Supplementary Material for
“Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves”

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Abstract
This appendix contains: i) a discussion of continuity of the stopping boundaries; ii) proofs of corollaries in the main text; iii) a recursive formulation of the welfare function; iv) the equilibrium and social planner’s policies for exponential well-ordered cost functions; v) equilibrium characterization pertaining to the case when later innovations are penalized; vi) welfare comparisons for fixed search speeds; vii) an illustration of the optimal team composition; viii) an analysis of the model with independent observations; and ix) a discussion of alternatives to the regularity assumption.

1 Continuity of the Stopping Boundaries
In this section we show that, in any Markov equilibrium, any alliance is associated with a boundary that is almost surely continuous, provided minimal conditions on agents’ individual searches hold. Namely, we assume that all agents search non-trivially if on their own, effectively assuming that all search costs are not prohibitively high.

Lemma OA 1. If for all $i \in N$, $g_i(M) < M$ for all $M$, then in any Markov equilibrium, for any $A \subset N$, there exists an optimal stopping boundary $g^A : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $g^A(M) \leq M$, $g^A$ is almost surely continuous, and $\tau^A = \inf\{t \geq 0 : X_t = g^A(M_t)\}$.

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Proof. First, for any maximal value \( M \), never stopping \( (g^A(M) = -\infty) \) cannot be an equilibrium strategy for any alliance. Otherwise, the payoffs to all members would be unboundedly small, violating individual optimality. Furthermore, since the single-agent search value is positive for all agents, it can never be a best response, for any agent under any equilibrium, to stop when \( X = M \). Therefore, the stopping boundary of any alliance lies below \( M \).

Towards a contradiction, suppose that, for some alliance \( A \), the stopping boundary \( g^A(M) \) is discontinuous. Let \( \hat{M} \) denote a point of discontinuity. Since \( g^A(\hat{M}) \) is a point of stopping, we must have some agent \( i \) that finds it optimal to stop at \( g^A(\hat{M}) \). That is, \( g^A_i(\hat{M}) = g^A(\hat{M}) \).

By Lemma A.2 in the main text, the stopping boundary of agent \( i \) has to be a drawdown stopping boundary, and therefore continuous. Hence, in order to have a discontinuity in \( g^A \), it must be that the identity of the agent who stops changes from \( i \) some \( j \neq i \) around \( \hat{M} \). Without loss of generality, assume that the change happens to the right of \( \hat{M} \). That is, for \( \varepsilon > 0 \), at \( \hat{M} + \varepsilon \), agent \( j \) is the first to leave alliance \( A \). Again, by Lemma A.2, agent \( j \)'s stopping boundary is also a drawdown stopping boundary, and thus continuous. Furthermore, since both boundaries are drawdown boundaries, they are parallel and never cross one another. Therefore, the agent with the lower drawdown would prefer to stop at both \( \hat{M} \) and \( \hat{M} + \varepsilon \) in a continuous manner, contradicting the existence of a discontinuity at \( \hat{M} \). In other words, in every alliance, there is at least one agent that has a continuous boundary, and the stopping boundary of the alliance is that boundary. The stopping boundaries of agents who continue their search may exhibit discontinuities. However, since these boundaries are never reached, it is without loss to assume they take the form of a drawdown stopping boundary with agents’ respective drawdown sizes.

\[ \blacksquare \]

2 Proofs of Corollaries

The proofs of Corollaries 1 and 3 follow directly from the text preceding them.

**Proof of Corollary 2.** First, we show that as alliances shrink, total search speed cannot increase. Let \( f^A(\sigma^A) = \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^A)^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \). And assume \( \rho > 0 \). From here on, we will suppress the superscript \( A \) on \( f \) under the CES specification.

Assume there exists an alliance \( A \) and an agent \( i \) such that \( A \cup \{i\} \) generates lower overall search speed compared to that generated by alliance \( A \). That is, \( f(\sigma^A) > f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}}) \). Unique solutions are interior, so for each agent \( j \in A \),

\[
\frac{2c_j(\sigma_j^A)}{c_j'(\sigma_j^A)} (\sigma_j^A)^{\rho-1} w_j \frac{f(\sigma^A)}{f(\sigma^A)} = f(\sigma^A) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{2c_j(\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\}})}{c_j'(\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\}})} (\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\}})^{\rho-1} w_j \frac{f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}})}{f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}})} = f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}}). \]

\[2\]
Since \( f(\sigma^A) > f(\sigma^{A\cup\{i\}}) \) and each of the cost functions is log-convex (the left-hand sides are strictly decreasing in \( \sigma_j \)), it must be the case that \( \sigma_j^A \leq \sigma_j^{A\cup\{i\}} \). The CES formulation then implies that \( f(\sigma^A) < f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}}) \), in contradiction.

The comparative statics pertaining to individuals’ search speed follow immediately from log-convexity of the cost functions. \( \blacksquare \)

**Proof of Corollary 4.** To prove the corollary, we introduce superscripts \( eq \) and \( sp \) to denote the equilibrium and social planner’s solutions, respectively (these are suppressed otherwise, when there is low risk of confusion). Assume \( \rho > 0 \). We use the following set of lemmas. For these, we assume interior equilibrium and social planner search speeds, as presumed in the corollary.

**Lemma OA 2.** Any active alliance \( A \) has a higher search speed under the social planner’s solution compared to the equilibrium.

