

The Third House: Group Bills in the California State Legislature

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Abstract

The extent to which groups are involved in the legislative process and legislator decision-making is of interest to legislative scholars, but difficult to empirically study because of the private information exchanges between legislator and group. This article exploits a reporting institution in the California state legislature to explore group involvement in the policymaking process and legislative effectiveness. In the California state legislature, extra-legislative individuals or organizations that write legislation and secure a legislator to author the bill may be listed as sponsors. Data on group sponsorship activity come from California bill analyses and extend from 1993-2014. This unstudied group tactic is frequently used: 37% of bills introduced and 59% of bills that become law list an extra-legislative sponsor. I show that group sponsorship is significantly related to passage, even after matching on a number of covariates. Also, legislators use fewer group bills and substitute out of group bills as they gain more experience. Overall, the results demonstrate that group input serves as an integral part of a legislative portfolio and the agenda-setting stage of legislative decision-making.

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In 2013, California state Senator Kevin de León proudly touted his introduction of S.B. 402, a bill about breastfeeding protocols in hospitals, via a press release on his personal website. The entity listed for reporters to contact regarding questions about the bill, however, is not Senator de León. Instead, the California WIC Association (CWA), a nonprofit organization of local WIC agencies and the sponsor of S.B. 402, is listed as the point of contact for those interested in learning more about the bill (Rosenhall 2013). In the California state legislature, extra-legislative organizations or individuals that write legislation and secure a legislator to “author” the bill may be listed as “sponsors.” This example is far from an exception; more than 37% of the bills introduced list an extra-legislative sponsor and 59% of the bills that become law are sponsored. The role that groups play in determining the legislative agenda has been a fundamental question since Schattschneider (1960). In this paper, I use California’s unexplored reporting institution to study groups’ policy-making success and legislator motivations for relying on group assistance.

This paper examines the interaction between group and legislator in the production and promotion of legislation.¹ Some scholars argue that groups “subsidize” like-minded legislators; characterizing the relationship as a partnership between group and politician where the group has information and the legislator has the ability to introduce legislation (Hall and Deardorff 2006). However, previous work does not identify the specific legislative products on which group subsidies are provided and utilized. I use an unexplored reporting institution in the California state legislature to determine the relationship between groups and legislators in the production of legislation. Legislators use group expertise to learn about the legislative process and to boost their success.

While neither Congress nor other states list the non-legislative “sponsor” of a bill as clearly as the California state legislature, qualitative evidence suggests that these institutions rely on groups for similar legislative entrepreneurship functions. In their interviews of the Senate Judiciary Com-

¹Throughout the paper I refer to the entities that sponsor bills as groups. A typical definition of an interest group “is an organized body of individuals who share some goals and who try to influence public policy” (Berry 1989). This definition is broader than my conception of a “group” for this paper; sponsors may not be organized individuals but a sponsor intends to influence public policy, inherent in their sponsorship of a bill. Individuals, such as the California Attorney General, also sponsor bills, violating the restriction that an interest group be a *collection* of individuals.

mittee, Nourse and Schacter (2002) find that “the sentiment was uniform that lobbyists can have a strong influence on statutory text and that this is not a rare event but, instead, a normal part of the drafting process.” A New York Times analysis found that 70 of the 85-lines of a financial regulation bill came from Citigroup recommendations (Lipton and Protes 2013). Ansolabehere, Ginsberg, Shepsle and Lowi (2010) claim that groups “have substantial influence in setting the legislative agenda and in helping craft specific language in legislation.” On the state level, Hrebenar and Thomas (2010) surveyed Maryland legislators in 1987, finding that 61% of legislators agreed that lobbyists provided them with “valuable help in drafting bills and amendments.” Lobbying firm websites highlight victories in getting language they drafted passed for clients.² A New York Times wedding announcement reported that the groom is “responsible for trying to get short-term-rental legislation favored by Airbnb passed in New York City” and the bride works for the New York City Department of Transportation and is “responsible for drafting legislation and advocating its passage in the City Council and the State legislature” (<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/fashion/weddings/jenna-adams-andrew-kalloch.html>). Non-legislative drafting and advocacy for the passage of legislation is a pervasive and recognized occurrence on the state and federal level.

In the California state legislature, the *sponsor* is broadly defined as the “legislator, private individual, or group who developed a piece of legislation and advocates its passage” (California State Legislature Glossary).³ Whereas, the *author* is “a member of the legislature who introduces a legislative measure” (California State Legislature Glossary). California has disclosed this information since at least the 1940s, when Anderson (1942) observed that there was a delay at the beginning of the session in the introduction of bills because groups “have not learned enough of [legislators’] abilities and interests, to make certain whom they want as authors of their bills.” Beyond drafting the initial version of the bill, investigative journalists report that sponsors provide authors with talking points, memos, and testimony, and authors often allow the sponsor to “approve or reject

²For example, on behalf of a “large utility client” a Florida lobbying firm formed a coalition and “quarterbacked the coalition’s work [by] drafting the language” and received praise from the client for the firm’s ability to “transform an idea into law in one session” (<http://www.becker-poliakoff.com/state-legislative-lobbying>).

³While legislators may also be “sponsors,” I do not examine these instances, dropping them during the processing step.

bill changes during the committee process” (Meyers 2015). This feature of the California state legislature allows me to explore the dynamics of group-legislator interactions on the bill level.

The implications that this tactic has for democracy are not clear-cut. Group sponsorship of bills may promote constituency service or responsiveness. Some argue that groups inform legislators about constituency concerns (e.g., Robert 1961; Truman et al. 1951; Hansen 1991). By introducing solutions engineered by cities, counties, and constituents’ employers, legislators can efficiently respond to the needs of the citizens that they are charged to represent. However, allowing groups to become intimately involved in the legislative process may open the system to undue influence from unrepresentative forces (e.g., Schattschneider 1960). Corporations or industry groups sponsor some bills in an attempt to garner additional favors or special exceptions that profit the company. Consider S.B. 860, sponsored by Taser International, authored by Senator Lou Correa, and introduced to the state Senate in 2008. This measure sought to amend the penal code to permit ownership of a specified type of remote stun gun. Conveniently, Taser International’s product met the specifications in the bill, but their main competitor’s product fell slightly short. Opponents claimed that this bill would create a state-sponsored monopoly. This example illustrates the concern that groups may manipulate this system to insert narrow and self-interested claims into the law.

