MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

Kenneth Arrow, Samuel Bowles, and Steven Durlauf, Editors


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Meritocracy, Redistribution, and the Size of the Pie*

ROLAND BÉNAOU

This chapter examines how ambiguous notions such as “meritocracy,” “equality of opportunity,” and “equality of outcomes” can be given a formal content and related to more standard economic concepts such as social mobility, income inequality, and efficiency. It then proceeds to examine how redistributive policies affect each of these criteria of social justice and economic performance. This is done using a dynamic, optimizing model of earnings determination that incorporates ability, effort, family background, educational bequests, and redistributive policies. Because of endogenous labor supply and missing credit markets, redistribution has both adverse and beneficial effects on investment and output.

Writers on distributive justice have put forward very different views of what an individual “deserves” or is “entitled to.” At one end is Rawls (1971), who sees no moral justification for differences in welfare among individuals. Innate talent and socioeconomic background are equally arbitrary forms of luck, which in themselves merit no reward. Some inequality is necessary to provide incentives for people to produce, but it should be kept to the minimum level consistent with maximizing the welfare of the most disadvantaged individual. At the other end are libertarians such as Nozick (1974), who view individuals as entitled to the entire endowment with which they came into the world, comprising both their own qualities and whatever was inherited from parents or other altruistic donors. Common perceptions of fairness fall between these two extremes, with the line often drawn between innate qualities of the individual, which are mostly seen as true merits, and inherited economic and social advantages, which are not. For instance, Loury (1981) states that “it is widely held that differences in ability provide

* Prepared for the conference on “Meritocracy and Inequality” organized by the MacArthur Foundation at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful to J. P. Benoit, Jason Cummins, Jordi Gali, and especially Efe Ok for useful suggestions and references. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9601319) and the C. V. Starr Center is gratefully acknowledged.

1 With the proviso that the capital thus transmitted should not have been acquired unjustly in the past, through expropriation, exploitation, or the like. But while Nozick briefly concedes that a principle of “just redress” is necessary, he remains remarkably silent on what it should be.
ethic grounds for differences in rewards,” and then proceeds to define measures of meritocracy based on the correlation between talent and income. Roemer (1995) goes further and proposes that resources be redistributed so as to equalize utility among people whose performance deviates to a similar extent from the predicted median for individuals with whom they share a set of basic characteristics, observed early in life.

Although surely arbitrary, this distinction between background and ability or talent seems to underlie two recurrent themes in discussions of social justice: equality of opportunity which is seen as desirable, and equality of outcomes, which is not. I begin this chapter by discussing potential measures of each, based on the extent to which individual ability is rewarded both relative to background and in absolute terms. Even in the context of a simple abstract model, it is clear that redistributive policies (or exogenous technological change) will generally affect these two notions in opposite ways, so they cannot be examined separately. I therefore discuss possible indexes of meritocracy that take the form of “meritocratic utility functions” defined over these two “goods.”

To see whether these concepts are useful, I then examine whether they are good indicators of the effects of redistribution on social mobility, income inequality, and growth. These effects, which constitute the chapter’s second main focus, are studied in the context of a dynamic optimizing model where heterogeneous families accumulate human capital. Because the idea of meritocracy is often associated with that of maximizing the size of the economic “pie”—albeit at some cost in terms of insurance or social preference for equality—I focus on the path of total output as the main indicator (or component) of efficiency. The exposition is centered on the case of progressive income taxation, but I also discuss the similar effects of progressive education finance (equalization of school inputs). Equality of opportunity is shown to be closely related to social mobility. Perhaps more surprisingly, meritocratic utility functions, introduced to represent competing notions of distributive justice, turn out to reflect fairly accurately the main channels through which redistribution affects growth. Equality of outcomes dulls individuals’ incentives to provide the effort required to translate ability into earnings, and this contributes to lower output. Enforcing greater equality of opportunities, on the other hand, yields efficiency gains when there are imperfections in the markets for loans and insurance. For instance, reallocating educational funds toward poorer, liquidity-constrained families who have a higher return on human capital investment tends to raise the economy’s growth rate (e.g., Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira 1993, Benabou 1996b). It also provides valuable insurance against idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., Varian 1980, Persson 1983). Most of these benefits are shown to occur in future periods, through a gradual reduction in inequality and the inefficiency of human capital investment that it implies. In contrast, the costs are all contemporaneous. Thus society may be faced with an intertemporal trade-off: maximizing long-run growth in every period does not result in maximizing long-run output.

As explained above, the analysis generally validates the common intuition that meritocracy, appropriately defined, is desirable not only on grounds of fairness but also on grounds of efficiency. Indeed, long-run output takes a form very similar to the meritocratic utility function posited in the first part of the chapter. There are differences, however, arising in particular from the complementarity between the inputs into human capital accumulation that are being redistributed (money and the school resources it buys) and those that are not (neighborhood effects, social capital) or even cannot be redistributed (parental characteristics). Meritocracy calls for greater redistribution in the presence of these complementarities, whereas efficiency pushes the other way, unless some of these nonpurchased inputs can be simultaneously redistributed. I extend the model to show how residential stratification and human capital heritability affect the desirability of redistribution (through tax or education policy) from either point of view.

