Routledge Studies in Cultural History

1. The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe
   Edited by Brendan Dooley and Sabrina Baron

2. The Insanity of Place/ The Place of Insanity
   Essays on the History of Psychiatry
   Andrew Scull

3. Film, History, and Cultural Citizenship
   Sites of Production
   Edited by Tina Mai Chen and David S. Churchill

4. Genre and Cinema
   Ireland and Transnationalism
   Edited by Brian McIlroy

5. Histories of Postmodernism
   Edited by Mark Bevir, Jill Hargis, and Sara Rushing

Histories of Postmodernism

Edited by
Mark Bevir, Jill Hargis, and Sara Rushing

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
New York London
Contents

Acknowledgments vii

1 Introduction: Histories of Postmodernism
MARK BEVIR, JILL HARGIS, AND SARA RUSHING 1

2 Honesty as the Best Policy: Nietzsche on Redlichkeit and the Contrast between Stoic and Epicurean Strategies of the Self
MELISSA LANE 25

3 Escape from the Subject: Heidegger's Das Man and Being-in-the-World
JILL HARGIS 53

4 A Rock and a Hard Place: Althusser, Structuralism, Communism and the Death of the Anticapitalist Left
ROBERT RESCH 75

5 Hammer without a Master: French Phenomenology and the Origins of Deconstruction (Or, How Derrida Read Heidegger)
PETER ELLI GORDON 103

6 “A Kind of Radicality”: The Avant-Garde Legacy in Postmodern Ethics
MARK BEVIR 131

7 Derrida's Engagement with Political Philosophy
PAUL PATTON 149
Acknowledgments

Histories of Postmodernism derives from a conference that we organized at the University of California, Berkeley, in October 2004. For their generous support of that conference, we thank the Department of Political Science and the Townsend Center for the Humanities. We are also grateful to those who contributed so much to our discussions at the conference, especially David Bates, Fred Dolan, Suzanne Guerlac, and Paul Rabinow.
2 Honesty as the Best Policy

Nietzsche on Redlichkeit and the Contrast between Stoic and Epicurean Strategies of the Self

Melissa Lane

In *The End of Modernity*, Gianni Vattimo asserted that postmodernism began in Nietzsche’s work. Indeed, invocations of Nietzsche in relation to postmodernism are manifold. Thoughts attributed to Nietzsche (including the “new Nietzsche” of the French poststructuralists) as well as the “new Nietzsche” of American academe in the 1980s have been identified as lying behind each of the postmodern ideas identified in the introduction to this volume. In particular, anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism, anti-representationalism and anti-dualism have in common a concern with the nature and content of truth claims. And it is truth that has become central to recent discussions of Nietzsche and to critics of his relations with postmodernism. Bernard Williams has argued that Nietzsche is not, as postmodernists would have it, a “denier” of truth or indifferent to truthfulness. In contrast, as Paul Patton observes in this volume, Richard Rorty has sought to remove Nietzsche from the arena of truth altogether, relegating his influence to the “private” realm of idiosyncratic self-fashioning. Yet while self-fashioning has become a leading theme of the “postmodern” reading of Nietzsche, and his demand for truthfulness a leading theme of some of its major critics, there has been little discussion of two aspects of these claims: first, the relationship between “truthfulness” and “honesty,” and the extent to which Nietzsche marks out a virtue of honesty named *Redlichkeit* from *Daybreak* (1881) onward; and second, the relationship between the intellectual demands of honesty and the attempt to fashion a suitable emotional stance for the self. In both of these concerns, as we shall see, Nietzsche was engaged in an evolving and contrasting evaluation of the role of honesty in the cognitive and the emotional aspects of self-fashioning in the strategies of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans. Thus one cannot assess Nietzsche in relation to postmodern concerns without understanding his own developing position in relation to these Hellenistic traditions of thought, traditions which had become intensely influential again in the early modern period and which had shaped the thinking of the French classical moralists with whom Nietzsche was also deeply engaged.

Previous assessments of Nietzsche on the Stoics and Epicureans have focused almost exclusively on his view of their attitudes toward the emotions.
But comparing their cognitive stances—epitomized in an overt relationship between Stoicism and Redlichkeit in the sequence of Nietzsche's books from *Daybreak* to *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886)—reveals the extent to which honesty and intellectual adequacy came to weigh for him on the side of Stoicism. In the contrasts Nietzsche draws between Epicureans and Stoics, and the linking of the latter to the ethic of Redlichkeit, we find that honesty as an intellectual policy comes to constrain the range and nature of admirable self-fashioning, just as it did for Montaigne and his fellow French classical writers whom Nietzsche so admired.

The theses of this chapter intersect with recent themes in research on Nietzsche from several angles. First, while I broadly concur with the contention that Bernard Williams ascribes to what he calls Nietzsche's cognitive stance of truthfulness, he and other recent writers on cognition and morality in Nietzsche speak interchangeably of "truthfulness" and "honesty" without noting the significance of the distinct trajectories of *Wahrhaftigkeit* (truthfulness), *Redlichkeit*, and another word for honesty, *Ehrlichkeit*, in Nietzsche's texts. These trajectories reveal the ways, and moments, in which Nietzsche felt it necessary to articulate a new virtue of *Redlichkeit* in contrast first with the traditional and unthinking dimensions of *Ehrlichkeit*, and then with the Platonic-Christian entanglements of *Wahrhaftigkeit*. In the process we gain a keener understanding of the cognitive stance that he sought to develop.

Second, and relatedly, my contention that *Daybreak* marks the emergence of two preoccupations—with *Redlichkeit* and with an emerging preference for the cognitive stance of Stoicism—was of an earlier celebration of Epicureanism—which then feature marked by *The Gay Science* (1882), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–85), and *Beyond Good and Evil*, provides a new lens on the question of the unity or sequential division of Nietzsche's published writings. Rather than relegating *Daybreak* to a "middle period" which is superseded by a "late period" somewhere in or after *The Gay Science*, the continuity in their discussions of *Redlichkeit* and the Stoic cognitive stance reveals the extent to which the four texts from *Daybreak* to *Beyond Good and Evil* constitute a consistent sequence and share common preoccupations. Of the major texts, it is only *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887)—from which these themes are largely absent—that stands apart from this sequence. Whereas from *Daybreak* to *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche is not only criticizing past formations of thought and self-fashioning (such as the Christian) but also developing his own stance of *Redlichkeit* in relation to the productive if problematic stances of the Stoics and Epicureans, *Genealogy of Morality* has a much narrower focus on the main line of decadence from Platonism to Christianity with scarcely any concern either for the development of an alternative Nietzschean virtus or of the Hellenistic roots which might nourish it.

Finally, my evaluation of Stoics and Epicureans in Nietzsche owes much to recent research on the variety and subtlety of Nietzsche's engagement with the ancient schools. Leaving aside his complex and well-documented engagements with Plato, Platonism and Socrates, it is clear that even with respect to the Hellenistic schools neither he nor his hero Montaigne drew exclusively on any one over the others. Rather, important elements of his thought derive from his reflections on Cynicism and skepticism as well as Stoicism and Epicureanism. Indeed, Nietzsche's understanding of *Redlichkeit*—with its semantic overtones of frank, forthright and uninhibited speech—is flavored both by his understanding of the flourishing of *parrhesia* in the ancient world (especially but not only in Cynicism, as in *Beyond Good and Evil* 26 and 230) and of its incarnation in the French classical moralists, above all in Montaigne. But the mutual evolution of this understanding of *Redlichkeit* and of Nietzsche's attitude to Epicurus's strategy of cognitive self-constriction for the sake of tranquility, and the contrasting relationship between Stoicism as a non-consolatory, non-delusional cognitive attitude to reality and the Nietzschean virtue of honesty, has not been previously observed.

These, then, are the gaps that the present chapter seeks to fill. It is inspired by a remark in Jean-Luc Nancy's pioneering discussion of the significance of *Redlichkeit* in Nietzsche, in the context of which he says that it involves an "acknowledgement of reality" which is "of the Stoical type, perhaps." And there is indeed a crucial textual link between *Redlichkeit* and Stoicism in *Beyond Good and Evil* 227, although Nancy does not refer to it. Here, *Redlichkeit* is postulated [gesetzt] to be "our virtue," the virtue of "we free spirits" which "we cannot get rid of," and it is said that even if this honesty one day should soften, "we will stay harsh, we who are the last of the Stoics! [bleiben wir hart, wir letzten Stoikern]." To appreciate the significance of this connection (while acknowledging that Nietzsche enjoyed playing with such plural self-apostrophe—*Beyond Good and Evil* ends with a question posed about "we mandarins with Chinese brushes"), we must look in turn at Nietzsche's treatment of *Redlichkeit*, the Stoics and the Epicureans, along the way considering the relationship of *Redlichkeit* to *Ehrlichkeit* and then to *Wahrhaftigkeit*.