Even if group-sponsored bills are innocuous, we may remain concerned that this practice distorts the legislative process by altering legislators’ prioritization of issues. The ease of introducing a sponsored bill may lead legislators to consider a different distribution of bills than they would under a system with no sponsored bills. Combined with a contained policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), Cotton and Dellis (2014) argue that this agenda distortion “reduces social welfare.” As noted in Hirsch and Shotts (2014), the Hall and Deardorff (2006) model of lobbyists providing “legislative subsidies” to legislators assumes that issues are chosen exogenously, thus groups do not influence the agenda ordering or composition. Rather than simply bringing bills to legislators already working on the issue or helping a legislator pass a bill championed by the legislator, groups may also convince legislators to consider an issue or bill that the legislator would

not have conceived of absent the group's request. Meyers (2015) cites a legislative aide who credited sponsors for "bring[ing] the 'idea'" to the legislative author. In more colorful terms, a former state legislator decries the label of author since "the real author is the special interest group" and "the legislators are simply prostituting" (de Sa 2010*b*). While these questions about the implications that group drafting has for democracy are tricky to answer, I take a first step by considering legislators' utilization of group aid on specific legislation.

Related Literature

This work contributes to several different literatures. First, this paper addresses research on legislators' sponsorship decisions and legislative effectiveness. Additionally, these data allow me to contribute to the empirical study of informational lobbying in the legislative arena. Group provision of bills seems to be an important component of the portfolio of bills that a legislator sponsors (Wawro 2001; Schiller 1995), the winnowing process (Krutz 2005), and legislative effectiveness (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Miquel and Snyder 2006; Volden and Wiseman 2014). Wawro (2001) and Schiller (1995) constrain legislative entrepreneurs to the set of legislators. Group sponsorship challenges these scope limitations, in line with Mintrom's 1997 critique. Indeed, I show that a discussion of legislative entrepreneurship, as defined by Wawro (2001) as "acquiring information, bill drafting, coalition building, and pushing legislation," is incomplete without considering the role of non-legislative actors. Descriptive statistics on the volume and range of topics covered by group sponsored bills suggests that groups play an intimate role in legislators' construction of a portfolio of bills to introduce.

Moving to subsequent stages of the legislative process, scholars study a number of predictors of legislator effectiveness (e.g., majority party status, seniority, bills sponsored, and electoral security). The high passage rate of group sponsored bills relative to non-group bills suggests that group backing and expertise on a bill greatly improve its chances of passage. An unexplored way for a legislator to increase her effectiveness (as measured by the number of laws she gets past legislative hurdles) is to utilize group bills. In this paper, I show that utilization of group bills is a substantial "key to legislative success" (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 2003).

The interaction that I examine primarily occurs at the agenda-setting stage. Examining group influence before the roll call stage is important for a number of reasons. First, earlier policy-making phases may be more susceptible to group influence (Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall 1996; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech and Kimball 2009). Indeed, scholars recognize that legislators frequently work with interest groups to draft legislation (Hall 1996). However, measuring the extent of this practice has been historically elusive. While the roll call vote generally assumes a dichotomous value, the range of bills that a legislator may introduce is large. The dichotomous dependent variable measurement in PAC contributions and roll call vote studies attenuates the problem that plagues interest group research. Scholars are unsure of the influence that group actions have on legislative outcomes because of uncertainty over what legislative actors would have done in the absence of the group. I argue that this issue is less problematic in the realm of bills that the legislator chooses to introduce. While a legislator may consider introducing a similar bill in the absence of the sponsoring organization, the wide range of possible issues that a legislator may address assuages this concern.

The connection between observable group activities and legislative outcomes is often tenuous. For example, the study of the relationship between PAC contributions and roll call voting black-boxes the connection between group activities and legislative outcomes. Multiple theories of motivations for PAC donations exist; thus, the connection between donations and policy outcomes is murky. By comparison, the association between group provision of bills to legislators and group desire to influence policy outcomes is clear cut. By tracing group bills through the legislative process, I am able to test theories about group success on closely connected measures of group activity and legislative activity.

Theory

Legislators assume costs and accrue benefits when they introduce legislation (e.g., Schiller 1995). Group sponsorship of a bill alters this calculation. The costs and benefits associated with utilizing group legislation systematically influence the partnership patterns between groups and legislators. I assume that a legislator prefers to introduce bills that are closer to her ideal point than

the status quo that the legislation seeks to replace. Legislators operate under constrained resources of time, staff, and information; these resources are essential to facilitating their basic goals of getting reelected, securing influence within the legislature, and enacting good public policy (Fenno 1978). Legislators' quintessential goals can be promoted by authoring group-sponsored bills. In particular, authoring group bills provides legislators a low-cost way to facilitate the classic goal of enacting favorable public policy. However, implicit in partnering with a group, legislators lose some autonomy over the bill's trajectory. This trade-off leads to differential use of group bills across legislators and bills based on the varying costliness of introducing legislation.

The benefits associated with introducing a bill may hinge upon the legislation's fate (Woon 2008). A legislator may extract position-taking or electoral benefits from merely introducing a bill (Mayhew 1974; Rocca and Gordon 2010; Loewen, Koop, Settle and Fowler 2014). A legislator's extraction of policy goals from bill introduction are conditional upon passage. Also, passing a bill gives a legislator a tangible accomplishment to show constituents (Fenno 1978). Legislators often publicize legislative victories on their websites, demonstrating what the legislator has done for the district lately. The passage of some bill that is important to a legislator's constituency may aid in reelection or progressive ambition goals (Mayhew 1991). Some argue that legislative effectiveness is positively related to campaign contributions (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999). Additionally, passing legislation may help legislators gain intra-institutional power (Miquel and Snyder 2006). A number of legislators' classic goals may be facilitated by introducing bills that actually succeed.

