Introduction

In Search of the Mongols and Mongolia: A Multinational Odyssey

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World history, according to Hidehiro Okada, was born in the thirteenth century, when what he called the only two "historically minded" civilizations, those of the Mediterranean and China, were brought into direct contact by the Mongols. Having conquered China and secured a stronghold near the Mediterranean on the Black Sea, the Mongols are said to have not merely facilitated unprecedented cultural and economic exchange throughout Eurasia, but to have given form to the major Eurasian peoples, including the Russians, Turks, Persians, Indians, Tibetans, Chinese, and Koreans. Around Eurasia's maritime periphery, meanwhile, Okada surmises that the ensuing "age of great navigations," alleged to have been begun by the Japanese in 1350 and the Portuguese in 1415, constituted a "response" to the Mongols' continental domination.1

Only the most unabashed enthusiasts of the imperial history of the Mongols would endorse these claims made by Okada. In fact, while noting the many forms of enduring Mongol influence, most scholars more often find themselves attempting to explain how a people who forged the world's most extensive land empire declined to virtual political oblivion, becoming the objects of imperial rule. So tenuous a connection do the Medieval exploits of empire-building seem to have with the twentieth-century subjugation of a tiny landlocked nation and related minority communities in adjacent states that Mongolia's modern history appears utterly discontinuous, if not a complete inversion.

Yet Okada's attempt to recapture for the Mongols historical influence over the basic internal structure of their powerful overlords, Russia and China—while pointedly passing over the Mongol relationship with a third regional colonizer, Japan—remains instructive. His thought experiment has the virtue of revealing usually unspoken fantasies of certain Mongolists, not to mention some Mongols, and more importantly, of highlighting the need to examine the history of twentieth-century Mongols and Mongolia in terms of the longue durée of Eurasian geopolitics, especially the shifting Russian-Chinese-Japanese triangle in Northeast Asia. That examination, as Okada insists, must not degenerate into a one-way search for the influence of outsiders on the Mongols, however weak the latter may have become.

Even if the medieval Mongols did not initiate world history, the travails of their successors in modern Mongolia (understood in the broadest sense) offer many insights into fundamental issues of today's world—from the Russian advance in Asia and the demarcation of the vast Sino-Russian frontier to the fate of
pastoral nomadism when assaulted by modernity in its Communist and post-Communist guises; from Japanese attempts to conquer the Asian mainland to the relative weight of the cultural and the political in shaping a people's identity; from the spread of Chinese settlement across large parts of Asia to the conditions under which buffer nations are formed and preserved, or engulfed and nearly eradicated.

Over the course of the twentieth century in Northeast Asia, Mongols and interested outsiders alike have pursued their dreams and fashioned their identities in the sparsely inhabited steppe-desert. From the images of the mysterious "secret land" and the "grand world empire" of the khans, to the "geopolitical pivot" of Eurasia, and finally to the "exotic backwater" forced into modernity, Mongolia's heritage has been continually reshaped, and to an extent remains for grabs among state builders on all sides of the border. To appreciate this enduring fascination with the cosmopolitan, landlocked Mongols, as well as the set of experiences and historical lexicon available to would-be rulers, some sense of the trajectory of Mongol studies will be given.

Russian Matrix

Modern scholarship on the Mongols began in the multinational Russian empire. Russian attention toward Mongol peoples focused first on the tsar's own subjects, including the Kalmyks of the lower Volga and the Burjatas of eastern Siberia, and formed part of the expanding empire's efforts to study and master the Orient. Beginning in 1833 the Mongolian language was taught at the University in Kazan, then Russia's main center for training Orientalists. Around mid-century a rival center developed at St. Petersburg University, which acquired an oriental languages department to complement the city's research-oriented Asian Museum (founded in 1818). St. Petersburg soon eclipsed Kazan.

With Russia's acquisition of the Amur basin from China and the founding of Vladivostok in 1860, as well as the subsequent Russian penetration into Manchuria, Russia took greater notice of the Mongol subjects of China. The Russian Geographical Society organized several scientific expeditions to Outer and Inner Mongolia, both of which were under Chinese rule. Siberian traders promoted further explorations, as did the Russian government's political ambitions in the Far East—symbolized and stimulated by Russia's construction of the Transsiberian and the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) in the 1890s.

In retrospect, the establishment of a Russian consulate in Urga (Ulaanbaatar) in 1858 can be seen as marking the onset of a successful thrust into the extensive Mongol lands claimed by China. This Russian advance was greatly spurred by the 1911 revolution in China, and not long diverted by the chaotic revolutionary and civil war years 1917-21 in Russia. By that time, Russia had come to hold a preeminent place as arbiter of Mongol affairs. A combination of the Russian empire's tradition of German-inspired scholarship, the diversity of a realm that stretched across Eurasia, and Russia's turn to a forward policy in Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century furnished a unique matrix for collecting and disseminating knowledge about the Mongols.

Chinese study of the Mongols provides an important contrast. Among outsiders the Chinese have had the longest direct contact with the Mongols—experience that produced generations of interpreters expert in Mongol languages (the Manchu rulers of China even took their script from the Mongols). Under the Qing, Mongol Studies were advanced by Zhang Mu (1805-49), who wrote an investigation of "Mongolian Pastures," and Tu Ji (1856-1921), who employed ancient chronicles to rewrite the history of the Yuan. Wang Guohei (1877-1927) edited Chinese accounts of travels to Mongolian lands, and Ye Dehui (1864-1927) prepared the first modern edition of the thirteenth-century Secret History of the Mongols, which had been transliterated long ago into Chinese. Taking advantage of their experience as subjects and then overlords of the Mongols, Chinese scholars seemed well on their way to matching their Russian counterparts.

But this early development did not grow into a mature tradition for a number of reasons. Unlike some Qing functionaries, Chinese scholars never fully learned Mongolian languages, instead working with Qing dynasty imperial records (Zhang Mu) or translated and transliterated texts (Tu Ji, Wang Guohei, Ye Dehui). No less consequentially, Chinese Mongol studies took shape as part of the Qing's project to map and classify the frontier regions. Individual scholars and the entire enterprise became closely tied to the Manchus and imperial rule, a circumstance that would come to discredit practitioners and the practice alike. Ye Dehui and Wang Guohei both fiercely opposed the 1911 revolution, whose circumscribed character enabled them to continue working. During the 1926-27 Nationalist revolution, however, Ye Dehui was executed as a counter-revolutionary and Wang Guohei committed suicide in despair.

