The prevailing view among political scientists has long been that ethnic diversity and strong ethnic nationalisms are barriers to stable democracy. Recent evidence from the “third wave” of global democratization, however, suggests that this need not always be so, and indeed that ethnic nationalism can, under the right conditions, work for rather than against democracy’s rise and consolidation. There are even cases where the lack of strongly felt ethnic identities turns out to have been harmful to the building of democracy. In particular, the experience of the Soviet and post-Soviet world over the last several decades stands as a prime source of support for the idea that politically mobilized ethnicity and democracy can go together, provided that ethnic feelings are focused on ending foreign rule rather than fighting with other ethnic groups closer to home. Before reviewing that experience, however, let us take a brief look at the more negative, traditional view of ethnicity’s impact on democracy.

In one classic formulation of this view, the injection of open political competition into an ethnically plural society inevitably unleashes a tendency toward “ethnic outbidding” by politicians vying to maximize support from voters within their respective ethnic in-groups. The result is a slide toward democratic breakdown and violence, whether because elites try to manipulate electoral processes, or because minorities reject majority decisions in which the minorities feel they have had no voice.1

The eminent theorist of democracy Robert A. Dahl, while offering a view that is not quite so bleak, still worries that high levels of ethnic diversity make democracy much less likely, particularly in countries where one ethnic group can plausibly aspire to dominate a state.2 Other authors identify strong ethnic passions with extreme right-wing ideolo-
gies that share, in their view, an instinctive antidemocratic animus and a penchant for militarism, intolerance, violence, and even genocide. Indeed, many argue that the exclusionist character of ethnic nationalism makes it a weak basis on which to build a democratic society, and that only a self-consciously civic nationalism is ultimately compatible with democratic development.³

The third wave of democratization that began in 1974 complicated but did not overturn this consensus. In the early cases of the wave, from Southern Europe and Latin America, ethnicity played a fairly minor role (with the important exception of Spain). But as the third wave spread to Asia, the Soviet bloc, and Africa—all regions with societies far more ethnoculturally fragmented than Southern Europe and Latin America—ethnic or communal issues came to the fore. Not only was ethnic nationalism sometimes itself a driving force behind democratization efforts, but the third wave also raised the issue of “stateness” as a necessary prerequisite for successful democratization, as some countries undergoing political opening saw the rise of separatist nationalisms, with state breakup or even ethnic warfare ensuing in a few cases.

The third wave thus sharpened the issue of ethnicity’s relationship to democracy, prompting renewed consideration of three broad questions: 1) Is ethnic diversity as such an obstacle to democracy building? 2) Are strong ethnic identities bad for democratization? 3) By what causal pathways do ethnic identities come to matter for democratization?

Broad-gauge cross-national research can tell us something about these relationships, but we should also be aware that the available cross-national measures of ethnicity are blunt instruments. There is much we need to know about ethnicity and politics that they cannot tell us. Readily available quantitative indicators focus heavily on ethnic demographics.⁴ This distorts analysis, which badly needs to “scale down” in order to discern crucial processes at the intersection of ethnicity and democratization that global measurements will never reveal.

Studying the post-Soviet states is helpful in this regard. They show us a range of outcomes in which ethnicity played a central role, and they yield more fine-grained evidence—at the level not only of countries but also of regions and localities within them—about how the dynamics of ethnicity and democratization interrelate.

Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Outcomes

History offers examples of democracy blooming amid ethnic variety. Many of the “first wave” democratizers of North America and Western Europe (the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland) were highly diverse states. At the same time, the first wave occurred in an era when language and ethnicity were not yet commonly held to be—as they are now—a basis upon which to claim political and
social rights, complete with internationally recognized norms of self-determination and minority protection to back them up.

Cross-national studies of democratization that take the third wave into account have cast doubt on the idea that there is any direct relationship between democracy and ethnic diversity. In practically all such studies, the statistical significance of the relationship between ethnic diversity and democracy disappears once one controls for other factors known to be associated with democracy or its absence, such as economic growth, the prevalence of Islam, oil-based economies, or prior colonial experience. This remains true, moreover, no matter what configuration of diversity one tests for. There are extremely diverse societies (India, Papua New Guinea) that rate as successful democratizers. There are societies with one or a few major ethnocultural cleavages (including Israel, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkey) that have produced relatively stable democratic polities. And there are far more homogeneous societies (Egypt, Haiti) that remain outside democratic ranks. Clearly, the raw demographics of diversity say little by themselves about whether or not a society will become a stable democracy.