**Proof.** Towards a contradiction, suppose there exists an alliance \( A \) such that \( \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A,eq})^{\rho}/\rho \right) > \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A,sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right) \). The social planner’s solution satisfies

\[
2 \sum_{i \in A} \frac{c_i(\sigma_i^{A,sp})}{c_i'(\sigma_i^{A,sp})} w_j(\sigma_j^{A,sp})^{\rho-1} \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A,sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right) = \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A,sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right)^2 \forall j \in A,
\]

which implies that

\[
2 \frac{c_j(\sigma_j^{A,sp})}{c_j'(\sigma_j^{A,sp})} w_j(\sigma_j^{A,sp})^{\rho-1} \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A,sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right) < \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A,sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right)^2 \forall j \in A.
\]

From log-convexity of costs, the left-hand side of this inequality increases as \( \sigma_j^{A,sp} \) decreases. For the equilibrium constraint to hold, \( \sigma_j^{A,eq} < \sigma_j^{A,sp} \) for all \( j \in A \), in contradiction. \( \blacksquare \)

**Lemma OA 3.** In the social planner’s solution, for any alliance \( A \) and any agent \( i \not\in A \), \( f(\sigma^{A,sp}) < f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp}) \).

**Proof.** Suppose not. Then, there exists an alliance \( A \) and an individual \( i \not\in A \) such that \( f(\sigma^{A,sp}) \geq f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp}) \). Then, for all \( l \in A \), we must have

\[
2 \sum_{j \in A \cup \{i\}} \frac{c_j(\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\},sp})}{c_j'(\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\},sp})} w_l(\sigma_l^{A \cup \{i\},sp})^{\rho-1} \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A \cup \{i\},sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right) \frac{f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp})}{[f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp})]^{\rho}} = f(\sigma^{A,sp}) \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
2 \sum_{j \in A \cup \{i\}} \frac{c_j(\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\},sp})}{c_j'(\sigma_j^{A \cup \{i\},sp})} w_l(\sigma_l^{A \cup \{i\},sp})^{\rho-1} \left( \sum_{i \in A} w_i(\sigma_i^{A \cup \{i\},sp})^{\rho}/\rho \right) \frac{f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp})}{[f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp})]^{\rho}} = f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\},sp}) \text{.}
\]
Since search costs are strictly positive, the second equality implies that, for all \( l \in A \),

\[
2 \sum_{j \in A} c_j(\sigma_{j}^{A \cup \{i\}, sp}) \frac{w_l(\sigma_{l}^{A \cup \{i\}, sp})^{\rho-1} f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}, sp})}{[f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}, sp})]^\rho} < f(\sigma^{A \cup \{i\}, sp}) \leq f(\sigma^{A, sp}).
\]

Log-convexity of costs implies that the left-hand side of this inequality increases as \( \sigma^{A \cup \{i\}, sp} \) decreases. The social planner’s constraint for alliance \( A \) then implies that \( \sigma^{A, sp} < \sigma^{A \cup \{i\}, sp} \) for all \( l \in A \), in contradiction to the last inequality. Furthermore, in the social planner’s solution, if \( A_k \) and \( A_{k+1} \) are consecutive active alliances, then for any \( i \) in \( A_{k+1} \), we have \( \sigma^{A_k, sp} > \sigma^{A_{k+1}, sp} \) since \( A_{k+1} \subseteq A_k \).

To prove Corollary 4, we combine Lemmas OA 2 and OA 3 with Corollary 2. Specifically, consider any non-singleton alliance \( A \) on path for the equilibrium and the social planner’s solution. For any \( i \in A \), Corollary 2 implies that \( \sigma^{A, eq}_i < \sigma^{\{i\}, eq}_i \). From Lemmas OA 2 and OA 3, \( \sigma^{A, sp}_i > \sigma^{\{i\}, sp}_i \). Since an individual searching on her own chooses the optimal search speed, \( \sigma^{\{i\}, eq}_i = \sigma^{\{i\}, sp}_i \). We therefore have \( \sigma^{A, sp}_i > \sigma^{A, eq}_i \). Furthermore, from Lemma OA 3, in the welfare maximizing solution, each agent’s search speed decreases as her alliance shrinks in size.

**Proof of Corollary 5.** Towards a contradiction, suppose that for some alliance \( A_k \), which is active in both the social planner’s solution and the equilibrium, we have \( d^{eq}_{A_k} > d^{sp}_{A_k} \). Consider an alternative policy for the social planner, under which each agent \( i \) in \( A_k \setminus A_{k+1} \) searches with \( \sigma^{A_k, eq}_i \) when the current gap \( M - X \) is between \( d^{eq}_{A_k} \) and \( d^{sp}_{A_k} \). Under this policy, each agent \( i \) in \( A_{k+1} \) still searches using a speed \( \sigma^{A_{k+1}, sp}_i \), as in the candidate policy. We now show this generates an improvement.

First, under this policy, agents in \( A_k \setminus A_{k+1} \) are better off. Indeed, those agents are utilizing the same search speed they would in equilibrium. Agents in \( A_{k+1} \) are searching with speed \( \sigma^{A_{k+1}, sp}_i \). From Corollary 4, \( \sigma^{A_{k+1}, sp}_i > \sigma^{A_k, eq}_i \). Thus, agents in \( A_k \setminus A_{k+1} \) are receiving greater positive externalities compared to equilibrium. Furthermore, since the gap is larger than \( d^{eq}_{A_k} \), in equilibrium the agents have a positive continuation value, which is increased due to positive externalities.

Second, under this policy, agents in \( A_{k+1} \) are better off. Indeed, when the gap between the observed maximum and their search outcomes falls between \( d^{sp}_{A_k} \) and \( d^{eq}_{A_k} \), their own search speed is unchanged, but since speed aggregators take the CES form with substitutes, they receive positive externalities from agents in \( A_k \setminus A_{k+1} \).

