurgency training institutes and $214 million for better roads and bridges in 34 Naxalite-affected districts.\textsuperscript{42} Justifying the centre-fueled force influx, the Home Minister at the time, P. Chidambaram publicly expressed skepticism that states could effectively reassert authority over Naxal-dominated territory.

In 2011, the Indian Army joined operations. While officials claimed the Army was merely joining to help train state forces, not to engage directly with Maoists, many doubted this claim, pointing to careful words from the Army chief giving Indian Army troops legal authority to attack if attacked. True or not, the possibility of India deploying its army against its own citizens compounded anti-government sentiment in underserved areas where many already had cause to feel badly served by both state and national government.\textsuperscript{43}

**Civic Action Programme**

- Date: 2010 - present
- Key Actor(s): Central Government, Central Armed Police Forces
- Type of Event: Development scheme
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

The Civic Action Programme (CAP) is a scheme to broaden the mandate of security forces deployed in LWE-affected States. Under this scheme financial grants are sanctioned to Central Armed Police Forces (like CRPF and BSF) to undertake civic action in the affected states. The program is intended to win support among locals in Naxal-affected areas and improve perception of security forces.\textsuperscript{44} Funds are provided for the Central Armed Police Forces (including central paramilitary forces and border security forces, among other wings) to conduct welfare activities in their deployment areas. Through the end of 2015, about $15 million had been made available.\textsuperscript{45} The Ministry of Home Affairs set broad guidelines for implementation by the states. They which include directions to establish youth training centers to improve academic


performance, establish libraries, provide hand pumps and other low cost water supply facilities, establish recreation clubs with televisions, distributing sports items, sewing machines, and musical instruments, and more.\(^{46}\) On the whole, the initiatives are small-scale and community-oriented, focusing especially on resources and recreation for young people and do not involve any major construction.

In August 2013, the initiative shifted focus from project-centered to individual and family-centered. Rather than funding neighborhood projects, the Home Ministry has asked central paramilitary forces to adopt an individual-oriented approach.\(^{47}\) This could take the form of donating seeds and manure or helping to set up a hand-pump. The change in approach is expected to reduce animosity between locals and security forces.

**Integrated Action Plan/Additional Central Assistance**

- Date: 2010 to present
- Key Actor(s): Central Government
- Type of Event: Development program
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

The Integrated Action Plan is an initiative developed by the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division of the central Ministry of Home Affairs. The scheme was meant to accelerate development in 60 Tribal and Backward districts by providing public infrastructure and services. Beginning in financial year 2010-11, each district received approximately $3.75 million, increasing to $4.5 million the following year. This supported the construction of projects like rural roads, community and health centers, schools, toilets, and more.\(^{48}\) The Integrated Action Plan was renamed the Additional Central Assistance (ACA), and in 2015 covered 76 Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected districts in 10 states.\(^{49}\)

IAP does not only cover districts affected by LWE violence. Of the initial 60 districts covered by the plan, 48 were identified as LWE-affected. The others were included because of their high tribal populations, significant forest cover, or high poverty levels.\(^{50}\) IAP was discontinued in

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2015 after the Modi government came to power. In June, 2017, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced plans to restart the IAP program.\(^{51}\)

### 4 National Maoist Events

#### Merger of MCC and PWG

- **Date:** 21 September 2004  
- **Key Actor(s):** PWG, MCC, Left Wing Extremists  
- **Type of Event:** Consolidation of Naxalite factions  
- **Likely Effect on the Conflict:** Intensification, emergence of a central party to control Naxalite activities in the country with regional, zonal and district level committees

On 21 September 2004, the MCC and PWG combined forces to form the CPI (Maoist) under the leadership of Mupalla Lakshmana Rao alias Comrade Ganapathy as the general Secretary.\(^{52}\) This became the primary Naxalite organization in India, consisting of a Central Committee and state, district and bloc level committees carrying out militant activities in 9 states, often in partnership with local front organizations. Their primary stated objective is overthrowing the Indian government by a people’s war. To that effect, the CPI (Maoist) armed its cadres and started gaining ground in the form of ‘Liberated Zones’ where the state machinery was replaced by an indigenous parallel government. As the situation stands, despite the Naxalites gaining control of large territories and geographical area (like Abhujmadv forest and Saranda forest which falls in the geographical area of three states). The party came up with their own constitution and work plan on this day. After the merger of PWG and MCC, their respective armed wings also merged. The People's Guerrilla Army (PWG) and the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (MCC) combined to form the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army. The PLGA is the primary unit which carried out attacks for CPI (Maoist).

### 5 National Communication Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Center, Andhra Pradesh</th>
<th>Policy Statement</th>
<th>Center government declares the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) to be terrorist organizations under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.(^{53})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 6, 2001</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Center government declares the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) to be terrorist organizations under the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.(^{53})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 28, 2001</td>
<td>Center, Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>State/Center Agreement</td>
<td>The chief secretaries, home secretaries, and police chiefs of these nine states met to discuss Naxalite attacks. The Center encouraged these states to use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Bihar,
Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand,
Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra,
Orissa, Uttar Pradesh,
West Bengal

February 24, 2002
Orissa, Bihar, Jharkand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh
Policy Statement
The Center government has announced plans for development in tribal areas of six states. It has allocated Rs four billion for roads, electrical infrastructure, and school construction.

January 19, 2004
All/Center
Agreement
Following requests from States, the Center has announced that it will no longer charge Naxalite-affected States when Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs) are deployed.

January 5, 2005
All
Policy Statement
The Center announced an increase in paramilitary force recruitment from Naxal-affected areas. The policy is intended to keep unemployed youth from joining Naxal groups.

December 29, 2006
Center
Policy Statement
Center Home Secretary Duggal said that the Center wanted to pursue a policy focused on development to contain Naxalism. He also encouraged Naxal-affected States to create surrender policies similar to the Andhra Pradesh model.

May 26, 2009
Center
Policy Statement
On his first day in office, Center Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced the Center’s strategy for countering Naxalism. He said that the Center intended to prioritize security, carrying out police

July 8, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | Center Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced in a speech to the lower house of Parliament that the government did not believe development work was possible in Naxal-affected areas until they have been cleared by security forces.  

July 16, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | Center Home Minister P. Chidambaram, speaking to the upper house of Parliament, reiterated the Center’s policy to focus on police action. He added that the Center government does not support non-State actors, specifically Salwa Judum.  

September 16, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | Prime Minister Singh addressed the Maoist threat during a police conference. He urged the Center and States to take action to modernize police forces by improving training and access to technology. He also argued that many more police officers were needed.  

September 21, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | The Center government began a new media campaign. Advertisements were placed in national newspapers with names and photos of people killed by Naxal violence.  

October 21, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | Center offered to hold talks with CPI-Maoist conditional on the group ending violence.  

November 12, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | Center Home Minister P. Chidambaram clarified earlier statements on the conditions for talks. CPI-Maoist would not need to surrender its weapons in order to have talks; they would only need to give up violence.  

November 16, 2009  | Center  | Policy Statement  | The Center government announced that it will begin using unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor insurgents.  

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May 19, 2010  Center  The Center reiterated its offer of talks, conditional on CPI-Maoist suspending violence. The Home Minister defined suspending violence as a halt to all attacks for 72 hours.68

June 15, 2011  Orissa, Chhattisgarh  Agreement  The Center government announced plans to increase joint operations with Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The Center Home Minister also clarified that there would be no more operations without the participation of State forces.69

August 2, 2011  Center  Policy Statement  The Center government approved raising Specialized India Reserve Battalions (SIRBs) to execute development projects. SIRBs would have both engineers and security forces.70

April 30, 2012  All Nine  Agreement  The Center government promised to install over 2,000 mobile towers in Naxal-affected states to improve communications between security forces.71

December 4, 2012  Maharashtra, Orissa, Jharkand, Chhattisgarh  Agreement  The Center government has asked four Naxal-affected States to allocate land for new army bases in Naxal ‘liberated zones.’ By the Army’s rules of engagement, units may fire in self-defense only if attacked by Naxals.72

June 1, 2013  Center  Policy Statement  Center Home Minister Shinde encouraged all Naxal-affected States to develop special forces modeled on the Andhra Pradesh Greyhounds.73

June 6, 2013  All  Agreement  The Chief Ministers (CMs) of Naxal-affected States convened a special meeting to discuss Naxalism. All 9 states agree to form a national policy and follow the Andhra Pradesh model. Bihar’s CM argued for prioritizing development while Chhattisgarh CM argued for a security response. The Center agreed to deploy additional forces, focusing on top CPI-Maoist leadership.74

73 News Brief, South Asia Intelligence Review, June 1, 2013, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair
6 ANDHRA PRADESH

6.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Andhra Pradesh has been plagued by Naxalite violence since the Peoples War Group established itself in 1980.⁷⁵ Naxalites are entrenched in the districts of East Godavari, Visakhapatnam, Vijayanagaram and Srikakulam.⁷⁶ At first, the conflict was mainly between landlords and the rural poor, the latter being mobilized by CPI-ML (People’s War) and other Naxalite factions. Mass protests escalated, and quickly evolved into armed struggle against landlords.⁷⁷

Compared to other Maoist-affected states, Andhra Pradesh has found reasonable counterinsurgency successes. By 2009, as Maoists were expanding activity in other states, security forces were gaining control in Andhra Pradesh.⁷⁸ Two key policies have contributed to this relative success. First is the state’s long-standing surrender and rehabilitation policy, instituted in 1997, which has offered a viable path back to the mainstream Maoists.⁷⁹ Second is the state’s specialized counter-insurgency force, known as the Grey hounds, which have specifically carried out anti-Maoist operations since 1989.

As it has been across many states, Naxalite violence has declined in recent years in Andhra Pradesh. In 2015, there were only eight reported casualties from Maoist activity, down from twelve in 2014 and thirteen in 2013.⁸⁰ An on-going challenge to stability is the issue of Bauxite mining, which has been a vehemently opposed by Maoists and tribals in areas in which mining would be carried out. The state government had plans to allow bauxite-mining operations in Visakhapatnam and Vizainagaram Districts, but they were put on hold just two week after been announced in November of 2015 after fierce local opposition.⁸¹ The state government’s future actions surrounding bauxite-mining are a likely source of tension.

6.2 STATE HISTORY
Andhra Pradesh is a coastal state that sits at the bottom of the Red Corridor, a stretch of heavily Maoist-affected land that runs along eastern India. State formation in the post-independence period was complicated by concerns of many parties to preserve linguistic homogeneity. Andhra state, the predecessor to Andhra Pradesh, was created from Telugu-speaking parts of Madras State in 1953, and combined with the Telugu-speaking areas of Hyderabad three years later to form the Andhra Pradesh.

⁷⁵ Bhaskar Sarkar, Tackling the Maoist Insurgency (New Delhi: Atlantic & Distributors, 2012): 12
⁷⁶ Bhaskar Sarkar, Tackling the Maoist Insurgency (New Delhi: Atlantic & Distributors, 2012): 12
⁷⁷ Tanweer Fazal, “‘Peace Talks’ as Strategic Deployment: the State, Maoists and Political Violence in India” Irish Studies in International Affairs 26 (2015): 47
⁷⁸ Tanweer Fazal, “‘Peace Talks’ as Strategic Deployment: the State, Maoists and Political Violence in India” Irish Studies in International Affairs 26 (2015): 47
Naxalism in Andhra Pradesh began initially in the 1960s in northern districts of Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Vizakapattanam, and East and West Godvari districts. Later, it moved to the entire Telangana region, where inequality, low wages, and caste and gender oppression and frustration with local administration made the population receptive to Naxalites’ calls to action. During the National Emergency of 1975-1977, the Naxalite movement suffered significant setbacks as lines of communication were monitored and cut off, and preventive detention was used to detain many Naxalites.

Between 1970 and 2000, there were 16 left-wing extremist groups in Andhra Pradesh, but most active was People’s War Group (PWG). PWG was formed in Andhra Pradesh on 22 April 1980 in Telangana and later merged with MCC to become CPI [Maoist]. In the early 1980s, state politicians employed diplomatic language in efforts to gain electoral support among Naxalites and their sympathizers. The Andhra Pradesh Home Minister publicly described Naxalites as ‘true patriots who had been misunderstood by the ruling classes’. Throughout the 1980s, the People’s War Group (PWG), a Naxalite organization, consolidated power and planted roots in Telangana. In the 1990s, PWG declared its strongholds in North Telangana to be a “Guerilla Zone,” planning to transform the area into a liberated area, free from government interference.

On 2 June 2014, Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated, which created the state of Telangana and satisfied the long-held demands for separation. In its latest incarnation, the argument for bifurcation was on development grounds – that officials of a separate state of Telangana would be more able to promote development more effectively. Some opposed to bifurcation argued that it would lead to escalation of Naxalite activity in Telangana because of troubles of police coordination or bureaucratic failure, troubles in transition and confusion, but there has been no such escalation, and Maoist violence is declining in the region, as it is elsewhere in India.

### 6.3 State Events

#### 1969 Police Occupation and Development Initiatives

- Date: Summer 1969

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- Key Actor(s): Naxalites, Srikakulam District Committee, Andhra Pradesh State Police, Central Reserve Police
- Type of Event: Police occupation, State government development initiatives
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Police repression and occupation prevented Naxalites from openly operating in villages, lead to formation of guerilla squads

In the summer of 1969, after the Srikakulam District Committee directed the local Naxalite party to intensify guerilla attacks, party members attacked landlords in local villages, killing several and burning the property of several others. These mob-like attacks were supported by hundreds of tribals who participated in the ransacking.\(^87\)

In response, the area was declared to be a disturbed area in June 1969, which gave the local police additional powers, including orders to shoot on sight. Central Reserve Police were brought in to undertake combing operations.\(^88\) Additionally, addressing longstanding complaints in the area, the State Government oversaw a number of initiatives including the transfer of hundreds of acres of land from moneylenders to tribals, a tribal cooperative bus service, distribution of subsidized rice, and a promise to prevent harassment by policemen.\(^89\) The land distribution scheme suffered from poor management and corruption. The scheme ultimately benefitted wealthy elites and did little to address tribal land concerns.\(^90\)

These combined activities made it more difficult for Maoists to operate for two reasons. First, the government initiatives were, at least at first, well received by the population and reduced support for Maoists. Second, heavy police presence made it riskier to openly operate in the village. This forced Maoists to stop conducting open raids in the village, shift their base of operation into the forest for cover, and coordinate guerilla activity in the form of smaller squads that were constantly on the move to evade capture. State and central police forces were accused of brutality against unarmed civilians,\(^91\) but these accusations did not re-earn sufficient support for Maoist that would have prevented their shift to the forested mountains.