But does this mean that ethnicity is irrelevant to the politics of democratization? Not necessarily. Ethnic diversity may affect democratization’s chances indirectly, by interacting with and influencing other factors such as economic growth, governmental performance, the strength or weakness of civil society, instability and large-scale violence, or institutional design. There is evidence, for instance, that ethnic diversity significantly lowers aggregate economic-growth rates, though the effects may be greater under authoritarian regimes than in established democracies. There is also reason to think that greater ethnic diversity is associated with poorer governmental performance and reduced provision of public goods, both or either of which could work to undermine a regime, whether democratic or not. Yet this relationship is also subject to qualification, as other research has suggested that these effects can be remedied through nation-building reforms that build trust across groups.

There is much evidence of both the broad-gauged and finer-grained sort that political dynamics in ethnically plural societies are highly sensitive to institutional choices. Unmodified majoritarian arrangements such as first-past-the-post election rules are known to do a poor job of representing minorities and can destabilize democracy in ethnically plural contexts by threatening to install the ethnic majority permanently in power. Federalism is widely believed to harm chances for stable democracy in ethnically diverse countries, yet has also been known to aid democratic stability if the country’s majority ethnic group lacks a core home region and if the federal bargain is reached consensually by ethnic elites rather than imposed from outside or above. So ethnic diversity matters, but seldom in a direct way.
Alternatively, it is also quite possible that the true problem of ethnicity as it relates to democratization has been hidden by the narrow way in which political scientists think about this relationship. Much theoretical research focuses too tightly on demographics, and assumes that diversity (or some particular demographic configuration thereof) determines regime outcomes. But the vast majority of scholars who study ethnic politics would never reduce the topic to a matter of the degree of diversity in a society or to a particular demographic configuration of cultural pluralism. Moreover, these scholars recognize how hard it is to measure diversity objectively, and can point to many other factors (institutional, social, historical, and economic) that predict better than demography itself whether ethnicity will become mobilized politically.

Widely used demographic metrics such as Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF)\(^8\) cannot tell us what really matters in determining whether ethnicity will become politically salient in a given society—to say nothing of precisely how it will manifest itself in politics. The mistaken assumption here is that a particular configuration of diversity is likely to be directly translated into patterns of ethnic mobilization or violence. Scaling down to a level where good data on ethnic mobilization and violence are available allows us to see just how dubious this assumption is. The Soviet record going back to Mikhail Gorbachev’s inauguration of glasnost (openness) in the mid-1980s shows that republics with less ethnic diversity (and hence lower ELF scores) tended to have more ethnic protests (though the relationship is not statistically significant).\(^9\) Republics such as Latvia and Armenia, each with widely different demographic make-ups, shared high levels of ethnic mobilization. Likewise, republics where ethnicity was little mobilized could look quite unlike each other in terms of demographic patterns: Russia and Kazakhstan are examples of this variant. Similarly, there is simply no relationship between the degree of ethnic diversity in a Soviet or post-Soviet republic and the level of ethnic violence that it has known.\(^9\) Perhaps this should not surprise us: Globally, ethnic diversity is generally a poor predictor of civil wars, and even in those cases when such a war can be called “ethnic,” economic or geographic factors turn out to have more predictive power than ethnodemography.\(^10\)

The weak guidance provided by demography alone becomes even more evident when one probes how indices such as ELF mismeasure ethnic politics. Russia, which has fought two major wars in Chechnya precisely over ethnic separatism and is generally considered by experts who study the country to be characterized by a great deal of ethnic diversity, has a slightly lower ELF score (.25) than Argentina (.26), an immigrant society where ethnicity has never been politicized. Tiny and placid Liechtenstein (with an ELF score of .57) is recorded as being considerably more ethnically fragmented than genocide-wracked Rwanda (with a score of .32). And Taiwan (with a score of .27) is considered more
ethnically divided than Lebanon (with a score of .13). Such measures defy the common wisdom about where ethnic politics is weak or strong and reflect the facts that demographic diversity is both hard to measure and a poor predictor of the importance of ethnic identity, division, or mobilization within a society.

