

Appendix A: Formal Model

In this section we introduce a short and highly stylized model to formalize the intuition as to why size, scope and apparent leaderlessness are protest characteristics that are likely to trigger cascades of mobilization. The model is intended merely to supplement the main paper; the reader should feel free to skip it if they feel comfortable with the theory of the paper as presented in the main text.

Suppose that the population consists of n citizens indexed by i , and $|G|$ groups of equal size indexed by g . Let $k(i) \in G$ denote the group individual i identifies with. Starting from the observation that previous anti-government protests in Egypt where the leaders were clear (e.g. independent unions, the Muslim Brotherhood) did not trigger protest cascades, we claim that fence sitters care not only about overthrowing the government, but also about what might replace it should the revolution succeed. Whoever leads a successful revolution will have a much stronger chance of also leading the new regime. If there is no clear leader, however, then each group may feel that they have a greater chance of claiming power afterwards than if the revolution was led by some other group.

To capture this intuition, we assume that the protests can either be led by one of the groups, in which case we denote it by P_g with $g \in G$, or it may have no apparent leader in which case we denote it by P_\emptyset . We denote by $\{R_1, R_2, \dots, R_{|G|}, SQ\} = \mathcal{R}$ the set of all possible regimes, where R_k refers to rule in favor of group k , and SQ refers to the status quo. We use r to refer to a generic element of \mathcal{R} . In line with the previous discussion, we assume that for all i , $\Pr(R_{k(i)}|P_{k(i)}) > \Pr(R_{k(i)}|P_\emptyset)$. That is, protests are more likely to result in a regime favorable to group $k(i)$ if group $k(i)$ leads the protests than when the protests have no apparent leaders. Since groups are identical and regimes are mutually exclusive, this implies that a regime in favor of i is more likely under leaderless protests than when protests are led by another group, $\Pr(R_{k(i)}|P_\emptyset) > \Pr(R_{k(i)}|P_{j \neq k(i)})$. Thus, each citizen prefers a successful revolution led by her own group to a leaderless revolution, but she prefers a leaderless revolution to the status quo (SQ) or a revolution led by another group.¹

Further denote by ν the number of protesters, by β the breadth of support the protests in terms of demographics including locations, and by $L \in \{\emptyset\} \cup G$ the group leading the protests. The expected utility of a fence sitter i is then given by:

$$\mathbb{E}[U_i(L, \nu, \beta)] = \Pr(\text{success}|\nu, \beta) \sum_{r \in \mathcal{R}} [\Pr(r|P_L)(u_i(r) - u_i(SQ))] - c(\nu, \beta) \quad (1)$$

¹We believe that this probabilistic approach is particularly reasonable in the Egyptian context. For instance, some protesters might have chosen to sit these protests out if they had known *a priori* that they would lead to the election of a Muslim Brotherhood-led parliament and a Muslim Brotherhood president in 2012.

Our assumptions imply the following:

1. $\Pr(\text{success}|\nu, \beta)$ is increasing in ν and β . That is, the probability of having a successful revolution is increasing in both the number of protesters, and the breadth of support.
2. $\Pr(R_{k(i)}|P_\emptyset) > \Pr(R_{k(i)}|P_{j \neq k(i)})$. That is, for any given level of support, the probability that the revolution will lead to a regime favorable to i is higher when there is no apparent leader than when there is a clear leader who is not from i 's group. Since groups are of equal size, as long as there are at least two groups it follows that a seemingly leaderless revolution will be more attractive to the average fence sitter.
3. $c(\nu, \beta)$ is decreasing in ν and β . That is, costs of participation are decreasing in the number of protesters and breadth of support.

Appendix B: Survey Analysis of Media Usage among Egyptians and Revolutionaries

As a complement to the analysis in the main paper, in this section we leverage two surveys to analyze differences in media usage patterns among first movers, Egyptians who joined the revolution on later days, and those who did not participate at all. The first survey we examine is the Egyptian component of Wave II of the Arab Barometer project. The survey was fielded in Egypt in June 2011, and although it was not explicitly focused on the revolution, it did include a battery of questions asking respondents about whether and when they participated in the revolution and their attitudes towards it. It also asks questions about media usage both in general and during the revolution. The number of respondents was 1,219; 98 (8%) of these respondents claimed to have participated in protests during the revolution, and 34 (2.8%) claimed to have participated on January 25, 2011 (Beissinger et al., 2015). The second survey we analyze is Zeynep Tufekci's and Chris Wilson's (2012) survey on media usage patterns during the Egyptian revolution. This survey (which we refer to as TDS) was fielded less than a month after Mubarak stepped down and its sample only includes Egyptians who participated in the revolution ($n = 1,048$), providing an opportunity to explore more thoroughly variation within this subset of the Egyptian population. A downside to the survey is that the respondents were identified using a snowball sampling technique, in which the surveyors asked respondents for referrals to other revolutionaries. As we discuss further below, we conduct a number of additional analyses and robustness checks to correct for this potential sampling bias.²

² There is a risk in both of these surveys that respondents' answers were shaped by the political context in which the surveys were fielded; in the post-revolution euphoria of 2011 respondents may have been more likely to claim participation in the

Together these two surveys demonstrate the following two important insights, which add additional weight to our claim that social media use enabled first mover mobilization. 1) *active* social media use was higher among first movers than among Egyptians who participated in later days of protest, who, in turn, used social media more than those who did not participate in the revolution at all. And 2) social media usage during the revolution was the strongest predictor of participation in the first day of protests when compared against use of all other media and information sources.