After the debacle of the nationalist triumph, Chinese Mongol Studies might have recovered and advanced, yet the Chinese lacked the impetus of a colonial context, of a search for an Asiatic "other" with which to define themselves. It is not necessary to "apologize" for Russian condescension toward and mistreatment of "Asiatics" to recognize that in comparison with the Chinese, the Russians managed to encourage a sense of Mongol identity, record Mongol history, and not merely destroy but also preserve artifacts of Mongol culture, as part of a project to define the ethnic and national categories of Asia and Europe. Of course, not all non-Russians have enjoyed such "beneficial" effects of Russian imperialism. But the Mongols did—an outcome for which Russian competition with the Chinese was indirectly responsible.

Among Russian Mongolists Aleksei M. Pozdeev (1851-1920) stands out. A professor at St. Petersburg, and then founder and director of the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok in 1899, Pozdeev's two volumes (of a projected seven) on Mongolia and the Mongols, based on his 1892-93 travels to the area and published in 1896-98, inaugurated the attempts to bring Mongolian history up to the present. Expeditions to Mongol regions by outside observers were then rare, although in Mongolia, as elsewhere in Asia, Russian efforts soon caught the attention of the British. Co-belligerents alongside the Russians in the imperial "Great Game" for
influence across the Asian continent, British observers produced a spate of travel books with such titles as "Unknown Mongolia" and "With the Russians in Mongolia," the latter indicating unequivocally who had beaten her majesty's empire to the punch. From the outset, study of the Mongols took place as part of grandiose political projections and Great Power imperial rivalry. Where Pozdneev led the way, other scholars and officials of Russia, and then the Soviet Union, followed. In 1921 there appeared what became the new standard work in Russian on Mongolia. It was written by Ivan Maiski (1884-1975), a trade official (and later ambassador to Great Britain) who spent eighteen months in Outer Mongolia during the Russian civil war. Maiski's partisan eyewitness account of the Mongolian parallel to the "October revolution," and the resultant formation of a Mongol state between Russia and China, long colored subsequent treatments of twentieth-century Mongol history, whether written in support or denial of the view that Mongols had had their own revolution.

In tracing the expanding enterprise of Russian Mongol studies from Pozdneev to Maiski, it is important to keep in mind that in Russia the study of the Orient was often carried out by non-Slav subjects of the Russian empire. In the case of Mongolian studies, a critical role was played by the Burut intelligentsia. Russified enough to have acquired a university education and a political vocabulary of nations, progress, and modernity, yet different enough to have retained a sense of their "Mongolness," the Buruts assisted Russian specialists and administrators in language and alphabet reform, Buddhist and Tibetan studies, as well as the study of Mongol law, literature, ethnography, and history, sometimes attaining the status of leading scholars in their own right.

No doubt the most prominent Burut intellectual was Tsyben Zamtserano (1880-1940), who taught Mongolian language and culture in St. Petersburg (later Petrograd), the imperial metropole, before the 1917 revolution. In 1921, with Russian assistance he founded the Mongol Scientific Committee, which in 1961 became the Mongolian Academy of Sciences on the Soviet model. Behind Zamtserano and the Mongol Scientific Committee stood a half century of Burut-Russian interaction that helped make possible the pivotal Russian role in Mongol affairs. In sharp contrast, Beijing never tried to make similar use of its Mongol subjects. And Tokyo had no such option, until much later, when through conquest it unsuccessfully sought to replace China as the Middle Kingdom in Asia.

Scholarship and Service

Political developments in Russia after 1917 furth ered the formidable Russian investment in the study of Mongolia, but they also eventually abetted the self-subversion of Russia as the singular arena of Mongol studies. No one better encapsulates these interrelated trends of consolidation and displacement than Nicholas Poppe (1897-1992).

Like many protagonists in this story, Poppe was born in Asia, more precisely, Shandong Province, China. His father, a graduate in Oriental Studies at St.

Petersburg, served as secretary of the Imperial Russian consulate in Tianjin and then in Qiqihar, Mukden, and Harbin (where he was murdered by a burglar in 1913). As a baby Nicholas spoke Chinese, but moved back to Russia and, like his father, studied at Petrograd University. Although his studies were interrupted by war service and the subsequent general dislocation, Poppe earned a degree in oriental languages in 1921, and began working at the Asian Museum of the Academy of Sciences and at Petrograd (later Leningrad) University.

In 1925, at age twenty-eight, Poppe precociously became a professor at Leningrad University, the same year that the Asian Museum was remade into the Institute of Oriental Studies, where he also worked, cataloguing Mongolian manuscripts. The next year Poppe formed part of a select group sent by the Mongolian Commission of the Academy of Sciences to Mongolia. "Ulaanbaatar was a typical Chinese town," he recalled of his first trip. "There were numerous Buddhist temples and monasteries, Chinese shops and restaurants, and only a few Russian-style houses." All this would soon change.

Through an unusual set of circumstances the talented Poppe rose quickly. After the Russian Pole Wladislaw Kotwicz (1872-1944) emigrated to take a post at Lwów University in newly independent Poland in 1923, Kotwicz's student (and Poppe's teacher) Boris Vladimirsov (1884-1931), who had briefly studied in Paris (with Paul Pelliot [1878-1945]) and in London, became the head of Mongol studies in the Soviet Union by virtue of holding the leading position in the Leningrad Academy of Sciences. Following Vladimirsov's death at age forty-seven, Poppe took over the Mongolian Department of the Soviet Union's Institute of Oriental Studies, amid an impressive constellation of linguists, ethnographers, geographers, and historians studying the diverse peoples of Eurasia.

On the basis of the aforementioned Secret History of the Mongols, as well as various chronicles and law codes analyzed and published by nineteenth-century scholars, Vladimirsov had cut a wide swath, putting forth a general theory of nomadic "feudalism" and attributing the advent of epics to the steppe "aristocracy." By contrast, Poppe and his generation were discouraged from grand visions, or even from comparative linguistics. Such approaches were thought to hint at a political movement supporting pan-Mongolism and pan-Turkism, both feared as dangerous to the Soviet state. Poppe concentrated on a Yukat grammar, Burut dialects, and then a Khalkha (Mongolian) grammar, analyzed separately. Scholarship was encouraged and funded by state authorities, who also made plain their stake in the outcomes.

During the Stalinist 1930s, the state's involvement in scholarship became more heavy-handed. Poppe recoiled at the devastation of innumerable purges while worrying about becoming a victim himself. Looking back, he remembered having suffered "all kinds of ideological obstructions," yet he concluded that by and large his work "proceeded satisfactorily." Poppe assisted the Soviet army in the demarcation of the Mongolia-Manchuko border with Japan in 1939, but claimed to have refused to serve as a translator in the winter war of 1939-40 against Finland (beloved site of his childhood summer retreats before the 1917 revolution).
A sense of genuine patriotism sometimes overlapped with Communist endeavors, and sometimes did not.