**REDLICHTKEIT AND EHRLICHTKEIT**

While Nietzsche uses both *Redlichkeit* and *Ehrlichkeit* at times to mean "honesty," and while he is too fluent a writer to corral himself into any rigid scheme of word choice, nevertheless, we can discern a striking over-all pattern in his choices between each of these substantive nouns (and, to a lesser but still significant extent, in his use of the various adjectival forms deriving from them). Underlying this pattern are their quite different semantic overtones in German: *Ehrlichkeit* as the virtue of an upright and honorable man, *Redlichkeit* invoking honesty as frank speech. *Ehrlichkeit* is a preoccupation especially before *Daybreak* in *Human, All Too
Human 32 (1878–80), where the noun or its adjectival form is the subject of several headings of individual passages. There it bears mixed values, being used both for stances which are presented as admirable and also for figures presented as conventionally honest and honorable but self-deceiving as to the significance of this virtue. (Even Nietzsche's early outburst of admiration for Montaigne's honesty in "Schopenhauer as Educator" is couched in terms of Ehrlichkeit.) These relatively early writings thus consider the advantages and disadvantages of honesty primarily by using terms deriving from Ehrlichkeit promiscuously for both. Meanwhile Redlichkeit scarcely appears in any form before Daybreak.34

It is Daybreak—called by Nietzsche in Ecce Homo (1888; section on "Daybreak")35 the launch of his "campaign against morality"—that marks a dramatic break with this pattern. There and from then on, in Gay Science, Zarathustra, and Beyond Good and Evil especially, the Ehrlichkeit family is used predominantly in the negative sense of the conventionally but deludedly honest and honorable, while Redlichkeit is used predominantly to signify a new kind of virtue with which Nietzsche's free spirits and philosophers identify. And this new pattern of partition between the two families of terms is textually marked: while Human, All Too Human is pervaded by passage headings invoking Ehrlichkeit, Daybreak in contrast is pervaded by Redlichkeit, the noun alone appearing twelve times whereas in writings before Daybreak it had appeared only once.

Daybreak 436 celebrates Redlichkeit as "A virtue in process of becoming [Eine werdende Tugend]" and describes it as "among neither the Socratic nor the Christian virtues; it is the youngest virtue, still very immature, still often misjudged and taken for something else, still hardly aware of itself...." In contrast, Daybreak 248 diagnoses Ehrlichkeit as a virtue that emerged from the simulation of honesty among the "hereditary aristocracies." The contrast is plain. Ehrlichkeit is an old and now conventional virtue, which has therefore become liable to self-misunderstanding on the part of those who possess it, in contrast with Redlichkeit which is the youngest virtue, still emerging as a virtue, not least in Nietzsche's own texts.

Although, as noted above, the much later Genealogy of Morality scarcely attends to the value of Redlichkeit per se, when Nietzsche does there consider the cognitive nature and value of asceticism and its intellectual daughter atheism, his choice of terms reveals the same contrasting valorizations of Ehrlichkeit and Redlichkeit.36 In Genealogy of Morality III.26, Nietzsche is attacking the "objective" historians and idealists who flirt with ascetic ideals, and exclaims, "I have every respect for the ascetic ideal in so far as it is honest [ehrlich]! So long as it believes in itself and does not tell us bad jokes!" Here, he is speaking of asceticism which remains asceticism, not yet turning its intellectual scrutiny upon itself, but at least behaving honorably in its own terms, and so ehrlich is used to mark the conventionality and honorableness of such a stance. In contrast, the very next section, Genealogy of Morality III.27, applauds the "[u]nconditional, honest [redliche] atheism which is the air "we more spiritual men of the age breathe" and which has precisely taken the next step of turning its discipline in truth-telling fostered by religion against the "lie enthält in the belief in God" itself. (Indeed, Genealogy of Morality 357 has praised Schopenhauer for having been the first to achieve this "unconditional honest atheism," using the same German phrase.)

This contrast further helps us to understand the famous remarks on Plato's "noble lie" ("ehrliche' Lüge") in Genealogy of Morality III.19. Here Nietzsche uses ehrliche to capture the virtue- and honor-notations of Plato's gods, in which, as G.R.F. Ferrari has remarked, genmais has overtones of "grand or noble" but also colloquially of "massive, no-doubt-about-it," while playing in German as Plato does with the Greek with a context of lying in which the sense of "honorableness" and its usual association with "honesty" come apart.37 And while Nietzsche is observing that such noble lies require the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood in relation to oneself, the fact that the lie is a lie disbars it from being described in the frank-speaking terms of Redlichkeit. When one lies, even if one is right to lie, one cannot be said to display Redlichkeit; whereas, as Nietzsche shows here in his choice of translation from the Greek, Ehrlichkeit can at a pinch be pushed in the direction of the honorable at the price of the honest. Indeed this may be the seed of his contempt for the conventional ehrliche, recalling the way that Montaigne and his contemporaries contrasted the man bound by religious convention with the bonnête homme who would in German be said to be redliche rather than ehrliche.

Again, it must be acknowledged that this new distinction between Ehrlichkeit and Redlichkeit is not universally observed in the texts from Daybreak onward. Whereas there appears to be a particular salience to the occasional positive valorizations of Ehrlichkeit from Daybreak onward, negative uses of Redlichkeit in contrast do constitute a significant group: they appear almost exclusively in contexts which treat Redlichkeit as an existing social attitude and as an attitude towards other people,38 in contrast with the positive pattern in which it is considered as an attitude towards oneself or to the world, reality, or knowledge. Gay Science 329, for example, clearly distinguishes between redlich-demanding attitudes among the present busy bourgeoisie and the genuine Redlichkeit which would emerge from solitude. The only other reservation about Redlichkeit which emerges after Daybreak, particularly in Beyond Good and Evil, is that the trumpeting of any virtue, even this new and youngest one, is potentially misleading. Positive invocations of Redlichkeit in Beyond Good and Evil 227, 230 and 295 are thus followed by warnings that one must not moralize or become complacent as a result of one's commitment to Redlichkeit. Nevertheless, with these caveats acknowledged, we will now show that Redlichkeit from Daybreak to Beyond Good and Evil is considered as a new virtue, one linked specifically to a proper cognitive stance exemplified in the consideration of philosophers, knowledge, and Wissenschaft or science.
REDLICHKEIT AS A VIRTUE

We have seen already that Daybreak 456 proclaims Redlichkeit as “the youngest virtue,” a claim repeated by Zarathustra, who attacks those who hate “the man of knowledge and that youngest of virtues, which is called honesty [den Erkennenden und jene jüngste der Tugenden, welche heisst: Redlichkeit].” We will return to the connection between Redlichkeit and knowledge below. First, we must note that Daybreak not only proclaims Redlichkeit a new virtue, but also gives content to it by offering a significant reinterpretation of the view of the cardinal virtues proposed in Human, All Too Human (The Wanderer and His Shadow 1880) 64. There, Nietzsche describes four eras of “higher humanity” as each honoring one of the Greek cardinal virtues above the others: in the first era, bravery (Täferkeit); in the second, justice; in the third, moderation; in the fourth, wisdom, concluding the passage by challenging the reader to say in which era we “we” and “you” (i.e., the reader) live. He was content to give the classical names and (by implication) definitions of the virtues, the burden of the passage lying not in redefining but simply in prioritizing among them. But in Daybreak 556 he advances a new list of “the good four [virtues]” which names and (by implication) redefines some of them, drawing strikingly but idiosyncratically on Roman and French sources to do so. The passage reads thus: “The good four. — Honest [redlich] towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us; brave [taper] towards the enemy; magnanimous towards the defeated; polite — always: this is what the four cardinal virtues [Kardinaltugenden] want us to be.”

Here, we find a new account of the cardinal virtues—presented adjectivally as attributes of persons rather than as substantive nouns—which revises the previously postulated definitions of three of the four. While bravery or courage is not significantly changed, justice has been dropped in favor of Ciceronian magnanimity or great-souledness (though Cicero himself, De Off. 1.61, treated magnanimity as an enhancement, not a replacement, for the traditional four cardinal virtues). Moderation is replaced by “politeness”: the lineage of politeness here recalls Ciceronian decorum, but is heavily inflected by the French idea of honnête homme, an ideal which incorporated polite sociability into a standard of “honesty” conceived as a kind of global virtue at once moral, social, and still connected to its roots in frank speaking. (Redlichkeit in German can also connotate a global sort of virtue, one with roots in honesty but extending to a general uprightness.) Most importantly for us, wisdom (Weisheit in The Wanderer and His Shadow 64), with its overtones of widely recognized and objective knowledge, is replaced by the cognitive virtue of being honest [redlich]; compare the way that the eighteenth-century writer Nicolas de Chamfort, whom Nietzsche read avidly especially in 1881–82, had defined the honnête homme as “détrompé de toutes illusions.” Note that the scope of this virtue is restricted to “ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us.” Limiting the scope of honesty to oneself and one’s friends makes it not incompatible with lying to outsiders, though lying itself could never (as we observed in relation to Genealogy of Morality III.19) be aptly described as redlich.