Group sponsors can improve a bill's probability of passage via several pathways. I outline a few here, but remain agnostic as to which are most important since the factors likely vary across group and bill. Group sponsors, especially specialized groups or expert agencies, may be able to draft legislation that maps the policy onto outcomes more closely than the legislator or legislative counsel's office would be able to achieve. On the Congressional level, some complain that the bill text does not accomplish the desired goals because of staffers' "sloppy drafting" (Nourse and Schacter 2002). Additionally, interviews of legislative staffers find that lobbyists are especially adept at drafting legislation that foresees "potential ambiguities or unforeseen results. . .because

their clients would be the ones to pay a high price to litigate the language” (Shobe 2014). This increase in “quality” can convince aligned legislators that voting for this bill will map onto the intended outcome. Similar to the logic in Lupia (1994), a group sponsor listed on a bill analysis may provide a “shortcut” for legislators deciding whether to vote for the bill. Additionally, observers note that groups spend significant resources to hire “the best lawyers, pollsters and PR firms who carefully craft legislation to maximize success” (Meyers 2015). When sponsoring a bill, groups generally serve as “brokers,” gathering other groups to support and testify on behalf of the bill and using their legislative contacts to whip key votes (Heaney 2006). The presence of the group as a signal, the bill quality, and the activities taken by groups to push the bills they sponsor may boost the passage rates of group sponsored bills above those bills without a group sponsor.

Hypothesis 1 *Sponsored bills are more likely to pass through both chambers and become law than non-sponsored bills.*

Group sponsorship can reduce the costs to a legislator of introducing and guiding a bill through the legislative process; however, a trade-off to partnering with a group complicates this interaction. Legislators face an essential trade-off when making the decision between using group information and engaging in legislative entrepreneurship tasks without outside aid. While extra-legislative help may provide substantial benefits by reducing the cost of introducing and pushing legislation, legislators may lose an element of control over the content of the legislation. Sometimes the sponsored bill may align with the issue that the legislator wishes to address at that moment. Here the cost to using a group bill falls in the push-and-pull between legislator and group. The legislator may have to concede some specific language preferences in exchange for the sponsor’s services. For other sponsored bills, the bill may not be on the topic that the legislator most wants to be associated with, but she feels some obligation to the group to author the bill. The costs traditionally associated with bill sponsorship include generating an idea, drafting the legislation, gathering information relevant to the text, finding a line-up of individuals to testify on behalf of the bill, and gathering support for the bill. As noted above, group sponsors help on some or all of these legislative tasks, thus reducing the cost of introducing a bill for the legislator. As I detail below, the costs are higher for

introducing bills on substantive issues and for relatively inexperienced legislators. These higher costs attenuate the trade-off and increase the probability that sponsored bills will be observed.

Substantive bills take more effort to craft and consider compared to uncomplicated bills. Investigative news stories suggest that legislators view group bills as a low-cost and effective way to address a substantive issue. Consider California Assembly Member Ken Cooley, who authored A.B. 720 on carbon emissions credits. Cooley states “the subject matter is pretty darn arcane,” but he strongly “believes in [making the state’s climate change policy more business-friendly]” (Meyers 2015). This example demonstrates that legislators use group resources and expertise to obtain quality legislation on complicated topics. By definition, resolutions are “opinions” which do “not have the force of law” (Legislative Glossary). While admittedly an imperfect measure, the bill’s length indicates some information about the bill’s complexity (Kousser 2006). Given the increased costs to introducing non-resolutions versus resolutions and more complex bills, I expect,

Hypothesis 2 *Relative to non-group bills, sponsored bills are more likely to be “substantively” important and more complex.*

The “cost” of generating independent legislation is higher for inexperienced legislators. When interviewed, “a few new members confessed that in their first year, over 90 percent of their bills were drafted or given to them by lobbyists” (Cain and Kousser 2004). First-term legislators must adjust to the realities of legislative life, leading an office, studying legislative procedures, and even learning “how to collect the mail” (de Sa 2010a). While legislators remain busy throughout their tenure, they learn from doing in the first term (e.g., Fiorina 1977; Mayhew 1974). Subsequently, the costs of introducing independent legislation are higher in the first term compared to other terms. Given these increased costs of legislating, all else equal, newer legislators will use more sponsored bills and substitute out of sponsored bills and into independent legislation in their later terms. The trade-off between reduced workload, increased passage, and reduced control for partnering with a group sponsor on a bill may be most costly for legislators with more experience. In other words, first-term legislators have a higher cost to writing and pushing their own legislation which may exceed the benefit of getting a bill at exactly their own ideal point.

Hypothesis 3 *Legislators with fewer terms of service will use more group bills.*

Data, Methods, and Results

In the following sections, I present the data and methods used to analyze the differential passage rates of group sponsored bills and non-group sponsored bills, and legislators' uptake of these types of bills over their legislative life-cycle. The outcomes are 1) bill success and 2) legislator authorship and passage of bills, especially of group-sponsored bills. First, I present the bill-level data and results, and then the legislator-level. In the bill-level section, I use matching to compare the passage rates of sponsored versus non-sponsored bills, finding that sponsored bills are more likely to pass. For the legislator-level analyses of legislator use of group bills, I present results from OLS regressions with legislator fixed effects.

Bill Level Data

For the bill-level analyses, the main outcome variables are dichotomous measures for bill *i*'s fate. I record bill *i*'s passage in the Assembly, the Senate, both houses, and final enactment. To gauge the relative success of group-sponsored bills versus non group-sponsored bills, the bill dataset has information for every bill introduced within the California state Senate and Assembly from 1993-2014. In these analyses, the main variable of interest is *group sponsorship* of the bill. This variable is dichotomous, with a value of 1 indicating that the bill is listed as being sponsored by one or more groups. Group sponsorship data come from bill analyses.⁴ In the California state legislature, the Office of Research analyzes all bills under consideration and compiles bill analyses. Committees also compile an analysis for every bill considered. These analyses are several pages long, and contain background information, fiscal and legal implications, suggestions for improvement, listings of entities that support and oppose along with their rationale, and most importantly for this paper, the bill's sponsor. Sometimes the sponsor is listed clearly at the top of the bill analysis, as the SOURCE or SPONSOR (see Figure 1). Other times, this information is denoted in parentheses by the group's name in the list of groups that support the bill. The text

⁴To access and easily download these documents, visit <ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub>.

of the analysis frequently includes a sentence about the sponsor along with statements from the sponsor. Using basic text analysis tools (e.g., grep), I search each bill analysis for the source or sponsor. The bill analyses are available from 1993-present.