**Formation of Greyhound Units**

- Date: 1989
- Key Actor(s): Andhra Pradesh Government
- Type of Event: Formation of specialized anti-insurgency police force
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Flexible forces with strong intelligence support, likely reduce Naxal influence

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\(^{90}\) Ajay K. Mehra, “Naxalism in India: Revolution or Terror?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12, no. 2 (2000): 50

Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhounds are hailed by the National Government and other Indian states as a model for effective counterinsurgency operations. The Greyhounds were formed in 1989 as an elite and specialized local anti-insurgency security force. Its members were drawn from other police wings in the state and given rigorous training in jungle combat. Greyhound personnel who serve in Maoist-affected areas are paid 150% of the usual Commando salary. There are two key features of success. First, Greyhounds did not report to or work for District Police, but rather to a special director who oversaw a larger Maoist-affected region, which included multiple districts. This flexible command structure reduced bureaucratic inefficiency, allowing units to respond quickly to evolving situations. Second, the units had strong intelligence support, especially as cell phones became widespread and Maoists could be tracked more precisely using cell phone towers.

Greyhound units have been criticized on human rights grounds for indiscriminate killing and lack of oversight. A Human Rights Forum report alleges that the “force has been given an explicitly extra-Constitutional task and operates without legislative oversight and scrutiny.” The same report states that the “Greyhounds make no effort to apprehend suspects, their brief is very clearly to assault and kill.” Additionally the effectiveness of the Greyhounds has been called into question as Maoists may have merely been chased out of Andhra Pradesh and pushed over state borders.

**Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy**

- Date: 1997 to present
- Key Actor(s): Andhra Pradesh State Government, Central Government, Naxalites
- Type of Event: Surrender scheme
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

Andhra Pradesh, having had an active Naxalite presence since the 1980s, has long had a surrender policy through which Naxalites can turn themselves into state police and receive a cash reward. An unofficial policy has been in place since at least 1990, when 80 Naxalites surrendered, but a formal one was instituted in 1997. Ten years later, that number had risen to 763. While the details of original policy are unclear, the government has periodically updated

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94 The Terrible Cost of an Inhuman Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights Forum No. 28 (Hyderabad: Nayya Printers, 2013): 48
95 The Terrible Cost of an Inhuman Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights Forum No. 28 (Hyderabad: Nayya Printers, 2013): 47-48
the scheme. In 1999, the government announced that Naxalites could now surrender to civilian authorities as well as to the police in response to reports that Naxalites were wary of surrendering to police. In the early 2000s, surrendering Naxalites received Rs 5000 (about $75) to cover immediate expenses and were eligible to receive $7,500 to help transition to a new career. In 2009, Naxalites who surrendered were promised Rs 50,000 (about $750) and land for farming.

Between the start of the policy and 2009, over 7,000 Naxalites surrendered and 2,500 have been rehabilitated. While many have hailed Andhra Pradesh’s surrender policy as a success, some seek to temper the praise by pointing out that not all those who have turned themselves were previously active in that state. There are reports that because Andhra Pradesh’s surrender and rehabilitation policy is more attractive than neighboring Chhattisgarh’s, Maoists are drawn across the state border to turn themselves in to Andhra Pradesh police and take advantage of a more generous rehabilitation program.

The Centre provides funds to states for their individual surrender policies through the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, through which it reimburses Maoist-affected states for expenditure incurred through grants for surrendered Maoist cadres. The Centre has also made efforts to standardize surrender policies across states.

Merger of MCC and PWG

- Date: 21 September 2004
- Key Actor(s): PWG, MCC, Left Wing Extremists
- Type of Event: Consolidation of Naxalite factions
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification, emergence of a central party to control Naxalite activities in the country with regional, zonal and district level committees

As it did in many other states, the merger signaled a surge of Maoist activity in Andhra Pradesh. The merger was particularly significant in the psyche of Maoists in the state as CPI-Maoist Central Committee has very heavy representation from Andhra Pradesh.

Election of New Congress Government and Attempted Peace Talks

- **Date:** May 14 2004 – January 16, 2005  
- **Key Actor(s):** Andhra Pradesh State Government, Maoist (CPI-ML), CCC  
- **Type of Event:** Political Change and attempted peace talks  
- **Likely Effect on the Conflict:** Escalation – failed peace talks led to resurgence of violence, and belief on both sides that peaceful negotiations were, at least in the short-term, futile

The Congress-led government came to power in May of 2004, promising to address engage in talks with Naxalites. Shortly after being elected the Congress Government lifted the ban on the Peoples War Group and its front organizations on 22 July 2004.\(^{105}\)

Many also credit the years-long efforts by a Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) made up of academics, lawyers, journalists, and activists, with putting peace talks on the public agenda.\(^{106}\)

The peace process was initiated in the summer of 2004, and by the end of July, a draft of the terms of ceasefire was being discussed. A key issue of contention was the laying down of the arms. The government wanted Naxalites to renounce weapons during public meetings and other appearances, but Naxalites refused to do, arguing that it would expose cadres to violence, leaving them unarmed against local criminals and private militiamen working for landlords.\(^{107}\) The result was an informal and poorly observed ceasefire, on all sides.\(^{108}\)

Just before the second round of talks, PWG announced the merger with MCC to become the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which some government officials took as a sign the CPI (Maoist) was not earnestly interested in peace negotiations. The talks between the new CPI Maoist and the state government were held between 15 and 18 October 2004.\(^{109}\) Naxalite demands included land reform—redistribution of ceiling surplus—as well as the release of jailed Naxalite cadres. The state government agreed to consider commission to look into land reform proposals.\(^{110}\) Peace talks were adjourned, to be resumed in January.

Naxalites pulled out of peace talks on January 17, 2005. A statement by CPI (Maoist) State Secretary Ramakrishna and CPI (ML) Janashakti State Secretary Amar pointed to the “repression let loose by the state police,” citing specific operations that had killed Naxalites in recent days in violation of the ceasefire.\(^{111}\)\(^{112}\) Of those incidents, the Superintendent of Police claimed police

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fired in self-defense after delivering clear warnings to Naxalites not to fire, which were ignored.\textsuperscript{113} Naxalites who were at the negotiating table had apparently asked smaller Naxalite groups to abide by the ceasefire, though they had not been involved in the peace process.\textsuperscript{114} Greyhound forces carried on combing operations, allegedly killing Naxalites between the summer and fall.\textsuperscript{115}

The failed peace talks led to resurgence of violence and augmented the belief on both sides that peaceful negotiations were, at least in the short-term, futile.

**Implementation of Integrated Action Plan in Andhra Pradesh**

- Date: 2010 to present
- Key Actor(s): Central Government, Andhra Pradesh State Government
- Type of Event: Development program
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

The central government awards block grants to affected districts, and state execution of projects varies drastically, with some states heavily under-utilizing and mismanaging funds. Of all the states that received IAP funds, Andhra Pradesh performed second, utilizing over 77% of funds from the Centre.\textsuperscript{116} The reasonably efficient execution of targeted, people-centered development initiatives has been well received.

In January of 2016, the Union Home Ministry allotted an additional INR 10 billion (or about $150 million)\textsuperscript{117} to the 35 worst Left Wing Extremism-hit districts in seven states, including one in Andhra Pradesh, and one in Telangana.

### 6.4 Communication Events

| January 19, 2005 | Agreement | Center Home Minister Shivraj Patel encouraged Andhra Pradesh to hold talks with the Naxals, but acknowledged that the local government has the best assessment of the situation. He went on to say the Center government should not be making decisions for |


Andhra Pradesh announced an updated surrender policy for CPI-Maoist cadres. The State will offer rewards ranging from INR .1 million (~$2,000) to INR 2.5 million (~$50,000) depending on the rank of the cadre. These amounts are the highest of any Naxal-affected state. The reward can also be given to security forces and informants if Naxals are killed during operations.\textsuperscript{119}

Executive Summary

After the original Naxalbari uprisings in West Bengal were suppressed by West Bengal government forces in the 1970s, the Naxalite movement spread to neighboring Bihar. The movement lost strength during the national emergency of 1975-77 when many local leaders were killed or detained. After the emergency was lifted, mass peasant organizations resurfaced in Central Bihar, executing actions from strikes and protests to killing landlords in the name of Naxalism. The movement had spread to 26 out of 28 districts by the middle of the 1980s.

The rigidity of caste identity in Bihar influences the choreography of Naxalite activity in two key ways. First, as in other states, the strength of caste hierarchies and associated grievances helped mobilize lower-caste farmers to support Naxalite activity. Second, strong caste identities mobilized private armies among upper castes as early as the 1980s to provide for the security of fellow caste members and safeguard their land. These private armies also engaged in mass killing of peasants who supported Naxalites, escalating tensions.

After the merger of PWG and MCC in 2004, Naxalite violence resurfaced in many states along the Red Corridor, making national headlines. The national government accelerated counterinsurgency operations. This involved sending additional central paramilitary forces (in a surge-like tactic) to Maoist-affected areas. Other initiatives were development-focused, requiring operationalization at the state level. The military operations of the late 2000s fostered resentment in areas where security forces attempting to clear villages of Maoists imposed costs on civilians. To compensate, the Ministry of Home Affairs increased funding for development projects in the same period, and directed states to shift their focus from projects to individuals and families in terms of civic action programs. Casualties from Naxalite violence in Bihar, which peaked in the mid 2000s, have been declining steadily since 2010, with the exception of 2013.

State History

Bihar was established as a province, along with present-day Orissa in 1912—Orissa separated in 1936. Bihar borders West Bengal to the East, Uttar Pradesh to the West, and Jharkhand to the South, making up part of what is known as the Red Corridor, a region in Eastern India heavily affected by Maoist activity. North Bihar is one of the most flood-prone regions in the world, which poses challenges and imposes enormous costs in the form of destroyed crops, submerged habitations, and frequent distress migration. Bihar is often described as the most backward

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state according to a variety of Human Development indicators. Bihar’s economy is rooted heavily in agriculture, which engages more than 80 per cent of the population.

Bihar has a long history of peasant uprisings. Through the 1930s and 40s, a mass peasant movement called Kisan Sabha mobilized to attack unjust land tenure practices, along with the British Government and Indian National Congress for not responding to peasant demands. Most Naxalite activity in Bihar is concentrated in central Bihar. Though central Bihar is more socio-economically developed than much of the rest of state, the unrest in this region can be explained in part by the rapid modernization and subsequent increase in productivity that sharpened polarization between classes and quickly radicalized peasants in the area in the 1960s and 70s.

In the early 1970s, Naxalite activities in Central Bihar were dominated by three Maoist groups—the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)—Liberation Group, The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist). Of the three, the MCC was the most extremist and violent wing. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s declaration of a National Emergency suspended democracy and authorized anti-Naxalite operations. During this period, police operations – most notably ‘Operation Thunder’ – succeeded in capturing and killing many prominent Naxalite leaders, dealing a blow to the movement as various groups simultaneously struggled with internal fighting.

After the National Emergency was lifted in 1977, the CPI(ML)-Liberation emerged as the main organization representing the Naxalites. Unlike MCC, CPI(ML)-Liberation focused aggressively on political organizing tactics. They sought to expand and electrify the mass peasant electorate through protests, rallies, strikes, and public meetings, while repudiating tactics like assassinations. They also engaged with parliamentary politics, joining with a several other mass organizations (including the All India Students Association (AISA)) under the umbrella of the Indian People’s Front (IPF) to secure a seat in the Indian Parliament in 1984. The CPI (ML)-Liberation also made electoral gains in the state assembly, and through the 1980s and 1990s, succeeded in securing an increase in agricultural wages, drawing attention to the sexual exploitation of low-caste women, and redistributing land to peasants in many villages.

Meanwhile, throughout the late 80s and 90s, the MCC rejected electoral politics and continued to carry out a number of massacres against upper caste members, including the Dalelchak-Baghaura

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massacre in 1987 which killed 42 people, the Bara massacre of 1992 in which 36 upper caste Bhumihar were killed, and the Senari massacre of 1999 which killed 35. In the same period, private armies (known as ‘senas’) emerged along caste lines to provide for their own security. Most of these emerged in the 1980s and declined in the early 1990s due to internal weakness, but the most powerful of these was the Ranvir Sena, which emerged in 1994 in the Bhojpur district and was dominated by upper caste Bhumihar. They carried out a series of deadly massacres from May 1995 to June 2000, exacerbating class and caste tension.

7.3 **State Events**

**Operations Siddharth and Rakshk**

- Date: 1988-9
- Key Actor(s): Central Government and Bihar Government
- Type of Event: Counterinsurgency Effort (socio-economic & military)
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Escalates tension by breeding resentment from police repression and increasing frustration in the wake of corrupt social programs

Operations Siddharth and Rakshk were launched jointly by the central and Bihar state governments to address Naxalite violence from 1988-89. The operations were meant to work in tandem by boosting development to address grievances as well as by driving out Naxalites with military force.

As part of Operation Rakshk, 4,500 paramilitary forces from the Border Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force, and the Bihar Military Police were deployed in the Jehanabad district. These forces were accommodated in schools, hospitals, and health centers at great inconvenience to local people. There were also reports of local police forces perpetrating violence against landless laborers and poor peasants. As such, the police presence generated resentment among locals. Operation Siddharth aimed to implement land reform and enforce minimum wages, but the reforms were riddled with corruption and delays, which also angered intended beneficiaries.

**Division of Bihar, Formation of Jharkand**

- Date: 15 November 2000
- Key Actor(s): Central Government, Bihar State Government, Jharkhand State Government

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Type of Event: Reorganization of State
Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification, consolidation of forces

On 15 November 2000, the state of Jharkhand was created under the Bihar Reorganization Act. Earlier that month, Chhattisgarh had been carved out from Madhya Pradesh, and Uttarakhand (now Uttarakhand) from Uttar Pradesh. The central government’s rationale was that dividing larger states into smaller administrative units would allow for more efficient governance and promote effective development. The movement for a separate state of Jharkhand had been brewing among tribal adivasis since the 1930s, and in the 1990s, representatives from the movement secured concessions from the state government in the form of the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC), which granted limited powers in development decision-making.

Made up of the southern portions of Bihar, the new state of Jharkhand contained the areas with rich natural and mineral resources and modest industrial infrastructure, while Bihar retained fertile areas with many rivers and heavy annual flooding. There is disagreement as to which state the bifurcation favored, as well as over the extent to which the separation promoted development in each state. Both states continue to face significant obstacles to development.

The bifurcation intensified the Naxalite conflict for two main reasons. First, the division was meant to bring streamlined administrative processes that could better promote development. The lack of immediately clear improvement exacerbated frustration with ineffective state government. Secondly, the new state of Jharkhand brought a new theatre of violence for the conflict as those tribals who had been previously mobilized by the secessionist aims were able to refocus their attention on Naxalite grievances, which fueled and sustained solidarity with Naxalite activity in neighboring Bihar.