Nietzsche identifies a close connection, verging on a redescriptive identity, between Redlichkeit and cruelty: “wild honesty [ausschweifende Redlichkeit]” is said to be a more “polite” name than “cruelty” in Beyond Good and Evil 230. Yet he takes care to warn against the dangers of such cruelty going too far, becoming what Gay Science 159 will condemn as the vice of “unyieldingness [Unbewusamkeit].” Zarathustra encounters a man who is making himself bleed by applying leeches to his own skin, who announces that he has learned from Zarathustra to be the “conscientious man” and declares, “Where my honesty [Redlichkeit] ceases I am blind and want to be blind. But where I want to know [wissen] I also want to be honest [redlich], that is, severe, stern, strict, cruel, inexorable.” Zarathustra’s response to the “conscientious man” is difficult to characterize precisely, but it is clearly critical and negative. That Redlichkeit, like any virtue when pushed too far, can turn into a vice is a point which Nietzsche makes in an Aristotelian vein: its corresponding vice is stupidity or boringness. Excessive cruelty in the service of an unyielding honesty is both emotionally and cognitively problematic, for it fails to recognize its own roots and motivations. Daybreak 536 warns against the cruelty with which people deploy their particular virtues and enjoins, “let us act humanly with our ‘sense of honesty’ [sinn für Redlichkeit], this is (like) a thumscrew whose ability to torment all proseylizers ‘we’ have tested on ourselves.

An important generalization of the “conscientious man” story, which argues that dangers lie not only in an excess of honesty (as per Daybreak 536) but in the nature of honesty itself, is made in Gay Science 107. There, Nietzsche contends that pure and isolated Redlichkeit “would lead to nausea and suicide.” Redlichkeit is portrayed as the attitude displayed and generating “the insight into general untruth and mendacity [Unwahrheit und Verlogenheit]...the insight into delusion and error as a condition of cognitive [erkennen] and sensate existence” which is the result of science [Wissenschaft]. But fortunately, Nietzsche avers, Redlichkeit now encounters a “counterforce [Gegenmacht]” which enables us to avoid these dire consequences of its otherwise unchecked operation. This counterforce is art [Kunst], described as “the cult of the untrue” and “the good will to appearance.” Nietzsche insists that it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence is still “bearable” for “us,” and that anyone who is “ashamed” of himself for this does not yet “belong amongst us.”

This important passage helps to clarify the cognitive dimensions of Redlichkeit as a Nietzschean virtue. The person with this virtue speaks frankly (that is, without lying) about the whole content of what they perceive, even where that content consists of untruths and lies. In other words, Redlichkeit combines the virtues which Bernard Williams distinguishes as Sincerity and Accuracy: combining frank speaking with an unblinking
acknowledgment of all the reality which one perceives in relation to a particular subject. (However, it is not uncomprisingly endorsed; it can be dangerous to health and life if pushed too far.) These cognitive aspects of Redlichkeit are underscored in Nietzsche's further remarks about its relationship to philosophers and to science (Wissenschaft), to which we now turn.

**REDLICHKEIT, WISSENSCHAFT, AND PHILOSOPHERS**

As we have seen, *Gay Science* 107 strongly, though not uncritically, aligns Redlichkeit with Wissenschaft, the German word for science or structured body of knowledge, which in its adjectival form has been glossed as "careful, methodical attention to the real facts of the situation being investigated." 51 "Knowledge" (Erkenntnis) too is aligned with Redlichkeit in a positive vein, especially in *Daybreak*, where in *Daybreak* 84 Christian philologists are criticized for lacking Redlichkeit, and in *Daybreak* 482 the men "whom we should call philosophers" are posited in a rhetorical question to be "too serious in their passion for knowledge and for honesty" to seek fame. *Gay Science* 319 indictss insufficient Redlichkeit for leading to an inadequate Erkenntnis in the founders of religion and similar folk, contrasting these overly credulous men with "we reason-thirsty ones" who "want to face our experiences as sternly as we would a scientific experiment"—Redlichkeit und wissenschaftlichen Vorsuches here linked as the path to adequate Erkenntnis. And the ideal of science finds its apotheosis in the startling and deliberately amusing passage of *Gay Science* 335, titled "Long live physics!" Here, we must become physicists who know what can and (like the moral worth of an action) cannot be known: "so, long live physics! And even more long live what compels us to it — our honesty [Redlichkeit]!"

Yet, like the difficult passage of *Gay Science* 344 in relation to truth, *Beyond Good and Evil* 230 will acknowledge that what lies behind the will to knowledge and to Wissenschaft is not easy to explain or justify: "Why do we choose it, this insane task? Or to ask it differently: Why knowledge (Erkenntnis at all)?—Everyone will be asking us this. And we who have been prodded so much, we who have asked ourselves the same question a hundred times already, we have not found and are not finding any better answers...." Moreover, *Daybreak* 550 had already noted the danger that such honesty posed to the great knowledge-loving philosophers of the past (Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza): the danger was that their Redlichkeit would become a "panegyrist" of all things. That is, insofar as honesty generates (the intense enjoyment of) knowledge, it risks projecting that positive value onto things themselves, forgetting that what is valuable rather is the exercise of honesty generating knowledge itself. And *Gay Science* 110 had made knowledge, Redlichkeit and skepticism (again a combination recalling Montaigne) complicit in the evolving fight about the "truths," in which "knowledge and the striving for the true finally took their place as a need among the other needs."

As *Gay Science* 110 shows, it is impossible wholly to segregate Redlichkeit from the complex and difficult question of the status of truth, and truths, in Nietzsche. But without being able to enter into that question fully here, we can at least show that Redlichkeit as a Nietzschean virtue is related to the cognitive standpoint beyond good and evil. This is manifest in *Zarathustra* "Retired from Service," where the "old" and "last" pope tells Zarathustra that it is his (Zarathustra's) very piety which has engendered his unbelief: "Is it not your piety itself that no longer allows you to believe in a god? And your exceeding honesty (ubergrosse Redlichkeit) will yet carry you off beyond good and evil, too!" Here it is Redlichkeit itself that is credited (albeit by the old pope, whom Zarathustra then invites into his own cave) with enabling one to travel beyond good and evil. This remark encapsulates the importance of Redlichkeit in the textual economies of *Daybreak*, *Gay Science*, *Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil* in particular. Further illumination of the relationship between honesty and truth for Nietzsche can be found by comparing the terms Redlichkeit and Wahrhaftigkeit, while remaining alert to the complexities of the relationship between the latter (truthfulness) and truth in the texts (e.g., *Daybreak* 73; and on philosophers as friends of "truth," but not dogmatists, *Beyond Good and Evil* 43).

**REDLICHKEIT AND WAHRHAFTIGKEIT**

In works before *Daybreak*, where as we have seen Redlichkeit scarcely appears, Wahrhaftigkeit is quite often used in a positive sense. It plays an important role in the conclusion of the second and third essays of the *Un timely Meditations* (1873–76), on history and Schopenhauer respectively, as well as in evaluation of the positive contributions of the Renaissance in *Human, All Too Human* 237. In the Preface to *Human, All Too Human*, added in 1886 (and in the note from 1886–87 first published in *The Will to Power* 945), Nietzsche claims the virtue of Wahrhaftigkeit as his personal "luxury." But there are also negative uses of Wahrhaftigkeit to be found in *Human, All Too Human*, for example in its book *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (1879) 32, where in a strikingly Platonic remark it is said that poets who pretend to know and so deceive others about "real reality [wirkliche Wirklichkeit]" end by becoming "honest [ehrlich]" and believing in their own "truthfulness [Wahrhaftigkeit]." Here, truthfulness and being ehrlich are presented as mutually supportive deceptions, which evolve from deceiving others to deceiving themselves—in stark contrast to the antithesis between Redlichkeit and self-deception, and the inaffinity between Redlichkeit and deception of any kind, which we have observed.
From *Daybreak* onward, the generally positive valorization of *Redlichkeit* is occasionally shared with or paralleled by a similar valorization of *Wahrhaftigkeit*. And there is the occasional remark that treats *Wahrhaftigkeit* and *Redlichkeit* equally negatively, as in *Daybreak* 418. But the burden of *Beyond Good and Evil*, particularly in its opening sections, is to question both the value placed on *Wahrhaftigkeit* and its very ability to question its own value. In this context of the opening of *Beyond Good and Evil*, important contrasts are drawn between *Redlichkeit* and *Wahrhaftigkeit*. It is as if *Daybreak’s* framing of the *Redlichkeit* as a young and new virtue here enables it to play a critical role vis-à-vis the old, Platonic and Christian dynamics implicating the virtue of *Wahrhaftigkeit*. So while it is certainly not the case that Nietzsche never invokes *Wahrhaftigkeit* in a valorizing vein, recent treatments of this theme (celebrating his ironic paradox in *Beyond Good and Evil* 177 of “*Wahrhaftigkeit*” being something which perhaps no one has yet been *wahrhaftig* enough about) have ignored his several assertions that at least in some contexts it is *Redlichkeit* in contrast to *Wahrhaftigkeit* which he values.