1. Measures of Meritocracy

1.1 Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcomes

A recurrent theme in discussions of meritocracy is equality of opportunity, which means that family origins should not constitute a significant advantage or handicap in pursuing economic success. One intuitive measure of this is the fraction of variance in income that is attributable to an individual’s own qualities, or lack thereof, rather than to his or her background. Starting with the simplest case, suppose that a person’s (lifetime) income can be written as

\[ y = \bar{y} + \lambda a + \mu b, \]

where \( b \) represents social background (e.g., family resources) and \( a \) some intrinsic quality of the individual (e.g., cognitive ability), which for now is taken to be independent of \( b \). Both are normalized to have mean zero, so \( \bar{y} = E[y] \). One can then define meritocracy in opportunities as:

\[ M^{opp} = \frac{\text{Var}[\lambda a]}{\text{Var}[y]} = \frac{\lambda^2 \sigma_a}{\lambda^2 \sigma_a + \mu^2 \sigma_b^2} \]

This is also the squared correlation between income and ability, which Loury (1981) proposed as a definition of “weak meritocracy.” It is also the main definition of equality of opportunity discussed in Atkinson (1980). It increases as \( \mu \) decreases, say by equalizing school expenditures or neighborhood compositions, or as \( \lambda \sigma_a \) rises, say because technological progress...
increases the return to ability. In the more realistic case where \(a\) and \(b\) are correlated one must decide what part of their covariance represents qualities it is “meritocratic” to reward, as opposed to inequitable disparities in opportunity. For instance, it is generally viewed as unmeritocratic that children’s educational opportunities should be constrained by parental wealth; inherited talent or beauty, on the other hand, seem somehow less objectionable. But this is a thin line to draw, and one that can shift rapidly with technology. Family resources already determine, through the quality of pre- and postnatal care, some permanent characteristics of children’s health and physical appearance that directly affect their productive abilities. With the continued progress of genetic engineering, disparities in wealth will increasingly translate into different abilities to ensure that children are born with desirable traits (or at least free of undesirable ones), whether physical, cognitive, or behavioral.

It seems hard to avoid carrying this logic to its natural conclusion, namely, that inherited advantages or disadvantages of any kind make opportunities unequal. In that case one simply replaces \(a\) by \(a' = a - E[a|b]\) in the computation of \(M^{opp}\). Thus if intelligence, initiative, or beauty is partly inherited and contributes to earnings, its predicted component is counted as part of \(b\). Only innovations, including market luck, are part of the individual’s intrinsic “merit.” This information-based definition may seem unusual, but I do not see that ethical considerations provide a convincing rationale for drawing the line elsewhere. The distinction commonly made between traits whose transmission is mediated by socioeconomic resources and those inherited through other channels seems to reflect instead a practical concern about what can or cannot be redistributed across families. Fortunately, the issues, results, and policy trade-offs to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter are not critically predicated on a specific definition.

For instance, although a general distinction between background and intrinsic qualities captures an important component of what most people mean by “meritocracy,” the picture is incomplete. What is missing is the converse notion that imposing equality of outcomes is unmeritocratic, as the following example will make clear. Let income still be determined by equation (1), but suppose now that the government taxes it at the rate \(\tau\) and redistributes it in an egalitarian manner. Posttax income is therefore:

\[
\hat{y} = (1 - \tau) y + \tau \hat{x} = \tilde{y} + \lambda (1 - \tau) a + \mu (1 - \tau) b.
\]  

This equalization could also take the form of pay scales or wage norms within the firm, as in Scandinavian countries, or arise through technological

---

2 More generally, if ability and background are multidimensional vectors \(A\) and \(B\), one simply replaces \(E[a|b]\) by \(E[A|B]\) in equation (2). Thus income is decomposed into the part that is predictable on the basis of family and social characteristics and that which is not.
develop such a model in section 2 and show in section 3 that notions like \( W(M^{opp}, M^{out}) \) and \( P(M^{opp}, M^{out}) \) indeed provide useful (albeit imperfect) intuitions both on social mobility and on the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution. But first I turn to the issue of effort decisions.

1.2 Rewards to Effort

Is a society that rewards effort necessarily more meritocratic? A common view of distributive justice indeed holds that individuals should be held responsible for the actions that are under their control but not for their innate attributes, which are not (e.g., Roemer 1995). However, different propensities to work must ultimately reflect different (perceived) returns to effort, hence differences in either background or ability. Formally, let income net of effort costs be determined by:

\[
\max e \left( \bar{y} + \lambda a + \mu b + v e - e^2 / 2 (\gamma a + \delta b) \right).
\]

Then:

\[
M^{out} = \lambda + \gamma \nu^2,
\]

\[
M^{opp} = \frac{(\lambda + \gamma \nu^2)^2 \sigma_v^2}{(\lambda + \gamma \nu^2)^2 \sigma_v^2 + (\mu + \delta \nu^2)^2 \sigma_b^2}.
\]

While a higher return to effort \( \nu \) always improves \( M^{out} \), its effect on \( M^{opp} \) depends on the behavior of \( (\lambda + \gamma \nu^2)/(\mu + \delta \nu^2) \). Equality of opportunity increases or decreases depending on \( \gamma \delta \mu / \lambda \), that is, on the relative ability-intensity of effort, compared to that of other determinants of income. To make things concrete, suppose that the cost or perceived cost of graduating from high school is much higher in a community with poor role models and peers. To the extent that the sorting of families into towns and neighborhoods reflects differences in parents' wealth, education, or even tastes, the differences in studying effort (attendance, homework, etc.) observed between the children of poor and better-off communities will not reflect differences in their individual merits.