Measures such as ELF are highly sensitive to unit size. They can easily underestimate the importance of ethnicity in big countries (Russia or China, for example), where sizeable minorities (sometimes larger than the populations of many countries) form but a small percentage of the whole vast populace. Little Monaco has just 32,000 people but a high fractionalization score of .68 because about half its citizens are ethnically French and a sixth are Italian. The Philippines, by contrast, rates a fractionalization score of just .24 because its Muslim minority accounts for only 5 percent of the total population, even though the 4.5 million Muslim Filipinos form a group that is close to 150 times the size of Monaco as a whole.

And as others have noted, the delineation of groups upon which ELF and metrics like it depend is highly arbitrary and hinges on governments’ census decisions or on what other interested sources choose to report. This categorization is itself a political act and is well known to diverge from the ways in which ethnicity is actually imagined on the ground. Demographic measures of diversity are based on assumptions about the clarity and fixedness of ethnic identities that students of ethnic politics have long abandoned. As one study concludes, “Any theory about multinationalism that fails to provide a dynamic for changing identities will miss crucial aspects of transitional politics.”

**Minority Mobilization and Democratization**

With the pitfalls of gross measurements and oversimple causal assumptions in mind, let us step back, then, and ask precisely how democratization mobilizes ethnicity, and how mobilized ethnicity in turn shapes the way that democratization unfolds. As a form of governance, democracy does not require ethnic demobilization, and indeed assumes that pressing issues which affect society will find their way into politics. Democracy does require that ethnically charged conflicts be solved without major violence and within lawful channels, lest strife or a lack of confidence in the grievance-resolving capacity of democratic institutions give resurgent authoritarianism a foothold.

In these regards, the critical processes involved in ethnicity’s interaction with democratization revolve around how regime change interacts with cultural difference. The degree of diversity per se determines relatively little about this dynamic and how it will play out. Ethnic mobilization associated with regime change can slide into ethnic violence, but it can also stabilize if satisfied minorities demobilize or come to favor
institutionalized forms of multiethnic engagement. What happens in a
given case hinges on leadership (that is, on the choices made by politi-
cians as regime transition unfolds), on the ways in which ethnicity be-
comes a basis for inclusion or exclusion
during the democratization process, and
on the opportunities for and obstacles to
the mobilization of ethnic differences.

Scholars agree that democratization
exacerbates ethnic conflict, and cite two
broad causes for this. The first has to do
with the interests of authoritarian rulers
and how they manipulate ethnicity in
order to gain and keep power for them-
selves. Jack Snyder argues that democ-
ratization exacerbates ethnic violence by
tempting politicians to “play the ethnic card” in order to avoid chal-
lenges and consolidate their rule. The early stages of democratization,
he says, are when nationalism typically becomes politicized, as elites
make nationalist appeals in their competition for popular support.

Snyder contends that when authoritarian elites in partially democra-
tized regimes feel threatened by democracy, they have an incentive to
use the levers of government and their control over the economy and
mass media to sell exclusionary nationalism to their populations as a
way of gaining popular legitimacy in lieu of further democratization.
Imperfect media markets characterized by partial monopolies, ethnici-
cally segmented audiences, journalists with little sense of ethics or pro-
fessionalism, and government manipulation make it easier for worried
authoritarian politicians to stop democracy in its tracks with overheated
“us against them” nationalist appeals.¹²

The obvious example that Snyder had in mind was Yugoslavia, where
the theory fits the facts fairly well. But the “bad leaders did it” account
often overstates the degree to which narrow elite power interests are be-
hind ethnic mobilization and violence. This brings us to the second broad
causal account, which looks primarily not at leaders and their schemes,
but at the larger system of ethnic social relationships that democratiza-
tion potentially reconfigures and the ways in which democratization
engages the interests and passions of large numbers of people.¹³

Most authoritarian regimes in ethnically plural societies are dominated
by a particular cultural group. The basic problem in regime transition,
than, is how democratization will affect the interests of individuals within
a given society’s various cultural groups. The stakes are often consider-
able, including the relative status of groups, the division of wealth among
them, the opportunities for education and cultural expression that mem-
bers enjoy or are denied, their chances for upward mobility, the represen-
tation of interests within the state, how citizenship is defined, and so on.
To be blunt, democracy as such is a numbers game. Majorities rule. Minorities are potentially threatened. In this sense, democratization in culturally or ethnically plural societies typically faces a “minority problem” that must be dealt with in order to forestall strife or instability. Ethnic minorities are potentially among the biggest losers in any democratization process that empowers ethnic majorities, so the dilemma facing democratization in a multicultural society is how to marginalize destabilizing forms of mobilization and to integrate the interests of minorities in a revised system of power whose legitimacy critically depends on majority rule.

