In the early 1780s, Johann Blumenbach (1752–1840), an anthropologist and comparative anatomist from the German Gottingen, was wrestling with the issue of the agency that defines development and regeneration of living organisms. The juxtaposition of entelechy and mechanism, the two dominant frameworks of the time, seemed unsatisfactory. The preformationist theory insisted that everything could be traced back to the original germs, and thus did not allow for any new development.1 In turn, the mechanical theory of development located the primary cause of regeneration of living organisms in the interplay of physical and chemical forces only, and refused to admit the existence of any other substance that could distinguish living organisms from other material objects.

Disappointed with both extremes, Blumenbach found a solution in the formative function of organization itself. After a series of experiments on fresh water polyps, the naturalist drew attention to the fact that the polyp tends to regenerate amputated parts. Significantly, these new parts replicated
the original configuration of the lost element rather than its color or size. It was precisely the body’s ability to re-produce the structure—although often in a diminished (“depressed”) form—that epitomized in Blumenbach’s view the organizing and purposive force of all living bodies. This persistent tendency of a living organism to maintain its internal organization—despite the unfavorable or even harmful exchanges with the surrounding environment—Blumenbach defined as Bildungtrieb, formative or vital force. Generalizing from his experience, Blumenbach concluded:

there is no such thing in nature, as pre-existing organized germ . . . the organized matter of generation, after being duly prepared, and having arrived at its place of destination takes on a particular action, or nisus, which nisus continues to act through the whole life of the animal, and by it the first form of the animal, or plant is not only determined, but afterwards preserved, and when deranged, is again restored.

In combination with the mechanical principle (which causes, for instance, crystallization of minerals) this Nisus Formations was seen as capable of sustaining the progressive formation of the organism, providing a consistent support, necessary repairs, and reproductions when injuries take place.

Replicating the logic of the Newtonian mechanics, Blumenbach was quick to point out that his version of epigenesis was not supposed to describe the cause of generation, which is “involved in Cimmerian darkness,” just as the cause of gravitation or attraction is. Rather, the idea was to analyze the effects produced by this force. The very existence of the organic form, in other words, was endowed with the significance of the teleological principle.

Apart from the considerable influence that Blumenbach’s work had on development of life science in Europe, his version of vitalism produced yet another important outcome. Impressed by the insights of the naturalist, Immanuel Kant wrote in his letter to Blumenbach in 1790:

Your work has taught me a great many things; indeed your recent unification of the two principles, namely the physico-mechanical one and the teleological—which everyone had otherwise thought to be incompatible—has a very close relation to the ideas that currently occupy me but which require just the sort of the factual information that you provide.

Informed by Blumenbach’s work, Kant’s Critique of the Teleological Judgment, in fact, presents precisely a discussion of the “internal purposiveness in organized beings,” purposiveness that originates within the organism as an interplay between its parts and its whole, between the content and the form.
In this chapter I want to show how the same epistemological move—from a traumatic injury to vital organization—was replicated during the two post-Soviet decades by a group of Siberian social scientists in their sociological writings on vital forces of the Russian ethnos [etnos]. While switching from the eighteenth-century Germany to contemporary Russia, I want to keep in mind the double characteristic of materialist vitalism provided by Kant and embodied by Blumenbach.

Instead of seeing in contemporary attempts to revive and reformulate vitalism yet another example of the post-Soviet turn to the occult and/or paranormal, I want to approach these desperate yet rational attempts to find an “objective” factor of regeneration, to outline a “comprehensive” explanation of ethnic development somewhat differently. I will construe them as a form of a post-utopian thought, as an alternative post-Soviet framework, which in a double discursive move tries to distance from the flattening mechanical functionalism of postcommunist neoliberal changes, and—simultaneously—to envision the “organismic ontology” of the Russian nation as a new logic of nation building. Decidedly non-Marxist, this intellectual framework presents, nonetheless, a telling example of intellectual strategies through which post-Soviet intelligentsia in Russia makes itself relevant after the collapse of state socialism.

In what follows, I focus mostly on texts that I collected in 2001 to 2004 during my fieldwork in Barnaul, the administrative center of the Altai region, located in Siberian part of Russia, on the borders with China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan. All texts were produced by professional provincial intelligentsia, that is, professors of philosophy, sociology, and cultural studies in several Siberian universities. While traditionally being a very articulate and active segment of the Russian society, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the intelligentsia has started losing its social prominence. At least, to some extent, multiple alarmist scenarios and forecasts produced by this group could be seen as a reflection on the intelligentsia’s own diminishing role. At the same time, such publications provide a useful link to understanding imaginary constructions of the national belonging in a situation where more positive ways of “inventing traditions” and “imagining communities” are unavailable or discredited.

Academic texts that I will analyze fall into two major categories. First, I will quickly review the genre of ethnohistories of trauma, in which current problems in Russia are usually addressed through the constant rewriting of Russia’s past in order to demonstrate the non-Russian character of its national/state institutions, and, correspondingly, the anti-Russian nature of these institutions’ politics. Understood as an organic body, the Russian ethnos becomes split off from available political institutions and emerges as an easy target for “external” and “alien” forces. Teleology of the vital
becomes reversed here; regeneration is read backwards—as a process of organized extinction.

