

## globalization, americanization and sarkozy's france

*sophie meunier*<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University,  
Robertson 437, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA

doi:10.1057/eps.2010.2

---

### Abstract

Globalization and Americanization have often been intertwined and interchanged in the French political discourse. This article explores whether and how the election of Sarkozy, and then of Obama, are transforming this equation. The French obsession with globalization and Americanization was temporarily appeased at the time of the 2007 election, which enabled Sarkozy to come to power. Yet the French rapprochement with the US, at least on economic issues, is not so clear as has often been portrayed. However, the past couple of years have shown that globalization no longer equals Americanization. This should help mitigate the strains put on the Franco-American relationship by the world financial crisis.

**Keywords** americanization; France; globalization; sarkozy

When Nicolas Sarkozy became president of France in May 2007, many commentators in the Anglo-Saxon world rejoiced that the French had finally elected an overtly pro-business, pro-globalization, pro-American politician.<sup>1</sup> This assessment was too simplistic and too optimistic. Sarkozy's first two years in office, punctuated by France's presidency of the European Union (EU) and the worldwide financial and economic meltdown, have shown a more complex picture and a French president as eager as his predecessors to denounce the ravages of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and lay blame on the US.

To be sure, Franco-American relations look blissful now, and it seems that the name-calling and the differences over Iraq happened in a different century. American politicians, including the 2008 presidential candidates, can go to France without fear of political retribution at home. In France, Sarkozy has not been punished politically for his American vacation in August 2007, his speech to the US Congress in November 2007, nor his meetings with John McCain and Barack Obama during the American presidential campaign. These actions have been less a source of domestic political resentment and mockery than his

inability to deliver on his campaign promises and his 'bling bling' personal behaviour. His apparent camaraderie with Obama, some say tinted with jealousy, is more than endorsed by the vast majority of French people, who still approve highly of the American president one year into his mandate.

Should we expect the current rapprochement between France and the US to pacify the relationship between the French and globalization? Vice versa, should the current French attitude towards globalization lead to a new policy towards the US? After all, globalization and Americanization have long been connected in French minds and rhetoric.

France has had an ongoing tumultuous relation with globalization and Americanization, which was rekindled by the global financial meltdown. This article argues that this relation was temporarily appeased at the time of the 2007 election, which enabled Sarkozy to come to power. French attitudes towards globalization have evolved on the margin, yet this evolution has not happened because of the new environment created by the policies of Sarkozy, but rather in spite of them. First, because the rapprochement with the US, at least on economic issues, is not so clear as it has often been portrayed. And second, because globalization no longer equals Americanization. This should help mitigate the strains put on the Franco-American relationship by the financial crisis.

## **GLOBALIZATION, AMERICANIZATION, AND THE ELECTION OF SARKOZY**

France has long entertained a tumultuous relation with globalization and Americanization. This relation was temporarily appeased at the time of the 2007 French presidential campaign, which enabled Sarkozy to be elected. However, the pro-American, pro-business Sarkozy did

*'At the time, the equation was simple: globalization equals Americanization.'*

not get elected because of his novel vision, but in spite of it.

### **THE FRENCH COLLECTIVE FEAR OF GLOBALIZATION**

For many years France was holding a singular position in Europe, and among all the advanced industrialized countries, on the issue of globalization – a position made of obsession, fear, defiance, rejection, and schizophrenia. Less than a decade ago, the French were completely obsessed with globalization (Gordon and Meunier, 2001). A sheep farmer who had ransacked a McDonalds had become a national hero; anti-globalization pamphlets were flying off the shelves; anti-globalization associations were all the rage; and even President Jacques Chirac was talking the talk of the anti-globalization movement (Meunier, 2000). At the time, the equation was simple: globalization equals Americanization. American companies, from fast food chains to Hollywood studios, were subjecting the world to their products, destroying national cultures in the process, with no consideration for social justice, only the maximization of profit as the ultimate objective. Globalization was perceived as bad because it was perceived as American.

Over the past twenty years, France has been transformed considerably as a result of technological and demographic challenges, in addition to the twin pressures of Europeanization and globalization (Schmidt, 1996; Culpepper, 2006). But for various reasons that I have analysed elsewhere, these massive transformations of the French economy, society and polity were for the most part not

communicated and enacted through traditional open political debate, but instead took place in the shadows (Meunier, 2003). While the French political economy has deeply but incrementally changed over the past two decades, this change has taken place quietly, as if the only version of globalization that the French could tolerate was 'globalization by stealth'.