2. Inequality, Redistribution, and Growth

I now turn to a truly dynamic, optimizing model of earnings determination, which embodies the effects of luck (genetic or otherwise), effort, family background, educational bequests, and redistributive policies. It will allow me to relate the dual notions of meritocracy defined above to more standard economic variables such as social mobility, income inequality, or productive
efficiency, and to clearly demonstrate the costs and benefits of redistribution. The model is more fully developed in Bénabou (1996c, 1997) and the reader is referred to these papers for proofs, which will be omitted here. The second paper also provides a quantitative analysis through numerical simulations.

2.1 The Model

A continuum \( i \in [0,1] \) of infinite-lived agents or dynasties maximizes the intertemporal utility

\[
U_0^i = E \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \rho^t \ln c_t^i - \delta(t)^n \right]
\]

subject to:

\[
c_t^i + e_t^i = y_t^i
\]

\[
y_t^i = (h_t^i)^{\lambda} (\ell_t^i)^{\mu}
\]

\[
h_{t+1}^i = \kappa \xi_{t+1}^i (h_t^i)^{\sigma} (e_t^i)^{\beta}
\]

In period or generation \( t \), agent \( i \) produces output \( y_t^i \) using his or her human capital \( h_t^i \) and labor input \( \ell_t^i \). Taxes and transfers, specified below, then transform this gross income into net income, denoted \( \bar{y}_t^i \). Both consumption \( c_t^i \) and education expenditures \( e_t^i \) are financed out of these current resources, reflecting agents' inability to borrow for human-capital investment. Insurance markets are also incomplete, so that the random shocks \( \xi_t^i \) cannot be diversified away. The simplest interpretation of \( \xi_t^i \) is as the child's innate ability, as in Loury (1981), but it can also stand for other forms of luck. This shock is assumed to be i.i.d., without much loss of generality since children already inherit some of their parents' productive potential through the term \((h_t^i)^{\sigma}\). This nonpecuniary effect of family background on the young's human capital can thus be viewed as a convenient stand-in for genetic inheritance. More generally, if the home environment provides important inputs that affect children's ability to learn in school, \( \alpha \) is large. Social-capital spillovers at the level of the school, the neighborhood, or the community have the same effect when these "clubs" are highly segregated by income and occupation.

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\[
\bar{y}_t^i = (y_t^i)^{1-\tau} (\bar{y}_t^i)^{\tau}
\]

where \( \bar{y}_t^i \) is defined by the balanced-budget constraint:

\[
\int_0^1 (y_t^i)^{1-\tau} (\bar{y}_t^i)^{\tau} \, di = \int_0^1 y_t^i \, di = y_t^i.
\]

Note that \( \bar{y}_t^i \) is the break-even point where pre- and posttax income coincide, and that \( \bar{y}_t^i > y_t^i \) when \( \tau > 0 \), in contrast to the usual linear case. Indeed, the elasticity \( \tau \) measures the degree of progressivity of the fiscal scheme, or conversely its regressivity when it is negative. As usual, tax rates \( \tau > 1 \) must be excluded because they are not incentive-compatible. Redistributive policies other than income taxation, such as education finance or residential integration, will be discussed in section 4.

2.2 Savings and Effort

Intuition suggests that the anticipation of future taxes \( \{\tau_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) will negatively affect parents' incentives to invest in their children's education. While this is correct, it can be shown that the policy described by equations (9)–(10) can be combined with an investment subsidy, financed by a proportional tax on consumption, to ensure that the savings rate never deviates from its optimal level, \( \delta = \beta \lambda (1 - \rho \alpha) \). Moreover, for any envisioned sequence \( \{\tau_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \), this complementary scheme is Pareto-optimal: it will be unanimously supported by every family in every generation. For brevity I shall directly assume here that agents save a constant fraction \( \bar{\delta} \) of their post-tax income.

Since writing Bénabou (1996c and 1998) and the first version of the present chapter, I have become aware of a couple of articles in the public finance literature that used a similar geometric scheme in a static context, most notably Persson (1983).
as in a Solow model. The only margin subject to distortion is therefore labor supply, and the dynamic optimization problem faced by an agent with human capital \( h \) is:

\[
V(h) = \max \left\{ \ln((1 - \delta)(h^{1 - \tau})^{1 - \tau}) - \delta l^n + \rho EV_{t+1} [\kappa h^n (\delta(h^{1 - \tau})^{1 - \tau})^{\lambda}] \right\}.
\]

(12)

It can be solved under any tax profile \( \{\tau_t\}_{t=0}^\infty \), but for simplicity I shall restrict attention from here on to time-invariant policies, \( \tau_t = \tau \). One can then show the following result.

**Proposition 1**: Let the rate of fiscal progressivity be \( \tau = \tau \) for all \( t \). Agents then choose in every period a common, constant labor supply:

\[
l = \left( \frac{\mu}{\delta(1 - \tau)(1 - \rho \alpha)} \right)^{1/\gamma}.
\]

(13)

A more progressive tax system reduces the return to effort because it impounds each generation’s current consumption (numerator) as well as its ability to pass on human capital to its offspring (denominator). Because of the second effect, the distortion is greater the more forward-looking agents are, and the more lasting human capital is: \( -l'() \) increases with \( \rho \) and \( \alpha \).

Finally, note that it would be straightforward to allow an individual’s effort to vary with his ability \( \xi_i \) or background \( h_i \), as in section 1.2. Replacing in equation (5) the cost of effort \( \delta \) by \( \delta (\xi_i)^{-\tau} (h_i)^{-\tau} \) leaves the model’s structure unchanged, up to a renormalization of the parameters.