Then, I will focus on the second category, ethnovitalism. While being closely associated with the rhetoric and methods of traumatic ethnohistories, ethnovitalism is less preoccupied with the unceasing portrayal of the past harm and sufferings of the nation. Its main goal is to provide the analytics of ethnic survival, to outline methods that could “compensate the loss of cultural genotype” of the Russian nation. The struggle over constructing and interpreting the nation’s memory of the past, so typical for traumatic ethnohistories, is replaced in ethnovitalism by a similar struggle over constructing and interpreting perceptions of the nation’s current experience.

Created by highly educated and articulate scholars in social sciences, these two organismic versions of ethnocentric narratives usefully point to the painful role of a differentiating split that produces a sense of national unity in post-Soviet Russia.

ETHNOHISTORIES OF TRAUMA: RUSSIAN TRAGEDY AS A RUSSIAN CROSS

The “Russian tragedy” is by no means a unified or a homogeneous script. It is articulated differently by people with different social trajectories and educational histories. These differences matter, yet despite all its variations, the “Russian tragedy” has a core of ideas and images that point to the reason behind the choice of this traumatic genre. With some modifications, this framework is often employed in mass media and daily communication. The metaphor of the “Russian cross” epitomizes the logic of the Russian tragedy, perhaps, most vividly.

Apparently, the concept has been around for quite some time, but it became especially popular in the Barnaul media during the discussion of the first results of the 2002 National Census. As the argument goes, Russia’s population is steadily decreasing every year. There are two major demographic reasons for this. One is the general increase in the number of deaths in Russia: since 1999, 700,000 to 900,000 people die annually. The other major factor that contributes to Russia’s “depopulation” is a declining birth rate. The superimposition of the diagrams of these two processes produces a graphic image that was quickly labeled the “Russian cross” (russkii krest).

This preoccupation with the biological condition of the nation is hardly new. The “Russian cross,” not without a certain twist, illustrates a typical tendency of modern political regimes to institute themselves through a discourse, in which “every people is doubled by a population,” as Giorgio Agamben put it. The population, then, becomes quickly “ethnocized”
emerging as a natural category, as an unproblematic unit of sociobiological taxonomy.

There is another important moment, too. What differentiates the post-Soviet biopolitical doubling from other similar examples is its overwhelming orientation toward the past. By and large, biopolitical distinctions of the “Russian cross” aren’t evoked to stimulate ethnically exclusive pronatalist policies in the future.18 Wrapped in demographic terms, the story about the dying out nation is a historical project. Providing an inverted teleology, it aims at delineating, at pacing out the path that has lead to the current (miserable) location.

Conflation of the demographic and the religious in the “Russian cross” adds yet another important dimension to this traumatic narration. The conflation is instrumental in moving a discussion of technical issues of social policies, health and child care or the epidemics of alcoholism toward the predictable fascination with the nation’s suffering. In the process of this conflation, Russia’s depopulation is often transformed into stories about the “genocide of the Russian people.”19 These stories, then, quickly slip into a discussion of a deliberately conceived and purposefully implemented program of ethnic extermination. Gavrili Popov, a former mayor of Moscow and one of the most active “pro-democratic” politicians (demokrat) of the perestroika period, for instance, wrote in 2000:

I think there was a Russian (russkii) Holocaust. It was organized by the Soviet state and the communist party, which was in charge of it. Burning humans alive is not the only way to constantly reduce their number. The nation could be burnt at construction sites of communism. Or—in fights with imperialist aggressors. Or—in a process of collectivization. . . . Overburdened with inhumane tasks by the leader, the nation could be killed in a doomed experiment of building communism in an isolated country. The people could be destroyed by the Soviet ideology that mercilessly deadens their minds and dries out their spiritual energy, persistently extirpating the century-old foundations of the people’s life. The demographic data and predictions regarding the future of ethnic Russians is nothing but evidence of a holocaust.20

A Barnaul journalist suggests an exactly opposite correlation between the Soviet state and “resistance” of the Russian etnos, framing it as a question:

“Is it just a mere coincidence that [the Russian cross emerged] exactly in the period when the previous [Soviet] state order (gosudarstvennoe ustroistvo) was broken down, and new reforms started?”21 In turn, Aleksandr Prokhozhev, a professor from the Altai State Pedagogical University, bluntly identifies in his book The Shadow People the “perpetrators of the genocide”:

“The decade of complete Jewish dominance in Russia has resulted in the surplus of deaths over births. Every year the population of Russia shrinks by one million. Two million homeless children wander around the country.
There was nothing similar to that even after the Great Patriotic War [in 1941–1945]. Now, Russia is in a debtor’s prison, totally subordinated to the Jewish bankers from the International Monetary Fund."\textsuperscript{22}

Regardless of their particular political preferences, each of these versions of the Russian tragedy is rooted in the same rhetorical striving to envision the “natural life” of the Russian ethnus as separate from the development of its national forms. State and nation or, to be more precise, state and ethnus became discursively split: political institutions of the nation and the nation’s organic body assumed noncoinciding symbolic and social locations.