Consider *Beyond Good and Evil* 1 and 5. *Beyond Good and Evil* 1 introduces as the topic the “will to truth,” described as “this famous truthfulness [*Wahrhaftigkeit*] that all philosophers so far have talked about with veneration” (compare Zarathustra “Of the Famous Philosophers”). And *Beyond Good and Evil* 5 diagnoses “our” mistrust of these philosophers as resulting from the fact “that there is not enough genuine honesty about them [das ist nicht genug Wahrhaftigkeit zu haben]: even though they all make a huge, virtuous racket as soon as the problem of truthfulness [das Problem der *Wahrhaftigkeit*] is even remotely touched upon.” Indeed, lacking sufficient honesty and advocating instead prejudices which they call “truths,” these famous philosophers lack two specific forms of bravery or courage [Tapferkeit; picking up the Human, *All Too Human*, *The Wanderer and His Shadow* 64 and *Daybreak* 556 terms for the classical cardinal virtues]: courage of conscience to be honest with themselves, and the good taste of courage which would lead them to be honest with others either in warning or in self-satire. A wedge is inserted here between concern with the problem of truthfulness as a philosophical problem, and the virtue of honesty: the former does not entail the latter, and it is the latter that Nietzsche values.

*Beyond Good and Evil* 5’s contrast between the problem of *Wahrhaftigkeit* and *Redlichkeit* parallels an important remark in *Daybreak* 456, the passage which we saw identifies *Redlichkeit* as a “virtue in the process of becoming.” For *Daybreak* 456 precisely introduces *Redlichkeit* as contrasting with the “level of *Wahrhaftigkeit*” that many “worthy people” have attained, a level of thinking themselves and feeling sincere in asserting the classical or Christian nostrums of virtue and salvation. The point in both passages, *Beyond Good and Evil* 5 and *Daybreak* 456, is that *Wahrhaftigkeit* is a familiar classical, Christian and philosophical virtue, and as such has become a trap: people believing themselves to be truthful and seeking to be truthful are able dishonestly to ignore the roots or consequences of their actions. (Compare *Beyond Good and Evil* 264, in which a contemporary educator who “preach[es] truthfulness [*Wahrhaftigkeit*] above all else these days” to his students is described in manifestly contemptuous terms.) *Redlichkeit* as a new virtue, again, is able to escape these entanglements of the ancient, rooted and complex will to truthfulness.

**REDLICHTKERT AND STOICISM**

We may now reconsider the link between *Redlichkeit* and Stoicism asserted in *Beyond Good and Evil* 227. In this passage, as mentioned earlier, *Redlichkeit* is postulated as “our virtue,” the virtue of “we free spirits” which “we cannot get rid of.” Nietzsche avers that even if our (presumably, disposition of) *Redlichkeit* should one day for some reason become “weary” and lead to our craving a “better, easier, tenderer [besser, leichter, zärtlicher]” life, nevertheless “we will stay harsh, we who are the last of the Stoics! [bleiben wir hart, wir letzten Stoikern].” After some further comments on how others will perceive this *Redlichkeit* and what it might, or should, be called, the passage concludes with the warning that we must not let our *Redlichkeit* degenerate into our stupidity (*Dummheit*), lest we become “saints or tedious bores,” which we noticed above in relation to the risk of virtues degenerating into vices.

What does it mean that “we,” whose virtue is *Redlichkeit*, are the last of the Stoics? The thought is not that even should our *Redlichkeit* evaporate, we would still remain Stoics. It is rather that should our impulse toward *Redlichkeit* for some reason weaken, our Stoic character of hardness or harshness will restore or preserve it. For far from *Redlichkeit* disappearing from the passage after the thought that it might soften, the rest of the passage is preoccupied by it. One might think that the role of Stoicism here is not cognitive, but solely emotional, as furnishing a harshness of emotional stance that can discipline the will; and indeed, most literature on Stoics and Stoicism in Nietzsche focuses exclusively on this point. But the suggestion that the vice which *Redlichkeit* risks degenerating into is stupidity (*Dummheit*) implies that its fundamental character is cognitive. Moreover, the dangerously crenated desire for an easier (*leichter*) life picks up in *Daybreak* 456, where the worthy people at a certain “level of truthfulness” precisely think themselves entitled, when they feel that they are acting selflessly, to take a *leichter* attitude towards the truth (*Wahrhaftigheit*); similarly in *Gay Science* 347, where the masses are said so fervently to crave scientific-positivist “certainty” that the task of proving such certainty is treated “more lightly and negligently [*leichter und lasslicher*].” In these passages, as in *Beyond Good and Evil* 227, we find that the desire for a *leichter*, easier existence risks fostering a flawed cognitive stance. *Redlichkeit* in contrast, insofar as it remains strong, is hostile to such self-indulgent and
so self-deceiving emotional, hence cognitive, flaccidity. Instead, its Stoic overtones associate it with a severe and unblinking acknowledgement of nature and reality, of the way things are, which does not attempt to moralize away suffering or harm.

This view of the Stoics is in play in Daybreak 546 in a passage entitled “slave and idealist,” in which the Stoic sage Epictetus (who had been a slave) is contrasted positively with “our idealists” of today. Epictetus was “brave” (possessing Tatferkeit) and “self-sufficient”; unlike later Christians, he lived without either hope or gratitude to the gods. Crucially, Nietzsche links these ethical attributes to his cognitive attitudes and commitments. “The fairest thing about [the Stoic ideal as embodied in Epictetus]...is that it lacks all fear of God, that it believes strictly in reason, that it is no penitential preacher.” It is because the Stoic believed in reason that he lived in self-sufficiency, without either hope or fear of God, needing neither preaching nor consolation. The achievement of knowledge on the basis of reason enables the achievement of bravery—for reason teaches both that there is nothing supernatural that we need fear and that our natural needs are in fact few.

Consider two further passages where, although the Stoics are not named, they are surely in view. In The Wanderer and His Shadow 37, Nietzsche adjoins a group he calls “you dismal philosophical blindworms” not to treat their own oversights of self-fashioning as if they were fate facts about the terribleness of human passions. Instead, he advises that one attend to kleiner matters (as it were, the petits faits) in order “to take from the passions their terrible [furchtharren] character.” And he concludes: “let us...work honestly [redlich] together on the task of transforming the passions [Leidenschaften] of mankind one and all into joys [Freuden-schaften].” As Nietzsche, who elsewhere calls himself an old philologist, would have known very well, it was a Stoic program to abolish the passions [individually, pathē] —which were rooted in and indeed constituted by cognitive errors —but instead to promote a different set of cognitive-emotional stances named in Greek eupathē, which are meant to be devoid of the suffering and lack which the “passions” proper involve. For example, the “passion” of pleasure (bēdonē) was to be replaced by the eupathē of joy (chara). So the appeal to “joy” in The Wanderer and His Shadow 37 is a clue that, while both Epicureanism and Stoicism could be indicated by the claim that the passions are “terrible” and the title of the passage (Eine Art Kultus der Leidenschaften), it is Stoicism in particular which is primarily in view. And while redlich is playing an adjectival rather than substantive role here, the exhortation to pursue this strategy “honestly” suggests that it could otherwise be undermined by the wrong kind of cognitive stance.

The final Stoic connection to Redlichkeit is more speculative. We have already noted the assertion of a “wild honesty [ausschweifende Redlichkeit]” in Beyond Good and Evil 230, followed immediately by a renouncing of the elegant names of virtues such as Redlichkeit and “love of truth” (Liebe zur Wahrheit) so as to avoid the danger of feeding “unconscious human vanity” in claiming these virtues as one’s own. Nietzsche continues the passage by announcing an appropriate goal for “we hermits and marmots” who have freed ourselves from even the moral bauble of the name of Redlichkeit:

[1] The terrible basic text [schreckliche Grundtext] of homo natura [italics added] must be recognized even underneath these fawning colors and painted surfaces. To retranslate [wiederübersetzen] humanity [den Menschen] back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura [italics added] so far; to make sure that, from now on, the human being will stand before the human being, just as he already stands before the rest of nature today, hardened by the discipline of science [hart geworden in der Zucht der Wissenschaft]... 

The passage then concludes with the unresolved self-challenging musing on the question of why one should pursue knowledge at all, which we noticed above.