The first pattern can be discerned in the Arab Barometer data. The Arab Barometer includes several questions regarding Internet and social media usage. First, it asks respondents in general whether they use the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter.³ Second, in the module on the Egyptian revolution, it asks a much more pointed question about active social media usage during the revolution: “Did you support the protests against Mubarak through the internet, such as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube?” Table 1 shows the distribution of responses to these questions across three mutually exclusive groups: 1) first movers (i.e., respondents who participated in the January 25 protests), 2) fence sitters (i.e., respondents who “sat on the fence” during the first day of protest but joined the revolution on subsequent days), and 3) Egyptians who did not participate in the revolution. As the table indicates, revolutionaries in general (i.e., both early movers and fence-sitters) were considerably more likely to be Internet, Facebook, and Twitter users than Egyptians who did not participate in the revolution. However, there is no meaningful difference between first movers and fence-sitters. Yet when we compare the distribution of responses to the more specific question, which asks about *active* social media use during the revolution, we find a different result. The proportion of first movers who used Internet-based platforms, like Facebook and Twitter, to actively support the protests was twice as large as the proportion of fence-sitters.⁴ The takeaway, then, is that, although first movers and fence-sitters in the revolution were equally likely to be social media users in general, first movers were far more active on social media during the revolution than fence-sitters.⁵

revolution’s protests (or, in the case of the TDS survey, the first day of protest). However, we believe the risks to our inferences from any such biases are minimal. In the case of the TDS survey, the questions were fielded very shortly after the revolution, leading to less risk of respondent distortions, and there is also less incentive for respondents to falsify their answers regarding *when* they may have joined the protests (i.e., joining on day one is not significantly more socially desirable than joining on day two). In the Arab Barometer there is some risk that respondents in the summer of 2011 claimed to have participated in the revolution when they did not. But as Beissinger et al. (2015) point out, the Arab Barometer statistics regarding protester participation align with those produced in other surveys, lending them additional credibility. Moreover, there is similarly little reason to believe that respondents in the Arab Barometer who claimed to have protested had a strong incentive to distort when they joined the revolution. Finally, by triangulating our survey findings with other data sources, particularly interviews with protesters and activists, we believe we can limit the risk to our inferences from potential respondent biases.

³ The question on Internet use asks about the frequency of Internet use (i.e., daily or almost daily, at least once a week, at least once a month, a few times a year, non-use). For the purposes of our analysis anyone who uses the Internet, regardless of frequency, is coded as an Internet user.

⁴ The differences between the proportion of revolutionaries (i.e., first movers and fence-sitters) and the proportion of non-revolutionaries using the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter are all statistically significant at a 95% confidence level using a standard difference of means test. Similarly the difference between the proportion of first movers and the proportion of fence-sitters who used social media to support the protests is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level .

⁵ The results show that Internet use, social media use (i.e., either Twitter or Facebook use), and *active* social media use

Table 1: Internet & Social Media Use Among Egyptians

	First Movers	Fence-Sitters	Non-Revolutionaries
Internet use	50%	52%	16%
Facebook use	38%	33%	7%
Twitter use	9%	8%	1%
Social media use to support protests	41%	19%	3%
	<i>n=34</i>	<i>n=64</i>	<i>n=1,121</i>

Source: Arab Barometer

The difference in social media use between first movers and fence-sitters can also be identified in the TDS data, which asks several more specific questions about how respondents used various media sources during the protests. For example, the data show that first movers were more likely than fence-sitters to send or receive information during the revolution both on Facebook (81% vs. 67%) and on Twitter (19% vs. 9%).⁶ The data also show that respondents who were first movers were more likely than fence-sitters to cite Facebook as their most important information source during the protests (40% vs. 29%) and one of their top three information sources (72% vs. 61%).

We can use the Arab Barometer data to further examine the statistical effect of social media use on the likelihood of participation in the first day of protest, and in the revolution in general. Below we include the results of four regressions: the first two are run only on the subset of respondents who claim to have participated in the revolution and use as the dependent variable whether a respondent claims to have participated in the January 25 protests; the second two are run on the full sample and use as the dependent variable whether a respondent claims to have participated in protests during the revolution. All four regressions control for age, gender, college education, and urban location. The key independent variables, which are derived from the same questions used to produce Table 1 in the main paper, are 1) Internet use, 2) social media use in general (i.e., use of either Facebook or Twitter), and 3) social media use to support protests during the revolution. The results of the regressions appear in the table below.

The models demonstrate that Internet, general social media use, and social media use to support the protests are all strong predictors of participation in the revolution among the full sample of respondents. More importantly, the only variable included in the two models predicting first mover mobilization among

(i.e., a positive response to the question about supporting the protests through social media) are strong and statistically significant predictors of participation in the revolution, controlling for age, gender, college education, and urban vs. rural. More importantly, the only variable predicting participation in the January 25 protests among the smaller subset of revolutionaries, controlling for the same factors, is the *active* social media use question.

⁶ The differences between these proportions and those noted above from the Arab Barometer survey are likely driven by the significant differences in the two surveys' samples, with the TDS sample being drawn entirely from Cairo and over-representing younger, better educated, and more Internet-connected members of the revolutionary coalition.