It is important that in these traumatic narratives of loss it is not a unifying/ unified community that is constantly imagined. Theories of “stolen” statehood and “appropriated” culture seem to indicate a profound difficulty with translating current changes into a language outside the vocabulary of blame and hatred. Despite all the biopolitical caesuras and gaps introduced by ethnohistories of trauma, they fail to produce a stabilizing effect. Imagined ethnic divides don’t perform the function of the constitutive “cut” that could set the subject “apart” and thus define the range of the subject’s symbolic and identificatory possibilities.\textsuperscript{23}

Rather, a proliferation of the discourse of abjection, with its repetitious operations of division and separation, reminds one the figure of a stray \textit{deject}, described by Julia Kristeva: “A deviser of territories, languages, works, [he] never stops demarcating his universe whose fluid confines . . . constantly question his solidity and impel him to start afresh.”\textsuperscript{24} Different versions of the “Russian tragedy” point toward a similar unceasing (and unsuccessful) search for an “anchoring point” that could stop the “endless movement of the signification,” and render the nation’s experience meaningful.\textsuperscript{25} Let me turn to the genre of ethnovitalism now.

**FORCES OF VITALISM**

It wouldn’t be a stretch to say that for the Altai ethnovitalists, traumatic stories about the Russian nation had the same revealing effect as for Blumenbach his experiments with amputated polyps. The purposiveness of the living organism—in this case, the Russian \textit{etnos}—was found in the very act of reproducing and maintaining the original material structure. Such an organismic perception of the \textit{etnos} not only brought with it an extensive—somatic—vocabulary, but also it provided Siberian scholars with a particular narrative logic that easily incorporated the teleological tropes of death and revival of the Russian \textit{etnos}. To put it slightly differently, the attractiveness of somatic metaphors and narratives for today’s vitalism seems to be rooted exactly in the same intellectual move that more than two centuries
ago had imbricated the organismic activity with the nonorganic matter and thus created a narrative of development, a story of life.\textsuperscript{26}

Throughout the 1990s, the Faculty of Sociology at the Altai State University has been actively developing a comprehensive, albeit often confusing, sociological theory, in which issues of ethnic difference become a prominent tool for explaining Russia’s current situation. Depictions of the national pain and misery were not seen as the end in itself but were used as a starting point for analyzing the process of the national regeneration. It appears that the recognition of loss, or—to put it in words of Sviatoslav Grigoriev, the chair of the Department of Sociology at the Altai State University, and the main proponent of the sociological theory of vital forces—the “situation of castration (situatsia kastratsii) of the Russian national self-awareness (samosoznanie) and the Russian culture” has stopped—however temporarily—the “endless movement of symbolization,”\textsuperscript{27} and becomes a starting point for narrating not just the traumatic past but also the future of the “Russian etnos.”

What are the major discursive moves that made possible this translation of stories about “horrifying grief and misery” into an analysis of the \textit{etnos’} vitality? How does this particular “system of marks,” as Derrida calls it in his paper on racism, outline “space in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders”?\textsuperscript{28} In other words, how does the “situation of castration” help to organize a community? In the rest of my essay, I show how this version of \textit{ethnovitalism} managed to use the organismic language to construct a bigger picture of the nation, the country, and the world. I suggest that ethnovitalism provided a necessary framework, a useful combination of the physico-mechanical and the teleological principles that could render dramatic changes meaningful, and to articulate a \textit{posttraumatic} vision of the Russian national identity.

In the 1990s the “Altai sociological school of vital forces,” as this intellectual movement is often called, emerged as a network of educational institutions and publications, with the Faculty of Sociology, Psychology, and Social Work at the Altai State University as its administrative and intellectual core. The influence of this academic ethnovitalism is not limited to the Altai region only. The school (both, the movement and the faculty) is recognized nationally, and is increasingly cited in the national academic journals as an example of a growing field of the “sociology of life.”\textsuperscript{29}

In spite of dozens of monographs, collected volumes, textbooks, educational standards, and conference proceedings published by the faculty, it is not that easy to grasp the actual theoretical and practical content of its conceptual apparatus. Predominantly, texts have little factual material. Most of them are written in a genre of academic “reflection” upon a theoretical or methodological issue. Articles tend to be structured self-referentially, with few oft-recurring “foundational” passages and definitions used to justify
rather than to explain the usage or the content of key terms and ideas of the vitalist sociology.

In 1999, in a “foundational” text, which Grigoriev coauthored with Yurii Rastov, a senior sociologist of the Faculty, the scholars outlined retrospectively their epistemological evolution. Citing their own studies of migration and employment patterns carried in the 1970s as a source for their later generalizations, the sociologists postulated that “each subject of social life has in his or her possession a different set of potentialities of subjecthood (nabory potentsii subjektnosti).” As the sociologists observed, the practical realization of these potentialities depends on three major elements: particular “features of the social space” (sotsial’noe prosranstvo), the subject’s “ability to comprehend” these features adequately, and a “system of factors called vital forces.”