Bill No: SB 21
Author: Roth (D), et al.
Amended: 5/24/13
Vote: 27 - Urgency

SENATE EDUCATION COMMITTEE : 9-0, 4/17/13
AYES: Liu, Wyland, Block, Correa, Hancock, Hueso, Huff,
Jackson, Monning

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE : 7-0, 5/23/13
AYES: De León, Walters, Gaines, Hill, Lara, Padilla, Steinberg

SUBJECT : University of California: University of California
Riverside Medical School: funding

SOURCE : California Medical Association

Figure 1: *Example of a bill analysis. Here the sponsor of the bill is indicated by SOURCE:*

To detect and control for differences between sponsored and non-sponsored bills, I collect a set of descriptive variables on the bills. The *Bill Length* variable counts the number of words in the introduced version of a bill. This variable provides a rough measure of bill complexity or sophistication (Kousser 2006; Huber and Shipan 2002). The *Consent Calendar* designation provides a measure of the controversy surrounding the bill. Consent calendar bills “(1) have received no ‘no’ votes in committee and (2) have had no opposition expressed by any person present at the hearing” (California Legislature Glossary). Tucker (1989) argues that a “consent calendar” tag indicates that the bills are considered minor by state legislators. The California state legislature classifies bills into several categories. These variables come from OpenStates (for the 2009-2014 bills) and bill histories (for the 1993-2008 bills). Local bills, urgency bills, and resolutions are coded as dichotomous measures. Local bills are those that affect one or more specific localities. Urgency bills are deemed to affect “the public peace, health, or safety and requir[e] a two-thirds vote for passage” (California Legislature Glossary).

Committees likely have different propensities to pass bills, so I add committee fixed effects to some models. In these models, I limit the sample to those bills that are assigned to some committee from 2009-2014. Bills that die at the desk are not assigned to a committee, so these bills are dropped from the models that include committee fixed effects. The committee of origin

data come from OpenStates, so these data are only available from 2009-2014.

On the federal level, scholars find that a variety of bill author characteristics affect bill passage (Woon 2008; Krutz 2005; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 2003). Thus, I include the *terms of service* served in either chamber by bill *i*'s author and the absolute distance between the legislator's ideology and the chamber median (*Distance from Median*).

Bill Level Analysis

Over the eleven sessions of data, 37.4% of bills introduced in the California state legislature have a group sponsor listed. In the Appendix, Table A1 displays various descriptive statistics on non-group sponsored bills compared to group sponsored bills. Several differences are noticeable. A higher percentage of sponsored bills are local bills, compared to non-group bills. There is not a clear difference in the mean number of cosponsors between non-group and group sponsored bills. On average, group sponsored bills have slightly more amendments added throughout the legislative process than the non-group bills.⁵ More non-group bills are resolutions, compared to the percentage of group sponsored bills that fall under this classification. Group sponsored bills are, on average, longer than non-group sponsored bills. These summary statistics provide initial support for Hypothesis 2.

The most pronounced and interesting difference between group sponsored and non-group bills is the differential passage rate, on display in Table 1. 59% of bills with a group sponsor are enacted to become law, compared to 27% of bills without a group sponsor. This 32 percent point gap in passage rate indicates that the presence of a group sponsor is essential to understanding bill passage in the California state legislature. Among the subset of bills that make it out of committee, there is still a 13 percent point difference in the passage rates between unsponsored and sponsored bills. The gap in passage rates between non-group and group bill passage narrows when examining legislation that makes it past a primary winnowing stage, indicating that group sponsors play an

⁵In Appendix A1, I check to ensure that sponsored bills are not radically altered over the legislative process. While I find that group-sponsored bills are more likely to pass than non-group sponsored bills, the power of the group sponsor may be diminished if the group's preferred language changes over the process. In this analysis, I find that among bills that pass, sponsored bills are changed less than non-group sponsored bills.

important role in the committee stage of bill consideration. Limiting the pool of bills to those that do not go on the consent calendar, the indication of bill importance or controversy, there is a vast difference in the passage rate between sponsored and unsponsored bills. Among non-consent calendar bills, only 15% of non-group sponsored bills become law compared to 44% of group sponsored bills. Even under the strictest examination of the difference in passage rates, the striking separation in the fate of group versus non-group bills remains.

	Non-Group Sponsored	Group Sponsored
% Pass lower	40.87	77.85
% Pass upper	37.95	74.51
% Pass both	32.71	70.94
% Vetoed	5.91	11.67
% Vetoed (if passed both chambers)	18.07	16.42
% Become law	26.63	59.40
% Out of committee bills that become law	55.45	68.42
% Non-consent calendar bills that become law	14.92	43.68

Table 1: *Descriptive statistics on non-group sponsored bills passage rates compared to group sponsored bills.*

The volume of sponsored bills as a fraction of chaptered bills varies across time and chamber. Figure 3 plots the percentage of chaptered bills that are sponsored bills for each session from 1993 through 2014 by chamber. This figure displays that a slightly higher percentage of chaptered bills are sponsored bills in the lower chamber compared to the Senate. Figure 2 displays the percentage of sponsored bills that become law. In the Senate, the success of sponsored bills has increased over time. While 43% of sponsored Senate bills became law in the 1995-1996 session, 65% of Senate sponsored bills became law in the 2013-2014 session. Figure 2 displays that sponsored bills have enjoyed great success in the California state legislature over time.




Figure 2: *Plot of the percentage of sponsored bills that are chaptered, per session and chamber, from 1993-2014.*




Figure 3: *Plot of the percentage of chaptered bills that are sponsored bills, per session and chamber, from 1993-2014.*

Estimating the Effect of Group Sponsorship on Passage

To estimate the effect of group sponsorship on passage, I first run a series of logistic regressions and then present results from a matching analysis. The logistic regressions of bill passage on group sponsorship include a set of control variables potentially relevant to bill passage and are included in Appendix A3. These logistic regressions show that group sponsorship is a statistically and substantively significant predictor of passage through committee, lower and upper chambers, and chaptering. The descriptive statistics and logistic regressions indicate that sponsored bills pass at a much higher rate compared to those without a sponsor. However, group sponsorship is not randomly assigned among bills. Indeed group and non-group bills are likely to differ in ways that are correlated with both group sponsorship and the probability of passage. To deal with these confounders, I turn to matching. Specifically, I use the Matching package to conduct one-to-one genetic matching on the 2009-2014 Assembly bill data (Diamond and Sekhon 2013; Sekhon 2008; Henderson and Chatfield 2011).

