The Psychological Logic of Peace Summits: How Empathy Shapes Outcomes of Diplomatic Negotiations

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Why do some peace summits succeed while others fail? We offer an explanation that highlights the importance of empathy between leaders. Studies in negotiations and psychology show that empathy—the ability to take the perspective of others and understand their cognitive and affective states without necessarily sympathizing with them—is critical in overcoming biases, transcending long-held enmities, and increasing the likelihood of cooperation. We show that empathy is perceptual in nature. Actors can convey it through both words and expressive behaviors in face-to-face interactions. From these, leaders gain an understanding of whether the other side is willing to negotiate in good faith and what a potential agreement might look like. Additionally, we argue that all is not lost if the leaders of warring states prove unable to cultivate these beliefs about each other. A skilled mediator can step in and build relational empathy between disputants. We assess the empirical ramifications of conveyed and relational empathy by comparing two of the most salient Middle East peace process summits with divergent outcomes: success at Camp David 1978 and failure in 2000.

In his waning days in office, US President Bill Clinton engaged in several high-level interpersonal meetings with the recently installed Russian President Vladimir Putin. Despite Clinton’s strong reputation for empathy, his “primordial connection with the pain of the American people,” and his ability to understand the “wants and needs” of ordinary Americans, the Russian delegation found Clinton to be “off-putting, even condescending,” and didactic. Clinton may have been an empathic person, but on this occasion, he did not express it. His behaviors negatively affected Putin. “Putin felt that Russia was betrayed by the U.S. and that’s why the approach was very cautious” (Baker & Glasser 2005, 126). This interaction played an important role in solidifying a relationship of mistrust. It also gives rise to a broader question: What causal role does perceived empathy, or lack thereof, play in diplomacy?

We argue that empathy, and the beliefs individuals hold about their counterpart’s ability to empathize, are critical to the process and outcomes of diplomatic negotiations—and in specific, identifiable, and predictable ways. We develop our claims by drawing from diverse literatures in social psychology, business negotiations, conflict resolution, diplomatic studies, and affective neuroscience. We first demonstrate that numerous findings suggest that empathy—the ability to understand the cognitive and affective states of others without necessarily sympathizing with them—is required for overcoming long-standing hostilities. Individuals use empathy to infer intentions, motivations, positions, and interests; it is also a precursor to trust. Without it, negotiations fail. The history of intractable conflict, such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or the Troubles in Northern Ireland, where a lack of empathy characterizes the relationship, illustrates this point. As UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld put it, “you can only hope to find a lasting solution to a conflict if you have learned to see the other objectively, but, at the same time, to experience his difficulties subjectively” (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 237).

Individuals require empathy to resolve conflict because those engaged in a negotiation, such as a peace summit, need to believe that the other side can understand their interests, positions, and intentions, particularly their desire to negotiate in good faith. This is critical to finding an acceptable zone of possible agreement. To test whether their counterparts have empathy, individuals pay close attention to what their interlocutors express through words and behavior. A wealth of evidence suggests that individuals convey their empathic capacity to each other through expressive signaling: the bodily behaviors, unspoken mimicry, and facial micro-expressions of interpersonal


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social interaction. These signals help individuals form beliefs about whether the other can empathize. This represents the first step of our theory: individuals convey and receive empathic signals to demonstrate their desires for agreement.

We also argue that all is not lost when leaders of warring states fail to effectively empathize with or send empathic signals to each other. While empathy is critical, we suggest that it need not be dyadic between the main protagonists in a conflict. Instead, we argue that mediators have the ability to build empathy between individuals who cannot create it themselves. Thus, when individuals do not empathize directly with each other, as is often the case in protracted conflicts, an empathic mediator can compensate. As Tony Blair (2014) reflects on his role moderating the Northern Ireland Peace Process: “This is not a matter of reason but of emotion … Many of the hundreds of hours I spent in discussion with the parties were not simply about specific blockages or details of the negotiation, but rather about absorbing and trying to comprehend why they felt as they did and communicating that feeling to the other side … I then had inside me something of the passions they felt inside them.” Blair helped each side feel what was important to the other, effectively building empathy between two sides that could not empathize on their own.

Empathy thus has a relational quality. We draw upon recent social-relational work that privileges social ties that occur between actors and the ways in which past and present interactions shape identities, roles, and preferences (Nexon 2010, 10). Recent scholarship in social network analysis (SNA) has applied psychological principles to understand network design. Empathy, in particular, has been shown to predict new social ties developing between unconnected nodes. This turn to psychology in SNA reveals important characteristics of network evolution, helps make predictions about the formation of new network ties, and, to our knowledge, has not yet been incorporated into IR. Ultimately, our theory has two steps. First, we suggest that empathy is something that occurs within individuals, through the reproduction of the mental states of others. Second, empathy can potentially occur between actors, all enabled and facilitated by an empathic mediator.

This argument has significant ramifications for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations. Our theory departs from existing explanations of peace summitry and diplomacy in a number of ways. First, we highlight the role of individual leaders and mediators. While much of the study of diplomacy focuses on the communication of state interests and intentions, we focus on a much more personal level: how individuals cultivate and express a highly personal ability to empathize with another person. We engage with a growing body of literature that seeks to understand how face-to-face interactions and personal diplomacy can credibly reveal private information about leaders’ intentions and desires to negotiate in good faith (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012; Holmes 2013; Yarhi-Milo 2013, 2014). Moreover, our theory highlights how individual behaviors—in particular, signals sent through expressive behaviors, such as emotional expression—are perceived, which in turn affects outcomes. Leaders and mediators who prove unable to convey their ability to empathize may be “leaving money on the table,” since they presumably would benefit from a successful summit, by unnecessarily shrinking the zone of possible agreement, or limiting their ability to find a positive outcome.

While structural constraints, bargaining power, strategic interests, and other negotiation strategies matter for outcomes, relying only on these variables produces misleading and unsatisfying results. As we demonstrate, relying on material variables alone makes it difficult to generalize across cases. Rather, empathy is crucial precisely because it affects how bargaining power, positions, and interests are conveyed, received, and understood. As we elaborate below, leaders and mediators use empathy to better comprehend their counterpart’s motivations, the interests underlying their stated positions, and the concessions they can be expected to make and accept. Communicating this information to other parties is crucial to reaching a bargaining outcome.

In what follows, we first conceptualize empathy, and highlight its particular importance for distributive negotiations and reassurance due to its expressive characteristics. We then examine what happens when expressive empathy fails, turning to relational empathy in peace summitry. We use a plausibility probe to assess the theory in two critical cases—the 1978 and 2000 Camp David Summits, which share many structural characteristics—and assess our argument against leading explanations of these two cases. We conclude with ramifications for IR theory as well as the conduct of diplomacy by policymakers.

What Is Empathy?

As Booth and Wheeler (2008, 237) note, “Empathy is a potentially significant but under theorized concept in foreign policy analysis.” Recent work (see, for example, Wheeler 2013; Crawford 2014; Head 2016a,b) has started taking empathy seriously, partly due to growing recognition that the emotional turn in IR has produced valuable insights, as well as the ability to better understand how empathy works through diverse approaches and sophisticated methods, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain (see Hutchison and Bleiker 2014 and Jeffery 2014 for excellent reviews).

From a neuroscientific perspective, empathy has been separated into two ideal types: affective and cognitive (Cox et al. 2012, 727). The difference is one between “feeling and knowing.” Affective empathy refers to one’s ability to comprehend and respond to another’s emotional states. Cognitive empathy refers to one’s ability to comprehend and understand another’s perspectives and intentions. Empathy is not sympathy, though the two are often conflated. Sympathy is an emotional response of sorrow, care, compassion, or concern to another’s condition. Sympathy often arises because an individual understands the emotional state of another; therefore, empathy can be a precursor to sympathy. As a result, empathy is often associated with prosocial or altruistic behavior and tends to be viewed as a normatively positive ability. But empathy can...
Empathy for international security concerns. As Jervis (2013, 6) notes with respect to conflict, “empathy requires understanding how the other side sees us, and this can be particularly difficult when there is a great gap between its perception and our own self-image.” On the other hand, empathy shows promise for undercutting the security dilemma through the transmittal of intentions and developing of trust, as well as making progress in intractable conflict by lessening the distance between self and other. One strand of research has looked at the relationship between empathy and face-to-face interactions as important to understanding the emergence of trust. Wheeler (2013) argues that empathy played a crucial role in allowing Reagan and Gorbachev to understand each other’s intentions and trust that the other was being sincere. Holmes (2013) argues that salient episodes of empathy aided the German unification process, particularly George H. W. Bush’s face-to-face interactions with Gorbachev.