Surrender Policy

- Date: November 23, 2001
- Key Actor(s): Bihar State Government
- Type of Event: Surrender scheme
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

Bihar’s surrender policy provided 10,000 rupees upon surrender and an additional 3,000 rupees per month after that. Under this policy, the surrender rate in Bihar was low compared to other Naxal-affected states. Officials blamed the slow release of funds and poor awareness of the

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Additionally, some surrendered Maoists claimed that they did not receive promised compensation. By 2009, the policy had been increased to provide a grant of 200,000 rupees with additional compensation available for surrendering weapons. The policy also promised free education for the children of surrendered Naxals. Bihar’s government announced plans to revise the policy in 2009 so that it would include rehabilitation programs, but these changes were not implemented until the 2013 amendments.

Aapki Sarkar Appke Dwar Program

- Date: 2006
- Key Actor(s): Bihar State Government
- Type of Event: Development initiative
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

This program began as a pilot initiative in Sikaria village in 2006. It has since been extended to 65 panchayats in eight Bihar districts. In 2009, the Center government declared the program to be so successful that it encouraged eight other states to implement similar programs.

Aapki Sarkar Appke Dwar, “Your Government at Your Doorstep,” aims to target Naxal-affected panchayats with significant development investment. The program builds roads, schools, post offices, computer centers and health clinics.

Surrender Policy Amended

- Date: December 3, 2013
- Key Actor(s): Bihar State Government
- Type of Event: Surrender scheme
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

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Bihar’s original surrender policy was ineffective because the incentives were too low and the policy did not guarantee that Naxals would not be prosecuted. As a result, very few cadres surrendered under the program.\(^{149}\)

Bihar State government amended the State’s surrender policy on December 3, 2013. Under the new policy, Naxals that surrender are eligible to receive 250,000 rupees (~$4,000), with additional compensation available for those surrendering with weapons. The money is kept in a bank and surrendered Naxals may claim it three years after their surrender.\(^{150}\) Until that time, they are eligible for a one-time payment of 10,000 rupees and a monthly benefit of 4,000 rupees. Manu Maharaaj, the senior superintendent of police in Patna, Bihar, said that the slow speed at which money is disbursed and general unawareness of the program have contributed to the low number of surrenders.\(^{151}\) The State government authorized additional funding in 2015 to address the low surrender rate.\(^{152}\)

**Operation Green Hunt**

- Date: July 2009-present
- Key Actor(s): Maoists, National Gov, State governments of Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra,
- Type of Event: Counterinsurgency operations
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Increased military presence and establishes state authority in Maoist-controlled areas, occupying forces also exacerbate resentment

While military operations may have reduced Naxalite forces by clearing and holding territory, the occupying forces have also imposed costs on civilians. Locals in Bihar have long-complained of security forces disrupting daily life. While Maoists have been known to attack school buildings, security forces have occupied and destroyed school buildings, fostering resentment. Police forces often move to occupy schools after attacks by Maoists on police stations make those buildings unusable, and security forces frequently use school buildings for temporary shelter when conducting combing operations against Maoists in remote areas.\(^{153}\) A 2009 Human Rights Watch reported on the impact of the Maoist conflict on schools in Bihar and Jharkhand.

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Maoists claim only to target schools that have been emptied of students occupied by security forces, which is how they justify their attacks on schools, but Human Rights Watch’s research undermines that claim. The report suggested that Naxalites were “attacking government schools because they were the only government building in the remote rural areas.” Both of these activities disrupt children’s education, regularly leading children to drop out or attend less regularly.

**Integrated Action Plan/Additional Central Assistance (Bihar version)**

- Date: 2010 to present
- Key Actor(s): Central Government, Bihar State Government
- Type of Event: Development program
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Moderate impact due to poor implementation in Bihar, but established avenue for success in future

The Integrated Action Plan was renamed the Additional Central Assistance (ACA), and in 2015 covered 11 districts in Bihar. While funded by the center, execution is at the district committee level, giving committee the flexibility to draw up concrete proposals, with the Planning Commission at the center monitoring progress. The success of the program has varied between states, with some reported irregularities and corruption—often in the form of diverted funds. Bihar’s implementation has been particularly poor, with the state government underutilizing the funds made available by the Centre, and struggling to complete projects on time or at all. In 2012, Bihar used only 61% of available funds. In that year, West Champaran and Munger Districts completed 0 and 25% of their projects, respectively.

### 7.4 Maoist Events

**Merger of MCC and PWG in Bihar**

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- Date: 21 September 2004
- Key Actor(s): PWG, MCC, Left Wing Extremists
- Type of Event: Consolidation of Naxalite factions
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification, emergence of a central party to control Naxalite activities in the country with regional, zonal and district level committees

In Bihar, as in many other states, Maoist violence surged following the merger. Bihar in particular had a number of competing Naxal organizations throughout the late 20th century. As a result, the consolidation of parties and resulting coordination of attacks was particularly impactful.

### 7.5 Communication Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 2001</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Following an official request from the Government of Nepal, the Union Home Ministry expressed its concern to the Bihar State Government over its lack of action dealing with PWG insurgents.¹⁶⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 2009</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Bihar announced that it will expand policing and establish an Anti-Terrorist Squad. This expansion includes increasing the Auxiliary Police force, establishing a new police training center, and establishing model police stations.¹⁶¹  The Anti-Terrorist Squad became operational in 2013.¹⁶²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 22, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Bihar State Government requested that four additional districts, Lakhisarai, Munger, Buxar, and Sheikhpura, be covered under the Security-Related Expenditure program. The Center government only agreed to cover Munger district.¹⁶³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 14, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Bihar’s Chief Minister Nitish Kumar criticized the Center Government’s security policy, saying that policing should only be a part of the government’s response to Naxalism. He argued that the State and Center should work together to “saturate the Naxal-prone areas with development.”¹⁶⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16, 2011</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Bihar is increasing funding for anti-Naxal operations, allocating INR 810 million to buy armored vehicles and troop-carriers. Center Home Secretary R.K. Singh visited Bihar and reported that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bihar is the only state where Naxalism is diminishing.\textsuperscript{165}

March 6, 2013 Disagreement The Center government criticizes Bihar for not contributing enough to fighting Naxalism. The Home Ministry wrote to Bihar’s Chief Secretary complaining that Naxal-affiliated organizations have been allowed to operate freely and the efforts of anti-Naxal Special Forces are not noticeable in Bihar.\textsuperscript{166}

November 19, 2013 Disagreement The Center Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) issued a report accusing Bihar’s government of being ‘soft’ on Maoists. The report contends that Bihar’s counterinsurgency efforts have declined, leading to a rapid increase in killings by Maoists (as compared to the previous year).\textsuperscript{167}

December 12, 2013 Disagreement Center Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde said that there has been a complete breakdown of cooperation between Bihar and Center forces. In a letter to Bihar’s Chief Minister, Shinde advised the CM to look at other states counterinsurgency structures and learn from them.\textsuperscript{168}

December 13, 2013 Disagreement Members of Bihar’s ruling party disrupted both houses of parliament demanding that Home Minister Shinde apologize for the “insulting” letter that he wrote to Bihar’s Chief Minister.\textsuperscript{169} Shinde issued a statement defending his letter.\textsuperscript{170}

December 17, 2013 Disagreement Bihar’s Chief Minister disputed Home Minister Shinde’s claim that Bihar is not doing enough to counter Maoists, saying that Shinde is not objective.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{166} News Brief, \textit{South Asia Intelligence Review}, March 6, 2013, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair
\textsuperscript{171} News Brief, \textit{South Asia Intelligence Review}, December 17, 2013, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair
8 CHHATTISGARH

8.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Chhattisgarh separated from Madhya Pradesh in 2000. The new state struggled to deal with Naxal activity. This struggle was compounded by the instability of the first chief minister’s government and the spillover of fighters from Andhya Pradesh. Following the 2004 merger of the PWG and MCC, Naxal activity surged in Chhattisgarh. In particular, the Dandakaranya region became an important command center for Naxals. The State response has been characterized by strong use of force. Beginning in 2008, the State armed the tribal Salwa Judum movement and accorded its members the status of Special Police Officers. The Indian Supreme Court ruled in 2011 that it is unconstitutional to arm civilians, particularly youth, in place of providing security. The State of Chhattisgarh disputes that ruling and is seeking to reinstate Salwa Judum. Chhattisgarh was also the site of the first Operation Green Hunt action in 2009, which led to the deaths of over 100 Naxals. Both Salwa Judum and Operation Green Hunt have contributed to anti-government sentiment in the region.

8.2 STATE HISTORY
Chhattisgarh was formed by the enactment of Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 on 1 November 2000. The demand for a new Chhattisgarhi speaking state had first come up in 1920’s, then put up before the State Reorganisation Committee in 1954 but rejected. It wasn’t until the 1990’s that an organised political movement was initiated to strongly demand for the separation of the Chhattisgarhi speaking districts from the state of Madhya Pradesh. This demand was led by a group called Chhattisgarh Rajya Nirman Manch under the leadership of Chandulala Chadrakar, a tribal leader. This group initiated a number of state-wide protests demanding for a separate state and in 2000, with Atal Behari Vajpayee the Prime Minister of India leading the National Democratic Alliance, this demand was accepted a Chhattisgarh was carved out of Madhya Pradesh.

At present, Chhattisgarh has 27 districts and predominantly covered under the Schedule V of the Indian Constitution which gives special rights to regions with high tribal concentration. The present Chief Minister of the state, Dr. Raman Singh from the Bhartiya Janata Party, won his third term in 2013, which runs through 2018. His tenure since 2003 has allowed for political stability in the state and continuity in counterinsurgency measures. Since the formation of the

173 Provision as to the Administration and Control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, The Constitution of India, http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg_Rom8Fssss(33).pdf
Chhattisgarh has been considered one of the worst Left-Wing Extremism affected states, with the highest number of casualties (security forces, insurgents and civilians combined) since 2005. However, according to various reports, the state is also the top performer in terms of implementation of the critical Public Distribution System (PDS) which has allowed for hunger to be almost eradicated from the state. According to Chhattisgarh State Public Relations Department’s official website, in terms of primary and secondary education also, the state’s performance has been relatively better than many other states and it has a positive sex ratio in favour of females. Chhattisgarh accounts for 38 per cent of the country’s steel production and second in the country in terms of mineral revenues with 16 per cent of the country’s total mineral production. The state also is the biggest supplier of structural steel in the country and has the country’s largest bauxite and aluminium plants. According to the state government, it is a “zero power cut state”.

However, despite all these positive developments, Chhattisgarh has lagged behind a number of indicators and has a high intensity of Naxal violence. It is one of the poorest ranking states in the Human Development Index, standard of living index and health, sanitation and hygiene indices. The penetration of telecommunications in the state is one of the poorest in terms of road density (road per 100 km), it fares lower than the national average.

When it comes to Left Wing Extremism, the state has recorded a decline in casualties since a peak from 2006 to 2010. As of 2016, however, the annual death toll remained the highest in the country. India’s LWE problem is not uniform in nature and scope in all the states. Naxals established a presence in rural and tribal areas districts of Surguja and Bastar in the early 1980s. These areas have some of the lowest rates of education and health care access in India as well as few government facilities. Additionally, villagers in scheduled areas allege that corporations and government forces have threatened and intimidated them into giving up land for mining and industrial purposes. Naxal forces have addressed some of these concerns by dealing with land disputes and organizing schools and clinics. The Naxals’ attention to local concerns have contributed to their support in these areas. This support has waned in the face of

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increasingly strict Naxal practices, particularly executions of suspected informers and extortion.\(^{183}\)

Moreover, credible access to justice and gaps between allocation and delivery and implementation mechanisms of welfare schemes and development initiatives has added to this ferment. A Center report on the Panchayati Extension to Schedule Areas Act, 1996 (Local Self Governance) found that the act had done little to preserve tribal lands in Chhattisgarh.\(^{184}\) Rampant mining activity in Schedule areas and indiscriminate sale of land to corporate in Schedule V areas without due consent of the people’s local representatives has caused mass resentment against the government.

8.3 **State Events**

**Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and spillover effect**

- Date: 1989 to present
- Key Actor(s): Andhra Pradesh Greyhounds
- Type of Event: Naxal Displacement
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Increases conflict in Chhattisgarh

Greyhounds are an elite police force with specialized jungle warfare training which was inducted by the Andhra Pradesh state government in 1989.\(^{185}\) The members of this elite force are handpicked from the state police and are made to undergo rigorous training in special operations, armed and unarmed combat and jungle warfare. They are paid substantially higher than regular police officers and function mainly in Andhra Pradesh, and on request, in other LWE-affected states. The primary function for the Greyhounds force was to conduct targeted strikes at the top Naxal leaders, thus, creating space for the state authorities to push for development initiatives and clear that area of LWE before the insurgents have a chance to regroup and find a new leader. It worked phenomenally well for Andhra Pradesh which has even now, managed to keep Naxalism in check. However, for other neighbouring states, especially those which were on the other side of the Dandakaranya, the spillover effect from escaping Naxals was intense. Chhattisgarh bore the major brunt of this spillover effect. Most of the Naxal leaders and cadres, who escaped action by the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh, crossed the state border into Bastar and set up bases there. This is one reason that most of the top-rung leaders of CPI (Maoist) at national as well as state level are from Andhra Pradesh. This spillover effect is what caused LWE to spread fast and deep into Chhattisgarh in a small frame of time.


On 1 April 2013, the national government announced that it was setting up a national level Greyhounds-like force under the Special Infrastructure Scheme of the Ministry of Home Affairs and sanctioned Rs 208 crore for its establishment.

**Formation of state:**

- **Date:** November 1, 2000  
  - **Key Actor(s):** Chhattisgarh State government, Madhya Pradesh State government  
  - **Type of Event:** State Creation  
  - **Likely Effect on the Conflict:** Increases conflict due to low capacity of new government

Chhattisgarh was created on 1 November 2000 as a result of a decades old demand of separation of the Chhattisgarhi-speaking belt. However, many experts believe that the demand for separation from Madhya Pradesh intensified in the 90's due to intensification in Naxalism-related activities in the tribal belt of the state which now comprises the state of Chhattisgarh. With the creation of Chhattisgarh, the Naxal-affected areas were carved away from Madhya Pradesh and a new political leadership in the nascent stages of the state’s formation were unable to control the expansion of insurgent activities in the state. The new state incorporated many poor areas, which created additional challenges for the new government.

With a substantially high forest cover (Abhujmadh forest) which transcends state boundaries and is spread over three states (Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh) the Naxalites had a safe haven and easy transit across state boundaries. After Jangal Mahal in West Bengal was taken down, this was the perfect alternative for hideouts and planning as the accessibility in the thick forested areas is next to nil for the government agencies.

Since the extremists are known to take up localised issues to mobilise dissent against the state machinery, they found high success in finding foot soldiers of the movement. Before the state could find its footing and establish a credible leadership, the Naxals had already established their supremacy, especially in the mineral-rich, tribal Bastar division in the south of the state.

