at the moment that we had a suit pending with the Kantō [i.e., Kamakura], the Kantō came to be destroyed.” Here indeed was someone who was already looking forward to a revived Bakufu.

If we discount the brief episode of the Taira a century and half earlier, Japan had never experienced the collapse of an established government. The sense of national trauma could only have been overwhelming, provoking a host of new questions that could not possibly be answered. The caretakers of the moment were truly on the spot. As we have seen, shiki as the society’s stabilizers had started coming undone on their own, but now they were having their original meanings deliberately scuttled. A general evisceration of the concept was in progress, as we see from a final, concluding example.

Thus, what could it have meant when a proprietary title (ryōke shiki) was divided into fractional portions, only one of which was still held by the original temple owner? In short, what were the implications for the protected summit of the old hierarchy when ownership, the final rampart, could be reduced to mere shares? Put differently, was not the spell cast by courtiers at last being broken when titles no longer expressed an objectified world of consensus privilege? And when that stage was reached, were not men from the provinces finally in a position to challenge the only condition they had ever known—that of being apprenticed subordinates to absentee interests?

IT WOULD SEEM TO have been a misjudgment. On the twenty-sixth day of the eighth month of 1375, Imagawa Ryōshun, shortly after storming an enemy castle, invited Shōri Fuyusuke to a banquet, whereupon he had the hapless Fuyusuke hacked to death in the midst of festivities. Imagawa Ryōshun justified his callous deed by claiming that Fuyusuke’s duplicity and disloyalty demanded drastic punishment. The Shimazu and Otomo, Imagawa allies, disagreed: the former defected to the opposing Southern Court while the latter wavered, persuaded to maintain wary allegiance only after being liberally compensated! Even though Ryōshun had been on the verge of annihilating the Kikuchi and other Kyushu supporters of the Southern Court, his offensive collapsed after Fuyusuke’s death.

The dissolution of Ryōshun’s army is perplexing, since victory and lucrative rewards had seemed at hand; the enervated forces of the Southern Court faced imminent defeat. Instead, the latter’s beleaguered forces were rejuvenated by defectors from the Imagawa. This turn of events raises a significant issue. If the warriors of the fourteenth century were as unscrupulous and aggrandizing as they have long been imagined, why would they abandon their own best interest? In fact, the disintegration of the Imagawa army may have been a consequence of Ryōshun’s demand for unconditional loyalty.
Nearly all narratives of this epoch have the same underlying assumption: “Loyalty was the highest value . . . [in] an age when disloyalty was commonplace. From Ashikaga Takauji until Tokugawa Ieyasu, gekokujo, the overthrow of lords by their vassals, was one of the most salient features of political life.” Or, as proclaimed by James Murdoch in his well-known indictment of the era, the fourteenth century was “a golden age, not merely of turncoats, but of mediocrities.” Yet it is possible that this emphasis on treachery is misplaced, for, as we shall see, the disjunction between loyalty and disloyalty was not as clear as it would initially seem.

Murdoch is hardly alone in portraying fourteenth-century warriors as rebellious, disloyal men. For example, Peter Arnesen describes how Mōri Motoharu, an Aki warrior who had repeatedly fought for Ashikaga Takauji, “rebelled” against Takauji’s shugo in 1350, but later fought for the Ashikaga in the 1360s. Arnesen admits some bafflement by the ease of Mōri’s “treason” and his subsequent reinstatement, an anomaly that goes to the heart of the problem here. How could it be that rebellion and treason, among the most egregious offenses of the modern era, seemed to evoke hardly a shrug in the fourteenth century? The existence of carefully preserved documents addressed to the same man but emanating from both the Ashikaga Bakufu and the Southern Court—inacontestable proof that he was a “turncoat”—throws doubt on the notion that stigma adhered to those whose loyalty shifted. Moreover, warriors who repeatedly switched sides suffered little ill-consequence and may even have been generously rewarded, revealing either an enormous toleration for cynicism on behalf of the fourteenth-century Japanese, or a system of obligation in which loyalty was limited.

As I should like to argue, words such as “treason” or “loyalty” should be used with caution, for they imply the existence of a coherent and widely recognized ethos of encompassing devotion to a political or institutional entity that is capable of transcending personal interest; such an ethos seems absent in fourteenth-century Japan. The term chūetsu—generally defined as “loyalty”—appears in a bewildering variety of circumstances, most of which are only tenuously related to abstract loyalty. One can find references to kitō chūetsu, or chūetsu through prayer; chūetsu for divine matters and festivities; and even the chūetsu of upright temple administration. Warriors were rewarded for “battle chūetsu,” “wound chūetsu,” the chūetsu of dismembering an opponent, the chūetsu of taking prisoners, the chūetsu of arriving at an encampment, the chūetsu of causing others to surrender, the chūetsu of defecting, and the chūetsu of building an arrow storehouse. Descendants of warriors who had been killed would write of their father’s “loyal service” (chūkin); fathers who lost their sons could receive praise and jito shiki for their son’s chūetsu; and a few enterprising sorts could receive nearly simultaneous recognition for chūetsu by both the Northern and Southern courts. At times, chūetsu meshes with our sense of loyalty: Nomoto Tsujimaru boasted of his undivided (nuni) chūetsu for the Ashikaga, and Shōni Sadatsune proclaimed, shortly before his suicide: “I have exhausted chūetsu for my lord. Let not my descendants be divided.” Although Sadatsune believed suicide to be the ultimate manifestation of chūetsu, a Hōjō retainer proclaimed, “If we turn back safely, preserving our lives for battles to come, we will always be remembered as men who understood the meaning of loyalty (chūgi).” The one common denominator is that chūetsu refers to tangible, meritorious services worthy of compensation, such as prayers for victory, participation in battle, temple administration, or the construction of fortifications. The term chūetsu is less an abstraction than a description of services rendered.

The meaning of the term chūetsu is critical in comprehending the nature of military service in fourteenth-century Japan. If chūetsu is conceived of as “loyalty,” then one would assume that military service was obligatory; in other words, a warrior was ideally bound to fight for some lord, and his failure to do so would constitute treachery. If we understand chūetsu as being roughly analogous to “service,” however, then the autonomy of those rendering it should be seen as normative; warriors who rendered chūetsu labored under no encompassing obligation. Chūetsu, predicated upon the receipt of adequate remuneration, constituted a narrowly defined commitment to fight or provide some other service, which cannot be equated with unconditional obedience; instead of transcending personal interest, chūetsu was synonymous with it.

Of course, not all those who fought were recognized for their service (chūetsu). Indeed, all who fought and killed were not, in fourteenth-century parlance, even warriors. Some received little recognition for their exploits and were barely distinguishable from common laborers. Others, hereditary warriors, had their acts of merit subsumed into the rewards of still others. Finally, some men received recognition for their personal exploits and the actions of their followers. Thus, instead of reifying the diverse body of men who fought into a single analytic category, they should be judged according to their social position and concurrent obligations.

Warrior actions were embedded in a social matrix; the particulars of each man’s social situation delineated the parameters of possible—or socially acceptable—behavior, which shaped their general actions and am-
bitions. Hereditary followers, secure with name and lineage, remained remarkably loyal to their lord and strove for his success, for they prospered as he did. By contrast, autonomous warriors jealously preserved their privileged status and homelands, resisting service under the command of socially distant, prestigious men of Ashikaga, Nitta, or imperial lineage.

No single system of lordship could encompass such disparate warrior interests. Those who aspired to regional lordship—a lordship over land—attempted to amass lands and increase their bands of hereditary followers. In contrast to these regional magnates, national hegemons achieved the support of autonomous warriors through confirmations, grants of land rights, and other gifts: they constructed, in short, lordships over men. A hegemonic lord was obliged to keep his supporters content through the magnanimous distribution of rewards. If he failed to offer adequate compensation, or if his promises were unreliable, then his followers would desert him. In other words, land grants were offered in exchange for service (chūsetsu); no further obligation was entailed. Land was merely a conduit that linked a hegemons’s promises and legitimating authority to the interests of autonomous, free-spirited warriors. He who offered the most reliable compensation secured the support and conditional allegiance of autonomous warriors. Only when such a system of lordship is understood are we in a position to judge whether the fourteenth century was an age of “turncoats and mediocrities.”

HEREDITARY WARRIORS

All who fought were not equal. Akugō—“evil priests”—and nobushi—literally “those who lie in the fields”—fought and died but were not generally considered to be warriors. Only those of warrior lineage could fight and receive recognition; these men took pride in being born to a warrior house (yumiya no ie).10 Hereditary warrior obligations differed, however, between “insiders,” or miuchi, who maintained strong ties to a lord, and autonomous “outsiders,” or tozama. In other words, tozama and miuchi labored under different obligations and expectations.

The distinction between miuchi and tozama appears with deceptive clarity in the Sata Mirenshō, a law primer of the early fourteenth century: “Tozama are jō gokenin who serve the Shogun’s house. Miuchi are vassals (miuchi-bōkōnin) of the Lord of Sagami [the Hōjō].”11 According to the Sata Mirenshō, a warrior’s relationship with the Kamakura Bakufu determined his status as either tozama or miuchi.

One might assume that the categories of tozama and miuchi would disappear with the Hōjō and the Kamakura Bakufu, but this did not occur. In fact, bellying the Sata Mirenshō’s political definition, these terms had gradually become social categories.12 In other words, a warrior’s identity as a miuchi or tozama had become sufficiently divorced from political allegiance and enshrined as a hereditary right, which would retain significance apart from the existence of any political entity. For example, approximately two decades after the destruction of the Kamakura regime, a miuchi of Ashikaga Yoshikira, Myō no Shimotsuke, indignantly refused an order from Ashikaga Tadafuji, whom he denounced for “sending a messenger who makes no distinction between miuchi and tozama.”13 Believing himself to be a miuchi of the Ashikaga shogun, Myō no Shimotsuke could not countenance receiving rewards from another lord. Conversely, no leader could override the pervasive belief that miuchi lacked autonomy in determining alliances and that they were thereby ineligible to receive significant rewards from anyone other than their lord.14

Miuchi who shifted allegiances independently of their lord were castigated as traitors. Thus, one Ashikaga houseman (kerai no mono) who had fought valiantly for the Nitta was, upon his capture, summarily executed.15 In a variation, the treachery of a miuchi of the Shōni house proved to be the catalyst for his own lord’s suicide.16 Or again, it was declared to be entirely “the punishment of heaven” that a retainer who had stripped off and hidden for his own use the armor of his dead Hōjō lords (shu) should be captured and ignominiously executed.17 A miuchi who was willful enough to rebel, but too weak to succeed, could expect to be severely punished because his behavior transgressed the bounds of social acceptability.