### 2.3 Individual and Aggregate Dynamics

Taking logs in equations (7)–(8), the accumulation of human capital becomes:

\[
\ln h_{t+1} = \ln \xi_i + \ln \kappa + \beta \ln \delta + \beta \mu (1 - \tau) l
\]

\[
= \ln l + (\alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \tau)) \ln h_t + \beta \tau \ln \tilde{y}_t.
\]

(14)

It is easy to see that human capital and income always remain log-normally distributed across families. Indeed, suppose that \( \ln h_t \sim \mathcal{N}(m_t, \Delta_t^2) \); the production function (7) then implies

\[
\ln y_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\lambda m_t, \mu \ln l, (\lambda \Delta_t^2)).
\]

(15)

Bénabou (1996c), and under more general preferences in Bénabou (1998). The latter paper also derives the equilibrium path of savings rates when corrective consumption taxes and investment subsidies are not available.

**Proposition 2**: The cross-sectional distribution of human capital evolves according to the linear difference equations:

\[
m_{t+1} = \ln \kappa + \mu l + (\alpha + \beta \lambda ) m_t + \beta \tau (2 - \tau) (\lambda \Delta_t^2)\]

\[
\Delta_t^2 + 1 = (\alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \tau))^2 \Delta_t^2 + s^2
\]

where \( \ln \kappa = \ln k - \xi_t^2/2 + \beta \ln \tilde{e} \) is a constant. The distribution of income is then given by equation (15).

Two important terms appear in these expressions. The first is \( \alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \tau) \), which measures the degree of persistence of inequalities in human capital and income, or conversely the lack of social mobility. I will show in section 3 that it is directly related to the index of “equality of opportunity,” \( M^{opp} \). The other critical term is \( \beta \tau (2 - \tau) (\lambda \Delta_t^2) \), which captures the gains in aggregate welfare achieved by redistributing income at the rate \( \tau \) in period \( t \)—keeping labor supply constant. These arise primarily from two sources:

(a) redistribution provides insurance against the idiosyncratic shock \( \xi_t + 1 \);

(b) it tends to raise total output \( y_t + 1 = E[y_t + 1] \), through a reallocation of capital from low to high marginal product investments.

Because this chapter’s main concern is with the links between meritocracy, redistribution, and the size of the economic “pie,” I shall from here on focus only on the second of these effects.\(^8\) Proposition 2 easily leads to the following result, where \( \ln k = \lambda (\ln k + \beta \ln \tilde{e}) - \lambda (1 - \lambda) \xi_t^2/2 \) is a constant.

**Proposition 3**: Income inequality reduces the growth rate of per-capita income,

\[
\ln y_{t+1} - \ln y_t = \ln \kappa + \mu (1 - \alpha) \ln l - \Omega(\tau)(\lambda \Delta_t^2)/2,
\]

(17)

to an extent measured by

\[
\Omega(\tau) = \alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \tau)^2 - (\alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \tau))^2.
\]

(18)

\(^8\) It is not difficult, however, to compute from equation (14) and proposition 2 a family’s expected intertemporal welfare, which embodies the insurance effect. On the insurance value of redistributive taxation (in a static model) see also Varian (1980) and Persson (1983).
This loss factor is positive for all \( \tau \) and minimized at \( \tau = 1 - \alpha(1 - \beta) \).

These results have simple interpretations. The first three terms in equation (17) give the growth rate of a representative agent economy, where everyone has the same level of human capital. Convergence to the steady-state in \( y_\ast \) occurs at the rate \( (1 - \alpha - \beta) \). As usual, continual growth could be sustained by incorporating spillovers to preserve constant returns. The last term shows that inequality constitutes a drag on growth, in line with the empirical findings of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Perotti (1996), among others. The reason is that credit market imperfections result in a misallocation of education resources: given that \( \alpha + \lambda \beta < 1 \), families with low human capital have a return higher than wealthier ones, but are constrained to lower levels of investment by their inability to borrow. This differential marginal productivity of education expenditures reflects the presence of decreasing returns in educational investment \( (\lambda \beta < 1) \), which are only partially mitigated by the positive impact of family background \( (\epsilon \lambda \beta \alpha \text{ in equation (8)}) \). The role of decreasing returns can be made more apparent by rewriting:

\[
\mathcal{U}(\tau) = \alpha + \beta \lambda(1 - \tau) - (\alpha + \beta \lambda(1 - \tau))^2 - \beta \lambda(1 - \tau - (1 - \tau)^2).
\]

Under a tax rate \( \tau \), \( y'_{\tau + 1} \) is proportional to \( (y'_{\tau})^2 + \beta \lambda(1 - \tau) \) \( y'_{\tau} \beta \lambda \), and the difference of the first two terms in \( \mathcal{U}(\tau) \) directly measures the concavity of this accumulation technology. The last term embodies the extent to which \( y'_{\tau} \) is due to the concavity (progressivity) of the fiscal scheme \( y'_{\tau + 1} = (y'_{\tau})^2 - \gamma y_{\tau} \) with respect to \( y_{\tau} \).