Empathy and Negotiation Outcomes

Empathy affects the outcome of distributive negotiations. Early negotiations studies viewed emotion, empathy, and expressive behavior as a hindrance to successful outcomes. Folk wisdom offered “clear advice about how to deal with emotions in negotiation: Do not get emotional” (Shapiro 2003, 739). Recent psychology and management studies challenge this view, suggesting that emotion and empathy do not hinder negotiation, but rather can help individuals reach beneficial outcomes. Not only can suppressing emotions have an undesired effect of making agreement more difficult, but it can also prevent the transmission of crucial signals. By being emotionally aware, “[a] negotiator may come to realize the extent to which she wants a particular object (instrumental satisfaction) or a particular kind of treatment and deference (affective satisfaction). With expanded information about the relative importance of interests, parties are more capable of devising options for mutual gain” (Shapiro 2003, 742). Or, as Adam and Shirako (2013, 785) put it, “Emotions convey important information about the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of negotiators and thus elicit behavioral responses from their counterparts.”

More specifically, Fisher and Ury’s (1983) classic work in negotiation theory notes the importance of what is now termed cognitive empathy in order to derive the interests that motivate one’s positions. Since negotiators do not have perfect information about their counterparts’ interests, those who do not try to take the other side’s perspective may fail to find rational outcomes that would leave both sides in a better position than non-agreement (Trötschel et al. 2011). Put another way, in order to rationally find a zone of possible agreement, both sides must understand the interests and positions of the other, including their best alternative to a negotiated agreement. Crucially, this is as much about determining objective bottom lines as it is about understanding how others understand their own positions. As Acland (1995, 57) argues, people “are not motivated by facts: they are motivated by their perceptions of the facts, their interpretations of the facts, their feelings about the facts.” Or, as Crawford (2014, 550) puts it: “[t]he perception and creation of interests is an emotional process as well as one rooted in a material reality or drive for power.” These perceptions explain why far-reaching concessions can be viewed as insincere or small concessions can be viewed as meaningful. Finally, the literature shows that empathy helps negotiators solve intractable conflict by transforming the perception of the negotiation from fixed-pie to expanded-pie in nature (Galinsky et al. 2008). (We have placed more discussion of empathy and negotiation in the online supplementary material.)

Crucially, conveying empathy to the other may be as important as actually possessing it. For instance, Alex Pentland (2008, 12) demonstrates that signals of empathy can improve negotiation outcomes by up to 30%, all else being equal. These studies have significant ramifications for diplomatic negotiations.

**Table 1. Key concepts associated with the construct of empathy**
(adapted from Decety 2010)

| Empathy is the ability to understand the cognitive and affective states |
| Empathy is distinct from both sympathy and perspective-taking |
| Empathy includes both affective and cognitive components |
| Empathy includes bottom-up processing of affective arousal, emotion awareness and understanding, as well as top-down processing in which the perceiver’s motivation, memories, intentions, and attitudes |
Empathic Capacity vs. Empathy Conveyance

For empathy to have effects in diplomacy, actors must convey it to others. Individuals who do not believe that their counterparts have the ability to understand their interests are less likely to engage in good-faith negotiations. They will question the other’s ability to find an acceptable agreement and will likely find themselves in stalled discussions due to the biases discussed above. This is because the ability to empathize, often referred to as empathic capacity, is a dispositional and measurable trait, but it is ultimately useless if not conveyed to others. Individuals in negotiations act on beliefs about empathic capacity. Unable to directly measure someone’s empathic capacity, individuals infer it through the other’s expressive behaviors.

As such, empathy has a contextual element as well. A variety of findings show that individuals convey and infer empathic capacity through facial cues, emotions, interpersonal mimicry, gestures, and language (Pentland 2008). Facial expressions such as “eyebrows pulled down and inward over the nose, head forward, intense interest in evocative events” all express empathic concern (Zhou et al. 2003, 275). Studies of the clinician–patient relationship show that nonverbal communication—posture, eye contact, social touch—reveals a capacity for empathy (Montague et al. 2013). Researchers can accurately approximate levels of conveyed empathy by studying behavioral indicators. Many of these studies use videos of patient–doctor interaction or interaction transcripts where the indicators, either behavioral or linguistic, are observable. The idea behind this demonstrates that when individuals convey empathy behaviorally, the process is observable. While these indicators are limited by what the researcher can pick up on and may also correlate with outcomes additional to empathy, psychological studies suggest that these observable indicators are highly correlated with levels of conveyed empathy. Additionally, language can convey empathy. Psycholinguists model language as a mechanism for conveying both affective and cognitive information. While this is not as simple as identifying “empathy words,” the essential logic is similar: certain lexical configurations convey empathy more than others (cf. Gibson et al. 2015). Similar to behavior synchrony, language style synchrony in interactions can predict perceived empathy as well (Lord et al. 2015). These findings suggest that by viewing and interpreting expressive behaviors, leaders gain not only a sense of sincere intentions, but also a sense of whether the other can truly understand their positions and interests. Face-to-face interaction not only builds, but also reveals empathy.

While empathic capacity is largely dispositional, individuals are able to convey their empathic capacity, or lack thereof, to others despite their actual empathic capacity. Someone who possesses empathic capacity may come off as unempathic, and someone who lacks empathic capacity may be able to convey that they are empathic through their behaviors. Thus, we delineate causal mechanism: the conscious or unconscious signaling of empathy or lack of empathy in face-to-face interactions leads to received inferences regarding negotiation intentions, thereby affecting outcomes. The above discussion leads us to generate the following hypothesis, which represents the first step in our theory:

(H1): Leaders use beliefs about empathic capacity, engendered through face-to-face interactions, as credible information of the other’s intention to negotiate in good or bad faith. All else being equal, assessment of good faith intentions is more likely to result in negotiated agreement; whereas, assessment of bad faith intentions is more likely to result in non-agreement.

The Mediator and Relational Empathy

The ability to convey empathy is productive for both reassurance and distributive negotiations. However, a lack of conveyed empathy characterizes many intractable conflicts. A puzzle thus emerges: Why do substantive peace summits—those that are not perfunctory—often succeed even when they are characterized by a stark lack of mutual understanding between leaders of warring states? After all, if successful negotiations require conveyed empathy, how is it that peace summits ever succeed? A deficit in the capacity, or desire, to empathize should imply that obtaining negotiated settlements remains quite difficult.

We argue that the success or failure of peace summits can depend on the ability of a mediator to build relational empathy between two leaders who are unable to convey empathy to each other directly. Relational empathy is a concept that developed out of conflict resolution (Broome 2008) and has been used to increase dialogue between groups in conflict. Broome, for example, argues that adding an interaction component—focused on problem-solving workshops and interpersonal dialogue—to the individual-focused psychological construct of empathy makes conflict resolution more successful. Like emotion, empathy is both something that one experiences in the body, as well as something that emerges from, and exists within, social relations.4

Focusing on relational empathy requires consideration of the social ties, interaction, communication, practices, and exchanges that occur between objects of analysis. Our objects are leaders or diplomats, though we do not imply that individuals are either analytically or ontologically prior to the relations that they have with each other. While we do not imply an actor-only model, we aim to incorporate a social network perspective with individual psychological differences within the network. As such, we combine individual psychology with social networks, a move that parallels recent developments in SNA (Kalish and Robins 2006). In particular, studies combining SNA and psychology demonstrate an independent and causal role for perceived empathy. Specifically, those who are perceived as highly empathic possess a greater ability to forge social ties relative to those who are perceived as less empathic (Kleinbaum et al. 2015). Driving this is the simple notion that “[e]mpathic people make others feel understood in their company . . . [f]eeling as if one’s perspectives and feelings are understood by someone else is thought to make people feel ‘that they are worthy of respect, of being heard, and that their feelings and behaviors make sense,’ providing a sound basis for an interpersonal relationship” (Kleinbaum et al. 2015, 3). Thus, individual differences in perceived empathy play a significant role in explaining network and relational outcomes (Estrada and Arrigo 2014, 3).

4 The extent to which emotion is “social” remains an ongoing debate. See, for example, Mercer 2014; McDermott 2014; Bially-Matern 2014 for recent theorizing of this issue. We have also placed more discussion of emotions in IR in the online supplementary material.
Bringing these insights together, we can construct a model of relational empathy in diplomacy. It contends that mediators who are perceived as empathic may be able to build empathy between separate dyads. They do so by strongly conveying a capacity for empathy through face-to-face interactions with each disputant, which includes exhibiting an understanding of both sides, signaling empathy through expressive behaviors, and using empathic discourse. The individuals in the dyad must each believe that the mediator understands his or her interests, positions, and desires for the future. In such cases, an empathic tie is formed between the mediator and disputant. Once these ties are formed in each dyad, the mediator helps both sides build mutual understanding. Here, the causal mechanism lies in the mediator signaling empathy or lack of empathy to one or both disputants. They, in turn, infer signals of the mediator’s ability to understand their interests and positions to the mediator, who is able to then find an acceptable zone of possible agreements where the two disputants, on their own, could not. We thus arrive at the following hypothesis:

\[(H_2): \text{Mediators who are able to understand and convey the perspectives of each side to the other are more likely to generate relational empathy between the protagonists, thereby increasing the likelihood of an agreement. Mediators who do not convey empathic capacity to both sides will fail to generate relational empathy between the protagonists, thereby decreasing the likelihood of an agreement.}\]

Crucially, relational empathy differs from the creation of trust between the mediator and the disputants. Kydd (2006) argues that successful mediators are those who can demonstrate to each side of an interaction that they are trustworthy. This allows each actor in the dyad to disclose true preferences and interests to the mediator. In this case, the mediator plays an information-revealing role. We do not discount this role of the mediator but suggest that relational empathy can exist even if the mediator and protagonists do not trust each other. Empathy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trust. Finally, we also consider the relationship between empathy and deception, both among disputants or mediators, and the role it may play in shaping summit outcomes in the online appendix.