Where an authoritarian regime has traditionally favored a majority ethnic group, democratization is unlikely to pose a threat to the existing order of ethnic stratification, and ethnic mobilization from below usually plays a relatively minor role in motivating the initial political opening. But even in such cases, minorities often take advantage of the greater political openness that accompanies democratization to mobilize in order to place their concerns on the political agenda. Such mobilizations need not undermine democratization, and indeed may even move it forward. But in majority-dominant democratization, the stability of the democratization project depends critically on the ability to craft arrangements that integrate minorities into newly reconfigured political institutions and that marginalize the separatist tendencies that might arise among them.

By contrast, in cases where an ethnic minority has traditionally been favored by an authoritarian regime at the expense of an ethnic majority, ethnic mobilization from below by the subordinate majority group is often a key driver of transition. Here, changing the regime necessarily means fundamentally changing the system of ethnic stratification. The main problem facing democratizers in such countries is how to demobilize previously favored minorities and gain their acquiescence to their altered, less favored role in a reconstructed social order.

The logics of both of these situations can present themselves even within a single case. The USSR, for instance, was a majority-dominant polity, controlled by elites drawn mainly from the Russians and other Slavs who formed the bulk of the Soviet populace. As one would expect in a majority-dominant democratization, Gorbachev’s political opening at first had little to do with ethnic issues, and his program of democratization did not seek to alter the traditional ethnic-Russian dominance over the state. Indeed, for Gorbachev “nationality issues”—which would soon include demands for separation from the USSR—were viewed as largely irrelevant to Soviet democratization until the large-scale minority mobilizations from below that his opening unleashed pushed them onto the political agenda. But what appeared as minority mobilizations from the vantage point of the Soviet Union as a whole were seen as majority mobilizations when viewed from the vantage point of minori-
ties within each of the USSR’s union republics. Democratization within each of the union republics promised to empower titular ethnic groups and reverse the fortunes of other minorities within these republics, giving rise to yet another layer of minority separatism within the union republics themselves. Thus, the nationalization of politics at the republican level politicized groups such as the Abkhazis and Ossetians in Georgia, the Gagauz in Moldova, Poles in Lithuania, and Russophone minorities in the Baltic and elsewhere. What Donald Horowitz refers to as the logic of infinite regress (the idea that any territorial division of the state creates its own minorities) pushed ethnic conflict farther downward. For example, the local ethnic-Georgian minority within Abkhazia (itself a subregion of Georgia) mobilized politically in response to Abkhaz-nationalist mobilization, which in turn had been spurred earlier by Georgian-nationalist mobilization.

Democratization at all these levels stood or fell with the ability of transitional regimes to demobilize and integrate minorities. The success of democratization in the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, for instance, must be ascribed at least in part to the demobilization of minorities there and to the ethnic violence that failed to materialize as Russian-speaking and Polish minorities integrated fairly peacefully into the new order. This stood in sharp contrast to the violent conflicts that wracked Georgia and Moldova over their respective minority issues, sending these states into disorder and permanent division. Thus ethnic mobilization or demobilization was a critical switch that sent political events moving down one track or the other. Like minorities in Georgia and Moldova, Russian-speakers in the newly independent Baltic states also faced a vast reversal of social fortunes under democratization. Yet cross-cutting cleavages, local divisions among Russophones, the higher living standards and better economic chances that the Baltic states offered, the absence of ethnofederal territories to act as political bases, and the EU’s efforts to nudge local regimes toward integration all combined to undermine Russophone and Polish mobilizations in the Baltics.15

The benefits to Baltic democracy of avoiding significant minority separatism and violence were enormous. Instead of becoming weak and divided states with collapsed economies and flourishing corruption (the Georgian and Moldovan plight as a result of ethnic civil wars), the Baltic states instead became models of democracy and development. Moreover, the critical demobilization and subsequent integration of minorities that allowed Baltic democracy to develop peacefully occurred despite initial discriminatory policies that Estonia and Latvia in particular undertook. In short, the ethnic challenges involved in democratization cannot be understood as mere functions of ethnic demography. Rather, any effort to probe the intersection between ethnicity and democratization must engage the factors that mobilize or demobilize minority nationalisms and transform them into sources of political instability in the context
of regime transition—most importantly, economic opportunities and incentives, the collective-action problems facing minorities, and government policies aimed at minority integration.