Table 2: Effect of Internet and Social Media Use on Protest Participation

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Jan 25 Protest		Rev Protest	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)
Female	-0.112 (0.537)	-0.135 (0.564)	-1.065*** (0.258)	-1.108*** (0.261)
College	-0.372 (0.478)	-0.399 (0.502)	0.688*** (0.256)	0.643** (0.261)
Urban	-0.056 (0.500)	-0.107 (0.522)	0.640*** (0.245)	0.791*** (0.245)
Internet use	-0.287 (0.699)	-0.780 (0.621)	0.618* (0.333)	0.507* (0.300)
SM use (general)	0.432 (0.700)		0.708** (0.356)	
SM to support protests		1.632*** (0.622)		1.517*** (0.348)
Constant	0.476 (0.837)	0.416 (0.862)	-2.708*** (0.410)	-2.743*** (0.411)
Observations	98	98	1,219	1,219
Log Likelihood	-61.731	-58.091	-290.942	-283.595
Akaike Inf. Crit.	137.462	130.182	595.884	581.189

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

the sub-set of revolutionaries that has a statistically significant effect is social media use to support the protests.

We can further explore the statistical relationship between social media use and first-mover mobilization using The TDS survey. Moreover, this survey helpfully allows us to directly compare the effect of social media use against use of other media sources. The analysis is important because, as noted in the main paper, protesters during the revolution relied on multiple information sources, making it challenging to parse the independent effect of any one. A regression analyzing how the use of each information source affected the probability of day one protest participation, while holding the use of all others constant, offers one way of testing these independent effects.

The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 4. The regression’s dependent variable is a binary outcome variable for participation in day one protest. We test the effect of six different information sources on the probability of protesting on day one: Facebook, Twitter, satellite TV, text messaging, phone, and face-to-face interactions, while also controlling for age, gender, and Internet access.⁷ The question in the survey does more than ask about general use; it explicitly asks whether a respondent used an information source to “send or receive information about the January 25 protests.” Throughout the TDS survey the term “January 25 protests” is used to refer to the eighteen days of protest that toppled the Mubarak regime, not to protests on January 25, 2011 specifically. To Egyptians, who commonly refer to the 2011 revolution as the “January 25 Revolution,” denoting the eighteen day protests in this way would be relatively natural and clear. The figure shows the difference in average predicted probability of participation in day one protests for a protester who used a given media source versus a protester who did not (holding all other variables at their mean). As it indicates, Facebook and Twitter are the only two media sources whose use during the revolution predicts participation in the January 25 protests. The average revolutionary who used either Facebook or Twitter during the protests was significantly more likely to be a first mover than one who did not use social media. In contrast, satellite TV usage negatively predicts early participation, and there is no statistically significant effect for phone use, SMS use, or reliance on face-to-face interactions.⁸

Bias Correction in TDS Survey Analysis


There is, of course, always a concern that a survey collected through snowball sampling will produce unrepresentative data and therefore biased results (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004). In order to assess the representativeness of the “snowballed” sample in the TDS survey, we compare it to the results of the nationally representative Arab Barometer survey. Figure 5 compares the results of the TDS sample across a variety of characteristics to two sub-groups within the Arab Barometer survey: Egyptians who live in urban settings, and urban Egyptians who participated in the January 25 uprising. There are 520 respondents in the first group, and 65 respondents in the second group.

As the figure indicates, the TDS sample is indeed biased compared to the reference group of urban

⁷ We selected these six sources, because they were the ones that interviewees most mentioned as being important during the revolution. However, the survey also asked about the use of radio, print media, blogs, and email. We also run the analysis with these variables included, and the results do not change.

⁸ This is not to deny the importance of older, more traditional source of information during the revolution. As noted above, during later stages of the uprising, particularly after Internet platforms were interrupted or shut down, more traditional forms of communication became far more important (Hassanpour, 2014). Even during the first protest, other methods of communication were certainly used, including mobile phones, face-to-face communication, and emailing. But often these communication forms were used in interaction with social media - for example, as discussed further below, activists’ mobile phone numbers were posted on Facebook pages, and protesters discussed the protest plans with their friends after learning about them on Facebook. In this sense social media seems to have complemented and enhanced the usefulness of other platforms during this early stage of mobilization.

Figure 4: Effect of Key Information Sources on Probability of Day 1 Protest Participation among All Protesters



protesters. The sample tends to be younger, better educated, and more connected to the Internet than the average urban protester.


In order to ensure that the conclusions we draw in the paper are not being skewed by this biased sample, we use a variety of weighting techniques to “fix” the bias in the TDS sample and then re-analyze it. We employ five different weighting techniques and assess which technique does the best job of matching the TDS sample to the subset of urban protesters in the Arab Barometer.

The first technique entails a straightforward logistic regression model. We combine the Arab Barometer sub-sample with the TDS sample, and run a model predicting the probability of being an AB observation given this combined sample i.e.:

$$Pr(AB|AB + TDS)$$

We run this model using the following covariates: age, female, internet, college. We also use pre-developed weights for the Arab Barometer observations, to ensure that these observations are themselves representative of the true national sample. We then use this model to predict the probability that each TDS observation

Figure 5: TDS Sample vs. Arab Barometer




is in the AB sample (π). Our weights are constructed as $\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}$ for each observation.

The second through fifth techniques employ common matching methods designed to develop propensity scores in causal inference analyses. We use propensity score matching, covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS) matching, entropy balancing, and a matching method using support vector machines (SVM).