Note that the reference to becoming hard (hart) through the discipline of Wissenschaft picks up the hart that “we who are the last of the Stoics” will remain in Beyond Good and Evil 227. Nietzsche is musing here on man as part of nature, an important Stoic theme, and in homage to them he seems to have picked up, inverted or perhaps even coined a Latin phrase in order to do so. For homo natura is not the common Latin tag that readers might imagine; in fact I have not been able to find a source for this phrase in Latin prose. Its grammatical structure is odd, making sense as an ablative (man in, by or qua nature, normally needing a complement, but compare servus natura, “slave by nature,” which was the usual Latin translation for Aristotle’s discussion of natural slaves) or as a simple equation (man equals nature, man [is] nature; compare homo mensura, also a phrase which could be completed by an implicit “est”). It was indeed a Stoic injunction to view man as part of nature and to understand man in relation to the understanding of nature; and it was equally characteristic of Nietzsche’s thinking from Human, All Too Human onward, and still influential here in Beyond Good and Evil, to insist on treating man as part of nature.

Wissenschaft had already made great strides in Nietzsche’s day in the understanding of nature; now he urges that is time for the understanding of human nature to catch up, an injunction with which, if phrased this generally, the Stoics could in principle have agreed. Whether this is the right source, or Nietzsche had simply invented the phrase or found it elsewhere, Beyond Good and Evil 230 on my reading is enjoining a Stoic-inspired view of human nature as part of nature, yet its own view of what that nature would be is not necessarily the same as that of the Stoics. Similarly,
it is invoking the *hart* cognitive stance that characterizes the Stoics, yet also attacking a particular Stoic philosopher's self-contradiction in attempting to live out the anti-emotional Stoic ideal. These complexities in Nietzsche's attitude to the Stoics are among the tensions and so the caveats that need now to be entered to my general account of Nietzsche's admiration for the Stoic cognitive stance.

**THE COMPLEXITIES OF STOICISM IN AND FOR NIETZSCHE**

While we cannot examine all of the texts in which Nietzsche treats the Stoa, we can identify three themes that complicate his account of them. First is the idea of the Stoics as hypocrites or actors. In *Gay Science* 99 Nietzsche quotes approvingly from his own *Untimely Meditations* two lines in which Stoicism and honesty appear to come apart: “That passion [Leidenschaft] is better than Stoicism [Stoizismus] and hypocrisy [Heuchelei], that being honest [Ehrlich-sein] even in evil is better than losing oneself to the morality of tradition....”62 It may be significant that an *Ehrlichkeit* word is used here instead of Redlichkeit: Nietzsche does not choose to drive an explicit wedge between Stoicism and Redlichkeit. Nevertheless, it will be plain that Stoicism is here aligned with hypocrisy against honesty. Nor is this the only instance of such alignment. As we will see, in *Beyond Good and Evil* 9 the Stoics are called “strange actors and self-deceivers,” and in *Gay Science* 359 the “stoicism of gesture” of “bored, weary self-despisers” like St. Augustine is criticized, though this is presented as a vener of Stoicism rather than a full commitment to it. While the Stoics may strut about vaunting their self-discipline, they risk hypocrisy in their purported denial of the passions while eitherexperience them or advocating the only-different-in-name *expathetiai*. But these points do not undermine their cognitive stance toward reality, only their strategy for handling the emotions. And it is significant to note that Epictetus, Nietzsche's favorite example of a Stoic, is never subjected to any such criticism in *pro prion persona*. Considering them as an ancient school among other such schools, Nietzsche can acutely perceive the temptations of hypocrisy that would afflict the Stoics; but when admiring Epictetus, he does not try to make any such hypothetically charge stick.

The second theme is that while Nietzsche, as I have argued, admired the unblinking Stoic commitment to the acceptance of nature as a whole, he did not accept the specific dogmatic beliefs to which they believed their knowledge of nature had led them. In *Beyond Good and Evil* 9, he attacks those he calls “you noble [edlen] Stoics” (note the second-person here, in contrast to the first person plural in 227) for their ideal of living “according to nature.” Nietzsche claims that this is contradictory, since nature is “without purpose,” while living is “assessing and preferring”; he diagnoses the Stoics as having projected their morals and ideals “ontos nature” to make it over in their own image. The passage concludes by generalizing the point to all philosophies: a philosophy “always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power....” One familiar problem here is that it is not immediately obvious what Nietzsche should find objectionable in the Stoics’ stance, given that they are successfully imposing their will to power and creating values.63 But the criticism seems to be that they deceive themselves about the nature of those values, reifying values as if they derived from nature rather than understanding that they have only created a “nature” in the image of their own values. (Compare *Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims*, which is headed “Law of nature” a superstition” and concludes: “Necessity in nature becomes more human and a last refuge of mythological dreaming through the expression ‘conformity to law.’”)64 Redlichkeit does not appear here, but its significance elsewhere in *Beyond Good and Evil*, as shown above, helps us to understand the present attack on the Stoics as “strange actors and self-deceivers.” It is precisely their self-deception, what *Beyond Good and Evil* 5 called the fundamental lack of honesty in the philosophers of the past, which incurs Nietzsche's attack. Yet the Stoic cognitive stance is not in principle wedded to such self-deception. The latter is the fault of the ancient Stoa's metaphysical commitments, not of their commitment to honesty, which so far as it goes keeps self-deception at bay.

The third theme is that of the Stoic attitude to the emotions and their strategy for self-government in relation to their cognitive commitments. To survey this theme (without repeating the excellent work which has been done on the topic of the emotions in the Stoa) we must assess the changing and complex relationship between Nietzsche's views of Stoics and Epicureans.

**STOICS AND EPICUREANS**

Nietzsche, at times, emphasized what Epicureans and Stoics had in common over what they divided them. For example, *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* 224, “Balm and Poison,” describes the pair of Epicurus and Epictetus as representing “the voice of reason and philosophy,” and constituting “wisdom in bodily form.” Christianity was at best a substitute for the degenerated ancient cultures to live decently when no longer capable of appreciating those sages. *Human, All Too Human* 282 praises Epictetus alongside Pascal, Seneca and Plutarch, while *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* 408 pairs Epicurus with Montaigne alongside Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, Pascal and Schopenhauer. But elsewhere in *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche is preoccupied by Epicurus to a far greater extent than by any Stoic, and his preoccupation is overwhelmingly positive. Epicurus is praised for discovering that emotional peace need not depend on solving theoretical
of condemnation because he tended to struggle to be true to himself and to speak as frankly as possible about himself and the world he perceived.) They appear only once in Beyond Good and Evil, a text as comparatively preoccupied by the Stoics as Human, All Too Human had been by the Epicureans. He repeats the judgment that Epicurus is a pessimist in Genealogy of Morality III.17, and that he is a reality-hating decadent in The Anti-Christ 30 and 58. And while Nietzsche’s unpublished notes (his Nachlass) unsurprisingly contain a great deal of mixed evaluations of both Stoics and Epicureans, there is one particular note which is significant for understanding what Nietzsche ultimately could not accept in the Epicureans. This is in the note on “Moral values even in theory of knowledge” from Springfall 1887, which appears as The Will to Power 1 578, where Epicurus is singled out as having “denied the possibility of knowledge [Eupik leugnet die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis],” a disastrous move which Augustine and Pascal—for all Nietzsche’s respect for the latter2—later followed.

CONCLUSION

These late judgments reveal Nietzsche’s ultimate conclusion that Epicureanism, for all the greater attractiveness of its emotional strategies, was fatally flawed as a cognitive stance. Epicureans sought to restrict their beliefs in order to achieve happiness and inner peace; Stoics steeled themselves cognitively as well as emotionally to confront reality, to expand their knowledge to include the whole of nature. This then is why Nietzsche associated the Stoics rather than the Epicureans with the Redlichkeit that constituted the characterization of his own intellectual stance from Daybreak through Beyond Good and Evil, even though his own view of the content of “nature” was quite different from the official Stoic view.

Honest acknowledgement of the inconvenient and unpleasant aspects of reality or nature was essential to the Nietzschean stance of Redlichkeit, connected to his view of Wissenschaft, which was not confined to a purportedly superseded “middle period” but which rather characterizes and unites his mature works from Daybreak to Beyond Good and Evil. It is a theme that the postmodern readings of Nietzsche as a denier of truth or a celebrator of private self-fashioning, and the attempted defenses of Nietzsche as committed to truthfulness and truth, have equally neglected. The honest acknowledgement of the real by the philosopher of the future (as contrasted with the derided “real reality” of the poets) was a virtue of what Mark Bevir in this volume would call modernism, although Nietzsche more often depicted himself as opposing modernity than as defining an alternative version of it. In Ecce Homo he remarked on his project in Beyond Good and Evil thus: “This book is in all essentials a critique of modernity, not excluding the modern sciences, modern arts and even modern politics, along with pointers to a contrary type that is as little modern as possible.
— a noble, Yes-saying type. In the latter sense, the book is a school for the gentilhomme, taking this concept in a more spiritual and radical sense than has ever been done....

