The Illusion of Radical Right Partisan Stability
How Party Positioning Affects Radical Right Voting in Germany

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Abstract

How stable is support for radical right parties? In one view, radical right voters are antisystem voters, beyond capture by established parties. In another, they form frustrated issue publics, gravitating towards parties that represent their preferences. We evaluate these hypotheses in Germany, where the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is presently the largest opposition party. Using an original panel survey, we show that AfD voters resemble stable partisans with entrenched anti-establishment views. Yet, this consistency does not simply reflect antisystem voting, but is also rooted in unchanging party-issue positioning: our experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when established parties accommodate their preferences. Gridlocked party positioning thus gives rise to the “illusion” of radical right partisan stability. We further demonstrate that, while mainstream parties can attract radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so – suggesting the status quo is an equilibrium.

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1 Introduction

Populist radical right parties have become a potent force in many democracies. Given that such parties inherently embody a rejection of the existing power structures in the name of “the people” (Golder 2016), their rise has sparked concerns about the public’s confidence in the established political order. To some, the popularity of the radical right forewarns of a backlash against liberal democracy — a hypothesis seemingly fortified by recent examples of democratic backsliding in the wake of radical right victories in Eastern Europe (Foà and Mounk 2017). These experiences raise a troubling possibility: that radical right voters, even in consolidated democracies, increasingly oppose democratic government in principle, rather than just on the issues (cf. Sartori 2005).

Are such concerns well-founded? Although radical right parties constitute a significant and growing party family in Europe, we are still learning about what causes support for such parties to be fleeting or to endure1 and what role established parties play in this process. We aim to address these issues empirically by probing the loyalty of radical right voters, asking: Can established parties capture radical right voters by changing their policy positions on the issues most salient to them? Or does the rise of the radical right represent a more encompassing and enduring rejection of the political establishment?

We distinguish between two general answers to these questions. If, on the one hand, radical right voters represent frustrated issue publics who support the radical right because these parties best reflect their policy preferences, then established parties can undercut radical right parties by becoming more responsive on the issues that their voters prioritize.

1See Voogd and Dassonneville (2018) for a recent discussion and contribution.
Viewed from this perspective, the rise of the populist right signals dissatisfaction less with democracy than with the policies put forth by established parties. If, on the other hand, radical right supporters are better characterized as *antisystem voters* who fundamentally reject the political establishment, then there is little parties can do in the near term to stem the tide. Even if mainstream parties were to adopt positions that are closer to those embraced by the typical radical right voter, these voters’ opposition towards the political establishment runs so deeply that such moves would not shake their support of the radical right (Sartori 2005).

These accounts produce clear predictions, yet evaluating them convincingly is challenging. First, to gauge partisan stability, we have to examine individual voters over time. However, most analyses have either been cross-sectional or sampled different respondents over time. Second, to examine whether radical right voters anchor their vote choice to parties’ issue positions, we need to know what issues radical right voters prioritize and, further, how they rank different parties on these issues. While existing research has persuasively demonstrated that radical right voters hold distinct views on issues such as immigration and law and order (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008), it has yet to probe to what extent they prioritize these issues vis-à-vis other salient policy concerns, which may be better represented by other parties. Third, and crucially, to test whether these voters would actually desert the radical right if established parties co-opted its position on salient issues, these parties have actually to move, and radical right voters need to be aware of these moves. However, established

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2 For a review, see Golder (2016). The use of panel data to study radical right voting is a recent phenomenon; see, for example, Berning, Lubbers and Schlüter (2018); Jacobs and Kayser (2018); Mader and Schoen (2018).
parties rarely make dramatic shifts away from the status quo (Dalton and McAllister 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018), and even when they accommodate radical right issue preferences, it is unclear whether voters monitor such moves closely (Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu 2011). Lastly, to produce realistic implications about party behavior, we have not only to determine whether policy shifts allow established parties to capture radical right voters; it is also critical to assess how these shifts affect the support of their existing voter bases.

We designed our study to meet these challenges. First, to examine partisan stability, we conducted a four-wave panel study in which we observed the voting intentions and political preferences of German citizens over a 15-month period. To assess the linkage between party and issue preferences, we asked respondents detailed questions about party choice, policy preferences, issue priorities, and party rankings on these issues. Drawing on these rich descriptive data, we next designed a conjoint experiment, in which we varied parties’ positions on priority issues, as well as other theoretically-important attributes separating the frustrated issue publics and antisystem voting views. Our experiment examines directly whether established parties can recapture AfD voters (and repel or retain other voters) by accommodating these voters’ issue preferences.

Based on this multi-pronged design, we arrive at two main conclusions: First, although AfD voters are extremely dissatisfied with the political system and remarkably stable in their partisan support, many are better characterized as frustrated issue publics than as antisystem voters. Their support for the AfD in part remains stable because other parties fail to meet their preferences on their most prioritized issue – immigration – not because

\(^3\)For recent work on whether this accommodation occurs, see Abou-Chadi and Krause (2018) and Dancygier and Margalit (2018).
they mistrust the political system altogether. Once we introduce the important counterfac-
tual scenario in which other parties do adopt more restrictive immigration positions, up to
half of the AfD’s electorate deserts the party for more established alternatives.\footnote{We find that the AfD’s own position on immigration moderates this effect, suggesting that the party enjoys a first-mover advantage (Kitschelt, 2007; Meguid, 2008), a point we discuss in Section 5.} Not only
are our estimated effects considerably larger than those based on observational data (e.g.,
Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2007), they are also substantively critical; for example, the far-left
Die Linke could propel itself to the forefront of the political opposition by capturing just
10\% of AfD voters. Thus, much of what appears as radical right partisan stability is not
caus ed by entrenched antisystem views, but is an “illusion” produced by party positioning
on immigration.

Second, although we find that established parties that advocate more severe immigration
restrictions can peel away voters from the AfD, we also demonstrate that doing so is a
losing strategy, for these gains are far outweighed by defections from their more immigrant-
friendly core electorates. Our analysis thus explains why mainstream parties do not simply
absorb radical right voters by accommodating their preferences: The gridlock of established
parties on immigration reflects an electoral equilibrium, in which mainstream voters bind
their parties to more liberal immigration policies than AfD supporters prefer (cf. Arzheimer
2013).

Our study advances existing research in several ways. First, recent work has considered
declining trust in political institutions and the ascent of populist, radical right politicians
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and, in some cases, even democracy at large (e.g., Foa and Mounk 2017). Our theoretical framework and empirical evidence allow us to demonstrate why this inference can be misleading when established parties are out of step with public opinion from constituencies that are not their own. In short, when parties fail to offer policy alternatives that satisfy issue voters, the latter come to resemble antisystem voters, even as issue preferences continue to structure their vote choice.

Second, while we provide further evidence of changing partisan alignments (Bornschier 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015), our research also foregrounds the importance of electoral strategy in translating such realignments into radical right voting. By highlighting the role of party-issue positioning in driving up radical right party vote shares, we demonstrate that their support is precarious and sensitive to the configuration of established party positions on immigration (Carter 2013; Meguid 2005). Yet, we also show that established parties have strong incentives to maintain the status quo, thereby leaving an opening for the radical right. Our research thus supports the notion that immigration presents parties with a collective action dilemma (Arzheimer 2013): Unless all established parties coordinate on proposing tougher immigration policies so as to prevent party defections across the board, the radical right will remain a potent electoral force. The way out of this dilemma would be to raise the salience of other issues, a point we revisit in closing.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline our main research question and contrast the antisystem voting and frustrated issue publics views. In Section 3, we explain why adjudicating between these two views is conceptually and empirically dif-

5Others also highlight the erosion of democratic norms (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018) and the connection to fascism (Copsey 2018).
ficult and necessitates a research strategy that allows for the manipulation of party-issue positioning. In Section 4, we introduce the German case, discuss its generalizability, and demonstrate that AfD voters exhibit persistent, highly loyal support for the AfD. Although these characteristics are consistent with the antisystem voting view, they may also align with the frustrated issue publics view under conditions which we show obtain in Germany. Therefore, in Section 5, we utilize a conjoint experiment, which shows that many AfD supporters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their issue preferences. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of our analysis.

2 Two Views of Radical Right Voting

Following the literature (Golder, 2016; Mudde, 2007, 2010), we use the term “radical right” to describe a party family combining three ingredients. First, radical right parties are populist, calling for political power to be transferred from parties and politicians to “the people.” Second, they are nationalist, defining the people in terms of rigidly drawn national (and oftentimes ethnic) boundaries. Lastly, they are authoritarian, calling for the root-and-branch reform of the established political order around traditional morality, strong leaders, and society’s “natural” hierarchies.

A voluminous literature addresses the question of why voters support radical right parties. Much of this work has focused on the social and economic developments that have recently driven up “demand” for these parties, ranging from rising immigration, to cultural change, 

Additionally, scholars have examined the individual-level attributes associated with radical right voting (e.g., Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren, 2008; Mayer, 2013). We present AfD voters’ individual traits in the Appendix.
to the economic pressures wrought by globalization and austerity and the accompanying
shifts in groups’ social status (Dancygier 2010; Gidron and Hall 2017; Golder 2016; Hobolt
and Tilley 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2017).