We develop weight vectors using all five methods and then recalculate the means in the TDS sample, this time using the weights. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 6, where we compare the rescaled means to the original TDS mean and to the AB's urban protesters across the four covariates of age,

Figure 6: Adjusted TDS Sample vs. Arab Barometer



female, internet, and college.⁹ As the figure suggests, entropy balancing does the best job of fixing the bias in the TDS sample, with the new means almost exactly in line with those of the AB sample.¹⁰ We therefore proceed with our analysis using the weights developed through entropy balancing.¹¹


The original analysis presented in Figure 4 showed that, in the unweighted sample, Facebook and Twitter

⁹ The means of “charity” and “union” do not change meaningfully after these weights are applied.

¹⁰ Entropy balancing has an additional advantage over propensity score, CBPS, and SVM matching. Whereas each of these three approaches gives weights of 0 to a majority of observations, the entropy weights are greater than 0 across all observations, allowing us to leverage information from all observations in the sample in our analysis (rather than a small subset thereof).

¹¹ As robustness checks, we also run the analysis using the predicted probably weights and the SVM weights. In the former Facebook, Twitter, and phone use predict day one participation, and in the latter only Facebook does (standard errors in this model are much higher due to the high number of 0 weights). When we conduct the analysis using the CBPS and Propensity score weights the models produce multicollinearity.

Figure 7: Effect of Various Information Sources on Predicted Probability of Day 1 Protest (Weighted Model)



use were the only significant predictors of day one protest. Here we produce the comparable figure using a model that relies on the entropy balance weights (Figure 7). As with Figure 4, the figure shows the difference in average predicted probability of day one protest for a protester who used a given media source versus a protester who did not. The results do not differ markedly from those in the unweighted model. In the unweighted model satellite TV had a strong negative effect on likelihood of day one protest, whereas both Twitter and Facebook had a positive effect. Phone use also seemed to have a positive effect, although the statistical significance was not as strong.

In the weighted model both Facebook and Twitter continue to be strong predictors of day one protest, though now the effect of Facebook is slightly stronger than Twitter. Phone use also emerges as a strong and statistically significant predictor of day one protest, and satellite TV, though still a negative predictor, is now no longer statistically significant. By and large, “fixing” the bias in the sample does not meaningfully change the overarching finding that using social media during the uprising was a strong predictor of early

participation in protests.

Full Results of TDS Regressions

In the table below we include the full regression results for both the original unweighted and weighted versions of the TDS analysis discussed above. Both models used the same sets of covariates, and controlled for age, gender, and Internet use.

Table 3: Effect of Media Usage on Jan 25 Protest Participation

	<i>Dependent variable: Jan 25 Protest</i>	
	Original Model	Weighted Model
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.019** (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)
Female	-0.294* (0.166)	-0.548*** (0.168)
Internet access	0.153 (0.218)	0.096 (0.193)
Phone use	0.355* (0.191)	0.695*** (0.195)
TV use	-0.634** (0.259)	-0.434 (0.280)
SMS use	0.221 (0.139)	0.027 (0.151)
Twitter use	0.678*** (0.196)	0.539** (0.239)
Facebook use	0.762*** (0.195)	0.814*** (0.200)
Face-to-face	-0.006 (0.282)	-0.369 (0.329)
Constant	-1.796*** (0.485)	-1.383*** (0.487)
Observations	1,039	1,039
Log Likelihood	-629.220	-551.523
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,278.440	1,123.046

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix C: Details for January 25 Protest from “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook Page

To help personalize content, tailor and measure ads, and provide a safer experience, we use cookies. By clicking or navigating the site, you agree to allow our collection of information on and off Facebook through cookies. Learn more, including about available controls: [Cookies Policy](#).

facebook [Sign Up](#)

Email or Phone Password [Log In](#)

[Forgot account?](#)

تفاصيل يوم 25 يناير - 25 January

January 24, 2011 at 5:53am

عشان تشوف الصفحة دي كويس
يا ريت تدخل على اللينك ده أفضل

<http://bit.ly/Egypt25>

لو اللينك مشتعلش إقراها من هنا

من نحن

بدأت الدعوة للتظاهر يوم 25 يناير من صفحة كلنا خالد سعيد وهي صفحة على الفيسبوك اتعملت عشان قضية الشهيد خالد سعيد اللي اتقتل من التعذيب والضرب في الشارع في إسكندرية يونيو 2010. الدعوة كانت عفوية ولم يكن مخططا لها من أي قوى سياسية أو شعبية. وبعد ما نشرت الدعوة وبسبب أحداث تونس تشجع كل المصريين للمطالبة بالمشاركة ونشر الفكرة. الصفحة لا تتبع أي حزب أو جماعة أو حركة أو جمعية فالصفحة مستقلة بذاتها وهي لا تؤيد شخصا أو فكرة هي لكل المصريين الذين يريدون الدفاع عن حقوقهم. والصفحة قائمة على جهود ذاتية من الأعضاء في الصفحة وده كان سر نجاحها.

لماذا نتظاهر؟

تمر مصر بواحدة من أسوأ مراحلها التاريخية في كل النواحي. فبرغم التقارير التي تذكرها الحكومة المصرية لتجميل الصورة إلا أنه وللأسف الحقيقة مختلفة عن تلك التقارير. ونزلونا جميعا يوم 25 هو بداية للنهائية، نهاية كل الصمت والرضا والخنوع لما يحدث في بلادنا وبداية لصفحة جديدة من الإيجابية والمطالبة بالحقوق. يوم 25 يناير هو مش ثورة بمعنى إنقلاب لكن هو ثورة ضد الحكومة لنقول لها أننا بدأنا الاهتمام بشؤون بعضنا البعض وسنأخذ كل حقوقنا ولن نسكت بعد اليوم.