The virtue of Redlichkeit belongs to Nietzsche’s school for the gentilhomme. It is young as a virtue compared to its Platonic and Christian forebears, but its German formulation draws on a French tradition of thought in which homété was a sum of all the virtues, exuding nobility, and imbuing politeness and good manners with an insistence on frank speaking. In working his way to an admiration of the Stoic model of unblinking acceptance of reality free of the Epicurean search for consolation, Nietzsche also had in mind his mentor Montaigne and his compatriot classical moralists. Theirs was not a virtue that could contemplate a line drawn between private and public pursuits of the kind that Richard Rorty envisages; it was precisely a virtue requiring acceptance of the whole of what is known or experienced. Honesty as the avoidance of self-deception about the real is at once a cognitive and an ethical constraint on the possibilities of self-fashioning, and also on the Rortyan idea that such self-fashioning could be entirely insulated from the public world. As such, although there is more which needs to be said about the relationship between honesty and truth than can be attempted here, we can conclude that the recovery of the centrality of honesty in Nietzsche’s thought—achieved here by locating him in relation to the traditions of Hellenistic thought with which he grappled, as well as the models of French classicism which he admired—poses a severe challenge to attempts to appropriate Nietzsche for a postmodernist attack on truth.

NOTES


2. French poststructuralists such as Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and others, who are central to most accounts of “postmodernism,” were profoundly and prolifically affected by Nietzsche in the 1960s and 1970s, responding in part to the challenge posed by Martin Heidegger’s work on Nietzsche published in 1961. Heidegger gave lecture courses on Nietzsche from 1936 to 1940, and again in the early 1950s; he also wrote a number of individual lectures and essays on him from 1936 to 1946. In 1961 these were published in two large volumes as Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Nelsey Verlag, 1961), which were quickly translated into French and then later into English, the latter by David Farrell Krell between 1979 and 1987 by Harper & Row. For all Heidegger’s influence on the French Nietzsche, however, as Ernst Beiler argues, “much of the French work on Nietzsche can be seen as a refection of Heidegger’s interpretation by insisting on the metaphorical character of Nietzsche’s writings, his style, his irony, and his masks.” See “Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century,” in Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins eds., The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 281–322, at 316.


4. To sketch this sort of list is not to say that these attributions or readings of Nietzsche are justified. It is rather to point out that interpretations of Nietzsche are central, if sometimes hidden, elements feeding most central postmodern claims. For a short but trenchant critique arguing that Nietzsche defined his vision of what would come after modernity substantively, in contrast to the endless play of the postmodernists Lyotard and Derrida which they impute to him, see Wilfried van der Will, “Nietzsche and Postmodernism,” in Keith Ansell-Pearson and Howard Caygill eds., The Fate of the New Nietzsche (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), 43–54.

5. In “Nietzsche, modernity, aestheticism,” in Magnus and Higgins eds., The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, 223–252, Alexander Nehamas calls Nietzsche “a postmodern thinker avant la lettre” because he has “abandoned the desire for complete liberation and innovation,” but argues that this does not mean he has given up the demand for non-absolute truth or originality. Nehamas has also given an influential reading of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in his Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

6. Among the other ideas identified are stylistic irony and self-reference. A key postmodernist appropriation of Nietzsche, Paul de Man’s argument in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979) that Nietzsche showed all language to be figural and so incapable of expressing literal truth, is decisively criticized both as a reading of Nietzsche and as a claim in its own terms by Maudémardi Clark, “Language and Deconstruction: Nietzsche, Paul de Man, and Postmodernism,” in Clayton Koelb, ed., Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 75–90. Likewise, against the postmodernist contention of anti-humanism, Kathleen Higgins, “Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity,” in Koelb ed., Nietzsche as Postmodernist, 189–215, argues that Nietzsche was concerned with subjectivity and so an “implicit critic of postmodernism.”


10. Nehamas, Nietzsche, 218, emphasizes the emotional connection of honesty to cruelty in Beyond Good and Evil 230, on which see also the present text below, but does not consider its cognitive significance. Alan White, “The Youngest Vicar,” in Richard Schacht ed., Nietzsche’s Postmodernism: Essays on Nietzsche’s Prelude to Philosophy’s Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 63–78, focuses directly on Redlichkeit, stressing its connection to speech and tracing an interesting genealogy for it in the treatment of identity from the Eleatics to Schopenhauer. He questions, but ultimately accepts, the translation of it as “honesty,” and while noting its differentiation from Ehrlichkeit and other similar terms in Nietzsche’s writings, does not analyze their relationship in any detail.


14. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 13, discusses in tandem Nietzsche’s “ideal of truthfulness” and his appeal to “honesty and intellectual conscience.” His discussion speaks indifferently of “honesty and intellectual conscience” (citing The Gay Science 319, which invokes Redlichkeit, and 344, which does not), “honesty” (translating rechtschaften in The Anti-Christ 50), and “the value of truthfulness” (citing BGE 177’s play on walhfragtig and walhfrichtigkeit), in his Introduction to his edition of Gay Science, xvii. A similar blanket invocation of “truthfulness or honesty, in the sense of the intellectual conscience” is made by Maudemar Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 196. Raymond Geuss’ discussion of “honesty” in Nietzsche in “Nietzsche and Morality,” 8–9, cites only the “ehrliche Lüge” passage of On the Genealogy of Morality III.19, the unusual features of which are discussed here below. Robert B. Pippin, “Nietzsche’s alleged farewell: the premodern, modern, and postmodern Nietzsche,” in Magnus and Higgins eds., The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, 252–278, treats “honesty” as a Christian virtue without attending to its specifically Nietzschean development (199). Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of An Immoralist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), stresses Nietzsche’s concern for “intellectual conscience” (passim) and his “love of truth” (21) but again without any discussion of “honesty” in particular.


17. The identification of a distinct “middle period” is often misattributed to Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), who discussed but on the whole rejected it, while remarking nevertheless on D’s “experimental” status. The paradox is that Robert C. Solomon, who so misattributes it, rightly rejects the idea of a middle period, in the course of rejecting postmodern readings of Nietzsche which he thinks appeal to a purported middle period perspective (yet others have called the middle period from Human, All Too Human (hereafter cited as HATH) through the first four books of GS “posi- tivistic,” so attributed in Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 69, and inaccurately criticised in favour of a consistently “skeptical” Nietzsche by Beverly E. Gallo, “On the Question of Nietzsche’s ‘scientism,’” International Studies in Philosophy 22.2 (1990), 111–119. In contrast, Ruth Abbey, who correctly identifies both Kaufmann’s own view and the originisation of the tripartite periodization in Lou Selomé, in my view wrongly defends a distinctive “middle period” stretching from HATH through the first four books of GS. Abbey discusses the “heroism” of science and Enlightenment and also the ethic of care of the self as distinctively middle period concerns, but contrasts them with the “later works” from Z onward, without noticing the centrality of Redlichkeit (absent from her index) which as I show unites D, GS, Z and BGE. This sequence should be taken to include and conclude with Book V of GS, which appeared in 1887, the same year as On the Genealogy of Morality (the distinction I draw between these works and GM being based not on chronology but content and purpose). See Robert C. Solomon, “Nietzsche, Postmodernism, and Resentment,” A Genealogical Hypothesis,” in Koebh ed., Nietzsche as Postmodernist, 267–293, at 270 with n.5, and Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche’s Middle Period (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), xi–xii with notes 1–5 and 87–106.


19. In this chapter I primarily consider only the writings published in his lifetime on Nietzsche’s own authority. The Nachlass, which encompasses notes from throughout Nietzsche’s working life and which were not edited by him for publication, naturally present a more mixed and complex picture, though I believe that when considered chronologically they broadly bear out the arguments made here.

20. GM, however, at one juncture condemns both Epicureanism and Stoicism. Picking up from the end of GM III.17, where Epicurus is compared to Buddhism as a religion of pessimism, GM III.18 explains how such “hypnotic total dampening of sensibility” depends on the unusual powers of “courage, contempt for opinion, [and] intellectual stoicism” (Muth, Vorachtung der Muth, Verachtung des Muth, Stoicisms). This joint condemnation of these two Hellenistic schools as pessimistic is at odds with the distinction between their intellectual strategies made in several other texts, as will be shown below, and may best be taken to underscore how comparatively unidimensional the line of argument of GM is.