**Relational Empathy at Camp David? A Tale of Two Summits**

In the following section, we illustrate some of these dynamics in two peace summits by conducting a plausibility-probe-based comparison. We compare the successful summit in 1978 at Camp David I (CD1) negotiated by Israeli PM Menachem Begin, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and US President Jimmy Carter, with the failed Camp David II (CD2) summit in 2000 negotiated by Israeli PM Ehud Barak, Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat, and US President Bill Clinton.

We test the plausibility of our framework as a method of understanding whether individuals convey empathic capacity in diplomatic interactions through expressive behaviors and whether these signals have a significant impact on the outcomes of peace summits. We focus both on discursive evidence that includes references to decision-makers’ assessments of the other leader’s personality, as well as predicted behavioral indicators of empathy, including specific facial and bodily gestures, language consistent with empathy, and personal chemistry between the actors. For measurement, we borrow from the aforementioned psychology studies on empathy that assess levels of empathy from behavioral and physiological indicators. We also borrow from studies in linguistics and discourse analysis that identified empathy discourse constructs and dictionaries. While we are limited to what negotiators wrote down and reported in post-hoc reports/memoirs, this allows us to link our proposed causal mechanisms with observable indicators that have been identified by existing studies. We do not necessarily take statements about empathy at face value; however, we triangulate such evidence with additional sources, such as interviews with participants, in order to gain a measure of the presence or absence of beliefs about empathy.

**Why the Camp David Summits? Examining the “Standard Story”**

The two Camp David (CD) summits provide a good opportunity to examine our theory. The validity of causal inference in qualitative casework increases when variation in the variable(s) of interest is maximized and confounding factors minimized. Both summit meetings were convened to solve a territorial dispute between Israel and an Arab entity/state, and involved an expectation of an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for recognition/peace. They involved the United States as a mediator, specifically a president from the Democratic Party, who was intimately involved in the negotiations and familiar with the protagonists of both parties prior to the summit. Limited direct negotiations and a lack of trust between disputants characterized both summits; the bulk of the social interaction occurred between each side and the mediator. Both summits involved negotiations over extremely high-stakes existential issues. As such, demonstrating that conveyed empathy impacts negotiation outcomes, even when material interests and ideology exert their strongest pull, would provide considerable support for our argument. The two summits feature important differences as well. To address this challenge, we use process tracing to test “whether each of the potentially causal variables that differ between two closely but imperfectly matched cases can or cannot be ruled out as causal” (Bennett and George 1997). For each summit, we evaluate the relative causal role of prominent alternative arguments, and explain why they are either unconvincing or themselves a function of the presence or absence of empathic capacity.

Perhaps most importantly, existing explanations of the two summits have often conformed to *standard stories*, where analysis involves positing relatively simple cause/effect relationships in order to create a comprehensible sequential narrative of a political outcome. There are two main problems with this type of storytelling (we provide more discussion of standard stories in the online supplementary material). First, as Tilly (2008a, 21; 2008b, 70) notes, “[stories] ignore the intricate webs of cause and effects that actually produce human social life,” and “omit a large number of likely causes, necessary conditions, and especially, competing explanations of whatever
happened….” Moreover, standard stories tend to over-
privilege dispositional accounts of actions. “[They] trot
out a few actors whose dispositions and actions cause
everything that happens within a limited time and place”
(Tilly 2000a, 21). For example, Telhami (1990, 157) has
argued that CD1 can be explained largely through the
cause and effect of “one primary variable: the change
in the distribution of regional and international power.”
Telhami’s account is sequential, the cause and effect is
simple, and the overall story is compelling. As an account
of CD1, it provides tremendous insight into the outcome,
and we do not dispute that it holds some truth to it.
Transposing that same model of power and interests to
CD2, however, becomes more problematic; as we will
show, the story that worked for CD1 does not explain
the outcome of CD2, and those standard stories that explain
CD2 cannot account for CD1.

We argue, both here as well as in the online appendix,
that by incorporating the social-relational component
discussed above, we can build upon these standard stories in
such a way that makes them both more transposable and
generalizable across cases. Our emphasis on the relations
and positions of actors within the broader social setting,
as well as the attributes of the actors that are derived from
their relations with others, allows us to combine an actor-
centered account with a more relational perspective.6

Camp David I

Pre-Summit Empathic Capacity Assessments

The beginning of the CD1 process largely involved the
mediator (Carter) assessing the main protagonists (Sadat
and Begin), in addition to the history of the region as well
as relative power and economic capabilities of Egypt and
Israel. Carter did this in order to understand their sincere
interests and positions, to see if agreement was possible,
and to evaluate if the protagonists had the capacity to
work with each other. Carter’s intuition held that both
structural considerations and personal psychologies would
prove important to finding agreement (cf. Carter 1995,
327). Specifically, put into a room together, was it likely
that Sadat and Begin could empathize with each other in
order to build mutual understanding? Carter felt confi-
dent that they could and was optimistic about the future.
As Quandt (2014), member of the National Security
Council in the Carter administration and active member of
the CD1 negotiations, puts it, “Carter . . . had a personal
investment in peace in the Holy Land . . . This was a mis-
163–64) words, “detect [Carter’s] pattern of thinking on
him revealed some important aspects of his personal-
ity: “Begin believes that face-to-face meetings with world
leaders can bring about changes in their approaches to
complex and seemingly intractable international prob-
lems. In line with this belief, he says that the United States
and Israel can come to an understanding on the Arab
question.”7 Carter’s subsequent personal interactions with
Begin also helped him form a belief that Begin was differ-
ent from his reputation as an intransigent hardliner
(Carter 1995, 297).

Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 signaled his
ability to empathize with Israeli interests and perspectives.
Nonetheless, the administration still needed to determine
what he really wanted: Would a separate bilateral peace
deal with Israel suffice or “does he need something
more”? To answer this question, the administration tried
to fully understand Sadat’s mental state, a strategy that
involved numerous interactions. They spent a year “at-
tempt[ing] to get inside his head . . . we realized he had
agency . . . we tried to find out what he really cared about
(Quandt 2014). A similar endeavor was undertaken with
Begin: “Is Begin simply too intransigent to deal at all with
these issues?” Through a series of face-to-face interactions,
the Carter administration ended up gaining glimpses into
the “backstage” of the Israeli thought process. “We had
seen little hints of a side of Begin that was a little bit more
pragmatic . . .,” leading to a sense that he did really want
an agreement (Quandt 2014). The meetings helped
“[break] through the political drama that [Begin] was
very good at creating and we saw a different side of [the]
man” (Quandt 2014).

Therefore, as CD1 began, Carter felt confident that he
could generate empathy on both sides. As he explained to
his advisors: “I think I can bring them to understand each
other’s positions better. My intention is to meet with them
for a couple of days, try to work through the misunder-
standing, and within a very few days—two or three at the
most, we will reach agreement on broad principles”
(Rosenbaum and Ugrinsky 1994, 162).

Personal Interactions and Empathy at CD1

Almost immediately after arriving at Camp David, it be-
came clear that the optimism reflected in this statement
was misplaced, perhaps naïve. Begin demurred at the
notion of direct talks with Sadat, preferring team negoti-
ations. Carter (1995, 340) “spelled out to Begin the advan-
tages of a good rapport between [Begin] and Sadat during
the days ahead . . . [and] believed that as they got to know
each other, it would be easier for them to exchange ideas
without rancor or distrust.” Begin eventually agreed to
direct talks. Although the Israeli delegation was disappointed
and left the room “without being certain of Egyptian in-
tention” (Dayan 1981, 162), the meeting allowed Begin to
draw inferences from Carter’s expressive behaviors, con-
firming hypothesis H1. “While arguing with Sadat,” Dayan
(1981, 163) admits, “[Begin] took careful note of the re-
marks—and facial expression—of Carter to try to discern
intentions, which points he supported and which he
opposed.” Begin later used this data to, in Dayan’s (1981,
163–64) words, “detect [Carter’s] pattern of thinking on
some of the subjects.”