This “subjecthood” should not be mistaken for an outcome of the Foucauldian subjection, though. The vitalist subjecthood has nothing to do with subject positions—discursive or otherwise—that an individual or a group assume in order to address others and become addressable themselves. In the absence of a Russian language equivalent for the English “agency,” the subjecthood of ethnovitalism is understood first and all as an essentialist entity, “the self-ness” (samost’) that gradually unfolds itself in time and space, as I was reminded in conversations with Altai scholars.

Regardless of its exact content, the ethnovitalist subjecthood did help to shift the accent of sociological studies from “lifeless” analyses of relations of production to the “human-centeredness” and “culture-centeredness” (chelovekotsentrichnost’, kul’turotsentrichnost’) of individual and group interactions. In other words, “subjecthood” was instrumental in going beyond the traditional limits of the “dialectical relations” between base and superstructure, firmly established in Soviet-style social analysis. Later, the primary analytic focus was moved from the subjecthood to “vital forces” that actually help to make the subjecthood real. Yet, as Altai vitalists often stress, the analytical task of the category of “vital forces” is far from discovering or even describing some hidden essence of the human being. “Vital forces” is a sociological rather than a philosophical category; hence, its main purpose is to help understand the real existence of the “individual or collective subject of life-implementation” realized in actual space and time.

The major impetus for developing the concept of “human vital forces” came from yet another sociological study realized by a group of Altai sociologists in the early 1990s. The study traced regional consequences of the nuclear test explosions conducted in the neighboring Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) in 1949 to 1962. Detrimental impact of the tests was certainly known to the Soviet officials and local population, yet until perestroika there was neither discussion of this case, nor social help to the
people who suffered from these explosions. The sociological project was a part of the general policy of openness started by Gorbachev in the late 1980s; and it was meant to provide the government with practical recommendations able to minimize "negative social consequences of the [Sempalatinsk] tragedy." In their report symptomatically titled *A Sociologist in the Region of an Ecological Trouble*, two prominent members of the Faculty concluded in 1994 that along with "obvious manifestations of genetic instability among the offspring" of those who have experienced the influence of the explosions in 1949 to 1962, there also was "multiple and diverse decrease of the vital capacity (zhiznestoikost') of the cohorts in question; the population at large was "negatively affected."37

The traumatic origin of the Altai vitalism is important, as is the original combination of issues of environmental disaster, health and political responsibility, on which the project was based. By the end of the 1990s, the traumatic foundation of the concept was generalized; references to a specific politico-environmental disaster were replaced by a version of the "Russian tragedy." Traumatic experience acquired the force of an intellectual matrix and became an effective interpretative and narrative device. To quote Grigoriev:

> The transformation of the general order (uklad) of social life, mass alcoholism (alkogolizatsia), criminalization of the daily life and governmental sphere, living standards below the sustenance level—all that provoked illnesses, increased mortality, and decreased life-expectancy among all native people of Russia. . . . This situation not only brings up questions of the national and state security of Russia, but also [it points toward] the numerical decrease of the state-forming etnos (gosudarstvoobrazuushchii etnos)—i.e., Russians and other native peoples—in the national-cultural community [of the country].38

Significantly, in the process of this generalizing shift, the split between the nation and the state, so typical for the late Soviet theories of ethnicity, was somewhat overcome. The state emerged as a direct continuation of etnos or, perhaps even more importantly, as a primary condition for the etnos’s survival. No longer construed as a contested apparatus of class power, the state was seen as "the ethnopolitical status of the people," and "a form of vital activity (zhiznedeiatelnost’) of the ‘social body’ of culture."39 The state was part and parcel of the "ethnic milieu"; it was an element of the surrounding landscape, a biopolitical institution that helped to maintain "the vital forces of national communities."40

Within the framework of ethnovitalism, "survival" of the Russian etnos was no longer constructed only as an issue of significant cultural and historical proportions. It also became a matter of the "socioecological" security of the state and the nation, a burning question of "personal and ethnic ecology" (ekologiia lichnosti i etnosa).42 Correspondingly, the main task of the
“nonclassical” sociology of vital forces, then, was no less but “creation of theory and practice of the civilization of the managed socio-natural (sotsioprirodnyaya) evolution.”

As anthropology of science has demonstrated, such intertwining of biological metaphors and sociological analysis often reflects the emerging character of a new discipline. For instance, in her study of American immunology, Emily Martin showed how the vocabulary of the new field of research was created largely through borrowing images and metaphors of the nation-state: “As immunology describes it, bodies are imperiled nations continuously at war to quell alien invaders. These nations have sharply defined borders in space, which are constantly besieged and threatened.”