Complementing these important, demand-oriented works, we examine the supply-side of
radical right voting, focusing on the choices of mainstream parties that either nourish or
starve radical right parties of support (e.g., Art 2011; Bustikova 2014; Kitschelt 2007). In
particular, this paper addresses how parties should respond *programmatically* to the rise of
the radical right, that is, the types of policy stances they should adopt, without necessarily
modifying the rules of the game (Carter 2013; Meguid 2005, 2008). We outline two general
views on this dilemma below.

**The Frustrated Issue Publics View**  Can established parties capture radical right voters
by moving closer to their preferred issue positions? This strategy depends on the *frustrated
issue publics* view of radical right voting, which assumes that radical right voters are pre-
dominantly pragmatic and issue-motivated — that is, their goal is to achieve key policy
outcomes (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000). Unlike prototypical issue voters, how-
ever, radical right voters are “frustrated” by their perception that established parties will not
accommodate their issue preferences. This perception generates antipathy for the political
establishment and feeds into the populist accusation that established parties are out of touch
with and unaccountable to “the people” (Mudde 2010).

The frustrated issue publics model yields several key predictions. First, radical right
voters’ populist sentiments are secondary to their issue preferences; although they may ap-
pear resentful and mistrusting of the political establishment, they would readily defect to
mainstream parties if the latter accommodated their issue preferences (Carter 2013; Meguid 2005, 2008). Indeed, established parties should be even more attractive to radical right voters (as issue voters), since the former possess greater legislative capacity, experience, and probability of holding office (Meguid 2008). Thus, in the frustrated issue publics view, the populist attitudes and partisan loyalties of radical right voters are fickle and “skin-deep” – once established parties change their issue positions, radical right voters should readily follow.

Second, if radical right voters are issue-motivated, they should punish their party for taking more centrist positions on core issues (cf. Tavits 2007), rather than “following the leader” by adopting its views (Lenz 2013). This is true even if radical right voters are protest voters who do not actually expect their party to win office, as moderating dilutes the message that their vote communicates (cf. Alvarez, Kiewiet and Núñez 2018).

Although the frustrated issue publics view assumes that radical right voters are policy-motivated, it does not make consistent predictions about their strategic voting behavior. While radical right voters are often unresponsive to strategic voting incentives, such as party size or district magnitude (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2003), this does not imply that they are not motivated by issues (see van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000 for a careful discussion). When issue-motivated voters perceive established parties as failing to provide suitable policy alternatives, they may cast seemingly non-strategic protest votes in order to stimulate party repositioning (Alvarez, Kiewiet and Núñez 2018). Thus, whether frustrated issue voters respond to strategic voting incentives depends on the range of alternatives available to them.

To summarize, in the frustrated issue publics view, radical right voters follow their issue
preferences, not their partisan loyalty or antipathy towards the political establishment. Thus, radical right voters should be willing to support established parties if the latter accommodate their policy views. This core prediction sharply divides this perspective from the antisystem voting view, to which we now turn.

**The Antisystem Voting View** In the *antisystem voting* view, radical right voters are distinguished foremost by their overriding distrust of political institutions and established parties (Belanger and Aarts 2006; Rooduijn, van der Brug and de Lange 2016). Unlike frustrated issue publics, who are highly responsive to party positioning on core issues, antisystem voters are cynical about the willingness and capacity of established parties to address their grievances. Consequentially, they are likely to view policy shifts by the latter as “cheap talk,” greatly undermining the effectiveness of issue competition (cf. Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018).

The antisystem voting view yields radically different predictions from the frustrated issue publics view. Most importantly, while mainstream parties can integrate frustrated issue publics by accommodating their preferences, antisystem voters are fundamentally averse to supporting established parties. The roots of this rigidity lie in factors that are inherently difficult for established parties to emulate or overcome, such as political cynicism and distrust (Foа and Mounk 2017); the charismatic authority of radical right politicians (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 2002); and blame for social and economic developments, which have eroded the status of radical right voter bases (Gidron and Hall 2017).

Unlike the frustrated issue publics view, which predicts the *conditional* absence of strategic voting, the antisystem voting view is only consistent with non-strategic voting. Anti-
system voters “vote with the boot”: they mistrust the entire political system and seek its total reform (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; Mudde 2007). Such voting is intrinsically expressive, rather than instrumental; consequently, antisystem voters are unaffected by strategic voting incentives (Arzheimer 2009).

Lastly, antisystem voters also differ from issue voters in the relative weight that they place on political experience. Given their political cynicism, antisystem voters are more likely to cast pure protest ballots against incumbent parties (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). In contrast, issue publics do not share this intrinsic aversion to incumbency, and may value it to the extent that it enhances politicians’ ability to achieve desired outcomes.

We should point out that though we use the distinction between frustrated issue publics and antisystem voters to structure our theoretical framework, empirically we expect the radical right electorate to consist of a mixture of these two ideal types. Furthermore, it is conceivable that frustrated issue voters eventually turn into anti-system voters; disappointment with the established parties’ failure to move closer to their issue preferences can undermine these voters’ trust in the political system as a whole (cf. Voogd and Dassonneville 2018). Although we are unable to test these (likely long-term) developments, we find no evidence that such a dynamic unfolded in the 15 months during which our panel was fielded.

For example, we find no over-time increase in antisystem views among voters who in wave 1 agreed that established parties do not listen to voters’ concerns about refugees (see Table A7). On the relationship between political discontent, anti-establishment messaging and populist party support see also Rooduijn, van der Brug and de Lange (2016) and Rooduijn et al. (2017).
3 The Problem of Observational Equivalence

Are radical right voters better described as frustrated issue publics or antisystem voters? As our point of entry into this debate, we argue that, despite their different micro-foundations, these views can be observationally equivalent. For example, when frustrated issue publics perceive established parties to be nonresponsive on core issues, they may well agree with antiestablishment statements like “Mainstream parties do not care about what the public thinks.” Conversely, antisystem voters may simply adopt the issue positions endorsed by antiestablishment leaders or by parties that they already identify with, rather than choosing parties based on issues [Lenz 2013]. Unfortunately, many kinds of data — in particular, cross-sectional data that do not contain perceptible shifts in party positioning — are unable to distinguish between these two causal sequences. When parties do not actually change their positions on core issues, neither antisystem voters nor frustrated issue publics change their party preferences; the two models are observationally equivalent.

Instead, what distinguishes the two models empirically is the hypothesis that, if established parties do move closer to their preferred issue positions, frustrated issue publics will transfer their votes, whereas antisystem voters will continue to support a radical right party. This argument is summarized in Table 1. As the left column shows, we can often observe highly stable, non-strategic radical right voting in the absence of party repositioning, regardless of whether radical right voters are antisystem or issue voters. This is because frustrated, issue-motivated radical right voters can look like antisystem voters when they perceive parties as unwilling to accommodate their issue preferences.

It is only under party repositioning that we are able to distinguish the two views (right
Established parties move closer to radical right voters on salient issues

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<td><strong>Frustrated Issue Publics</strong></td>
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Table 1: Observational Equivalence of Antisystem Voters and Frustrated Issue Publics.

column). When established parties adopt more accommodative stances, the empirical implications of the two models diverge, with frustrated issue publics moving back into the fold of established parties. This empirical divergence frames our core research question: By changing the positions taken by political parties on priority issues, can we also induce radical right voters to alter their party preference?

This question not only speaks to a longstanding debate about voter types; it has also preoccupied centrist parties trying to formulate optimal electoral strategies against niche party challengers [Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018, Bale 2008, Cohen 2018, Meguid 2008, Pardos-Prado 2015]. In Germany, established parties are grappling with this question amidst the AfD’s continued success in state elections following its entry into the Bundestag. Having laid out our theoretical framework and core research question, we now delve deeper into our empirical analysis of the German case.
4 The Apparent Stability of Radical Right Voting in Germany

4.1 The Refugee Crisis and the Rise of the AfD

We situate our analysis in Germany, a case that was once notable for the weakness of its radical right politics, but which has recently become emblematic of the immigration controversies and populist, antisystem movements roiling Europe (Hambauer and Mays 2018; Lux 2018). After four years of a grand coalition between the center-right CDU/CSU and the center-left SPD and a twelve-year reign by Angela Merkel, voters in Germany expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the political dominance of the established parties, a development on which the AfD capitalized. Furthermore, the inflow of refugees preceding the 2017 Bundestag elections propelled the topic to the forefront of the political agenda. When asked what issues would decide their vote choice, respondents to our survey most frequently cited immigration (followed by inequality; see below).