The second trilateral meeting was far less collegial.
Heated arguments erupted, and “[a]ll restraint was now
gone . . . the niceties of diplomatic language and protocol

6While we maintain many aspects of a “choice-theoretic approach,” we
show that the relations/positions of actors in summitry play a crucial role in
the summit’s outcome, thereby moving us slightly closer to a social–relational

7Declassified document CRM-77-13279.
were stripped away . . . It was mean. They were brutal to each other . . . personal” (Carter 1995, 359). Sadat, summing up his views from the meeting, said, “Minimum confidence does not exist anymore since Premier Begin has acted in bad faith” (Carter 1995, 360). The two protagonists could not stand being in the same room together, let alone convey empathy to one another. Carter reluctantly separated them and tried a different tactic of building mutual understanding.

This approach required Carter to convey to each side his sincere assessment of the other protagonist, a process that occurred at both cognitive and affective levels: “[i]t was clear that we had a long way to go . . . Over the next eleven days, I was to spend much of my time defending each of the leaders to the other” (Carter 1995, 347). He reminded Sadat of “the imperatives of political life for Begin in a democracy.” He reminded Begin of “the sensitive role Sadat was having to play in representing, without their expressed approval, the interests of other Arabs” (Carter 1995, 347). Similarly, he stressed to Begin that “Sadat’s courage and his personal sacrifice in making the peace initiative” signaled Sadat’s intention to negotiate in good faith. A recently declassified briefing memo suggests that conveying understanding was precisely the strategy: “Begin should understand that you [i.e., Carter], without taking sides on the specific issues at hand, can understand why Sadat, from his perspective, believes that his act has not yet been reciprocated,” referencing Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem (FRUS 1977–1980, vol. 9, 23).

Carter also went to great lengths to convey to Begin that Sadat was flexible when it came to finding the ultimate arrangement that would bring about peace, despite what he said publicly—effectively giving Begin “backstage” access to Sadat’s true intentions. Carter (1995, 373) indicated to Begin that there “were some things the Egyptians could not propose as their own preference,” but may nevertheless be willing to accept. As the same briefing memo mentioned above suggests, “convey[ing] to [Begin] our understanding of Sadat’s reluctance to [normalize relations] in the absence of something he can use in the wider Arab context,” was critical (FRUS 1977–1980, vol. 9, 23). Carter attempted to instill in Begin his own reading of Sadat’s intentions—intentions that suggested that a deal could be made. One of Begin’s biographers, Gordis (2014, 72), argues that Begin eventually “intuited” such a deal with Sadat after these interactions with Carter, where Sadat would gain peace and the Sinai, thus satisfying the wider Arab constituency.

At each turn, Carter attempted to take what he had learned, not of stated positions, but of sincere intentions and desires, and convey them to the other, thus slowly building relational understanding between the two. When Sadat expressed his concerns that Begin lacked empathy, given his history, Carter (1995, 346) “pointed out that Begin was a man of integrity and honor, with very deep and long-held opinions . . . He had spent a lifetime in public affairs developing his ideas, expounding them, and defending them, even at great personal danger.” Sadat responded by promising “to go to extremes in being flexible, in order to uncover the full meaning of Begin’s positions” (Carter 1995, 346). One particularly critical position to convey to Sadat was that “Begin was not going to pretend for a moment that Jerusalem was up for discussion” (Gordis 2014, 173). Sadat understood this and dropped it as an issue.

As expected by hypothesis H1, Carter’s ability to convey to each protagonist what the other desired depended on him being perceived as empathetic so that both sides felt comfortable sharing their intentions. With Sadat, conveying empathy was relatively straightforward. Shortly after a side trip to visit Gettysburg, Sadat made an “interesting observation”: “Since our visit to Gettysburg he had been thinking that I, as a Southerner, could understand what it meant to be involved in a terrible war, and also knew how difficult it was to rebuild both material things and the spirit of a people after a recognized defeat” (Carter 1995, 398). Sadat and Carter connected on an emotional level, and Sadat indicated that Carter could understand him, thus giving Sadat confidence that Carter could empathize with his position.

Lacking the same type of relationship with Begin, Carter found conveying empathy more difficult. Begin seemed skeptical of Carter, perhaps stemming from a lack of trust on both sides. As Quandt notes, Carter “never quite trusted Begin,” and Begin likely did not trust Carter either, especially because “Begin’s family history made him very distrustful of Arabs, non-Jews.” Nevertheless, during the same Gettysburg trip, Carter (1995, 380) wanted to show “that the people of our country had suffered horribly when brothers fought each other.” He also wanted to connect the war experience with his own family, showing that he, like Begin and Sadat, came from a lineage where war was foundational. This made an impression on Begin. Dayan (1981, 171) notes that Carter “could not contain his feelings as the [Gettysburg tour guide] gave his dry recital, and he injected his own observations . . . He did so with great emotion . . .” Begin, moved, quietly recited the Gettysburg Address. Rosalynn Carter argues that this was a turning point, and as Wright (2014, 173) argues, this may have been the moment where “Begin really did appreciate what peace was and what it could be for his country.”

Carter’s strategy of conveying to Begin that he understood Begin’s position culminated toward the end of the summit:

….when it looked like everything was going to break down then, Prime Minister Begin sent me over some photographs of me and him and President Sadat and wanted me to autograph them . . . And instead of just putting my signature on it . . . I personally autographed it to his granddaughters and grandsons . . . and I carried it over to him in one of the most tense moments and I handed it to him . . . And he and I had quite an emotional discussion about the benefits to my two grandchildren and to his if we could reach peace. And I think it broke the tension that existed there (Carter and Richardson 1998, 160–61).

Carter said to Begin, “I wanted to be able to say, ‘This is when your grandfather and I brought peace to the Middle East’” (Wright 2014, 259). Begin told Carter, with tears running down his cheeks, “Why don’t we try one more time?” After seeing Begin’s tears, Carter also began to cry (Carter and Laue 1992, 287), an important moment of interpersonal mimicry, which is a key indicator of empathy. Since this occurred precisely when the negotiations

8Undated Quandt interview: http://91581084.weebly.com/william-quandt.html (accessed June 1, 2016). This was also reflected early in the summit with the Israeli delegation assuming that the phones in their rooms were bugged (Shilon 2012, 307).
are going poorly, it suggests the empathy displayed had a causal role in affecting the eventual outcome. As Anderson (2013, 114) argues, Carter and Begin “opened an empathic horizon for dialogue across intransigent differences.”

“Breakthrough”

Having monitored carefully what both sides said, and did not say, Carter realized three crucial points for reaching the eventual agreement: both sides wanted an agreement; Carter believed he understood which issues were vital to both sides; and most importantly, he understood which issues were not critical. In the words of Cyrus Vance (1983, 223):

Carter told the political team of his concern that in our preoccupation with the West Bank–Gaza complex of issues . . . we had overlooked a chance to negotiate an Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty. He noted that not only did the differences on the Israeli–Egyptian bilateral issues seem less profound in this area, but also that the presence of Sadat and Begin provided a unique opportunity to negotiate a framework for a peace treaty between [the] two . . .

Not everyone agreed. Most of the State Department specialists had “fundamentally different judgment[s] . . . on what Sadat needed as political cover” (Quandt 1986, 218). They believed that Sadat would insist on a resolution of the Palestinian problem in order to demonstrate “that he was not abandoning his Arab brothers” (Vance 1983, 223). Relying on his interactions with both sides, Carter believed that only a minimal degree of linkage to the West Bank and Gaza issues was necessary and that it would not obstruct the search for a bilateral agreement. As Quandt (2014) explains, it was not that Carter did not care about the Palestinian issue. Rather, he realized that for political and ideological reasons, Begin would not agree to give up claims to the West Bank and Gaza. Carter could, however, push Begin on dismantling settlements in Sinai. Part of arriving at this strategy involved trying to disaggregate Begin’s “core position” from his “negotiating style,” or “political drama,” cultivated through distracting exercises in diction, the placement of commas, and so forth (Quandt 2014). Once Carter saw through this negotiating style and recognized Begin’s “other side,” the path to cooperation became clearer (Quandt 2014). Pushing Begin on Palestine would not be productive. Carter also believed that Sadat could accept his trade-off proposal: dropping reference to withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for Israeli willingness to leave Sinai completely, Sadat’s top priority.