The role of credit market imperfections in generating a dependence of aggregate growth on the distribution of income and wealth has been explored in a number of papers such as Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Perotti (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Bénabou (1996b, 1996c), Aghion and Bolton (1997), or Piketty (1997). The potential for growth-increasing redistributions is a general feature of these models (most of which abstract from labor supply), although in some of them the presence of a fixed cost in the investment technology implies that regressive policies may be called for at the early stages of development. Calibrated simulations on U.S. data suggest that the long-run gains from

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9 This complementarity between background and purchased inputs explains why the tax rate \( \tau \) that minimizes the growth losses from inequality \( U(\tau) \) decreases with \( \alpha \). In its absence \( (\alpha = 0) \), and with fixed labor supply \( l'(\tau) = 0 \), the growth-maximizing tax rate would be \( \tau = 1 \); such is for instance the case in Loury (1981) or Piketty (1997). One could easily incorporate into the model additional features that make inequality either more costly or more desirable: complementarity or substitutability in the production of goods and human capital, costs of crime, and so on. These additional components of \( U \) are studied in Bénabou (1996b) and to some extent in section 4.2, but for now I intentionally focus on a "benchmark" case with no externalities of any kind.

10 Throughout this section I shall implicitly assume strict quasi-concavity of the relevant objective functions. This condition was always satisfied in numerical simulations.

11 Writing \( l'(\tau) \) in equation (19) implicitly assumes that agents always expect the current tax rate to remain constant in the future. But the result stated in proposition 4 applies in the general case: for any given expected sequence \( \{\tau_t; k^t\} \), a change in \( \tau \) can be shown to affect labor supply \( l \) and the loss factor \( l/(\tau) \) only in the current period, but inequality \( (\lambda \beta^t + k^t)^2 \) in all future periods.

---

2.4 Short- and Long-Run Effects of Redistribution

Consider the economy at a given point in time. The degree of inequality \( \Delta_2^2 \) is given, as the result of historical accidents and past policies. The degree of progressivity \( \tau^* \Delta_2^2 \) that maximizes the current growth rate is determined as the solution to:

\[
\mu(1 - \alpha)^2 l' l(\tau) | l(\tau) = \mathcal{U}'(\tau)(\Delta_2^2)^2/2.
\]

The marginal distortion to labor supply is optimally balanced with the marginal gain from relaxing the liquidity constraints on poor families’ investment. As a result, \( \tau^* \Delta_2^2 \) increases with \( \Delta_2^2 \) but remains bounded above by \( \tau = \text{argmax} \Delta_2^2 \). This static trade-off, however, is only part of the story. Looking more than one period ahead reveals another, dynamic effect of redistribution: increasing \( \tau \) at time \( t \) reduces \( \Delta_2^2 \) and, more generally, all future variances. Similarly, if the tax rate is permanently set to \( \tau \), inequality converges to:

\[
\Delta_2^2 (\tau) = \frac{s^2}{1 - (\alpha + \beta \lambda(1 - \tau))^2}.
\]

By lessening future growth losses due to the combination of inequality of resources with imperfect markets, this homogenizing effect on the distribution of human capital and income generates an important intertemporal trade-off.

Proposition 4: Much of the benefit from an increase in redistribution occurs in future periods, whereas all of the costs are contemporaneous. Therefore, maximizing short-run growth in every period will not result in maximizing long-run growth or output.

Formally, long-run output, which is obtained by taking limits in equation (17),
\begin{equation}
\ln y = \frac{\theta + (1 - \alpha)\mu \ln(\sigma) - \Omega(\sigma) \lambda^2 \Delta \tau}{1 - \alpha - \beta \lambda}.
\end{equation}

(21)

is maximized by the tax rate \( \tau^* \) defined as the solution to:

\begin{equation}
\mu(1 - \alpha)l(\gamma)l(\tau) = \frac{\gamma^2(\tau)\lambda^2 \Delta \tau}{2} + \Omega(\tau)\lambda^2 (\Delta \tau)^2 / 2.
\end{equation}

(22)

Let \( \Delta \tau = \Delta \tau(\tau^*) \) denote the associated level of inequality; it is easy to see that \( \tau^* > \tau^* \). Thus, starting from the steady-state \( (\tau^*, \Delta \tau) \), a tax cut would boost growth for a while but eventually lower output permanently— as well as increase income disparities. Conversely, suppose that in every period \( \tau \) is set so as to maximize current growth: \( \tau = \tau^* \). The economy will converge to the steady-state \( (\tau^*, \Delta \tau) \) located at the intersection of the upward-sloping locus defined by equation (19) and the downward-sloping locus given by equation (20); note that \( \tau^* < \tau^* \). Starting from this steady state, higher long-run output can be achieved at the cost of an initial phase of slower growth, through a permanent increase in the rate of tax progressivity.

This intertemporal trade-off, which also occurs when evaluating individual or aggregate welfare rather than per capita income, makes clear the importance of the horizon over which policies are evaluated by governments and voters. It arises, fundamentally, from the fact that incomplete markets make the entire distribution of income a state variable relevant to the economy’s aggregate behavior. To obtain a similar reversal between the short- and long-run effects of tax policy in a standard growth model one would have to introduce a form of “time to build” delay between government spending (say, on infrastructure) and its productivity benefits.

Bénabou (1996b) shows that a similar trade-off is likely to apply to other forms of redistribution, which involve social capital rather than financial resources. That paper develops a general analysis of the costs and benefits of mixing together heterogeneous populations in the presence of human capital spillovers or production complementarities. It explains in particular how policies promoting the residential integration of neighborhoods, or affirmative action in education or at the workplace, may reduce growth in the short run yet still increase it in the long run.