The new state was created to pay focused attention to the neglected tribal regions which had a large forest cover and high mineral resources. However, “green pastures” were created within the state with attention only to urban areas and developing corporate resources for mining and other industrial activities, leaving the tribals out in the cold yet again.

The first chief minister of Chhattisgarh, Ajit Jogi from Indian National Congress spent a tumultuous tenure of three years marred with scandals and allegations of corruption. This was enough time to throw the state in throes of a violent conflict.

**Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy**

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186 Personal interviews with current and former government officials and local political leaders during a field visit to Chhattisgarh in 2013.
Chhattisgarh’s surrender policy was first sanctioned in 2004. At that time it required surrendered Naxals to participate in anti-insurgency efforts. For many surrendered Naxals, this meant taking part in anti-Naxal operations alongside security forces.\(^{187}\) As of 2014, surrendered Naxals are entitled to a monthly stipend of 4,000 rupees for three years, a 250,000 rupee grant, and an additional cash award depending on their rank. According to a 2014 report, none of the Naxals that surrendered in that year received their benefits.\(^{188}\)

Chhattisgarh has consistently had high levels of surrenders. In 2016, 961 Naxals surrendered in Chhattisgarh.\(^{189}\) Villagers contend that many of these surrenders are ordinary people that have been coerced into surrendering for propaganda purposes.\(^{190}\)

**Formation of Salwa Judum**

- Date: 2005
- Key Actor(s): Salwa Judum, Chhattisgarh State Government
- Type of Event: Arming of Non-State Actors
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification due to new violent actors

Salwa Judum formed in 2005 in Dantewada District in the Bastar division. There is no consensus on what led to its formation, but one story holds that the Naxals had been enforcing a boycott of a local forest product. Local tribal people did not support the boycott and fled to relief camps to avoid Naxalite reprisals.\(^{191}\) The State government enlisted tribal youth in counter-insurgency operations, eventually making them Special Police Officers and Koya commandos. They were provided with very little education and training to perform these duties.\(^{192}\)

Salwa Judum’s peak era of activity was between 2005 and 2010. They operated as a militia in Chhattisgarh, especially in Bastar division. There were several cases of extortion, smuggling,

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\(^{187}\) Aritra Bhattacharya, “There is no War in Bastar, Only Battles,” *The Caravan*, August 22, 2016


murder and criminal intimidation against them, but no action was taken against them. There were reports where it was revealed that during and after Operation Green Hunt, the Salwa Judum cadres would sometimes turn their guns on the very security forces they were intended to support.\textsuperscript{193} The National Human Rights Commission in several of its reports had noted gross human rights violations by members of the outfit.

\textbf{Implementation of Forest Rights Act}

- Date: 2005 – present (2017)
- Key Actor(s): Center Government, Chhattisgarh State Government
- Type of Event: Development
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Increases support for Naxalites

The 2006 \textit{Forest Rights Act} recognizes the historic rights of forest dwellers over forest resources. Implementation of the act has been hampered by poor awareness of its provisions throughout India. This is especially a problem in the large interior forest areas of Chhattisgarh.\textsuperscript{194} A 2012 study found that some Chhattisgarh forest dwellers believed that local leaders had intentionally not told them about the Act for political purposes.\textsuperscript{195} Although activists allege that Chhattisgarh has been slow to settle claims, their 42% settlement rate is in line with the national average, which is about 40%.\textsuperscript{196}

In 2016, Chhattisgarh became the first State to revoke land rights that had previously been granted under the Forest Rights Act. This was done to facilitate coal mining.\textsuperscript{197}

\textbf{Suspension of Salwa Judum and Special Police Officers:}

- Date: 2006
- Key Actor(s): Salwa Judum, Chhattisgarh State Government
- Type of Event: Dispute over Arming Non-State Actors
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Disruption of cooperation between Center and State

On April 11, 2006, the state government had itself suspended the Salwa Judum which had initially started as People’s Resistance Movement, a largely peaceful movement, under the leadership of Mahendra Karma. However, in 2008, when Karma declared that Salwa Judum

\begin{footnotes}
\item[193] Based on reports and fact sheets accessed during field visit to Bastar in 2013.
\end{footnotes}
would cease to exist, the state government took it under its ambit and armed the Salwa Judum cadres. It also inducted several Special Police Officers called Koya Commandos who were already part of the state’s counterinsurgency strategy with the Salwa Judum cadres as force multipliers in the state’s plan.

The Indian Supreme Court declared Salwa Judum and other SPOs unconstitutional on July 5, 2011. The ruling criticized Chhattisgarh for “claim[ing] that it has a constitutional sanction to perpetrate, indefinitely, a regime of gross violation of human rights in a manner, and by adopting the same modes, as done by Maoist/Naxalite extremists.” The ruling focused on the age, lack of education, and lack of training that most Salwa Judum recruits possessed.

The State argued that the SPOs were only engaged in non-combatant roles, such as “spotters, guides, intelligence gatherers and for maintenance of local law and order.” The Supreme Court, however, found that the SPOs had been given firearms “as full fledged members of the police force, and are expected to perform the duties, bear the liabilities, and … [put] their lives on the line” as regular security forces.

The Supreme Court order required that the State of Chhattisgarh immediately stop using SPOs for counterinsurgency, retrieve all firearms issued to SPOs, and make provisions for the safety of former SPOs. It also required that the Center government end funding for SPO recruitment or support.

After the group was declared to be unconstitutional, its members became a prime target of the Naxals, regularly being killed in concerted strike operations. They are now housed in fortified camps to ensure their protection in different parts of Chhattisgarh. Some members who feared reprisal attacks joined the Naxal ranks. The state government in Chhattisgarh is still contesting the Supreme Court decision and is hoping to reinstate Salwa Judum and Koya Commandos in full capacity.

**Operation Green Hunt in Chhattisgarh**

- Date: July 2009 to mid-2010
- Key Actor(s): Center Government, Chhattisgarh State Government
- Type of Event: Police surge

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199 Nandini Sundar and Ors. Vs. State of Chattisgarh, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 250 of 2007, Order (Supreme Court of India, 2011): 2

200 Nandini Sundar and Ors. Vs. State of Chattisgarh, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 250 of 2007, Order (Supreme Court of India, 2011): 60

201 Nandini Sundar and Ors. Vs. State of Chattisgarh, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 250 of 2007, Order (Supreme Court of India, 2011): 76

202 Based on reports and fact sheets accessed during field visit to Bastar in 2013.
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Temporary decrease in attacks, long term builds resentment against government

The Ministry of Home Affairs sanctioned a covert operation to “flush out” insurgents from the forested inner-reaches of Abujmahd forest. This operation was jointly carried out from July 2009 (exact date unavailable) by the CRPF and State Police and Cobra Commanders. The Chhattisgarh government termed it as Operation Green Hunt. It was an area domination exercise in which no prisoners were taken. In December 2009, this operation was intensified over a period of four days in which nearly 100 Naxals were reportedly killed. However, the collateral damage of this operation was intense and while the number casualties declined in 2009 and a few months in 2010 (Naxals took this time to regroup and rearm themselves), the reprisal attacks which followed were deadlier than ever and saw a tremendous spike in the number of casualties. The Chhattisgarh government eventually suspended this operation, reportedly sometime in mid-2010. However, the damage was done and the resentment against the government was at an all-time high. The clear-hold-build model failed as this operation only cleared the area, the peace wasn’t held for long and the time that took for the Naxals to recover from the operation was never utilized for building trust and confidence among the locals by the state.

8.4 MAOIST EVENTS

Merger of PWG and MCC:

- Date: 2004
- Key Actor(s): PWG, MCC
- Type of Event: Consolidation of Naxalite factions
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification, emergence of a central party to control Naxalite activities in the country with regional, zonal and district level committees

While the top leadership of the party remained largely the original leaders from Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, the second rung leadership took into consideration local demographics. So, in Chhattisgarh, the biggest tribe being the Gonds, the second rung leadership comprised Gond leaders. This has given them a significant boost in the local hierarchy where smaller tribes like Madhiya and Murias have been reduced to the level of foot soldiers.

This development brought the Abujmahd forest and the Dandakaranya region into focus, with Chhattisgarh becoming the primary command and control centre for all Naxal activity in India. Moreover, there have been several reports by intelligence agencies that the year 2014 will see a resurgence of Naxal activity in a state after a hiatus to celebrate and commemorate the tenth anniversary of LWE in Chhattisgarh. Since 2004, the activities of the movement have increased in scale and size, becoming increasingly brazen year on year. From small crude targeted strikes

to large scale attacks using sophisticated technologies, their MOA is getting increasingly refined. With the stated aim of CPI (Maoist) being overthrowing the present political structure in India, use of excessive force has been their biggest weapon.

**Formation of Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee:**

- Date: 2004
- Key Actor(s): CPI (Maoist)
- Type of Event: Formation of Naxalite headquarters
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Likely to result in increase in Naxal attacks due to safe haven for planning

The mythical Dandakaranya region where Lord Rama apparently spent his time during his 14-year exile is now a fortified command structure for all Naxal activity. After its formation in 2004, Chintalnar in Sukma district (then Dantewada district) was made its headquarters and in years to come, a village called Jagargonda in Dantewada district was completely taken over by the insurgents and closed to civilians as well as security forces. It was in January 2014 that the spokesperson for DSZC Gumudavelli Venkatakrishna Prasad aka Gudsa Usendi surrendered in front of CRPF in Andhra Pradesh and some concrete leads have started emerging towards capturing this fortified structure. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Home Affairs had been credited with an anonymous statement citing that the General Secretary of CPI (Maoist) Ganapathy was spotted in the area coordinating a meeting of cadres to plan attacks on election officials and state ministers.

The state and regional committees under DSZC have formed Dalams (regional units) and run parallel governments in their areas of influence called Janatana Sarkar ordering public executions through a Kangaroo court and capitalising on the lack of credible access to justice. In Chhattigarh, these Dalams have been known to intimidate people into joining them, coercing locals to provide human and logistical support and attacking anybody who are even suspected to be working with the government. There have also been allegations that they use child soldiers and have, in the past, used locals as human shields in operations against the security forces. They have their own military school in the Abujhmad forest in Chhattisgarh state area, some surrendered Naxalites told Chhattisgarh police in 2013.

### 8.5 COMMUNICATION EVENTS

**December Disagreement**  Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh said that the Center should be responsible for dealing with the Naxalites. He argued

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that individual state action was impossible due to difficulties in coordinating between states and lack of resources.\textsuperscript{206}

February 19, 2009, Policy Statement

CPI-Maoist, through the Dandakaranya regional committee spokesman, announced that it was willing to engage in peace talks with Chhattisgarh’s government. Chhattisgarh’s Chief Minister responded that he would consider a proposal for talks.\textsuperscript{207}

July 14, 2007, Disagreement

Center Minister of State for Home said that Chhattisgarh is not doing enough to deal with the Naxal insurgency. Specifically, he said that the State was not properly training police and that lack of training has contributed to deaths of Center Reserve Police Force personnel.\textsuperscript{208}

April 29, 2009, Agreement

The Center Reserve Police Force bought land in Chhattisgarh and Orissa intended for new operational headquarters for the Combat Battalion for Resolution Action (COBRA) force.\textsuperscript{209}

May 11, 2009, Policy Statement

Chhattisgarh Home Minister Nanki Ram Kanwar announced that there would be no negotiations with Naxals until attacks ended. He added that Naxalism is a national issue, so any talks should be held with the Center Government.\textsuperscript{210}

May 21, 2009, Disagreement

The Center Ministry for Home Affairs requested that states affected by Naxals, especially Chhattisgarh, deploy additional forces during joint missions. The request came after complaints from Center forces that state police in Chhattisgarh were often not present during operations.\textsuperscript{211}

July 15, 2010, Policy Statement

At a meeting of Chief Ministers of Naxal-affected states, Chhattisgarh CM Raman Singh called for a national strategy for responding to the Naxal insurgency. He also said that the only possible strategy focused on security.\textsuperscript{212}

January 11, 2011, Policy Statement

Chhattisgarh announced an expansion of the Special Police Officer (SPO) program. 2,400 youths in the Bastar district will be recruited as SPOs. Since they are not part of the regular police

force, their monthly pay is INR 3,000 (~$65).  

July 6, 2011 Disagreement The Supreme Court ruled against Chhattisgarh’s policy of deploying tribal youth as Special Police Officers. This applies to Koya Commandos, Salwa Judum, and all similar forces. The ruling found that arming youth that had not completed their education violated the Constitution. The ruling required that all such forces be immediately disarmed and their weapons recalled.

June 20, 2012 Disagreement The Supreme Court has repeatedly issued orders requiring that security forces leave schools. As of January 2011, the Government of Chhattisgarh was still using schools as camps for security forces despite the orders. Chhattisgarh State announced plans to require its forces to leave schools in September 2012.

May 31, 2013 Agreement Center Government announced plans to move UAV operations to Chhattisgarh. At the same time, the Indian Air Force expanded helicopter operations in the area.

May 31, 2013 Disagreement In the aftermath of a CPI-Maoist attack on a Congress convoy in Bastar that killed 24 people, Chhattisgarh CM Raman Singh criticized the Center’s strategy for combating Naxalism. He argued that the Naxal insurgency was a national problem, but that the Center had failed to coordinate planning, intelligence-gathering, and necessary resources for operations.

August 23, 2013 Disagreement The Supreme Court threatened the Chhattisgarh State Government with contempt proceedings for failing to carry out its orders. The Court noted that the State had not banned Salwa Judum or required security forces to vacate schools.

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Chhattisgarh’s Home Minister reiterated the State’s willingness to begin talks with Naxals. This statement followed reports that the Supreme Court had requested that the State begin talks.²²¹

9 JHARKHAND

9.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Jharkhand state came into existence on 15 November 2000 under the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 when the southern parts of the state of Bihar were separated to form the new state. The date of the formation of the state is significant because it coincides with Birsa Munda’s birthday, who led the tribals of then Bihar against the feudal agrarian practices of the British colonial rulers as a part of India’s independence movement. The demand for a separate state for Jharkhandis was finally met after almost 50 years of struggle which began pre-independence in India and owing to neglect of the tribal belt of Bihar, intensified in the 1980’s.

Bihar’s tribal areas, which form most of Jharkhand, were significantly affected by Left Wing Extremism. In fact, the current Chief Minister of the state, Mr Raghubar Das in his first address after taking over the position in January 2015 stated that over six decades of administrative failure in the region led to an increase in and sustenance of Naxalism in the state, a problem which his government promises to address on a priority basis.\(^\text{222}\)

Jharkhand, like other states in the Red Corridor, is rich in natural resources like iron ore, manganese, coal, limestone, graphite, quartzite, asbestos, lead, zinc, copper, and some gold, among others. It also is one of the leading states in generating electricity from thermal and hydroelectric plants. However, the fruits of these “gifts” have eluded the tribal population of the state.