Carter’s ability to take the perspectives of the two sides allowed him to recognize a zone of potential agreement that other members of his team did not. This strategy also required exerting more pressure on Begin to commit to dismantling the Sinai settlements, which he was not yet willing to do. As Begin pledged at one point: “My right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement” (Reynolds 2010, 323). Carter was able to see through this (Quandt 2014). Carter’s strategy to push Begin on Sinai but not the West Bank and Gaza paid off, and a breakthrough occurred when Begin agreed to have the Knesset vote on removing the Sinai settlements, contingent upon settling all other Sinai issues. The final agreement was by no means perfect. But, as Quandt (1986, 258) puts it, “Carter was very much the architect of the Camp David Accords. He had played the role of the draftsman, strategist, therapist, friend, adversary and mediator. He deserved much of the credit for the success and he bore the blame for some of the shortcomings.” Or, as Begin put it: “The Camp David conference should be renamed. It was the Jimmy Carter conference . . . the President of the United States won the day.”

Discussion and Competing Explanations

In sum, we find support for our hypotheses. From the outset, the summit was characterized by leaders attempting to draw inferences from each other’s expressive behavior, in particular their empathic capacity (H1). These inferences became particularly important for Carter, who initially thought that Sadat and Begin would be able to empathize with each other. When it became clear that the two leaders could not do so, Carter changed strategies and signaled empathic capacity to each of the protagonists individually. Negative beliefs about empathic capacity were intimately linked to the two leaders’ assessments of bad-faith negotiations—Carter’s strong signals of empathy, such as his willingness to listen and understand each disputant while engaging emotionally with each of them through words and behavior, compensated for the absence of such signals between Begin and Sadat. The mimicry displayed by Carter and Begin toward the end of the summit suggests that these signals were indeed difficult to manipulate and therefore taken as honest signals. These honest signals were sent and received despite indications that Carter and Begin did not trust each other. As predicted by hypothesis H2, Carter’s strategy led the two leaders to become more accommodating in their positions vis-à-vis each other, moving the negotiations from zero-sum to positive-gain, and eventual agreement. While Sadat and Begin did not come to mutual understanding through dyadic interactions, they were able to nevertheless empathize with each other, suggesting the development of relational empathy.

This case also demonstrates the development of mutual understanding between the two leaders. At the beginning of CD1, “there was no compatibility at all between Begin and Sadat on which to base any progress” (Carter 1995, 328). As Quandt (1986, 317) argues, this assessment may even underestimate the incompatibility: “[t]he depth of their distrust, even hatred, was hard for [Carter] to understand.” By the end of the summit, however, a warmer interpersonal relationship formed. While one should not read too much into comments at a signing ceremony, Begin “complimented Sadat profusely, frequently referring to him as a friend” (Gordis 2014, 174). In his speech, Begin spoke of a particular Jewish teaching where “there is a tradition that the greatest achievement of a human being is to turn his enemy into a friend, and this we do in reciprocity . . . And, indeed, we shall go on working in understanding, and in friendship, and with good will” (174–75).

Other compelling explanations for the outcome of the summit exist. Some have suggested that CD1 was bound to succeed since the negotiations did not involve sensitive issues such as settlements in the West Bank or the status of Jerusalem. Others suggest that the decline of Soviet Union’s “capacity and willingness to aid Egypt” (Telhami 1990, 47), due in large part to economic disparities
between the two superpowers, combined with changes in the regional distribution of power meant that Sadat may have been more inclined to cooperate with the United States and, thus, concede more. Sadat’s unilateral gestures and declarations during his visit to Jerusalem, as well as the secret contacts between the two delegations prior to the summit, revealed too much of his bargaining position, allowing Israel to exploit him (Morrow 1999). Finally, one could argue that indicators of empathy and indicators of bargaining success go hand-in-hand: when negotiations succeed, the participants tend to become more accommodating over time. As such, where we see empathy, others may see rational information-sharing behavior.

These explanations are misleading or incomplete for five main reasons. First, with respect to expectations regarding the success of the summit, there was significant concern in the Carter administration about the likelihood of the summit’s success prior to and during the summit: “I asked Mondale, Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, and Jordan to come to Camp David . . . none of us thought we had much chance of success, but we could not think of a better alternative” (Carter 1995, 316–17). Once word of the summit got out, Carter (1995, 324) was “deluged with warnings from my closest advisers and friends,” with Congress concerned about damaging the US-Israel relationship. Second, as we noted, the road was rocky in the early days of the summit according to all accounts. This was not a perfunctory summit where agreement was guaranteed. Thus, changing power dynamics might have created an opportunity for peace, but there was nothing deterministic about that opportunity succeeding. Indeed, as even Telhami (1990, 157) suggests, power dynamics created only an “inclination toward a bilateral agreement,” rather than destined success.

Third, there is no evidence of any overt use of power by Carter to bring either Sadat or Begin in line. While he certainly reminded both sides about the consequences of failure, the discussions were as much about personal relationships as geopolitics. When Sadat threatened to leave, Carter reminded him that his action would damage their personal friendship. Carter had “an aversion to hard bargaining,” as well as “posturing for the crowd back home, making extreme offers, [and] exaggerating the significance of concessions” (Princen 1991, 60). Thus, while US power remains ever present in any negotiation, Carter and his team did not resort to overt power politics, even when they could have.

Fourth, we note that even in straightforward explanations that attribute the success of the summit to the distribution of power and interests, rather than interpersonal relations, there is often slippage between levels of analysis. Consider Telhami’s account. While power and interests provide the structural inclination to find agreement, Telhami moves to the domestic and individual levels in order to explain the actual outcome. Bargaining behavior at the summit, for example, “correspond[s] well to differences in the system of government and in the personalities of the leaders” (Telhami 1990, 180). More specifically, Telhami (1990) writes, “Sadat’s personality was especially unsuited to good bargaining” (4), and “[i]n his dealings with foreign leaders Sadat often failed to distinguish between personal (social) and state (professional) relations” (176). According to Telhami, this worked to Carter’s advantage: While Carter was generally a poor strategic bargainer (179), he possessed a number of traits, such as being overoptimistic and trusting. Like Sadat, Carter found separating personal and professional roles difficult (179). This worked well because Sadat heavily valued personal friendship and loyalty (176). Similarly, Stein’s (1999, 252) account highlights traditional rationalist variables, but also finds a role for personality characteristics and style. This move to interpersonal dynamics at the summit in these accounts suggests that even a straightforward power/interests standard story is ultimately unsatisfying. Power and interests play out among actual individuals, and accounting for how is crucial to explaining diplomatic outcomes. However, rather than just adding personal dynamics to the story without theorizing their effects, we argue that it is necessary to precisely articulate, in an independent and causal way, what specific personal characteristics are relevant (empathy and conveyed empathy) for the outcome and how they play out in particular interactions (the development of relational empathy).

Finally, we grant that while some observable implications of our causal mechanism resemble those of other mechanisms, such as a standard rationalist reading or bargaining behavior perspective, other independent evidence stands out as indicative of empathy. Carter’s appeal in Gettysburg to empathy in matching the shared historical experience between the US/Israeli/Egyptian delegations, the emotional appeal of the photographs, the mimicry in emotional response that occurred subsequently, and use of highly empathic discourse in the dyadic interactions between Carter and Begin/Sadat throughout the second half of the summit constitute evidence of processes outside a rationalist power/interest framework. We argue that without these moments of empathy, the agreement likely would have failed. After all, Carter engaged with Sadat and Begin with empathy not when the negotiations were going well, but when they were going poorly and the leaders wanted to leave Camp David. The timing of the shifts in the momentum of the summit, as we pointed out, as well as the discourse about why the shift took place, all point to the role of Carter’s expressive signals.

Most importantly, the standard rationalist story does not neatly transpose to other cases, even when the main variables of interests are similar in value. We now turn to one such example.

Camp David II

The standard story about the role of power and interests in determining the outcome of peace summits cannot adequately explain the failure of CD2. President Clinton saw it as a major objective in his final term to broker a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The summit was his last opportunity as president to complete the process that began with the signaling of Oslo I during his first term. The Israeli side not only urged convening this summit, but also made by far the most generous concessions Israel had ever offered to the Palestinians during this summit. The prime minister of Israel realized that for both domestic political and strategic reasons, Israel would fare better concluding this final agreement at that moment. And indeed, the failure of this summit had significant adverse consequences, many of which the delegation members anticipated: the failure of CD2 led to the collapse of the Oslo framework, the fall of Ehud Barak and the delegitimization of Yasser Arafat, and the eruption of a second Intifada, and created a stain on the legacy of Clinton as the president who was unable to “seal the deal.” Why then, despite the strong interests of the two actors
with the most bargaining power, the United States and Israel, did CD2 result in dismal failure?

We argue that this standard story fails to explain the outcome of CD2 precisely because it neglects how leaders’ cognitive and affective abilities to convey empathy during the bargaining process affect the outcome of negotiations. While the peace conference between Israel and the Palestinian authority mediated by the United States did not fail solely because of concerns about empathy, we find support for our theory’s hypotheses in the accounts of members from all three delegations. First, we observe significant evidence indicating that all three leaders used expressive signals of empathy to infer intentions to negotiate in bad faith. Second, due to the lack of perceived empathic capacity between Arafat/Barak, the role of Clinton as a mediator became crucial. However, unlike Carter, Clinton failed to build relational empathy between Arafat/Barak. Ultimately, the negative expressive signals of empathy within the dyadic interactions, according to members’ accounts, significantly impacted the outcome of the summit and negatively affected the prospects for agreement.