By the end of the 1990s, globalization was a political buzzword with very negative connotations – and a French obsession. Other European countries seemed to embrace the opportunities offered by globalization, while others adopted a 'wait and see attitude'. Not France. There it had become taboo to speak positively about globalization, even though France's globalized companies were reaping the benefits of globalization.

On the left as on the right, policy-makers took major steps to ensure that France be well positioned in the new globalized world, but they covered their tracks by holding a very public, almost interchangeable discourse about the need for globalization to be 'managed' and 'humanized'. Since the French still look back fondly on the role of state planning and intervention in creating an attractive country with generous social protections, they remain wary of the sorts of neo-liberal doctrines that have been embraced not only in the US but also, it seems, everywhere else in Europe. In France, until very recently, it was more popular and acceptable to denounce the ravages of 'jungle capitalism' or the 'dictatorship of stockholders', than it was to praise the free market.

The polls are unanimous in reflecting this collective fear: the French have long been particularly worried about globalization, much more so than their neighbours. A 2007 report by the Centre d'Analyse Stratégique confirms this pattern (Centre d'analyse stratégique, 2007): 71 per cent of the French people

polled stated that globalization was a threat versus an opportunity, compared to only 47 per cent of Europeans in all EU countries. And the same poll showed, no surprise, that the French were, of all the Europeans, the least favourable towards globalization. It is also in France that competition is deemed to be the most negative in Europe.

### **THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION DURING THE CAMPAIGN**

Has France changed its tune on globalization with the election of Sarkozy? Did his pro-American displays appease French views of globalization and make them more in line with those of the rest of the Western world? I argue that it is not Sarkozy who was able to change French perceptions of globalization and Americanization, but rather this change in perceptions that enabled him to get elected.

The change in perceptions was slight but still noticeable. One novelty is that, at least until the financial crisis hit in the autumn of 2008, it was no longer taboo to consider how France could best benefit from globalization or to recognize that there is a need for the country to adapt. The change happened sometime during the 2007 presidential campaign. It is as if the floodgates guarding positive feelings about globalization, on the right as on the left, have finally been opened after more than a decade (Chopin, 2008; Cohen-Tanugi, 2008; Laidi, 2008).

The media have become much more critical of blanket anti-globalization statements. *Le Monde*, and even *Liberation*, have changed on this. They now report facts such as trade is one of the sectors creating the most jobs in France, so it is paradoxical that politicians always attack globalization, which was unheard of several years ago. They were critical of the protectionism defended by Sarkozy

during the WTO negotiations in July 2008 and in February 2009 when France unveiled its new automobile plan in response to the crisis.

At the time of the 2007 presidential campaign, anti-globalization rhetoric had lost its intellectual cachet. The poster child of the French anti-globalization movement, ATTAC, has disappeared from the screens. You no longer hear about it, when it was so 'in' less than a decade ago. José Bové, the sheepfarmer who had gained fame by destroying a McDonalds in 1999 and who used to be a French idol, barely reached 1 per cent of the vote when he ran in the first round of the 2007 presidential election.

Many analysts have openly argued that the socialist party had failed in the elections and lost ground precisely because its leaders had been unable to articulate a modern, practical discourse towards globalization. If the socialist party is imploding, it is because it has not been able to confront and resolve its multiple contradictions with respect to globalization (Chopin, 2008; Weber, 2008).

Indeed, in September 2007, former socialist foreign minister Hubert Védrine published a report, commissioned by President Sarkozy, on the issue of globalization, in which he argued that it was time for France to rethink its position – and that entailed accepting a market economy as a fact of life, enacting domestic reforms to take advantage of globalization, and trying to regulate globalization through Europe (Védrine, 2007).

In addition, maybe a generational change was also taking place, before the financial crisis hit: according to IPSOS, more than a quarter of the youth polled said that globalization represented hope for them (20 per cent said indifference and 52 per cent said anxiety). They seemed less worried than the 35–59-year olds, who were by far the most anxious group (IPSOS, 2005).