As a part of Bihar, the tribal belt which now constitutes Jharkhand, received minimum funds from development plans. Resettlement and rehabilitation of the tribals under the provisions of Schedule V of the Indian Constitution also remained poorly implemented.\(^\text{223}\)

A 2008 report by an expert committee constituted by the Planning Commission of India noted, “In general, the contradiction between the tribal community and the State itself has become sharper, translating itself into open conflict in many areas. Almost all over the tribal areas, including Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Assam, Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, tribal people seem to feel a deep sense of exclusion and alienation, which has been manifesting itself in different forms. …The socio-economic infrastructure among the tribal people is inadequate, thereby contributing to their disempowerment and deprivation.”\(^\text{224}\)


The problem in the state is two-fold: firstly, since its inception, the state of Jharkhand has remained politically unstable with the political landscape remaining marred with successive corrupt governments and long periods of President’s Rule imposed. The state has seen 10 governments and three tenures of President’s Rule imposed in the last 14 years. Secondly, the Constitutional provisions for Schedule V areas which govern a large part of the state owing to its high tribal population, have not been followed leading to exploitation of the natural resources in the state without taking into consideration the tribal interest. In fact, in Jharkhand, the Panchayat Extension to Schedule Areas Act, 1996 has not been implemented at all because there haven’t been any elections to appoint the Gram Sabhas (Village Councils) as is mandated under the Schedule V. This has led to a complete failure of local self-governance too.

As a consequence, Jharkhand emerged as one of the worst affected states in India’s Red Corridor. In 2013, 22 of Jharkhand’s 24 districts were affected by Naxalism. In that year Jharkhand also recorded the highest number of casualties due to Naxal violence.

9.2 State History

The tribals in Jharkhand state are anthropologically perhaps as old as India. Their struggle is well documented as a part of the independence movement of India against British Imperialism. The Santhals, Mundas and Pahariyas are among numerous other tribals who rebelled as far back as the 18th century against the colonial rule.

The movement for a separate state of Jharkhand started in the early 1900’s when Jaipal Singh, an Indian Hockey captain and Olympian, suggested the idea of a separate state consisting of the southern districts of Bihar. The new state of Jharkhand separated from Bihar on November 15, 2000 following the passage of the Bihar Reorganization Bill in India’s Parliament.

Since the early Magadh Empire which ruled over the northern parts of India including present day Bihar and Jharkhand, the idea of a distinct indigenous entity has existed. In 1765, the British East India Company took control of the area and it became known as Jharkhand.

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225 Provision as to the Administration and Control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, The Constitution of India, http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const_Pock%202Pg_Rom8Fsssl33.pdf
228 Unstarred Question No. 2248, Government of India Rokya Sabha, 2014
The tribals in Jharkhand have been fighting for their right to self-determination and autonomy since before the First War of Independence in 1857. The tribal areas of Jharkhand are mineral-rich and have historically been exploited by outside interests. The main issues that brought together the disparate tribal communities to demand a separate state related to regional economic issues, particularly rights over resources.\(^{233}\)

One important early organizer in the movement was the Adivasi Mahasaba, which was founded in 1939.\(^{234}\) Originally a student group, it became the Jharkhand Party in 1949 and contested the 1952 Bihar State Assembly election. That election made the Jharkhand Party, under the leadership of Jaipal Singh, the second largest party.\(^{235}\)

In 1963, however, Jaipal Singh joined the Indian National Congress with his followers which led to the eventual decline of the Adivasi Mahasabha. The strength of pro-statehood leaders steadily eroded in successive elections post 1969.

Jharkhand had suffered from political instability since its formation in November, 2000. Jharkhand has seen ten governments and three instances of President’s Rule imposed. This constant political failure has led to exacerbation and sustenance of the problem of Naxalism in the state.\(^{236}\) Most of the political turmoil in Jharkhand has been the result of charges of corruption or failure to maintain a majority in the Legislative Assembly in a coalition government. This constant change in leadership has led to the state’s progress being slow due to lack in consistent political will. Moreover, as a consequence of this political upheaval, the confidence and faith of people in the federal polity of the country has considerably shaken.

### 9.3 State Events

**Formation of State**

- Date: 15 November 2000
- Key actor(s): Central Government, State Government
- Type of event: State Reorganisation under Constitutional Provision
- Likely effect on the conflict: Intensification, Emergence of new theatres of violence


Jharkhand was created under the Bihar State Reorganisation Act, 2000 on 15 November 2000. It was then the 28th state of India and was carved out of the state of Bihar incorporating the largely tribal belt in the south of the undivided state. The demand for a separate statehood for Jharkhand started soon after the Indian independence owing to the presence of more than 50 tribal communities from different scheduled castes and tribes as recognised by the Indian Constitution. After the formation of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha under the leadership of Santhal tribal leader, Shibu Soren, this movement gained steam. All the tribes in Jharkhand were asked to come on board this movement for separate statehood. Some of the prominent tribes in Jharkhand are Santhal, Munda, Oraon, Ho, Birhor, Kharia, Bhumij, Dusad, Lohar, Gond, Kuiri, Muchi, Kudmi (Mahato) and Mahali.

However, these tribes were not united in their demand for a separate statehood. The history of Jharkhand statehood demand is replete with ethnic and regional divisions because of which, the state is still in a state of instability.

The basic reasons behind the movement for a separate state were exploitation of the tribal people by dikus (outsiders), exclusion of some of the tribal communities from the constitutional guarantees and reservations, the right to forest resources and the marginalisation and displacement of populations due to rampant industrialisation and mining activities. These activities occur in spite of the fact that these areas falling under Schedule V of the Indian Constitution and institutional failure to implement the development projects in these areas.

The new state became a new stage of leftist insurgent activities which were already on the rise in undivided Bihar. With high concentration of mineral wealth and other natural resources, Jharkhand became one of the first states where criminalisation of Naxal activity became evident. Local criminals and thugs started forming splinter groups, apparently following the leftist ideology, only to expand their extortion and other criminal activities.

With a high tribal concentration, pre-existing problems in implementation due to institutional and administrative failure and rampant corruption, the new state was plagues with the problems of access to justice, lack of development, infrastructure, health and sanitation facilities, employment opportunities and education. This added to the ferment and allowed the various groups to easily mobilise ground level support for carrying out regular attacks against the security forces. In fact, in several districts of Jharkhand, the Naxalites ran parallel government and systems of justice dispensation which still exist.

The new state came into existence to address the issues of neglect of the tribal regions. However, due to unstable political circumstances, only a few urban and semi-urban regions benefitted. The tribal regions largely remained unaffected in this regard and therefore, the problems of lopsided development persisted leading to an increase in the conflict, leading up to 2013, when Jharkhand recorded the highest number of casualties among all Naxal-affected states.

**Shanti Sena and Special Police Officers**

- **Date:** 1998 (in Odisha), 2000 (in Jharkand)
- **Key actor(s):** Tribal population, security agencies, Naxalites
- **Type of event:** Grass-root human intelligence, force multipliers in COIN operations
- **Likely effect on the conflict:** Initial containment followed by retaliatory Intensification, Criminalisation of locals due to arming

The Shanti Sena or army of peace was the first concerted effort by the Odisha state government to combat the Naxal threat in the state by reaching out to the locals for support. It was initiated in 1998. Jharkhand adopted this step as well after the state’s creation in 2000. While there isn’t much official information available about the strength, functioning or modus operandi of this civilian force, it is believed to have started on the principles of non-violence, solely for the purpose of ground-level intelligence gathering.

In recent times, there have been allegations of armed cadres from Shanti Sena committing acts of extortion from landlords, industrialists, and businessman on the pretext to fight against the Naxalites and human rights violation\(^\text{240}\). The outfit is headed by Tileswar and Praveen Shah and is most active in Gumla district. They have a significant presence in neighbouring districts of Khunti, Simdega and Ranchi as well. Since the past few years, the Shanti Sena cadres have been under constant attack from the members of CPI (Maoist) and other Naxalite splinter groups in the state. There have been several targeted attacks in which a number of Shantii Sena cadres have been killed\(^\text{241}\).

However, security establishments in Jharkhand have refused to comment on the existence of the outfit, neither confirming nor denying it.

**Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy (Nayi Disha)**

- **Date:** 2001
- **Key Actor(s):** Jharkhand State Government
- **Type of Event:** Surrender policy

\(^{240}\) Inputs based of field visit to Gumla district in Jharkhand in 2012 and 2013.

- Likely effect on the conflict: De-escalation

Jharkhand’s surrender policy was first introduced in 2001. It has since been amended in 2003, 2009, and 2015. As of 2016, the policy provided each surrendered Naxal with a surrender reward of 50,000 Rs., a monthly stipend of 5,000 Rs., education for his/her children, a vocational training program, land, and any reward posted for the specific person.

The policy came under fire in 2017 after the surrender of zonal commander Kundan Pahan. Pahan is believed to be responsible for the murder of 74 people, including the 2009 kidnapping, torture, and murder of a special branch inspector. Pahan received 1.5 million rupees (the bounty on his head) for surrendering.

**Offer of Peace Talks**

- Date: January 2010
- Key Actor(s): Jharkhand State Government, CPI-Maoist
- Type of Event: Discussion of Peace Talks
- Likely Effect on Conflict: No talks occurred, so minor effect

On the day that he was sworn into office, Jharkhand’s new Chief Minister Shibu Soren offered to hold talks with Naxalites. Soren’s government also put a halt to long range patrols and search operations, which had been common while the State was under President’s Rule. CPI-Maoist responded positively to the offer, but set conditions before talks could occur. These conditions included releasing prisoners, ending Operation Green Hunt, and punishing police officers involved in extra-judicial killings. CPI-Maoist offered a 72-day ceasefire if the State halted Operation Green Hunt. CM Soren responded that there would be no talks until CPI-Maoist laid down arms. This did not happen and the talks never materialized.

**Saranda Action Plan (Jharkhand)**

- Date: 30 January 2012

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242 Sudhir Kumar Mishra, “Jharkhand Has Open Mind on Rebel Rehab Policy,” *The Telegraph*, May 17, 2017
244 Amitabh Srivastava, “Getting Away with Murder,” *India Today*, June 8, 2017
- Key actor(s): state government, Ministry of Rural Development – Government of India, Police organisations
- Type of event: Area domination followed by development initiative
- Likely effect on the conflict: Decline in conflict

Saranda is a dense forest and the largest Sal plantation in Asia. It is situated in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand predominantly and covers area in both, Chhattisgarh and Odisha as well. Since the formation of the state, the 56 villages under six Panchayats of the Saranda Forest Region had been under the control of CPI (Maoist) and were called the Liberated Zone. There are approximately 1,50,000 inhabitants, mostly from the Ho tribe, living in the forest villages here. There were many Naxalite training camps in the deep reaches of the forest which served as headquarters of insurgent activities in the region. Since the Ministry of Home Affairs initiated Operation Green Hunt in Abujhmad forest in neighbouring Chhattisgarh in 2008-09, there were many anti-naxalite operations in Jharkhand as well.

However, unlike the security forces elsewhere, these operations were carried out most discretely in Jharkhand. According to some news reports, one such set of operations was Operation Anaconda I and II and many middle and senior level leaders amongst the active naxalite outfits were targeted and eliminated in Saranda in August 2011. After this area dominance exercise, The Ministry of Rural Development, then headed by Jairam Ramesh from the United Progressive Alliance, announced and implemented the Saranda Action Plan on 30 January 2012 through the Jharkhand state government.

The key features of the Saranda Action Plan are as follows:

- Distribution of Solar Lamps, Bicycles, Transistors, and Musical Instruments to all the 7000 families in the areas recognized and targeted under the SAP. (Estimated Cost Rs. 5.2 crores).
- Installation of 200 hand-pumps in the villages. (Estimated Cost Rs. 1.2 crores)
- To bring all the 7000 families under BPL (Below Poverty Line) Scheme and IAY (Indira Awas Yojana).
- Under Forest Right Act, 2006 to distribute land pattas (ownership titles) up to 4 hectares and old age pension to the eligible families and persons, respectively.
- SAIL (Steel Authority of India) has been asked to assist in construction of one Integrated Developmental Centres (IDC’s) under its Corporate Social Responsibility activities. These IDCs would have Public Distribution System shops, Health Sub-Sectors, Agriculture Information Centres, Bank/Post Office, Market, Godowns, etc. The proposal is to construct 10 IDCs at a cost of Rs. 5 crore each. SAIL has been further asked to consider running health-centres and supply vehicles for local public transport facilities. SAIL is actively involved in the mining of iron ore in the Chiriya Mines located within the Saranda forest.

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• CRPF battalions would set up camps in the area to provide security cover to the local population and developmental initiatives.

Following the implementation of SAP, the security forces managed to gain substantial ground in terms of garnering local support against the Naxalites. In this exercise, hard combative actions were accompanied by development initiatives by the state which bore favourable results for the state. While in the year 2013, Jharkhand record the highest violence in LWE related incidents, it was seen as only a desperate measure by the Naxalite groups to regain control of lost territory. However, the following years, the extent of violence as well as the geographical spread of Naxalism in Jharkhand has seen a decline.

The current government at Centre led by Bhartiya Janata Party and the present Chief Minister of Jharkhand, Raghubar Das has also indicated their commitment to continue with the plan for further benefitting the tribal communities.

9.4 MAOIST EVENTS

Formation of splinter groups

- Date: July 2004 onwards
- Key actor(s): CPI (Maoist), Tribals, new groups
- Type of event: Factionalism in CPI (Maoist)
- Likely effect on the conflict: Intensification

Jharkhand’s leftist insurgency is peculiar in the sense that it is the only state where more than 20 break-away splinter groups are simultaneously functioning and carrying out attacks, sometimes even against each other. One of the main splinter groups is Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC). The CPI (Marxist-Leninist), the pre-cursor to the CPI (Maoist) had faced mass exodus of Naxalites belonging to Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Classes from the outfit in the state in July 2004. Dissatisfied with the interference of the Yadav community members who originally hail from the state of Bihar and form the second-rung leadership in the parent organisation, influencing major decision making process, the tribal and backward class foot-soldiers snapped ties with the CPI (Maoist) to form a separate outfit: TPC. The group was originally led by a Jharkhand leader known as ‘Bharaji.’ More recently, it has been led by Brajesh Kunju and is active in Gaya and Aurangabad in Bihar and gained foothold in the districts of Chhatra, Latehar and Palamau in Jharkhand.\(^{251}\) In the last few years, they have been at war with the CPI (Maoist)

and have suffered several mass casualties. They have also carried out massive operations against the CPI (Maoist) and reportedly have large reserves of firepower capabilities.\textsuperscript{252}

There is also the People’s Liberation Front of India or PLFI which broke away from CPI (Maoist) in 2007. It is led by Dinesh Gope and is most active in Khunti, Ranchi, Gumla and Simdega districts. Like TPC, PLFI also reportedly possesses a large cache of sophisticated arms and ammunition.