Pre-Summit Assessments

Barak and Arafat came to the negotiating table with different agendas. Barak urged President Clinton to convene a summit to conclude a final status agreement. Reading intelligence reports, Barak reasoned that if the peace process did not move forward, violence would soon erupt in the Palestinian streets. Later, he confessed that the summit also served as an important litmus test, “either to unmask Arafat” or to see if Arafat was a “Palestinian Sadat” (Pressman 2003, 11).

Yasser Arafat felt extremely reluctant about CD2, largely due to his negative beliefs about Barak’s empathy and sincerity. Yasser Abed Rabbo, a close advisor to Arafat, recalls that the Palestinian leader drew important inferences about Barak from his first interaction with him, where the latter used “exaggerated flattery” that “aroused Arafat’s suspicion,” leading him to say, “Hell, this man is trying to play games with us” (Aronoff and Kubik 2012, 190). This sense of mistrust intensified during Barak’s time as PM. According to Arafat, Barak failed to implement an agreement to withdraw Israeli forces from the West Bank, intensified construction of settlements, and failed to release prisoners detained for acts committed prior to the Oslo Accords. Moreover, Arafat claimed that Barak’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and offer to withdraw from the Golan weakened Arafat’s standing and allowed other Arab countries to pursue a hard line while he was continuing the peace process. Most significant, from Arafat’s perspective, was Barak’s decision to negotiate a peace deal with Syria first. Arafat felt abandoned by Barak’s turn to the Syrian track and remained highly suspicious of his motives to convene “the summit that would end all summits” at that moment.

Nevertheless, personally reassured by Clinton that he would not bear the blame if the summit failed, Arafat acquiesced. Considering his long history of successful negotiations with Clinton during the Oslo process, Arafat believed that Clinton understood what he could and could not accept. Indeed, prior to the meeting, Arafat saw Clinton as an empathic leader. According to interviews, Arafat did not always trust Dennis Ross or Madeleine Albright, but he “saw in Clinton the American President who can actually deliver the Palestinian state. He thought that Clinton had the charisma, the power, the understanding, the devotion to make this happen” (Aronoff and Kubik 2012, 124). Still, according to Arafat’s senior advisor, Abu Ala’a, “the Palestinians perceived the summit as a trap that Israel and the US were setting for them, a trap from which they had to escape” (Ginossar 2005, 55). Clinton recognized the lack of empathy between the leaders: “As usual, each leader saw his own position more clearly than he saw the other side. There was not a high probability of success for the summit. I called it because I believed that the collapse of the peace process would be a near certainty if I didn’t” (Clinton 2004, 912).

Personal Interactions at CD2

The summit opened with a memorable scene of Barak and Arafat squabbling at the door over who would enter the negotiation room first. They actually started to get physical, but then Barak simply pushed Arafat inside. Symbolic of the summit’s dynamic, this scene represented one of very few face-to-face meetings between the two leaders during CD2. Indeed, Barak decided early on to employ an all-or-nothing strategy: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Barak also insisted that all positions would be conveyed to Arafat through Clinton. Notwithstanding his aides’ repeated requests, he refused to hold substantive talks with Arafat throughout the summit, mostly because he feared that the documentation of his position in a direct meeting would be treated as a starting point in subsequent negotiations. Members of the Palestinian delegation became suspicious of Barak’s decision, noting that it contradicted the summit’s rationale (Malley and Agha 2001, 5).

Not only did Barak’s behavior during the summit lack empathy and sensitivity, but it also verged on antipathy. According to Abu Ala’a, “Even if it is not his intention, Barak exudes contempt and arrogance.” Even members of the Israeli delegation were highly critical of his emotional signals, considering them tactless and not conducive to negotiations. At one point, Barak’s close advisor Yossi Ginnosar commented, “you are stepping all over [Arafat]. He is afraid of you. You can help draw out more flexibility from them through a less coercive and more open environment” (Sher 2013, 94). Similarly, Foreign Minister Ben-Ami commented, “Arafat needs respect. You show no respect towards him. He can adopt more comfortable positions when there is respect” (Bergman 2005, 113).

Barak’s attitude reached a visible all-time low, according to participants, during one evening in the summit. As Gilead Sher (2013, 94–95) describes it:

Arafat was about to approach Barak . . . Barak stopped and deliberately did not extend his hand. The two sat on both sides of Secretary Albright, and during the entire evening did not exchange even one word. The situation was embarrassing, uncomfortable and unnecessary. Intentionally ignoring Arafat was interpreted as mixing the personal relationship of the leaders with the hardship and difficulty of negotiations.

Even prior to the summit, Barak possessed a strong reputation for lacking empathy. As his senior negotiator, Sher argues, “Ehud is brilliant, but has zero social intelligence” (Aronoff and Kubik 2012, 135). Yossi Beilin (2004, 126), who had known Barak for years, similarly notes: “He is
very direct—lacking in diplomacy and manners.” Clinton (2004, 913), who spent a lot of time with Barak over the years and witnessed his behavior during the summit, explains that as he got to know Barak better, it became clear that he was not a leader who could understand or cared about understanding the other’s perspective:

He [Barak] … was willing to go a long way on Jerusalem and on territory. But he had a hard time listening to people who didn’t see things the way he did … Barak wants others to wait until he decided the time was right, then, when he made his best offer, he expected it to be accepted as self-evidently a good deal. His negotiating partners wanted trust building courtesies and conversations and lots of bargaining.

Members of the Palestinian delegations paid significant attention to Barak’s expressive signals. Arafat reportedly said to George Tenet, “Where is Barak … Why won’t he meet with me or talk to me? I came to an agreement with Clinton so that we could use these days profitably and move ahead” (Enderlin 2003). Indeed, as Malley and Agha (2001, 7) explain, Arafat paid attention not to what Barak was offering but how he was making his offer: “[o]bessed with Barak’s tactics, Arafat spent less time worrying about the substance of the deal than he did fretting about a possible ploy. Fixed on potential traps, he could not see potential opportunities.”

Even in the eyes of members of the Israeli delegation, Barak’s expressive behavior colored how the Palestinians interpreted his proposals. In Pundak’s (2001, 40) words, “the Palestinians did not trust him [Barak]; had no confidence in what he was offering, and Barak in fact ended up weakening the Israeli position by offering concession after concession without receiving anything in return.” Ben-Ami (2006, 253) similarly assesses that Barak’s social behavior left Arafat feeling “humiliated and overmastered by his arrogant interlocutor … ‘He treats me like a slave,’ shouted Arafat at Madeline Albright on one tense occasion at the Camp David Summit.”

Arafat also failed to exhibit empathic behavior during the summit. As Muhammed Rashid, Arafat’s key advisor and a participant in CD2, admits: “We just didn’t engage.” Everything about Arafat—his verbal statements, gestures, and demeanor—suggested he mistrusted Barak. According to Dennis Ross (2004, 651), “if body language sends a message, Arafat’s spoke volumes.” Similarly, Martin Indyk observed that from the opening negotiating setting onward, Arafat acted as if he “was shut up in a bunker” (Enderlin 2003, 179). Barak viewed Arafat’s passivity as an indicator that he did not appreciate Israel’s far-reaching concessions, claiming he was “treating us like suckers” (Sher 2013, 94). In a later interview, he asserted that Arafat’s behavior at CD2 was nothing but a “performance” aimed at maximizing concessions from Israel. “He did not negotiate in good faith, indeed he did not negotiate at all. He just kept saying ‘no’ to every offer, never making any counterproposals of his own” (Morris 2002). His assessment of Arafat’s intentions shifted as well, claiming he now understood that Arafat believed Israel “has no right to exist, and he seeks its demise” (Morris 2002). Ben-Ami (2006, 41) described their meetings as being “like a conversation conducted by deaf men.” As Ben-Ami (2006, 253) explains, “[Barak] was an intellectually arrogant and undoubtedly brilliant general who was totally blind and deaf to cultural nuances … and Arafat … was incapable, or pretended to do so, of conducting a fluid dialogue.”

We therefore find strong support for H1. Arafat and Barak used their interpersonal interactions to gain a sense of the other’s intentions to negotiate in bad faith. At this point, Clinton was in a position similar to Carter in CD1. However, rather than displaying empathic capacity to both protagonists individually, Clinton became impatient with Arafat and members of his delegation. He hammered Arafat hard on multiple occasions, dictating more than listening. On the day before the conference ended, Clinton reportedly told Arafat: “You won’t have a state and relations between America and the Palestinians will be over. Congress will vote to stop the aid you’ve been allocated, and you’ll be treated as a terrorist organization” (Kurtzer et al. 2013, 147).