The German situation thus reflects trends in many West European countries, where immigration levels are high and rising, and mainstream parties have been offering increasingly similar stances on this issue (Dancygier and Margalit 2018), providing an opening for challenger parties. Moreover, though Merkel’s run as chancellor is particularly long, dissatisfaction with political elites runs high across Europe (Kriesi 2012). Learning about the AfD’s 2017 manifesto denounces the “omnipotence” of the “political oligarchy,” represented by the major parties and calls for power to be returned to the people (Alternative für Deutschland 2017, 8).
foundations of voter preferences in the German case could therefore shed light on developments elsewhere, especially during the early years of radical right party emergence.

In the months preceding the election, party-issue positioning in Germany was quite stable, giving rise to the problem of observational equivalence discussed earlier. To verify this stability, we used newspapers and party manifestos to document the positions of Germany’s leading political parties on prominent policy questions connected to immigration and whether there should be upper limit (Obergrenze) on the number of refugees allowed annually into Germany. We recorded party positions from mid-2015 to early 2018, bracketing the endpoints of our survey and beginning just before the sharp uptick in refugee inflows. These positions are shown on a quarterly basis in Table 2.

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Table 2: Timeline of Party Positions on the Refugee Cap.

The question of an upper limit became increasingly salient in the lead up to the elections.  

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9We searched German-language newspapers for statements relating to the Obergrenze by leading party figures, covering 15 newspapers and manifestos.
Germany received by far the most refugees of any European country, and while Merkel’s liberal stance was initially greeted with support, views soon began to harden (Mader and Schoen, 2018). Fleeing violence at home, Syrian refugees constituted the largest group, followed by Afghans and Iraqis. Though the government pursued measures that curbed the inflow (e.g., reclassifying sending countries as “safe”; an agreement with Turkey to host refugees) and in some instances sharpened its rhetoric (especially the CSU), established parties did not change their positions on the upper limit. We also verified that they did not drastically alter their positions on two other salient policy dimensions, deportations and family reunification. In brief, though the established parties took steps to limit the arrival of refugees and at times adopted harsher language, they ultimately did not change course on the major, salient refugee-related issues of the day. Accordingly, AfD supporters in our survey gave these parties very low ratings on their immigration positions throughout.

These circumstances provided an opening for the AfD. Founded in 2013 on a platform opposing the Eurozone, the party soon pivoted to immigration. It won 12.6 percent of the votes and is now the largest opposition party and the only party to endorse a complete stop.

4.2 Probing the Stability of Attitudes and Behavior of AfD Voters

To examine the attitudes and behavior of AfD voters, we drew on our 15-month, four-wave online panel survey of German respondents, which we carried out from September 2016 to December 2017. The target sample size for each wave of our survey was approximately $N = 3000$. Respondents were sampled to be nationally representative on age, gender, and region. To ensure that our results are not driven by the composition of our sample, we replicate the analyses below using weights (see the Appendix for details). To our knowledge,
our survey is unique in its breadth and longitudinal structure: There is no other panel study of German citizens that elicits voters’ views of the political establishment vis-à-vis a radical right alternative; their self-selected issue priorities and associated preferences; their assessment of how parties rank on these self-selected issues; and how these issues in turn influence their vote choices in both an observational and experimental setting. Thus, our study is uniquely positioned to evaluate the individual-level stability and effects of these variables.

However, we also note that our approach is not designed to illuminate long-term processes relating to structural changes in the economy and society (e.g., Bornschier 2018; Inglehart and Norris 2017), or to varying organizational or ideological features of radical right parties (Golder 2003; Art 2011; Kitschelt 2007). Rather, we examine party support during a time of high immigration salience, established party convergence on this contentious issue, and mistrust of political elites, a setting that generalizes to several West European countries in the 21st century.

We begin by assessing the individual-level stability of AfD support using self-reported vote intention. We define AfD voters as all respondents who cast a party or a candidate ballot for the AfD during the 2017 Bundestag election (none of our results change significantly if we restrict the definitions to either party-ballots or candidate-ballots only). We then compute the percentage of AfD voters who reported an intention to vote for the AfD in each wave (for question wordings of this and other items, see the Appendix). Figure 1 shows that 72% of eventual AfD voters expressed a vote intention for the AfD in at least 3 out of 4 waves, a much higher incidence of persistence than among other voters (CDU = 49%, SPD = 35%, Die Linke = 50%, Greens = 46%, and FDP = 35%). Interestingly, the same number of AfD
Figure 1: Persistence of Vote Intention and Issue Preferences Among AfD Voters Over Time. This figure illustrates the proportion of AfD voters who, in a given number of waves (0-4), plan to vote for the AfD; feel closest to the AfD; say that immigration decides their vote; and call for accepting fewer refugees.

voters (72%) stated that the AfD was the party they felt closest to in at least three waves. Again this value is higher than those for other established parties (CDU = 50%, SPD = 53%, Die Linke = 66%, Greens = 65%, and FDP = 35%).

AfD voters also exhibit extremely stable issue priorities and preferences. The remaining panels of Figure 1 plot the proportion of respondents who prioritize immigration and prefer a reduced refugee intake. The vast majority of AfD respondents persistently state that immigration determines their vote choice, and that Germany must accept fewer refugees.

Finally, our survey reveals that AfD voters hold extremely negative perceptions of mainstream parties and politicians. We examined three survey items asking respondents whether they think (1) that “the AfD is for those who no longer feel at home in the politically established parties”; (2) that politicians care not at all, very little, somewhat, quite a lot, or a lot “about what people like [them] think”; and (3) whether they have no, little, some, or complete “trust in political parties.” Figure 2 shows that AfD voters almost universally hold antieestablishment attitudes. Across items and waves, roughly 90% of AfD voters hold the
antiestablishment position, relative to only about a quarter to 60% of non-AfD voters. This gap persists even when comparing AfD voters to supporters of another non-centrist party, Die Linke. Its supporters do not hold above-average anti-establishment views. (Notably, among non-AfD voters we observe a reduction of antiestablishment views over time, perhaps a function of parties’ campaign efforts ahead of the election.) In Germany as elsewhere, radical right voters hold dismal views of the political establishment (Rooduijn, van der Brug and de Lange, 2016; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). Furthermore, like other radical right voters, AfD voters are more likely to be male, to have low levels of education, and to perceive themselves as occupying a low rung on the social status hierarchy (Gidron and Hall 2017; Mudde 2007; see Appendix for details).

4.3 Evidence that the AfD Vote is Non-strategic

These pessimistic assessments could prompt voters to cast ballots for anti-establishment parties, even if their candidates do not have a chance of winning. In this section, we show, using constituency-level electoral data, that AfD voters are indeed willing to vote for unpopular candidates, suggesting, at least at first glance, that they are antisystem voters. We follow a strategy used by Gschwend (2007) and exploit Germany’s mixed electoral system, which has voters cast two ballots. The first vote determines winning candidates of single member district races, who receive half of the seats in the Bundestag, while the second vote goes to the party and determines the allocation of the other half to party lists using proportional representation rules. Because voters have a stronger incentive to redirect their first vote to a less favored but more competitive candidate, the large centrist parties have historically captured a larger share of the first vote, while smaller parties have fared better in the second
Figure 2: Prevalence of Antiestablishment Views Among AfD Supporters.

vote. Thus, the incidence of ticket splitting provides a measure of the degree to which parties benefit or lose from calculating voters.

Figure 3 visualizes this dynamic by plotting the party vote shares (x-axis) against the candidate vote shares (y-axis), focusing on the CDU; the FDP (a smaller liberal party and historically a junior coalition partner to the CDU); and the AfD.

The left panels of Figure 3 illustrate that strategic voting incentives drive votes towards CDU and away from FDP candidates: for each point of the party vote that the CDU receives, the CDU candidate receives about 1.2 points. Conversely, FDP candidates receive slightly more than half a point for each point that the FDP receives as a party. By contrast, the AfD
party and candidate vote shares are tightly correlated at one, indicating a near-complete absence of strategic voting: Across constituencies with varying candidate competitiveness, AfD voters appear not to redirect their votes to candidates from larger parties. Unlike supporters of other small parties, AfD voters do not change their support depending on electoral institutions or projected win margins.

To avoid ecological bias, we also examine ticket splitting in our survey and find similar patterns. Conditional on giving her party vote to the AfD, the probability that a voter also votes for the AfD candidate is 80%. In contrast, Die Linke party voters only support the Linke candidate 66% of the time, and FDP/Green party voters support the FDP/Green candidate less than half of the time. AfD voters are thus most willing to “waste” their votes on noncompetitive candidates.
In the previous section, we have shown that AfD voters have persistent vote intentions; that they hold dismal views of established political parties; and that they are inattentive to strategic voting incentives. Each of these attributes is often linked to the hypothesis that radical right supporters are antisystem voters who fundamentally reject established political parties. Yet, for reasons discussed in Section 3, they are also consistent with the frustrated issue publics view. To disentangle these competing accounts, we need to test whether AfD voters will alter their support for the party if other parties adopt positions similar to those of the AfD.

