In Europe, “immigration” is a highly charged notion, loaded with history, politics, cultural values, and welfare state. It symbolized postwar Europe since most Western European states willingly accepted large influxes of immigrants for economic reconstruction. These immigrants were typically of non-European origin, whose sojourn was supposed to end with economic recovery. Yet many found Europe to be a permanent home, claiming citizenship and obtaining attendant social and political rights, including the right to vote. Immigration’s consequences have been multifaceted, as have been its processes themselves. Violent and occasionally lethal conflict is one outstanding aspect, represented by such incidents as the prolonged demonstration by French youth of North African descent in October–November 2005.

In this important book, Rafaela Dancygier seeks to account systematically for immigration-related conflict in Europe. She advances a theory to explain the puzzle, “why, where, and when immigration leads to conflict in the areas of immigrant settlement” (p. 3). Immigrants have been a staple for contemporary Europe, especially in cities, where, it is commonly believed and portrayed, they live in a clustered or ghettoized fashion. Immigrant conflict is a rarity. But media and scholarly analysis has thus far been preoccupied with spotty incidents, making a generalizable understanding of conflict difficult. The condition underlies the motive for Dancygier’s study (p. 9). She parses the puzzle in two ways: The first is to identify the circumstances under which immigrant conflict takes place. In this context, “immigrant” refers to the first and later generations of non-European immigrants, typically from Muslim-majority societies. Muslim immigrants best fit the story of postwar European migration. With an estimated 15 to 20 million, they now compose variously 3% to 8% of the host-society population across Europe. The second way of addressing the puzzle is to understand the successes and failures of immigrant conflict. Some cases boiled up to violent clashes whereas others simmered
down. A systematic, comparative approach allows Dancygier to go beyond the conventional small-N studies still prevalent in the immigration and citizenship literature. This study also joins an emerging set of books that make a theoretical claim applicable to Europe-wide cases (i.e., the EU-15 countries; Howard, 2009; Lahav, 2004; Messina, 2007).

What explains the puzzle? Dancygier’s answer, based on meticulous research with a combination of statistical analysis and archival research supplemented by interviews, points to two primary explanatory factors: economic scarcity (especially housing resources) and electoral power of immigrants. In her analysis, conflict occurs only when economic resources in a given locality are short and under competition between European natives and non-European immigrants. Then, the type of immigrant conflict depends on the extent to which immigrants wield political clout by forming a viable electoral bloc. When immigrant citizens do possess electoral power and candidates need their support to win, the political climate is in favor of the immigrant demands for improvement in life conditions. Immigrants gain priority for resource allocation over natives, natives resist it, and therefore immigrant–native conflict ensues. In contrast, when immigrants are not numerous enough to constitute swing votes, their demands are unlikely to be met, and natives retain the priority over political resources. Immigrants then may engage in antistate behavior, which is a pattern of immigrant–state conflict.

In addition, two further factors of immigration shape the ways in which the two independent variables play out. The first is the degree of preparation for hosting migrants at the state level. If the host government provides housing and infrastructure as well as saves jobs specifically for them, conflict is less likely to arise. On the other hand, when immigrants ask for such accommodation yet if it remains undersupplied because of resource scarcity, conditions will be ripe for friction (see the figures on p. 41).

Dancygier relies on both quantitative and qualitative methods for empirical support. She makes extensive use of survey data and population statistics that establish patterns of immigrant settlement in urban settings. She then draws on archival documents to show how politicians from immigrant-heavy districts became aware of, and responsive to, the growing demands immigrants put forth. The statistical analysis examines causal relationships in her theory. It demonstrates that influxes of migrants and deteriorating economic conditions, especially unemployment among White European youth, are associated with racist violence against immigrants (pp. 120-127). Dancygier then discusses how these settings interact with local elections. Her case studies come primarily from Britain, with four different localities,
but she also compares the British cases to those in Germany, France, and the rest of Europe (the latter two less extensively).

Dancygier’s ambitious work makes three contributions. First, it argues against the predominant notion among scholars that identity is more significant than economics in explaining the European public’s opposition to non-European immigration. Second, it takes a fresh look at the linkage between immigration and the strength of radical right parties. Finally and most important, Dancygier’s theoretical construction, in effect, weaves together the major divide in the literature—immigration control and immigrant integration. Although the two factors in the immigration regime in her book speak to immigration control, the two main independent variables account for immigrant integration. Explaining the onset and variation of immigrant conflict requires a much wider scope than is currently accepted in the discipline.