Another episode that observers highlight as a significant failure to build understanding is a conversation between Clinton and Abu Ala’a, where the president became furious when Abu Ala’a immediately rejected Israel’s proposed map of the West Bank. Clinton’s face, according to Robert Malley (Malley and Agha 2001), became “redder and redder and redder” until he lashed out at Abu Ala’a: “I’m doing this for your sake, and all you can do is come back with posturing.” Abu Ala’a later noted, “It’s one thing to get mad at me, but to get mad at me in front of the Israelis … to take sides with the Israelis in a meeting with us, you’ve undermined my position as a negotiator for my side.” No matter what Clinton wished to achieve during this interaction, the exchange had an adverse effect on the Palestinian delegation’s willingness to continue negotiating. Following that episode, Abu Ala’a (architect of the Oslo process and one of Arafat’s closest confidants) figuratively checked himself out of the summit, turning both passive and negative. Even members of the Israeli delegation treated this episode as key to understanding the outcome of the summit. According to Israel’s chief negotiator, Sher (2013, 68):

The shouts could be heard in every room of the lodge. Abu Ala, white as a sheet, left the room, very hurt. This was a critical moment, with far greater implications that could be initially gauged. Abu Ala lost all faith then in the honest, unbiased brokerage of the United States, and thenceforth would repeatedly claim that the Americans were inclined to accept Israel’s positions without considering the Palestinians.

According to Indyk, Arafat’s other key advisor at the time, Abu Mazen, was already against the summit. After Clinton humiliated Abu Ala’a and alienated him, this created a “critical mass of Arafat’s advisers against doing anything, and Arafat himself thought he was getting trapped. And he got more and more paranoid when Barak wouldn’t deal with him … [leading to] a pretty disastrous kind of dynamic” (Swisher 2004, 276). Even beyond this altercation, participants in CD2 reported that “Arafat and Clinton met several times during the day; each time Arafat returned to his cabin showing expressions of anger, betrayal, and hurt over U.S. portrayal of him as the skunk in the room for not accepting Israeli sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.” Indeed, partly out of frustration, Clinton and Arafat had several “heated exchanges” where Clinton “almost shouted” at Arafat about...
his attitudes toward the rights of the Jews on the Temple Mount (Swisher 2004, 304–5).

On the other hand, Clinton adeptly conveyed empathy to the Israeli side (Kurtzer et al. 2013, 147). Clinton “felt sympathetic to Barak’s democratic domestic politics, ultimately spending much of the time in his conversations with Barak discussing this issue” (Kurtzer et al. 2013, 120). Barak’s domestic coalition at the time of CD2 was about to collapse, and during the summit, he would spend much of his day calling home to maintain political support. According to a senior member of the administration:

I think the President was ... pretty tolerant of what Barak’s clock was, what he thought he could do, what he thought his politics were. One of [Clinton’s] great strengths is even with his enemies he could put himself in their circumstances. And I think one of the reasons ... he is effective is he could project ... empathy in the best sense. He could really imagine what the constraints of even his opponents were. (Kurtzer et al. 2013, 123)

Failure at CD2

The lack of perceived empathy between the leaders precluded them from appreciating each other’s concessions. This led them to form unrealistic expectations about what positions the other could offer/accept, and ultimately viewed the other as negotiating in bad faith. For example, in regard to sovereignty over Jerusalem, perceived lack of empathy toward the other’s frame of reference and domestic constraints caused the leaders to underappreciate each other’s concessions and instead infer bad faith or a lack of willingness to compromise further. Barak saw the present situation in Jerusalem as the relevant reference point, and anything he offered the Palestinians was something he was essentially conceding or giving to them. Barak clearly moved beyond any previous Israeli PM by agreeing to eventually withdraw from 90% of the West Bank and offering Palestinians control of some East Jerusalem neighborhoods. Still, Barak failed to appreciate that, from the Palestinian perspective, the reference point was not the concessions of previous Israeli PMs but rather Israel’s border before the June 1967 war. Thus, “[i]n the Palestinian mindset, what Israel keeps out of the West Bank is what the Palestinians ‘give’ to Israel and which must be justified” (Telhami 2001, 11).

Similarly, Arafat failed to put himself in Barak’s position and understand that the concessions he was offering were genuinely unprecedented. Moreover, Arafat failed to understand “the importance of the Temple Mount to Jews, beyond the Western Wall” (Telhami 2001, 12), and thus saw no compromise on this issue and did not present a counterproposal. On several occasions, Arafat remarked that the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism, was not under the Haram al-Sharif mosque, but instead in the city of Nablus. These comments fueled the Israeli delegation’s anger and suspicion that he was not negotiating in good faith. In sum, both sides overestimated their own concessions and underestimated the other’s counter-concessions.

According to Telhami, the US delegation de facto empathized with Israel’s narrative. As a result, they found Arafat’s refusal to accept Barak’s compromise formula on Jerusalem baffling. Indeed, Clinton felt frustrated that Arafat did not move far enough toward the Israeli position. On the other hand, he saw Barak as breaking taboos in Israeli politics that put him at higher risk politically—something that Clinton understood very well.

The lack of perceived empathy between Clinton and the Palestinian delegation also materially affected his reading of the Palestinians’ domestic constraints and ultimately resulted in the inability to build relational empathy. Clinton believed that Arafat was less bound by public opinion, and so could deliver an agreement on Jerusalem. Yet, the vast majority of Palestinians, according to public opinion polls, preferred no agreement at all to an agreement that gave the Palestinians a state without East Jerusalem. The Palestinian leadership took these redlines very seriously. This is partly because the issue of Jerusalem—especially Haram al-Sharif—was crucial not only to Palestinians, but also to Muslims worldwide. This inability to appreciate domestic constraints also held true on the Palestinian side, which failed to recognize that Barak could not keep his domestic coalition while selling an agreement that compromised on Jerusalem remaining the united capital of Israel.

As for Clinton, his deep understanding of democratic domestic politics, including Israeli politics, allowed him to empathize with Barak’s constraints more than Arafat’s. Clinton and his team viewed Israel’s bottom line on Jerusalem through the Israeli prism as “a red line which no Israeli prime minister can cross, and if he does, he’ll be out of office” (Kurtzer et al. 2013, 136). In contrast, they did not fully appreciate the significance of Jerusalem to the Palestinians, the Arabs, and the Muslim world. According to one White House official:

[T]he people missing on the team were ... people who could understand the Palestinians’ experience ... [Y]ou could have someone on the team who is particularly sensitive to Palestinians of all stripes, Christian, Muslim views of Jerusalem. You certainly had that in terms of sensitivities to the Jewish, Israeli views; you didn’t have that on the other side. (Kurtzer et al. 2013, 137)

Discussion and Alternative Arguments

In sum, during CD2, Barak and Arafat used personal interactions to draw inferences from others’ expressive behavior to assess their empathic capacity. According to accounts from members of all three delegations, the negotiators used these inferences as credible information of the other’s intention to negotiate in bad faith. Consistent with H1, negative beliefs about the other’s empathic capacity greatly affected negotiations over Jerusalem, which led to the failure of the summit. As predicted by H2, beliefs about the empathic capacity of the mediator were crucial. The Palestinian delegation perceived Clinton as neither willing nor able to understand their positions and domestic constraints, thereby reinforcing their perception that the summit was a trap. Unlike Carter, Clinton’s inability (or unwillingness) to convey empathic capacity to both leaders during the summit prevented him from building relational empathy between the disputants.

The standard bargaining story based on relative power/interests of participants cannot explain the outcome of this summit. Transposing Telhami’s argument regarding
CD1, for example, to CD2 illustrates the core problem of the standard rationalist story. Based on this reading, we should have anticipated a positive outcome in the form of an agreement, one that looked closer to what Clinton and Barak (those who possessed a stronger bargaining power) were pushing for. During the summit itself, Clinton repeatedly leveraged American power vis-à-vis the Palestinian delegation, and he reportedly threatened Arafat with the adverse consequences of failing to reach an agreement.

In addition to exercising overt power politics, both leaders had strong political and strategic interests in coming out of this summit with an agreement at hand. Both Clinton and Barak understood that a failed summit would have “costly” implications for their own standing and their countries’ interests. Barak’s interests in reaching an agreement were clearly reflected in the large concessions he offered, and the extraordinary political risk he took in breaking “every conceivable taboo” in domestic politics by offering Palestinian sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem. An agreement was also clearly in the best interests of the United States. As the sole superpower, it was in a strong position to greatly influence negotiations. In addition to American strategic interests in guaranteeing stability in a Middle Eastern ally, Clinton personally enjoyed a high 59% approval rating at the time. Thus, Clinton had both considerable assets of domestic political capital as well as a mandate to negotiate a settlement.

