

## Do Immigrants Assimilate More Slowly Today than in the Past?<sup>†</sup>

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*Using millions of historical census records and modern birth certificates, we document that immigrants assimilated into US society at similar rates in the past and present. We measure cultural assimilation as immigrants giving their children less foreign names after spending more time in the United States, and show that immigrants erase about one-half of the naming gap with natives after 20 years both historically and today. Immigrants from poorer countries choose more foreign names upon first arrival in both periods but are among the fastest to shift toward native-sounding names. We find substantial cultural assimilation for immigrants of all education levels. (JEL J15, N31, N32, Z13)*

The cultural assimilation of immigrants is a divisive political issue in the United States. Many politicians and voters hold the nostalgic view that European immigrants assimilated quickly in the past, in contrast to immigrants today.<sup>1</sup> However, this passionate debate about cultural assimilation is not new. Writing

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<sup>1</sup>There are many expressions of this nostalgic view in public life. One typical example was articulated by talk show host Rush Limbaugh in 2014: “Italian-Americans came, and they became Americans. They held on to their traditions...but they were Americans first, not Italians first...They essentially were assimilating into a distinct American culture that they craved to be part of...What’s happening to immigration now is there is no desire to assimilate...they are coming here and demanding that America accommodate their culture” (Limbaugh 2014).

in 1891, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge asserted that immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe “is bringing to the country people whom it is very difficult to assimilate and who do not promise well for the standard of civilization in the United States” (Lodge 1891, p. 35). Progressive reformers sought to “Americanize” immigrants through compulsory schooling and English-only laws (Lleras-Muney and Shertzer 2015; Bandiera et al. 2019). Eventually, swayed by this growing coalition, Congress passed strict immigration quotas in the early 1920s, ending the Age of Mass Migration (Higham 1955, Goldin 1994, King 2009, and Abramitzky and Boustan 2017).

Our paper provides the first quantitative comparison of the cultural assimilation of immigrants in the past and the present. We focus on two waves of migration to the United States, the first mostly from Europe (1850–1913) and the second from Asia and Latin America (1965–present). Measuring cultural assimilation is challenging because information on cultural practices—things like food, dress, and accent—are not systematically collected.<sup>2</sup> The premise of this paper is that we can trace cultural assimilation by examining shifts in the names that immigrants give their children as they spend time in the United States. We draw on a rich literature in sociology and economics suggesting that names are signals of cultural identity.<sup>3</sup> One benefit of name selection as a measure of cultural assimilation is that it is a pure choice, unlike intermarriage, which reflects both a choice (who you want to marry) and a constraint (who wants to marry you).<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, name choices will capture assimilation that can take place within co-ethnic couples, as well as between couples of different backgrounds.

We construct “Foreignness Indices,” also referred to as the *F*-index, for each name in the past and present indicating the relative probability that a given name was held by immigrants versus the US-born. We then compare the name choices that immigrants selected for their children after they spent more time in the United States. For the past, we use the 1920 Population Census and for the present, we use California birth certificate records for 1989–2015 (California Department of Public Health 1989–2015). Using different data sources raises obvious comparability issues. The 1920 census covers the entire US population, records names as reported to the enumerator, and includes information about immigrants’ year of arrival to the United States. In contrast, the birth certificate records cover only the state of California, contain an infant’s legal name, and most importantly do not include direct information about years of arrival. We try to standardize the historical and modern data, and Section V further investigates sensitivity to these differences.

<sup>2</sup>One counterpoint is census data on self-reported ability with spoken English (Ward 2019).

<sup>3</sup>Liebersohn (2000) is the classic reference in the sociology of naming. Zelinsky (1970) and Liebersohn and Bell (1992) study differences in name choices by region and by parental education, respectively. On names and social outcomes across various contexts, see Liebersohn and Mikelson (1995), Fryer and Levitt (2004), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), and Figlio (2005) on blacks; Sue and Telles (2007) on Hispanics; Algan, Mayer, and Thoenig (2013), Smith and MacRaild (2009), and Gerhards and Hans (2009) on immigrants to Europe; Rubinstein and Brenner (2014) on ethnic groups in Israel; and Olivetti and Paserman (2015) on intergenerational mobility in the United States between 1850 and 1940.

<sup>4</sup>Intermarriage has been used extensively in sociology as a marker of cultural assimilation (see, for example, Gordon 1964; Alba and Golden 1986; Liebersohn and Waters 1988; Pagnini and Morgan 1990; and Wildsmith, Gutmann, and Gratton 2003). Angrist (2002) and Meng and Gregory (2005) study intermarriage in economics.