After the 1941 Nazi invasion of the USSR, Poppe was evacuated from Leningrad to the Kalmyk republic, and then closer to the Caucasus, which fell under German occupation. By his own account he served the occupiers as a translator, and in 1943, when the Germans were forced to retreat, Poppe left with them. He was posted to the Wannsee Institute just outside Berlin, an intelligence unit answerable to the SS, as a specialist on Soviet minority nationalities, and assigned the task of composing an encyclopedic work on the history and culture of Siberia, which he claimed never to have finished.22 Poppe moved with the Wannsee staff during its evacuation to Graz, Austria, sought and received a transfer back to Berlin to the East Asian Institute, but was again evacuated when the latter shifted to Marienbad (Marienské Lázně).

With the German defeat, Poppe approached British intelligence, received an invitation to Cambridge, but then was refused a visa, evidently for his wartime work in Germany. Similar reasons apparently lay behind the withdrawal of an invitation to teach at Harvard. Supposedly sought by the Soviet authorities (for allegedly having instigated the turn of the Kalmyks to the Germans), Poppe finally departed Frankfurt on a U.S. military plane in May 1949 to begin a new life in America. Living under an assumed name for a time, he wrote a series of reports for the U.S. State Department on Soviet academic life, especially on the course and impact of Stalin's purges.

A linguist of esoteric languages, his services were deemed useful by yet another powerful patron of scholarship: in the fall of 1949, Poppe was asked to join the faculty at the University of Washington, Seattle. He became a member of Washington's Far Eastern and Russian Institute—a unique combination for an American university that his own life personified.23 For almost two decades Poppe led the Institute's distinguished program in Mongolian and Altaic studies.

Despite his emigration to the United States, Poppe's collaboration with German scholars of the Orient continued.24 He became especially close to the leading German Mongolist, Walther Heissig (b. 1913), who was born in Vienna and taught for many years at the University of Bonn, leading a seminar on the peoples of the steppes.25 Heissig's most accessible publication characteristically involved an instructional dialogue about what we know of the Mongols and how we know it. He swept the reader through a tour of ancient manuscripts uncovered in Russia, Persia, and China, as well as archaeological discoveries made in the sands, along the way dispelling the erroneous notion that the Mongols, as a nomadic people, had failed to record their own history.26

Heissig learned Mongolian and first collected manuscripts while working in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo established in the 1930s. As a German consular official, he enjoyed favorable access to Japanese-controlled territories throughout Asia, as did his Hungarian contemporary, Lajos Ligeti, another Mongolist oriented toward Inner Mongolia. For a brief period, the Japan-Germany-Hungary—Inner Mongolian "revisionist" axis formed an opposed pole to the Soviet-Buriat-Kalmyk-Outer Mongolia matrix discussed above, and provided a privileged space for conservative-minded scholars who saw Mongolia as another place to document the unwanted assault of modernity on "tradition."27

Avowedly anti-modernist, if not reactionary, Heissig embodied the kind of painstaking scholarship with source materials that prerevolutionary Russia had emulated, and that Poppe admired and practiced. Joining forces with the younger Heissig, Poppe asserted membership in an international circle of classically oriented scholars, seemingly above politics, disdainful of modern tendencies, and utterly devoted to the specialized knowledge of their arcane subjects.28 Heissig's ability to transmit the joy and achievements of Mongol studies to a wide audience set him off from Poppe, but the German's commitment to scrupulous scholarship, within a conservative ethos, provided an important clue into the ease with which Poppe undertook his wartime work under the Nazis. Another clue lay in Poppe's disapproving attitude toward Soviet Communism.

In 1955, from the dual perspective of insider and outsider, Poppe composed an overview of Mongol Studies in the USSR, published in Russian for a Munich-based émigré journal.29 He noted that prerevolutionary Russia had held a distinguished monopoly on Mongol studies, pointedly citing an impressive 1935 bibliography that listed more than 2,400 books and articles in Russian.30 From experience he observed that the dependent status of Outer Mongolia had afforded unique access for Russians, and that the founding of the Buriat and Kalmyk autonomous republics inside the USSR had heightened interest still further. The construction of rail lines as well as the advent of auto transport also helped.

Then politics "intervened," however. Poppe asserted that prior to 1930 there had been little direct political interference in Soviet academic circles, and that under the Soviet regime a sizable number of serious publications on the Mongols were issued, but he emphasized that with the arrests of the 1930s, books, papers, and scholarly archives were confiscated, never to see the light of day. (Poppe did not say how he escaped arrest.) From 1937 through the war, not much scholarly activity on Mongolia seems to have been conducted, and in his opinion the few immediate postwar publications were often restatements of previously published research. He added that little note was taken of foreign scholars, except to denounce them—an especially inexcusable offense against the cosmopolitan ethos essential to serious scholarship.31

Stalin had died two years before Poppe composed his historiographical overview, but in Poppe's opinion a recovery of the Soviet community of Mongol scholars from the state's devastation was not visible. In the mid-1950s, the achievements of the 1920s and early 1930s, built on strong pre-revolutionary foundations, seemed to Poppe an archaeological ruin. Never again would Russia dominate the world of Mongol studies—such was his implied message. Indeed, his own emigration to the United States by way of Germany seemed to signal the end of Russian preeminence, and the self-inflicted nature of that downfall.

A retrospective of Soviet Mongol studies from within the USSR, not surprisingly, painted a picture of a robust community of scholars, at least by the 1960s, stretching back continuously to 1917. Poppe's name was conspicuously
Mongolia, a region known for its relationship with Russia, and the end of the Mongol empire, has been of interest to historians for centuries. The Mongol period was marked by its nomadic heritage and its influence on the development of Central Asia. Despite Mongolian efforts to modernize and Westernize, the traditional aspects of the Mongolian culture and language have remained intact. The Mongol influence on the development of Central Asia should not be overlooked by historians.

In the 20th century, Mongolia experienced significant changes as a result of the Soviet Union’s influence. The country faced challenges in maintaining its cultural identity, and the language and traditions were preserved through education and cultural institutions. The modernization of Mongolia has led to the development of new industries and technologies, although the traditional way of life continues to be an important aspect of Mongolian identity.

In conclusion, the study of Mongolia’s history is crucial for understanding the region’s cultural, political, and social development. The Mongol empire’s influence on Central Asia cannot be understated, and the country’s modernization has led to a unique blend of traditional and modern values that continue to shape its identity. The future of Mongolia remains a topic of interest for scholars and policymakers alike.
foundations upon which politics rested. And politics for him ultimately meant the great power rivalries among empires or civilizations.