We conclude that \( d^{eq}_{A_k} > d^{sp}_{A_k} \) cannot be optimal for any \( A_k \).
3 Recursive Formulation of Welfare

As mentioned in the text, welfare can be written in a recursive fashion. Namely, we have:

**Proposition OA 1.** Suppose $A_1, \ldots, A_K$ is the optimal sequence of alliances with associated drawdown sizes $d_{A_1}, \ldots, d_{A_K}$. When search starts at $X_0 = M_0 = 0$, we have:

$$W(0, 0, N) = \sum_{m=1}^{K} ((d_{A_m})^2 - (d_{A_{m-1}})^2) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_m} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{m}})}{(f^{A_{m}}(\sigma_{A_{m}}))^2},$$

where we set $d_{A_0} = 0$.

**Proof.** Using Propositions 3 and 4, we can write the expected welfare as follows:

$$W_k(0, 0) = (d_{A_k})^2 \sum_{i \in A_k} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_k}) \frac{(f^{A_k}(\sigma_{A_k}))^2}{(f^{A_k}(\sigma_{A_k}))^2} + d_{A_k} \sum_{m=k}^{K} (d_{A_{m+1}} - d_{A_{m}}) \frac{2 \sum_{i \in A_{m+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{m+1}})}{(f^{A_{m}}(\sigma_{A_{m}}))^2}$$

$$+ (d_{A_{k+1}} - d_{A_k}) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_{k+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{k+1}})}{(f^{A_{k+1}}(\sigma_{A_{k+1}}))^2} + (d_{A_{k+1}} - d_{A_k}) \sum_{m=k+1}^{K} (d_{A_{m+1}} - d_{A_{m}}) \frac{2 \sum_{i \in A_{m+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{m+1}})}{(f^{A_{m}}(\sigma_{A_{m}}))^2}$$

$$+ \cdots + (d_{A_{K+1}} - d_{A_K}) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_{K+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{K+1}})}{(f^{A_{K}}(\sigma_{A_{K}}))^2} + (d_{A_{K+1}} - d_{A_K}) \sum_{m=K}^{K} (d_{A_{m+1}} - d_{A_{m}}) \frac{2 \sum_{i \in A_{m+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{m+1}})}{(f^{A_{m}}(\sigma_{A_{m}}))^2}$$

$$+ (d_{A_K} - d_{A_{K-1}}) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_{K-1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{K-1}})}{(f^{A_{K-1}}(\sigma_{A_{K-1}}))^2} + (d_{A_K} - d_{A_{K-1}}) \sum_{m=K-1}^{K} (d_{A_{m+1}} - d_{A_{m}}) \frac{2 \sum_{i \in A_{m+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{m+1}})}{(f^{A_{m}}(\sigma_{A_{m}}))^2}$$

$$+ (d_{A_K} - d_{A_{K-1}}) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_K} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_K})}{(f^{A_{K}}(\sigma_{A_{K}}))^2}.$$

The first term, $(d_{A_k})^2 \frac{\sum_{i \in A_k} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_k})}{(f^{A_k}(\sigma_{A_k}))^2}$, corresponds to the expected payoffs of members of alliance $A_k$. Similarly, terms of the form $(d_{A_{j+1}} - d_{A_j}) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_{j+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{j+1}})}{(f^{A_{j+1}}(\sigma_{A_{j+1}}))^2}$ correspond to the expected payoffs of members in $A_{j+1}$ who are not in $A_j$. The remaining terms capture the externalities induced by members of each alliance. For instance, the term $d_{A_k} \sum_{m=k}^{K} (d_{A_{m+1}} - d_{A_{m}}) \frac{2 \sum_{i \in A_{m+1}} c_i(\sigma_{i}^{A_{m+1}})}{(f^{A_{m}}(\sigma_{A_{m}}))^2}$ corresponds to the positive externalities (net of own payoffs) members of the first alliance $A_k$ induce on members of all future alliances. Similarly, each term of
the form \((d_{A_{j+1}} - d_{A_j}) \sum_{m=j+1}^{K} (d_{A_m} - d_{A_{m-1}}) \frac{2 \sum_{i \in A_{m+1}} c_i^2(A_{m+1})}{(f_{A_m}^2(\sigma_{A_m}))^2}\) corresponds to the positive externalities (net of own payoffs) members of alliance \(A_j\) induce on future alliances. Naturally, the last alliance \(A_K\) has no alliances that follow it and, therefore, does not induce externalities of this sort.

Noticing the telescoping sum and setting \(d_{A_{k-1}} = 0\), we can write

\[
W_k(0, 0) = \sum_{m=k}^{K} ((d_{A_m})^2 - (d_{A_{m-1}})^2) \frac{\sum_{i \in A_m} c_i^2(A_m)}{(f_{A_m}^2(\sigma_{A_m}))^2}.
\]

In particular, for \(k = 1\), we get the formula asserted in the proposition. \(\blacksquare\)

4 Equilibrium and Social Planner Solutions for Exponential Costs

In this following section, for simplicity of exposition we focus on CES production function with \(\rho = 1\) and the specific class of exponential cost functions that underlie Figure 4 in the main text.

\[
c(\sigma) = e^\sigma = c_1(\sigma) = \beta_2 c_2(\sigma) = \beta_3 c_3(\sigma).
\]

It follows that:

\[
c_1'(\sigma) = c(\sigma), \quad c_2'(\sigma) = \frac{1}{\beta_2} c(\sigma), \quad c_3'(\sigma) = \frac{1}{\beta_3} c(\sigma).
\]

The ratio of costs to marginal costs is identical across agents. We focus here on the symmetric equilibrium profile. Technically, this setting is not regular and there are multiple equilibria. We maintain this example for its simplicity.