*'At the time of the 2007 presidential campaign, anti-globalization rhetoric had lost its intellectual cachet.'*

On Americanization, the change was perceptible as well during the campaign. In January 2007, the socialist party tried to exploit Sarkozy's open love for the US as a character flaw, depicting him, in a pamphlet written by Eric Besson, as 'an American neo-con with a French passport' (Besson, 2007). But the accusation did not stick, nor did it damage his chances of election.

The election of Sarkozy was made possible by the fact that a majority of French citizens were ready to give his proposed reforms a chance, since the previous policy solutions showed signs of having run their course. His campaign platform of 'rupture' was clear, and voters could not claim that they had been tricked into accepting a reformist agenda that they had not seen coming.

## **GLOBALIZATION AND AMERICANIZATION UNDER SARKOZY**

Yet on the issue of globalization, like so many French politicians, and like so many French citizens, Sarkozy has been ambiguous from the start (Van Renterghem, 2008). As a result of this ambiguity, the rapprochement between France and the US under Sarkozy had not contributed to a rapprochement between French politicians and globalization before the financial crisis hit the world.

### **SARKOZY'S AMBIGUOUS VIEW OF GLOBALIZATION**

Indeed, there may be two Sarkozys when it comes to globalization, as was revealed

in his major speech on globalization delivered in Saint-Étienne in November 2006 (Sarkozy, 2006).

Sarkozy #1 is the one usually portrayed in the American media, and the one usually highlighted by French socialists during the presidential campaign hopefully to scare voters away. He is the economically neo-liberal Sarkozy, the pro-American Sarkozy, who wanted to adapt France to the realities of globalization by reforming the labour market, making hiring and firing more flexible, making the state leaner and more efficient, reforming tax policies. That is the Sarkozy who admires the US and wishes that France could import and adapt the best socio-economic features of America.

And indeed the key theme of the Sarkozy 2007 presidential campaign, or at least the slogan that made him win, was to restore the 'valeur-travail' (work value, work as a value). This value needed to be restored precisely so that France could adequately compete in the world of globalization. It was also, more implicitly, to restore the value of wealth and make it socially acceptable to earn more and become rich in a world of globalization.

But there is also Sarkozy #2, patriotic, interventionist, and *dirigiste*. Sure, he wanted to increase labour market flexibility and streamline the heavy and costly French bureaucracy. But at the same time he is a firm believer in the heavy hand of the state in the management of the economy, especially in a period of global economic upheaval.

He has shown doubts about free and fair competition, as was evidenced by his insistence that the EU remove references to this in the mini-treaty that was agreed on at the June 2007 European summit and later in the Lisbon Treaty. He tried to resurrect industrial policy and has advocated Community preference. In trade, Sarkozy's openly protectionist

*'In rhetoric, Sarkozy has displayed a more open stance towards globalization than his predecessor.'*

streak was on display during the July 2008 negotiations for the Doha Round. He promised French farmers that he would fight for them in the multilateral trade talks under the WTO, just like every French politician before him. In Geneva, France forcefully tried to pressure the then European trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, into limiting European concessions on agriculture, even if it meant less progress for European service exports to the rest of the world – this all the while France was presiding over the EU.

In rhetoric, Sarkozy has displayed a more open stance towards globalization than his predecessor. But in deeds, as *Le Monde* puts it, 'when Mr. Sarkozy asks Mr. Mandelson not to sacrifice European agriculture "on the altar of liberalism," his critics in Europe think they hear Jacques Chirac' (Ricard, 2008).

### **GLOBALIZATION NO LONGER EQUALS AMERICANIZATION**

Why has the rapprochement between France and the USs under Sarkozy not contributed to a rapprochement between French politicians and globalization? Because the US no longer seems to weigh much in the French's assessment of globalization; because other countries are quickly catching up with French fears about globalization, including the US; and because the main answer to the challenges of globalization for France seem to be in European integration, which does not take the US into account.

A decade ago, the French equation was simple:

globalization = US = bad

Today the US is dropping out of the equation. Globalization is still viewed with fear and suspicion, but it is no longer only the Americans' fault or only to their benefit, in spite of their obvious responsibility in the crisis. A 2008 poll showed that the French have a negative assessment of the US economic influence on their own economy (70 per cent say that the US economy is having a negative impact on France), but so do, and even more so, the British and the Germans (72 per cent each) (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2008).