We find that the *rate* of name-based assimilation was similar in both periods. Although immigrants did not completely converge with the US-born in name choices in one generation either historically or today, immigrants reduce the naming gap with the US-born by about one-half after spending 20 years in the United States. Furthermore, we find that the rate of cultural assimilation varies substantially by country of origin, with groups that started with high foreign sounding names switching more rapidly to more American sounding names (Southern and Eastern Europeans in the past, Mexican and Vietnamese immigrants today). We find substantial cultural assimilation for both literate and illiterate immigrants in the past, and for immigrants at all education levels today.

Despite perceived economic returns to having a native-sounding name,<sup>5</sup> immigrants may give their children ethnic names in order to retain their original cultural identity. The fact that parents do not fully adopt native naming patterns within the first generation highlights the value that immigrants place on maintaining their cultural identity, consistent with Akerlof and Kranton's (2000) and Benabou and Tirole's (2011) theories of the economics of identity and Bisin and Verdier's (2000) model of cultural transmission within families. Shifting toward native-sounding names may reflect learning about US culture, a greater identification with US culture over time, or making a final decision to stay in the United States rather than return home.<sup>6</sup>

Our paper is also one of the first to document cultural assimilation for first generation immigrants. Many papers in economics and other social sciences show that the *children of immigrants* readily join US society. Second generation immigrants have similar fertility behavior, labor force participation, and political preferences to the children of the US-born, with only minor differences associated with their parents' home country.<sup>7</sup> However, it has been a challenge to find large longitudinal datasets that allow researchers to follow shifts in first generation immigrants' behavior over time.

We emphasize that our paper has no normative implications. That is, we do not imply that immigrants *should* assimilate culturally into the US society. In fact, arguably part of what makes a society flourish is its openness to cultural diversity. Our paper simply documents what immigrants do in practice.

<sup>5</sup>Immigrants who adopt native-sounding first names experience wage growth after the name change (Arai and Thoursie 2009; Biavaschi, Giulietti, and Siddique 2017; Carneiro, Lee, and Reis 2015). Relatedly, Oreopoulos (2011) finds that resumes with more foreign-sounding last names receive fewer call backs in Canada. Goldstein and Stecklov (2016) and Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2016) both document differences in outcomes between men with more/less foreign-sounding first names in the cross section, but we see much smaller differences between pairs of brothers with more/less foreign names.

<sup>6</sup>Gould (1980) and Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo (2013) document high rates of return migration to Europe in the past. Dustmann and Görlach (2016) finds similar rates of return migration today.

<sup>7</sup>On assimilation across generations in the Age of Mass Migration, see: Watkins 1994; Watkins and London 1994; Guinnane, Moehling, and O'Gráda 2006; Foley and Guinnane 1999. For contemporary studies, see: Fernández and Fogli 2009; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Blau et al. 2013.

## I. Data and Definitions

### A. Datasets with Information on Names

For the past, we use the 1920 census to reconstruct the names and ages of children living in the household with immigrant and US-born mothers. We also observe mother's current age, place of birth, and arrival year in the United States.<sup>8</sup> Because modern census data does not reveal names, our modern sample is the universe of births occurring in the state of California between 1989 and 2015 (excluding 2011, which is incomplete).<sup>9</sup> California housed one-third of the foreign-born population in 1990. Birth certificates report the names of children, their mothers, and often their fathers. California birth certificates do not contain information on age of arrival, which is a key limitation.

Our research design compares multiple births from the same mother. In the 1920 census, we directly observe all children living in the household. For the modern data, we instead link mothers across births occurring in California using mothers' first name, maiden name, birth place, and exact birth date. Overall, we match 80 percent of US-born mothers who report having two or more children (as recorded in the parity measure). We match a lower share of foreign-born mothers (67 percent) because a larger proportion of their births occurred outside California. Online Appendix Figure 1 documents the match rate by year. The match rate is lower at the beginning of the sample because many reported births occurred before the dataset began. Panel A of online Appendix Table 1 compares the characteristics of matched and unmatched mothers. Matched mothers have higher levels of education than unmatched mothers. Panel B documents that these educational differences are driven primarily by the lower match rates for immigrants and mothers born outside of California, suggesting that the matching process itself does not select on the basis of educational attainment.