Indeed, how to best respond to the rise of the AfD is a question that is dividing political parties. While there is a cross-party consensus that the AfD must be stopped from entering the next Bundestag, there is considerable disagreement about how to achieve this goal. Within the CDU, for instance, some strongly oppose a move to the right on immigration, “because for every voter that you win back with AfD-light-slogans, you lose two in the middle.” Other CDU politicians argue instead that stricter refugee policies would bring AfD voters back into the fold without alienating core supporters. The CSU bet on this...
scenario when it adopted harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric in the run-up to the 2018 Bavarian election, but its poor electoral performance suggests that this was not a winning formula. Similar debates are splitting Die Linke, with some in the party’s leadership blaming its liberal refugee stance for its weak showing in the eastern states, and other Linke politicians highlighting the need to more strongly emphasize economic inequality and redistribution.[12]

To test whether established parties can capture radical right voters by changing their policy positions, we designed a conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014), where we presented our respondents with hypothetical candidate profiles. This conjoint experiment can adjudicate the two main views because it allows us to observe the behavior of AfD voters in the counterfactual setting where mainstream parties shift their issue positioning.[13] Only in this setting where established parties move closer to radical right voters on salient issues, do the antisystem voting view and the frustrated issue publics view have different theoretical predictions. If AfD voters move, it provides some evidence that AfD voters are, at least in part, frustrated issue voters. If they don’t, it supports the notion that they are antisystem voters.

https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article212091167/Stanislaw-Tillich-Das-Wahlergebnis-geht-mir-sehr-nahe.html


[13] Vehrkamp and Wratil (2017) also employ an interesting conjoint experiment to examine how issue positioning affects vote choice. However, since party affiliations are not included, they cannot address the central question about partisan stability that we pursue here.
Conjoint analysis is particularly helpful for our purposes, because we can combine policy positions and candidate characteristics that our survey suggested were important to AfD voters, allowing for richer candidate profiles and substantively meaningful choice tasks. Furthermore, the realistic properties of conjoint analysis result in high levels of external validity (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015). Nonetheless, we also acknowledge that some respondents might not consider policy shifts that we assign to candidates as credible. We therefore only select candidate-policy pairings that would be realistic given the current state of German politics (see below). Moreover, we vary positions of candidates, not parties, as the stated policy preferences of German legislators can deviate from the party line (Zittel and Nyhuis, 2018). Note also that if some respondents still do not find these policy shifts credible, this would make it more difficult for us to detect evidence of issue-based party-switching, and our results would consequently represent a conservative, lower-bound estimate of the prevalence of frustrated issue voters among the AfD’s electorate.

5.1 Experimental Design and Methodology

Harnessing the panel structure of our study, we analyzed waves 1-3 to identify the issues most salient to AfD voters. Specifically, we presented respondents with a list of 14 issues (in randomized order) and asked them to select the 3 issues that would be most important in deciding their vote choice. While 80% of AfD voters prioritized immigration (along with linked issues of terrorism and crime), they were also likely to list other issues (see Figure 4). Specifically, about 30% of AfD supporters selected pensions – a proportion rivaling that among other voters – while about 20% selected social and income inequality.

\footnote{Figure 4 shows results from Wave 3; results are similar for all other waves.}
Figure 4: Issue Priorities across Voters. We plot the proportion of voters stating that immigration, pensions, or inequality are one of three issues determining their vote.

Reflecting these three priorities, we composed profiles of candidates holding distinct positions on immigration, pensions, and taxation. Given its centrality to the AfD’s platform and salience among AfD supporters, our core attribute of interest is the proposed refugee policy. According to the frustrated issue publics view, AfD voters should be less likely to support the AfD if either the AfD adopts a less restrictive refugee policy or if another party proposes a more restrictive one. Alternatively, if AfD voters more closely resemble antisystem voters, variation in proposed refugee policies should have little effect. Since the upper limit (Obergrenze) was among the most publicly discussed policy positions, we varied candidates stances on the number of refugees that should be allowed to enter Germany (no upper limit; 500,000; 200,000; or complete stop).

We also examine whether especially extreme proposals related to the treatment of refugees drive some voters away from the AfD. To do so, we varied whether candidates approved of border police being permitted to shoot refugees who entered Germany unlawfully. In January 2016, Frauke Petry, then the leader of the AfD, advocated for this radical policy in order to
Lastly, the fact that many AfD voters prioritized inequality and pensions led us to probe whether they could be pulled away from the AfD by introducing policy disagreement on these issues. Indeed, many AfD voters either disagree with their party’s position on these issues or view it as relatively incompetent; when asked how well the AfD represented their views on pensions, on average AfD voters rated it quite poorly (42 out of 100). To capture the causal impact of this disagreement, we varied whether a candidate had given “much” or “no thought” to the sustainability of pensions. We chose this neutral language because pension sustainability tends to be a valence issue, and it is a subject that the AfD had not focused on. The attribute is therefore meant to signal competence and attention rather than postulate a specific position.

Additionally, since AfD voters gave the AfD low scores on the issue of social and income inequality (43 out of 100), we included an attribute indicating that a candidate would advocate raising, lowering, or maintaining the top tax rate. The inclusion of this dimension also allows our results to speak to the larger debate about whether radical right parties can broaden their appeal by adopting leftist economic policies (Arzheimer, 2013; Harteveld, 2016).

To further differentiate the frustrated issue publics and antisystem voting views, we composed three additional attributes: incumbency status, the candidate’s stated reason for
differentiate the frustrated issue publics and antisystem voting views, we composed three additional attributes: incumbency status, the candidate’s stated reason for

15See Zeit Online, “AfD will Flüchtlinge notfalls mit Waffengewalt stoppen.” January 30, 2016 (https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-01/frauke-petry-afd-grenzschutz-auf-fluechtlinge-schiessen). So that our conjoint analysis can generalize more easily outside Germany we did not choose an extremist stance related to Germany’s Nazi past.
running, and his projected competitiveness. If the frustrated issue publics view is correct, incumbency would have a positive effect, since it would signal greater legislative capability and ability to implement policy (Meguid 2008). Conversely, antisystem voters should punish incumbency, especially among non-AfD candidates. Along similar lines, issue voters should be more likely to reward candidates for trying to influence policy, while antisystem voters should be more likely to reward candidates who run for office to give “ordinary citizen” a voice. Finally, electoral competitiveness can help us estimate the degree of strategic voting. While our observational data suggest that competitiveness had little to no effect on the probability that an AfD supporter chose the AfD candidate in the 2017 election, if the frustrated issue publics view is correct, this effect should vary depending on whether other candidates also propose restrictive immigration policies. Conversely, antisystem voters should always vote for the AfD, regardless of the projected win probability. Thus, we are chiefly interested in the interaction of this variable with the proposed refugee policies.

Each respondent was asked to complete five choice tasks. For each choice task (i.e., selecting the preferred candidate and rating each candidate on a scale of 1-7), respondents were shown four experimentally-varied candidate profiles, from the following parties: Die Linke, SPD, CDU, and AfD (See Appendix for conjoint script and other details). We did not include the Greens or the FDP (or the option of non-voting), to avoid excessive complexity in the choice tasks that can undermine the quality of responses. Moreover, since AfD voters are too far removed ideologically from the Greens, switching support between these two parties is rather implausible. Finally, since male politicians significantly outnumber female politicians in the AfD and in Germany as a whole, we restrict the analysis to male candidates.
We begin by showing that support for the AfD is highly responsive to party-issue positioning. To estimate the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of AfD candidate attributes, we focus on respondents who indicated that they had voted for the AfD party or candidate in the 2017 election. The number of unique AfD voters in this conjoint analysis is 414 (about 14% of respondents in this experiment; the total number of unique respondents is 3019). Each of the 414 respondents is presented with 5 different candidate profiles, yielding a sample size (respondent-candidate profile pairs) of 2070. We fit a linear regression model of the binary outcome variable, Vote for the hypothetical AfD candidate, on sets of indicator variables measuring the levels of the AfD candidate attributes. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) show that the estimated coefficients of this regression model correspond to the causal effects of each attribute on the probability that a given AfD voter selects the hypothetical AfD candidate. The results are shown in Figure 5, along with 95% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered at the respondent-level. Some levels are shaded in gray to indicate that those levels are excluded from a particular experimental design because they might lead to unrealistic profiles (see the Appendix for details).

Figure 5 shows that AfD voters are responsive to the AfD’s issue positioning. In particular, positions on the refugee issue predominantly and significantly shape support for the AfD. Among AfD voters, the causal effect of the AfD candidate adopting a moderately less restrictive stance on immigration is to reduce support for the hypothetical AfD candidate by more than 15 percentage points.
Figure 5: Causal Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Vote Choice Among AfD Voters. Here, we plot the AMCEs of hypothetical AfD candidates' attributes on the probability that they are chosen by AfD voters. We find that the refugee policy predominates, with AfD voters being around 15 points less likely to choose an AfD candidate that does not propose a ban. We removed implausible attribute levels, denoted by gray italicized labels.