**Observation OA 1.** If the alliance \(\{1, 2, 3\}\) is active under the social planner’s policy, the resulting total search speed is 6 and the total search cost is \(\frac{3e^2}{\sqrt{\beta_2 \beta_3}}\).
Indeed, search speeds are determined by the following system:

\[
\begin{align*}
2 \left( c(\sigma_1) + \frac{1}{\beta_2} c(\sigma_2) + \frac{1}{\beta_3} c(\sigma_3) \right) & = c(\sigma_1), \\
2 \left( c(\sigma_1) + \frac{1}{\beta_2} c(\sigma_2) + \frac{1}{\beta_3} c(\sigma_3) \right) & = \frac{1}{\beta_2} c(\sigma_2), \\
2 \left( c(\sigma_1) + \frac{1}{\beta_2} c(\sigma_2) + \frac{1}{\beta_3} c(\sigma_3) \right) & = \frac{1}{\beta_3} c(\sigma_3).
\end{align*}
\]

Solving the equations simultaneously, we get:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{3} (\sigma_1 + \sigma_2 + \sigma_3) & = 2, \\
c(\sigma_1) + \frac{1}{\beta_2} c(\sigma_2) + \frac{1}{\beta_3} c(\sigma_3) & = \frac{3e^2}{\sqrt[3]{\beta_2 \beta_3}}.
\end{align*}
\]

**Observation OA 2.** If alliance \{i, j\} is active under the social planner’s policy, the resulting total search speed is 4 and the total search cost is \(\frac{2e^2}{\sqrt[3]{\beta_i \beta_j}}\).

In this case, search speeds are determined by the following system:

\[
\begin{align*}
2 \left( \frac{1}{\beta_i} c(\sigma_i) + \frac{1}{\beta_j} c(\sigma_j) \right) & = c(\sigma_i) \frac{1}{\beta_i}, \\
2 \left( \frac{1}{\beta_i} c(\sigma_i) + \frac{1}{\beta_j} c(\sigma_j) \right) & = c(\sigma_j) \frac{1}{\beta_j}.
\end{align*}
\]

Solving the equations simultaneously, we get, as stated:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{3} (\sigma_i + \sigma_j) & = \frac{4}{3}, \\
\frac{1}{\beta_i} c(\sigma_i) + \frac{1}{\beta_j} c(\sigma_j) & = \frac{2e^2}{\sqrt[3]{\beta_i \beta_j}}.
\end{align*}
\]

**Observation OA 3.** In equilibrium, in any alliance \(A \subset \{1, 2, 3\}\), the total search speed is 2/3. Agents share the speed costs equally. Each agent’s individual search cost is given by \(\frac{1}{\beta_i} e^{\frac{2}{\beta_i}}\) and total cost is \(\sum_{i \in A} \frac{1}{\beta_i} e^{\frac{2}{\beta_i}}\).

In equilibrium, for any alliance \(A\), individual search speeds are determined by:

\[
\frac{2 \left( \frac{1}{\beta_i} c(\sigma_i^A) \right)}{\sum_{i \in A} \sigma_i^A} = c(\sigma_i) \frac{1}{\beta_i} \quad \forall i \in A.
\]
Solving this system yields:

\[
\frac{1}{3} \sum_{i \in A} \sigma_i^A = \frac{2}{3};
\]

\[
\sigma_i^A = \sigma_j^A \forall i \in A,
\]

\[
c(\sigma_i) = \frac{1}{\beta_i} \frac{e^{1/3}}{e^{1/3}}.
\]

Straightforward calculations then generate the following two observations, where \{1\}{2\}{3} stands for agent 1 leaving before agent 2, who leaves before agent 3; \{1,2\}{3} stands for agents 1 and 2 forming an exit wave and leaving first, followed by agent 3; and so on.

Observation OA 4. There are four patterns of equilibrium exit waves:

1. \{1\}{2\}{3}, which requires \(\beta_2 > e^{1/3}\) and \(\frac{\beta_3}{\beta_2} > e\);
2. \{1,2\}{3}, which requires \(\beta_2 < e^{1/3}\) and \(\beta_3 > e^{4/3}\);
3. \{1\}{2,3}, which requires \(\beta_2 > \frac{4}{3}\) and \(\frac{\beta_3}{\beta_2} < e\);
4. \{1,2,3\}, which requires \(\beta_2 < \frac{4}{3}\) and \(\beta_3 < e^{4/3}\).

Observation OA 5. There are four patterns of optimal exit waves:

1. \{1\}{2\}{3}, which requires \(\min\left(\frac{2}{9} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}, \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}\right) > \frac{1}{\beta_3}\) and \(\frac{1}{\beta_3} < \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}} - \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}\);
2. \{1,2\}{3}, which requires \(\min\left(\frac{2}{9} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}, \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}\right) > \frac{1}{\beta_3}\) and \(\frac{1}{\beta_3} < \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}} - \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}\);
3. \{1\}{2,3}, which requires \(\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}} < \min\left(\frac{2}{9} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}, \frac{1}{\beta_3}\right)\);
4. \{1,2,3\}, which requires \(\frac{2}{9} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}} < \min\left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_2\beta_3}}, \frac{1}{\beta_3}\right)\).

Figure 1 here expands on Figure 4 in the main text and illustrates the wedge between the equilibrium and social exit wave sequences. Each panel corresponds to a different pattern of the social planner’s (SP) optimal exit waves. As can be seen, while the “weak order” by which exit waves occur in equilibrium is preserved by the social planner—see Lemma 1 in the main text—the pattern of exit waves may still differ dramatically depending on whether agents have full discretion or are governed by the socially optimal policy.
5 Penalties for Later Innovations

We now consider an extension of our model where stopping earlier grants an advantage. For simplicity, we consider here a team of only two agents. We assume that the first agent to stop, say at time \( t \), receives \( M_t \). The second agent to stop, say at time \( s > t \), receives \( \alpha M_s \), with \( \alpha < 1 \). If both agents stop at the same time \( t \), they both receive \( M_t \).