### B. Measuring the Foreignness of Given Names

We construct an index of name foreignness for every given name, based on the relative probability that the name is held by someone born in the United States or abroad. The formula is given by

$$R_{name} = \frac{\frac{\#foreigners_{name}}{total\#foreigners}}{\frac{\#natives_{name}}{total\#natives}}.$$

This measure has a natural interpretation: for example,  $R = 2$  implies that a name is twice as likely to be used by foreigners as by natives.

<sup>8</sup>In our main analysis, we focus on non-black children who were born outside the South because few immigrants lived in the South in 1920. We also restrict the sample to the children of mothers who were less than 40 years old in 1920 to minimize inaccurate measures of birth order due to the departures of older sibling from the childhood home.

<sup>9</sup>There is a large literature in economics and public health using the California birth certificate data to look at birth outcomes. Currie and Moretti (2007) also link mothers over time by name, date, and state of birth.

The formula for relative probability is sensitive to outliers. We thus adopt the normalized index used by Fryer and Levitt (2004) to measure distinctly black names. In particular, the foreignness index or  $F$ -index is defined as

$$Foreignness Index_{name} = 100 \cdot \frac{\frac{\#foreigners_{name}}{total \#foreigners}}{\frac{\#foreigners_{name}}{total \#foreigners} + \frac{\#natives_{name}}{total \#natives}},$$

and ranges from zero to 100, with a value of zero reflecting distinctively native names and a value of 100 reflecting distinctively foreign names. Note that the  $F$ -index is a simple function of  $R$ , equivalent to  $R/(1 + R)$ .<sup>10</sup>

Calculating the  $F$ -index is data intensive because it requires having counts of foreign- and US-born residents with each given name. This is straightforward in the historical data because the 1920 census contains information on the first name and birth country of every resident of the United States. However, in the modern birth records, we can only use the names of birth parents to compute the modern  $F$ -index. A further concern in the modern data is that birth certificates record the birth places (and thus foreign-born status) of mothers, but not of fathers. We impute birth places for men in the modern data by assuming that all foreign-born mothers were paired with foreign-born fathers, and likewise for US-born mothers.<sup>11</sup> The foreignness of a given name changes over time as names come into and out of fashion. We thus construct the  $F$ -index from individuals born soon before the children in the sample. To ensure that we have enough data to accurately reflect each name, we construct the  $F$ -index from ten birth cohorts in each period (1895–1905 for the past; parents born between 1985–1995 for the present).<sup>12</sup> Online Appendix Table 3 lists the most foreign, neutral, and native names for boys and girls for our main  $F$ -index in the past and present.

Section V presents results with alternative versions of the  $F$ -index. Our preferred historical index uses the names of the entire population (both parents and non-parents), but we show below that results are nearly identical when using the names of parents only (the correlation between the two indices is 0.954). For the historical data, we also present results using a birth cohort specific  $F$ -index to better capture naming trends calculated from cohorts born in  $t - 1$  to  $t - 20$  for a child born in  $t$ . We address measurement error in boys' names in the modern data by calculating an  $F$ -index from the names of the children themselves, rather than from birth parents. In this case, we classify children of foreign-born mothers as “foreign” and children of US-born mothers as “native.”

<sup>10</sup>Online Appendix Table 2 presents strong pairwise correlation between alternative measures of cultural assimilation (intermarriage, English fluency, and application to US citizenship) and our names-based measure for the historical data. However, we acknowledge that we cannot compare any of the observable indicators of cultural assimilation with unobserved, home-based practices.

<sup>11</sup>More than 83 percent of foreign-born women with a child present in the household living in California in 2000 had a foreign-born spouse (our calculation from IPUMS). Yet, imputing father's birthplace will introduce some measurement error into the  $F$ -index values of boys' names.

<sup>12</sup>Parents born between 1985 and 1995 are observed having children primarily after 2005.

## II. Estimating the Relationship between Time in the United States and Name Choice

Conceptually, we are interested in comparing the two periods of mass migration in both the *level* of assimilation (gap) and the *rate* of assimilation (closing the gap) between the US-born and foreign-born. We start by describing our empirical exercise and then we discuss the identification assumptions required to compare both the level and rate of assimilation across the two periods.