For Martin, the popularity of this somatic nationalism has to do with two major reasons. A lack of a developed analytic language in the new discipline forced scholars to look for ready-made tropes and interpretative tools elsewhere. At the same time, the familiarity and metaphorical imperceptibility of traditional images of the nation-state turn the language of the “state war” into a discursive default, a termilogical prosthesis ready to fill in the symbolic vacuum. What is crucial in such borrowings, as Martin suggests, is the ideological work that this imagery does: violence is inscribed in the very core of the daily life, is envisioned as a part of the body’s function.

As I have been suggesting, though, the attractiveness of the somatic nationalism is not determined by the all permeating nation-state discourse only. By naturalizing the nonorganic or the social, somatic tropes also turn the organismic logic into a self-sustaining and perpetually unfolding narrative device: the organic organization of the etnos is construed as the way of ethnic being and as the primary purpose of its existence.

Even though terminological borrowings of Altai ethnovitalists were caused by the insufficiency of their professional language not dissimilar from the case described by Martin, the logic of their borrowings was reversed. In this case, society and sociology were expressed in naturalized terms. Yet the general direction of this somatic nationalism remained intact: images of health and illness became dominant, and the academic project was increasingly construed as a corrective discipline. Grigoriev even published a text that clearly pointed toward the functional task of the emerging theory. As the sociologist maintained, there was a need to institute “social therapy” as a new branch of contemporary social knowledge in order to highlight the fact that “social subjects with structural and functional anomalies” have essential specificities in their functioning and development.

The new field of academic social therapy still has to pass through the period of its infancy; a therapeutic function, however, clearly underlies the “vitalist sociology” as a whole.

The generalization of traumatic experience also modified the construction of the agent of this experience. Original “demographic groups” (i.e.,
“victims of radioactive exposure”) evolved into “national groups” and “national-ethnic communities.” Statistical populations were turned back into ethnic peoples, to reverse and rephrase Agamben. Correspondingly, the basic category of “vital forces” (zhiznennyе sily) was supplemented by its spatial counterpart—the category of the “vital environment” (zhiznennoe prostranstvo). The categorical production logically took later the shape of “culture-vitalism” (kulturvitalism), a peculiar amalgam of organic metaphors and cultural categories that brought together the biological, the ethnic, and the territorial.

THE VITAL SPACE FOR ORGANIC CULTURE

There are three major elements that interest me in this intellectualized vision of post-Soviet ethnicities: the formation of vital forces; the role of space in shaping these forces; and the ethnic specificity of Slavic vitality.

Within the “nonclassical vitalism” of Altai sociologists, the specific origin of “vital forces” is not exactly clear, just like it was within the more classical European vitalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many ethnovitalists are busy exploring various aspects of “energy exchange” between nature and human beings. Different types of energy, it is said, are absorbed from nature through the senses, and then transformed and accumulated as “psycho-energetic systems” in the nervous system and brains. Others talk about Homo vivens, “a bio-psycho-social being (biopsikhosotsialnoе sushchestvo) with inherent (prisushchie) physical, psychic, and social forces as a source of this being’s life.” The expenditure and recuperation of these forces, their integration and splitting, their loss and their accumulation is the “essence of the biopsychosocial life of humans.” As a particular example, Yuri Rastov, a sociologist of conflict, cites his study of “poor categories [of people] in cities and villages” who, despite their objectively bad living conditions, are not inclined to protest. As he concludes, the reason of this incoherence has to do with the “predominance of physically and psychically defective (ushcherbnykh) people” among these categories. “It is impossible to multiple forces when one has none.”

In Grigoriev’s own work, social racism that equates possession with access and, conversely, dispossession with degeneration, acquired a somewhat different form. It was not the “inherent” life sources that become problematic for the scholar. Rather it is the preservation of a particular place-of-development, it is the securing of the unique configuration of vital forces that were shaped by each “national-ethnic community” (natsionalno-etnicheskaiia obshchestvo) in the process of a very particular “interaction with the vital environment, habitat, and the means of livelihood (sredstva k zhizni).” Importantly, Grigoriev emphasized the ethnic specificity of
this formative role of space; citing "the history of the Slavic etnos" as his evidence, he insisted that the key organizing institute traditionally was not based on relations defined by blood or kinship. Rather, it was the territorial community (obshchina) that sustained the viability of the etnos.\textsuperscript{55} Successful history of a particular national-ethnic community is envisioned as a result of a proper positioning of the "community" vis-à-vis other etnoses. In turn, the ethnic habitat, the "vital environment," along with landscape also includes a politically organized space. Ethnovitalism proposes a list of "indicators" that allow anyone to monitor the levels of vital forces of different national communities within the state. Among the most important, Grigoriev, for instance, lists (1) distribution of different "national-ethnic communities" across the professional field; (2) levels of formal education and qualification; (3) relative place within the "socio-hierarchical system of social governance"; (4) property qualifications; (5) territorial distribution; (6) demographic profile; and (7) health profile.\textsuperscript{56} As Grigoriev comments, "Domination by a certain nationality (natsionalnost') in the most qualified layer of a particular professional group is extremely important for increasing both the scope of its influence in society and the range of its possibilities for developing and defending their vital forces."\textsuperscript{57}