هناك 30 مليون مصري مريض بالاكنتاب منهم مليون ونص مرضى بالاكنتاب الجسيم وأكثر من مائة ألف محاولة انتحار خلال عام 2009 تسببت في وفاة 5000 شخص. لدينا 48 مليون فقير منهم مليونان ونصف المليون يعيشون في فقر مدقع. لدينا 12 مليون مصري بدون أي مأوى ومنهم مليون ونصف يعيشون في المقابر.

هناك فساد منهجي أدى إلى وجود قضايا فساد تزيد قيمتها جميعا بأكثر من 39 مليار جنيه خلال عام واحد فقط. ومصر تحتل المركز 115 بين 139 دولة في تقرير التنافسية العالمي من حيث الفساد الحكومي.

هناك أكثر من 3 مليون شاب عاطل ونسبة البطالة بين الشباب تجاوزت 30% ومصر تحتل المركز الأخير بين 139 دولة في معدل الشفافية في التوظيف.

لدينا أعلى معدل لوفيات الأطفال في العالم بواقع خمسين طفلا كل 1000 ولادة. ونصف أطفال مصر تقريبا مصابون بأنيميا و8 ملايين شخص مصاب بفيروس سي. ولدينا أكثر من 100 ألف مصاب بالسرطان سنويا بسبب تلوث المياه. ولدينا سيارة إسعاف لكل 35 ألف مواطن.

في مصر قانون للطوارئ تسبب في وفاة عشرات المصريين من التعذيب والقيض على الآلاف منهم دون وجود أي سند قانوني لعمليات القيص عليهم. وبسبب استخدام الأمن لمراقبة السياسيين وإجهاض نشاطهم فقد نتج عن ذلك تزوير فاضح في انتخابات مجلس الشعب أدت إلى أن الحزب الحاكم يحصل على أكثر من تسعين بالمائة من مقاعد المجلس.

لمعرفة المزيد ومصادر هذه المعلومات يرجى مشاهدة هذا الفيديو.

لماذا يوم 25 يناير؟

في عام 1952 قاوم أجدادنا في جهاز الشرطة بتناديهم العادية الجيش البريطاني بدياباته وجيوشه فاستشهد منهم 50 وأسر أكثر من 100 وصرخوا أروع الأمتلة في التضحية من أجل الوطن. ونحن بعد أكثر من خمسين سنة نعاي الآن من ممارسات جهاز الشرطة الذي أصبح أداة لتعذيب المصريين وإهانتهم. وقد اخترنا هذا اليوم بالذات لأنه يرمز إلى النحام الشرطة مع الشعب وهذا ما نرجو يوم المظاهرة أن يلتحم معنا الضباط المحترمون لأن قضيتنا واحدة. يوم 25 يناير هو إجازة رسمية مما يفتح لكل المصريين المشاركة دون تعطيل أعمالهم.

ما هي مطالبنا؟

المطلب الأول: مواجهة مشكلة الفقر قبل أن تتفجر وذلك باحترام حكم القضاء المصري بزيادة الحد الأدنى للأجور زيادة عادلة خاصة في مجالات الصحة والتعليم لتحسين الخدمات المقدمة للشعب. والعمل على صرف إعانات تصل إلى 500 جنيه مصري لكل شاب خريج جامعي لا يستطيع الحصول على وظيفة وذلك لفترة محددة.

المطلب الثاني: إلغاء حالة الطوارئ والتي تسببت في سيطرة الجهاز الأمني على مصر والقبض على المعارضين لسياسات الحكومة ووضعهم في المعتقلات دون أي ذنب. ونحن نطالب بفرص سيطرة النيابة على الأقسام لوقف عمليات التعذيب المنهجية التي يتم ممارستها في أقسام الشرطة. وتنفيذ أحكام القضاء واحترامها من قبل الحكومة المصرية.

المطلب الثالث: إقالة وزير الداخلية حبيب العادلي بسبب الانقلابات الأمنية الذي تواجهه مصر متمثلاً في الحوادث الإرهابية وانتشار الجرائم التي حدثت على يد ضباط أو عناصر من وزارة الداخلية دون وجود الرادع القوي.

المطلب الرابع: تحديد مدة الرئاسة بحيث لا تتجاوز فترتين متتاليتين لأن السلطة المطلقة مفسدة ولأنه لا توجد دولة متقدمة تسمح لرئيس الجمهورية البقاء عشرات السنين في منصبه. من حقنا أن نختار رئيسنا ومن حقنا ألا يستبد أحد بالسلطة فيحكم البلاد حتى يموت.

طبعاً هناك مطالب كثيرة لكل المصريين في مجالات زى الصحة والتعليم والبدية هي إننا نتحرك مع بعض ونحقق مطلب مطلب عن طريق الضغط على الحكومة وده دورنا كشعب إننا توجه الحكومة ونحاسبها على أداءها ونحدد أولوياتها مش العكس.