Typically, in a 1934 essay Lattimore interpreted the establishment by Japan of the Manchukuo puppet state in 1932 as a decisive shift in the trajectory of Asian history, marking a turn from the maritime regions back to the internal areas north of China's Great Wall where Japan and the Soviet Union confronted each other. Emphasizing strategic concerns and dramatizing his subject, Lattimore wrote that Mongolia, "of which the world knows less than it knows of China, Siberia, or Manchukuo"—but on which he was an expert—provided "the key to the destiny of the whole Far East." Using the popular language of the day, he suggested that Mongolia formed a kind of geo-strategic "pivot" whose control would supposedly serve as a basis for continental domination. For East Asia he predicted war, and less presciently for the Mongols, civil war.41

After World War II, Lattimore noted that Outer Mongolia had provided an effective buffer for the Siberian frontier and posed challenges for a Japanese army that might have tried to cross it.42 Indeed, following Japan's defeat and its military disengagement from Inner Asia, Lattimore slightly shifted his gaze from Mongolia to Chinese Turkestan. Retaining his geohistorical approach, and his focus on long-term migration and settlement patterns beneath imperial rule, he now called Xinjiang, or Chinese Turkestan, "the pivot of Asia" and argued that it constituted a "new center of gravity...in the world," accessible to Soviet Russia but not to America. The long, yet remote, frontier between Russia and China remained "the key" to world Politics.43

In sum, the Inner Asian frontier, "though divided between Chinese, Soviet, and other sovereignties," retained "a character of its own," as Lattimore wrote in the introduction to his collected papers in 1962.44 That character consisted in its way of life, which supposedly provided no basis for a stable polity.45 Despite its distinctive identity, therefore, Inner Asia was destined to be dominated from without. Such was the sober, geopolitical message of Lattimore's romance with Mongolia.

Developed Satellite or Dominated Colony?

Under Lattimore's direction, a seminar on Inner Asia was established at the Page School at Johns Hopkins.46 Lattimore also sponsored a number of publications, the most important of which for our purposes was Gerard Fritters' book, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (1949). Completed in 1939 but withheld for a decade following the outbreak of war, the book explored Mongol relations with Russia/USSR, China, and Japan, using published Russian sources (but no Chinese or Japanese ones). Field work in the "closed" country of Mongolia was then impossible.47

Fritters argued that Soviet interest in Mongolia was not a response to the failure of revolution in Europe but to the security threat posed by retreating White or counterrevolutionary armies during the Russian civil war. He contrasted China's failed attempt to take advantage of Russian distraction and disarray from 1914 to 1921 with the USSR's ability beginning in 1921 to deepen the close ties forged by the tsarist regime and become the de facto arbiter of Mongolian affairs. Meanwhile, Japan's foray into Inner Asia was blunted by the Soviet victory at Nomonhan in 1939, turning the Japanese southward, while Nazi Germany's war strategy did not in time envision a coordinated attack with the Japanese against the eastern Soviet Union. In short, Soviet hegemony in Mongolia seemed to arise for bona fide reasons, and so remained unchallenged.48

In a preface, Lattimore sought to elaborate some of Fritters' themes. He highlighted the importance of Russia as a counterweight to Chinese pressures, especially settlement, in Mongol lands. For a time, some Mongols in Inner Mongolia saw Japan as a counterweight to the Chinese, but in his view the legacies of Russian and Japanese influence were strikingly different. Whereas the USSR "developed" Outer Mongolia, giving it institutions and helping build a modern nation, the Japanese reinforced the "non-modern" or "feudal elements" of Inner Mongolia, namely the princes and the church. The Japanese presence supposedly carried little long-term positive import. For these reasons Lattimore concluded that the Soviet position in Mongolia was not really imperialist.49

Soviet "developmentalism" constituted a favorite theme of Lattimore's. Writing of a visit to the Mongolian People's Republic in 1962, with memories of the despair he had witnessed in the Inner Mongolia of the 1930s, Lattimore asserted that the former Outer Mongolia represented "an outstanding example of the successful economic development of one country by a planned program of aid from another country," and that "today the Mongols are better fed and better clothed than any other people in Asia," while their housing, education, and employment levels, and distribution of income were also highly praiseworthy. He claimed to have seen not just an economic boom, but a truly popular government whose "alliance" with Russia was "regarded by the people as their alliance, not just a deal between politicians."50

To be sure, Lattimore noted that "things were not always so smooth" and that the unfolding of a Marxist, urban, proletarian revolution in a nomadic society seemed paradoxical. But with or without Marx, he argued that there would have been a showdown with the Lamaist church, for "the Mongols of the twentieth century had either to modernize their society and state or perish as a people." The close association with Russia, a reversal of the Mongols' historic relationship with China, accelerated that confrontation and propelled Outer Mongolia into the modern world. And far from annexing Mongolia—except for the region of Uriankhai which became Tannu Tuva and which Lattimore overlooked51—the Russians had created a state that supposedly served Mongol interests as much as Russia's. The clincher in the argument for Lattimore was Mongolia's escape from "wartime occupation."52

To many, Lattimore's version of *Realpolitik* constituted an apology for the USSR. One of Lattimore's most impassioned critics was Nicholas Poppe, who was particularly provoked by Lattimore's introduction to the 1955 English translation of the official biography of the Mongol revolutionary Sükhbaatar,
whom Lattimore called a political leader on par with Vladimir Lenin or Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), as if the Mongols had not been utterly dependent on their Soviet "advisers.\textsuperscript{53} Poppe, who felt that nothing short of complete independence for Mongolia was acceptable, had little trouble adducing evidence of Soviet domination, from the bloody purges to the close parallels between Mongolian and Stalinist cultural manifestations.\textsuperscript{54}

Citing published works that Lattimore had not consulted and that made for a far less benevolent picture of Mongolian subordination to the USSR, Poppe viewed Mongolia not as an example of Soviet developmentalism but as a "springboard" for Soviet penetration of Asia. Furthermore, Poppe interpreted the subordination of Mongolia by the USSR as a harbinger of the fate of eastern Europe after 1945: "Had the Western world known the way that Mongolia had been turned into a Soviet satellite, the Western world would have behaved significantly more carefully" in its dealings with Stalin at Yalta and after.\textsuperscript{55}

On the defensive, Lattimore wrote that not all instances of state-to-state subordination were identical. He argued that the term satellite was usually equated with colony or puppet, but ought not to be. Rather, a satellite was formed when a minority in the subordinate state willed such status as a lesser evil. Lattimore further contended that Poppe ignored Chinese encroachment upon Mongol territories and its accompanying Sinification, as well as the 1930s Japanese thrust, which buttressed the backward-looking Mongol princes and lamas in Inner Mongolia. In short, Poppe wrote of Soviet "domination" without reference to the full picture of external events. "National emergency may or may not be a moral justification," Lattimore wrote, "but in politics it is a reality," adding that "it was only because Mongolia lay under the shelter of Soviet protection that it was not overrun by Japan."\textsuperscript{56}