On a more personal level, Clinton was engaged in “a final hunt for a legacy,” according to many commentators. A successful resolution would have been the greatest foreign policy triumph of the post-Soviet era, ensuring that Clinton’s presidency would be remembered not only for economic prosperity but also for immense contributions to world peace. Clinton also had large personal stakes in the peace process. According to Malley and Agha (2001), Clinton “was prepared to devote as much of his presidency as it took to make the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations succeed.” He claimed to have “spent more time on it than anyone else has” and said he “would do anything that would be helpful to facilitate the agreement.” “All my life,” explained Clinton, “I have wanted to see peace in the Middle East, and I promised myself when I got elected president I would work until the last day to achieve it.”

The inadequacy of this standard bargaining story does not mean that the summit failed solely due to the lack of empathy in the negotiations. Analysts suggest two other, more contextual, alternative explanations for the outcome of CD2. First, it has been argued that Arafat never intended to reach a final status agreement and thus, conveyed and relational empathy had a limited effect on the outcome of this summit. We contend, however, that this reading of the summit is inadequate. If Arafat never planned to reach an agreement, then his expressive behavior was consistent with his intentions, and thus the Israeli and Americans interpreted the signals correctly. Put differently, the absence of empathy signals was causally related to the outcome of the summit by affecting perceptions about intentions. Still, given uncertainty about Arafat’s intentions at the beginning of the summit, Barak’s behavior adversely affected how members of all three delegations (including his own) read his true intentions, affecting what others were willing to offer in return. Finally, even if Arafat did not want an agreement based on what Barak was willing to offer during the negotiations, this does not imply that he was not ready to sign an agreement that he believed to be good for the Palestinians. By conveying asymmetric empathy in favor of the Israelis, Clinton showed a significant bias that Palestinians believed had always existed in American-led negotiations: that an American mediator cannot truly understand the positions and interests of the Palestinians. Clinton’s expressive behavior made these biases more salient, and prevented the formation of relational empathy between the participants. We discuss further counter-explanations in the online supplementary material.

Conclusion

This article provided a new explanation for an important puzzle of diplomacy: Why do some peace summits succeed while others fail? Conventional explanations suggest that diplomatic outcomes are endogenous to other factors such as power and national interests. We identify a different logic that highlights the importance of empathy between leaders. While empathy is often viewed as a dispositional trait, we show that it is also perceptual in nature: it can be conveyed through both words and expressive behaviors in face-to-face interactions. From these, leaders gain an understanding of whether the other side is willing to negotiate in good faith and what a zone of potential agreement might look like. Therefore, beliefs about empathic capacity, and the ability to cultivate those beliefs in interpersonal interactions, may be as important as possessing a dispositional proclivity toward empathy. If protagonists do not wish to negotiate in good faith, then summits likely are doomed to fail. But it is precisely through expressive signals of empathy that other leaders come to understand these intentions. Finally, we argue that all is not lost if the leaders of warring states are unable to cultivate these beliefs with respect to each other. A skilled mediator can step in and build relational empathy between disputants; relations and interactions, in addition to beliefs and dispositions, are important. When this strategy is successful, it increases the potential for agreement, as well as the creation of a new relationship or social tie between the disputants.

Some might argue that the outcomes of the summits are mere artifacts of trust, or lack thereof, rather than empathy. Others might suggest that demonstrating empathy to your adversary is a signal of weakness rather than strength. We disagree. Studies show that empathy is necessary but not sufficient for the development of trust. Indeed, in CD1, Begin and Carter did not have much trust between each other, but they were able to empathize with each other. In CD2, despite Arafat trusting Clinton regarding his commitments, the agreement never materialized. As Quandt (2014) argues, “Anybody who is a good diplomat, or even politician, has to develop certain skills in trying to figure out where the person you are trying to persuade is coming from.” Likewise, when interpreting conciliatory gestures, policymakers should not be quick to jump to conclusions of weakness. Leaders who dismiss the importance of empathy do so at their own peril. They are
less likely to be invited to the negotiation table, and more likely to potentially limit the zone of potential agreement, and fail to reach agreements that serve their interests. This is also true of mediators. Mediators who are unable to convey empathy toward disputants and therefore build relational empathy are also letting go of a potential opportunity to find peace. Future research should develop the relationship between empathy and trust, explore what types of leaders are more likely to intuitively understand the need to convey empathy in negotiations, and what types of mediators will prove most likely to succeed at building relational empathy. This research will aid policymakers in answering the question of who should negotiate and mediate.

Crucially, however, the presence of empathy in any kind of interstate negotiation does not necessarily lead to normatively positive or long-lasting agreements. Indeed, our main objective in this article has been to assert the link between the presence of empathy in negotiations and the ability to reach a cooperative agreement. While we have noted the positive effect of empathy in peace negotiations, we believe similar dynamics should operate in interstate bargaining over other security or economic issues involving face-to-face interactions such as those over trade agreements or environmental treaties. Moreover, we believe future work can further explore how empathy has helped outside of the Arab–Israeli conflict. For example, Kim (2016) finds that when American leaders leveraged empathy in their negotiations with the Chinese, as part of a broader strategy of persuasion, they were able to reach cooperative outcomes even on issues that involved China’s core values. To the extent that persuasion requires not only the ability to be rhetorically powerful, but also the ability to empathize, relational empathy may play an important role in persuasion through mediation.

One of the implications of our study relates to signaling. While costly signals of reassurance may allow states to achieve cooperation, there are many potential types of such signals leaders could offer. Leaders without the ability to empathize may well be sending the wrong reassurance signals since they may not understand the domestic constraints or sensitivities that will affect how the signals are understood and received; “pushing the right buttons” requires understanding how the other will react. Further, while the costly signaling literature has focused on public statements or costly actions, our study suggests that private expressive and verbal signals can be equally important and effective in bargaining (Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012). Nevertheless, as we note in the online supplementary material, the ability of leaders to demonstrate empathy through such signals can, theoretically at least, be employed by deceptive leaders with malign intentions. Political scientists should further wrestle with the potential dark side of empathy by empirically testing this proposition.

This study also offers a more nuanced approach for understanding the effects of face-to-face diplomacy. Like empathy itself, face-to-face diplomacy is not necessarily an unalloyed good; there exist important sources of variation that lead some interactions, but not others, to result in better understanding. Theoretically, we advance the study of private diplomacy by identifying conditions, rooted in the profiles of the actors themselves rather than the environment, that affect the outcomes of this type of bargaining. Methodologically, we advance the study of diplomacy by tapping into a new source of data that helps make sense of outcomes: expressive behaviors. More broadly, our study reafirms that important role of leaders in explaining interstate bargaining outcomes, and specifically leader-level attributes and interactions (Saunders 2011; Holmes 2013; Aronoff 2014; Horowitz et al. 2015; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Lebovic and Saunders 2016). Our findings further suggest that a particular individual-level attribute, that of empathetic capacity, can be especially meaningful in interstate bargaining. Future studies could further evaluate the micro-foundations of this proposition in a controlled setting such as experiments and with more precise instrumentations (cf. Kertzer and Renshon 2016).

More specifically on the question of micro-foundations, our theoretical approach and findings contribute to a recent debate at the intersection of constructivism (and social constructionism more broadly) and psychology regarding just how relevant what goes on in an actor’s head is for explaining political outcomes.13 By bringing psychology into social relational approaches, we contribute to this debate by demonstrating that when it comes to interstate negotiations, it is empathic capacity, and perception thereof, that can make or break them. As we have shown, the divergent outcomes of the two summits are difficult to explain without appealing to a specific psychological micro-foundation: the ability to both express, and detect, empathy. In this instance, psychology has provided us with very specific insight into what is occurring in the minds of leaders that is crucial for understanding the outcome of their face-to-face interaction. It is precisely through triangulation of words, behaviors, expressions, and actions that we can reconstruct what is occurring both between actors in a social relation as well as gain insight into what is occurring within the mind of the actors involved in that relationship. Words, actions, and expressive behaviors matter, not just as stand-alone practices, but as perceived, and motivated, indicators of intentions. Ultimately, the promise of bridging psychology with social constructionism is in the ability to challenge assumptions and test specific hypotheses that ultimately will provide leverage on explaining existing puzzles that have been resistant to structural or bargaining theories and approaches.

Supplemental Information

We have placed supplementary literature review, theory-building, methodological issues, and empirical data in an online appendix available at http://www.marcusholmes.com/ISQ_Psychological_Lo of_Summits_Supplement.pdf as well as at the International Studies Quarterly data archive.

References


13There is now voluminous work on this debate (cf. Shannon and Kowert 2012; Lebow 2009; Rathbun 2009; Aronoff 2014). In particular, see Krebs and Jackson (2007) for a strong skeptical position and Kaufman’s (2012) excellent response and summation of the debate.