We first consider the *rate* of assimilation. A natural approach to estimating the effect of years spent in the United States on name foreignness of children would be to consider the following specification for foreign-born mothers:

$$(1) \quad \text{ForeignnessIndex}_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 \sum_{m=1}^{20} \mathbf{1}[\text{YearsUS}_{ijt} = m] \\ + \beta_2 \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbf{1}[\text{Birthorder}_{ijt} = k] + \gamma_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}.$$

The dependent variable is the foreignness index of child  $i$ 's name born to mother  $j$  at time  $t$ . The main right-hand-side variable is a set of dummy variables for the number of years a mother has spent in the United States at the child's year of birth  $t$ . The omitted category is women who give birth in their year of arrival to the United States ( $\text{YearsUS} = 0$ ). By including mother fixed effects ( $\alpha_j$ ), we identify the effect of time spent in the United States using name differences between siblings born in different years. We control for the child's rank in the birth order with a set of dummy variables to account for traditions in some cultures to name oldest sons and daughters after relatives.<sup>13</sup> Note that child's birth year dummy variables would be collinear with mother's years in the United States and the mother fixed effect, which absorbs mother's year of arrival. We thus add child's birth year ( $\gamma_{ij}$ ) in five-year bins to absorb secular trends in naming.<sup>14</sup> We later show that results are robust to using three-year bins instead.

We cannot use equation (1) for a past/present comparison because we do not observe mother's arrival year in the CA birth records. In addition, equation (1) does not allow us to compare the name choices of US-born and foreign-born mothers. Instead, our main analysis uses mother's age in birth year  $t$  as a proxy for mother's time spent in the United States. This proxy relies on a demographic equation relating mother's years spent in the United States by birth year  $t$  to her age in birth year  $t$  and in her year of arrival to the United States (*mother's years in United States by birth year  $t$  = mother's age in birth year  $t$  – mother's age at arrival in United States*). For example, a mother who arrived in the United States at age 20 and had a child at age 30 would have been in the United States for 10 years by the time of birth. Controlling for a mother fixed effect absorbs a mother's age at arrival in the

<sup>13</sup> Online Appendix Figure 2 shows results that interact birth rank with mother's country of origin to account for differences in naming traditions. Results are similar.

<sup>14</sup> A common approach to addressing the standard age-period-cohort collinearity problem is to group one of these categories into bins (e.g., Card and Lemieux 2000 impose that the effect of some cohorts are the same).

United States, allowing us to use mother's age at birth year  $t$  as a proxy for mother's years in the United States (net of measurement error).<sup>15</sup> The key assumption underlying our interpretation of this proxy is that mother's age at birth does not directly affect the rate or level of assimilation.

For our past/present comparison, we thus estimate the relationship between name foreignness and mother's age at the time of birth for mothers between the ages of 20 and 40:

$$(2) \quad \text{ForeignnessIndex}_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \pi_1 \sum_{m=21}^{40} \mathbf{1}[\text{AgeMother}_{ijt} = m] \\ + \pi_2 \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbf{1}[\text{Birthorder}_{ijt} = k] + \gamma_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}.$$

The main right-hand-side variable here is a set of dummy variables for the mother's age at the child's year of birth  $t$ . The omitted category is mothers who were 20 years old at a child's birth.

We provide two pieces of evidence to support the assumption that mother's age at birth does not have a *direct effect* on name choice beyond its effect on years spent in the United States. First, we consider the name choice of US-born mothers as they age. Our assumption implies that there should be a decline in name foreignness with mother's age at birth, which increments by one for each year she spends in the United States (= years in the United States) for foreign-born mothers due to cultural assimilation but not for US-born mothers, which is indeed what we find (see Figure 1). Second, we consider the names given to the children of immigrants who themselves were born abroad before their mothers moved to the United States. Before migrating to the United States, mothers may still select US-sounding names for their children prospectively if a move to the United States is already planned, but we expect such assimilation to be more muted. We indeed find a substantially smaller reduction in name foreignness with mother's age for children born abroad than for children born in the United States (see online Appendix Figure 3). Note that we can only observe children born abroad in the historical data.

Unless assimilation proceeds at a constant pace for each year spent in the United States, we need to additionally assume that the spacing between the mother's age at arrival in the United States and her age at first birth in the United States is the same in the past and in the present in order to compare the rates of assimilation across these two time periods. Imagine that immigrant mothers in the past had their first child after two years in the United States, whereas immigrant mothers today wait five years before having their first child. If the rate of cultural assimilation is fastest in the first few years in the country, then we would overstate assimilation in the past relative to the present. However, we find a very linear relationship between

<sup>15</sup> Both age and year of arrival are measured with error in the census. There is a well-known problem of both "age heaping" and "year heaping" on the zeroes and fives. A regression of mother's years in the United States at birth on mother's age at birth and a set of mother fixed effects in the 1920 census data results in a coefficient of 0.81 (SE = 0.004), rather than 1.0, demonstrating that mother's years in the United States and age at birth are closely but not perfectly related.