All politics is local, for Dancygier, when it comes to understanding immigrant conflict. The selection of case studies, especially the focus on Britain, is in large part the result of data availability—particularly population statistics and election records. Tower Hamlet, one of the greater London boroughs, represents a case of immigrant–native conflict. It had long been characterized by the history of immigration and chronic poverty (the third poorest locality throughout Britain). It was a popular destination for Bengalis from South Asia. This district was traditionally a stronghold for the Labours, but the Liberal Party began to challenge the status quo by the late 1970s. Taking advantage of “the area’s deplorable housing conditions and acute overcrowding,” the Liberals successfully courted Bangladeshi votes to wrest control over the local council in the 1980s (pp. 142, 145). The outcome upset the Labours. Consequently, they had to pay more serious attention to the demands of Bangladeshi immigrants for more council-sponsored residential spaces—at the expense of the native Whites. White backlash against the Bangladeshi ensued. Based on the extensive use of the extant literature and news reports, Dancygier’s carefully composed narrative traces the fact that “racist violence” was primarily politically oriented. The situation was also propitious for radical right parties. The British National Party, for instance, seized the ongoing ethnic tension before the by-election in the early 1990s. It organized protest marches for the district Whites while quietly helping to incite violence. It won the election for a ward seat on the Tower Hamlet council.

Birmingham witnessed immigrant—state conflict. Despite a sizable immigrant population from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent, ethnic minorities there remained unorganized so that they did not constitute a viable voting bloc. In addition, the dominant Labour Party was so popular
among the White voters as to be able to neglect the political demands for improved services by the immigrant residents. Frustrated immigrants took to the streets, where they confronted the police. Besides the occurrence of immigrant conflict, Dancygier also provides cases where the immigration-related tensions did not lead to violence. In Ealing (another London borough) and Leicester, population statistics and electoral history show that the social, economic, and political conditions did not exceed the threshold of conflict, although tensions fluctuated over time.

Germany never went through such ethnic strife. Compared to Britain, it was much better prepared to accept immigrants. Why? It was because of Germany’s loss of all the occupied territory at the close of World War II. Since it did not possess ready-made sources of cheap labor from which to recruit, it had to reach a series of treaties with countries in Eastern Europe and, above all, Turkey. Germany, therefore, had the advantage of time for planning (in particular housing saved for immigrants), which effectively precluded the development of conflict-prone conditions.

Dancygier’s analysis, combining macro- as well as micro-level data, is full of *aperçus*, of which two stand out. The first is the micro-level profiling that identifies a prototypical individual who may vote for the radical right. The existing literature has shown that only a small segment of the electorate would support the radical right (hence its consistent electoral weakness) across much of Europe (Norris, 2005, pp. 186-187). But it is unclear what kind of individuals fall into such a category. Dancygier ventures an answer: A White native who tends to be socioeconomically insecure, probably not well educated, and vulnerable to country-level economic fluctuations. It is, then, not surprising that such an individual weighs economic security more highly than cultural values.

Second, a macro-level implication is that the identity–interest dichotomy is, in fact, less rigid than usually assumed in the literature, including by Dancygier. To be sure, objective socioeconomic circumstances do appear to matter in motivating immigrants or natives to protest government policy regarding resource allocation. However, it can be inferred from Dancygier’s analysis that *perceived* negative consequences of the policy condition the predisposition of individuals more than the lack of employment per se (e.g., p. 63). The *shared* understanding of such consequences across a given ethnic group allows cultural identity or values to serve as a readily available focal point around which to mobilize the disgruntled individuals. In this sense, immigration-related conflict has a political as well as sociological root.

In short, *Immigration and Conflict in Europe* likely will become a key work against which future publications in immigration and citizenship are
evaluated. In particular, it shapes a direction in which like-minded researchers ought to consider the impact of immigration control on integration issues and vice versa.

References


Reviewed by: Cynthia M. Horne, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA, USA
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In Between Law and Diplomacy: The Social Contexts of Disputing at the World Trade Organization, Joseph A. Conti examines the nexus of international trade law, diplomacy, and global power relations through an exploration of international trade disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO provides a forum in which actors negotiate, cajole, and conflict over the architecture of international laws, norms, and practices, thereby directly and indirectly contributing to the evolution of international trade jurisprudence through the process of disputing over trade. He examines the process of disputing through four phases: legal mobilization, the consultative phase, the adjudicative phase, and finally the implementation and compliance phase (chap. 3). He argues that this disputing process demonstrates how “institutional dynamics, like legal capacity and experience, and interpersonal dynamics, like reputation, shame, and fear, shape processes of disputing” (p. 2). Conti’s particular contribution derives from his individual level focus on WTO insiders, what he calls his “interior view of the WTO”