Part 1 of the course is taught by Stephen Morris;

The course will cover advanced topics in information economics and mechanism design.

Lectures will be on Tuesday and Thursday 9:00 to 10:30 in JRR 101

There will be three problem sets assigned, due on Feb 14, Feb 28 and Mar 14. This part of the course will be examined in 24 hour take home exam around the time of spring break. Students may also be evaluated with a research paper instead or in addition.

Familiarity with material taught by Stephen Morris in the first year PhD course in spring 2016 and material taught by Juan Pablo Xandri in the second year PhD course in Fall 2016 will sometimes be assumed. Please see the instructor if you did not take those courses.

Two books referred to in the class will be

Borgers. *An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design*.  
Krishna. *Auction Theory*.

The second half of the course will be taught by Tommaso Denti. Course coverage will include information theory, endogenous information acquisition, monotone comparative statics, global games, reputation and reputational bargaining.
Outline of Topics (subject to change)

1. The Common Prior Assumption (1 lecture)


2. Review of Core Material in Mechanism Design (1 lecture)

Borgers chapter 2, 3 and 6
Myerson Satterthwaite (1983)

3. Topics in Auctions (1 lecture)

Krishna

4. Multidimensional Mechanism Design (1 lecture)

Borgers chapter 5

5. Dynamic Mechanism Design (2 lectures)

Borgers (and coauthors) chapter 11

6. Full Implementation (1 lecture)

7. Virtual Implementation (1 lecture)


8. Informationally Robust Mechanism Design (3 lectures)

Borgers chapter 9
Papers in Bergemann and Morris. *Robust Mechanism Design*. This is a collection of papers which are all individually available on the web. An introduction and overview, which will be used in the course, is available online at http://www.nowpublishers.com/media/Journal-Article-PDFs/0700000057.pdf

9. Approximate Mechanism Design (1 lecture)


Hartline Textbook