The Jharkhand Liberation Tigers is also a breakaway group which first appeared in December 2004. According to local authorities, the group was a criminal gang active in Latehar, Chatra, Simdega, Khunti and Gumla districts.\textsuperscript{253} The JLT is involved in a large number of cases of extortion from contractors, government employees and corporates.

The initial motivation for these factions to break away from the Central organisation was the caste equations. These splinter groups alleged that the CPI (Maoist) practiced disruptive and divisive caste politics internally which were not conducive to the tribal cause.\textsuperscript{254} Therefore, these groups not only broke away from CPI (Maoist), but also vowed to finish off the Party in Jharkhand. In reality, however, it is more to do with the competition in extortion areas.

According to a former senior government official from the Ministry of Home Affairs, while on one hand, internal factionalism in Jharkhand has led to a problem in dealing with Naxalism as it is challenging to conduct peace dialogues and arrive at a compromise and a comprehensive peace accord with so many groups; on the other hand, constant in-fighting has led to weakening of Naxalite structures substantially. Nevertheless, the presence of so many factions has changed the trajectory of conflict in the state and given it a peculiar character.

**Merger of PWG and MCC (Jharkhand)**

- Date: 21 September 2004
- Key actor(s): PWG, MCC, Left Wing Extremists
- Type of event: Consolidation of strength, emergence of a central party to control all Naxalite activities in the country with regional, zonal and district level committees
- Likely effect on the conflict: Intensification, force multiplication and better organisation of extremists.


\textsuperscript{253} Based on personal interviews during field visit to Jharkhand in 2012-13

Jharkhand’s case is peculiar under the larger Naxal insurgency ambit. Despite a significant presence of the CPI (Maoist) in the state, a number of leftist splinter groups having ideological skirmishes with the party emerged almost simultaneously. These groups have been constantly at war with each other and many of them comprise of erstwhile criminals who carry out widespread acts of extortion. This, coupled with a lack of political will, has led to an increase in insurgent activities and since there is no single coordinating organisation, it has spread quickly in almost all the districts in the state. Since the state is plagued by development and administrative failure\(^{255}\), there are several localised issues like displacement of tribal population due to excessive mining activities, lack of basic infrastructure, unemployment, minimum selling price on forest produce, non-compliance with constitutional guarantees under Schedule V and failure to implement central and state development schemes. The naxalites are champions of mobilising local support based on these issues and have carried out attacks on security forces and civilians.

### 9.5 Communication Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 3, 2002</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Jharkhand is formulating a plan to fund development projects in 13 Naxal-affected districts.(^{256})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 2003</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>In response to a strike called by the MCC and PWG, Chief Minister Arjun Munda called on the groups to join talks with the government. (^{257})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 14, 2005</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Jharkhand’s Home Minister announced that the State is reviewing its surrender policy.(^{258}) The draft proposal included job offers in the police force, agricultural land, homes, legal aid, and financial compensation as incentives.(^{259}) The policy was not actually amended until 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Center Minister of State for Home Affairs Ajay Maken called Jharkhand’s intelligence network inadequate, saying “there are loopholes” and “it should get more strength.” He also promised Center support to improve the intelligence network.(^{260}) This came after Jharkhand received an INR 200 million grant from the MHA to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{257}\) News Brief, South Asia Intelligence Review, May 6, 2003, [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair)

\(^{258}\) News Brief, South Asia Intelligence Review, November 14, 2005, [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair)


\(^{260}\) News Brief, South Asia Intelligence Review, December 1, 2009, [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair)
improve its intelligence network in February, 2009.\textsuperscript{261}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 4, 2010</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Jharkhand’s Chief Minister called for talks and offered to hold off on major operations against Naxal areas.\textsuperscript{262} CPI-Maoist set out conditions for high conditions for talks, requiring that the State release imprisoned Naxals, drop all cases against them, and withdraw their forces.\textsuperscript{263}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29, 2010</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>Jharkhand Chief Minister Shibu Soren reversed position on Operation Green Hunt. He had previously expressed skepticism about the program and said that it would not be allowed in Jharkhand without the State’s express permission. After meeting with the Center Home Minister, CM Soren welcomed Center forces for Operation Green Hunt.\textsuperscript{264}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 24, 2012</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Center Home Minister P. Chidambaram rebuked the Jharkhand State Government for its poor performance in containing Naxalism. The Home Minister pointed to widespread extortion and violence as notable problems.\textsuperscript{265}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


10 KARNATAKA

10.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Karnataka has emerged to be the latest Indian state experiencing Naxalite conflict. In their beginnings, the Naxalites focused on bringing attention to poor government services, including drinking water, roads, and employment.\(^{266}\) Naxal presence in Karnataka was confined to the North of the state, particularly in the Raichur district, which borders Andhra Pradesh. Evictions justified by inept farming and debt-ridden peoples, are commonly enforced by Karnataka’s government. Experts see no reason, other than the exploitation caused by unfair and unequal evictions, for Naxalism to flourish in the region. “Compared to the dry areas of Andhra Pradesh... the still-prevalent zamindari system breeds Naxalism, the socio-economic situation in the Malnad areas of Dakshin Kannada, Udupi and Chikmagalur (all inside Kudremukh national park) is different,” says Girija Shankar, editor of Janamitra, a local daily. Extensive land reforms here have resulted in equitable redistribution of land in the 1970s, he adds. The daily wage offered to farm workers is between Rs 100 and Rs 120. Literacy in some of these areas is also high. Some parts in Chikmagalur district (that are outside the national park) are affected by Naxalism. But there are other reasons for that: farmers have small landholdings and many are landless, they get relatively low wages.\(^{267}\)

Initially, Naxalites in Karnataka had sought safety within the state’s boundaries and also sought protection within the capital, Bangalore. It has been noted that the activity of Naxalites has been proceeded along an established pattern. It had been devised and implemented with considerable success in other parts of India. The spread of Naxalism has followed similar paths throughout the Indian subcontinent. After establishing Naxal presence in an area and engaging and testing the security forces in battle, the Naxalites seek to bring political institutions within the state, under their control: through recruiting and utilizing many sympathizers, intimidating opponents into submission and/or coercing them to resign from their posts.\(^{268}\) The activities of the Naxalites in Karnataka, actions that have been repeated across the subcontinent, cannot be seen in one-dimension as these are part of the larger ‘whole-India’ strategy of the Naxalites to capture political power through an armed action. The Naxalites have criticized politics in general, especially politics through a parliamentary system, and consider many democratic institutions to be misleading. Consistently, they have maintained that they are committed to waging an all-out armed struggle in order to capture political power and hope to create what they call a New Democratic Revolution (NDR)-no matter the cost.\(^{269}\)

In August 2010, one year after the establishment of the national IAP program, Karnataka was declared to no longer be one of the Naxal affected states.270

10.2 State History
Karnataka is a Southwest Indian state bordering both the Arabian and Laccadive seas, Goa to the Northwest, Maharashtra to the North, Andhra Pradesh to the East, and Kerala to the Southwest. Karnataka is one of the larger and more important economic provinces of India.

Individuals that support Naxalism in Karnataka capitalize on the public narrative that landless farmers and peasants were cheated as they were denied cultivable lands on which to work. The slave wages that are paid to farmers help to contribute to the rise and spread of Naxalism. Naxalite groups have systematically capitalized on this resentment. The tribesmen and villagers that worked for these slave wages and worked on those lands, already isolated due to pathetic infrastructure, became wholeheartedly against the democratic system in favor of a communist regime.

In general, the rebels (Naxalites) enter an area and begin to identify some causes of the people’s grievances against the state government. After assessing the situation and publically highlighting the government’s acts of inefficiency and ineptness, they claim that the government is responsible for continued public deprivation. The Naxalites offer public assurances that they are willing to fight the state in order to decrease public suffering, and redistribute land among the population. According to one analyst, “Once the rebels develop a support base among the people they proceed to break down the structures of civil governance – only a rudimentary presence – through threats and murders. The objective is to create an administrative vacuum where the writ of the state’s officialdom does not run and then entrench themselves there.”271

10.3 State Events

Discussion between Karnataka State Government and CPI-Maoists

- Date: June 18th, 2013
- Key Actor(s): Karnataka State Government officials, CPI-Maoists
- Type of Event: Discussions and offer for peaceful surrender
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Helping to initiate official dialogue between Maoists and government to start initiating a dialogue for peace terms.

“The State Government is ready to hold talks with CPI-Maoist and it would welcome any Maoists who wanted to surrender themselves and join the mainstream”, Karnataka Chief

Minister Siddaramaiah said in Bangalore. This is a sharp change from previous interactions with Maoist insurgents as the government became willing to engage in peaceful diplomatic relations rather than restoring to use police force in quelling the supporters. At the same time, the Chief Minister announced plans to recruit another 8,000 police officers.

**Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy**

- Date: November 22, 2014
- Key Actor(s): Karnataka State Government, Naxalites
- Type of Event: Surrender scheme
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

De-escalation programs, sponsored by the Karnataka government, helped to get two wanted Naxals—Noor Zulfikar and Sirigere Nagaraj—to willingly accept an offer to forfeit arms and surrender before the state’s jurisdiction. This action helped to add credibility to the statements of the Home Ministry, stating that the Naxals have been losing group. Before these two surrenders, there had been few examples of active Naxals taking part in the surrender and rehabilitation programs.

In order to promote a stronger de-escalation movement to encourage surrenders, the State government increased compensation in September 2015. For those who were not concerned with monetary gain from their respective surrenders, a section of Naxals rather demanded that pending criminal cases against them be withdrawn.

### 10.4 Communication Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 29, 2004</td>
<td>At the request of the Karnataka State Government, the Center government is funding a program to provide support for people that want to move away from Naxal-affected Kudremukh National Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 18, 2005</td>
<td>Karantaka State Government announced that it had allocated funding for development projects in the Naxalite-affected districts of Udupi, Chikmagalur, and Mangalor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Karnataka Chief Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy announced plans to establish a commando force similar to the Greyhounds. The first commando team finished training in July of 2011. Karnataka’s Home Minister announced additional plans in 2014 to establish commando teams in every district.

Karnataka’s Director General of Police acknowledged the socio-economic conditions that foster Naxal recruitment. He promised development programs to combat the Naxal movement.

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11 MAHARASHTRA

11.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Only six of Maharashtra’s 35 districts are affected by Maoists, and those six districts are in Vidarbha, an under-developed eastern region that shares borders with Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. Most of that activity is concentrated in two districts—Gondia and Gadchiroli. The biggest challenge to containing the Maoist threat in Maharashtra is the Maoist activity in in neighboring states. Troubles result from coordination of various security forces across state borders, and spillover of violence. All the same, the Ministry of Home Affairs designates Maharashtra as one of the states where Left Wing Extremism has been kept under control.

Maharashtra’s diverse agrarian history and modern geography exacerbate the Maoist problem. Made up of four distinct British provinces, different portions of the state developed different relationships to a landlord as overseer of the land and, often, abuser of tenants. Additionally, the contiguous forest cover in the districts of Gadchiroli, Gondia and Chandrapur have provided cover for Naxalites since the late 1980s when the Naxalite group People’s War moved out of Andhra Pradesh, looking for refuge.

The Maharashtra State Government has made strong efforts to incentivize villagers to deny Maoists support. While that scheme has been troubled by bureaucratic errors, villages responded immediately to that tactic. Other successful state efforts have included a Maoist rehabilitation scheme, which rewards Maoists who turn themselves in, and the raising of local forces specially trained to target the Maoist threat in the forested, troubled regions.

11.2 STATE HISTORY
The present state of Maharashtra was born after the Bombay Reorganisation Act of 1960, when the territories of Gujarat were separated from Bombay and Maharashtra was formed from portions of Hyderabad, the Central Provinces, and Berar. Each of these regions had a different agrarian infrastructure before Independence, which contributes to present-day disparities in agrarian situations. Much of the state agriculture was run by the Rayatwari system, under which each field was separately evaluated, and those who cultivated the land paid revenue directly to the treasury. However, in some of Vidarbha—the region in which Naxalites are most active today—an individual (called a Malgujar) was empowered to collect all the revenue from an assigned area and was recognized as proprietor of that land. This gave rise to a landlord culture, which would later exacerbate agrarian tensions. Adivasi tribal history in Maharashtra is one of

282 Arun Srivastava, Maoism in India, (New Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2015): 159
283 Arun Srivastava, Maoism in India, (New Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2015): 159
being repeatedly displaced from land, or made into tenants or bonded laborers, under the British in the 19th century. 286

India’s third largest state in terms of area and the second largest in terms of population, Maharashtra is among India’s relatively economically advanced states.287 It has the second largest tribal population.288 Given the size of the state, there are unsurprisingly large differences in development and per capita income between different regions of the state. The literacy rate in Maharashtra (in 2001) is well above the national average, in both urban and rural areas.289 However, 96% of tribal people live in rural areas and “constitute the poorest section of society” – they have high rates of infant mortality and malnutrition among women and children.290

The Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) was Maharashtra’s major anti-poverty intervention. Despite opposition from wealthy landlords, the bill passed unanimously in the state assembly in 1978 and launched formally in January 1979.291 The EGS was meant to guarantee unskilled employment on demand, ideally within 8km of a participant’s home.292 The program expanded rapidly, creating millions of workdays. After a sharp hike in EGS wages in 1988, employment dropped sharply, but soon after saw a slow and steady rise.293 Maharashtra is heavily burdened by the practice of farmer suicide—farmers crushed under debt take their own lives at alarming rates. The issue captured national attention in 1995 as Maharashtra reported a significant rise in farmer suicides.294

11.3 STATE EVENTS

Naxal Gaonbandi Scheme

- Date: 2003
- Key Actor(s): Maharashtra State Government
- Type of Event: State policy incentivizing local action
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Deescalation, villages prevented Maoists from entering

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The Maharashtra State Government implemented the Gaonbandi scheme in 2003 to prevent Maoists from mobilizing and solidifying support among villagers. The Scheme authorized the government to financially reward any local village body or panchayat that passed a resolution barring Maoists from entering. Payments were originally to be made in two installments. Unfortunately, the program was plagued by delays and inefficiencies. Though hundreds of villages quickly passed such resolutions to ban Maoist entry, by the end of 2006, only 112 of the 324 villages that had passed resolutions had been given the funds they were promised. Of those 112, only 73 villages had been given the full amount (Rs. 200,000) they had been promised. Amid mounting frustration with bureaucratic inefficiency, in November 2006, the Maharashtra Government increased the payment to Rs.300,000 to be paid in one lump sum.

Although the delay in awarding promised rewards has fermented frustration with government, the program did succeed in prompting hundreds of villages to ban Maoists, and there is little evidence to suggest that frustration at delayed reward has led villages to repeal bans – rather they are mounting pressure on the government while awaiting payments.