Focusing on Experience and Reason for running, neither attribute reveals substantively or statistically meaningful effects. If anything, each provides evidence against the antisystem voting account. AfD voters do not intrinsically value newcomers who state they run for office because “politics too often ignores ordinary citizens” over candidates who focus on policymaking. We investigate the chance-of-winning attribute in detail in Section 5.4.
We also find suggestive evidence that AfD voters are potentially swayed by the candidates’ proposed pension and tax policies. AfD voters are significantly more likely to prefer candidates who are attentive to pensions and who propose increasing taxes on the rich, reflecting a broader European trend whereby many radical right party supporters are in fact economic leftists (Harteveld, 2016). These findings confirm the logic of the AfD’s actual drift to the left on pensions, taxation, and social welfare. Especially east German branches of the AfD have begun to campaign on expanding the welfare state, embracing generous pension policies in the hopes of strengthening their support ahead of upcoming state elections (Oltermann, 2018). Lastly, we find that AfD voters are also sensitive to the severity of the proposed border security policy, even after accounting for the broader question of how many refugees Germany should accept. AfD voters are about 5 percentage points more likely to support the AfD candidate when he condones gun violence targeted at refugees at the border. Violent extremism appears not to repel AfD voters; it solidifies their support.

The findings on the tax and border policies allow us to rule out an alternative explanation, which is that AfD voters withdraw support from AfD candidates who propose less restrictive refugee policies as punishment for deviating from the party program (rather than because of their issue preferences). If this mechanism were in effect, we should not find that AfD voters are sensitive to AfD candidates’ aggressive position on gun usage or liberal position on taxes, neither of which reflected the party line at the time.

Although the causal effects of the other policy dimensions are substantively meaningful, ranging from 5 to 10 percentage points, positions on refugee policy clearly predominate. In particular, AfD voters heavily punish the AfD for adopting less restrictive immigration policies. The next crucial question is whether AfD voters respond to refugee policy positions
Figure 6: Causal Effects of Refugee Issue Positioning on AfD Vote Choice Among AfD Voters. This figure shows that AfD voters are between 5 and 15 points less likely to select the AfD candidate when other candidates propose stricter refugee policies. The baseline policies for each party are set to their status quo policies, denoted by bold italicized labels, while restricted policies are denoted by gray italicized labels.

of other established parties. While issue publics would respond to shifts in refugee policy positions of any party, including mainstream established parties, antisystem voters do not opt for established parties, even if they agree with those parties' proposed policies. Can AfD voters be persuaded to move to established parties when those parties accommodate their issue preferences on refugee policy? We answer this question in Figure 6, where we regress the same binary outcome variable, *Vote for the hypothetical AfD candidate*, on sets of indicator variables measuring positions on the upper limit adopted by hypothetical candidates from the established parties.
In Figure 6, we set the baseline for each party so that it approximates its real-world policy position. We also represent the causal effect of refugee policy positioning of the AfD as a reference. Figure 6 shows that the mainstream parties can dramatically reduce the AfD’s vote share by adopting more restrictive positions on immigration. Controlling for the AfD’s position on refugees, accommodative parties can reduce the share of AfD voters who support the AfD by between 5 and 15 percentage points, with effects being largest for parties on the left. Importantly, the Linke candidate can capture AfD voters even when he does not advocate the most restrictive position.

Although the average impact of refugee policy positions is large, there might be important heterogeneity. In particular, effects could be moderated by voters’ trust in political parties. If voters are antisystem and genuinely distrustful of established parties rather than expressing dissatisfaction simply because those parties don’t meet their issue preferences, then they should not be swayed by changes in issue positions. Yet we found surprisingly little variation in the magnitude of the effects of refugee policy positions by political trust: in the Appendix, we show that AfD voters who express no trust in parties are as willing to switch their vote to these parties when they appeal to them on the basis of issues. This evidence further casts doubt on the independent importance of antisystem views in explaining voting behavior.

Instead, we find that the effect of other parties’ refugee policies varies most strongly in interaction with the AfD’s own position on the refugee issue. As Figure 7 shows, when the AfD candidate proposes a less restrictive refugee policy – an upper limit of 200,000 – he can lose more than half of his voters to a candidate that proposes a complete ban. To be clear, we do not think this configuration is a realistic scenario, but we include it here to demonstrate that positioning on the refugee issue outweighs allegiance to the AfD among
Figure 7: Interactions Between Proposed Refugee Policies. This figure illustrates the interaction between the AfD’s proposed refugee policy and the policies proposed by other candidates. For example, when the AfD candidate proposes an annual cap of 200,000 while Die Linke candidate proposes a ban, fewer than half of AfD voters choose the AfD candidate.

many AfD voters. By contrast, when the AfD remains at the most extreme position and another party proposes a ban, it loses about 30% of its voters. The dampening of this effect suggests that the AfD enjoys greater credibility in this domain, so long as it remains fixed at the most restrictive position (Meguid 2008; Kitschelt 2007). This finding highlights the need to replicate our analysis in future years: if established parties lose credibility over time by failing to meet radical right voters’ issue preferences, then their ability to persuade these voters might also decline while party attachment to the radical right potentially intensifies (Golder 2016).

5.3 Why Party Positioning and Radical Right Support Remain Stable

Thus far, we have shown that a considerable share of AfD voters are sensitive to issue positioning and open to capture by established parties. Why, then, do established parties
not simply absorb the AfD’s constituency by adopting its anti-immigrant platform?

We show here that, in fact, established parties have strong incentives not to accommodate AfD voters’ preferences as they can lose their own supporters by proposing harsher refugee policies. In Figure 8, for each party, we estimate causal effects of refugee policy positions on their own supporters. In particular, we regress the binary outcome variable, Vote for the hypothetical candidate from Party X, on sets of indicator variables measuring the refugee policy positions of hypothetical candidates from Party X where Party X is one of Die Linke, the SPD, or the CDU. The estimated causal effects of the refugee policy positions for each of these regressions are shown in Figure 8.

As Figure 8 shows, the three established parties each stand to lose a large proportion of their own voters by becoming more restrictive on the immigration issue, which, in the case of the SPD and CDU, more than offsets their gain from AfD voters. On average, proposing a ban leads to a loss of around 10% of each party’s constituency. Post-multiplying this estimate by 2017 vote shares implies a loss of around 3%, 2.5%, and 0.8% of all voters for the CDU, SPD, and Die Linke, respectively, relative to absolute gains of around 1.3% from the AfD. Proposing a ban is thus potentially incentive-compatible – if highly risky – only

\[16\] In this conjoint analysis, the number of unique voters for each party are 482,760, and 756 for Die Linke, the SPD, and the CDU, respectively. Because each respondent evaluates five choice tasks, the sample sizes (respondent-candidate profile pairs) of those three parties are 2410, 3800, and 3780, respectively.

\[17\] In the Appendix, we show the average treatment effects for all voting respondents of moving to a ban (Table A8). Relative to their most popular policy, all non-AfD candidates lose between 2% to 5% of voting respondents by proposing a ban.
Figure 8: Causal Effects of Refugee Issue Positions on Vote Choice by Own Supporters. This figure plots the AMCE of the refugee policies proposed by each party on their own supporters. For example, when the SPD candidate proposes a ban, SPD voters are 10 percentage points less likely to support him. As the figure shows, the ban is quite unpopular among supporters of the established parties, outweighing the potential influx of AfD voters for the SPD and CDU, though not the Left Party.

for Die Linke. Combined with our earlier results, our findings suggest that accommodation is most relevant for Die Linke, which has in fact begun to split internally over the refugee issue [Oltermann 2018].

5.4 Why AfD Voters Look Non-strategic

Our experimental results establish that roughly 30 to 50% of AfD voters can switch their vote choice to established parties if the latter move closer to AfD voters on salient issues. Another key difference between the antisystem voting and frustrated issue publics view is
Figure 9: Causal Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Vote Choice Among AfD Voters, Interacted With Status Quo. This figure shows that, for AfD voters, the refugee policies proposed by other parties strongly moderate strategic voting and the effect of the AfD’s proposed refugee policy. Only when another party proposes a ban do the Chance of winning and Refugee policy attributes have a statistically significant effect on the probability that AfD voters choose AfD candidate.

their emphasis on strategic voting behavior, as discussed in Section 2. While we showed that AfD voters seemingly voted non-strategically, the effect of strategic voting incentives can be muted even for issue voters if they perceive no other party as offering an acceptable alternative (Section 3). To test this possibility, we define a new variable, Status Quo, that takes the value of one if no other party proposes a complete stop to new refugees, and zero otherwise.

In Figure 9, we show the causal effects of AfD candidate attributes on AfD vote choice
among AfD voters when interacted with Status Quo. Two important empirical findings stand out. First, by fixing the experimental conditions to the real-world configuration we are able to replicate the non-effect of strategic voting incentives identified in Section 4.3. That is, once our experiment mimics actual party positioning at the time of the 2017 election, AfD voters look non-strategic: they are as willing to support candidates with low probability of winning as candidates with high probability of winning. The causal effect of the Chance of Winning attribute is weak, insignificant, and in the wrong direction.