Pointing to particular examples of such dominance, some sociologists increasingly frame it as "ethnoentrepreneurship" (etnopredprinimatel'stvo),\textsuperscript{58} which could potentially lead to "ethnocracy" (etnokratiia), that is, a political domination of an etnos (or a part of it) in a multiethnic society.\textsuperscript{59} The situation might become especially serious, when such political, professional, financial or informational dominance is achieved by ethnic groups that have their own nation-states outside Russia.\textsuperscript{60} To quote Grigoriev:

Could anyone call the situation that we have now normal, after the barbaric—or was it just very flexible?—anti-Russian privatization, when 70% of the country's economy and finances are controlled by the Jewish national minority? The World Jewish Congress freely conducts its events in Russia, while national and patriotic organizations of the Russians are barely allowed to drag out their miserable existence.\textsuperscript{61}

The vital environment, in other words, is turned into an area, where circulation of goods, capital, and labor is overshadowed by circulation of etnoses. Inability to restraint the circulation of (unwanted) etnoses within a traditional ethnic milieu raises a question about "control over property and power" that Russians lost.\textsuperscript{62} In this situation, when "vital energy (passionarnost) in Slavic countries is declining," as Grigoriev puts it, studies of vital forces of Slavic people are of strategic importance.\textsuperscript{63}

This strategic importance is often realized by projecting the terminology of genetics onto cultural history and the present. Metaphors of "cultural genotype," a "genetic social code of culture," and the "genome of culture"
create a discursive field in which culture, as Tamara Semilet recently put it, is understood as “an organic system . . . which is born and sustained only as an ethno-national formation.” Culture is ethnoviviparous by definition, that is, it is conceived, nourished and developed only inside of the etnos’s body. As she stressed, “The function of culture-bearing (kul’turodhnaiia) is a monopoly of etnoses, peoples, and nations. Any organic culture is a national culture.” Etnos, then, is both “source and substrate (substrat)” of vital forces of culture; it is “the subject of culture-creation (kul’turotvorchestvo).”

The vocabulary of sociogenetics helped to modify the understanding of the “vital environment.” Metaphors of culture-as-organism delineate everything that could “violate the integrity” of the ethnic vital forces, “suppress energy,” or “change the essence” of the etnos. Trauma-stories of the Russian tragedy were finally relocated within the context of national security. In her book on Culture-Vitalism, published in 2003 by Altai State, Semilet outlined the problem of “national cultural security” (natsional’naia kul’turnaia bezopasnost’) and provided a list of “threats to the vital forces.” The list, in fact, succinctly summarizes grievances about the current state of Russian culture frequently voiced in the mass media. External dangers to national culture, for instance, include: foreign language domination (inoizychnoe zasile); foreign religions (chuzhdye religii); foreign-born (inorodnye) ideals and standards; outside attempts to dominate the internal political life of the country; radical modifications of patterns of social ties and interaction; imposition of “cultural inferiority complex” and the “apathy of despair.” The “mutual pressure” of etnoses reappears as cultural intrusion, where “ethnosphere” becomes an arena of global “competition of etnoses (konkurentsiia etnosov),” which turns “vital environment” of each etnos into a target of “geopolitical strategies” of globalization.

These “strategies” do not escape the touch of historicizing called upon to demonstrate the diminishing of the vital space of the Russian culture. During the conference on “Vital Forces of Slavic People on the Verge of Centuries and Worldviews: Multifacetedness of the Problem,” organized in December 2000 by the faculty, presenters listed multiple facts and evidence that could easily be summed up in the following quote: “On average, from the times of Ivan the Terrible until the middle of the XIX century, our country’s territory was increasing daily by one square kilometer. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russia entered a process of slow shrinking. Back then it occupied 1/5 of the world’ land surface; now it can barely claim 1/7 of it.”

In more up-to-date versions of a similar narrative, “etnoses of the G-7,” often referred to as the “gold billion” (zolotoi milliard), are portrayed as being deeply invested in reducing “the Russian, and predominantly Slavic, population to 40–50 millions” to be used as a cheap labor force in order to “serve the interests of the world capital-elite” (kapitaloelita), with Russia
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Itself to become a deindustrialized country with no control over its natural resources. It is in this combination of issues of security, ethnicity, and territory that the 1920s ideas about the importance of the specifically Eurasian location of Russia become essential again. As some ethnovitalists like to claim, historically "Russia-Eurasia" was located between the East and the West, occupying simultaneously "the middle and 'the heart'" (sredinno-"serdechnoe" polozhenie). The vital position determines Russia’s role of "cultural mediator" between different cultural poles, and "synthesizer" of different cultural logics. Hence, the collapse of Russia would not be just a problem of the Russian or even Slavic etnoses:

As the Eurasian civilization, Russia is the center of world stability and instability. If the mondialist strategic plan to confederate Russia were to succeed . . . instability would settle here. The West and the East would clash; China would make a geopolitical shift towards Siberia. Germany would “shift” towards the East; the Islamist fundamentalism would also “shift” along the axis of the Volga-river–the North Caucasus–Kazakhstan. A geopolitical havoc (smuta) of grand proportions is to happen, then. And humanity would hardly succeed in getting out of it, because "portable nuclear bombs," not to mention other weapons of mass destruction, have become a reality these days.