Striking examples of miuchi loyalty frequently appear. The powerful tozama Utsunomiya Kintsuna joined Ashikaga Takauji’s forces upon the defeat of the Southern Court’s Nitta Yoshisada. Unaware of this development, two miuchi bands (tō) of Utsunomiya warriors, the Ki and Sei, marched with Kitabatake Akiie of the Southern Court to the capital. However, “when they heard that Utsunomiya [Kintsuna] had joined [Ashikaga Takauji’s] forces, they all took their leave [and] . . . went up to the Capital.”18 These two bands of fighting men, after “galloping toward their lord (shu no mono),”19 built forts and subsequently bore the brunt of Akiie’s offensive.20 Miuchi followed the lead of their lord even when his choice entailed grave personal sacrifice.

Miuchi who abandoned their lord merited strict censure, but this did not preclude the possibility of some achieving autonomy. A miuchi had to
be resourceful in order to switch allegiances independently of his tozama lord. For example, one Haga hyōke nyūmon Zenka barricaded himself in a castle with an infant son of his Utsunomiya lord (shu) and joined an opposing military alliance. Although a contemporary chronicle decreed Haga's behavior as "disturbing the relations between lord and follower (shujū no reigi o midare)," he legitimated his de facto autonomy by acting in the name of his lord's son.\(^{21}\) Zenka's actions generated enough ambiguity of social position to allow for his success, but he could not openly behave like a tozama. Perhaps a generation or more needed to pass before the autonomy of such miuchi became hereditarily enshrined and the descendants of a miuchi became widely accepted as tozama.

In fact, most miuchi remained miuchi, even though their lord, or focus of loyalty, might shift. For instance, when Hosokawa Kiyouji was destroyed by the forces of the Ashikaga Bakufu, many of his miuchi transferred their allegiance and became followers of Hosokawa Yoriyuki.\(^{22}\) Only a few of Kiyouji's most powerful miuchi used the opportunity to achieve independence, among them the ignoble Hayami Shiros.\(^{23}\) Formerly a miuchi of Kiyouji, he turned over a strategic castle to Ashikaga forces and thereby severed his miuchi relation with the Hosokawa while securing his autonomy. In the process he ensured the destruction of Kiyouji.\(^{24}\)

The only miuchi who could achieve independence were those who controlled substantial lands and followers. Those of little means reaped benefits directly from their miuchi status by participating in distant military campaigns and by sharing the rewards that accrued to their lord. That meant that unless internal dissension weakened that lord severely, the lord could normally crush the rebellion of a miuchi who should have had to overcome military inferiority and the stigma of treachery. For most miuchi, the advantages of service and protection outweighed the drawbacks of dependence.

The stability of a tozama's band of miuchi depended on the extent of the lands they controlled. Miuchi who administered or were entrusted with extensive lands could behave, or at least attempt to behave, as tozama. In other words, miuchi loyalty was contingent upon the maintenance of social distance between miuchi and tozama, which was predicated upon a disparity of directly controlled resources. Those with few—if any—lands were the most loyal, whereas those with significant holdings tended to be unreliable. When the distinction between tozama and miuchi collapsed in all but name, a volatile situation developed, which frequently led to the disintegration of ties of dependence.

Two distinct strata existed among miuchi: those who were individually bound to their lord, and those whose obligation stemmed from corporate membership. The latter organizations, composed of men of vastly inferior social position, generally had little choice but to remain loyal. Although occasionally the term "warrior bands" has been used to describe the relationship between a lord and his followers, this term obscures the multiplicity of subservient relations. Miuchi belonging to corporate organizations had no direct relation with their lord; instead, the entire corporate entity was treated roughly as if it were an individual miuchi.

Most miuchi organizations consisted of either warrior bands (tō) or military units known as ikki. For example, sixty-seven obscure warriors signed an oath and formed the Kadochigai ikki sometime during the first decade of the Nanbokuchō era.\(^{25}\) Their individual landholdings were minuscule; indeed, their collective landholdings were far from substantial. Each member sacrificed individual freedom in order to belong to a group with collective responsibility. Thus, for instance, one clause in the oath contained a provision that progeny who were orphaned should be raised by other ikki members.\(^{26}\)

One apparent irony is that although the principle of subservience to a magnate remained unquestioned, miuchi organizations as a whole retained limited autonomy in determining how to fight. Although one clause of the Kadochigai ikki oath contains the acknowledgment that regional peace and stability were based on the prowess of their Otomo lords, another states as follows: "Concerning military service: the core group (shucho) shall decide what is appropriate . . . but this shall not violate the [wishes] of the majority (takan no gi)."\(^{27}\) Inasmuch as these warrior bands (tō) and ikki were unlikely to rebel, their limited autonomy posed no threat to their lord. Moreover, the social distance between ikki participants and local magnates enabled the former to behave with more latitude than was generally possible for individually bound miuchi. At the same time, ikki might collectively be granted rewards, for example, jōshiki, as in the case of awards by Ashikaga Takauji and Yoshimitsu to the Kadochigai ikki, nearly thirty years apart.\(^{28}\)

As should be evident, such corporate miuchi were not ephemeral organizations. The Kadochigai ikki survived for at least thirty years. Furthermore, the Ki and Sei bands (tō) who fought loyally for the Utsunomiya from the 1330s through the 1350s had also participated in an attack against the Andō of Tsugaru in 1323.\(^{29}\) Thus miuchi organizations, which might have come into being in the late Kamakura age, were clearly capable of surviving an extended period of political turmoil. By contrast, other less
comprehensive allegiances were prone to disintegration. In an age of instability, then, assemblages of *miuchi* were a bastion of support for *tosama* and an important source of stability for the dependent warriors themselves, who were able to enjoy in the process a degree of autonomy.

Like most social designations, *tosama* status is more identifiable than it is definable; some men were *tosama* while others were not. Autonomy in war, or "freedom of movement" (*kōshū no jiyū*), each a cherished desire of nearly all warriors, represents more a function than a defining feature. The equation of *tosama* and *gokenin* in the *Sata Mirensho* is singularly unfavorable since both suffered from the same inherent ambiguities. Although the authors of that law primer bravely attempted to distinguish *gokenin* from non-*gokenin*, their claim that the former were men "whose ancestors held ownership of land since time immemorial..." and received a Bakufu *kudashibumi* [edict of confirmation] while the latter were not, cannot be sustained. In fact, many hereditary landowners, particularly those of western Japan, received no such edicts, even though their forebears had appeared on *gokenin* registers. Nevertheless, the hereditary aspect of *gokenin* status was solely determined by genealogies and hereditarily transmitted documents.

Although genealogies might be fabricated and embellished, this did not undermine their role as a principal vehicle of social classification. An investigation of the veracity of a warrior's hereditary rights, or genealogical claims, was well-nigh impossible; merely to accuse a warrior of being a non-*gokenin* constituted slander. One should not, however, overestimate the autogenesis of *gokenin* or *tosama* status, since men of manifestly inferior social rank, such as hereditary *miuchi*, could be recognized as a *gokenin* (*tosama*) only with difficulty. Instead, the way to expand the number of *gokenin* was through the prosperity of their families. All landholding members descended from a family of *gokenin* status could use this designation for themselves. The determining factor of such status was simply a man's plausible, genealogically justifiable claim that he was a *gokenin*.

Central authorities failed to realize the degree to which *gokenin* status had become an autogenic social designation, free of any iron-clad association to any political entity. Emperor Go-Daigo, for example, sought to abolish the position of *gokenin* after the destruction of the Kamakura Bakufu, based on his perception of a link between the two. *Gokenin* resisted less out of any visceral loyalty to the defunct Kamakura regime than out of a realization that Go-Daigo was seeking to establish the Court as the sole arbiter of social status. *Gokenin* complaints that they were now indistinguishable from commoners (*bonnin*) and little better than "slaves and servants" indicates that many were keenly aware of the significance of their social space and the threat its elimination posed. Attempts to abolish *gokenin* status, in addition to being tantamount to a personal insult, jeopardized *tosama* power and authority by creating a pervasive state of social ambiguity. *Tosama* resisted and continued to refer to themselves as *gokenin* in documents addressed to the Kenmu regime, and subsequently to the Ashikaga Bakufu and to the Southern Court.

Documents relating to the Nejime family of southern Kyushu illustrate that *tosama* status was linked to autonomy in war; only *tosama* were individually recognized in battle. Nejime Kiyonari, the head or *sōryo* of the Nejime, received documents that ordered him to mobilize the Nejime family (*ichizoku*). Kiyonari was responsible for followers and family members who fought for him, and he received credit for their actions and compensation for their loss. Nejime Kiyotane, a *gokenin* cousin of Kiyonari, was wounded at the very engagement where Kiyonari fought, but his wounds are not recorded in the latter's petition for reward (*gunchi*). Instead, Kiyotane submitted his own petition. Separate petitions and recognition merely imply autonomy, not disunity. Kiyotane could fight where and when he pleased, whereas Nejime *miuchi*, both relatives and hereditary followers, could not.

The autonomy of *tosama* was manifest in their method of military mobilization and rewards. Military commanders requested *tosama* service through orders of mobilization (*saiokujō*). A formal request to fight ipso facto implies conditional obligation; true loyalty is not contingent upon invitation. An oath written in 1336 also expresses the fundamental autonomy of the Nejime *tosama*. All who signed, landholders of *gokenin* status, promised "as a clan (*ichimon*)... to act in complete accord (*ichimi dōshin*) concerning everything." Furthermore, the signers vowed: "Let there be no differences of opinion (*igi*). Everything shall be discussed at the council (*shūgi*). If some disobey this purport, they shall suffer the punishment of all of the middling, small, and great gods of the country of Japan in Heaven, Earth, and Hell." Formal unity among Nejime *tosama* was forged through an oath, indicating the voluntary nature of this agreement and alliance. By contrast, Nejime *miuchi* labored under informal and unconditional obligations, which required no oath; those truly obligated to fight remain largely unrecorded in documentary sources.

Occasionally the distinction between *tosama* and *miuchi* seems vague. When *miuchi* were entrusted with substantial lands or castles by their
tozama lord, tension arose from the inherent ambiguities of a nominally landless retainer's control of land holdings, a hallmark, after all, of tozama status. Miuchi who viewed such a possesion as a delegation of a tozama's authority tended to scorn offers of outside rewards, though there were always those who opted the other way—particularly when a lord was otherwise preoccupied. The ambiguous position of a landholding miuchi made social mobility a possibility, even though attempts to change one's status entailed great risk.