21. Among many such discussions, see pre-eminently Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Sather Classical Lectures, vol.61) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). There are recent articles on the topic in Section III in Paul Bishop, ed., Nietzsche and Antiquity: His Reaction and Response to the Classical Tradition (Rochester,
NY: Camden House, 2004). I have discussed it myself briefly in Plato’s Prog-

22. Although Pierre Vialle’s classic thesis as to Montaigne’s sequential Stoic, Skep-
tic and Epicurean phases has been problematized, a complex concern with
these three Hellenistic schools as well as with Cynicism remains central to
the understanding of Montaigne. See Pierre Vialle, Les sources et l’évolution
des Essais de Montaigne, 2nd edition, 2 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1933), and
for example R.A. Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne: A Critical Exploration,
149, 166 and passim, references I owe to Neil Kenny. Montaigne himself
observed the complicating fact that sometimes Stoics and Epicureans agree in
ways that one would not expect, for example that Seneca’s advice to Lucilius
to give up either the life of luxury or life itself was surprisingly of Epicurean
rather than Stoic inspiration (Essays I.32). The difficulty of distinguishing
sometimes between Stoic and Epicurean themes is addressed in the present
chapter, below.

23. A classic study of Cynicism, including important discussion of Nietzsche at
250–277, is Heinrich Nietzsche-Pröbsting, Der Kynismus des Diogenes und
der Begriff des Zynismus (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1979),
which is the foundation for the discussions of R. Bracht Branham, “Nietzsche’s
Cynicism: Upperclass or lowerclass?” and Anthony K. Jensen, “Nietzsche’s
Unpublished Fragments on Ancient Cynics: The First Night of Diogenes,”
in Bishop, Nietzsche and Antiquity, 170–181 and 182–191, respectively. See
also Nietzsche-Pröbsting, “The Modern Reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the
Enlightenment,” in Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé eds., The
Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1996), 292–365. As with the convergence between
Stoicism and Epicureanism noted above, there are important Stoic uses of
Cynicism, on which see the texts recommended by the editors in Branham

24. On Nietzsche and Scepticism (in its Pyrrhonist form), see the discussion in
Jessica N. Berry, “Nietzsche and Democritus: The Origins of Ethical Euda-
emonism,” in Bishop, Nietzsche and Antiquity, 98–113, including her refer-
ce to further bibliography in notes 1–3, and her own forthcoming work.

25. The most influential study of Stoicism in Nietzsche, which however has
also served to circumscribe the whole debate on the topics of pity and emo-
tion, is Martha C. Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism,” in
Richard Schacht ed., Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1994), 139–167, which is criticized by Oliver Conolly,
“Pity, Tragedy and the Pathos of Distance,” European Journal of Philosophy
6, no. 3 (1998): 277–296. A more recent general evaluation of Stoicism in
his life and thought is O. Elverton, “Nietzsche’s Stoicism: The Depths Are Inside,”
in Bishop, Nietzsche and Antiquity, 192–203, which notes briefly the
connection between Stoicism and honesty in BGE 227 (194), and brings two
important notes from the Nachlass to the discussion of Stoicism and emotion
(200). See also, as Nussbaum advises, Jonathan Barnes, “Nietzsche and
Diogenes Laertius,” Nietzsche-Studien 15 (1986) 16–40, who discusses the three
long studies which Nietzsche published in 1869 and 1870 on the sources of
Stoicism in Diogenes Laertius: de Laetii Diogenis fortissbus, analoga Laer-
tiana, and Beiträge zur Quellenkunde und Kritik des Laertian Diogenis, all
now collected in RGA II/1.

26. Epicureanism in Nietzsche’s thought is partitioned by Berry, “Nietzsche
and Democritus,” into a more positive view of Democritus, whose version of
ataraxia involved “cheerfulness,” and a more negative view of Epicurus
and the “apathetic” ataraxia which was tantamount to nihilism. Berry’s rec-
ognition of the Democritean strand is valuable, but her treatment of Epi-
curism in Nietzsche’s thought is quite brief and general, not noting the
dependence of his anti-Democritean passive understanding of apathia
on his culpably limited consolatory cognitive stance, nor the evolution
of Nietzsche’s attitude toward him, and instead bracketing together the Stoics
and the Epicureans simply as ascetic (106). No other article in Bishop’s valu-
able collection takes Epicurus as its central theme, but see the remarks below
on the section “Plato and Epicurus” in Laurence Lampere, “Nietzsche and
Plato,” in Bishop, Nietzsche and Antiquity, 205–219, at 210–211.

27. Branham, “Nietzsche’s Cynicism,” 179. Indeed BGE 26 does explicitly con-
nect Redlichkeit to Cynicism—the philosopher is said to be lucky if he meets
cynics, because “Cynicism is the only form in which common souls come
close to honesty (Redlichkeit).” However here we find Redlichkeit as the vir-
tue of the common soul, whereas in BGE 227 and elsewhere we will find it
connected to Stoic philosophers.

28. Although Montaigne wrote rather than engaging in the public speaking of
the Cynics, his practice of not hiding anything gave his writing the flavour of par-
rhetorics, and the written quality must not be neglected, which would
fit into Foucault’s definition of “the one who uses parrhésia” as “someone
who says everything he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but opens
his heart and mind completely to other people through his discourse,”
as given in “Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parhésia,” Lecture
1, from the transcription of six lectures given at the University of California,
Berkeley, between October and November 1983, as online at http://foucault.
info/documents/parrhesia, last checked July 23, 2006, a reference I owe to
Andrea Sangiovanni.

29. Berry concludes “Nietzsche and Democritus” with a description of the role
of Democritus in Nietzsche as follows: “the notion of ‘cheerfulness’ grows up
alongside the notion of parrhesia in interpretation – both integral components
of an ‘honest’ and robust intellectual or ‘spiritual’ life” (113), but without
giving any textual content to the meaning of honesty in Nietzsche. And Fiona
Jenkins, in her exploration of Nietzschean rhetoric in GM (“Rhetoric, Judg-
ment, and the Art of Surprise in Nietzsche’s Genealogy,” in Bishop, Nietzsche
and Antiquity, 295–309), evocatively describes his stance as “we are ‘real-
ists’” (300), commenting that this stance contrasts for Nietzsche with “coun-
trarily misjudgement, erroneous estimation of oneself, of others, of existence
as such, misjudgement that honesty and maturity would enable one to avoid”
(300), but gives no textual specification for her conception of “honesty.”

30. For an example of this, see “Our Probity!” On Truth in the Moral Sense in Nietzsche,”
in Laurence A. Rickels ed., Looking after Nietzsche (Albany: State University of
New York, 1990), 49–66, at 70 and 79, respectively.

31. Nietzsche, BGE, 296.

32. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human (Menschliches, Allzuemenschi-
ches), Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, trans. R.J. Hollingdale,
intro. R. Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The two
parts of the second volume are hereafter identified additionally as AOM,
Assorted Opinions and Maxims (Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche), and
WS, The Wanderer and His Shadow (Der Wanderer und Sein Schatten).

34. In fact, a substantive term deriving from Redlichkeit appears prior to D only in the form of Unredlichkeit in HATH 447 ("Making use of petty dishonesty (Unredlichkeit)"); a discussion of the power of the press. The adjective redlich is attested in HATH 225 and, a positive but basically insignificant form in HATH 95. More significant is its appearance in WS 37, in relation to a clearly Stoic strategy for transforming "passions" into "joys," which is discussed below.


36. Neither Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, 14–15, who discusses GM III.26, nor Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 191, who discusses GM III.27, notes the significance of the contrast or the nuances which it builds into what they each simply refer to as "honesty.


38. See, for example, BGE 34, 44, 244; See also Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols (Götzen-Dämmerung)*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, intro. M. Tanner (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1990), 12.


40. In BGE 284, "you" are enjoined to "keep control over your four virtues: courage, insight, sympathy, solitude (des Mutes, der Einsicht, des Mitgefühls, der Einsamkeit)" because "solitude is a virtue for us." (Note that the voice in this passage changes from addressing the second person singular to invoking the first person plural: see the remarks on Nietzsche's stylistic shifts of voice and the significance of the first-person plural, in GM in particular, in Pippin, "Nietzsche's alleged farewell," 256–258 and 265–267). If we try to map this onto the cardinal virtues, courage clearly remains identical with bravery in both the WS and D versions; insight corresponds to wisdom (WS) and honesty (D); sympathy now seems to replace justice (WS) and magnanimity (D); and solitude now replaces moderation (WS) and its more social reinterpretation as politeness (D).

41. Nietzsche, D, 556.

42. D 370 makes a requirement of Redlichkeit itself that a thinker should "love his enemy" in order to praise and confront what can be said against his own thoughts, and does so in relation to the concern for "truth."