Regarding internal developments, Lattimore rebuked Poppe for the idea that the Mongols were mere pawns in the Soviet embrace. Even if they were ordered to act by the Soviet authorities, Lattimore contended that the Mongols who collectivized agriculture were "driven by real convictions of their own, wanting to do what they did, and engaged in real controversies with other Mongols." In conclusion, Lattimore hinted that the postwar Japanese political and economic relationship to the United States might similarly fall under the rubric of satellite—an occupation, for the most part accepted by Japan's ruling elite, and aimed not at exploiting but at developing Japan.\textsuperscript{57}

From today's vantage point, it is not difficult to see that Outer Mongolia was both a developed satellite and a dominated colony; that the views of Poppe and Lattimore are complementary rather than diametrically opposed. To put the matter another way, the experience of twentieth century Mongolia has been contradictory. Poppe offers a corrective to Lattimore's apologia; Lattimore provides a dose of realism to soften Poppe's visceral anti-Communism. Lattimore comes at the issues with a sense of constrained possibilities; Poppe, with an uncompromising spirit. But each in their own way remained Mongolophiles.

During the dark days of McCarthyism, Poppe was summoned to testify against Lattimore. He noted that some of Lattimore's works were superficial, but he did not accuse Lattimore of being a secret communist or a spy. According to Poppe, Lattimore expressed his gratitude in a letter. But Lattimore later accused Poppe in print of having been an SS "officer" during the war—a charge that Poppe felt compelled to refute with exonerating documents obtained from German archives. The irony of Lattimore, who was slandered as a Communist, later smearing Poppe as a Nazi, is a poignant reminder of the bruising battles fought by the generation born in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{58}

**A Developing Historiography**

Dating back to the *Secret History of the Mongols*, written in 1228 or 1240, the Mongols have had a rich tradition of chronicles and epics centered on the supposed words and deeds of Chinggis Khan and his successors. Although no writings survive from the period after the Mongols' expulsion from China in 1368 until the large-scale conversions to Buddhism in the late sixteenth century, writings from the seventeenth century onward exist in abundance. These voluminous sources have served as a basis for imagining a historical community of considerable antiquity, rooted in clan and church.\textsuperscript{59}

After the 1911 revolution, when Outer Mongolia declared its independence (Inner Mongolia remained a part of China), participants' reminiscences and biographies helped establish a new nationalist historiography that also drew on the ancient texts, many of which were soon rediscovered. With the Soviet-supported revolution of 1921, the Mongolian People's Republic encouraged historical research, emphasizing the former world empire and the new national community. Strongly anti-aristocratic, though not fully Marxist, this historiography competed with the glorifications of Chinggis Khan coming out of Chinese-controlled Inner Mongolia that also served to mobilize youth with nationalism.

By around 1950, however, independent Mongolia had abandoned the traditional Mongolian script for Cyrillic and turned the focus of history writing away from nationalist adulations of Chinggis to socioeconomic themes. In 1954, Mongolian scholars, teaming up with their Soviet counterparts, published *The History of the Mongolia People's Republic*, the first comprehensive effort that covered prehistory to the present, in both Russian and Mongolian.\textsuperscript{60} Its heavy-handedness and falsifications notwithstanding, this overview, together with monographic studies on the prerevolution, opened up a range of heretofore unexamined issues as counterpoints to the emphasis on heroes and war. Similar comprehensive histories of Inner Mongolia, in Chinese as well as Mongolian, appeared not long thereafter.

In short, as one moves deeper into the postwar period, one begins to see, particularly by the 1960s, a developing historiography on Mongols and Mongolia in the twentieth century written by the Mongols themselves. Writing on the Mongols by outsiders increased as well. In the USSR, a barrage of publications emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, many supervised by Il'in Zlatkin.\textsuperscript{61} Even in China, at Beijing's Central Nationalities Institute (founded in 1951) and the
Inner Mongolian University in Hohhot (opened in 1957). Mongol studies became more or less well-established following the 1949 revolution.62 (China also regained a presence in Outer Mongolia, posting an ambassador, reviving trade relations, and exporting contract laborers.)

In the Anglophone world, Britain achieved a certain prominence in the 1960s with Owen Lattimore at Leeds, and Charles R. Bawden (b. 1924) at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, who wrote a readable and comprehensive history.63 Bawden took as his subject the twentieth-century state formed in Outer Mongolia, noting that its borders were rather arbitrary, excluding more Mongols than were included. Yet he argued that states were nothing to sneer at in Inner Asia, as the case of Tibet demonstrated. Even though much was lost as well as reserved, Bawden hailed the recovery of a national state—at least for some Mongols—as a major achievement.64

In the United States, Denis Sinor, a Hungarian émigré, founded a Mongolian studies society at Columbia University in 1961, and moved it with him to Indiana University in 1963. A medievalist, Sinor set out to develop a syllabus and course outline for what he variously called Central Eurasian and Inner Asian history.65 He also trained a number of specialists in Mongol languages and history, including some on the twentieth century, and helped make Indiana one of the centers for Mongol studies in America, alongside the University of Washington under Nicholas Poppe.66

Poppe’s most celebrated student was Robert Rupen (b. 1922), who turned his 1954 dissertation into a masterly study published by the Indiana University Press a decade later. Even though the Mongol state formed the basic unit of analysis, Rupen cast his net broadly. He began with, and developed at length, the role played in Mongol history by Buriai intellectuals, whom he called “the most progressive indigenous leadership in Central Asia in the early twentieth century.” He also gave attention to pan-Mongolism, and its religious variant, pan-Buddhism, both of which he called “the most powerful indigenous idea in Central Asia in the twentieth century.” The pan-Mongolist aspiration, he showed, was meticulously frustrated by Russian policies. In fact, the Russians and Mongols often disagreed, yet they were united in their opposition to the Chinese. Herein lay the key to Rupen’s approach.67

In contrast to prevailing views, Rupen contended that “the Russians assumed a position in Mongolia with some reluctance,” and that they were encouraged to do so by the Buriai as well as by what became pressing strategic concerns. In a way, Rupen’s book can be said to have traced the gradual displacement in Outer Mongolia of Chinese by Russian influence, a turn of events that appears inevitable only in hindsight. He restored a sense of contingency, and also sought to characterize the evolving nature of Soviet influence in Mongolia.68 Rupen argued that “purges, secret police, and other apparatuses of totalitarian control do not tell the whole Mongolian story. Literacy and education, health and sanitation, science and modernization, were and are an important part of the Communist program.” In his treatment, the 1930s became not solely a story of internal Stalinist convulsion. “Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland,” he insisted, “explains more than any other single factor the Mongolian developments of the 1930s.” In sum, Rupen’s Mongolia was neither an unmitigated tragedy nor an overwhelming victory, but the “bittersweet tale of a small people that survived in a hot corner of Asia.”69