Although the categories of miuchi and tozama maintained a degree of permeability—landed miuchi could, with luck and skill, achieve tozama status, while a weakened tozama could become the miuchi of a particularly influential man—expectations regarding warrior behavior remained constant throughout the fourteenth century. A question thus emerges as to how one might organize a force of autonomous warriors. A social system that allowed tozama to maintain their privileges obviously posed problems for would-be regional or national hegemons. Among these aspiring lords, some sought to create a regional authority over land, while others sought to construct an interregional lordship over men.

THE LIMITS OF LANDED LORDSHIP

Prior to the onset of protracted warfare in the 1330s, no stable method of regional lordship existed. The only extant pattern of lordship, that of a landholding tozama and his miuchi followers, became inherently unstable as the tozama's power increased and his miuchi also became landholders. No mechanism existed for incorporating landed miuchi or, for that matter, tozama, into an institutionalized system of regional control or military organization.

Tozama were loath to serve under any figure of similar social status. The Kono, a powerful tozama family which had been established in Iyo Province for centuries, could not readily mobilize other tozama. In the sixth month of 1356, Ashikaga Tadayoshi ordered the Kono to lead "the Kono family (ichizoku) and the jito gokenin of Iyo Province." Judging from the frequent reiteration of this order, the Kono were singularly unsuccessful. Some orders of mobilization (saisokyujo) contained injunctions such as: "Lead the jito gokenin . . . of Iyo Province . . . Those who do not follow your command should be identified in order to be punished"; others cajoled and admonished: "the jito gokenin of Iyo Province should follow Kono Tsushima Nyudo . . . Those who render chusetsu shall be duly noted and rewarded for their valor . . . [Those remaining in Iyo] will be punished." In fact, the Kono were unable even to lead their own collateral lineages. Instead, Southern Court forces, composed of Iyo tozama, kept the Kono on the defensive and even managed to capture and occupy the main Kono castle. Ashikaga Tadayoshi eventually dispatched the taisbo Hosokawa Yoriharu to help subdue the "rebels" of Iyo in 1342.

Hosokawa Yoriharu was more successful than the Kono because tozama, or jito gokenin, were more amenable to serving under him. Kobayakawa Ujihara of Aki Province, for example, fought under Yoriharu's command. Tozama refused to serve under the Kono in spite of Kono Michimori's appointment as shugo of Iyo in 1350. Even as late as 1380, it was still necessary for Ashikaga Yoshimitsu to issue the following proclamation: "Jito gokenin, those exercising administrative authority over homelands (honshyoo asukaridokoro satanin), and myoshu shall obey the commands of the shugo and render chusetsu." Ashikaga Bakufu authority and prestige constituted an important bulwark for Kono efforts to mobilize tozama warriors; their own power and prestige were otherwise insufficient.

The power of local warrior lordship paled in comparison with the power that was wielded by upstart warriors of Ashikaga blood. Much of the success of Ashikaga collaterals stemmed from the fact that they, more than magnates such as the Kono, could readily ensure that tozama would receive rewards. The Isshiki, Shibukawa, Shiba, Memono, Kira, Hosokawa, Niki, and Imagawa, little more than weak gokenin possessing minuscule landholdings in Mikawa Province during the Kamakura period, suddenly became leaders of great armies as the Ashikaga amassed power and prestige. Ancient local warrior families such as the Kono could not compete with these former gokenin from one of the Ashikaga base areas.

Social stratification also profoundly influenced institutional developments. Ashikaga collaterals were appointed military commanders—taishbo—who could mobilize tozama from several provinces. Shugo offices were less powerful. During the first two decades of the Nanbokuchio period shugo were unable to readily mobilize tozama from their appointed provinces. Even when a powerful tozama, such as Kono Michimori, was appointed shugo of his native province, he remained unable to call up other tozama. When men who had served as taishbo were concurrently appointed shugo, however, the office of shugo became virtually indistinguishable from that of taishbo. This institutional amalgamation arose from the prominence
of personality vis-à-vis position. *Tozama* were more concerned with the social status of a military leader than with his office; Ashikaga collaterals exercised power regardless of whether they were *taishō* or *shugo*. By contrast, the office of *shugo* was coveted by *tozama*, since it enabled them to distinguish themselves from other *tozama*.

*Tozama*, *or* *jitō gokenin*, who did not become the *miuchi* of powerful men remained amenable to serving under Ashikaga collaterals who now occupied a status superior to that of *tozama*. For the *tozama* themselves, service under collaterals (be they *shugo* or *taishō*) in no way compromised their autonomy, or lessened their status vis-à-vis other *tozama*. By contrast, service under the command of *tozama*, even those appointed *shugo*, was fundamentally undesirable for *tozama*. For example, the *tozama* Kutsuki Yoriiji willingly fought under the command of Ashikaga collaterals such as the Imagawa in 1336, the Ishibashi in 1339, and Hosokawa Akiuji in 1347, but resisted serving under the command of Sasaki Dōyo, a non-Ashikaga magnate and *shugo* of Ōmi Province, in 1338.

The power of Ashikaga *taishō* could be ephemeral. Armies composed of *tozama*, while vigorous for a few weeks, might suffer from inherent instability, and could, if defeated or stalemated, disintegrate with astounding rapidity. Ashikaga collaterals had to rely upon other means, namely, the creation of a local band of *miuchi*, to amass power and build a regional lordship. Some were successful, others were not. After the Kannō Disturbance of 1350–51, several lineages of the Ashikaga *ichimon* were destroyed or severely weakened. On the other hand, the Hosokawa had no notable historical base in Shikoku but were able quickly to recruit or absorb a number of Shikoku warriors as *miuchi*. This was a relatively easy task for the Hosokawa because warriors of no great means preferred serving under a *taishō* as opposed to under a *tozama*. Correspondingly, *miuchi* of the Hosokawa occupied a superior social and political position compared with *miuchi* of local *tozama*. Those who linked their fortunes to a rising lord amassed derivative power, prestige, and quite possibly an opportunity for autonomy.

Social equality created a situation inimical to the creation of a local lordship. *Tozama* who amassed a degree of local power or prestigious titles incurred the hostility of other *tozama*. Furthermore, any *tozama* who expanded his local sphere of influence was forced to entrust castles and other lands to subordinates, thereby providing them with an opportunity to achieve autonomy. In short, local magnates labored under severe difficulties when attempting to dominate a particular area. By comparison, Ashikaga collaterals dispatched to localities occupied a position of manifest social superiority to local *tozama* and easily forged a fairly strong, if somewhat brittle, basis of regional support.

Considerations of lineage, status, and personality influenced the nature of lordship a magnate might attempt, and the relative ease (or difficulty) he would experience in achieving his goals. Those who sought to dispossess neighboring warriors generated the concerted opposition of local *tozama*, which ultimately crippled their attempts at regional consolidation. Of course, the creation of a regional lordship was not impossible; it was merely a laboried, piecemeal process most effectively accomplished over a span of several decades. *Taishō* who held powers of gift giving had a significant advantage over their indigenous *tozama* competitors because they occupied a clearly superior social status. Their largesse generated goodwill and prestige, which, if they so chose, could be more readily transformed into a landed lordship. During the fourteenth century, however, the ephemeral qualities of prestige, awe, and reliability generated by magnanimous rewards were a sufficient basis for attracting *tozama* support.

Those *tozama* magnates who were most successful, such as the Ouchi, took advantage of the turmoil of the Kannō era to usurp hegemonic powers of largesse. Ouchi Hiroyo first used the disturbances of the 1350s to occupy (ōryō) shrine lands. More remarkably, in 1352, the Ouchi started granting small amounts of land to followers. Ouchi documents increased dramatically in scope and frequency during the ensuing decades. Disputes were adjudicated, indicative of the establishment of a local judicial apparatus, lands and *jitō shiki* were granted or entrusted to warriors for the sake of provisions, transfers of *jitō shiki* were confirmed, warriors were recommended to the Bakufu to receive rewards, and even *tozama* holdings were confirmed. In addition, the Ouchi issued prohibitions for temples and undertook an extensive campaign of shrine rebuilding. Through these myriad efforts the Ouchi attempted to increase the social distance between themselves and other *tozama* by adopting a munificent policy of local patronage and largesse. Tozama remained unwilling to serve under him, however. For example, when Ouchi Yoshihiro crossed into Kyushu in 1375, he led only 300 family members and *miuchi*. By contrast, Imagawa Ryōshun's army exceeded 4,000 men.

Ashikaga collaterals, such as Imagawa Ryōshun, led armies composed of *tozama* drawn from northern Kyushu and western Japan, but they could
maintain a force for only a brief period of time. Indeed, even before his murder of Shōni Fuyusuke in 1375, Imagawa Ryōshun’s problems were considerable. According to a petition by Mōri Motoharu of Aki Province:

The *jito gokenin* of the two provinces of Bingo and Aki either sent a representative (*daikenshin*) or arrived late or returned to their provinces. Only Motoharu alone, bringing his sons served together with Imagawa forces since the very beginning [of this campaign] four years ago. In various encampments in various areas, not once have I been negligent. My service (*chūsetsu*) has been outstanding.64

Motoharu depicted his *chūsetsu* of remaining in Kyushu as truly exceptional; *jito gokenin* acted as they pleased, joining and departing Ryōshun’s army according to whim. After Ryōshun’s debacle of 1375, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu dispatched his younger brother to lead *jito gokenin* from Tōtōmi, Suruga, Bingo, and Aki provinces to Kyushu to aid the beleaguered remnants of the Imagawa army.65 Only a younger brother of the Ashikaga shogun had the prestige to lead a force of *tozama* drawn from such diverse areas.

Nearly all documented rewards were granted to fickle *tozama* and not to their *mituchi* counterparts. This apparent irony, that those who were least reliable received the most rewards, indicates that national, hegemonic lordship operated according to a different set of norms from regional lordship. National leadership, in other words, did not entail obligatory *tozama* subservience. Hegemonic lordship was based on land grants, not land per se. The act of granting lands and other rewards to disinterested *tozama* enabled a hegemon to create a reservoir of symbolic capital, which then formed the cornerstone of his political power. In order to rule the realm, one first had to give it away.