43. Nietzsche initially became acquainted with the French moralists inter alia through Friedrich Albert Lange's 1866 book, *History of Materialism;* he was given a copy of Montaigne for Christmas 1870, and throughout his life in Basel was reading the French classical moralists assiduously, his close friend Paul Réé's 1876 book *Psychologische Beobachtung* consisting of "maximes" in the style of La Rochefoucauld was also central to this engagement. On the French moralists, in addition to the works cited below, see generally Emmanuel Bury, *Littérature et politesse: l'invention de l'homme honnête, 1580–1750* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1996); and for a critical view of the historiography on the French influence on Nietzsche, Beatrix Bludau, *Frankreich im Werk Nietzsche: Geschichte und Kritik der Einflussphase* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1979). On the topic relevant to this paper, Vivetta Vivarelli, *Montaigne und der 'Freie Geist': Nietzsche im Übergang,* *Nietzsche-Studien* 23 (1994) 78–101, overlooks the relationship to Redlichkeit in Nietzsche altogether, while David Molner, "The Influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche: A Raison d'Être in the Sun," *Nietzsche-Studien* 22 (1993) 80–93, confines the relevance of Montaigne's honesty and of his own remark that for Montaigne and Nietzsche "not truth but honesty really matters" (86) solely to the context of literary style. Andrea Sangiovanni called my attention to the significance of the French moralists for this argument, while Neil Kenny helped to educate me about them.


45. Nietzsche, Z, "The Leech."

46. But Zarathustra strikes a more positive note about Redlichkeit in Z, "Of the Higher Man", 8. There, he cautions his listeners against exceeding their powers of carrying out what they will, which risks turning them into actors and pretenders and so damaging their honesty, "[H]er I count nothing more valuable and rare today than honesty (Redlichkeit)."

47. Nietzsche, BGE, 227. Equally, Redlichkeit like any virtue is no proof against corruption by other emotions and motives, for example "one grain of gratitude and piety too much" (D 293).

48. Branham, "Nietzsche's Cynicism," 174, cites this passage as an example of the hostility to shame which Nietzsche learned from the Cynics, though Cynicism does not inform the argument about art and science which is its principal burden.

49. In a similar vein, John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 290, remarks that when Nietzsche denies that his truths are "for everyone" he means "not that others will have equal truths of their own but that others can't or won't bear so much truth, and such truth."

50. Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, especially Chapters 5 and 6. In his "Introduction" to Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xix, Williams astutely comments on WP 822—"We possess art let us perish of the truth"—that "[Nietzsche] does not mean that we possess art in place of the truth; he means that we possess art so that we can possess the truth and not perish of it."


52. Nietzsche, BGE, 295.

53. Nietzsche, D, 479.

54. BGE 230 aligns Redlichkeit with Liebe zur Wahrheit and Liebe zur Weisheit, among other terms, though in a somewhat critical context in which pluming oneself is of these virtues is said to risk feckless pride and "unconscious human vanity."

55. As for example Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, 14.


57. The association of Stoicism with joy is however challenged in GS 12, where Nietzsche acknowledges that pleasure and pain are intertwined. He says that the Stoics were consistent in seeking as little pleasure for the sake of as little pain possible. Modern science may either, with the Stoics, follow this Stoic path, which makes man "cooler, more status-like, more stoic" and deprives him of his joys [Freuden]; or it may choose to inflict great
pain in order to “let new galaxies of joy [Freudian] flare up.” Here, Nietzsche seems to be using joy in a more colloquial sense, rather than in the technical Stoic sense which is more consistent to impute to WS 37.

58. Owing to Chris Clark’s eagle eye I am here correcting the Cambridge translation, which renders zurückübersetzen simply as “to translate.” Jessica Berry makes the same mistranslation in her otherwise valuable and relevant discussion of the importance in this passage and in HATH generally of Nietzsche’s concern that “human beings should be understood as continuous with the rest of nature”; see Jessica N. Berry, “The Pyrrhonian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche,” Journal of the History of Ideas 65, no. 3 (2004): 497-514, at 500.


60. This phrase is quoted as a tag for example in Table Talk of John Selden, ed. Frederick Pollock (London: Quaritch, 1927), 102, under the heading “Power: State”; it is actually quoted both in the singular and plural, and with accents indicating the ablative of servus Naturae, servis Naturae. The possible relevance of servus naturae was suggested by Quentin Skinner, that of homo mensura by Malcolm Schofield; Bill Burgwinkel and Neil Kenny also advised me on this point.

61. I have only been able to find two other instances of the phrase homo natura, in both of which however there is a qualification or complement. One is Seneca's "Natura homo mundum et elegans animal est" (Man is by nature a clean and delicate animal), which adds a verb and complement; it does not seem particularly apposite, but the formulation may have caught Nietzsche’s eye in that it was quoted by Montaigne in his Essays III.13. The other possible source is Cicero’s Academica (specifically the Academica Priorum, as the first edition of the Academica is sometimes known). Lucullus is describing how Antiochus of Ascalon was infuriated when he received two books by the Academic skeptic Philo: Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant adulati Alexandriam turque primum in Antiochus manus uenerant: et homo natura lenissimus - nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius - stomachachia tamen coepit. (Academica Priorum Priorum II.11) In Reid’s translation of that part of the sentence following the colon: ‘whereupon though a man naturally good tempered in the extreme — indeed it was not possible for gentleness to exceed his — yet he[re] began to get into a passion.’ Here, as Michael Reeves has pointed out to me, mutatis mutandis is quite appropriate, but the grammatical structure is not the same as that apparently structuring Nietzsche’s phrase. But if one conjectures that Nietzsche might simply have been struck by the conjunction of the two words, this also gives an interesting Stoic provenance to Nietzsche’s passage, since Antiochus of Ascalon, though the self-proclaimed spokesman of the Platonic “Old Academy,” held that Plato, the Peripatetics and the Stoics had essentially agreed. If, as a Stoic sympathizer, he was committed to the extirpation of passion, it is an irony which Nietzsche would have enjoyed pointing out that his doctrine, which philosopher was here only a coward and a phlegmatist (compare BGE 7 on the anger motivating Epicurus against Plato). Although the Stoic individual here does not come out too well, Nietzsche may again have enjoyed the thought of contrasting their individual actions with their call to understand nature as a whole, and also turning a comment about an individual into a tag apparently referring to “man by nature” in general—since unconsciously motivated generalizations of this kind were one of his favorite targets of attack. On this view, homo natura would, for Nietzsche, be not the man whom the Stoics had imagined or embodied, but the understanding of man as part of nature for which they had called even if they had failed to fulfill their own program consistently, man by nature able to acknowledge all that is in his nature rather than clinging to self-deluded dogma. I am grateful to Christopher Clark, Michael Reeve, Malcolm Schofield and Quentin Skinner for discussion of these possible sources and questions of translation, though I have not followed all of their views.


63. This kind of problem is discussed by Geuss, “Nietzsche and Morality,” 7-9.

64. Nietzsche, AOM, 9.


66. Ibid., 227, 295.


68. Admittedly, in GS 375 Nietzsche explains his heading “Why we seem to be Epicureans,” but he speaks ambiguously of “we modern men” who are “cautious about ultimate convictions” and mistrustful of “every unconditional Yes and No,” though he also relates the “almost Epicurean bent of knowledge (Erkenntniss-Hang)” to the pride in the “self-control of the rider on his wildest rides” as “our urge for certainty races ahead.” And in BGE 7, Nietzsche revels in a malicious Epicurean joke about Plato and the Platonists, coining the term Dionysokotakes or sycophants of Dionysus as a pun on Dionysokolas or actor; see the discussion of this passage in Laurence Lampert, “Nietzsche and Plato,” 210-211, who further takes it to be an illustration of the philosophical will to power on 215.

69. Williams, Nietzsche and the French, 173, on struggle for honesty; Brendan Donnellan, Nietzsche and the French Moralists (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1982), 19; he adds that the Epicureans were paradoxically ascetic in paring down their pleasures in order to be sure they only experience pleasure, whereas Montaigne had a more robust enjoyment of many pleasures.


72. For Nietzsche’s respect and admiration for Pascal as a moralist despite his Christian commitments, see Donnellan, Nietzsche and the French Moralists, 38-48.

73. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 2, commenting on his BGE.

74. I am most grateful to the editors of the volume for inviting me to contribute despite having become unable to attend the initial conference, and to King’s College Cambridge for supporting the costs of my foregone travel. I also thank Martin Riehl for crucial and generous practical aid in relation to the Nietzschean corpus, and him together with those acknowledged in the notes above, as well as Justin Reynolds, Duncan Large, and the attendees of the Monday Seminar in Political Thought and Intellectual History at Cambridge University (Lent 2006, chaired by Quentin Skinner, and invitation extended by Andrea Breeze) for their willing and advice; Trinity College Library; the Centre for History and Economics, King’s College, Cambridge, for hosting a research leave during the course of which the paper was conceived; the Rockefeller Foundation and MacArthur Foundation for funding that leave; and my colleagues in the History Faculty of Cambridge University and King’s College, Cambridge, for allowing it to me.