Naxal Surrender Policy

- Date: August 2005- Present
- Key Actor(s): Maharashtra State Government
- Type of Event: Surrender Scheme
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Deescalation

The state government launched a surrender scheme on 29 August 2005, through which, Naxals could turn themselves in for reward and rehabilitation. Under the scheme, Maoists who surrendered would immediately receive a cash reward, with bonus if they surrendered with weapons. In 2014, the cash reward for a central leader was between $24,000 and $30,000, and about $2,250 for a village-level supporter.

In the first few years, the program had struggled to appropriate sufficient funds, but the program has been repeatedly reformed and extended, and eventually found moderate success. Early on, the rehabilitation program and policy was weak — out of 267 Maoists who surrendered between 2005 and 2008, only 50 had been successfully rehabilitated.

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296 Arun Srivastava, Maoism in India, (New Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2015): 161
In 2010, changes to the rehabilitation program were proposed to provide surrendered Maoists with either land or vocational training when it became clear that they needed to be able to earn a livelihood and sustain themselves after laying down arms. In 2015, the government reported that through the rehabilitation program, men receive skill-training from the Industrial Training Institute and learn to drive, while women are trained in sewing and selling vegetables. Reflecting on the 10 years for which the program had been in place, the Maharashtra government stated in 2015 that 502 Maoists had given up arms and been rehabilitated. Of those 502, 482 were from the Gadchiroli district, the most heavily-affected district in Maharashtra.

**Operation Green Hunt (Maharashtra version)**

- Date: July 2009-present
- Key Actor(s): Maoists, National Government, State Governments of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra,
- Type of Event: Counterinsurgency operations
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Increased military presence and establishes state authority in Maoist-controlled areas

In Maharashtra, troop-deployment has been far less than in neighboring states, in part because of geographic concentration of Maoist activity in the state. While Maharashtra received almost 5,000 CRPF forces, neighboring Chhattisgarh had 32,000. Maharashtra’s version of the Greyhound forces (Andhra Pradesh’s specialized anti-Naxalite unit) was known as the Alpha Hawks. Made up of a team of 500 commandos selected from a Special Action Group of the Nagpur police, the Alpha Hawks were trained at the Unconventional Operations Training Centre (UOTC). The first such specially trained unit was deployed in June 2010 to the Naxalite-

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affected districts of Gadchiroli, Gondia, Chandrapur, and Bhandara. To incentivize these high-risk positions, members of the Alpha Hawks receive 150% of their usual salary.

**Attempted Withdrawal of CRPF Troops**

- **Date:** October 2014-June 2015
- **Key Actor(s):** National Government, Maharashtra State Government, CRPF Forces
- **Type of Event:** Attempted change in security arrangement
- **Likely Effect on the Conflict:** Negligible

In October of 2014, the National Government announced that it would completely remove Central Reserve Paramilitary Forces (CRPF) from the Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra and move them to Bastar in Chhattisgarh. The transfer was intended to streamline coordination between forces across state lines. Per the proposal, the districts in Maharashtra previously manned by CRPF were to be instead manned by ITBP (Indo-Tibetan Border Police), who were already present in Rajnandgaon, a district in Chhattisgarh adjacent to Gadchiroli. Justifying the action, a home ministry official applauded the Maharashtra police’s recent efforts to drive out Maoists from Gadchiroli, saying that the relatively stable environment warranted the withdrawal of CRPF troops, and that it was an ideal time for the ITBP to take over.

However, the Maharashtra government opposed the plan, arguing that recent successes warranted *continuity* in the security arrangement, rather than a change. One state official worried that “the state government…would have to start from scratch as far as coordinating with a central force is concerned.” Concerned that a change in forces would derail ongoing operations, and that the new force would take time to become familiar with the local terrain and population, the Maharashtra Government mounted such strong opposition to the withdrawal of CRPF troops that the Centre eventually withdrew the plan. There has been no spike in Maoist violence, rather it continued on a downward trend. Fatalities in 2015 were almost half what they were in 2014.

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11.4 Maoist Events

Merger of MCC and PWG

- Date: 21 September 2004
- Key Actor(s): PWG, MCC, Left Wing Extremists
- Type of Event: Consolidation of Naxalite factions
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification, emergence of a central party to control Naxalite activities in the country with regional, zonal and district level committees

As it did in many other states, the merger signaled a surge of Maoist activity in Maharashtra. Since much of Maharashtra’s Maoist activity is ‘spillover’ from more intense activity in more Maoist-affected neighboring states, the resurgence of coordinated Maoist activity in those states—especially Chhattisgarh—was matched by an increase in violence in Maharashtra as well.

11.5 Communication Events

June 3, 2009 Policy Statement

Maharashtra Home Minister Jayant Patil announced an INR one billion (~$21 million) to set up additional anti-Naxalite centers and border outposts. He also announced that the number of police at outposts would be increased from 12 to 60.\textsuperscript{311} The announcement came after sixteen police officers were killed in an attack on May 21.\textsuperscript{312}

September 19, 2009 Policy Statement

Maharashtra’s Special Task Force, which focuses on CPI-Maoist, will receive special training from the Force One battalion, which was created to respond to terror attacks.\textsuperscript{313}

12.1 **Executive Summary**
The emergence and, “growing influence of left wing extremists (also known as Naxalites) belonging to the erstwhile People's War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Center (MCC) along the borders of the eastern state of Orissa has become a cause for considerable alarm.”314 Their formations, led in large part by the Naxalites in the early 1960’s, manifested into a peasant movement, trying to mask itself as the Communist Party of India. This movement has led to a power struggle within the region. According to a Naxalite sympathizer, “the outfit is certainly planning to intensify its movement in Orissa and targeting urban areas to get mass support, particularly among the younger generations and students.”315 These intentions were manifested through the use of guerilla warfare with the aid of peasants, who wished to eliminate their landlords and build up resistance against the state's police force.316

Compared to states like Andhra Pradesh, the government of Orissa has critical failures in their battles with these Maoist insurgents. “The inaccessible hilly terrain, dense forests, lack of development, grievances of the tribals and poor, and the absence of administration have been conducive to the spread of left-wing extremism in Orissa.”317 Orissa has struggled to advance a coherent strategy to deal with Naxal conflict. The government adopted a hands-off policy towards left-wing extremism from the 1960s through the 1990s. A succession of governments from the 1990s through mid-2000s continued to fail to develop policy.318

12.2 **State History**
Orissa is an Eastern Indian state bordering the Bay of Bengal, Andhra Pradesh to the South, Jharkhand to the North and Chhattisgarh to the West. Orissa is one of the poorest provinces in India, with 32.6% of its population living below the poverty line—this compared the national figure of 22%. State formation in the post-independence period was complicated as the state was divided into 27 different territories without a political body to act as the hegemonic superior. Overwhelmingly Hindu (93%), the population almost exclusively speaks Odia. In 2011, the state changed its name from its original Orissa to its new name Odisha.

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The formations of Naxalism in Orissa came to fruition in the early 1960s and quickly distinguished itself from movements in neighboring West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar due to the emergence of revolutionary leadership and the charismatic appeal that Nagbhushan commanded among society. The people that resided in this region were insufficiently educated and lacked the basic necessities required to survive and develop societally. Further, they lacked economic opportunities and in these socio-economically depressed regions a deep sense of frustration and discrimination against their better off neighbors, government administrators and police forces emerged. Construction of large development projects, including several dams, has also contributed to government resentment due to displacement. One large project, the Hirakud Dam, resulted in the displacement of over 30,000 households with little to no compensation.\(^{319}\)

Naxalism in Orissa has its roots in 1960s tribal protests over access to agricultural land. These protests stalled when numerous Communist leaders, who had been supporting the tribal and peasant associations, were arrested in 1962.\(^{320}\) However, these groups rebranded themselves and banded together as the Orissa State Coordination Committee (OSCC). The Committee quickly embarked on an informational and propaganda campaign.\(^{321}\)

The campaign became violent in 1971 with the killing of a schoolteacher and police officer.\(^{322}\) Orissa emerged to be one of the most violence-affected states in the conflict.\(^{323}\) Naxalism’s influence is still prevalent in today’s Orissa, although, recent actions taken by these insurgent groups have died down. Yet, the Indian government and Orissa state government still remain active in confronting these groups.

### 12.3 State Events

**Special Operation Group**

- Date: August 21, 2004
- Key Actor(s): Odisha State Government
- Type of Event:
- Likely Effect on Conflict:


In August of 2004, Odisha created a Special Operation Group (SOG) composed of over 500 commandos and support staff. The SOG would be exclusively focused on terrorist and insurgent activity in the state. In June 2006, Odisha’s Home Department ordered that the SOG more than double in size and receive additional training.

**Surrender Policy**

- **Date:** June 20, 2006
- **Key Actor(s):** Odisha State Government
- **Type of Event:** Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy
- **Likely Effect on Conflict:**

Odisha’s surrender policy offered 10,000 rupees, homestead land, grants totaling 40,000 rupees available for building a house and marriage assistance, and a bank loan of up to 200,000 rupees. The bank loan portion of the policy failed because banks were unwilling to give loans without collateral. The surrender policy was announced along with the State government’s ban on CPI-Maoist and seven related organizations.

**Special Police Officers**

- **Date:** November, 2008
- **Key Actor(s):** Odisha State Government
- **Type of Event:** Special Force Creation
- **Likely Effect on Conflict:**

In November of 2008, the Odisha Director General of Police was instructed to recruit 2100 Special Police Officers (SPOs) among tribal youth in five districts. An additional 3500 posts

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were authorized in 2009. Home Department officials reported that the program is intended to function similarly to the Chhattisgarh SPO program.

Training for SPO consists of a 90 day basic course. After three years of service, they are eligible to become constables in the Auxiliary Police Force.

**Amendment to Surrender Policy**

- **Date:** 2012
- **Key Actor(s):** Odisha State Government
- **Type of Event:** Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy
- **Likely Effect on Conflict:**

In 2012, Odisha increased the rewards for surrendering. The top three Naxal officers in the state are each eligible for 2,000,000 rupees upon surrender. Other top Naxals are eligible for rewards between 250,000 and 2,000,000 rupees. Surrendered Naxals may also receive homestead land and financial assistance for land as well as a stipend of 2,000 rupees per month for three years.

**12.4 Maoist Events**

**Splinter Group Forms**

- **Date:** 2012
- **Key Actor(s):** Odisha State Organizing Committee, CPI-Maoist, Odisha Maobadi Party
- **Type of Event:**
- **Likely Effect on the Conflict:**

Orissa’s local branch of CPI-Maoist experienced a splintering in 2012. One of the party leaders, Sabyasachi Panda, allegedly criticized CPI-Maoist’s central leadership. He was expelled and went on to form a competing party, Orissa Maobadi Party (OMP). OMP cadres discouraged residents from cooperating with Telugu and Chhattisgarh Maoists. This party was later renamed CPI-Marxist Leninist Maoist.

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### 12.5 Communication Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 20, 2008</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>After the February 14 attacks in Nayagarh, Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik announced plans to improve policing capacity. These plans included fortifying police stations and armories, hiring additional police, increasing postings in the Special Operation Group, and strengthening the Special Intelligence Wing. (^{335})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 2009</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>The Center Reserve Police Force bought land in Chhattisgarh and Orissa intended for new operational headquarters for the Combat Battalion for Resolution Action (COBRA) force. (^{336})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8, 2009</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Orissa State Government created a State Industrial Security Force modeled on the Center Industrial Security Force. This policy came about after Naxal attacks on mines and pipelines in the state. (^{337})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10-11, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Orissa requested the Center send four additional battalions of the Center Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in response to attacks. (^{338}) Orissa’s Chief Minister stated that the Center has not been cooperative with his government with regard to fighting Naxalism. The Chief Minister claimed that the Center had withdrawn over half of the CRPF forces in Orissa. (^{339})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>In a speech to the state assembly, Orissa’s Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik criticized the Center for providing inadequate assistance to the State. His specific complaints were the withdrawal of CRPF forces and the Center’s refusal to send additional forces or a dedicated helicopter. (^{340})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Orissa Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik blamed inadequate Center support for his government’s inaction in responding to Naxalism. (^{341})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 5, 2010</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>The Border Security Force (BSF) put together plans to establish a battalion headquarters in Orissa following multiple requests from the State government. The State will provide about half of the land necessary for the headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 2010</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Orissa State Government has decided to form a Unified Command (UC) to organize the response to Naxalism. The UC is an 8-member committee comprised of representatives from the police, CRPF, intelligence services, and civil service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21, 2011</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Orissa’s Chief Minister rebuked the Center for reducing funding for police modernization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 15, 2012</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Orissa’s Director General of Police (DGP) responded to the Center’s claims that the State had failed to contain CPI-Maoist. The DGP pointed to the reduction in violence in several districts as proof of the State’s efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 2013</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>The Center’s Minister for Rural Development sent a request to Orissa’s Chief Minister asking that the State ensure that local elections are held and the needs of village leaders are addressed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13.1 Executive Summary
West Bengal was home to the original Naxalite uprisings of 1967, a peasant uprising that lasted for several years and lent its name to the CPI (Maoist) movement that surged nearly four decades years later. By the late 1970s, the Left Front Government, a coalition, dominated by the CPI-Marxist against which peasants had revolted, was back in control and the Naxalite movement had spread to neighboring states. CPI-Marxist continued to rule as the dominant party within the Left Front government for over 30 years. By the time CPI-Maoist was formed in 2004, if the original Naxalite memory still rang in West Bengal, it was among poor adivasis who carried their history of marginalization and fierce commitment to land rights, and less in explicit policy alignment with original movement, as the political and economy landscape had evolved over the years.

13.2 State History
West Bengal’s politics had been dominated by the Left Front until 2008. The Left Front lost in a landslide to the Trinamul Congress Party in alliance with India’s ruling Congress party. Together, they won 73% of the seats in the state assembly. 347 Just five years earlier, the Left Front held 80% of seats. Mamata Banerjee, the leader of the Trinamul Party, became the new Chief Minister of State. Banerjee was widely seen as more sympathetic to the Maoist and Maoist-adjacent cause, inasmuch as they overlapped with the plight of the rural the poor.

The impetus for the change in political power came from the events in Nandigram. Nandigram refers to a cluster of rural villages in the East Medinipur district, about 150 kilometers south-west of Kolkata in West Bengal. The residents, mostly farmers, are predominantly Muslim and low/scheduled caste Hindus. In January 2007, the chief minister of West Bengal took steps to forcibly acquire a large swath of land in Nandigram to establish a special economic zone (SEZ) in which a large Indonesian chemical hub was to be established. The Left Front government argued that the move would boost the economic wealth of the state and create non-farming jobs. The villagers, fiercely protective of their land, were vehemently opposed to the decision. To prevent annexation, the villagers formed the Bhumi Uchhed Pratirodh Committee (BUPC) (which loosely translates to “Resist Land Eviction Committee”), and took control of Nandigram by fortifying their villages with barricades made of stones and trees and cutting off roads. They also expelled the local administration, police, and local CPI (Marxist) loyalists who supported the land acquisition.