**LAND, LARGESSE, AND LORDSHIP**

One might be inclined to conclude, after reading the above survey, that Murdoch was essentially correct— it was an age of turncoats, if not, perhaps, mediocrities. *Tozama* warriors apparently exemplify men of mean sculpure, demanding excessive rewards and offering niggardly service. Kitabatake Chikafusa certainly believed so, stating: “These days a popular saying has it that if a warrior should enter into a single battle or suffer the loss of a vassal he will demand that ‘My reward should be all of Japan; half the country will not be enough!’ Of course, no one is really apt to make such an absurd demand, yet the saying is a first step to disorder.”66 Chikafusa’s criticism is founded on the belief that warriors should not be too boastful of their services or demand compensation.

Kitabatake Chikafusa posits the root of disorder in the failure of warriors to serve their “lords.” He laments: “Today . . . there are only people who, in all matters, disdain their lords and trumpet their own merits.”67 And yet, as should be evident, *tozama* had no lord or focus of obligation that transcended narrow self-interest. A social context in which *tozama* autonomy was normative indicates, pace Chikafusa, that the onus of responsibility rested not on *tozama* warriors but on the competing regimes to secure support through largesse in granting rewards. Instead of grants of land that guaranteed obligation, it was service (*chūsetsu*) that demanded adequate compensation.

Needless to say, this view is pregnant with ramifications. Confirmations and land grants bestowed upon autonomous warriors forged social bonds but did not entail additional obligations of military service. A regime whose promises were generous and reliable established credibility and accumulated power in the form of symbolic capital directly proportionate to its largesse.68 This symbolic capital enabled Ashikaga shoguns and collateral *taishō* to formalize their superior status by means of their monopoly of the distribution of rewards. This largesse not only generated confidence among the *tozama*, it also guaranteed them a free hand in controlling their lands. The resultant division between *tozama* and those of Ashikaga blood allowed the latter to construct and lead large armies. The seeming selflessness of refusing to amass lands themselves enabled Ashikaga collateral to command men whose wealth might have been greater than their own. Lords of men, not land, ruled the realm.69

“Then was then; now is now— rewards are lord!”70 This slogan, bandied about in the fourteenth century, is less a cynical commentary on warriors—as it might initially seem— than a metonymic recognition of the centrality of rewards for lordship. Of course, rewards came in many guises. A character from one’s own name could be bestowed upon a deserving warrior; battle flags could be given; swords could be granted to valorous warriors; homelands (*honryō*) could be confirmed; new land rights, or *shiki*, could be granted; and finally, lands and revenues could be provisionally entrusted to warriors for the sake of military provisions.71 Regardless of the form of rewards (*on*), largesse was an essential component of hegemonic lordship.

Although neither the *Baishōran* nor the *Taiheiki* is a model of historical objectivity, both reveal that magnanimity was the hallmark of an ideal
leader. Ashikaga Takauji received extravagant praise for his generosity: “Ruling the realm was his prime motive, so he placated bitter enemies by confirming their homelands (honryô) and bestowed grand rewards on those who had performed acts of merit (ebûkô).” Go-Daigo, on the other hand, was admonished for his parsimony:

Since the great disturbance of Genkô (1332–33), all the soldiers (shisatsu) of the realm joined the imperial army (kagun) in order to receive rewards (shô) for military merit (gunkô). . . . These countless warriors hoped for a token of appreciation for their exploits after peace had returned to the realm. Nevertheless, only nobles and rank officials (hikan) have been granted rewards (onsô). Each warrior, resentful that his act of merit (ebûkô) have received no recognition, discards his petitions (môshû), abandons his suits . . . and returns, alienated, to his home province. In fact, Go-Daigo was more magnanimous than the Taiheiiki would lead us to believe. Two days after returning to the capital in triumph in 1333, for example, he confirmed the holdings of the rival imperial lineage. Since the right to bestow and to confirm implied superior authority, such generosity served to reinforce his supremacy.

On the other hand, he was not able to grant bountiful rewards to all who aided his cause. His dismissal of Akamatsu Enshin as shugo of Harima Province, for instance, stems from the latter’s willful disregard of imperial orders; Enshin had continued to depool proprietary lands. For Go-Daigo, the protection of land rights and his own imperial prerogatives superseded the need to reward men such as Akamatsu Enshin. However, the tenacity of the Taiheiiki critique suggests that generous compensation of military exploits was widely recognized as an integral component of national lordship.

Go-Daigo’s Kenmu regime only rewarded those who directly participated in battle; merely reporting for duty was considered obligatory. In contrast, the Ashikaga praised warriors for arriving at an encampment. From the very beginning, the Ashikaga seem to have had lower expectations regarding their followers’ obligations. Or, phrased positively, they provided compensation for a wider variety of military services than did Go-Daigo.

Ashikaga promises of rewards exceeded the narrow bounds of legality, but this did not infringe upon their legitimacy. During the heady days immediately after the destruction of the Hôjô, Ashikaga Takauji and his brother Tadayoshi confirmed landholdings and granted rewards from hereditary Ashikaga and Nitta lands, even though they had no official au-
homelands secured his lasting enmity, creating, in the process, an implacable foe. Again, according to the Baishōron’s panegyric, Ashikaga Takauiji “placated bitter enemies by confirming their homelands.” In other words, a lordship of largesse entailed leniency toward the defeated; their rights to homelands were largely respected. Tōzama tenaciously attempted to maintain their lands. Similarly, this right of innomate ownership, contingent on force alone, provided a formidable barrier to those attempting to create a lordship over land. Those leaders most cognizant of these attitudes toward the land, as well as of the latent power of tōzama, were those who were ultimately most successful.

Lordship was predicated upon the ability to procure rewards for allies and followers. This is most evident during the Kannō era (1350–52) when warfare erupted, precipitated by a dispute between the Kō brothers—Ashikaga retainers—and Ashikaga Tadayoshi. Ashikaga Takauiji fought with the Kō brothers against his younger brother Tadayoshi, but suffered a string of defeats. Peace was restored on the twenty-seventh day of the second month of 1351 after the two Kō brothers had been ambushed and killed. According to the Entairyaku, “The Shogun, through tremendous effort, secured rewards for forty-three warriors.” He achieved this feat even though he had been worsted in battle by his brother. Furthermore, Takauiji extracted an oath from Tadayoshi to honor his rewards. This concession was significant because Tadayoshi had already declared the lands of the forty-three appropriate—kesho—and had actually rewarded them to his followers. Tadayoshi’s “victory” thus enhanced Takauiji’s power and prestige by underscoring his authority as the ultimate giver of gifts, the proof for which came almost immediately: when Hosokawa Akiuji arrived in the capital at the head of an army drawn from Shikoku, he requested an audience with Takauiji but was rebuffed, for the shogun “had no desire to meet a man who had surrendered (kōsannin).” In other words, once the indefatigable Takauiji had established primacy in granting rewards, he could punish those who fought against him by claiming such a pretext, and indeed even move to declare Akiuji’s lands potentially appropriate. From another angle, Takauiji’s promise, more binding than Tadayoshi’s, ensured the supremacy of his authority. Those who fought with him invariably benefitted; those who fought for Tadayoshi were less sure of adequate compensation. It should come as no surprise that when warfare resumed a few months later, Takauiji easily defeated his brother.

Hegemonic lords amassed considerable power even though they knew next to nothing about the lay of the land. For example, Ashikaga Tadafu, an illegitimate son of Takauiji, dominated northern Kyushu and western Japan during the 1350s and 1360s. However, when he promised a certain Yasutomi Yasushige a particular site as a reward, he mistakenly identified the province. In order to avoid such misunderstandings, Tadafu often issued uragaki ando, in which he simply confirmed a petition that had been submitted to him by adding a brief notation to the reverse side. In other words, Tadafu responded to tōzama requests by granting whatever they desired. Tadafu’s grants of land would be revoked, however, if the original owner elected to join his forces. As we have seen, hereditary homelands were inviolable in all circumstances. As Tadafu stated: “If the original owner of [previously rewarded] lands allies himself with [our] forces, then [his lands shall be returned and] other lands shall be exchanged for rewards.” Tadafu’s leniency ensured that he would develop no mortal enemies. However, unfortunately for him, a great number of western warriors, impressed by his generosity, flocked to his banner, thus creating an untenable situation. Those who had previously served with Tadafu lost their rewards, for all lands were now returned to their original owners. The hapless Yasutomi Yasushige lamented: “Although I was rewarded various lands for military merit (gunkō no chi), I have become virtually landless (muokun) since the original owners (bonshe) have joined our forces. This turn of events is unbearable (nankan no shidai nari).” Tadafu became a victim of his own success. Because nearly every local warrior joined his forces, appropriate lands became virtually nonexistent. Tadafu exhausted his supply of “gifts.” As his promises became less dependable, his forces withered.

Tadafu’s initial military strength contrasts sharply with the legendary tribulations of Ishiiki Dōyū. Although Dōyū granted jitu shiki to some warriors, he confiscated land from others. In 1337, he threatened Ryūzōji Rekurō to letane as follows: “Those who do not report (fusan no tomogara) [to the Ishiiki] will have all appeals for rewards (onsō sosō) ignored; those who report but render no military service (gunchi) shall have one fifth of their lands (shoryō) confiscated.” Ishiiki Dōyū eventually confiscated Ryūzōji homelands and granted them to Imagawa Tsuneyori. This action naturally earned him the lasting enmity of the Ryūzōji, one of whose numbers, Jemasu, excoriated Dōyū as being “unprincipled (mudo)” for such effrontery. Although Ryūzōji remained nominally allied to the Ishiiki, they quickly joined Ashikaga Tadafu with the hope of receiving confirmation of their homelands. Typically, Tadafu obliged with an uragaki ando to Ryūzōji letane in 1350.
Ishiki Dōyū, by penalizing warriors who fought neither for nor against him, ultimately hindered his ability to mobilize forces. A comparison between Ishiki Dōyū and Ashikaga Tadafuyu reveals that magnanimity and largesse allowed a hegemon to gain the support of tozama warriors, while punitive measures spawned deep-seated grudges by warriors who felt unfairly treated. Ishiki Dōyū acted too much like a regional magnate, attempting to build a base of lands, and not enough like a “gift-giving” supraregional hegemon. By confiscating lands of warriors who arrived in encampments but refused to fight, Ishiki Dōyū seemed arbitrary and unreasonable to tozama. Tadafuyu’s failure stemmed from the opposite flaw—his promises exceeded the bounds of reliability.