FIGURE 1. IMMIGRANTS SELECTED LESS FOREIGN NAMES AFTER SPENDING TIME IN UNITED STATES: PAST AND PRESENT

Notes: Panels A and B show the foreignness index of names given to children of native and foreign-born mothers by the mother's age when the child was born. These figures report the constant plus the estimated effect of the individual mother's age at birth indicators from equation (2). Panel C shows the foreignness index of names given to children of foreign-born mothers by the mother's years in the United States at the time of the child's birth. Specifically, we report the constant plus the coefficients on indicators of mother's years in United States when the child was born from equation (1). Regressions also include indicators for child's rank in the birth order, birth year in five-year bands, and mother fixed effects. The complete-count 1920 census data includes white children aged 0–15 who were born in a non-Southern state and were living with their parents in 1920. All children have mothers who were less than 43 years old in 1920 so that we can observe a relatively complete birth order, and who were between 20–40 years old at the time of the child's birth.  $N(\text{foreign-born}) = 4,219,213$ ;  $N(\text{native-born}) = 9,337,285$ . The California birth certificates data includes all children born to a mother aged 20–40 in California from 1989–2015.  $N(\text{native-born}) = 2,957,731$ ;  $N(\text{foreign-born}) = 2,082,142$ .

mother's age and name foreignness in both periods, suggesting that differential spacing between age at arrival and first birth would not likely affect our conclusions.

Without information on age of arrival in the modern data, we must proceed with caution in making statements about the *levels* of the naming gap between foreign and native-born mothers upon first arrival or by years spent in the United States. Mothers arrive in the United States at somewhat older ages today (age 24 on

average) than they did in the past (age 20 on average).<sup>16</sup> Our estimation approach uses mother's age at birth as a proxy for mother's years in the United States, which implicitly considers age 20 to be the first year in the United States in both time periods. Thus, we potentially *overstate the naming gap in levels* between immigrant and native mothers in the modern data at any given number of years spent in the United States. For example, at age 40, mothers will have had only 16 years in the United States in which to assimilate (on average), but we will treat them as if they have been in the United States for 20 years. Given we find that immigrants erase about  $-0.5$   $F$ -index points per year in the United States, a back of an envelope calculation that accounts for differences in age of arrival suggests that we overstate the level of the naming gap in the modern data relative to the historical data by 2 points ( $= -0.5 \times 4$  years) after 20 years in the United States.<sup>17</sup>

### III. The Name Choice of Immigrant Mothers: Past and Present

#### A. Core Results

Consistent with a process of cultural assimilation, we observe that immigrant mothers gave their children fewer foreign names as they spent more time in the United States in both the past and the present. Figure 1 graphs the implied  $F$ -index of US-born and foreign-born mothers by mother's age at the time of birth for the past (panel A) and the present (panel B). In particular, we report the constant plus the estimated effect of the individual mother's age at birth indicators from equation (2), allowing us to show both the initial level and rate of assimilation.<sup>18</sup> Online Appendix Figure 4 instead compares the *rate* of assimilation in both periods by directly graphing the coefficients on each mother's age at birth indicator relative to the omitted category of mothers who gave birth at age 20.

In the past, the children of recently-arrived immigrant mothers (mothers who are 20 years old at birth) were given names that averaged 55 points on the  $F$ -index, and children of US-born mothers who gave birth at age 20 were given names that averaged 34 points. This initial disparity amounted to a 21 point gap between young immigrant and US-born mothers. As mothers age, the US-born continued to give equally foreign sounding names, but foreign-born mothers reduced the average  $F$ -index by around 10 index points over 20 years, erasing half of the naming gap between immigrants and natives. At the end of 20 years, foreign-born mothers chose names that averaged 45 points on the  $F$ -index and US-born mothers chose names that averaged 35 points on the  $F$ -index, a difference of only 10 points. Similarly, in the modern period, the initial gap in  $F$ -index between young foreign- and US-born mothers was 24 points (48 points on the  $F$ -index for the foreign-born and 24 points

<sup>16</sup>Calculations from 1920 and 2000 censuses, respectively.

<sup>17</sup>Note that concerns arising from the missing information on age at arrival affects our interpretation of the estimates, but does not bias the estimates themselves. If one is interested in the naming gap by mother's age at birth, then our estimates can be used directly without considering differences in age at arrival.