Supplementing Rupen’s treatment of the Mongol experience as a problem of Russian/Soviet history, another prominent American scholar, Henry Schwarz, analyzed the Mongols in their relation to China. Schwarz lamented the general lack of serious attention among Americans to minorities in China, yet he was able to fashion an impressive program of Mongol studies in the United States around the subject of Chinese minority policies and the experience of minority communities. Adding political weight to the project, a good number of the scholars on Inner Mongolia inside China were by this time Mongols, a striking development of the post-1949 environment.70

Schwarz, who taught briefly at the University of Washington before transferring to Western Washington University in Bellingham, never wrote a study of Mongols per se, but he provided Mongol studies with renewed impetus and an institutional home. After Poppe’s retirement and the discontinuation of Mongol studies in Seattle, Schwarz in effect inherited Poppe’s mantle, as well as his friendship, patronage, and private book collection.71 It was Schwarz (and Western Washington) who published and edited Poppe’s memoirs, and it was Schwarz (and Western Washington) who, with Poppe’s assistance, among that of others, held the first North American conference on Mongolia in 1978.72 The participants resolved to make such a conference an annual event, a goal that proved ambitious.

Conferences in the U.S. on Mongolia or Mongol studies have become less—not more—frequent. In the introduction to a 1994 Festschrift for Schwarz, the editors pointed to their initial acquaintance with him in the late 1960s as the high watermark for Mongol studies in America.73 This claim may prove to be unduly pessimistic, however. One is tempted to conclude that the attention across the twentieth century devoted to Mongols and Mongol affairs will endure, if only because of the strategic location of the Mongols amid the Russians, Chinese, and Japanese, and the experience Mongols have acquired as a kind of landlocked cosmopolitan.

Mongolia as Touchstone

Mongol history, for better or worse, is Russian history and it is Chinese history. What of Japan? As we have seen, precisely the absence of a strong Japanese link to the Mongols has been cited as an allegedly happy result of Soviet involvement in Mongolia.74 Outer Mongolia can be listed among a limited number of nations in Asia where Japanese war guilt is a nonissue. Today, perhaps not coincidentally, Japanese involvement in Mongolian affairs, through investment and training, is extensive, and welcomed. Japanese study of Mongols and Mongolia has long flourished, as two major bibliographies published in the 1970s demonstrate.75


Covering works issued since 1900, these compendiums reveal the vastness of Japanese-language materials on Mongolia, including intelligence reports and more scholarly studies that were produced in great quantity during the interwar period, largely as a consequence of Japan’s political and military ambitions on the Asian mainland. Of course, Japan’s role in Asia has changed over time, and so has the impetus for Japanese study of Asia, including Mongolia. Indeed, Japan’s postwar refashioning of a new role for itself in Asia can be read in its Mongol studies. It is surely no coincidence, therefore, that Mongolia could be seen by one prominent Japanese scholar, Hidehiro Okada, as the starting point of world history—a world history that commences in Asia.

In sum, twentieth-century Mongol studies in Japan—as in Russia, China, Germany, Hungary, Britain, America, or anywhere else—provide a revealing window onto the trajectories traversed by these various countries. In writing about the Mongols, foreign scholars have often been writing about themselves and their own countries, as Mongols from their own experiences know only too well. The search for Mongols and Mongolia in the twentieth century has turned out to be a multinational odyssey.

This is no mere academic matter, for with the imperial retreat and then dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Mongolian state found itself charged with the task of reinventing its institutions and its modern identity. That identity cannot be limited to a recuperation of the exploits of Chinggis Khan, the Buddhist Church, and other elements with which to forge a national community, but must take account of Mongolia’s struggles to achieve modernity within a geopolitical triangle not of its own making. That triangle, moreover, has opened up to include a fourth member, the United States. Mongolia’s population of 2.3 million—75 percent under the age of 35, more than 50 percent under 21—is being buffeted by the epoch of “globalization.”

The inescapable international character of Mongolian history seems destined to continue. But if, as Robert Rupen wrote in 1964 (and his opinion is even more true today), the cliché of “Unknown Mongolia” has become a relic of the past, the historical connections across political divides in Northeast Asia are only now beginning to be rediscovered following the demise of Communism. With the reestablishment of transnational ties in Northeast Asia may come a renewed appreciation of the exceptional experience of the Mongols, a renewal we hope this volume of conference papers strengthens. Truth be told, even in the darkest depths of cold-war imposed isolation, Mongols never lost their transnational identities, whose formation and transformations in the crucible of geopolitical rivalries are explored in the essays that follow.

Notes

2. General overviews of Russian study of the Orient are provided by Richard Frye, “Oriental Studies in Russia” and Wayne Vucinich, “The Structure of Soviet Orientalism:

Fifty Years of Change and Accomplishment,” in Wayne Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 30-51, and 52-134, respectively.

3. For a detailed history of oriental studies in Russia, see Vasili V. Bartold, Istoria izuchenia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1911; 2nd ed. Leningrad, 1923); also contained in volume nine of the author’s collected works: Sochineniia 9 vols. (Moscow, 1963-1977). Born in St. Petersburg into a family of Baltic Germans, Bartold (1869-1930) is often seen as Russia’s premier Orientalist. See N.M. Akramov, Vydaiushhievasi russkie vostoksoved V.V. Bartol’d: Nauchno-biografcheskii ocherk (Dushanbe, 1963); and Bartold, Sochineniia, vol. 1, pp. 14-21.

4. Translations of accounts by early Russian travelers to the Mongols can be found in John F. Baddeley, ed., Russia, Mongolia, China; being some record of the relations between them from the beginning of the XVIIIth Century to the Death of the Tzar Alexei Mikhailovich A.D. 1676-1677 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1919).


6. Francis Woodman Cleaves, The Secret History of the Mongols: for the first time done into English out of the original tongue and provided with exegetical commentary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). The Secret History, which recounts the genealogy of Chinggis Khan, his life and campaigns, and the positions awarded to his successors, is the only Mongolian historical work that survives from the thirteenth century.


8. In the nationalist era one of the few scholars who continued the rich Qing tradition of Inner Asian research was Chen Yuan (1880-1971), a historian of the Yuan dynasty and Chinese religion. From 1929 he headed Beijing's Furen University (a Catholic institution). During World War II he remained at Furen, under Japanese occupation. After the Communist victory he participated in the land reform of 1951, and in 1952 became president of Beijing Normal University (Furen's successor). But he did little active research after 1949. Zhou Kangxie, ed., Chen Yuan xiansheng jinian nian sheng xuejun (Hong Kong: Ch'ungwen, 1971); cited in Atwood, “Chen Yuan [Ch'en Yüan],” pp. 156-57.