Kitabatake Chikafusa’s relations with the Ishikawa family of Mutsu Province illustrate that Southern Court leaders were cognizant of the importance of rewards but less aware of the significance of homeland rights to tozama warriors. Even though the Ishikawa had participated in Nitta Yoshisada’s sack of Kamakura in 1333, the Governor of Mutsu under the new Kenmu regime, Kitabatake Akiie, granted Ishikawa lands to Yūki Munehiro in 1334. By contrast, Ashikaga Takauji confirmed the landholdings (hon chigyō) of one Ishikawa collateral, Ishikawa Kabata Gorō Tarō, in 1335, even as he neglected that family’s main line. In the event, both Ishikawa Kabata Gorō Tarō and the other Ishikawa warriors fought for Takauji, participating in both the epic battle of Minatogawa and the attack on Mount Hiei in 1336.

Because their neighbors, the Yūki, were staunchly allied with the Southern Court, the Ishikawa came under intense pressure to defect. Kitabatake Chikafusa tempted them: “The Ishikawa have generally been enemies (onteki), but those who, regretting their past actions, join our forces will have their homelands (honyō) confirmed; later merit (kō) will be subsequently rewarded.” The Ishikawa responded by asking for the very homelands that had been granted to the Yūki in 1334. This incensed Kitabatake Chikafusa, who berated them as follows:

It has been customary for those who regret their prior inaction [i.e., those who refuse to respond to a call to arms] to have only one half or one third of their landholdings (honyō) confirmed. Confirmation of all your homelands (honyō) exceeds the bounds of benevolent rule (zensei). In recent years, you have been deeply [tainted] with [association with] the enemy (onteki); now, prior to joining our forces you present a list of desired lands. Is that not an insult to warriors (yumiya no chijoku)? . . . How can [people] who tend to have the outlook of a merchant (shōnin) be of use to the Court? Nevertheless, as previously promised, your homelands (honyō) shall be confirmed; later acts of service shall be correspondingly rewarded.

Kitabatake Chikafusa had no qualms about enticing warriors for tangible acts of merit. He could not countenance the invalidation of earlier decrees; a reward was a reward. Lands granted to the Yūki could not be returned to the Ishikawa. Instead of finding other suitable lands to compensate the Ishikawa (or the Yūki), as Takauji might have done, Chikafusa castigated the Ishikawa as having “the outlook of a merchant” for daring to request additional lands before joining his forces. The impasse between Kitabatake Chikafusa and the Ishikawa stemmed from the perhaps inevitable uncertainty regarding the delineation of a family’s homelands. From the Ishikawa’s perspective, homelands constituted the full extent of their holdings—all the lands under their control prior to 1334. For Kitabatake Chikafusa, however, Ishikawa homelands were composed solely of current holdings. The Ishikawa demanded the full restoration of their homelands in order to reestablish their warrior honor (yumiya no memmoku), but to Kitabatake Chikafusa the desire for pre-1334 homelands was an unreasonable request (and reward) for surrendering. Because Kitabatake Chikafusa failed to recognize the importance of homelands to a tozama like the Ishikawa, the latter remained an enemy of both the Southern Court and the usurper of “their” lands, the Yūki.

For his own part, Yūki Chikatomo abandoned the Southern Court cause in 1343, after receiving the enticing offer from Ashikaga Takauji that, “there shall be no disturbances regarding holdings (chigyō) [awarded] prior to Kenmu 2 (1335).” With this edict, Takauji was able to keep his promise to Ishikawa Gorō Tarō, yet also entice the Yūki by allowing them to maintain their ex-Ishikawa lands. Moreover, once the Yūki allied themselves with the Ashikaga, the hapless mainline of the Ishikawa had no choice but grudgingly to support the Southern Court. But the Ishikawa lost out in the competition over lands; they suffered the ignominy of losing their homelands and subsequently disappeared from the historical record. The Yūki, however, increased their holdings, showing that some tozama prospered at the expense of others. One can also surmise that the most effective manipulator of this system was Ashikaga Takauji; he was able to preserve the value of his promises, keep his partisans satisfied, and also expand his base of support. In contrast to Kitabatake Chikafusa, who pontificated profusely but only grudgingly granted rewards, Takauji’s promises carried great weight and his largesse was unsurpassed.
Yūki Chikatomo timed his transfer of allegiance well and profited accordingly. The Ishikawa were not so fortunate, but still presumably received a confirmation of their homelands as delineated by the Southern Court. According to the customary “law of surrender (kōsan no hō),” however, a warrior would be confirmed with only half his lands. Or, to be more precise, “according to the set rule, half of the homelands (bonyū) of those who had surrendered (kōsanimin) were returned.” This “set rule” seems to have been observed more in the breach than in reality. Powerful tozama rarely suffered such ignominy. For example, Aso Koresumi, distressed by the liberal treatment of his father-in-law, Aso Koretoki, complained: “It is a set rule that those who surrender (kōsanimin) should have only half [their holdings] confirmed. . . . How can [Koretoki] possibly wish for a full confirmation (ichien ando)?” Koretoki maintained a powerful local tozama lordship; even after briefly dallying with the Ashikaga forces he received full confirmation of his lands from the Southern Court. For those who realized that they had allied themselves to a losing cause, the confirmation of homelands was a welcome compensation.

How can one account for the difference between warriors who lost half their lands and those who suffered not at all? Timing was crucial. One warrior’s comment after another had surrendered in the field proves illuminating: “I have never heard of such a thing! Norinaga, if you had intended to surrender (lit. become a kōnin), you should have done it when the Shogun [Takauji] . . . invited you to join his forces with a communique (migyōsha)! After burning your expressly delivered communique, [why did] you come here to surrender? It is too much for words.” In other words, a tozama responding to a request for service could switch sides and suffer no punishment. Those who arrived at an encampment with a request to join allied forces were actually eligible for further rewards. If defeated in battle, however, a warrior had to hand over his weapons and unstring his bow, as was the customary practice for the act of surrender (kōsan no hō). Thus the most powerful warriors possessed ample opportunities to transfer loyalties independently of defeat in battle. Those unfortunate enough to suffer defeat were in a position of such weakness that the loss of some of their lands became inevitable.

This distinction was lost on some. Imagine a warrior’s consternation if instead of receiving rewards for service he had only half his lands confirmed! Such was the unhappy lot of Sōma Tanehira. He expressed indignation in 1348 because he had been confirmed with only one-half of his holding in spite of the service (chūsetsu) rendered on his behalf by his son, who helped attack the Southern Court fortress of Reisan. To add insult to injury, according to Tanehira, his younger brother had fought at the same battle and received a full confirmation of lands. Sōma Tanehira asserted that such a difference in treatment was incomprehensible. He failed to mention, however, that during 1336–37 he fought for the Southern Court. Tanehira seems to have waited too long to switch sides. Five years after Yūki Chikatomo had defected, Southern Court supporters were hard pressed by Ashikaga armies. In all probability, Tanehira had not received an invitation to fight, but, on the other hand, he had not surrendered his weapons in accordance with the custom of kōsan no hō. Surrender could be an ambiguous process.

The attitude of Sōma Tanehira and of the Aso indicates that although familial unity existed as an ideal, personal concerns were paramount. Upset that his brother was rewarded far more than he, Tanehira’s primary concern was not familial welfare. The Ishikawa’s divisions likewise stemmed from divided interests: Ishikawa Kabata Gorō Tarō staunchly supported the Ashikaga, while the main line, whose lands had been granted the Yūki, fought with whoever opposed the Yūki. Families with united interests fought together; as interests diverged, so did loyalties.

The success of interregional hegemons depended upon weaving as many competing strands of tozama self-interest into a fabric of guarded satisfaction. Popularity and military power were inexorably linked; by legitimating tozama rights, a regime was able to establish a degree of support commensurate with its ability to protect promised rights and rewards. A lack of foresight or flexibility in resolving the myriad of tozama claims weakened a hegemon’s basis of support; a failure to honor one’s promises ensured that the laboriously intertwined interests would unravel. Those who overtly attempted to aggrandize lands incited the opposition of tozama who were determined to retain holdings that were theirs by right. Only a hegemonic lord keenly aware of the interests of his men and of his own fragile basis of support could devote himself to providing adequate compensation for his followers; his edicts of confirmation secured and legitimated tozama rights in an unstable age of competing claims. Successful leaders ensured that tozama self-interest and their own interests were one. By balancing the myriad of tozama desires and respecting as many rights as possible, a hegemon cobbled together a coalition of disparate warriors even as his position remained precarious. The fourteenth-century political terrain was unforgiving of missteps, and profoundly ill-suited for mediocrities.
CONCLUSION

Individual warriors exhibited conflicting attitudes, which were inexorably linked to the particulars of their social and political position. Commoners who fought, although ineligible for rewards, could achieve miuchi status for some notable act. Miuchi were ideally bound to their tozama lord and only attempted to act independently when, in addition to securing enough lands and followers of their own, an opportunity arose for them to seek to achieve autonomy. Miuchi who were without extensive holdings tended to remain loyal, for their interests were in fact indistinguishable from those of their tozama lord. Finally, tozama exhibited autonomy in war and fought according to personal and narrowly defined family interests, not out of a sense of allegiance to any “lord.”

During the Age of the Northern and Southern Courts, political stability hinged upon social stratification. Of course, some men took advantage of the inherent instability of the age to obfuscate their social position. Thus, some miuchi attempted to attain tozama prerogatives, while other tozama struggled to establish a regional lordship. Those who were less fortunate clung to the privileges of their increasingly precarious social position, and either attempted to quash upstart miuchi, or, fearful of losing their status, refused to serve under tozama magnates. It remains eminently clear, however, that armies and polities were most effectively led by men who were socially distant from their companions.

The crucial divide in fourteenth-century lordship was between those who could offer grants to followers, and those who could not. The former were national or supraregional hegemons; the latter provincial magnates. Supraregional hegemons’ powers were great, if unstable. Some, such as Ashikaga Tadafuyu or a few Ashikaga collaterals, precipitously descended into obscurity. Others, such as the Hosokawa, were gradually able to attract locals as miuchi, and eventually established a landed lordship. Ashikaga Takauji proved the most successful of all by guaranteeing his promises and by providing the most generous and comprehensive compensation. By contrast, those, like Go-Daigo or Isshiki Dōyū, who aspired to a national or regional authority, could not countenance such a diffusion of power and accordingly received less tozama support.