<sup>18</sup>An alternative way to measure the initial naming gap is to pool native- and foreign-born mothers into a single regression without mother's fixed effects. In this case, we can include an indicator for being foreign-born and interact this indicator with mother's age at birth dummy variables. The coefficient on the foreign-born indicator reveals the names gap for mothers who are 20 years old at birth. The coefficient was 22.33 in the past and 20.13 in the present. A gap of this size is also apparent in Figure 1 for mothers in their young 20s.

for the US-born).<sup>19</sup> After 20 years, the foreign-born mothers reduced the average  $F$ -index by a similar degree (around 10 index points), erasing just under half of the naming gap with the US-born. The foreign-native gap at the end of 20 years was 12 points (37 points in the  $F$ -index for the foreign-born and 25 points for the native-born). One notable difference between the two periods is that both immigrant and US-born young mothers chose less-foreign names today.<sup>20</sup>

We return to the more natural specification for cultural assimilation that uses mother's years in the United States, rather than mother's age at birth, in Figure 1 (panel C). We can only implement this specification (equation (1)) in the historical data. Children born after their mother had spent 20 years in the United States scored 13 points lower on the  $F$ -index relative to their siblings born upon their parents' first arrival.<sup>21</sup>

### B. Heterogeneity by Country of Origin and Education

Immigrants from sending countries that are culturally distant from the United States or that face high levels of discrimination may enjoy the largest benefit from name-based assimilation, but they also may have experienced the highest costs of assimilation, in terms of abandoning elements of their cultural identity. Figure 2 documents that the speed of name-based assimilation differs by country of origin in both past (panel A) and present (panel B). For brevity, we report estimates from a modified version of equation (2) that replaces indicators for individual years of age with a linear effect of mother's age in birth year.

In the past, immigrants from Western European countries like England and Denmark gave their children less foreign-sounding names on average ( $F$ -index of 39–40, compared to 35 for the US-born) but exhibited *little to no decline* in name foreignness with time spent in the United States. In contrast, immigrants from countries like Portugal, Finland, Austria, and Russia gave their children highly-foreign names on average ( $F$ -index = 59) but also exhibited faster rates of name assimilation as they spent more years in the United States (declines of 8–12  $F$ -index points after 20 years in the United States). This result is not simply due to “regression to the mean”; without concerted effort on the part of immigrants to adapt to US society, the names given by immigrant parents would not mechanically drift toward the native norm.<sup>22</sup>

Today, Mexican immigrants give their children the most foreign-sounding names ( $F$ -index = 50), whereas other immigrants choose substantially less foreign names (average  $F$ -index = 26).<sup>23</sup> However, Mexican immigrants shift away from

<sup>19</sup>We replicate modern results for the subsets of mothers who had all of their reported births in California or who had all reported births after 1998; these restrictions help to balance the matched and unmatched mothers. Results are very similar in this case (see online Appendix Figures 5 and 6).

<sup>20</sup>For both past and present, we show results using 3-year bands for children's year of birth to control for changes in name trends, rather than 5-year bands in online Appendix Figure 7.

<sup>21</sup>If we instead use a birth-cohort specific  $F$ -index based on the 20 years of cohorts prior to a child's birth, we find a reduction of 7.2 points on the  $F$ -index (online Appendix Figure 8).

<sup>22</sup>There is little correlation between cultural and economic assimilation at the country level. In particular, the correlation between changes in occupation-based earnings from Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014, Figure 3) and changes in name-based assimilation (Figure 2 here) is 0.04 (or 0.17 without Finland).

<sup>23</sup>Anecdotally, Asian immigrants select native-sounding names on their birth certificate for the purpose of social interaction in the United States while maintaining an Asian name for household use.




FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF TIME IN UNITED STATES ON NAME FOREIGNNESS BY SENDING COUNTRY: PAST AND PRESENT

*Notes:* In this figure we estimate a regression of the foreignness index of a child’s name on a set of interactions between mother’s country of birth and a linear term for mother’s age at birth. We report  $20 \times$  the coefficient value of mother’s age at birth for each country of birth. Regressions also include indicators for child’s rank in the birth order, birth year in five-year bands, and mother fixed effects. Country labels also report the foreignness index of children born to mothers age 20 from each country. Panel A uses the complete-count 1920 Census. Panel B uses California birth certificates from 1989–2015. Sample details in note to Figure 1. All countries except Wales in the historical data and China in the modern data have coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.

foreign-sounding names most quickly, reducing the *F*-index by 10 points after 20 years spent in the United States. Vietnamese immigrants and immigrants from other countries (“rest of world”) also demonstrate rapid assimilation (a reduction