12. Ivan Maiskii, *Sovremennaiia Mongoliiia* (Irkutsk, 1921), reissued in abridged form as *Mongoliiia nakane ne revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1960). In the new edition Maiskii retrospectively described his work as the first "Marxist" study of Mongolia, but his original chapter on political history was severely truncated in the new edition, reflecting the struggle to bring scholarship into line with what was understood as Marxist ideology.

13. Maiskii's book included much valuable statistical material, such as the results of the first Mongol census, conducted under tsarist auspices. Mention might also be made of the monumental works of G.E. Grum-Grzhimailo (1860-1936). *Zapadnaia mongoliiia i Ural'Khaiskii krai* vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914), vol. 2 (Leningrad, 1926), whose comprehensive footnotes contain a veritable encyclopedia of publications. (The author's discussion of Chinghis Khan, to whom vast feats of historical transformation are attributed, predates Stalin's revolution from above by a mere three years.) Anatoli D. Kallinikov (1899-1940), a member of Maiskii's expedition, wrote a number of works about agrarian relations and the Mongol "revolution," including "Agrarnye otnoiienia i antifedal'naia agramaia revoliutsii v Mongoliia," in A. Mineev, ed., *Agramyi vegors na Vostoche* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 96-142.

14. As Robert Rupen wrote, "the common struggle against Russification, and the long common experience of Russian administrative control, in fact led to identification as 'Buriats' rather than as members of this or that clan and tribe. Clan and tribal differences became less important, and something approaching a common national consciousness developed." Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* vol. 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 32.


16. Ibid., p. 86. Poppe returned to Mongolia the following year and in 1929, in between traveling among the Buriats. After 1929 Poppe was not granted a Soviet exit visa to travel to Mongolia, but he continued to make numerous trips to Russian Buriatia up to 1941.

17. Born in Wilna and a student of St. Petersburg University, Kotwicz followed other Russians, including Piotr Piatigorskii. Also Orientalist in his origins, he was perhaps better known as a Russian linguist and philologist. His major work was published posthumously: *Obshchestvennyi stroi mongolov: Mongolskii kochevoi feodalizm* (Leningrad, 1934), which has been translated into French. For a review of his publications, see G.N. Rumiantsev, "Trudy B.Ia. Vladimirovskoi po istorii Mongoliia," in *Filoologiya i istoria mongolskikh narodov* (Moscow, 1958).

18. Vladimir V. vol. 5 of *Imperial Rivals* (vostokovedenie), formerly the Asian Museum, should not be confused with the Institute of Living Oriental Languages, where Poppe also worked and which was founded in 1920 (it was closed in 1938). For further details of the early years of Soviet Mongol studies, see the posthumously published memoirs of another Vladimirtsrov student, Aleksii V. Burdukov (1883-1943), *V starii i novoi Mongolii: Vospominaniia, pis'ma* (Moscow, 1967).

19. Leningrad's Institute of Oriental Studies (vostokovedenie), formerly the Asian Museum, should not be confused with the Institute of Living Oriental Languages, where Poppe also worked and which was founded in 1920 (it was closed in 1938). For further details of the early years of Soviet Mongol studies, see the posthumously published memoirs of another Vladimirtsrov student, Aleksii V. Burdukov (1883-1943). *V starii i novoi Mongolii: Vospominaniia, pis'ma* (Moscow, 1967).

20. Poppe wrote the first full grammar of Khalkha Mongolian (1951), a complete


22. See, for example, Heissig, ed., *Collectanea Mongolica: Festschrift fur Professor Dr. Rintgen zum 50. Geburtsstag* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966), part of his series called Asiatische Forschungen. This particular volume had contributions from Germany, England, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Japan, India, and Mongolia, in various languages.

23. Part of the language of the Buriait language (1938), plus various works on many other languages, including an up-dated Yakut grammar and glossaries for Medieval Mongolian. He prepared a number of translations of folktales and epics. *Poppe, Reminiscences,* pp. 261-79. See also A. Nikolaev, *Bibliografia Mongolskoi narodnoi respubliki* (Moscow, 1935).

24. Part of the language of the Buriait language (1938), plus various works on many other languages, including an up-dated Yakut grammar and glossaries for Medieval Mongolian. He prepared a number of translations of folktales and epics. *Poppe, Reminiscences,* pp. 261-79. See also A. Nikolaev, *Bibliografia Mongolskoi narodnoi respubliki* (Moscow, 1935).

25. List of victimized Mongol scholars were published in *Narody Azii i Afriki,*

32. For example, N.P. Shastina, "Mongolic Studies," one of the pamphlets in the English-language collection Fifty Years of Soviet Oriental Studies (Brief Reviews) (Moscow, 1967). Shastina singled out Boris Vladimiritzov as the last representative of "the Russian classical school of Orientalism" in which Mongol studies formed "an integrated complex of various fields," including history, linguistics, literature, and ethnography, all handled by a single researcher. Following Vladimiritzov, she argued, that each subfield evolved into a separate field of inquiry, with research often inspired by his writings and hypotheses. In her summary Buriat and Kalmyk studies were not treated, evidently to avoid any hint of pan-Mongolism.

33. Poppe wrote that Britain's Charles Bawden and the Heissig student Klaus Sagaster of Berlin turned down solicitations to relocate to America, and that Hidehito Okada of Japan accepted such an invitation but left after two years because of homesickness. In any case, Poppe explained that the university was compelled to find ways to reduce its budget. Poppe, Reminiscences, p. 241. Later, Far Eastern and Slavic languages were separated into two departments (Washington's Slavic department was almost abolished in 1995).

34. Owen and Eleanor each wrote a book describing their separate routes from Beijing to Chinese Turkestan—she across Siberia on the Transsiberian, he across Mongolia on the camel caravan route—and then collaborated on a description of their joint travel from Chinese Turkestan to on Kashmir. Owen Lattimore, The Desert Road to Turkestan (Boston: Little Brown, 1929); Eleanor Holgate Lattimore, Turkestan Reunion (New York: John Day, 1954); and Owen Lattimore, High Taurany (Boston: Little Brown, 1950). In a self-critical preface to the 1972 reissue of The Desert Road, Lattimore wrote that he was attracted to interwar Asia by the rise of Japan and the stirrings of nationalism in India and China (xii), rather than by romance.