The same poll revealed that the global perception of the US as the world's leading economic power is rapidly waning, and was doing so even before the financial crisis. Only in twelve countries out of the twenty-four surveyed did a majority of respondents see the US as still the world's biggest economic power. Forty-four per cent of the French shared this view, while 31 per cent thought that the world's leading economic power today was already China (in Germany, the US actually comes in third place, behind the EU and China).

Moreover, the French no longer think that the main beneficiary of globalization is the US. In a CSA poll taken at the time of the French presidential election, the number of French people who answered that the globalization benefits above all the US declined from a consistent 25 per cent since 2000 to 13 per cent (CSA/French-American Foundation, 2007).

So an improvement in Franco-American relations should not be expected to have any impact on French attitudes towards globalization. If anything, France and the US today are in the same boat with respect to globalization – they are on the same side of the fence, partners as well

*'... an improvement in Franco-American relations should not be expected to have any impact on French attitudes towards globalization.'*

as competitors, with China looming large on the other side.

Moreover, other countries are catching up with French anxieties about globalization. A decade ago, France stood up among Western nations as being the most nervous and outspoken about globalization, at least in rhetoric. Today, the unease about globalization is growing in other countries. A 2008 BBC poll highlighted strong views across the Western world that the benefits and burdens of globalization in recent years had not been shared fairly (BBC World Service, 2008). Majorities in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the US argue that globalization is growing too quickly. Why should the French relax their worries about globalization when Americans themselves are becoming as anxious about globalization as the French?

Even if the challenges and problems are global, the policy solutions proposed vary. For the Sarkozy administration, the main ally and the main tool in France's quest to harness globalization to its benefit is the EU. Yet the French view of Europe with respect to globalization is ambiguous. Is the EU a facilitator of globalization, a Trojan Horse of globalization inside Europe, or is it on the contrary a bulwark against globalization, the best defence that France has (Jacoby and Meunier, 2010)? This question has not been settled, as was evidenced by the French vote on the referendum on the European constitution in 2005.

Sarkozy has clearly indicated that he believes in the latter: as his presidency of the EU in 2008 revealed, he wants to reassert France's role within Europe precisely because Europe can help to protect France from the negative side effects of globalization. He stated that France cannot face globalization alone and said that 'only Europe can oppose the all mighty market forces'. 'What is no longer possible is that the term "European preference" has become a rude word (un gros mot) despite the fact that each day I see the signs of American preference, Canadian preference, Chinese preference or Indian preference. Reciprocity must be the rule in the EU's relations with other regions of the world' (Sarkozy, 2006).

What place does it leave for the US? Warmer ties on the foreign policy front do not weigh much when it comes to protecting French jobs or appeasing angry farmers or truck drivers. For all the efforts Sarkozy has invested in the special Franco-American relationship, from sending more French troops to Afghanistan to reintegrating NATO fully, we should not expect the political ties to seep into the economic relationship. Priorities first. If Europe can enable France to ward off an economic recession and, more generally, to weigh more heavily on the course of globalization, to the detriment of the US, then the new, improved Franco-American relationship will be placed in the background.

### **FRANCE, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE OBAMA ERA**

Two massive upheavals have the potential of altering the equation between globalization and the US in French rhetoric and policy – the financial crisis and the election of Obama. I argue that even though 'Sarko l'Américain' has reverted to the tried-and-true French tactic of blaming and scapegoating the US in order

*'... Sarkozy was ready to point the finger at the US in order to avoid facing unrest at home for the brewing economic crisis.'*

to score political points at home, this time it is not working, in part because traditional anti-Americanism is mitigated by the current French admiration for Obama.

### **SCAPEGOATING THE US FOR THE FINANCIAL CRISIS**

The image of the US has been severely tarnished by the financial crisis that erupted in the autumn of 2008. All over the world, starting in the US, American ways are being put on trial. In international media and international political gatherings, the crisis is turning into a prosecution of American capitalism and American-led globalization.

France, unsurprisingly, leads the way in this prosecution. Sarkozy has tried to capitalize on this for his own political benefit by tapping both in the anti-globalization and anti-American reservoir of French political discourse. Finding an external culprit is a classical tactic in domestic politics to divert potential blame. Notwithstanding his 'pro-American' penchants, Sarkozy was ready to point the finger at the US in order to avoid facing unrest at home for the brewing economic crisis.