In the matching analysis, the dependent variable is whether or not the bill becomes law. $Y_i(0)$ and $Y_i(1)$ are dichotomous indicators of bill i 's passage with and without a group sponsor, the

potential outcomes. The treatment is whether or not a group sponsors the bill. T_i represents the binary treatment indicator which takes a value of 1 if bill i is sponsored by a group and 0 if the bill does not have a group sponsor. The covariates are a set of bill characteristics, specifically whether the bill was a *resolution*, a *local bill*, an *urgency bill*, the number of *cosponsors* listed on the bill, and the bill's *length*.

Table 2 reports the pre- and post-matching balance statistics (standardized mean differences and the p value for a t-test that the covariate mean is the same between sponsored and unsponsored bills). Lower mean differences and larger p values indicate better balance. For example, positive mean differences indicate that sponsored bills have a higher incidence of the dichotomous variables or are longer. Before matching, there are significant differences between sponsored and unsponsored bills. Relevant for the theory, sponsored bills are significantly less likely to be resolutions and are longer in every session of the Assembly. Through matching, very good balance on the covariates is obtained. The lowest post-matching p -value is .29. The similarity between the sponsored and unsponsored bills in the matched dataset gives us some confidence that the remaining differences between these types of bills are due to the effect of sponsorship.

	Before Matching		After Matching	
	Std. Mean Diff.	t test p value	Std. Mean Diff.	t test p value
Assembly 2009-2010				
Resolution	-6.49	0.10	0.00	1.00
Local	17.19	0.00	0.00	1.00
Urgency	-1.19	0.75	0.00	1.00
Cosponsors	1.79	0.64	0.14	0.59
Length	8.85	0.02	0.21	0.61
Assembly 2011-2012				
Resolution	-9.50	0.03	0.00	1.00
Local	5.06	0.21	0.09	0.32
Urgency	-4.84	0.25	-0.83	0.29
Cosponsors	-4.22	0.32	-0.05	0.55
Length	8.38	0.02	0.70	0.16
Assembly 2013-2014				
Resolution	-18.01	0.00	-0.11	0.56
Local	13.76	0.00	0.00	1.00
Urgency	-12.82	0.00	-0.11	0.32
Cosponsors	-9.59	0.02	-0.11	0.40
Length	6.88	0.07	-1.60	0.48

Table 2: *Standardized bias statistics before and after one-to-one Genetic Matching, for the ATE.*

Table 3 displays estimates from a linear probability model and matching analyses. The controls used are those reported in Table 2. The first column reports the results from a linear probability model of bill passage on sponsorship, with the covariates. The second and third columns show the average treatment effect and the average treatment effect for the treated, and Abadie and Imbens standard errors. The results of the linear probability model and the matching estimates are very similar. These results show that there is a statistically and substantively significant impact of group sponsorship on bill passage.

	OLS (ATE)	Matching ATE	Matching ATT
Effect of group sponsor	.44	0.39	0.39
Standard error	.01	0.02	0.02
Covariates	✓	✓	✓

Table 3: *ATT=average treatment effect for the treated, ATE=average treatment effect. The standard errors in the matching analyses are Abadie-Imbens.*

While the balance on covariates between sponsored and unsponsored improves drastically after

matching, the results may be misleading if unobserved covariates remain after matching. I conduct a Rosenbaum bounds test to evaluate the sensitivity of the matching estimate to unobservable differences between sponsored bill and unsponsored bills (Rosenbaum 2002). Group bills and non-group bills may be different in unobserved or unmeasured covariates. In this setting, hidden bias is the extent to which sponsored bills would have to be more likely to pass compared to unsponsored bills to bias the matching analysis estimates. Perhaps the bill types differ in intrinsic quality which is unmeasured. The Rosenbaum bounds test how large this hidden bias would have to be before altering the substantive interpretation of the matching estimate. The researcher changes the sensitivity parameter, Γ , which represents the log odds of receiving treatment. The Rosenbaum bounds indicate that the results become insignificant when $\Gamma > 1.8$, $\Gamma > 2.2$, and $\Gamma > 2.2$ for the 2009-2010, 2011-2012, and 2013-2014 Assembly data, respectively.⁶ These parameters indicate that for the 2009-2010 Assembly, one of the observations in a matched pair of bills could be 1.8 times as likely to have received treatment without eliminating the observed estimate of treatment. These Γ values are quite robust for social science research (Keele 2010). This sensitivity analysis provides confidence that the matching estimates are robust to hidden confounders and are reasonable causal estimates of the effect of group sponsorship on bill passage.

Legislator Level Data

In the legislator component of the study, the unit of analysis is at the legislator-session level. This paper seeks to examine the why legislators use group-sponsored bills. In order to estimate the connection between legislative experience and utilization of group-sponsored bills, the main variable of interest is the legislators' *terms of service*. Miquel and Snyder (2006), using lobbyist ratings of legislator effectiveness, find that ratings of effectiveness increase "sharply with tenure." I expect that less experienced legislators use more group bills compared to their longer-termed counterparts because they 1) have a difficult time crafting bills without the assistance of lobbyists and group because of their lack of experience with the circuitous legislative process, and 2) they

⁶Using the `hlsens` function from the `rbounds` package which gives the Hodges-Lehman point estimate for the sign rank test (Keele 2010).

would like to author bills that pass, and 3) group legislation is more likely to pass than non-group sponsored legislation. Variables about the legislator's pre- and post-term limits tenure are generated from Klarner, Berry, Carsey, Jewell, Niemi, Powell and Snyder (2013) and OpenStates. Specifically, *term* indicates the term number being served by legislator *i* in the session *t*. Given the small number of legislators in the dataset who have served more than three terms (this is possible if the legislator served before the advent of term limits), I classify those legislators who served more than three terms in the *4+ terms* category.