TABLE 1—EFFECT OF TIME IN UNITED STATES ON NAME FOREIGNNESS BY MOTHER’S CHARACTERISTICS: PAST AND PRESENT

		Dependent variable = foreignness index			
		Mother is...			
		Literate	Not literate		
<i>Panel A. Historical data (1920 census)</i>					
Italy	Mom age at birth	−0.318 (0.033)	−0.215 (0.034)		
	Observations	405,349	307,335		
Austria	Mom age at birth	−0.697 (0.039)	−0.520 (0.062)		
	Observations	259,011	83,297		
Germany	Mom age at birth	−0.307 (0.040)	−0.714 (0.245)		
	Observations	257,488	5,812		
Russia	Mom age at birth	−0.909 (0.037)	−0.693 (0.060)		
	Observations	447,652	132,141		
Finland	Mom age at birth	−0.574 (0.107)	−1.049 (0.386)		
	Observations	48,264	4,037		
Portugal	Mom age at birth	−0.633 (0.187)	−0.724 (0.181)		
	Observations	15,845	16,442		
	Less than HS (1)	HS grad (2)	Some college (3)	College plus (4)	
<i>Panel B. Modern data (California birth certificates)</i>					
Vietnam		−0.389 (0.319)	−0.393 (0.166)	−0.328 (0.176)	−0.245 (0.138)
	Observations	21,296	44,331	32,784	46,190
Mexico		−0.544 (0.035)	−0.455 (0.045)	−0.488 (0.067)	−0.486 (0.106)
	Observations	1,397,249	625,503	270,753	121,395
China		−0.768 (0.682)	−0.018 (0.331)	−0.094 (0.067)	−0.072 (0.168)
	Observations	10,582	25,109	25,717	98,319

*Notes:* This table reports coefficients from estimates of a modified version of equation (2), a regression of the foreignness index of a child’s name on a linear measure of mother’s age at the time of birth. Regressions include indicators for child’s rank in the birth order, birth year in five-year bands, and mother fixed effects, and are conducted separately by mother’s country of origin and literacy status. Panel A uses complete-count 1920 census data. Panel B uses California birth certificate data (1989–2015). Sample details in note to Figure 1. The six countries included in panel A exhibit assimilation in Figure 2 and have at least 2,000 mother-child observations in each category (literate/not).

of 7 points after 20 years in the United States), whereas immigrants from China and the Philippines exhibit little name shifting.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup>The California birth certificates also separately identify mothers from Cuba, Japan, and Canada. There are not enough observations in these subsamples to analyze separately. The remainder of mothers in the data are combined into a “rest of the world” category. It is hard to interpret the coefficient for this group because mothers in this group come from many different sending countries who may have children at different ages on average.

Immigrants of all literacy and education levels shift away from foreign-sounding names with time spent in the United States. Table 1 compares the pace of cultural assimilation by mother's country of origin and literacy status (panel A, historical data) or education (panel B, modern data); as above, we report the coefficient on a linear effect of mother's age at birth year on name foreignness. Panel A reports these estimates for the six countries that have at least 2,000 mother-child observations in each category (literate/not); recall that the literacy rate for some countries was more than 95 percent, and so this comparison is only feasible in some cases. We find substantial assimilation in all cases, with no clear pattern by literacy status. Illiterate mothers from Finland, Germany, and Portugal assimilated more rapidly than their literate counterparts, whereas for mothers from Austria, Italy, and Russia this pattern was reversed.

Panel B subdivides mothers in the modern data by country of origin and highest degree obtained in the data. For mothers from Mexico and Vietnam, the two countries that exhibit substantial name-based assimilation, we find rapid assimilation in all educational categories. If anything, less educated mothers appear to assimilate most rapidly, but we cannot statistically distinguish the coefficients across education groups.

#### IV. Sensitivity and Data Limitations

##### A. Data Comparability Issues

Throughout the paper, we attempt to standardize the historical and modern data. However, there are still a few remaining differences that we investigate here. First, the historical data covers the entire United States, while the modern data is only for California. We replicate our historical analysis in online Appendix Table 4 (row 1) for the state of California only; we still find substantial assimilation but the pace was somewhat slower than in the national sample.<sup>25</sup> Alternatively, we try reweighting the modern data so that the immigrant mothers in our sample reflect the country-of-birth distribution of immigrant mothers nationwide. In doing so, the reduction in name foreignness with time spent in the United States attenuates somewhat (from  $-10$  points to  $-8$  points after 20 years in the United States; see online Appendix Figure 9), primarily because of the high share of Mexican-born mothers in California with high rates of name-based assimilation.