The BUPC kept up armed resistance with several skirmishes with the police until 14 March 2007, when hundreds of police forces accompanied by CPI (M) party-members arrived, supposedly to

conduct repair work, and the face-off quickly escalated. Police fired into the crowd killing 14 and injuring scores more. Several instances of rape and sexual assault were also reported.

Central and State administration repeatedly asserted that the uprising was planned and sponsored by Maoists, though there were conflicting reports about the extent of direct material or strategic support. The armed resistance planned by BUPC at Nandigram was certainly in harmony with Maoist aims. A high-level CPI-Maoist secretary even pledged support for the Nandigram movement in the press, but almost derisively rejected the implication of coordination, saying that while Nandigram used basic tools like pipe guns, Maoists were advanced enough to have automatic weapons.

The police brutality with which the long-suffering advisasis were met in their armed resistance was well documented, despite efforts by CPI(Marxist) cadres to prevent journalists from observing the violence. The shocking reports of violence spread through the region, garnering national and international condemnation/accusations of human rights abuses, and fostering solidarity among students, activists, and other advisasis in the state. These reports heightened tensions and primed advisasis and security forces elsewhere – security forces were more likely to fear and expect a similar armed occupation, while poor advisasis were likely to be even more distrustful of security forces.

The events in Nandigram helped to usher out the Left Front coalition, which had governed West Bengal for decades. The longstanding loyalty many advisasis felt towards the various parties in the Left Front was irreparably damaged by the government’s decision to forcibly acquire land. This was ironic, because left Front originally came to power on the promise of radical land reforms that favored the rural poor. The police brutality against rural poor also shocked middle class CPI(M) supporters, many of whom protested in solidarity in Kolkata.

West Bengal was relatively free of violent Maoist activity until tensions flared in 2008 after a failed assassination attempt against the West Bengal Chief Minister. Local police forces raided

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354 Statements given by PCAPA+ and Lalgarh people about police brutality often referenced events at Nandigram (it was as bad as Nandigram, it was worse than Nandigram), suggesting that it was a key event in their minds.

the area of the assassination attempt, treating civilians with brutality in their efforts to find the responsible parties. In reaction to police brutality, some locals formed the People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCAPA) with support from local Maoists. PCAPA mobilized thousands of villagers in neighboring villages to stage disruptive protests for months. After they declared the area a liberated zone in the summer of 2009, military operations were launched to reclaim Lalgarh. Operations lasted for over a year, with both sides rejecting the other’s preconditions for peace talks. The historic victory of Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamul Congress Party, seen as more sympathetic to Maoist and adivasi grievances, helped facilitate peace talks. But the assassination of Maoist leader Kishenji during a massive operation ended the peace talks and dealt an enormous blow to CPI-Maoist. Maoist violence has plummeted in the state since his death.

13.3 STATE EVENTS

Poor Implementation of NREGA

- Date: 2005
- Key Actor(s): Central Government
- Type of Event: Central Government development program
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Program failures increased frustration with and distrust of State government among rural poor, who populate those areas in which Maoists find strongest support.

NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) is an ambitious central government initiative that aims to improve the livelihood of the rural poor by guaranteeing 100 days of wage-employment to every household whose adult members volunteer to perform unskilled manual labor. If work was not provided within 15 days, an applicant was entitled to be paid unemployment benefits. Implementation in West Bengal was poor. In 2007-08, only 2,373 households received the guaranteed 100 days of employment, although there were a total of 9,613,577 register job-card households in West Bengal. Widespread irregularities, delays in wage payment, and corruption was reported in implementation, and the program is plagued by many of the same issues today. The irregularities in the program fostered frustration, especially among the rural poor, who felt betrayed by the flawed execution of an initiative that was directly meant improve their economic security. The result was a deepened distrust of State and local government initiatives among the rural poor, who populate those areas in which Maoists find strongest support.

Lalgarh Police Crackdown

- Date: November 2008
- Key Actor(s): Villagers in Lalgarh, Maoists (allegedly)
- Type of Event: Severe police action
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Intensification of anti-police sentiment

Lalgarh, a poor and barren tribal area, is a picture of government neglect. The land can only be farmed for three months of the year, and welfare schemes run by the government are riddled with corruption.\(^{356}^{357}\)

On November 2, 2008, a convoy traveling from West Midnapore to Kolkata carrying West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya and three central ministers narrowly missed a landmine blast near Lalgarh in West Midnapur.\(^{358}^{359}\) The convoy had been returning from laying the foundation stone of a steel plant in Salboni.\(^{360}\) Maoists claimed responsibility for the attack.\(^{361}\) In response, the local police force, which already had a history of unnecessarily force in dealing with tribals, conducted several raids in order to find the parties responsible. There were many reports of villagers being rounded up and beaten, destruction of already meager food stocks of villagers, damage done to houses, and sexual assaults against women.\(^{362}\)

**Operation Lalgarh**

- Date: 2 November 2008 – June 2009
- Key Actor(s): Security Forces, Central Forces, Maoists, WB Gov, Central Gov
- Type of Event: COIN operation
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Escalation of conflict

Over the next several months, Maoists and PCAPA members skirmished with security forces, the Maoists claiming to be seeking to create a liberated zone free of state administrators and police. Between November 2008 and June 2009, 26 CPI (M) leaders and workers in the Lalgarh area were killed. Maoists declared Lalgarh to be a ‘liberated zone’ on 16 June 2009.\(^{363}\) The West Bengal government had been reluctant to act after months of agitation for two reasons. First, they feared a repeat of the violence at Nandigram, with similar public outcry. Second, they feared that ‘cracking down’ on Maoist activity would be politically unpopular ahead of an election in an area in which Maoist sympathies were strong. However, on June 16, Maoists declared Lalgarh to

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be a ‘liberated zone,’ and soon after, the bodies of three CPI (M) supporters and a local committee secretary were discovered in the forest. With violence escalating, the state asked for central aid in bringing order back to Lalgarh.

On June 18, 2009 Operation Lalgarh began – West Bengal police forces, supplemented by central forces, were sent to Lalgarh “to restore peace and rule of law and to protect lives on innocent people.” Throughout the summer, there were skirmishes in and around Lalgarh, with casualties on all sides. On August 6, the State Government admitted that Operation Lalgarh had not been successful thus far. Maoists had reportedly killed ten people in the area, despite the huge police and central paramilitary force presence. Over the next several months, Maoist leaders and government representatives struggled to agree on preconditions for peace negotiations, though both parties expressed interest in talks. The government insisted that the Maoists surrender arms and renounce violence as a precondition, while Maoist politburo leader, Rao, rejected the laying down of arms, and set his own preconditions: the immediate withdrawal of forces from Lalgarh and Jangalmahal, and the release of what he alleged were falsely arrested villagers.

Additional central security forces arrived on November 5, in addition to 17 companies of central forces and units and CoBRA (Commando Batallions for Resolute Action) forces that were already there. The following month, on December 3, six companies were withdrawn from the area and relocated to Jharkhand, though the remaining forces were still fighting. The fighting continued throughout the spring and early summer. On July 28, 2010, the West Bengal State Government announced an amnesty scheme for Maoists who were willing to surrender, with or without arms. Though state government spokespersons announced that some had laid down arms to accept the deal (which Maoist spokespersons denied) there was no overwhelming laying down of arms and fighting continued.

**Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy**

- Date: July 28, 2010
- Key Actor(s): West Bengal State Government
- Type of Event: Surrender Policy
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: De-escalation

West Bengal’s surrender policy was announced in July of 2010. The policy provides each surrendered Naxal with job training and a monthly stipend of 2,000 rupees for three years. After three years of good behavior, he/she will receive a reward of 150,000 rupees. There are additional incentives available for surrendering with weapons or satellite phones.

**Peace Talks**

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- Date: 2011
- Key Actor(s): West Bengal State Government, CPI-Maoist
- Type of Event: Peace Talks
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Temporary De-escalation

Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee campaigned on a promise to find a diplomatic solution to the Naxal conflict.\(^\text{366}\) She announced plans to release 52 political prisoners, including two high-level leaders, but held off after the Center expressed concerns. CPI-Maoist eventually agreed to talks without the release of prisoners.\(^\text{367}\) Two rounds of talks were held in September 2011. In the second, CPI-Maoist offered a one-month ceasefire if the State halted operations in Jungle Mahal. The group then withdrew from peace talks in November, alleging that the State had failed to follow through on its commitments.\(^\text{368}\) CM Banerjee blamed the Naxals for continuing violence during the peace talks.\(^\text{369}\) In mid-October, she gave CPI-Maoist seven days to lay down arms or major operations would resume. When this directive was ignored, talks did not resume.\(^\text{370}\)

### 13.4 Maoist Events

**Merger of PWG and MCC (West Bengal)**

- Date: 21 September 2004
- Key Actor(s): PWG, MCC, CPI (Maoist)
- Type of Event: Political merger
- Likely Effect on the Conflict: Escalated by consolidating and organizing forces, resurgence of violence in many states

As it did in many states, this merger in 2004 marked the rapid resurgence of Maoist activity in West Bengal, which had been relatively free of violence carried out in the name of Maoists. However, unlike other states affected by Maoist violence, much of the Maoist activity in West Bengal is executed through local apparatuses that formed in reaction to state-specific and village-events and grievances. Though they do operate with support from CPI (Maoist), Maoist activity is more decentralized in West Bengal than it is in other states.

**Formation of PCAPA**

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\(^{366}\) “Maoists Withdraw from Peace Talks,” *LiveMint*, November 14, 2011, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/7yj0bnWRux8HwgWZaZg0rK/Maoists-withdraw-from-peace-talks.html


\(^{368}\) “Maoists Withdraw from Peace Talks,” *LiveMint*, November 14, 2011, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/7yj0bnWRux8HwgWZaZg0rK/Maoists-withdraw-from-peace-talks.html


Outraged by police actions in Lalgarh, local adivasis formed the People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities to seek redress for past abuses and to prevent their future occurrences. Their list of demands included an immediate halt on raids and an agreement not to carry out raids without the presence of a tribal organization, Majhi Maroas, and compensation for past victims of police atrocities. The group also pressed for “traditional” punishments, including that the Superintendent of Police of West Midnapore and other guilty parties publicly apologize and humiliate themselves by crawling on hands and knees to the hamlet of Hariharpur.371 372

The PCAPA and its demonstrations had widespread support not only among villagers in Lalgarh and surrounding towns, but also among students from elite institutions in Kolkata, and other rights activists who traveled in large numbers to show solidarity with the Lalgarh uprising.373 Demonstrations caused massive disruptions as committees in village after village blocked traffic. By the end of November, there were protests in over 400 villages.

### 13.5 COMMUNICATION EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2009</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>The Center’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) criticized West Bengal for failing to ban CPI-Maoist and withdrawing police forces from Naxal areas. According to the MHA, Center forces would not be able to operate effectively under these conditions.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 4, 2010</td>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>Center Home Minister P. Chidambaram rebuked West Bengal’s government for not containing Naxals despite having adequate Center and local forces.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 5, 2010</td>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>West Bengal announced plans to establish a counter-insurgency force. The initial force of 400 commandos will be trained by Border Security and Central Reserve Police Force experts.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 26, 2011</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>West Bengal promised to provide compensation totaling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statement

INR 200,000 (~$4500) to the families of Naxal victims. This is in addition to INR 300,000 (~$6600) available from the Center.\(^\text{377}\)

November 22, 2011 Policy Statement

West Bengal’s Chief Minister warned activist organizations against supporting CPI-Maoist, saying that the Government is empowered to take action against them. The warning came in response to a press conference held by the Association for Protection of Democratic Rights and 21 other organizations.\(^\text{378}\)

October 13, 2012 Agreement

The Center’s Home Ministry encouraged West Bengal to resist the Calcutta High Court’s ruling that granted political prisoner status to captured CPI-Maoist members.\(^\text{379}\)


Under the Indian constitution, States are responsible for containing India’s Maoist insurgency. The affected States have taken up this responsibility differently at different points in time. Based on the in-depth state histories presented above, the following table summarizes these different strategies.

**Table 1: Overview of state-wise policy initiatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Surrender/ Demobilization Program</th>
<th>State-Level Elite Forces</th>
<th>Offer of Peace Talks</th>
<th>State-Level Peace Talks</th>
<th>State-Level Economic Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2003[^384]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa (Odisha)</td>
<td>2006, 2012</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None[^385]</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^380]: Scheme to redistribute land, intended to benefit tribal peoples
[^381]: Aapki Sarkar Aapke Dwar – builds schools, roads, health centers, etc.
[^382]: Food Security Act – eligible families receive rice, flour, and other goods at subsidized prices
[^383]: Saranda Action Plan – distributes land as well as household goods such as solar lamps and bicycles
[^384]: The Gaonbandi scheme financially rewards villages that ban the entry of Naxals
It can be insightful to link these policy changes to conflict data. Relying on annual state-level data on India’s Maoist conflict from the South Asia Terrorism Portal,\footnote{See Section 2.5.} we construct a panel dataset in which policies are “switched on” according to the overview table.

Table 2 shows the relationship of each policy switch with violence outcomes, controlling for state and year fixed effects. This strategy implicitly controls for time-invariant determinants of conflict at the state-level, as well as time-varying determinants of the conflict that affect all states at the same time. The only significant relationship is between the adoption of a surrender program and violence. The adoption of such a program is associated with increased violence. The relationship with the introduction of an elite force is similar in magnitude, but imprecisely estimated. Interestingly, only peace talks are associated with a decline in violence levels, although this effect does not gain statistical significance. These relationships are purely descriptive, and should not be given a causal interpretation. Still, it is striking that no policy intervention was followed by marked drops in violence across the 8 states we study.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
 & Log(Events) & Log(Casualties) \\
\hline
Surrender & 0.66 & 1.23* \\
 & (0.36) & (0.62) \\
Elite Force & 0.99 & 1.59 \\
 & (0.56) & (0.76) \\
Peace Talks & -0.55 & -0.50 \\
 & (0.29) & (0.46) \\
Economic Programs & 0.50 & 0.39 \\
 & (0.46) & (0.67) \\
Number of Observations & 120 & 120 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Policies and violence outcomes}
\end{table}

Notes: Observations at the state-year level. Violence data is based on the SATP daily incident reports, for the 8 Maoist-affected states described in this study, between 2000 and 2014. Outcomes are subject to a log(x+1) transformation. The policy variables are dummies that switch on according to Table 1. Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered at the state level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

\footnote{This data source is described in https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Shapiro-et-al-2015-Working-paper.pdf}