3. Meritocracy, Social Mobility, and Growth

Do more meritocratic societies grow faster? To address this question, let us now relate the determinants of growth to the dual notions of meritocracy discussed in section 1. Recall that \( \ln y = (1 - \sigma)(\ln h + \mu \ln h) \)

12 This is also the property that allows for multiple long-run equilibria in models such as those of Banerjee and Newman (1993), Piketty (1997), and Bénabou (1996c).

\[ W(M^{opp}, M^{opp}) = \left( \frac{\lambda}{\rho \beta \lambda} - \frac{\rho \beta \lambda}{\rho \alpha} \right)^{-\mu(1 - \alpha)/\eta} \exp \left( -\frac{\gamma^2 \lambda^2}{2 \Delta \tau^2} \right). \]

(26)

It is rather striking that \( W \) has all the properties discussed in section 1 for indexes of meritocracy: \( W_1 > 0, W_2 > 0, \) and \( W(M, M') = 0 \) whenever \( MM' = 0 \); moreover, \( W_{12} > 0 \) and \( W \) is quasi-concave (even concave at high enough values) in \( (M, M') \). Introduced to represent competing notions of distributive justice, meritocratic utility functions turn out to also capture the
two main forces that shape efficiency. Moreover, these two effects are indeed tied together by movements along a convex meritocracy possibility frontier:  
\[ M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} + (\alpha + \beta M^{\text{opt}})^2 = 1. \]  
(27)

If \( \bar{\Omega} \) was actually a constant we could interpret it as measuring the relative weight of \( M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} \) with respect to \( M^{\text{opt}} \) in \( W \) (slope of the iso-meritocracy curves) and we would be exactly in the case of Figure 12.1.\(^{14}\) The analogy is imperfect, however, because \( \bar{\Omega}(\tau) \) is not a constant preference parameter, but an endogenous measure of the productivity gains obtained by reducing disparities in educational opportunity: it varies together with \( M_{epp}^{\text{opt}}, M^{\text{opt}} \) in response to the progressivity rate \( \tau \). This more subtle but important effect marks the limit of the general intuition that meritocracy and efficiency go together. I explore this issue further in section 4.2.

When computing equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes I focused for simplicity on current income as a measure of individual reward. In a dynamic model one should more properly use expected intertemporal utilities, which take into account the value to parents of their children’s welfare. To see that this leads to very similar results, observe that consumption is proportional to posttax income \( y^\tau \), which has elasticity \( \lambda(1 - \tau) \) with respect to human capital; \( h^\tau \), in turn, follows an autoregressive process with innovations \( e^\tau \) and persistence coefficient \( p(\tau) = \alpha + \beta(1 - \tau) \). Therefore:

\[ M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} = \frac{\text{Var} \{ \ln e^\tau \}}{\text{Var} \{ U^\tau \}} = \frac{\lambda^2}{s^2 + p(\tau)^2 \Delta^2} \text{, so that } M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} = 1 - p(\tau)^2, \]  
(28)

\[ M^{\text{opt}} = \frac{\Delta U^\tau}{\text{ln} e^\tau} = \frac{\lambda(1 - \tau)}{1 - p(\tau)}. \]  
(29)

It is clear that \( M^{\text{opt}} \) and \( M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} \) (which is unchanged) are constrained to lie on a possibility frontier very similar to equation (27), and that \( \text{ln} e^\tau \) can again be expressed as a function of \( M^{\text{opt}}, M_{epp}^{\text{opt}}, \) and \( \bar{\Omega}. \)\(^{15}\)

4. Education Finance, Family Background, and Social Capital

4.1 Redistributing Education Funding versus Redistributing Income

A welfare-based measure of equality of outcomes becomes indispensable when redistribution occurs directly at the level of education funding rather than through progressive income taxation. Such is the case when the state provides free universal public education or transfers that aim to equalize school budgets between rich and poor communities. The distributional and efficiency properties of alternative systems of education finance have been investigated in a number of papers (e.g., Loury 1981, Glomm and Ravikumar 1992, Bénabou 1996a and 1996b, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996 and 1998, and Gradstein and Justman 1998). Here I shall simply explain the close similarity—except for one important difference—with the income redistributions studied earlier.

Suppose that earnings are left untaxed but educational monies are redistributed according to a progressive scheme.\(^{16}\) Thus \( e^\tau_i \) is replaced in equation (8) by \( e^\tau_i \), with:

\[ e^\tau_i = (e^\tau_i)^1 - \tau (\bar{\delta} y^\tau_i)^\tau, \]  
(30)

where \( \bar{\delta} \) and \( \bar{y} \) are defined as before. The case \( \tau = 0 \) corresponds to laissez-faire, while at the other extreme \( \tau = 1 \) imposes egalitarian funding. This policy has implications very similar to those of income taxation, and in particular gives rise to the same trade-off between distortions to \( k(\tau) \) and gains from relaxing both present and future wealth constraints. With respect to meritocracy, it is easy to see that equality of opportunity \( M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} \) remains unchanged, while the utility-based \( M^{\text{opt}} \) is now equal to the expression in (29) except that \( 1 - \tau \) does not appear in the numerator any more. This reduced impact on outcomes reflects the fact that parental consumption now escapes redistribution, and indicates that distortions to effort will be smaller than under progressive income taxation. It also implies that if human capital is the main transmission mechanism for intergenerational income differences, as in our model, progressive education finance is more meritocratic than progressive income taxation. If other channels such as financial bequests are important, on the other hand, the increase in \( M^{\text{opt}} \) obtained by redistributing only \( e^\tau \) rather than all of \( y^\tau \) must, once again, be traded against a reduction in \( M_{epp}^{\text{opt}} \).