Our first proposition shows that if the stopping times are (weakly) ordered at any point, they are weakly ordered everywhere. Thus, the order of exits is deterministic.

**Proposition OA 2.** If \( g_{i}^{(1,2)}(M^*) \geq g_{j}^{(1,2)}(M^*) \) for some \( M^* \), then \( g_{i}^{(1,2)}(M) \geq g_{j}^{(1,2)}(M) \) for all \( M \).

**Proof.** If \( g_{i}^{(1,2)}(M^*) \geq g_{j}^{(1,2)}(M^*) \) then it must be the case that \( V_j^*(M^*, g_i^T(M^*)) \geq M^* \) and

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1The analysis naturally extends to \( N \) agents via a decreasing sequence of discounts: \( \alpha_0 = 1 \geq \alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq \ldots \geq \alpha_N \). In addition, one could consider more continuous version of this setup, where the second agent who stops at time \( s > t \) receives \( M_t + \alpha(M_s - M_t) \). That model generates qualitatively similar results, but is more cumbersome to analyze.

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\[ V_i^{(1,2)}(M, g_i^T(M^*)) = V_i^i(M^*, g_i^{(1,2)}(M^*)) = M^*. \] This implies that
\[ g_i^{(1,2)}(M^*) - M^* + \frac{(\sigma_i^j)^2}{2c_i(\sigma_i^j)} \leq 0, \]
\[ \alpha M + \frac{c_j(\sigma_j^j)}{(\sigma_j^j)^2} \left( g_i^{(1,2)}(M^*) - M^* + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \right)^2 \geq M. \]

Now, since \( \alpha \leq 1 \), the second inequality implies that
\[ \alpha M + \frac{c_j(\sigma_j^j)}{(\sigma_j^j)^2} \left( g_i^{(1,2)}(M^*) - M^* + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \right)^2 \geq M, \]
\[ g_i^{(1,2)}(M^*) - M^* + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \geq 0, \]
\[ g_i^{(1,2)}(M^*) - M^* + \frac{(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \geq 0. \]

From this system, it must be the case that \( \frac{(\sigma_i^j)^2}{2c_i(\sigma_i^j)} \geq \frac{(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \). Now, towards a contradiction, suppose there exists a different \( M \) such that \( g_i^{(1,2)}(M) < g_j^{(1,2)}(M) \). Then, \( V_j^j(M, g_i^{(1,2)}(M)) = M \) and \( V_i^i(M, g_i^{(1,2)}(M)) > M \), which yield the following inequalities:
\[ g_i^{(1,2)}(M) - M + \frac{(\sigma_i^i)^2}{2c_i(\sigma_i^i)} > 0 \quad \text{and} \]
\[ g_i^{(1,2)}(M) - M + \frac{(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \leq 0. \]

These can hold only if \( \frac{(\sigma_i^j)^2}{2c_i(\sigma_i^i)} < \frac{(\sigma_j^j)^2}{2c_j(\sigma_j^j)} \), generating a contradiction.

In general, there is a leader—the agent who exits early—and a follower—the agent who exits later. As we now show, the leader’s stopping boundary remains her equilibrium stopping boundary regardless of \( \alpha \) and is governed by the drawdown identified in Proposition 2 in the text. Both the leader and the follower’s search speeds, when searching together or separately, also follow identical considerations to those pertaining to the setting analyzed in the paper and described in Proposition 1 of the text. In contrast, the follower’s stopping boundary does change since her rewards are scaled down by \( \alpha \).
We call agent \( i \) the leader if
\[
\frac{(\sigma_i^{1,2} + \sigma_j^{1,2})^2}{2(c_i(\sigma_i^{1,2}))} \leq \frac{(\sigma_i^{1,2} + \sigma_j^{1,2})^2}{2(c_j(\sigma_j^{1,2}))}.
\]

Henceforth, we will use \( L \) and \( F \) to denote the leader and the follower, respectively.

### 5.1 Equilibrium Speeds

The proof of Proposition 1 does not hinge on agents receiving the full value of the observed maximum.\(^2\) Therefore, analogous analysis yields that the search speeds (when interior) satisfy the following:

\[
\frac{2c_L(\sigma_L^{1,2})}{c'_L(\sigma_L^{1,2})} = \frac{2c_F(\sigma_F^{1,2})}{c'_F(\sigma_F^{1,2})} = \sigma^{1,2}.
\]

### 5.2 Leader’s Optimal Stopping

Since the search speed in any alliance is constant, the leader’s optimal stopping boundary satisfies

\[
g_L^{1,2}(M) = M - \frac{(\sigma_L^{1,2} + \sigma_F^{1,2})^2}{2(c_L(\sigma_L^{1,2}))}.
\]

### 5.3 Follower’s Optimal Stopping

\(^2\)See also Urgun and Yariv (2021b) for additional details on the optimal policy pertaining to scaled-down search rewards.

Urgun and Yariv (2021b) show that, in the solo-search problem, the optimal speed is independent of \( \alpha \) and thus identical to that identified in our baseline model. Their analysis also shows that the follower’s optimal stopping boundary is given by:

\[
g_F(M) = M - \alpha(\sigma_F^2)^2.
\]

Since the search speeds of the two agents differ, it is possible that \( g_L^{1,2}(M) \geq g_F(M) \). In that case, the follower stops at the same time as the leader.

If \( g_L^{1,2}(M) \leq g_F(M) \), when the leader stops, the follower’s payoff is at least as high as that derived from stopping immediately and receiving \( M \). Again, utilizing Urgun and Yariv
(2021b), the continuation payoff would is:

\[ V_F^F(M, g_L^{1,2}) = \alpha M + \frac{c_F(\sigma_F^F)}{(\sigma_F^F)^2} (g_L^{1,2}(M) - g_F^F(M))^2, \]

whereas stopping yields an immediate \( M \). Since both stopping boundaries are drawdown stopping boundaries, \( \frac{c_F(\sigma_F^F)}{(\sigma_F^F)^2} (g_L^{1,2}(M) - g_F^F(M))^2 \) is a constant independent of \( M \). When \( (1 - \alpha)M \) is larger than this constant, the follower stops as soon as the leader does.