To measure legislative effectiveness, I use several approaches (given the limitation of the data for the pre-2009 period). First, I follow the work of Wawro (2001) and Schiller (1995) in using the number of bills that a legislator sponsors in a session as a measure of activity. To calculate the number of bills that a legislator authored in a given session, I turn to OpenStates (for the 2009-2014 legislators), legislative bill histories, and Lewis's database of bill descriptions. Per session, I sum the *number of bills authored* by each legislator. To measure the relative success of legislator's in getting the bills that they introduce passed, I also calculate legislators' *hit-rate*, the percentage of bills that the legislator introduces that become law (Frantzich 1979).

To connect legislative effectiveness with utilization of group bills, I construct several dependent variables. The legislator-level measures of utilization of group bills are 1) the number of group bills that legislator *i* authored during session *t* (*number group bills*) and 2) the percent of legislator *i*'s bills that are sponsored bills (*fraction group bills*). To examine the relative success of legislators' independent bills compared to group bills, I calculate the *sponsored bill hit rate*, the percentage of sponsored bills that become law.

Legislator Level Analysis

Now, I turn to legislator-level data to test predictions about the percentage of a legislator's bills that are group bills and legislator characteristics. On average, legislators get 26.6% of their non-group bills passed in a session, compared to an average 59.2% of their group bills passed in a session. Figure 4 shows the density of the percentage of legislators' group sponsored bills that become law, compared to the density of the percentage of legislators' non-group sponsored bills

that become law. This plot shows the clear separation in passage rates between group-backed and legislators' independent bills, indicating a possible rationale for legislator's utilization of group-sponsored bills. When legislators wish to appear successful and pass legislation, using group-drafted bills may help further this goal.




Figure 4: *Density plot of a) percentage of legislator i 's group sponsored bills that become law in session t b) percentage of legislator i 's non-group sponsored bills that become law in session t .*

Estimating the Effect of Legislative Experience on Group Bill Use

I examine the relationship between the number of terms that a legislator has served and her use of group bills, authorship of non-group bills, and her success in getting each of these types of bills passed. These analyses are conducted on the 1993-2014 Assembly data.

To control for legislators' differential predilections for looking to groups, I include legislator fixed effects (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo and Snyder 2003). Adding fixed effects is important because of the unobservable differences between legislators that remain constant over time, such as legislative acumen and preexisting connections with groups. Compare Assembly member Mike Gatto to the Calderon brothers. Gatto authors few group bills and expresses concern for the "special-interest groups [that] draft legislation."⁷ Contrast Gatto to the Calderon family, which has been entrenched in California legislative politics for years with dense networks of interest groups

⁷See Gatto's press release on his "Wiki Bill" project.

connections.⁸ Fixed effects control for these differences between legislators. I use ordinary least squares regression for these analyses. While the dependent variables are counts, using probit or logit with legislator fixed effects has undesirable statistical properties (Angrist and Pischke 2008). I split these analyses into Democrat and Republican legislators since the California state legislature has been controlled by Democrats for all but one year included in these data. Membership in the majority party is likely to influence both the supply of group bills to Republican legislators and the ability of Republican legislators to introduce and pass their bills.

Table 4 shows the results from the OLS models of sponsorship with legislator fixed effects among Democratic Assembly members. The dependent variables in these models are (1) the number of group bills that the legislator authors (*# Group Bills*), (2) the number of non-group bills that the legislator authors (*# Non-Group Bills*), and (3) the ratio of group bills to the total number of bills the legislators authored (*Ratio (group/total)*). I find that compared to their first term, legislators in their second and third term use fewer group bills. Group bills form a larger portion of legislators' total portfolio (the number of group bills divided by the total number of bills the legislator introduced) in the first term compared to the second or third terms. As a legislator gains more experience, she adjusts her relative use of group and independent bills.

⁸<http://www.laweekly.com/news/worst-legislator-in-california-part-ii-2170841>

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	# Group Bills	# Non-Group Bills	Ratio (Group/Total)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2nd Term	0.300 (0.625)	2.794*** (0.820)	-0.026** (0.011)
3rd Term	-2.425*** (0.721)	1.783* (0.947)	-0.063*** (0.013)
4+ Terms	8.575 (7.769)	-9.217 (10.201)	0.199 (0.140)
Some Service in the Senate	-4.596 (3.908)	-2.687 (5.132)	-0.058 (0.071)
Legislator FE?	✓	✓	✓
Observations	514	514	514
R ²	0.718	0.672	0.718
Adjusted R ²	0.479	0.394	0.480
Residual Std. Error (df = 278)	5.470	7.182	0.099
F Statistic (df = 235; 278)	3.006***	2.419***	3.018***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Regressions among Assembly Democrats: *OLS regressions of number of group sponsored bills authored by legislator i, number of non-group bills authored by legislator i, and the ratio of group to total number of bills authored on the number of terms in the Assembly. Legislator fixed effects included.*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	# Group Bills	# Non-Group Bills	Ratio (Group/Total)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2nd Term	-0.852 (0.644)	-0.823 (1.045)	-0.003 (0.014)
3rd Term	-2.928*** (0.798)	-1.033 (1.296)	-0.035** (0.017)
4+ Terms	-4.390 (5.817)	-20.928** (9.441)	0.020 (0.126)
Some Service in the Senate	-5.610 (5.817)	-11.072 (9.441)	-0.043 (0.126)
Legislator FE?	✓	✓	✓
Observations	340	340	340
R ²	0.791	0.618	0.780
Adjusted R ²	0.599	0.268	0.579
Residual Std. Error (df = 177)	4.723	7.666	0.102
F Statistic (df = 162; 177)	4.126***	1.765***	3.878***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Regressions among Assembly Republicans: *OLS regressions of number of group sponsored bills authored by legislator i, number of non-group bills authored by legislator i, and the ratio of group to total number of bills authored on the number of terms in the Assembly. Legislator fixed effects included.*