Second, the right-hand panel of Figure 9 shows that AfD voters do behave strategically when other parties propose a ban. Under such counterfactual conditions, AfD voters are nearly 10 percentage points less likely to support a noncompetitive AfD candidate. Put differently, outside of the status quo, AfD voters are significantly less likely to waste their votes on uncompetitive AfD candidates, instead diverting their support to candidates who will actually be in a position to implement their desired policies.

Outside of the strategic voting and refugee intake attributes, we did not find any other significant interactions with Status Quo.

5.5 Summary of Findings

To summarize, in Section 4, we showed that AfD voters exhibit several features that are often associated with antisystem voters. Not only is support for the AfD highly stable over time, AfD voters feel profoundly alienated from established parties and do not redirect their votes to them, even when they have strategic incentives to do so. Each of these findings is consistent with the view that radical right voters are antisystem voters who would not vote for mainstream parties, even if the latter reconfigured their positions on the issues most
salient to them.

However, in contrast to this explanation, our experimental evidence reveals that a large fraction of AfD voters – in some scenarios, up to half – are perfectly willing to vote for established parties that better suit their issue preferences. Furthermore, once AfD voters have the option of choosing between multiple parties that meet their preferences, they do vote strategically, and are more likely to support stronger candidates.

Importantly, we are able to reconcile our descriptive and experimental findings. First, we experimentally recover a precise null effect of strategic voting incentives when other parties do not accommodate AfD voters’ preferences for more restrictive refugee policies. Second, we demonstrate that the status quo balance of party positions on the refugee issue is an electoral equilibrium: no party has a clear incentive to adopt more restrictive positions, and the AfD has no incentive to adopt a less restrictive position.

6 Concluding Remarks

A key question in the study of the radical right is whether its voters are forming loyal partisan identities, binding them to their parties irrespective of the policy positions of other parties, or whether mainstream parties can undercut the radical right by adopting its issue positions. Focusing on the German case, our findings suggest that the rise of the AfD – and the loyalty it appears to command – do not simply reflect a growing disenchantment with the political order, but instead emerge from an electoral equilibrium that prevents established parties from accommodating AfD voters’ issue preferences.

Our findings have nuanced implications for forecasting the stability of radical right support. On the one hand, we show that support for the AfD rests precariously on party
positioning on immigration: If an established party were incentivized to adopt more restrictive immigration policies, it could greatly undermine the AfD (Carter, 2013; Meguid, 2008). On the other hand, we also illuminate the electoral incentives that inhibit party repositioning on immigration. In this sense, the liberal preferences of more educated and cosmopolitan voters act as a powerful lever shaping radical right support (cf. Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten, 2013). In all likelihood, views on immigration will continue to be polarized and structured by social divisions in status and education, making it difficult for mainstream parties to integrate radical right voters into their electoral coalitions. As a result, in the absence of shifting issue priorities or preferences, support for radical right parties could indeed be stable, even without strong partisan identities.

To further explore the role of partisan identities, it would be illuminating to replicate our study in countries where radical right parties have had a longer presence and appear to command loyal support (e.g., France). It is possible that in these cases voters stick with radical right parties because they have developed deeper partisan attachments than the AfD has been able to foster in its short life span, even while remaining politically discontented (cf. Voogd and Dassonneville, 2018). Though our approach cautions against this inference absent additional evidence on voter preferences and party positioning, it is one that future work should address by leveraging variation in how established, centrist parties position themselves on salient issues.

Encouragingly, we find that AfD voters hold multidimensional preferences, making it possible to undercut the AfD by lowering the salience of immigration (cf. Arzheimer, 2009) and accommodating their voters’ preferences on the economic dimension. At the same time, our results also suggest that, if radical right parties continue to drift leftwards on economic
issues and to build competence in this area, this strategy may well lose its bite (Ivaldi 2015; Oltermann 2018).

Finally, although many AfD voters change partisan allegiances based on issue fit, we also find that nearly half never do. Interestingly, antisystem attitudes do not explain this loyalty. Rather, being male and especially disapproving of refugees best predict this unwavering support (see Appendix). On the one hand, this finding might bode well for democratic stability. Indeed, most of our analyses demonstrate that opposition to the political order has little independent explanatory power. On the other hand, that antisystem views do not cause AfD support suggests that radical right parties won’t lose the backing of their core electorate when and if these parties become part of the political establishment, so long as they remain fiercely xenophobic. By implication, the erosion of democratic norms that can accompany the rise of radical right parties could reflect a troubling political bargain: even when xenophobic voters are not drawn in by the anti-democratic impulses of radical right parties, future research should examine whether they are willing to accept a weakening of democratic norms if they are promised closed borders in return.
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URL: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx076](http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx076)
Online Appendix

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A Panel Survey Data

A.1 Survey Administration

The Respondi panel covers the online, 18+ German population. Our initial sample (wave 1) was sampled from the Respondi’s panel to be nationally representative on age, gender, and region. Respondi’s quality standards, along with further details on their sampling methodology, are reported below:

Membership and participation are voluntary and follow a double opt-in registration process. The panel is actively and centrally managed by a professional panel team. In order to ensure a high standard of quality, the panel undergoes a continuous quality control process using a thorough scoring and controlling system. Since we recruit via our own opinion platforms and the telephone, the focus is on intrinsic motivation thus preventing sample bias due to “professional” respondents. A guaranteed panel response rate of 60% within the first seven days serves as proof of this high standard of quality (Respondi, “Quality Standards”).

Our panel survey design was archived in the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) repository (#20170321AA). As the project evolved, we introduced the conjoint experiment in Wave 4 to gain additional leverage on our research questions. Please note, however, that the conjoint experiment in this paper was not pre-registered.

Our panel survey consisted of 4 waves, with the first wave consisting of 3435 respondents. We added fresh samples in each wave, both to avoid panel conditioning and to maintain the per-wave sample size at close to 3000. We also embedded a simple attention check every wave and analyze only observations that passed this check. Our 15-month panel lasted from September 2016 to December 2017, bracketing the German federal election in September 2017. In each wave, we retained about 70% of respondents from each previous wave. Around 44% of respondents participated in all four waves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Fresh Sample</th>
<th>Sample Size (Analyze)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>09/05/2016 – 09/23/2016</td>
<td>3435</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3419</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave 2</td>
<td>01/04/2017 – 01/17/2017</td>
<td>2907</td>
<td>10.3 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wave 3</td>
<td>06/19/2017 – 06/30/2017</td>
<td>3538</td>
<td>38.7 %</td>
<td>3274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave 4</td>
<td>12/07/2017 – 12/22/2017</td>
<td>3083</td>
<td>23.1 %</td>
<td>3019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1: Sampling Design.
Until Wave 1 | Until Wave 2 | Until Wave 3 | Until Wave 4
--- | --- | --- | ---
From Wave 1 | 100 | 75.9 | 58.0 | 44.2
From Wave 2 | – | 100 | 74.6 | 56.3
From Wave 3 | – | – | 100 | 67.0
From Wave 4 | – | – | – | 100

Table A2: Attrition Rate.

### A.2 Survey Question Wording

- **“Vote intention if elections on Sunday”**

  If the federal elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for? Please answer this question even if you are not entitled to vote. This information is very important for the scientific analysis of our study. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will remain anonymous.

1. CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/ Christlich Soziale Union)
2. SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
3. Die Linke
4. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
5. FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)
6. AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
7. Piraten Partei
8. NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
9. FW (Freie Wähler)
10. Tierschutzpartei
11. ÖDP (Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei)
12. Republikaner
13. Other [write in]
14. I would not vote
15. Don’t know
16. No answer

- **“Closeness to parties”**

  There are many political parties in Germany. How close do you feel to the following parties? Use a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you do not at all feel close to a party, and 100 means that you feel very close to the party. (Note: “no answer” was an option for each slider)
1. CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) (slider 0-100)
2. CSU (Christlich Soziale Union) (slider 0-100)
3. SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (slider 0-100)
4. AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) (slider 0-100)
5. Die Linke (slider 0-100)
6. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (slider 0-100)
7. FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands) (slider 0-100)
8. NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (slider 0-100)
9. Republikaner (slider 0-100)

• “Established parties listening to concerns about refugees”
And do you think that the established parties are listening to the German publics’ concerns in relation to the inflow of refugees? When it comes to the inflow of refugees, established parties:

1. Listen carefully
2. Listen somewhat
3. Don’t tend to listen
4. Don’t listen at all
to the concerns of German citizens.

• “Party best able to handle refugee crisis”
Germany has been receiving large numbers of refugees. What party do you think is best able to handle the refugee issue?

1. CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich Soziale Union)
2. SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
3. Die Linke
4. Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
5. FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)
6. AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
7. NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
8. Republikaner
9. No party
10. Other party [write in]
11. Don’t know
• “The AfD is an alternative for all those who no longer feel at home in the politically established parties”
   1. Agree completely
   2. Agree somewhat
   3. Disagree somewhat
   4. Disagree completely

• “How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?”
   1. Not at all
   2. Very little
   3. Some
   4. Quite a lot
   5. A lot

• “Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions listed below.”
  I trust political parties:
   1. completely
   2. somewhat
   3. not very much
   4. not at all

• “Issue deciding vote choice”

  Germany is facing a set of different issues, and political parties deal with these issues in different ways. Which of these issues are most important when it comes to deciding which party to vote for during the general election? Please list three issues (Note that the order of issues was randomized across respondents and waves).
  – Immigration
  – Education
  – Pensions
  – Health and health insurance
  – Crime
  – Unemployment
  – Environment, climate and energy
  – Terrorism
  – Rising prices, rising cost of living, inflation
  – Economic situation
– Construction of housing
– Gender equality
– Foreign policy
– Income inequality/social equality
– Other [write in]
– Don’t know

• “Issue allocation for vote choice” for three issues picked.

And how important is each issue when it comes to deciding your vote choice? If you had a total of ten points to allocate across the issues that you just selected, how would you allocate the points? The more points you allocate to an issue, the more important the issue is to you.

• “Issue fit” for three issues picked.

And how well do you think the following parties represent your views on these issues? Use a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that the party does not represent your views at all on an issue and 100 means the party represents your views very well.

– CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union)
– SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
– AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)
– Die Linke
– Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
– FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands)

• “Attitude toward refugee policies”

Now we will ask you a few additional questions about refugees in Germany, a topic on which there are many different opinions. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? “The number of refugees should be reduced.”

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Disagree strongly
B Conjoint Experiment

B.1 Experimental Design

Our conjoint experiment prompt was worded as follows:

Here are four hypothetical candidates for the Bundestag. Please choose the candidate you would be most likely to vote for if the election was held next Sunday. Also, rank each candidate overall on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning you strongly disapprove of the candidate and 7 meaning you strongly approve of the candidate. Please note that the candidates are similar except for the attributes below.

Each respondent saw five screens. Four profiles with eight attributes were shown on each screen. The first attribute, Party, was fixed on all screens as Die Linke, SPD, CDU, and AfD, both to avoid confusion and to allow each respondent to choose an option from one of these four parties on every screen. Among the remaining 7 attributes, the first three rows (Experience, Reason for running, and Chance of winning) were shown in the same order. However, levels in each factor are randomized. The order and levels of the four remaining rows were randomized. In order to maintain realistic profiles, we imposed randomized restrictions; for example, AfD candidates could not have previously served for several terms in the Bundestag and could not propose to accept all or 500,000 refugees per year, as this would not produce a plausible profile. Complete details on our randomization restrictions are reported in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>(1) In Bundestag for the first time</td>
<td>Do not assign to AfD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Previously served one term in Bundestag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Previously served for several terms in Bundestag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for running</td>
<td>(1) Because politics too often ignores ordinary citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) To continue to serve his party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) To participate in policymaking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance of winning</td>
<td>(1) This candidate is expected to win the support of many voters and could possibly enter the Bundestag</td>
<td>Half of the screens should show this attribute for one candidate and the other half should show this attribute for two candidates. A maximum of two candidates should have this attribute for any screen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) This candidate is expected to win the support of few voters and will probably not enter the Bundestag.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee policy</td>
<td>(1) There must be a complete stop to the arrival of refugees</td>
<td>Do not assign to AfD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) There should be an annual upper limit of 200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) There should be an annual upper limit of 500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) There should not be a limit to the number of refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border policy</td>
<td>(1) The German border police should be allowed to use gun violence against refugees who come to Germany illegally</td>
<td>Do not assign to SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) The German border police should not be allowed to use gun violence against refugees who come to Germany illegally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension Policy</td>
<td>(1) Has paid much attention to the question of how to sustainably secure pensions and the pension level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Has not paid much attention to the question of how to sustainably secure pensions and the pension level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Policy</td>
<td>(1) The top tax rate for the rich must increase</td>
<td>Do not assign to CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) The top tax rate for the rich should stay the same</td>
<td>Do not assign to Die Linke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) The top tax rate for the rich should be decreased</td>
<td>Do not assign to Die Linke and SPD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3: Factors and Levels with Randomization Restrictions.
B.2 Example

Figure A1: Conjoint Experimental Design
C Robustness Checks

C.1 Survey Weights

We used poststratification weights to adjust the conjoint respondent data for common sources of survey error (non-response, coverage error, etc.). The weights adjust the sample to the demographic distributions of Germany data from the European Social Survey (Round 8, released on 30th of May 2018, weighted by its sampling weights) in terms of gender, age and education. Then, we computed the difference between our main results reported in the paper and results from weighted samples. The results are substantively similar for all main results reported in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 without using these weights.
Figure A2: Difference between weighted and unweighted results (Figure 5): Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Choice Among AfD Voters.
Figure A3: Difference between weighted and unweighted results (Figure 6): Effects of Refugee Policies on AfD Choice Among AfD Voters.
### AfD Candidate Attributes

#### Experience
- Baseline: Never served
- Served once
- Served more than once

#### Reason for running
- Baseline: Serve his party
- Participate in policymaking
- Politics ignores citizens

#### Chance of winning
- Baseline: Could possibly win
- Unlikely to win

#### Refugee policy
- Baseline: Complete stop
- Allow 200,000
- Allow 500,000
- No upper limit

#### Border policy
- Baseline: Not permissible to use guns
- Permissible to use guns

#### Pension policy
- Baseline: Not paid much attention
- Paid much attention

#### Tax policy
- Decrease tax on rich
- Baseline: Maintain tax on rich
- Increase tax on rich

---

**Figure A4:** Difference between weighted and unweighted results (Figure 8): Recovering Noninstrumental Voting in the Status Quo.
Refugee Policies
Die Linke
Complete stop
Allow 200,000
Allow 500,000
*No upper limit*

SPD
Complete stop
Allow 200,000
Allow 500,000
*No upper limit*

CDU
Complete stop
*Allow 200,000*
Allow 500,000
*No upper limit*

Figure A5: Difference between weighted and unweighted results (Figure 9): Identifying a Political Equilibrium.
C.2 Scale as Dependent Variable

The following analyses correspond to Figures 5-8, though with the dependent variable as a candidate’s rating on the 1-7 scale, rather than the probability that he is chosen. We find similar results when using this dependent variable. See figure captions for details.

Figure A6: Causal Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Candidate Rating Among AfD Voters. This figure replicates Figure 5. The results are substantively identical when using the scale as the dependent variable. Again, the refugee policy has the largest effect; the proposed tax policy also has a large effect.
Figure A7: Causal Effects of Refugee Issue Positioning on AfD Candidate Rating Among AfD Voters. This figure replicates Figure 6. We find that, while the AfD refugee policy has a large effect on the AfD candidate rating, the other candidates’ positions do not have a similarly large effect. This contrasts with Figure 6 where the dependent variable was the choice probability (which is zero-sum).
Figure A8: Causal Effects of Refugee Issue Positioning on Candidate Ratings Among AfD Voters. This figure shows the effect of refugee issue positions on candidate ratings among AfD voters. Each coefficient quartet corresponds to one of four models having the candidate rating (Die Linke, SPD, CDU, and AfD) as the dependent variable and the refugee policy positions as the independent variables. We find that proposing a ban results in a large, significant increase in the average candidate rating from AfD voters.
Figure A9: Causal Effects of AfD Candidate Attributes on AfD Candidate Rating Among AfD Voters, Interacted With Status Quo. This figure reproduces Figure 9. We find similar interactions between the Status Quo variable, on the one hand, and the Chance of Winning variable and proposed refugee policy. In particular, we are able to recover the precise null effect of the chance of winning in the status quo.
Figure A10: Causal Effects of Refugee Policies on Ratings From Own Voters. This figure reproduces Figure 8. Again, here we show that parties are penalized by their own voters for proposing a refugee ban.
C.3 Heterogeneous Effect Analyses

In Figure 6, the average impact of refugee policies is large, but could also mask important treatment heterogeneity. In particular, a relevant source of heterogeneity is the degree of voters’ trust in political parties. If AfD supporters are antisystem voters and genuinely distrustful of established parties, rather than expressing dissatisfaction simply because those parties don’t meet their issue preferences, they should not be swayed by changes in issue positions. Yet, we found surprisingly little variation in the magnitude of the effects of refugee policy positions by political trust. In Figure A11, we show that AfD voters who express “no trust in parties” or think that “Politicians don’t care about people like me” are as willing to switch their vote to these parties when they appeal to them on the basis of issues.

Figure A11: Subsetting by “No trust in political parties” and “Politicians don’t care about people like me.”
D Characteristics of AfD Voters

D.1 Demographic and Ideological Predictors of AfD Voting

As previous research has shown, radical right voters in Europe tend to be disproportionately male and less educated. We find similarly that being female and years of education are negatively correlated with AfD support in Germany (See Column 1 of Table A4). We further find that AfD supporters are younger and more likely to be from East Germany. We do not find evidence of a correlation with income, although this variable has a relatively high proportion of missingness (9.70%). Conversely, self-rated socioeconomic status, which has less missingness, has a negative bivariate relationship with AfD support and a curvilinear relationship, consistent with the argument of Gidron and Hall (2017), although the squared term is not statistically significant. Lastly, workers are more likely to support the AfD relative to white-collar employees.