## 6 Fixed Search Speed

Suppose the search speed is fixed and determined at the outset. Agents cannot then adjust their search speed as alliances change in size or composition. To illustrate the impacts of such limited adjustment possibilities, we consider the simple case of two agents with well-ordered costs. That is, agent 1’s search cost is given by \( c(\cdot) \), while agent 2’s search cost is given by \( \beta c(\cdot) \) with \( \beta > 1 \). In this case, agents’ optimal solo search speeds coincide. We consider two cases: one in which both agents are restricted to a search speed that is optimal for their single-agent search; the second where both agents are restricted to a search speed that is optimal when they search jointly.

### 6.1 Single-agent Search Speed

Suppose agents are restricted to the search speed \( \sigma^I \) that would be optimal were they each searching individually on their own:

\[ \frac{2c(\sigma^I)}{c'(\sigma^I)} = \sigma^I. \]

As we soon show, this is, in fact, the welfare-maximizing fixed search speed.

When searching as a team, the optimal search speed for each individual would be given by \( \sigma^T < \sigma^I \), where

\[ \frac{c(\sigma^T)}{c'(\sigma^T)} = \sigma^T. \]

The corresponding drawdown for the team is then be given by

\[ d^T = \frac{2(\sigma^T)^2}{c(\sigma^T)}. \]
In contrast, if both agents are restricted to using $\sigma^I$, the equilibrium drawdown size of the initial alliance consisting of both agents is given by:

$$d^T_{\text{restricted}} = \frac{2(\sigma^I)^2}{c(\sigma^I)}.$$  

Claim OA 1. $d^T_{\text{restricted}} \leq d^T$.

Proof. Recall that $\sigma^T$ minimizes $\frac{c(\sigma)}{(2\sigma)^2}$. Inverting the ratio implies that we must have $\frac{4(\sigma^I)^2}{2c(\sigma^I)} \leq \frac{4(\sigma^T)^2}{2c(\sigma^T)}$.

If agent 2 continues searching after agent 1 exits, the search speed for agent 2 is optimal, and her solo drawdown size is therefore unaffected by the constraint and given by Proposition 2 in the text—call this drawdown size $d^I$. In particular, if the two agents leave at disjoint times in the unrestricted case, so that $d^T < d^I$, the claim implies that the agents would also leave at disparate times in the restricted case, since $d^T_{\text{restricted}} \leq d^T < d^I$. However, if agents depart jointly in the unrestricted case, that exit wave might disappear in the restricted case. To see this, observe that, in order to have an exit wave in the unrestricted case, we need:

$$\frac{4(\sigma^T)^2}{c(\sigma^T)} \geq \frac{\beta(\sigma^I)^2}{c(\sigma^I)}.$$  

For this wave to break in the restricted case, we need:

$$\frac{4(\sigma^I)^2}{c(\sigma^I)} \leq \frac{\beta(\sigma^I)^2}{c(\sigma^I)}.$$  

If $\beta \geq 4$, the restricted case will have agents departing at separate points, regardless of the structure of exit waves in the unrestricted case. To see the change in individual welfare, consider an agent utilizing a drawdown stopping boundary with drawdown size $d$ and search speed $\sigma$ that comes at a cost $c(\sigma)$. From Urgun and Yariv (2021b), the expected value for that agent is given by:

$$V(d, \sigma) = d - \frac{d^2}{4\sigma^2}c(\sigma).$$  

Therefore, in the unrestricted case, the expected value for agent 1, who is the first to leave is given by:

$$V^1 = \frac{(\sigma^T)^2}{c(\sigma^T)} = \frac{d^T}{2}.$$  

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whereas, in the restricted case, the expected welfare for agent 1 is given by:

\[ V_{\text{restricted}}^1 = \left( \sigma I \right)^2 \frac{d^T_{\text{restricted}}}{c(\sigma)} = \frac{d^T_{\text{restricted}}}{2}. \]

In particular, from the claim above, the expected welfare of agent 1 necessarily decreases.

The expected welfare of agent 2 depends on whether she departs when agent 1 does or continues searching. We omit its derivations. In either case, however, the restriction on the search speed leads to a decrease in her expected welfare as well.

### 6.2 Team Search Speed

We now consider the case in which agents are restricted to the optimal search speed for the team, \( \sigma^T \) defined above.

Our analysis so far implies that agent 1’s expected welfare is unaffected by this constraint and, using our previous notation, given by \( d^T \).

Agent 2 may be affected if she continues searching after agent 1 terminates her search. Indeed, when agent 2 can adjust her search speed to its optimal solo-level of \( \sigma^I \), the corresponding optimal drawdown is given by:

\[ d^I = \frac{\beta(\sigma^I)^2}{2c(\sigma^I)}. \]

However, when agent 2 is restricted to continue searching with speed \( \sigma^T \), she accordingly adjusts her drawdown to

\[ d^I_{\text{restricted}} = \frac{\beta(\sigma^T)^2}{2c(\sigma^T)}. \]

**Claim OA 2.** \( d^I_{\text{restricted}} \leq d^I \).

*Proof.* Recall that the optimal solo search speed \( \sigma^I \) minimizes \( \frac{c(\sigma)}{\sigma^2} \). Inverting the ratio immediately yields the claim as in the previous proof.