Second, the modern data records legal name as reported on a birth certificate, while the historical data were collected by census enumerators who may instead write down a different name that is used in social settings. Individuals may also change their names after birth in order to assimilate. This possibility introduces the potential role of measurement error in birth names in the 1920 census. In this case, particularly foreign names given by young mothers may be changed later on, thereby masking some of the actual assimilation that took place. Although we cannot fully address this issue, we restrict the historical data in online Appendix Table 4 (row 2) to children six years of age or younger who have not yet been to school, and thus

<sup>25</sup> California was the state with the thirty-second fastest pace of assimilation in the past, out of 48 states.

would not have had the time or the pressure to change their birth name. Patterns are similar to the full sample. Third, the  $F$ -index for the modern birth certificate data is based on the names of parents only, while the historical census data uses the full population (parents and non-parents). We instead replicate the results using an  $F$ -index based on parents only in the 1920 census (online Appendix Figure 10) and results are entirely comparable.

### B. *Heterogeneity by Gender*

Sociologists have documented that parents are more open to new or creative names for girls, while boys tend to receive a more traditional set of names, and so parents may be more willing to shift toward native-sounding names for daughters (Rossi 1965; Sue and Telles 2007). On the other hand, parents may be more concerned about the possible negative consequences of having an ethnic-sounding name in the labor market for sons than for daughters, especially in the past. Online Appendix Figure 11 shows that immigrants shift toward more native-sounding names somewhat more rapidly for daughters than for sons both in the past and the present (a disparity of five  $F$ -index points by gender after 20 years in the United States in both periods).

In the modern data, differential results by gender could be driven by measurement error in the  $F$ -index of boy names (see Section II). Online Appendix Figure 12 reproduces results by gender using an alternative  $F$ -index constructed from the names of the children of foreign-born versus US-born mothers; this index treats boys and girls names symmetrically. Using this metric, differential name choice by gender attenuates in the historical data and disappears in the modern data. It appears that parents shift their naming behavior with time spent in the United States at a roughly equal pace for sons and for daughters.

### C. *Alternative Measures of the $F$ -index*

Online Appendix Table 5 presents results from alternative  $F$ -indices that provide insight into the strategies that immigrant families used to assimilate through name choice. Row 2 replaces the overall  $F$ -index with a country-specific index. This measure asks whether immigrants shift away from common ethnic names with time spent in the United States. Estimates of name-based assimilation are similar in this case. Row 3 standardizes all names to their phonetic equivalents by using the NYSIIS algorithm instead of using raw names (for example, treating Roberto and Robert as the same name). Results are similar in the historical data but, in the modern data, the extent of name-based assimilation is cut in half. This pattern suggests that in California today, Anglicizing Spanish names is one strategy that immigrant parents use to assimilate. Indeed, inspecting common names at different percentiles of the  $F$ -index distribution reveals some names like Mary and Anna (low  $F$ -index) that have Spanish equivalents like Maria and Ana (high  $F$ -index).

## V. Conclusion

We study the cultural assimilation of immigrants during two Ages of Mass Migration drawing on historical census data for the early twentieth century and

California birth certificate records for today. Both then and now, immigrants chose less foreign names for their children as they spent more time in the United States, reducing the difference in name choice with the US-born by about one-half after 20 years in the United States. There are substantial differences in the pace of name-based assimilation by country of origin, with the immigrant groups most often accused of slow assimilation assimilating most rapidly.

Our findings suggest that immigrants' identification with United States culture grows stronger with time spent in the country. The gradual adoption of American-sounding names appears to have been part of a process by which newcomers learned United States culture, made a commitment to build roots in their adoptive country, and came to identify as Americans. Naming patterns also highlight the trade-off that immigrant families face between maintaining their cultural identity and assimilating into society at large.

Overall though, lessons from the Age of Mass Migration suggest that fears that immigrants cannot or will not fit into American society are misplaced. It would be a mistake to determine immigration policy based on the belief that immigrants will remain foreigners, preserving their old ways of life and keeping themselves at arm's length from the dominant culture.<sup>26</sup> The evidence suggests that over time immigrant populations come to resemble the US-born, and that new generations form distinct identities as Americans.

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<sup>26</sup>Fouka (2019) shows that forced assimilation policies can even generate backlash.

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