During the first two decades of the Nanbokuchō period, only members of the Ashikaga kindred and a few closely related shugo maintained the ability to lead armies drawn from several provinces. Only after the turmoil of the Kannon Disturbance (1350–51) were a handful of tozama magnates, such as the Ouchi, able to grant gifts or confirmations. In spite of this, the power of most tozama magnates remained limited, even in the case of shugo like the Kōno of Iyo. Inasmuch as hegemons were able to harness the dissatisfaction of less fortunate tozama (while also liberally rewarding their more prosperous counterparts), they succeeded in displacing or dominating those who, for their own part, had attempted to become regional magnates.

Military leaders could only mobilize tozama after respecting their homelands, and after promising adequate remuneration for those who chose to participate in battle. Hegemons, lords of men, compensated tozama instead of competing with them, and thereby accumulated symbolic capital, which was the foundation of their lordships. In the process, they found themselves bound to keep their promises, and also to forgive tozama lapses of loyalty. In short, the warriors of the fourteenth century have been unfairly castigated as “turncoats,” since in fact they owed service to none.

When Imagawa Ryōshun killed Shōni Fuyusuke he seemed, in this sense, to have behaved unreasonably and excessively, for Fuyusuke’s behavior had been neither egregious nor particularly unusual (though the same obviously could not be said for Ryōshun’s cowardly act). Yet, although his forces disintegrated in 1375, the indomitable Imagawa was able to regroup and eventually to dominate most of Kyushu. Ryōshun’s ultimate success indicates that the locus of power had already begun to shift toward regional magnates, which meant, conversely, that tozama autonomy was now becoming precarious. A remarkable oath, signed in 1392 by the Shibuya, a tozama of southern Kyushu, makes this point:

Concerning those allied with the Shimazu: at all times... we shall protect the Shogun (shogun-ke). When we are not in accord with the [Shimazu] shugo, we shall, of course, all follow the wishes of the Kūbō [Imagawa Ryōshun]. There must be no dissension. The members of this ikki must be in accord. [If we are] lacking in right (ri), we will lose [the right of] service (chū). [Thus,] in order for our sons and grandsons to remain able to render military service (guneki), and also to remain able [to maintain our] landed holdings (chūgobun), we shall rely together upon the Kūbō, who will determine the merit (rihi) [of all matters].

It was at this stage that the many were starting to become the miuchi of the few. Tozama such as the Shibuya preserved their autonomy from the Shimazu by subordinating themselves to a supraregional figure like Imagawa Ryōshun. Although service in an ikki organization was not particularly
desirable to a tozama, it was preferable to miuchi status vis-à-vis a regional magnate. But this is a story more of the fifteenth century than of the fourteenth. The age of limited loyalty was coming to a close. Perhaps, in the end, Imagawa Ryōshun's assassination of Shōni Fuyusuke was not such a grave misjudgment after all.

The Kikuchi and Their Enemies in the 1330s

Seno Seiichirō

In the political life of Japan, 1336 was a year of great choices and of huge discord. Marching east from Kyushu, Ashikaga Takauji defeated Nitta Yoshisada and Kusunoki Masashige at Minatogawa (1336/7/25), thus allowing his triumphant reentry into Kyoto, and also prompting Go-Daigo's flight to the Enryakuji on Mount Hiei. Though a compromise subsequently permitted Go-Daigo to return to the capital, the settlement proved only fleeting and the emperor now took refuge in the mountains of Yoshino. In national terms, 1336 marked the decisive break between what became the Northern and Southern courts, ushering in a lengthy era of civil strife.

Kyushu like other regions was affected by these momentous events. Yet Kyushu was also in the eye of the storm in 1336, with events occurring there that influenced both the regional and the national pictures. Alliances were made and broken during that year of great uncertainty, when families with long histories found themselves no longer sure which way to turn; insights into the future were hard to come by. The experiences of the Kikuchi of northern Kyushu are a useful lens through which to highlight the dramatically heightened importance of the battlefield in sorting such things out. At Tatarahama in 1336, the fate of none other than Ashikaga Takauji hung in the balance, underscoring the extraordinary fluidity of the 1330s.
ceived by Ôtomo Sadamune. See, e.g., *KI* 41, doc. 32229 (1333/6/2), for an arrival document by the Munakata, to which was affixed Sadamune’s countersignature. In the east, Nitta Yoshisada performed a similar role, e.g., *KI* 41, doc. 32247 (1333/6/7).

97. *KI* 41, doc. 32148 (1333/5/10).

98. A common request was for immunity from trespass by armies on the move, a desire that Takuji must have found easy to grant. On a single day, he issued protection orders for the Tofukuji, and for temples in Tango and Hizen; see *KI* 41, docs. 32171–73 (1333/5/18).

99. *KI* 41, doc. 32230 (1333/6/2).

100. For example, *KI* 41, doc. 32264 (1333/6/13), on behalf of the Kujō; and *KI* 32260 (1333/6/16), on behalf of the Saidaiji.

101. *KI* 41, doc. 32272 (1333/6/14).

102. *KI* 41, docs. 32370–71 (1333/7/17, 7/19).

103. For example, *KI* 41, doc. 32304–5 (1333/6/29); and *KI* 41, doc. 32352 (1333/9/14).

104. For the admonitions, *KI* 41, docs. 32320 and 32336 (1333/7/2, 7/7); for the reassignments to the Tōji, *KI* 41, doc. 32540 (1333/9/1). For an imperial censure now of the former *jitō* of Ōyama, *KI* 41, doc. 32574.

105. For Ōwara in Wakasa Province, see Yamamura, “Tara in Transition: A Study of Kamakura Shōen,” 349–91; *WG*, 177–78; *KB*, doc. 89; *DKR*, docs. 124, 133. For Ōyama Estate in Tanba, see Mass, “Jitō Land Possession in the Thirteenth Century,” 173–77, 181; and *KB*, doc. 127. The two *shōen*, for which voluminous sources survive, are among the most exhaustively studied of medieval estates.

106. *KI* 41, doc. 32452 (1333/8/6).

107. *KI* 41, doc. 32372 (1333/7/19).

108. For the *jitō* holdings of the Kamakura-era Kobayakawa, see *LAI*, docs. 84–85, 120; and *DKR*, docs. 41, 78. There is a substantial literature on Japanese in this prominent family.


110. *KI* 41, doc. 32389 (1333/7/24); and *KI* 41, doc. 32415 (1333/7/26). Both estates were located in Harima Province. For the political significance of the Kujō’s dispute here with the Akamatsu of Harima, see Goble, *Kenmu: Go-Daigo’s Revolution*, chap. 5.

111. *KI* 41, doc. 32489 (1333/8/20). The original grant, dating from the Shōwa era (1288–93), had been an award for loyal service against the Mongols (“Mōkin’en”).

112. See, e.g., the emperor’s confirmation of Sasaki Tokitsune in the *jitō* *shiki* of Kuchiki Estate in Ōmi Province; *KI* 41, doc. 32466 (1333/8/10).

113. *KI* 41, doc. 32567 (1333/9/3), on behalf of a holding of the Tōji. Or *KI* 41, doc. 32326 (1333/7/3), in which the object of the censure was the “violations of an *akuto*” (*akutō no ranbo*) in Wakasa’s Kunitomi Estate.

114. For example, the condemnation of a *jitō* in Bizen (*KI* 41, doc. 32467 [1333/8/12]), or of a *kumon* et al. in Owari (42, doc. 32618 [1333/10/9]). In another case, the censure was of the “provincial headquarters” (*kokuge*) in Satsuma: 42, doc. 32578 (1333/9/12).

115. Thus he might be shown, for all his titles, as in “Kamakura Takatoki” (*e.g.*, *KI* 41, doc. 32309 [1333/6]); or he might be referred to by a nominal Buddhist title, as in “Takatoki hoshi” (in a Go-Daigo edict; 41, doc. 32219 [1333/5/29]). Most damning of all was to highlight the undistinguished origins of his family, as in “Provincial local official (*saihō* Takatoki)” (41, doc. 32145 [1333/5/9]). His clan of origin might also be recalled, as in “the former Saga governor Taira Takatoki” (41, doc. 32356 [1333/6/9]).

116. See, e.g., the arrival statements of *gozen* from Harima, Kii, and Kaga provinces, respectively; *KI* 41, doc. 32150 (1333/5/10); *KI* 41, doc. 32261 (1333/6/10); and *KI* 32310 (1333/6). In all three cases, the word *gozen* preceded any *shiki* that might have been held (gesu-*kumon* in Harima, none in Kii, “partial” *jitō* in Kaga). A disproportionately large number of the arrivals listed no *shiki* at all (*e.g.*, *gozen* from Izumi and Harima: 41, doc. 32154, 32157 [1333/5/11, 1333/5/12]), though there were also others who cited neither *shiki* nor *gozen* status; these last included their names and provinces only (*e.g.*, 41, doc. 32174 and 32212 [1333/5/18, 1333/5/27]).

117. *KI* 41, doc. 32350 (1333/7/10).

118. *KI* 41, doc. 32578 (1333/9/28).

Chapter 2

1. These incentives for the Ôtomo were *jitō* *shiki* grants. For a summary of the events of 1375, see Tanaka Yoshinari, *Nanbokuchō jidaitushi*. For the offers to the Ôtomo and Shimazu, see *Nanbokuchō ibun, Kyūshū hen* (hereafter *NIK*), 5, docs. 5229, 5232. For one of the few nearly contemporary documentary references to Fuyusuke’s “chastisement,” see *NIK* 5, doc. 5392.


3. Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, 1: 88. George Sansom echoes Murdoch: “The disintegration of the old warrior society . . . was hastened by the war between the Courts, when . . . a warrior’s loyalty to his overlord was weakened to such a degree that the turncoat became a common phenomenon.” See Sansom, *A History of Japan*, 1334–1615, 205.


5. For *kitō chūseisu*, see *NIK* 1, doc. 811 (*kitō chūsen*); 2, doc. 1473 (*kitō chūseisu*); 2090 (*kitō chūseisu*); *Nanbokuchō ibun, Chūgoku shikoku hen* (hereafter *NBIC*), 5, doc. 4518 (*kitō chūseisu*); for the *chūseis* of festivities, *NIK* 4, doc. 4159; for *jimu kōki chūseisu*, *NBIC* 5, doc. 4489.