To assess the relationship between terms of legislative service and legislator's success in the legislative arena, I conduct another series of OLS regressions with legislator fixed effects. These results are presented in Table 6, the dependent variables are (1) the percent of the group bills authored by legislator *i* that became law in session *t* (*% of Group Bills Became Law*), and (2) the percent of non-group bills authored by legislator *i* that became law in session *t* (*% Non-Group Bills Become Law*). Looking at Model 1, the lack of significance on the author's term variables suggests that the group's expertise substitutes for legislative experience and enables legislators to be successful in their first term. Legislators' success in seeing group bills become law does not

seem to vary with legislative experience. Compare these regressions to the substantively and statistically significant coefficients on the term variables in Model 2. Compared to first term legislators, second and third term legislators are more successful at getting non-group bills passed into law. These findings suggest that group bills provide a way for legislators to gain legislative victories in their first term, when they have less success in achieving non-group bill victories.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	% Group Bills Become Law	% Non-Group Bills Become Law
	(1)	(2)
2nd Term	0.023 (0.015)	0.050*** (0.013)
3rd Term	0.027 (0.018)	0.035** (0.015)
4+ Terms	0.274 (0.188)	0.161 (0.158)
Some Service in the Senate	-0.052 (0.095)	-0.164** (0.079)
Legislator FE?	✓	✓
Observations	512	513
R ²	0.621	0.619
Adjusted R ²	0.298	0.296
Residual Std. Error	0.132 (df = 276)	0.111 (df = 277)
F Statistic	1.923*** (df = 235; 276)	1.918*** (df = 235; 277)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Regressions among Assembly Democrats: *OLS regressions of percentage of group sponsored bills authored by legislator i that become law and the percentage of non-group bills authored by legislator i that become law on the number of terms in the Assembly. Legislator fixed effects included.*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	% of Group Bills Become Law	% of Non-Group Bills Become Law
	(1)	(2)
2nd Term	0.015 (0.025)	0.037*** (0.012)
3rd Term	0.019 (0.031)	0.023 (0.015)
4+ Terms	-0.175 (0.223)	0.008 (0.111)
Some Service in the Senate	-0.002 (0.223)	0.022 (0.111)
Legislator FE?	✓	✓
Observations	337	340
R ²	0.582	0.621
Adjusted R ²	0.193	0.274
Residual Std. Error	0.181 (df = 174)	0.091 (df = 177)
F Statistic	1.495*** (df = 162; 174)	1.789*** (df = 162; 177)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Regressions among Assembly Republicans: *OLS regressions of percentage of group sponsored bills authored by legislator i that become law and the percentage of non-group bills authored by legislator i that become law on the number of terms in the Assembly. Legislator fixed effects included.*

Discussion

The most striking findings in this paper are the sheer volume of extra-legislative involvement in the legislative process and the differential passage rates between group-sponsored and non-group sponsored bills. Legislators rely more heavily on group bills in their first term and substitute out of group bills in later terms. The decrease in reliance on groups over a legislative life cycle suggests that a learning process occurs and alters the principal-agent relationship.

While this study capitalizes on a unique reporting tradition in a single state, the results suggest

that groups contribute extensively to the body of law within states. Legislators in California are not unique in their reliance on groups for technical information. In a highly professional legislative body, ranked the state legislature most similar to Congress, I find that legislators heavily utilize group expertise (Squire 1992). If we expect that legislatures with fewer resources rely more heavily on group services, uptake of group bills in other states may be even more widespread. Additionally, California state politics are important in their own right given the cover and size of the state in terms of population and budget.⁹

The influence that term limits have on interactions between legislators and lobbyists is of interest to scholars and observers of state government. While I do not have data on the pre-term limits years, these results suggest that less experienced legislators are indeed rely more on interest group information. Compared to their first term, legislators in later terms use less group sponsored legislation and are more successful in getting their non-group bills enacted into law. With term limits, there are more first term legislators in the body and thus more legislators who turn to groups as a source of expertise. The findings about the relationship between tenure and reliance on group bills lends support to Polsby's 1990 prediction that term limits would increase the increase legislators' reliance on interest groups.

Bill passage and legislator productivity are importantly related to group sponsorship and suggest legislator motivations for using this tactic. Examining the patterns of group bills utilization allows me to carefully explore group involvement in the legislative process. Mapping the involvement of non-legislator entities in the legislative process is important for understanding the system of laws that influence citizens. A democratic defect may arise if those who were elected must substantially rely on groups to craft high-quality bills that address the concerns of citizens in a timely manner.

⁹<http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-california-world-economy-20150702-story.html>

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Appendices

A1 Bill Change Analysis

Though I find that bills with group sponsors are much more likely than non-sponsored bills to pass, we may be concerned that these bills may be radically altered over the legislative process. Perhaps the group's desired bill is introduced and passed, but over the legislative process, the bill is amended to dilute the language preferred by the group. Terry Zinger, the president of Golden State Labor Compliance, sponsored a bill that "morphed into an ugly proposal that he wound up opposing."¹⁰ Indeed, Cain and Kousser (2004) find that about 6% of bills in the 1997-1998 Assembly were deleted and completely replaced with new language. The findings about the differential passage rates between sponsored and non-sponsored bills would be somewhat weakened if the sponsored bills that pass are altered more than non-sponsored bills that pass. In this section, I check to see how much sponsored versus non-sponsored bills change over their life-cycle.

With the text of all versions of the California state bills, I can detect the amount of change between each version of a bill. Using a simple diff program, `dwdiff`, I record the number and percentage of words that are inserted, deleted, and changed (the number of words that are removed from the earlier version and the number of words that replace them in the later version) between every two versions of a bill. For example if AB 1 is introduced, amended, and enacted, the program will calculate the change measures for three pairs: AB 1 introduced and AB 1 amended; AB 1 introduced and AB 1 enacted; AB 1 amended and AB 1 enacted. I limit this analysis to those bills that are passed, since comparing the amount of change on bills that have passed to bills that have not made it out of committee could hid real differences between the types of bills.

Figure A1 displays the density plots of the percentage changed across bill versions for sponsored and non-sponsored bills. This figure shows that sponsored bills that pass do not change more than non-sponsored bills that pass, the density of sponsored bills falls at the low end of the percent changed range. While some of the density for sponsored bills lies in the greater than 25% changed

¹⁰<http://raylebov.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/HOW-TO-SPIN-LAWS-AND-INFLUENCE-POLITICS.pdf>

range, the density plot for sponsored bills drops below the non-sponsored bills for every percentage over 25%.