Intuitively, since agent 2 is now constrained to search with a less efficient speed, she responds by searching for a shorter duration. As before, if the unrestricted setting generates an exit wave with both agents ceasing search in unison, \( d^T \geq d^2 \) and the restricted environment would yield the same exit wave. However, if the unrestricted search leads the agents to depart at different points, this need not be the case when search speed is restricted to stay
constant. Indeed, the two agents would terminate their search together if

$$\frac{4(\sigma^T)^2}{c(\sigma^T)} \geq \frac{\beta(\sigma^T)^2}{c(\sigma^T)}.$$ 

Again, $\beta = 4$ is the critical value: when $\beta < 4$ so that agents’ costs are sufficiently similar, a non-trivial exit wave may occur.

We can now assess the welfare loss of agent 2. Certainly, if the agents depart together both in the restricted and the unrestricted setting, the constraint on speed has no bite and neither agent’s expected welfare is affected.

In general, agent 1 departs with a maximal observed value of $M$ when the search observation hits precisely $X = M - d^T$. If agent 2 continues searching on her own in the unrestricted case, her resulting continuation value is:

$$V^2(M, M - d^T) = M + \frac{c(\sigma^T)}{\beta(\sigma^I)^2} \left( d^T - \frac{\beta(\sigma^I)^2}{2c(\sigma^I)} \right)^2.$$ 

When restricted to continue searching with a speed of $\sigma^T$, agent 2’s continuation value is given by:

$$V^2_{\text{restricted}}(M, M - d^T) = M + \frac{c(\sigma^T)}{\beta(\sigma^T)^2} \left( d^T - \frac{\beta(\sigma^T)^2}{2c(\sigma^T)} \right)^2.$$ 

The difference captures the welfare loss. In particular, whenever there is a non-trivial exit wave in the restricted setting, when agents depart in sequence in the unrestricted setting, the second term of $V^2(M, M - d^T)$ captures the loss in welfare.

### 6.3 Optimal Fixed Search Speed

One could tailor the fixed search speed to maximize the maximal welfare of the team. For illustration, suppose the costs of the agents are close enough so that a non-trivial exit wave occurs when the search speed is fixed. Namely, suppose that $\beta \leq 4$. For any fixed search speed $\sigma$, the expected welfare of agent 1 is given by:

$$\max_d V^1(d, \sigma) = d - \frac{d^2}{(2\sigma)^2} c(\sigma).$$
Agent 1 then chooses her optimal drawdown size \( \tilde{d} \) to satisfy the resulting first-order condition:

\[
\frac{\partial V_1}{\partial d} = 1 - 2\tilde{d} \frac{c(\tilde{\sigma})}{(2\tilde{\sigma})^2} = 0 \Rightarrow \tilde{d} = \frac{2\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})}.
\]

This yields an expected welfare of

\[
V^{1\text{restricted}}(\tilde{d}, \tilde{\sigma}) = \frac{2\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})} - \frac{\left(\frac{2\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})}\right)^2}{(2\tilde{\sigma})^2} c(\tilde{\sigma})^2 = \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})}.
\]

Since \( \beta \leq 4 \), agent 2 exits at the same time and her expected welfare can be calculated similarly:

\[
V^{2\text{restricted}}(\tilde{d}, \tilde{\sigma}) = \frac{2\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})} - \frac{\left(\frac{2\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})}\right)^2}{(2\tilde{\sigma})^2} c(\tilde{\sigma})^2 \frac{1}{\beta} = \left(2 - \frac{1}{\beta}\right) \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})}.
\]

The resulting expected welfare \( W(\tilde{\sigma}) \) for both agents is then:

\[
W^{\text{restricted}}(\tilde{\sigma}) = V^{1\text{restricted}}(\tilde{d}, \tilde{\sigma}) + V^{2\text{restricted}}(\tilde{d}, \tilde{\sigma}) = \left(3 - \frac{1}{\beta}\right) \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})}.
\]

The overall welfare is then maximized when \( \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^2}{c(\tilde{\sigma})} \) is maximized. Now, recall that the optimal individual search speed is defined by \( \sigma^I = \arg\min_{\sigma} \frac{c(\sigma)}{\sigma^2} \). In particular, the optimal fixed search speed is the individually-optimal search speed \( \sigma^I \), as analyzed in Section 6.1 above.

7 Team Composition

We now show that agents may prefer team members characterized by higher costs and marginal costs, provided the ratio of costs to marginal costs is sufficiently high.

Assume speed aggregators take the CES form with \( \rho > 0 \) and consider a team of two agents with log-convex costs \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \). Suppose agent 2 is replaced with agent \( \hat{2} \) with cost \( \hat{c}_2 \), such that \( c_2(\sigma) < \hat{c}_2(\sigma) << c_1(\sigma) \) and \( c_2'(\sigma) < \hat{c}_2'(\sigma) \) but \( \frac{c_2(\sigma)}{\hat{c}_2(\sigma)} < \frac{c_2'(\sigma)}{\hat{c}_2'(\sigma)} \) for all \( \sigma \in [\underline{\sigma}, \overline{\sigma}] \). Assume equilibrium search speeds are interior for either team. Let \( \hat{\sigma}_2(\sigma_1) \) be the solution of:

\[
\frac{2\hat{c}_2'(\sigma_2)}{\hat{c}_2(\sigma_2)} (\sigma_2)^{\rho - 1} \frac{1}{2} = \left(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{1/\rho}_2 + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^{1/\rho}_1 \right)^{\rho/2}.
\]
for any given $\sigma_1$. Assume further that
\[ \left( \frac{1}{2}\sigma_2^{1/\rho} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_1^{1/\rho} \right)^\rho < \left( \frac{1}{2}\sigma_2^{1/\rho} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_1^{1/\rho} \right)^\rho \]
for all $\sigma_1$. That is, agent 1 is first to stop for any choice of $\sigma_1$, with agent $\hat{2}$ best responding.