أماكن وتوقيت المظاهرات

مهم جداً إننا نفهم إن هدف المظاهرة هو إننا نحشد كل الناس معانا. الناس كلها متضايقة ومظلومة ومش راضية عن حال البلد يبقى لازم نشجعهم بشاركوا وعشان كده عابزين نعمل مسيرات في كل المناطق الشعبية والناس تنزل مع بعض في مسيرات أكثر من عشر أشخاص لحد مكان المظاهرة ده مهم جداً. وعلى فكرة أماكن المظاهرات مش مقصورة على الأماكن المذكورة هنا لأن فيه مظاهرات في أماكن ثانية لم يعلن عنها وهينظم فيها مظاهرات في محافظات مختلفة. المهم إنك تنزل وتعبّر عن رأيك وعضيك بالطريقة التي تقدر عليها.

القاهرة الكبرى

دوران شبرا
دوران المطرية
أمام جامعة القاهرة
شارع جامعة الدول العربية

ملاحظات مهمة: فيه جهات أخرى منظمة مظاهرات ومسيرات في أحياء شعبية في كل أنحاء القاهرة والجيزة وجولان لو كنت في منطقة شعبية انزل يوم 25 يناير وانضم لهم.

الإسكندرية: تم تحديد مكانين للوقف: المكان الأول هو ميدان محطة مصر والمكان الثاني هو ميدان المنشية. على أن تتحرك مسيرات من كل من كل مناطق الإسكندرية تسير عبر الكورنيش أو الشوارع الجانبية وذلك للوصول إلى نقاط التجمع في توقيت المظاهرة بالضبط. فيه مظاهرات أخرى ستخرج من أماكن غير ملعلن عنها ولمعرفة التفاصيل اتصلوا يوم التلات بعد 9 صباحاً على التلفزيون:

015

الإسماعيلية: شارع الثلاثيني وشارع السكة الحديد بجوار حمزاوي - رابط الدعوة على الفيسبوك في الإسماعيلية

الفيوم: مسيرة كبيرة سيقوم بها أهالي الفيوم تبدأ من ميدان الحوامم ببندر الفيوم تمام الساعة الثانية ظهراً

المحلة الكبرى: ميدان البندر وميدان الشون ومنطقة الشعبية والجمهورية وسينم التجمع في مكان خامس سينم الإعلان عنه في المظاهرة

طنطا: أمام مبنى المحافظة بمدينة طنطا والتجمع الساعة الثانية بالضبط

سوهاج: سينم تحديد المكان يوم الاثنين الموافق 24 يناير وللمعلومات متابعة رابط الدعوة على الفيسبوك في سوهاج

ياقي الأماكن: يرجى النزول لأسفل الصفحة والوصول لفقرة أرقام تهمك للحصول على أرقام منسقية المظاهرات في محافظتك.

إرشادات التظاهر

(1) المظاهرة سلمية. نحن دعاة سلام ولسنا دعاة عنف. نحن نطالب بحقوقنا ومن الأولى أن نحافظ على حقوق الآخرين. لن نستجيب لأي محاولات استقراز من الأمن عشان بخرجنا من شعورنا ونحصل اللي هما يخططوا ليه. هدف رئيسي من أهداف الأمن هو تصوير المتظاهرين على إهيم شوية بلطجية عابزين يخربوا البلد. يجب ضبط النفس وعدم التهور وعمل أي شيء يخالف القانون أو يعرض حياة أي شخص لخطر أو يتسبب في الإضرار بأي ممتلكات عامة أو خاصة. وفي حالة تواجد أي أفراد يقوموا بأي عمل عنيف يرجى التكتل حول الشخص واستعباده الفوري من داخل المظاهرة وإبلاغ الأمن عنه.

(2) يرجى التواجد في مكان المظاهرة في الوقت المحدد بالدقيقة. التأخير يتسبب في تشتيت الجهود واحتمال فشل المظاهرة. التواجد في نفس الوقت يجعل من السهل بدأ المظاهرة ويصعب على الأمن فرصة منعها.

٣) عند النزول من البيت لا تحمل أي شيء لا تحتاجه مثل كارتبهات أو الرخص أو بطاقات البنوك. احمل بطاقتك الشخصية ومبلغ كافي لأي طوارئ. ويا ريت متجيبش ساعتك أو أي حاجة تتكسر بسهولة. الزي الأفضل يكون رياضي أو جينز مع وجود جاكيت للحماية من البرد في حالة استمرار المظاهرة أو الاعتصام لوقت طويل. يا ريت كل شخص يجيب معاه قزارة مياه كبيرة لأنه داخل المظاهرة سيكون دائما في عجز في المياه.

٤) يرجى إحضار علم مصر وعدم إحضار أي شعارات أو لافتات خاصة بأي حزب أو حركة أو جماعة أو جمعية أو طائفة دينية. اليوم لكل المصريين لأننا جميعا نطالب بالمساواة في الحقوق والعدالة الاجتماعية ومش عابزين نتفرق.

٥) في حالة عدم نزولك لأي مظاهرات لا تكن في الصفوف الأمامية واطرك الصفوف الأمامية لمن هم أكثر خبرة على قيادة المظاهرة أو المسيرة عشان مبحلش لخطبة في اتخاذ القرارات.

٦) الهتافات موحدة ومتفق عليها. يرجى عدم استخدام أي ألفاظ بذيئة أو الدخول في معارك جانبية مع أفراد الأمن. الأمن المركزي مش هو عدوك. هو مجند نم إجباره أثناء خدمته في الجيش على القيام بهذا الدور وفي حالة عدم طاعته للأوامر يتم معاقبته بأقصى العقوبات. حاول بقدر الإمكان تركز مشاعر غضبك نحو عدوك الحقيقي.