A Misunderstood Intersection

Scholars have long noted that democracy requires a sense of peoplehood, a common “we” to whom the state properly belongs, though there is disagreement about whether such an identity must emerge before democracy or whether it can come after. An understandable suspicion of anything smacking of an ethnonational approach to peoplehood arose as part of a reaction against the rise of fascist movements in post–World War I Europe. There, extreme and authoritarian ethnic nationalisms had undermined weak democracies and embarked on armed irredentist adventures, committing mass murder in the name of racial and ethnic purity.

Academic writing on democratization has tended to focus on the ways in which ethnic passions can spawn radicalism and instability, and has favored civic over ethnic nationalism as the basis for stable democracy. Indeed, within liberalism there has been a great deal of discomfort with the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism more generally—liberals focus on the rights of individuals independent of cultural communities, and worry that a nationalist focus on the rights of a particular cultural community may constrain individual rights. Yet as many scholars now recognize, there is no such thing as a state that is perfectly neutral when it comes to culture, and liberal democracies—even when based on civic rather than ethnic principles—are also unavoidably rooted in a dominant cultural idiom. ¹⁶

Without denying ethnic nationalism’s dangerous potential to boil over into chauvinism and violence, we must also recognize that there is more to the story than simply this, and that there are ways in which ethnic nationalism can be functional for democracy. Both modern nationalism and modern democracy share a kinship with the principles of popular sovereignty and self-determination. ¹⁷ The ethnic nationalisms of Johann Gottfried Herder and Giuseppe Mazzini were compatible with democratic visions, even if the racist and xenophobic visions of the Comte de Gobineau and Charles Maurras were not. In the former versions, nationalism was concerned more with liberation from a foreign yoke than with ethnic purity or imperial expansion. The spirit of emancipation that ethnic nationalism called forth could also provide a motive for challenging authoritarian rule and a glue for creating stable political communities.

Thus not all ethnic nationalisms are born equal. Nationalism that targets members of other groups with the goal of creating an ethnically pure state is likely to end in bloodshed and to wreck the basis for democratic stability and the rule of law. But ethnic nationalism that aims at ending an external tyranny can, under certain circumstances, provide a social base for successful democratization.
Such a reappraisal of the possible convergence of the passion for self-rule in the ethnonationalist sense and the passion for self-rule in the liberal-democratic sense can draw support from the experience of postcommunist democratizations. The early literature on democratic transitions saw democracy as most often the fruit of a standoff between democracy’s supporters and its foes, who together chose the path of negotiation (and hence opening toward reform) in preference to the worries and uncertainties of continued confrontation. Postcommunist transitions, however, looked less like these cases of “pacted” change and more like classic revolutions. A revolutionary path to democracy means moving ordinary citizens to risk their lives in acts of mass protest against tyranny. What can inspire people to take such extraordinary risks? Ethnic nationalism is one answer.

In the USSR, strong ethnic identities, mobilized behind the desire to get out from under Moscow’s thumb, were key not only in motivating transitions, but also in seeing to it that they eventually led to democratic outcomes. Among the post-Soviet states, there is a direct relationship between the degree to which a republic experienced mobilization for secession from the Soviet Union during the glasnost period and the eventual outcome of democratization in that republic by 2006. Those republics that experienced strong anti-Soviet secessionist mobilizations during glasnost (and hence displayed strong nationalism oriented toward liberation of the republic from Soviet rule) had consistently better Freedom House scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties than did those republics that had failed to generate any significant mobilization for exit from the Soviet state. This pattern supports the idea that a strong ethnic nationalism focused against external tyranny may help rather than hurt democratization.