4.2 The Role of Family and Social Inputs to Education

In addition to teachers, classrooms, books, and other school resources, the accumulation of human capital involves important nonpurchased inputs, provided either by the family or by the local community. Examples of neighborhood influences include peer effects, role models, job contacts, local norms of behavior, and crime. Altering through law or financial incentives the so-

\(^{14}\) Note from equation (26) that this slope also depends positively on \( A \) and \( x^\tau \), both of which tend (ceteris paribus) to increase long-run income dispersion. This accords well with intuition: inequality of opportunity (a strong dependence of children’s education and income on parental background) should be more of a concern the more unequal families’ resources are.

\(^{15}\) Ex-ante or aggregate welfare in the steady state, \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^t \{ \mathbb{E} U^\tau + \delta \bar{y} \} \), also depends on \( M^{\text{opt}}, M_{epp}^{\text{opt}}, \) and \( \bar{\Omega} \). But in addition it incorporates the insurance value of redistribution.

\(^{16}\) In addition, there may be a flat consumption tax whose proceeds are used to finance educational subsidies, so that the savings rate remains equal to \( \bar{\delta} \). See the discussion in section 2.2, and Bénabou (1998) for more details.
cioeconomic mix of schools, communities, or even firms amounts to a redistribution of these various forms of “social capital” (a term coined by Loury 1977), which can be studied in a way similar to redistributions of income. Conversely, the presence of socioeconomic background as a complement to expenditures in the education production function affects the effectiveness of income redistribution and school finance reform. This is one of the main sources of divergence between meritocracy and efficiency.

Let us start by recalling the claim in section 2 that the transmission of human capital within the family and the impact of social capital in segregated communities can both be captured by the term \( (h_i) \gamma \) in equation (8). In the latter case, this reflects a more general technology of the form

\[
h'_i + 1 = \kappa \ell_i + 1 (h_i) \gamma (e_i) \rho (L_i) \gamma,
\]

where the local spillover \( L_i \) is measured by a CES average of education levels in the community or “club” \( \Omega_i \) where individual \((i, t)\) is educated

\[
L_i = \left( \int_{j \in \Omega_i} (h_j) \gamma (e_j) \rho (L_j) \gamma \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma - 1}}.
\]

By allowing the elasticity of complementarity \( 1/e \) to vary between \(+\infty\) and \(-\infty\), this specification captures all cases between the two extremes where local interactions are dominated by the lower or by the upper tail of the human capital distribution \( (L_i = \min_{h_i, j \in \Omega_i}^\ast \) and \( L_i = \max_{h_i, j \in \Omega_i}^\ast \), respectively). Perfectly segregated communities correspond to \( L_i = h_i \), while perfectly integrated ones yield \( L_i = L \) where this index is computed over a representative sample of the economy’s population. A rise in the degree of socioeconomic stratification such as an exodus of better-off families to the suburbs, can therefore be represented in the transmission equation

\[
h'_i + 1 = \kappa \cdot \ell_i + 1 (h_i) \gamma (e_i) \rho (L_i) \gamma
\]

by an increase in \( \alpha \) and a corresponding decline in \( \gamma \). This extension leaves the general structure of the model unchanged, and in particular, human capital remains distributed log-normally over time, \( h_i \sim \mathcal{N}(m, \Delta_i^2) \). Thus:

\[
\ln L = m + \Delta_i^2 (e - 1)/2e = \ln \gamma_t - \Delta_i^2 / \gamma_e,
\]

and the economy’s dynamics are obtained by simply replacing \( \ln \kappa \) with \( \ln \kappa + \gamma (m_e + \Delta_i^2 (e - 1)/2e) \) in equation (14). The law of motion for cross-sectional inequality \( \Delta_i^2 \) is then unchanged from proposition 2 and so is intergenerational mobility \( p(\tau) = \alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \tau) \). As to growth in per capita income, it becomes:

\[
\ln y_{t+1} - \ln y_t = \theta - (1 - \alpha - \beta \lambda - \gamma) \ln y_t + (1 - \alpha - \gamma) \ln (\gamma(\lambda \Delta_i^2)^2)/2
\]

where \( \theta \) is still a constant but \( \mathcal{L}(\tau) \) is now:

\[
\mathcal{L}(\tau) = \left( \alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \gamma)^2 - (\alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \gamma)^2)
\]

\[
\lambda \gamma (1/e - (1 - \lambda))
\]

which, of course, reduces to equation (17) in the absence of local spillovers. Note that when \( \alpha + \beta \lambda + \gamma = 1 \) the economy experiences continual growth, and redistributive policies as well as the extent of socioeconomic stratification affect the asymptotic growth rate. Two related questions can be addressed with this model.

First, what are the effects of greater socioeconomic segregation on the macroeconomy? This problem is analyzed in detail in Bénabou (1996b), so here I will just sketch the answer.\(^{17}\) In the short run, the impact on growth reflects the response of \( \mathcal{L} \) to a simultaneous increase in \( \alpha \) and decrease in \( \gamma \), with \( \alpha + \gamma \) constant. The last term in equation (35) shows that whether this is beneficial or detrimental depends in particular on the balance between the costs of heterogeneity at the local and global levels: the former reflect the degree of interdependence \( 1/e \) between peers or neighbors, while the latter arise from decreasing returns to individual human capital in production (recall that aggregate output is \( \gamma = \mu f_0 \gamma (h_i) \rho (L_i) \)). In the long run, the homogenization effect also comes into play: steady-state disparities in education and income increase with segregation, and this rise in \( \Delta_i^2 \) is always detrimental. Therefore the potential trade-off between short-run and long-run output growth discussed in section 2.4 for income redistributions also arises for redistributions of social capital.