٧) المحاولة قدر الإمكان لعدم تعطيل المرور في الشوارع. نحن لا نعاقب المواطنين نحن نطالب بحقوقنا. طبعاً بتكلم عن التعتيل المتعمد للمرور. لأنه في حالة نزول عشرات الآلاف في أي شوارع سيتم تعطيل المرور ومش ده اللي بتكلم عليه.

٨) متنزليش لوحدك .. أكرر مهم جدا متنزليش لوحدك لأن الأصحاب بيقيدوا في الظروف دي. يا ريت تكون مع حد وأقرب حد صاحبك تنزلوا مع بعض. زي ما بنزل الاستادات وقت المانتشات.

الهتافات الموحدة

فكرة الهتافات الموحدة هي من أهم أفكار التظاهر. كلنا نارلين لمصر ولازم نوحده صفوفنا ونكون إيد واحدة. هنلتزم بالهتافات مع بعض كلنا وهنركز على قضايا البطالة والفقير لأن دي القضايا اللي بتهم المصريين كلهم، ودي الهتافات اللي تم الاتفاق عليها:

تحيا مصر .. تحيا مصر
عيش .. حرية .. كرامة إنسانية
حرية .. حرية .. حرية .. حرية
يا حرية فينك فينك .. الطوارئ بيننا وبينك
مش هنتأف مش هنتأطى .. إحنا كرهننا الصوت الواطى
شعب تونس يا حبيب .. شمس الثورة مش هتغيب
بالروح بالدم .. نغديك يا وطن
ارفع صوتك قول للناس .. احنا كرهننا الظلم خلاص
واحد اتنين .. احنا المصريين
صحي الخلق وهز الكون .. مصر بلدنا مش هتهون
لما شعب تونس قام .. هرب اللص والمدام
حد أدنى للأجور .. قبل الشعب ما كله بنور
حقى الأقي شغل وأعيش .. والملايم ما بتكفيش
يلا يا مصري صحي الروح .. الحرية باب مفتوح
يلا يا شعب عدّي الخوف .. خلي الدنيا تصحى تشوف
شعب حضارة ومجد سنين .. مش هيطاطي ليوم الدين

تليفونات مهمة

التواصل مع المحامين
أرقام جبهة الدفاع عن متظاهري مصر وهم مجموعة من المحامين المتخصصين في دعم المتظاهرين والحفاظ على حقوقهم:

012- -012- -010-

التواصل مع منسقي المظاهرات

القاهرة الكبرى: 010- -015- -012-
الإسكندرية: 018- -014- -015-
الدقهلية: 015- -017- -015-
أسوان: 015-
الغربية: 011- -018- -015-
الإسماعيلية: 010- -015-
بورسعيد: 010- -015-
أسيوط: 014-
سوهاج: 018- & 017-
بنى سويف: 015-
السويس: 015-
البحر الأحمر: 015-
القليوبية: 015-
الشرقية: 015-
قنا والأقصر: 015-

لينكات نهمك

صفحة كلنا خالد سعيد على الإنترنت
الصفحة الرئيسية للدعوة ليوم الثورة على الفساد والبطالة والظلم والتعذيب
الدعوة الخاصة بوقفه محامين مصر لحماية المشاركين في المظاهرات
جبهة الدفاع عن متظاهري مصر

يشاركون في المظاهرات

يجب الإشارة إلى أن المشاركة الأكبر في هذه المظاهرات ستكون من الجماهير المصرية غير المهتمة بالسياسة. لأن الدعوة وصلتهم ولمست مشاكلهم ومآسيتهم. ولهذا فإن الدعوة من الأساس خرجت غير ميسسة وخرجت من صفحة "كلنا خالد سعيد" والتي لا تتبع أي أحزاب أو حركات ذات هدف سياسي. وقد استجابت للدعوة جميع القوى السياسية لأن المطالب واحدة ولأن هذه القوى السياسية قامت بالأساس للدفاع عن حقوق المصريين.

حركة شباب 6 أبريل
الحملة الشعبية لدعم مطالب التغيير
حزب الغد
شباب من أجل العدالة والحرية
جماعة الإخوان المسلمين
حزب الوفد
حركة حشد
حزب الجبهة الديمقراطية
رابطة البرادعي لدعم مطالب التغيير
حزب الكرامة
حملة دعم حمدين صباحي
الاشتراكيون الثوريون
الدكتور محمد البلتاجي
الأستاذ علاء الأسواني
والدة الشهيد خالد سعيد
الكاتب الساخر بلال فضل
المستشار محمود الخضيرى
الفنان عمرو وادك
المخرج محمد دياب
الفنان خالد أبو النجا

English (US) Français (France) Español Türkçe Português (Portugal) العربية Italiano Deutsch हिन्दी 中文(简体) 日本語 +

Sign Up Log In Messenger Facebook Lite Mobile Find Friends Badges People Pages Places Games
Locations Celebrities Groups About Create Ad Create Page Developers Careers Privacy Cookies Ad Choices ▶
Terms Help