To stop a potential worldwide catastrophe, as Grigoriev and Subetto recently suggested, one needs to understand that the model of personality developed throughout the course of the Russian history is “opposite to the liberal” model. The primacy of collectivity and congregationality (sobornost’), unity of the individual, society, and the state, claimed to be so typical for the Russians, are seen as a product of a particular Eurasian location, with its specific climate and its extensive landscape. Survival and preservation of the Russian “society-organism” (obshetsvo-organizm) can begin with introducing an "ecology of the Russian people" (ekologiya russkogo naroda), with developing a study of “social virology” (sotsialnaia virusologiia) as a “special scientific field” that could explore and prevent a “special type of ‘socio-psychological war’ aimed to destroy the backbone of the ethnos’ social memory, its basic value system, and its worldview paradigms.”

With its biopsychosocial ethnic body, its organic culture, and its rhetorical “violence in the name of the vital,” as the anthropologist James Faubion calls it, administrative and academic success of the vital sociology is a symptomatic example of the process through which communities are imagined and institutionalized in contemporary Russia. To some degree, the examples that I have discussed can be seen as an experimental situation of sorts: a group of scholars with a background in social sciences and humanities, with extensive experience of international academic travel.
and with access (however limited) to world literature, was set to create a
new framework for their sociological data. Starting from scratch, without
institutional or intellectual support/constraints of the discipline, the school
of “vital forces” in a short time managed to consolidate people and finan-
cial resources around the persistent production of quasi-academic narra-
tives, which are structured by a repetitive operation of ethnic division. By
breaking “a population” into distinctive groups, by “separating out” some
groups, these xenophobic discourses of ethnic difference create a tradi-
tional effect of intelligibility when dealing with the nation’s history. But
along with “distinctive” groups, the biopolitics of the “Russian tragedy”
also splits off the issues of responsibility for painful and tragic instances in
the recent national past.

The traumatic origin of vital forces, the therapeutic function of ethno-
vitalist narratives, the underlying striving to create a protective discursive
shield of ethnic cohesion cannot, however, hide the main logical flaw of
this construction. “Social therapy” of this vitalism can sustain itself only
through securing a constant production of objects-symptoms for its own
application: from the “situation of castration” of the Russian culture to
“viral infection” of the ethnos’ backbone; from “global competition of eth-
noses” to the “broken genetic code” of the national culture.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Nicholas Jardine, The Science of Inquiry: On the Reality of Ques-
Blumenbach caustically rendered the main argument of this approach: “According
to this theory we, and indeed all the children of Adam, were at one time ipso facto,
up in the two ovaria of our common mother Eve. There we lay, as it were
asleep, and although astonishing little creatures, yet completely organized bodies,
and perfect miniatures of the form we have since assumed.” J. F. Blumenbach, An
Essay on Generation (London: printed for T. Cadell; Faulder; Murray; and Creech,
Edinburgh, 1792), 13.

2. See Peter Hanns Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment (Berkeley: Univer-


4. See J. F. Blumenbach, A Manual of the Elements of Natural History (London:

5. See James Larson, “Vital Forces: Regulative Principle or Constitutive Agens? A

6. See Timothy Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German

of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial Literatures of Liberation (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003), 54–56.
11. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 222.
14. For a discussion see, for example, A. S. Panarin, Rossiiskaia intelligentsiia v mirovykh voinakh i revolutsiakh XX veka (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1998); Tatiana Kniazevskaya, ed., Russkaia intelligentsiia: Istoriiia i sud’ba (Moscow: Nauka, 1999); Andrei Zdravomyslov, Sotsiologicheskii natsional’niy krisis (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).
18. There are, of course, some exceptions to this rule; see, for example, Gavriil Popov, “Beregite russkikh. Razgovory o ‘rossiianakh’—popytka uiti ot problemy,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 4, 2000; for a review see Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “Staraia ideologiiia novoi sem’i: Demograficheskii natsionalism Rossii i Ukrainy,” in Semeyne uzy: modeli diia shorki, ed. Serguei Oushakine (Moscow: NLO Press, 2004), 1:268–96.
20. Popov, “Russkii kholokost . . . .”
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logicheskie Issledovaniia 4 (2003): 12–19; Leonid Guzalenko, “Nuzhna li sotsiol-
ogi zhizni zhivaia lichnost?” Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia 10 (2003): 3–13; V. G.
Nemirovskii and D. D. Nevirko, “Regional’nye sotsiologicheskie shkoly na poroge
zhizni kak novoe napravlenie mezhdistiplinarnykh issledovanii,” Sotsiologicheskie

30. Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Yurii Rastov, “Sovremennaya istoriia formirovaniia
sotsiologicheskoi konseptsiia zhiznennykh sil cheloveka,” in Sovremennoe obshchestvo
i lichnost v sotsiologii zhiznennykh sil cheloveka, vol. 1, Zhiznennye sily cheloveka: Osnovy
formirovaniia sotsiologicheskoi konseptsiii, ed. Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Ludmila De-
mina (Barnaul, Russ.: Izd-vo APNTs SO RAO, 1999), 8.