We also examined the ideological predictors of AfD voting, focusing on three areas in particular: affective attitudes towards the AfD, attitudes towards other parties in Germany and politics in general, and lastly views about refugees. Each of these areas are measured by four, two, and ten items, shown below. Because the questions in these batteries are highly intercorrelated, we constructed a summary scale from the first principal component of the AfD and refugee attitudes. We entered the refugee scale along with the demographic predictors in the multivariate probit model in Column 2 of Table A4, then the political attitudes in Column 3, and lastly all variables together in Column 4.

Unsurprisingly, we find that AfD voters hold significantly more negative views of refugees than non-AfD voters. While the relationship between the refugee scale and AfD voting is no longer significant after we account for political attitudes (Column 4), the two scales are highly correlated with each other ($\rho = 0.75$), meaning that AfD voters’ positive views towards their party are closely related to their opinions of refugees. Lastly, we find that individuals who mistrust political parties in Germany are also significantly more likely to vote for the AfD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements About the AfD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The AfD is not distancing itself sufficiently from extremist radical right positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I think it’s a good thing that the AfD wants to limit the inflow of refugees and migrants to a larger extent than other parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The AfD is an alternative for all those who no longer feel at home in the politically established parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The AfD is the only party that is willing to openly discuss the integration problems of Muslims.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 These principal components explain about 66% and 54% of the variance of the batteries, respectively.
Attitudes Towards Politics

- How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?
- Please tell me how much you personally trust political parties.

Views About Refugees

- Refugees are integrating well into Germany.
- Refugees who live in Germany permanently should be entitled to German citizenship.
- The number of refugees should be reduced.
- More is being done for refugees than for native Germans.
- Refugees should be willing to give up much of their culture of origin and instead adopt German culture.
- Refugees are good for the German economy.
- Refugees increase crime.
- The inflow of refugees increases the risk of terrorism.
- The inflow of male refugees makes it more difficult for native men to find female partners.
- The inflow of young male refugees makes it more difficult for young native men to find apprenticeships and jobs.

D.2 “Always-AfD” and “Never-AfD” Voters

This section examines the “Always-AfD” (“Never-AfD”) voters in our sample – the respondents who voted for the AfD in the 2017 September elections and who choose the hypothetical AfD candidate in all five (zero) screens. For these voters, the estimated effects of all seven attributes for all four hypothetical candidates is zero; that is, there is no configuration of attributes that dissuades these voters from choosing the AfD candidate.

The results are shown in Tables A5 and A6, respectively. We find that the strongest demographic predictor of being an Always-AfD voter, relative to an AfD voter that occasionally chooses a different candidate, is being male. Turning to the attitudinal measures, we find that Always-AfD voters hold more anti-refugee attitudes and pro-party attitudes than even other AfD voters. Interestingly, we do not find much evidence that antisystem political attitudes are predictive of Always-AfD voting once refugee opinions and attitudes towards
### Table A4: Multivariable Probit Model of AfD Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voted for AfD Candidate or Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (logged)</td>
<td>0.435**</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>−0.258</td>
<td>−0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.172</td>
<td>−0.225*</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.425***</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>−0.071***</td>
<td>−0.036*</td>
<td>−0.041*</td>
<td>−0.041*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>−0.292*</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.446**</td>
<td>0.455**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status²</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>−0.015</td>
<td>−0.041**</td>
<td>−0.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>−0.278*</td>
<td>−0.103</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>1.024**</td>
<td>1.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Worker</td>
<td>0.486**</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Worker</td>
<td>0.330*</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuge Scale</td>
<td>0.975***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfD Statements Scale</td>
<td>1.841***</td>
<td>1.788***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians Care</td>
<td>−0.089</td>
<td>−0.075</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Political Parties</td>
<td>−0.591***</td>
<td>−0.570***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−1.337</td>
<td>−2.822***</td>
<td>−5.625***</td>
<td>−5.600***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.839)</td>
<td>(1.031)</td>
<td>(1.420)</td>
<td>(1.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>2,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−1,136.675</td>
<td>−777.545</td>
<td>−495.728</td>
<td>−495.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2,295.350</td>
<td>1,579.091</td>
<td>1,019.456</td>
<td>1,020.464</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
the party are taken into account. Our results suggest that Always-AfD voting may be driven more by positive affect towards the party and extreme xenophobic preferences rather than by antisystem voting per se.

Turning to the model of Never-AfD voting in Table A6, we find that, aside from assessments of the AfD itself, views about refugees are the only significant predictor of “Never-AfD’ers.” Indeed, among respondents with warmer-than-average values on the refugee scale, more than 90% are Never-AfD’ers, compared to about half of those with cooler-than-average values. We conclude that, when Germans have positive views about refugees, it is very unlikely that they will ever consider voting for AfD candidates, irrespective of these candidates’ positions on other issues.

D.3 Additional Analyses

Figure A12: Conjoint Choice Frequencies by Party Label and Vote.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: 1 if Respondent Chooses AfD in All 5 Screens</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (logged)</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.491**</td>
<td>−0.534**</td>
<td>−0.393*</td>
<td>−0.420*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
<td>−0.255</td>
<td>−0.171</td>
<td>−0.338</td>
<td>−0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Education</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>−0.457*</td>
<td>−0.301</td>
<td>−0.308</td>
<td>−0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status$^2$</td>
<td>0.046*</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>−0.099</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>−0.008</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.361)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfD Statements Scale</td>
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<td>0.689***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.212)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians Care</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Political Parties</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1.807)</td>
<td>(1.962)</td>
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<td>−252.828</td>
<td>−249.448</td>
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<td>529.656</td>
<td>528.896</td>
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*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table A5: Multivariable Probit Model of “Always-AfD” Voting.
**DV:** 1 if Respondent Chooses AfD on 0 Screens

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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<td>Age (logged)</td>
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<td>0.724</td>
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<td>(0.575)</td>
<td>(0.589)</td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(0.606)</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>0.133</td>
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<td>(0.317)</td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East German</td>
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<td>-0.369</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.412)</td>
<td>(0.418)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.029</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
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<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
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<td>0.471</td>
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<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.486)</td>
<td>(0.506)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status²</td>
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<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-0.278</td>
<td>-0.432</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>-0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.511)</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.703)</td>
<td>(0.753)</td>
<td>(0.724)</td>
<td>(0.742)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unskilled Worker</td>
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<td>0.570</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.518)</td>
<td>(0.531)</td>
<td>(0.537)</td>
<td>(0.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Worker</td>
<td>-0.662</td>
<td>-0.731</td>
<td>-0.729</td>
<td>-0.707</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.642)</td>
<td>(0.645)</td>
<td>(0.652)</td>
<td>(0.656)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugee Scale</td>
<td>-0.392***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.233*</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfD Statements Scale</td>
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<td>-0.774***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.626***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians Care</td>
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<td>-0.174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Political Parties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.093*</td>
<td>-4.878*</td>
<td>-4.011</td>
<td>-3.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(2.685)</td>
<td>(2.684)</td>
<td>(2.706)</td>
<td>(2.870)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-145.688</td>
<td>-140.120</td>
<td>-137.513</td>
<td>-136.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>313.376</td>
<td>304.239</td>
<td>299.026</td>
<td>302.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table A6: Multivariable Probit Model of “Never-AfD” Voting.
Table A7: Change in Attitudes Among Respondents Who Say Parties Aren’t Listening on Refugees. This table shows the proportion of respondents who hold antisystem attitudes among those who said that parties do not tend to listen or do not listen at all on the refugee issue in Wave 1 of our survey in Sep. 2016. In general, the proportion who hold the antisystem view decreases over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AfD Only</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Little Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2016</td>
<td>49.83 0.06</td>
<td>82.15 0.04</td>
<td>86.10 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>48.93 0.06</td>
<td>81.47 0.04</td>
<td>80.56 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>47.23 0.06</td>
<td>78.53 0.05</td>
<td>77.74 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>48.36 0.06</td>
<td>78.19 0.05</td>
<td>74.69 0.05</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table A8: Voter-Average Treatment Effects of Refugee Policies (OLS). By showing the average treatment effect of refugee policies among all voting respondents, this table demonstrates that the prospective gains from proposing a refugee ban are outweighed by the losses, particularly when compared to upper limits of 200,000 or 500,000. Because the target population consists of all voters, we incorporate survey weights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Label</th>
<th>Die Linke</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>AfD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline: Complete ban on refugees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow 200k</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
<td>0.020*</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow 500k</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.023*</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow all</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.231***</td>
<td>0.341***</td>
<td>0.220***</td>
<td>0.166***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15,095</td>
<td>15,095</td>
<td>15,095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01