Sarkozy was behind the initiative that led to the first G20 summit in Washington in November 2008, designed to 'moralize' and 'refound' global capitalism. As holder of the rotating presidency of the EU at the time, the summit enabled him to exhibit strong international leadership and claim diplomatic victory, which he hoped to cash in on domestically (Rieffel, 2008).

The message about the origins of the crisis sent by the French government was

clear. As Bruno Le Maire, French minister for European affairs, unambiguously put it: 'I say it quite frankly: the financial crisis has come from the United States, the solution to the crisis is emerging from Europe' (AFP, 2009).

The Sarkozy administration went again on the offensive at the G20 Summit in London in April 2009. A few days before the summit, Sarkozy threatened to walk out from the meeting if France's demands for stricter financial regulation were not met. This was again an attempt to show France as a righteous leader, while portraying the US as the shameful laggard.

As the French bureau chief for *The Economist* reports, not much is new in the story of the turn taken by Sarkozy on economic policy:

*It is in the economic area that Nicolas Sarkozy seems to have discovered his Gaullist DNA, whether it is in his denunciation of laissez faire capitalism or in his efforts to turn the G 20 London summit into a confrontation between the defenders of Anglo-Saxon liberalism and the Franco-German willingness to regulate the market economy. Nicolas Sarkozy backpedaled to find himself on a terrain familiar to all French politicians: bowing down to the fishermen and the angry automobile workers; contesting the merits of the single European market, the new EU member states, low-wage countries; provoking London and Washington; and finally finding the old protectionist accent. (Pedder, 2009)*

### **THE FINGERPOINTING DOES NOT WORK**

Except this time Sarkozy's strategy of blaming the US in order to deflect blame from himself does not seem to be working. A myriad of polls show that a majority of French people do not support his actions to counter the crisis (neither do

they trust the Socialist Party). At this point, the French population seems more interested in seeing an improvement of the economic conditions than in laying blame.

One explanation for the lack of success of the 'blame-the-US' strategy is the trend noted earlier in the article: to most Europeans, the EU and the US are increasingly perceived as being on the same boat with respect to globalization, with China a looming menace on the horizon. Therefore the solutions to emerge out of the crisis should be similar and coordinated on both sides of the Atlantic, not accusatory and undermining.

Another compounding factor explaining the failure of the 'blame-the-US' strategy is that, to date, the French are still very big supporters of Obama. Prior to his election, France was one of the countries in the world with the largest declared support for Obama (BBC, 2008). On Inauguration Day, 70 per cent of the French said they had high hopes for what Obama would be able to do (CSA, 2009). To date, the French press has not turned against Obama. Therefore, the French public is not ready to blame Obama for a crisis for which he was not initially responsible. Instead, French voters would rather blame their own government and its failure to keep its promises.

### **CONCLUSION**

The French no longer make headlines worldwide for their anti-globalization actions and rhetoric, as they did a decade ago. It is not because they have stopped criticizing globalization as part of Sarkozy's strategy of rapprochement with the US. Neither is it because the French have finally embraced globalization. Rather, the rest of the Western world is catching up with French fears and doubts about globalization, so France no longer stands out in this respect.

The challenges of globalization today are also different from the challenges posed a decade ago. At the time, the main concerns in France were about how globalization threatened national culture, hard-won social progress, and jobs. Nowadays, in addition, the global challenges involve food prices, energy supply and independence, pandemics, and the health of the planet – this happening against the backdrop of declining American power and a catastrophic financial crisis with planetary economic ramifications.

In an interesting twist of fate, the complex equation involving France, the US, and globalization is being turned upside down these days. For the first year of the Sarkozy presidency, many analysts were wondering whether France was going to turn into a new America. As a result of the financial crisis and the

*'The challenges of globalization today are also different from the challenges posed a decade ago.'*

apparent lack of solutions in the American policy arsenal, however, a new interrogation has emerged in US newspapers, political speeches, and academic circles. Is the US becoming like France? To some, this 'France-ification of America' is meant as a supreme insult and a picture of where the US should not be headed; globalization should not be managed with the policy tools used by Europeans or else ... (Gregg, 2009). But to others, all of a sudden, France does not look so bad any more.