Figure A1: *Density plot of a) percent that the sponsored bills changed over their lifecycle b) percent that the non-sponsored bills changed over their lifecycle.*

A2 Bill Summary Statistics

	Not Group Sponsored	Group Sponsored
Mean Bill Length (Sen)	1678	2142
Mean Bill Length (Asm)	1375	1828
Mean # Cosponsors (Sen)	0.56	0.63
Mean # Cosponsors (Asm)	3.67	3.14
Mean # Amendments (Sen)	0.30	0.56
Mean # Amendments (Asm)	0.56	0.73
Mean # Days b/w 1 st and Last Action	248.43	262.60
% Local Bills	18.52	24.31
% Resolutions	13.00	4.73
% Urgency Bills	8.33	9.38
% Consent Calendar Bills	21.32	42.27

Table A1: *Descriptive statistics on non-group sponsored bills compared to group sponsored bills. Cosponsor and length of time summary statistics are on the 2009-2014 sessions.*

A3 Logistic Regressions: Estimating the Effect of Legislative Experience on Group Bill Use

These bill-level regressions model bill passage through committee, Assembly, Senate, and final enactment. I conduct a series of logistic regressions of bill passage on group sponsorship and in-

clude a set of control variables potentially relevant to bill passage. These regressions are run on the 1995-2014 Assembly bill data, and exclude resolutions and special session legislation. The Senate regressions look very similar and are thus excluded, though available upon request. Table A2 displays logistic regression models of passage through the committee stage, passage through the lower chamber, and passage through the upper chamber. A number of covariates, on the bill and bill's author, that have been shown to alter the chances of bill passage are included (bill level: *urgency bill*, *local bill*, *bill length*, *consent calendar*; legislator level: *author's years of service*, *author's distance from the chamber median*). These results show that group sponsorship is a statistically and substantively significant predictor of bill passage through each of these stages. The predicted probability of passage by an average length, local, urgency bill with a sponsor is 73%, whereas a similar bill without a sponsor has a 40% lower probability of passing. This result is striking, and provides initial evidence that, even controlling for a host of characteristics important to bill passage, group sponsorship remains an important predictor of bill enactment. Group-sponsored bills are more likely to pass through each stage compared to bills without a sponsor.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Pass Committee	Pass Lower	Pass Upper
Group Sponsored	2.21*** (0.03)	1.99*** (0.03)	1.81*** (0.03)
Local Bill	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Urgency Bill	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Bill Length	1.13*** (0.06)	0.61*** (0.05)	0.74*** (0.05)
Session FE?	✓	✓	✓
Observations	33,617	33,617	33,617
Log Likelihood	-18,631.15	-19,528.60	-19,823.22
Akaike Inf. Crit.	37,292.31	39,087.20	39,676.45

Note: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A2: Assembly Bill Progress (Logistic Regressions): *These models report logistic regression coefficients with session fixed effects. The dependent variable for the models are dichotomous indicators 1) of bill passage through committee, 2) passage through the lower chamber, and 3) passage through the upper chamber, respectively.*

Table A3 reports logistic models of Assembly bill final passage (also known as chaptered bills in the California state legislature). The group sponsorship coefficient is robust to adding in a number of different variables that are expected to matter a great deal for bill passage. In Model 1, I include the *consent calendar* variable which indicates that the bill did not receive opposition from any legislator or group in a hearing. Even including this variable that seems intimately tied to a bill's success does not decrease the significance of the group sponsorship variable. Additionally, the author's legislator experience (*lower terms*) and ideological distance from the chamber median (*distance from House Median*) are significant but do not detract from the substantive importance of the group sponsor coefficient (included in Model 2).

To test whether lobbying by groups on sponsored bills explains differential passage rate, I

include indicator variables for whether there was group support or opposition listed on the bill analyses. The bill analyses contain lists of the groups that submit letters of support or opposition towards the bill. Figure A2 shows an example of a bill analysis on which four groups supported the bill and none opposed.

POSITIONS

Support: Bet Tzedek Legal Services (co-sponsor)
California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform
(co-sponsor)
AARP California
Consumer Attorneys of California

Oppose:None received

Figure A2: *Example of group positions on a bill.*

For 2011-2012 session of the lower chamber, I collected data on the number of groups that support or oppose the bill. Shown in Model 4 of Table A3, adding indicator variables for the presence of support and opposition does not alter the substantive results of the logistic regressions of group sponsorship on bill passage. This analysis provides support for the conclusion that group sponsorship contributes to bill passage above and beyond mere group support on a bill.

	Chaptered			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Group Sponsored	1.47*** (0.03)	1.17*** (0.06)	1.94*** (0.06)	1.78*** (0.10)
Bill Length	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Local Bill	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.04)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.11)
Urgency Bill	1.00*** (0.05)	1.04*** (0.06)	0.65*** (0.11)	0.60*** (0.19)
Consent Calendar	2.06*** (0.03)	(—)	(—)	(—)
Lower Terms	(—)	0.03** (0.01)	(—)	(—)
Dist from House Median	(—)	-0.42*** (0.03)	(—)	(—)
Group Sponsor * Lower Terms	(—)	-0.00 (0.02)	(—)	(—)
Group Sponsor * Dist from House Median	(—)	0.39*** (0.03)	(—)	(—)
Support	(—)	(—)	(—)	1.39*** (0.11)
Opposition	(—)	(—)	(—)	-1.12*** (0.11)
Committee FE?	✗	✗	✓	✗
Session FE?	✓	✓	✓	NA
Sessions Included	1993-2014	1993-2009	2009-2014	2011-2012
Observations	33,617	23,562	7,504	2,700
Log Likelihood	-16,549.71	-13,396.08	-4,214.24	-1,410.91
Akaike Inf. Crit.	33,131.43	26,824.16	8,498.49	2,835.82

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A3: Assembly Bill Chaptering (Logistic Regressions): *Models (1), (2), and (3) report logistic regression coefficients with session fixed effects. For each model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of bill chaptering.*