6. For *kassen chūseisu*, see *NBIC* 1, doc. 945; and *NBIC* 3, docs. 1976–77; for wound *chūseisu*, *NBIC* 3, doc. 3724; for the *chūseisiert* of the capture of an enemy’s head see *NBIC* 3, doc. 3723; and *NBIC* 1, docs. 400–401 for the *chūseis* of one
prisoner and two heads taken; for the use of chūsetsu for those who had arrived at
an encampment, NBK 5, doc. 4303; for those praised for persuading other war-
riors to become allies, NBK 3, doc. 2633; for those who recently switched sides,
NBK 3, doc. 2633; for the chūsetsu of building an arrow storehouse (yagura), see
Kanagata kenshiri 3,1, doc. 3481.
7. For the service of being cut down in battle (uchishi chūkin), see NBK 6,
docs. 6294–95; for a father’s receipt of a jūji shiki for his chūsetsu and the death of
two sons, NBK 5, docs. 7776–77; and finally, NBK 2, docs. 2289–90, 2309, 2313,
and 2315 for documents issued to Asō Koretoki. In a period of eight days during
the third month of 1347, Koretoki was praised by Ashikaga Tadayoshi and by Em-
peror Go-Murakami for his military service (chūsetsu and gunchū, respectively).
8. See DNK, iewake 14, Kamagaike monjo, doc. 225 (1337 [Kenmu 4/8th
month Nomoto Tomoyuki Shisoku Tsurujumaru gunchūjō]; and Baishōron (1975
ed.), 99.
10. For one such reference to being born in a yumiyama no ie, see NBK 1,
doc. 1322 (1338/8/15 Kino Takeshige kishōmon); for warrior honor (yumiyama no men-
mokui) see NBK 5, doc. 5592 (1380/4/16 Tachibana Kinshige kishinjō).
Steenstrup translates jūji gokenin as jūji and gokenin. I believe these two were a
compound term in the Sata Mirensho. See “Sata Mirensho” in Zoku gunsho ruijū
25.1, 1–14. Although jūji and gokenin were distinct during the early Kamakura
period—the former being a tangible office and the latter being a more nebulous
status—the terms came to coalesce into jūji gokenin in the late Kamakura period.
The reason for this amalgamation remains unknown.
12. Misuci, in particular, were not limited to followers of the Hojō tokubō. See
Ogawa Makoto, Ashikaga ichimon shugo hattenshi no kenyū, 355.
13. Taiheiki, maki 38, “Shokoku Miyakata häki no koto tsuketari Etsu ikusa
no koto,” 353–54. Ashikaga Tadafuuyu was an estranged son of Ashikaga Takauijō.
14. Significantly, instead of “service” (chūsetsu), the term gi, best translated as
“duty,” often described the obligations of misuci. For this insight I am indebted to
Thomas Nelson.
15. Taiheiki, maki 17, “Kankō kyōhō no hitobito kinsatsuseraruru koto,” 165.
16. The Baishōron does not mention this at all, so I am inclined to think the
Taiheiki account a fabrication. Regardless of its veracity, the Taiheiki had to
“ring true” to fourteenth-century audiences. In other words, a rebellion by misuci
could drive a tozama to suicide. See Taiheiki, maki 16, “Shōni, Kikuchi to kassen
no koto,” 18–19.
17. McCullough, trans., The Taiheiki, 297–98. See also Taiheiki, maki 10,
“Shiota oyako jigai no koto,” 117.
19. Ibid., “Miidera kassen narabi ni tōji tsukigane no koto tsuketari Tawara
Tada ga koto,” 398.
20. Ibid., “Shōgatsu ni jiru shichii nichichi kassen no koto,” 421.
22. Ogawa, Ashikaga ichimon shugo hattenshi no kenyū, 339.
23. Ibid., 338.
24. Taiheiki, maki 36, “Hayami kokoro kawari no koto tsuketari Hatakeyama
josei ga koto,” 292.
25. NBK 6, doc. 6848, Hennen Ōtomo shiryo, Takita Manabu, comp., 2,
doc. 748.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. NBK 2, doc. 2397 (of 1346/5/17); NBK 5, doc. 5231 (of 1375/9/2). One of
these jūji shiki was granted to Asō Koaresumi in 1347 by the Southern Court’s
Prince Kaneyoshi. See NBK 2, doc. 2391.
29. According to the Suwa Daimyōjō e-kotoba (in Zoku gunsho ruijū, jingi
bu 3, maki 73, p. 512), the Ki and Sei bands of “Utsumonimaya housemen” (kenin)
suffered heavy casualties while fighting in northern Honshū (Tsuru).
30. Satō Shin’ichi used the phrase “freedom of movement” to describe jīō
gokenin in his Nanbokuchō no dōran, 175–78.
32. For one example, see Hizen Matsura tō Arikurake monjo, Fukuda Ikuo and
Murai Shōsuke, eds., doc. 17 (Chinzei gichiō an), 42–43. Seno Seichirō addresses
this question in Chinzei gokenin no kenyū, 159–60. Confirmations of gokenin
status were rare, particularly in western Japan.
33. An analysis of Go-Daigo’s abolishment of gokenin appears in Goble, “Go-
Daigo and the Kenmu Restoration,” 669.
34. Taiheiki, maki 13, “Ryūme Shinshō no koto,” 262–63; and maki 14, “Setsu-
doshi gekō no koto,” 325.
35. See, e.g., 1333/10/18 Miga Sukeye chakutōjō; and 1333/11 Miga Sukeyasu
gunjōjō, Dai Nihon Shiryo (DNS), 6.1, 265, 298; 1334/7/18 Ōe Michihide chaku-
tōjō, NBK 1, doc. 85; 1336/1/4 Ogawa Shigeharu hirōjō, DNS 6.2, 687, 1337/7/20
Kenbu (Nejime) Kiyotake chakutōjō, Kamakura ibun (KI), 41, doc. 3238; and
1333/11 Hizen Aoka Takanao mōshijōan, KI 42, doc. 32728. Warriors referred to
themselves as gokenin into the 1350s. See DNS 6.14: 703, 719 (1351/1[?] Yamakino
Nagatane mōshijō and 1351/6 Miga Sukeyuji gunchūjō).
36. NBK 1, doc. 519 (of 1336/3/26); doc. 957 (of 1337/5/16); and NBK 2, doc.
1391 (of 1339/8/28).
37. NBK 2, doc. 1391 (of 1339/8/28); doc. 1684 (of 1341/7/23); doc. 1883
(1342/11/1 shimizu Dōkan kyōjō); NBK 3, doc. 3166 (1351/8/21 Hatakeyama
Tadaaki kyōjō); docs. 3174–75 (1351, 8th month Nejime Kiyonari gunchūjō).
38. NBK 1, doc. 823; NBK 2, doc. 1394; NBK 3, doc. 3177. Kiyotane does
not appear at all on Kiyonari’s petition (gunchūjō); see NBK 2, doc. 1684, and NBK 3, doc. 3175.

39. NBK 1, doc. 383 (1336/11/21 Toriihama Kiyoyoshi to rensho keijō). Kiyonari and Kiyotane signed this document, as did the Nejime gokenin named Kiyotake, Dōkei, and Kiyoyoshi. One Nejime signer, Rairu, remains otherwise obscure. Kiyotake was a gokenin summoned to fight in 1333 and 1336. Ki 41, doc. 32383 (1333/1/20, Kenbu Kiyotake chakutōjō). See also NBK 1, docs. 787–88 (1336/11/21 chakutōjō, for Kiyotake and Kiyoyote). For Kiyoyoshi’s gunchūjō, see NBK 1, doc. 634 (1336/6/17 Kenbu Kiyoyoshi gunchūjō). Dōkei controlled large holdings of land: see 1323/10/20 Kenbu Takakiyō [Dōkei] yuzurijō, Kagoshima ken shirō kyōki zatsuroku jū, iemake 1: 465, doc. 718.

40. An analogous situation where aristocratic leaders could lead their peers with great difficulty is admirably elucidated in Leysier, Rule and Conflict in an Early Medieval Society.

41. NBK 1, doc. 376 (1336/6/14 Ashikaga Tadayoshi gunzei saisokujō an).
42. Ibid., doc. 440 (1336/6/4 Ashikaga Tadayoshi gunzei saisokujō an).
43. Ibid., doc. 530 (1336/10 Ashikaga Tadayoshi gunzei saisokujō an); also doc. 531. This order was duly repeated two months later; ibid., docs. 562–63 (1336/12 Ashikaga Tadayoshi gunzei saisokujō an).
44. See ibid. for example, fought fervently for the opposing Southern Court.

45. For the actions of the Kutsuna, see NBK 2, doc. 1190 (Kutsuna ichizoku gunchū shidai). The Otachi led the forces that captured Setanōjo, the main Kōno castle: Taiheiki, maki 22, “Yoshisuke Ason byōshi no koto tsuketari Tomo ikusa no koto,” 459.

46. NBK 2, doc. 1167.
47. Ibid., doc. 1203 (1342/10/20 Kobayakawa Ujihira gunchūjō an). See also ibid., docs. 1205, 1280–81. From this point onward, tensions between the Kōno and the Hosokawa increased, culminating in the Kōno’s allegiance with the Southern Court. With the fall of Hosokawa Yoriyuki the Kōno again allied with the Northern Court.

48. NBK 2, doc. 1789.
49. NBK 5, doc. 4627 (1380/8/6 Ashikaga Yoshimitsu migyōsho an).
50. For outright grants of lands as rewards by the Hosokawa in Tosa Province, for example, see NBK 1, docs. 933, 966. Most surviving Kōno documents are mere commendations. For six commendations (kishin) to Zennōji temple, see NBK 4, docs. 3194–95, 3228–29, 3277, 3281.