## Note

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in the roundtable 'The New "Special Relationship"? Post-Gaullist France and America', APSA, Boston, MA, 28–31 August 2008.

## References

- AFP. (2009) 'Europe leading US with solutions to the crisis: French official', 26 March.
- BBC News. (2008) 'Obama win preferred in world poll', 10 September, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7606100.stm>.
- BBC World Service. (2008) 'Widespread unease about economy and globalization', 7 February, available at [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb08/BBCEcon\\_Feb08\\_rpt.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb08/BBCEcon_Feb08_rpt.pdf).
- Besson, E. (2007) 'Les Inquiétantes ruptures de M. Sarkozy', available at <http://hebdo.parti-socialiste.fr/2007/01/10/347/>.
- Centre d'analyse stratégique. (2007) 'Les réalités sociales françaises à l'aune européenne', available at [http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/article.php3?id\\_article=696](http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/article.php3?id_article=696).
- Chopin, T. (2008) *France-Europe: Le bal des Hypocrites*, Paris: Editions Saint-Simon.
- Cohen-Tanugi, L. (2008) 'Euromonde 2015: Une stratégie européenne pour la mondialisation', available at [www.euromonde2015.eu](http://www.euromonde2015.eu).
- CSA. (2009) 'Les Espoirs des Français à l'égard de Barack Obama avant son investiture', 18 January.
- CSA/French-American Foundation. (2007) 'France-Etats-Unis: Regards croisés', available at <http://www.csa-fr.com/dataset/data2007/opi20070520-france-etats-unis-regards-croises-synthese.pdf>.
- Culpepper, P.D. (ed.) (2006) *Changing France: The Politics That Markets Make*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gordon, P.H. and Meunier, S. (2001) *The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Gregg, J. (2009) 'Old image of cost-cutting is out', *The Washington Times*, 12 March.
- IPSOS. (2005) 'Les craintes et les attentes des Français face au phénomène de la mondialisation', available at <http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/articles/1559.asp>.
- Jacoby, W. and Meunier, S. (2010) 'Europe and the management of globalization', *Journal of European Public Policy* 17(3): 299–317.
- Laidi, Z. (2008) 'L'Europe, fausse victime de la mondialisation', *Libération*, 30 July.

- Meunier, S. (2000) 'The French exception', *Foreign Affairs* 79(4): 104–116.
- Meunier, S. (2003) 'France's double-talk on globalization', *French Politics, Culture and Society* 21(1): 20–34.
- Pedder, S. (2009) 'So French', *Le Monde*, 5 May.
- Pew Global Attitudes Project. (2008) 'Global economic gloom', available at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=260>.
- Ricard, P. (2008) 'OMC: M. Sarkozy intrigue ses partenaires européens', *Le Monde*, 30 July.
- Rieffel, L. (2008) 'The G20 summit: What's it all about?' *The Brookings Institution*, 27 October.
- Sarkozy, N. (2006) 'Relever avec succès les défis de la mondialisation', Speech in Saint-Étienne, 9 November, available at [http://www.u-m-p.org/site/index.php/ump/s\\_informer/discours/relever\\_avec\\_succes\\_les\\_defis\\_de\\_la\\_mondialisation\\_9\\_novembre\\_2006](http://www.u-m-p.org/site/index.php/ump/s_informer/discours/relever_avec_succes_les_defis_de_la_mondialisation_9_novembre_2006).
- Schmidt, V. (1996) *From State to Market: The Transformation of French Business and Government*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Renterghem, M. (2008) 'Elites et grand public ont peu confiance dans la mondialisation, selon un sondage', *Le Monde*, 7 July.
- Védrine, H. (2007) 'La France et la mondialisation: rapport au Président de la République', Documentation française, available at <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/074000535/index.shtml>.
- Weber, H. (2008) 'Pourquoi le socialisme recule en Europe', *Le Monde*, 20 August.

### About the Author

**Sophie Meunier** is a Research Scholar in Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and the Co-Director of the European Union Program at Princeton. She is the author of *Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations* (Princeton University Press, 2005) and co-author of *The French Challenge: Adapting to Globalization* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001). She is currently writing a book on the politics of anti-Americanism.