The second question is how the presence of family or social inputs to education affects the desirability of redistributing financial resources, both from the point of view of meritocratic values and from that of long-run aggregate income (or efficiency more generally). Focusing for simplicity on income redistributions, note first that a rise in \( \alpha \) lowers \( \mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^{\gamma} = \mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^\gamma = 1 - (\alpha + \beta \lambda (1 - \gamma))^2 \) and increases \( \partial \mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^\gamma / \partial \gamma \). Therefore, in response to an increase in segregation, equality of opportunity unambiguously calls for an offsetting increase in redistribution. The picture is a little less clear-cut concerning inequality in outcomes. The income-based definition \( 
\]

\[
\lambda (1 - \tau) \]

remains unaffected but the utility-based measure \( \mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^{\gamma, \rho} = \lambda (1 - \gamma)(1 - \rho \rho(\gamma)) \) rises, and so does \( \partial \mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^{\gamma, \rho}/\partial \tau \); high-ability parents now enjoy more effective channels through which to pass human capital on to their offspring, and this is more valuable the lower the future tax rates. Whether more or less redistribution is called for thus depends on the specific form of \( W(\mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^{\gamma}, \mathcal{M}_{\text{opt}}^\gamma) \), that is, on the relative weights placed on the two meritocratic values. Nonetheless, in plausible situations where the discount factor \( \rho \) is not too high—or, equivalently, when equality of outcomes is

\(^{17}\) That paper provides a general treatment of dynamic economies with both local and economywide spillovers of the form (32).
judged mostly in terms of lifetime income rather than intergenerational welfare—the concern for equality of opportunity will dominate, leading to an increase in $\tau$.

Things are quite different from the point of view of efficiency. Focusing once more on long-run output, let us now examine how $\delta \ln y_m / \delta \tau$ or, equivalently, how

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \tau} \left( (1 - \alpha - \gamma) \mu \ln(\tau) - L(\tau) \frac{\Delta_s^2(\tau)}{2} \right)$$

(36)

varies with $\alpha$, keeping $\alpha + \gamma$ constant. There are three effects:

a. As explained following proposition 1, an increase in $\alpha$ magnifies the effort disincentive $- \partial \ln h(\tau) / \partial \tau$, because when human capital depreciates more slowly it becomes more sensitive to permanent changes in taxation.

b. For any given distribution of backgrounds, a greater $\alpha$ also magnifies the efficiency loss from a marginal increase in redistribution: $L(\tau)$ is maximized at $\tau = 1 - \alpha/(1 - \beta \lambda)$, which varies inversely with $\alpha$.\(^{18}\)

c. On the other hand, the efficiency value of reducing permanent inequality $\Delta_s^2 = \Delta_s^2(MPP)$ calls for responding to a rise in $\alpha$ with greater progressivity: one can show that $\partial^2(\Delta_s^2) / \partial \alpha < 0$.

The balance of these three effects is generally too complicated to determine analytically, but in simple cases where it can be done—and in all the simulations of the model—the first two dominate. For instance, proposition 1 and equation (20) imply that when $\alpha = 0$, $L(\tau) \Delta_s^2(\tau)$ is minimized by $\tau = 1$. For $\alpha > 0$, however, the solution can be shown to be interior. This suggests that $\delta^2 \ln h(\tau) / \delta \alpha < 0$, even before distortions to labor supply are taken into account.

These results accord well with intuition: when families or communities provide complementary inputs to education expenditures, factors that magnify disparities in background make redistribution less efficient, even though more of it would be called for from the point of view of meritocracy (or at least from that of equal opportunity). Compounding this problem is the fact that disparities in nonproductive or background inputs are likely to arise independent of capital market imperfections and therefore to persist in the face of extensive redistribution—which, in turn, they make less efficient. This is obvious when $h^n$ just reflects family human capital, but it also applies to social capital. Indeed, significant socioeconomic stratification can arise even with perfect credit markets, whether due to some group’s preference for racial separation or to differences in families’ valuations of community quality.

\(^{18}\) See Arrow (1971) for an early analysis of the impact of such complementarities between background and inputs on the optimal degree of redistribution, in a static model.

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**5. Conclusion**

There is no value-free definition of meritocracy. Redistributive policies such as progressive income taxation or education finance typically involve a trade-off along a “meritocracy possibility frontier” linking equality of opportunity with equality of outcomes. This trade-off differs from the conventional one between equity and efficiency, because equalizing the young’s opportunities for human-capital investment enhances not only social mobility but also the growth of aggregate output. The model presented in this chapter shows precisely how this positive contribution of educational or even fiscal redistributions to the size of the economic pie must be weighed against the concomitant disincentive effect of imposing a greater equality of outcomes among adults. The optimal degree of redistribution also reflects how family inputs and social capital affect the productivity of education expenditures, and incorporates the efficiency value of reducing inequality of resources in future generations.

**References**


Chapter 4, “Income Distribution and Inequality of Opportunity.”