35. The journal was founded in 1928 by the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu.


37. John G. Hanig and Urgunge Onon, Analecta Mongolica: Dedicated to the Seventieth Birthday of Professor Owen Lattimore (Bloomington: The Mongolia Society, 1972), pp. 10-18; Ordeal by Slander (vii). John T. Flynn argued that the accusations of espionage were true, and that their ill effects were made possible by the thin ranks of U.S. Asia specialists as compared with those on Europe. Largely concentrated, according to Flynn, in the Institute of Pacific Affairs, this small group of supposedly inventive Asia specialists aimed to defeat Chiang Kai-shek and deliver China, as well as Korea, to the communists by public propaganda and backchannel consulting work for the State Department. Behind it all Flynn saw Stalin. Flynn, The Lattimore Story (New York: Devin-Adair, 1953).


42. Owen Lattimore, "Inner Asia: Sino-Soviet Bridge" (1952), Studies in Frontier History, pp. 160-64.


44. Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers 1928-1958 (New York: Oxford, 1962), p. 29. Over the years Lattimore alternated names for the strategic area that occupied his studies, from High Tartary to Inner Asia. See the definition he elaborated in Lattimore, "The New Political Geography of Inner Asia" (1953), Studies in Frontier History, pp. 165-79. Lattimore's fascination with the Sino-Soviet borderlands and rivalry was evident in his first travel book, High Tartary, published in 1930, when he called the Sino-Russian clash "a play of primal forces, far more significant than superficial considerations of politics." Then he put forth the thesis that not just Mongolia but Xinjiang was moving into the Soviet orbit, a fear that Lattimore had picked up from Chinese officials during his travels and later repudiated in the preface to the 1975 edition. His Russophilia on full view, he speculated in 1975 that the Russians had not been motivated by "villainous designs" in their forward policy, even if such a policy was at variance with the USSR's pronouncements against imperialism! Lattimore, High Tartary, pp. 226-27, 74, 78. See also Lattimore, "The Inland Crossroads of Asia" (1944), Studies in Frontier History, pp. 119-33.


46. Like Heissig, Lattimore recruited several refugee "native" scholars from Inner Mongolia, including Urgunge Onon and Gombojav "John" Hanig, who later became president of the Mongolia Society in America. In a tribute on the occasion of Lattimore's return to the United States and seventieth birthday, they lauded their mentor as "the pioneer in initiating Mongolian studies as a coherent discipline in the 1940s" in the United States. John G. Hanig and Urgunge Onon, eds., Analecta Mongolica: Dedicated to the Seventieth Birthday of Professor Owen Lattimore (Bloomington: The Mongolia Society, 1972), p. 7, with a bibliography of Lattimore's publications on pp. 123-42.

47. As Robert Rupen has written, "essentially, no "outsider" saw any part of Outer Mongolia for even one week's visit in the whole thirty years between 1926 and 1956 (excluding Japanese POWs in Ulanbaatar 1945-47)." Rupen, Mongols, p. 271.

48. Fritters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position. Compare Fritters to the much inferior G.D.R. Phillips, Russia, Japan, and Mongolia (London: Frederick Muller, 1942), a work of vapid generalization and speculation without scholarly notes.

49. Lattimore, in Fritters, pp. ix-xlv.

50. Owen Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited (New York: Oxford, 1962), pp. 170-73. The book was based upon a two-month trip undertaken at the invitation of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences. Lattimore's emphasis on Soviet developmentalism vis-a-vis the Mongols as a model for other countries could have been lifted directly out of Soviet publications. It was echoed by many other writers in English.

51. On Tuva, see Rafael M. Kabo, Ocherki istorii i ekonomiki Tuvy. Chas' pervaia: dorevolutsionnaiia Tuya (Moscow-Leningrad, 1934), and Otto Mächen-Helfen, Reise ins Asiatische Tuba (Berlin: Der Bückerkreis, 1931). Kabo noted that tsarist Russia had designs on Tuva as early as the 1880s, and that aided by the Transsiberian railway, Russian settlement in Tuva picked up decisively after 1905 (especially after 1911), forming
an important element in advancing Russian policies. In English, there is William Ballis, "Soviet Russia's Asiatic Frontier Technique: Tana Tuva," Pacific Affairs, 14, March 1941, pp. 91-96, published under Owen Lattimore's editorial direction and largely a reiteration of Lattimore's position on Soviet developmentism.

52. In an earlier essay, he had written that "Mongolia came through the years of the rise of Hitler and Japanese militarism with less suffering, bloodshed, and economic loss than any other country in Asia," thanks to its association with the USSR. The bloody 1930s, however, were not mentioned. Lattimore, "Mongolia's Place in the World" (1949), Studies in Frontier History, pp. 270-95; the preface to Fritters book.


55. Ibid.


61. Russian-language publications on Mongolian history written by Soviet and Mongol authors, sometimes in collaboration, are reviewed from a Soviet "Marxist" point of view by Mark I. Gol'man, "Problemy novoi istorii," in Il'ia Zlatkin, ed., Obschestvennye nauki v MNR (Moscow, 1977), pp. 65-106. See also Gol'man, Problemy noveni' istorii Mongol'skoi narodnoi respubliki v zhiznialnii istoriografii SSHA (Moscow, 1970). Gol'man's book was notable for revealing to a Soviet audience that many non-Soviet authors considered Mongolia to be a Soviet satellite or colony, and that there had been a major uprising in Mongolia in 1932 against Soviet-enforced policies. See also Il'ia Zlatkin's Mongol'skaya narodnaya respublika-strana novoi demokrati (Moscow, 1950), which was translated into German and Chinese, and later revised as Ocherki novoi i noveni' istorii Mongoli (Moscow, 1957).

62. True, non-Han peoples comprise a minority among students and faculty in Hohhot, and many themes are forbidden and publications are restricted for internal use, but the existence of a community of scholars dedicated to matters Mongol is undeniable. See the dated remarks of Henry Schwarz, "Mongolian Studies in China," Zentralasiatische Studien, 14, 1980, pp. 211-16, based on a visit in 1979 to Beijing and Hohhot.


65. Sinor expounded on the premise that "the greatest achievements of humanity, the main centers of civilization, lie on [Eurasia's] edges," and concluded that the primary role of the "barbarian" nomadic peoples of the interior has been that of "an intermediary between these great sedimentary civilizations." Sinor, "Central Eurasian" in Orientalism in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), pp. 82-103. See also idem., Inner Asia: A Syllabus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); and idem., Introduction: The Concept of Inner Asia," in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).


69. Ibid.

70. Schwarz, China's Policies toward Minorities (Bellingham: Western Washington University, 1971); idem., The Minorities of China: A Survey (Bellingham: Western Washington University Center for Asian Studies, 1984). Mention should also be made of Joseph Fletcher (1934-1984), who taught at Harvard and whose Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1995) was published posthumously.


74. An excellent example, available in abridged English translation, is Yasuo Mishima and Tomio Goto, A Japanese View of Outer Mongolia (1942), originally published as Gaimo jinmin kyō wakatō - sore no kyōkō no tenets (1940).