51. See Ogawa, Ashikaga ichimon shugo hattenshi no kenkyū, 29ff. and 33ff.
52. For further evidence of the refusal of tozama to obey the Shimazu in Ōsumi and Satsuma provinces, see NBK 4, docs. 3831, 3845, and 3883. See also, Taiheiki, maki 38, “Shokoku Miyakata hōki no koto tsuketari Etchū ikusa no koto,” 352, 358–60.
54. Kutsuki monjo, Okuno Takahiro, ed., 1: 5–7, docs. 7–9, 11. For Yorii’s service under Hosokawa Akiuji, see ibid., 1: 8, doc. 14 (1347/8/9 Ashikaga Tadayoshi migyōsho). For Yorii’s reluctance to serve under the Sasaki, see ibid., docs. 56–58 (1338/8/16, 8/27, 9/3 Kyōgoku Dōyo kakkudashi); and ibid., doc. 10 (1338/10/2 Ashikaga Tadayoshi migyōsho).
55. For examples of tozama abandoning forces, see Taiheiki, maki 19 “Nitta Yoshisada Echizen no ku no shiro o otosukoto,” 275; and maki 38, “Shokoku Miyakata hōki no koto tsuketari Etchū ikusa no koto,” 399–400.
56. These included the Momono, Kira, and Ishibashi. See Ogawa, Ashikaga ichimon shugo hattenshi no kenkyū, 5.
57. NBK 5, doc. 4572.
58. NBK 3, doc. 2324.
59. For a sampling of the Ōuchi documents, see NBK 5, docs. 4054, 4266, 4370, 4581, 4601–2, 4607–9, 4621, 4641, 4647–48, 4726, 4736, and for confirmation of some Kumagai holdings, 4731.
60. For the prohibitions, see NBK 5, doc. 4734. Documentation for the rebuilding of shrines appears in NBK 4, docs. 3543, 3785.
61. Perhaps the Ōuchi usurpation of hegemonic prerogatives contributed to the Bakufu’s campaign against them in 1399 which ended in Ōuchi defeat.
62. NBK 5, doc. 4252. The term ichizoku kenin, or family members and houmen, is used in this document.
63. For this estimate, see Satō Shin’ichi, Nankokuchō no dōran, 450.
64. NBK 5, docs. 4065, 4665. For a later confirmation by Hosokawa Yoriyuki, see ibid., doc. 4112.
65. NBK 5, doc. 5332.
67. Ibid., 263.
68. For more on the nature of symbolic capital, see Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice.
69. For an important article on the personal nature of lordship, see Schlegier, “Lord and Follower in Germanic Institutional History,” from F. Cheyette, Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe, 65–99. See in particular p. 75: “The man who sought to erect a royal lordship depended on his followers; these were the chief props of his future power.”
70. “Mukashi wa mukashi ima wa ima on koso ibu yo.” Passage from Genpejō Jōsuke, maki 20, “Ishibashi kassen no koto.” Quoted by Tsuda Sōkichi, Bungaku ni aruwarateru kokumin shiō no kenkyū, 1, in Tsuda Sōkichi Zenshū, 5, 135.
71. In a particularly well known case, Go-Daigo bestowed the “taka” of Taka- haru (his name as imperial prince) to Ashikaga Takauji in recognition of his ser-
vice. For a more general reward of names, see NBiK 3, doc. 3723 (1335/9/3 Ashikaga Takauiji kanjō an). The 1311/3/29 entry of the Jūzōn niki (most readily accessible as the Kannon ninnen hinami ki, in Zoku gunsho ruijū, 29.2: 364–65) tells of the grant of a battle flag (naubata) from Ashikaga Takauiji to a deserving warrior. According to p. 79 of the Baishōron, two kenin of the Yūki fought so valiantly at Tenryūgawa in 1335 that Ashikaga Takauiji gave each a sword in appreciation. Confirmations (ando) are also numerous. For one instance of lands entrusted to the Tsuchimochi by the Imagawa for military provisions, see NBiK 5, docs. 5001, 5008. For confirmations of hereditary homelands (hon’ya), see NBiK 5, docs. 5003, 5009. For an offer of new lands, see NBiK 5, doc. 5426; for the offer of a shugo shiki and lands, see NBiK 4, docs. 4339–41, 4416. Perhaps some will object to my use of the admittedly vague term “lands” to describe the variety of shiki that were bestowed to warriors. Although rewards for jito shiki were perhaps most common, warriors were also rewarded ryōke shiki for their efforts. See NBiK 3, docs. 2118, 2123, and 1354 (1344/8/7 Ashikaga Tadayoshiya saikeyo). Although some later documents offer jito shiki—NBiK 5, doc. 5008, and NBiK 3, docs. 2119, 2128—others simply offer lands to be entrusted and make no distinction between jito, ryōke, or any shiki at all, for that matter. See NBiK 5, doc. 5001. I have lumped these various grants under the term “land” because I believe no significant division existed among these categories, although I may be forced to revise this in light of more systematic research on this subject.

72. Baishōron, 140. The Yoshiyadaki, attributed to Nitta Yoshiyasu but probably apocryphal, also stresses the importance of rewarding warriors commensurate to the degree of service they performed. See Hurst, “The Warrior as Ideal for a New Age” 221–22.

73. Taibeki, maki 13, “ Ryūme shinsō no koto,” 262.

74. DNS 6:1: 90–91 (1335/6/7 Go-Daigo tennō rinji). See also, Tanaka Yoshihara, Nanbokuchō jidaishi, 108–9.

75. The pioneering study on “gift giving” and authority is Marcel Mauss, The Gift.

76. Goble, “Go-Daigo and the Kemmu Restoration,” 352–53. For the Taibeki’s appraisal of Akamatsu Enshin’s rewards, see McCullough trans., 365.

77. Goble, “Go-Daigo and the Kemmu Restoration,” 379. For documents relating to Kyushu, see NBiK 1, docs. 93–94, 199–200, 330.

78. A Ryūzōji leysu document contains references to his military service (gunshō), yet the only tangible service leysu seems to have accomplished is to arrive at an encampment; NBiK 1, doc. 435. For another document that equates encampment with military service, see ibid., docs. 421–22.

79. Goble, “Go-Daigo and the Kemmu Restoration,” 386–87. For Ashikaga grants of Izu lands to the Uesugi and the Kō on 1333/12/9, see Ki 42, docs. 32807–9. For the Ashikaga confiscation of Nitta lands, see Satō Shin’ichi, Nanbokuchō no dōran, 119. For a sampling of grants by Ashikaga Takauiji in 1335, see NBiK 1, docs. 167–68 (1335/9/27 Ashikaga Takauiji kudashibumi); for a grant by Ashikaga Tadayoshi to the Nagai in Harima (which was a proprietary province—buukoku—of the Nitta) see NBiK 1, doc. 210 (1335/12/26 Ashikaga Tadayoshi kudashibumi). A 1335/9/27 Ashikaga Takauiji kudashibumi, granting Matsui, Kawachi, Sagami, Settsu, Shinano, Bungo, and Kōzuke lands to the Miura can be found in NBiK 1, doc. 304. See also NBiK 1, doc. 333 (of 1335/12/21).

80. NBiK 2, doc. 1354 (1344/8/7 Ashikaga Tadayoshiya saikeyo). See also, Kagawa kenshi 8, Zentsūji monjo, pp. 42–45. The onshōgata was the administrative organ of the Muromachi Bakufu responsible for rewards. Bettō shiki had been previously granted to Daisō Shōbo of Zuishin’in on 1344/12/1, implying a right of management (kanri). See NBiK 2, docs. 1078, 1082. Daisō Shōbo was able to maintain his bettō shiki rights, which were later transferred to another temple. See Kabukawa chōmei daijiten 37: 466. The ultimate fate of Takatsuna and his companions is unknown.

81. See, e.g., NBiK 5, docs. 4521. 82. Ibid., doc. 4260.

83. NBiK 3, docs. 3304–5. 84. NBiK 1, docs. 1128, 1231, and 1284.

85. Baishōron, 140.

86. The best account of this incident appears in the “Kannon ninnen hinami ki,” 361–62.

87. See Tōin Kinkata’s Entairayaku, 1351/3. Supporting documentary evidence can be found in NBiK 3, docs. 3021–22 (1351/3/1 Ashikaga Takauiji kanjō). The only reference to Tadayoshi’s oath appears in the latter documents. See also, Sato, Nanbokuchō no dōran, 248–49. Some discrepancy exists: according to the Zoku gunsho ruijū kansai edition of Entairayaku (v. 7), Takauiji secured rewards for 43 warriors, while the version found in DNS 6:4: 85–89 has it as only 42.

88. Sato, Nanbokuchō no dōran, 248–49.

89. Entairayaku, 1351/3 in DNS 6:4: p. 859. Tōin Kinkata wryly commented that Akuji showed fear for the first time since coming to the capital.

90. Tadayoshi was defeated, imprisoned in a Kamakura temple, and poisoned exactly one year after his triumph over the Kō brothers.

91. NBiK 3, docs. 3095, 3220. Yasutomi suggested that it was distance that had led to Tadafuji’s mistaking Buzen for Chikuken province. Tadafuji duly corrected his error.


93. NBiK 3, docs. 2802, 2829. See also, Yamaguchi Takamasa, Nanbokuchōki Kyūshū chūseiishì kenkyū, 2, 21.

94. NBiK 3, docs. 3095 (Yasutomi Yasushige mōshijō).

95. Isshiki Dōyū suffered from confined jurisdiction, few lands, and little support. See NBiK 2, docs. 1475, 1481.

96. See ibid., doc. 1469 for jito shiki granted to the Fukabori.

97. NBiK 1, doc. 840. The Ryūzōji wereokenin. See Ki 42, doc. 32633.
Chapter 3

This paper was translated by Thomas Nelson.


2. Azuma kagami (hereafter AK), 1181/2/29.

3. AK, 1185/7/12.

4. While resident in Hakata, a Tōfukuji monk named Ryōkaku described developments in Kyushu, Shikoku, and western Honshu in a diary known to later generations as the Hakata Nikki. It was written on the unused, reverse side of a list of documents relating to the Sonogi-no-shō in Hizen (a Tōfukuji property) dated 1325/7/3. It describes events from 1333/3/11 until 1333/4/7. This important source is kept at the Sonkeikaku Bunko.

5. Ōtomo monjo, 1333/8/28 Go-Daigo Tennō rinji. All the documents cited in this article may be found in vol. 1 of Nanbokuchō ibun, Kyūshū hen, edited by Seno Seichirō.


7. Madaraimono monjo, 1334/7/15 Madaraimono Todomu chakutōjō; Aritura monjo, 1334/7/17 Madaraimono Todomu chakutōjō; Kurashima monjo, 1334/8/18 Oe Michihide chakutōjō; Fukabori monjo, 1334/7/21 Fukabori Myōi chakutōjō; 1334/7/23 Fukabori Tokihito chakutōjō; 1334/7/28 Fukabori Tokitsugu chakutōjō; Kōzuma monjo, 1334/7/22 Miyano Jakue chakutōjō; Ryūzōji monjo, 1334/7/24 Ryūzōji Zenchō chakutōjō; Kondō monjo, 1334/7/26 Araki leari chakutōjō; Sagara-ke monjo, 1334/7/28 Sagara Ieiro chakutōjō; 1334/7/28 Sagara Suenaga chakutōjō.

8. Munakata Jinja monjo, 1335/1/21 Go-Daigo Tennō rinji; Ryūzōji monjo,