How can strong ethnic passions aid democratization? One can imagine several ways. A strong ethnonationalist movement can lay the basis for the resurgence of civic life and help to fuel the revival of a civil society that can stand apart from and contain the power of the state, foster knowledge of public issues, and so on. Moreover, democratization movements that cannot mobilize large numbers of followers are unlikely to put enough pressure on the state to spark democratic change, or to weather the regime’s efforts at repression. Such movements will probably end up yielding the political field to elements of the old regime. In short, a democracy movement that is “all flag and no army” is unlikely to win. Nationalism can do much to provide the army. On their own, appeals for liberalization gained limited public resonance during the glasnost period. But when such appeals were teamed with ethnonational demands—typically for greater freedom from Moscow—it was another story. Ethnic nationalism focused on liberation from external domination provided a mass base for democratizing movements across the Soviet bloc, and the strongest pressures from below for liberaliza-
tion came from precisely those movements that simultaneously pulled on both ethnic nationalist and liberalizing tropes, not from those that eschewed nationalism or sought to turn it against other ethnic groups (a recipe for ethnic strife) rather than the Soviet state.

The record also shows that the more followers a movement mobilized, the less likely it was to face repression. Groups with weaker ethnic identities (as measured by higher rates of linguistic assimilation) were less able to generate the kind of backlash mobilization needed to stop or limit repressive regime tactics. Where national identity was strong and oriented against Soviet rule, the nationalist desire to escape domination by the Kremlin also gave posttransition societies a powerful motive to integrate with the European Union and helped to establish the hegemony of democratic institutions and market transition in the aftermath of regime-change. The powerful desire to be part of the West and to escape the Russian sphere of influence has underlain much of democratic change throughout the post-communist region since 1989.

The three unambiguously successful democracies to have risen so far from the rubble of the USSR—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—relied heavily on ethnic nationalism to drive their transitions to free self-government. The ability of movements in those places—primarily using appeals to ethnic nationalism—to bring large numbers of people into the streets was critical to democratization’s success. Looking over the sizeable array of movements that emerged under glasnost, the Baltic movements stand out for the speed and extent to which they were able to mobilize populations against the Soviet regime. The widely shared desire among Balts to escape Soviet Russian rule and join the West also motivated their quick integration into the EU and NATO in the wake of independence and allowed them to weather the significant institutional adjustments and social dislocations that these memberships entailed. The most recent wave of democratization to sweep across the post-Soviet region—that of the “color” revolutions—was also in part the product of a similar drive. In these cases, it was a desire to overcome the pervasive corruption and state weakness that had plagued Georgia and Ukraine in the 1990s, and that had prevented these countries from integrating into the new Europe, threatening to moor them within a Russian sphere of influence.

In the contrasting case of Belarus, the absence of a strong national identity against Soviet rule has reinforced a weak civil society, provided a social base for the authoritarian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s efforts to tie the country more tightly to Russia, and helped to mar-
ginalize Belarusian democrats. Similarly, in Central Asia, where ethnic nationalism focused against Soviet rule was weak and where local and clan identities predominated, civil society remained attenuated. As Kathleen Collins has argued, the dominance of clan and local identities in the five post-Soviet republics of this region subverted formal political institutions, undermined political accountability and transparency, and provided a social base for the flourishing of clientelism and patrimonialism. Little mobilization emerged to challenge the old Soviet-era elites, who instead appropriated a nationalist agenda as a way of consolidating their power and building state institutions beyond societal control. In these cases, the absence of strong ethnonational activism against external domination helped to undermine prospects for democracy by weakening civil society, allowing elements of the old regime to appropriate nationalist discourse, and reinforcing local strongmen. All this suggests not only that certain kinds of ethnic nationalism are compatible with democracy, but that the absence of strong ethnic identities can, in some circumstances, actually be an obstacle to successful democratization.

NOTES


8. Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) is one of a family of measures that social scientists use to capture the degree of diversity in a society. Usually based on census
data, ELF and related measures are computed using the so-called Herfindahl concentration formula, which measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the entire population will be from different groups. The ethnic-fractionalization scores reported here are drawn from Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (June 2003): 155–94.

9. Data on ethnic mobilization in the post-Soviet states are drawn from my own work on the subject and can be accessed at: www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/research.htm.

10. I have measured ethnonationalist violence by a combined index of the number of ethnonationalist mass violent events in a republic during the 1987–92 period (drawn from my own data) and the number of civil-war battlefield deaths from 1987 to 2003 reported in the Uppsala University Battle Deaths Dataset.