Facebook © 2016

Appendix D: Twitter Topic Modeling

To conduct the topic modeling analysis of Egypt-based tweets we first divided the time frame around the protests into six distinct periods. We ran topic modeling with five topics for each period, and manually categorized these topics according to our evaluation of the types of information being communicated. There was a degree of subjectivity to these evaluations, which is why we reproduce all 30 of the topics below. We code a topic “opinions and slogans” if it seems to be articulating a set of prescriptive or diagnostic frames about the state of Egypt and its capacity to change. Often these topics explicitly reflect the discourse used during the revolution (like non-violence and a civil state) and make reference to themes that were central in the protesters’ demands (like police brutality). They also tend to reference important symbols (both positive and negative) of the revolution, including the example of Tunisia, the killing of Khaled Said (a metaphor for police violence), Hosni Mubarak and his close ally Omar Suleiman, and the influential activists Wael Ghoneim. We code a topic “coordination” if its content refers to protest planning and logistics, including the direct enumeration of event details (like protest locations, or dates and times) or the identification of sources where event details could be found (like key phone numbers, Facebook pages, or Twitter handles). We code a topic “news and updates” when its content includes information about events happening in real-time, like dynamics of protesting or the actions of security forces. We code a topic “documentation” if its content appears to be directly providing documentation of or linking to content providing documentation of violence or brutality during the protests. We code a topic “referrals” if its content seems to be directing protesters to another media outlet, usually a print or TV news source that was providing coverage of the protests. “Other” is used for topics that do not fit well into any of these categories.

The first two periods, January 22-23 and January 24 are the preparations for January 25. Most topics in this period, as can be seen are sharing of opinions and slogans, as well as coordination about the upcoming protests. On January 25, news and updates dominates the discourse on Twitter. Opinions and slogans are still widely discussed. Between January 26 and 28 Twitter is blocked in Egypt, however the few tweets that appear in that period reflect similar patterns to January 25; users share news and updates and document violence (particularly in Suez). Between February 2-10, during the sit-in in Tahrir Square, most discussions revolve around opinions about the political situation, and the future of the protests. On February 11 Mubarak steps down, and there is a huge spike in Twitter activity. The discourse on Twitter again mostly revolves around political opinions and slogans.

Date:	January 22 - January 23				
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	
jan25	egypt	jan25		يناير	مصر
egypt	على jan25		عيد الشرطة	يوم jan25	الي اللي
elshahee	protest	عشان wael	واحد	بعد 2011	ثورة
sidibouزيد	الى	الشعب	مبارك	المصرية	مظاهرات
	tunisia			أول	ولا
	egyptian	jan25		الحكومة	الناس
	via		الام	ايام	احنا
	الشباب	للمشترين	shmpongo	mubarak	سعيد
	العرب ramyraoof		وعيد	الثلاثاء	
Category:	Opinions & slogans	Coordination	Opinions & slogans	Coordination	Opinions & slogans

Date:	January 24				
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	
jan25	jan25	jan25	egypt		يوم
	بكرة	على	ولا jan25		يناير
	مصر	انا	الثورة	egypt	
	الي	alyaagad	will		غدا
jan25	egypt	كلنا	tomorrow	jan25	الغضب
	واحد	الله	mubarak		
	ثورة elshahee		الغاز carloslatuff		الامن
	ايه	عشان	ramyraoof		أول
	خالد wael		egyptian	jan	
	نازل	المصريين	support		الشرطة
Category:	Coordination	Other	Opinions & slogans	Opinions & slogans	Coordination

Date:	January 25				
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	
jan25	protest	jan25	egypt	الامن	egypt
	أمام		على	المتظاهرين	jan25
jan25	cairo		الي	ميدان	مصر
gamaleid	jan25		الامن	التحرير	egyrevolt
	now		مبارك	شارع	shorouknew
	الشرطة		على	على	freeegypt
25egypt	الآن		الناس	جامعة	يوم
	egyptian		اليوم	الدول	مظاهرات
	peopl		عاجل	متظاهر	الجزيرة
	street		المنصورة	الان	sidibouزيد
	today				
Category:	News & updates	News & updates	Opinions & slogans	News & updates	Referrals

Date:	January 26 - January 28				
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	
egypt	jan25	egypt	ala	jan25	
jan25	egypt		مبارك	الي	السuez
	السويس		ليه	الشعب	protest
	على	الله	لازم	عاجل	ianinegypt
jan25	على	بلاش	تتظاهر	مظاهرات	street
tahrir	compani		asadx		البرادي
	بعد	leeh	monasosh	fire	
	مصر		يمشي؟	وقالي	malek
mubarak	take	حياة		المحمول	video
	المتظاهرين	محمد	لأنك	خدمات	خير
Category:	News & updates	Other	Other	News & updates	Documentation

Date:	February 2 - February 10				
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	
jan25	mubarak	مصر	jan25	jan25	
egypt	على	revolut	egypt		مبارك
tahrir	الشعب	protest	tahrir		التحرير
3arabawi	jan25	peopl	ghonim	jan25	
new		الثورة	egyptian	cairo	
alarabiyaar		بعد	now		ميدان
alarabiya		الجيش	via	egypt	
	أحمد	النظام	wael	freeegypt	
almasryalyouma		الي	dear		سليمان
	هنا	الارمي	pleas		الرئيس
		now			
Category:	Referrals	Opinions & slogans	Opinions & slogans	Opinions & slogans	Opinions & slogans

Date:	February 11				
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	
25-Jan	25-Jan	مصر	tahrir	egyptian	
egypt		egypt		مبارك	will
mubarak		على	egypt		peopl
tahrir		التحرير	الله	25-Jan	protest
ghonim		الثورة	alarabiya		armi
now		على	alarabiyaar		palac
cairo		قصر		الجيش	now
presid		الي	25-Jan		back
aljazeera		النظام	freemgypt		say
	وائل	ميدان	live		world
Category:	Opinions & slogans	Opinions & slogans	Opinions & slogans	Other	Opinions & slogans