Two factors stand poised to determine whether the Euro-Zone ultimately heads toward stability or breakdown: the incidence and severity of external shocks, for which the current framework is ill-prepared at present; and the spread of a supportive "Kantian" political culture and identity at both the elite and mass levels. The two factors are linked, Dyson argues; the capacity of European elites to respond effectively to an exogenous shock will depend on the extent to which their actions spring from a world view that privileges the principles of partnership and mutual aid. This link to culture represents another interesting theme in the volume; Dyson sees the eventual ascendancy of a Kantian culture over rival Hobbesian and Lockean perspectives as essential to the success of Europe’s new "stabilization state" (p. 267). The mere fact that Europe has managed to achieve an "imperfect Kantianism" (p. 245) over the course of a half-century of integration gives Dyson cause for cautious optimism.

The introduction of single currency, which went off with nary a glitch on 1 January 2002, was still a year off in the future when The Politics of the Euro-Zone appeared. Nevertheless, the book retains a freshness and acuity that renders it must reading for anyone wishing to master the political complexities of this most recent stage in European integration. Readers conversant in the literature will find that many of the specific issues discussed in this volume—disagreements between prosperous and poor members, the democratic deficit, interorganizational rivalries within the treaty framework—will sound familiar. But the Euro-Zone lenses employed so adroitly by Kenneth Dyson generate fresh perspectives and novel insights.

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France’s postwar economic, social, and cultural model—which the French like to view as the “French exception”—has been increasingly challenged by the process of European integration. Because France has to operate within the constraints of its membership in the European Union (EU), it has been forced to tone down some of its dirigiste features with a strong state managing the economy and to adapt to the requirements of a liberal, globalized world economy. Similarly, its ambition of autonomy and grandeur in foreign policy has been gradually tamed by the reality of being one of fifteen EU members. The relationship between France and Europeanization, however, has not been only a passive one. At the same time, France has also used the process of integration for its own benefit and shaped Europe in its image, mostly in the fields of trade and agricultural policies, where it has long been setting the European agenda.
Moreover, Europe is giving France the platform and resources that it needs to project its views on the international scene, since common policies give the voice of individual countries larger international resonance.

Michel Gueldry’s *France and European Integration* examines the Europeanization of the French polity: what the process of European integration has changed to the French state, economy, social policy, foreign policy, and sense of identity. The book, which is not intended for specialists of French politics, starts with an overview of the distinctive features of the French model in the postwar era, focusing on the omnipresent role of the state in the French economy and society. Chapter 2 examines the move toward multilevel governance in the European Union and reflects on how the French legal order has been transformed by the new division of competence between the national and supranational levels. Chapter 3 surveys the evolution of the French economy from dirigisme to economic liberalism, arguing that the French state has been forced to turn over many of its powers to regulate the economy to the European Union as well as the international market. Chapter 4 examines how the evolution of French capitalism and European integration are affecting social policy and the welfare state in France. Chapter 5 recounts the changes in French monetary policy and the transition from a national to a supranational currency. Chapter 6 describes the passage from Gaullist-inspired policy of grandeur and autonomy to the contemporary objective of a strengthened European foreign policy and security community. Chapter 7 examines how the Europeanization of France has transformed the nature of “Frenchness,” both in terms of territory and identity-based policies. In the end, Gueldry argues that France is a “transnational polity”: “it operates in a European system of shared governance that is no longer entirely national nor fully federal” (p. 191).

In sum, Gueldry’s book is a good survey of the existing literature on France and European integration, both in French and in English, summarized into a coherent, easy-to-read package. One can regret, however, the lack of focus on two questions. First, domestic political analysis is almost absent from the book. It would be helpful to know whether and why the debate (or absence thereof) on Europe has had any impact on French domestic politics. Second, a fundamental question that comes to mind when reading *France and European Integration* is the extent to which some of the change witnessed in French policies can be attributable to European integration versus the broader process of globalization. Gueldry makes only one reference to the link between Europeanization and globalization, noting in passing that “While for France, Europe operates as a key agent of globalization of trade and finances, thus forcing changes to its national structures and procedures, the EU is also being used as a shield against some of the most dislocating aspects of globalization” (p. 176). This interesting paradox of how Europeanization serves both as a catalyst for and a shield against globalization in France would be worth exploring further.

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