31. See S. Grigoriev and E. Starikova, “Konseptsiia zhiznennykh sil kak teo-
reticheskoe osnovanie sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniiia spravedlivosti,” in Kul'turolo-
giia razvitiia rossiiskogo universiteta (Barnaul, Russ., 2003), 195.

32. Grigoriev, Kul'turologiia razvitiia rossiiskogo universiteta, 79.

33. Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Aleksandr Subetto, Osnovy neklassicheskoi sotsiologii
(Barnaul, Russ.: ARNTs SO RAN, 2000), 91.

34. See Grigoriev and Subetto, Osnovy neklassicheskoi sotsiologii, 103.

35. During these years, Semipalatinsk was used as the main site for testing
nuclear bombs above and under ground. For more than decade, the population in
Altai was exposed to the flow of radiation from the testing ground.


37. Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Ludmila Demina, Sotsiolog v raone ekologicheskogo
neblagopoluchiiia: Kontseptsiia, programma, opyat podgotovki (Barnaul, Russ.: Altaiskii
gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1994), 15.

38. Sviatoslav Grigoriev, “Teoretiko-metodologicheskie osnovy i aktual'nost ana-
liiza zhiznennykh sil natsional'nykh obshchestv v Rossii 1990-kh gg.,” in Sovre-
mennoe obshchestvo i lichnost v sotsiologii zhiznennykh sil cheloveka, ed. Sviatoslav Grig-
oriev and Ludmila Demina (Barnaul, Russ.: Izd-vo APNTs SO RAO, 1999), 1:36.

39. Tamara Semilet, “Teoretiko-metodologicheskie osnovaniia kul'turvitalistskoi
konseptsiia v sotsiologii,” in Neklassicheskaia sotsiologiiia v sovevremennoi Rossii, ed.
Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Ludmila Gusliakova (Moscow and Barnaul, Russ.: ARNTs
SO RAO, 2003), 71.


41. Grigoriev, Kul'turologiia razvitiia rossiiskogo universiteta, 183–82.

42. Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Aleksandr Subetto, “Kul'turotsentrichnost’ ekologii li-
chnosti i etnosa v sisteme obrazovaniia kak problema sotsialnoi virusologii: Kontekst

43. Sviatoslav Grigoriev, Iskry sokrovennogo (Barnaul, Russ.: OAO APK, 2000), 131.

44. Emily Martin, “Toward an Anthropology of Immunology: The Body as Na-

45. Martin, “Toward an Anthropology of Immunology,” 417.

46. Grigoriev, Iskry sokrovennogo, 134.

47. Grigoriev, “Teoretiko-metodologicheskie osnovy,” 42.

48. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 84.

49. See Wheeler, Vitalism; Guido Cimino and Francois Dushesneau, eds., Vital-
isms from Haller to the Cell Theory (Florence: Olschki, 1997).


53. For more on latent and direct racism in post-Soviet social sciences, see Viktor Voronkov, Oksana Karpenko, and Aleksandr Osipov, eds., Rasizm v iazyke sotsial’nykh nauk (St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2002).

54. Svatoslav Grigoriev, “Analiz rossiiskikh natsional’nykh obshnostei na rubezhe vekov s pozitsii zhiznennykh sil cheloveka i obshchestva,” in Grigoriev and Demina, Sovremennoe ponimanie zhiznennykh sil, 47.

55. Svatoslav Grigoriev, Vitalistskaya sotsiologii: Paradigma nastoiashchego i budushchego (izbrannye stat’i po neklassicheskoi sotsiologii) (Barnaul, Russ.: Izd-vo APNTs SO RAO, 2001), 121.


61. Grigoriev, Iskry sokrovennogo, 49.


63. Grigoriev, Iskry sokrovennogo, 299.

64. Mal’tseva, “Tsennosti obrazovaniia,” 240; Semilet, Kul’turvitalism—konsseptsiia zhiznennykh sil, 6, 54.

65. Semilet, Kul’turvitalism—konsseptsiia zhiznennykh sil, 51.


67. Semilet, Kul’turvitalism—konsseptsiia zhiznennykh sil, 63–64.

68. Semilet, Kul’turvitalism—konsseptsiia zhiznennykh sil, 63–64.


72. Aleksandr Subetto, "Ideia kommunizma v XXI veke," Semilet, Zhiznennye sily slavianstva, 63.


74. Aleksandr Subetto, "Patrioticheskoe soznание nachinaetsя s пониманий истории svoей strany, svoego naroda," in Dubhovnoe i sotsial’noe razvitie Rossii 1990-kh.: Problema sokhranenii zhiznennykh sil russkogo naroda, ed. Sviatoslav Grigoriev and Tamara Semilet (Barnaul, Russ.: School of Sociology, Altai State University, 1999), 12.