Let $V_1$ denote the equilibrium payoff of agent 1 with agent 2, and let $\hat{V}_1$ denote the equilibrium payoff of agent 1 with agent $\hat{2}$. Then, $\hat{V}_1 \geq V_1$. To see this, observe that even if agent 1 chooses the same equilibrium speed when partnered with agent $\hat{2}$ as she does when partnered with agent 2, her payoff is higher since the best response of agent $\hat{2}$ is always larger than the best response of agent 2. Thus, in equilibrium, she must be doing weakly better.

8 Independent Samples

In order to analyze the case with independent search outcomes, we turn our analysis to a discrete-time setup with two agents, 1 and 2. As in our benchmark setting, we retain the normality of observations assumptions. We also continue to assume that agents jointly control the variance. If an alliance $A \subset \{1,2\}, A \neq \emptyset$ is conducting search at time $t$, their observation is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation $\sigma^A_t = \sum_{i \in A} \sigma^A_{i,t}$ (an analogue of the CES speed aggregators with $\rho = 1$). The cost is still paid per draw, but now accumulates in discrete periods as opposed to continuous time. We maintain our assumptions on the cost of search speed, as well as the description of ultimate search rewards, which follow from the maximal observation during search. When search is conducted by a single agent, Urgun and Yariv (2021a) show that the optimal stopping policy is characterized by a threshold and the optimal search speed is constant. They show that:

**Proposition OA 3** (Urgun and Yariv, 2021a). For a given search speed $\sigma$, it is optimal to stop once the satisficing threshold $S^*_i(\sigma)$ is reached, where $S^*_i(\sigma)$ solves
\[ c(\sigma) = \int_{S^*_i(\sigma)}^{\infty} (x - S^*_i(\sigma))\phi^\sigma(x)dx. \]

The optimal search speed $\sigma_i$ maximizes $\psi^{-1}\left( \frac{c(\sigma)}{\sigma} \right)$, where $\psi(v) = \phi^1(v) - v \times (1 - \Phi^1(v))$ and $\phi^\sigma$ denotes the normal probability density function with mean 0 and standard deviation $\sigma$. The payoff from optimal search is $S^*_i(\sigma_i)$.

As noted in Urgun and Yariv (2021a), the function $\psi(v)$ and its inverse are difficult to simplify further in terms of elementary functions for closed-form characterizations, but they
can be easily tabulated and some properties of both $\psi(v)$ and its inverse are well known.

Once one of the players departs, the optimal search is stationary and identified by the proposition above. Moreover, similar arguments to those presented in the text can be used to show that equilibrium search speeds are constant within any alliance. Let $\sigma_i^{1,2}$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$ denote the search speed of agent $i$ when both agents search jointly. There are two thresholds $S_i^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})$ and $S_2^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})$ that determine when agent 1 and agent 2 cease search, respectively. Equilibrium thresholds equal the continuation values given the search speeds, while equilibrium search speeds are optimal given the thresholds.

For given search speeds, the optimal thresholds must satisfy, for $i = 1, 2$:

$$S_i^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}) = -c_i(\sigma_i^{1,2}) + \int_{-\infty}^{\min\{S_1^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}), S_2^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})\}} S_i^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})\phi^{1,2}(x)dx$$

$$+ \int_{\max\{S_1^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}), S_2^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})\}}^{\infty} I\left( S_i^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}) \geq S_j^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}) \right) S_i^{1,2}(\sigma_i) dx$$

$$+ \int_{\min\{S_1^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}), S_2^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})\}}^{\max\{S_1^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}), S_2^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2})\}} x\phi^{1,2}(x)dx.$$

While amenable to numerical analysis, a closed-form description of the optimal thresholds is naturally challenging to derive in this setting. Nonetheless, one can readily see one qualitative distinction between equilibrium outcomes in this setting and those we identify in the paper—the sequence of exit waves is no longer deterministic. Indeed, when sufficiently extreme observations occur, both agents may leave at once. However, for moderately high observations, one agent may leave on her own.

The equilibrium search speeds are chosen so that

$$\sigma_i^{1,2} = \arg \max S_i^{1,2}(\sigma^{1,2}) \text{ for } i = 1, 2.$$

Additional players introduce further hurdles to tractability since, for each alliance, one needs to consider the threshold corresponding to each agent. We leave the complete analysis of the independent case for future research.

9 Alternatives to the Regularity Assumption

Uniqueness of equilibria allows us to identify comparative statics and offer a clear comparison between equilibrium outcomes and socially efficient ones. Regularity provides sufficient con-
ditions for unique equilibrium outcomes. It corresponds to restrictions on the environment’s fundamentals. A different approach entails selection of equilibria, allowing for multiplicity. As noted in the main text, if there is only a discrete set of solutions and equilibria are selected to entail continuous strategies, the constant speed conclusion continues to hold. In this section, we consider two alternative plausible selection rules: speed maximization and Pareto efficiency. We show, using a class of examples, that these selection rules are unsuccessful in picking out a unique equilibrium. That is, even with these natural selection rules, further restrictions on fundamentals are necessary to guarantee uniqueness.

Consider the well-ordered cost setting with two agents. Assume exponential costs: 
\[ c_1(\sigma) = e^{\sigma} \] and 
\[ c_2(\sigma) = \beta e^{\sigma}, \] with \( \beta > 1. \) Suppose speed aggregators are such that 
\[ f^{(1,2)}(\sigma^{(1,2)}_1, \sigma^{(1,2)}_2) = h(\sigma^{(1,2)}_1) + \sigma^{(1,2)}_2, \] where \( h \) is continuous, increasing, strictly positive, and bounded on \([\underline{\sigma}, \overline{\sigma}]\). For simplicity, assume that for the singleton sets, we have 
\[ f^{(i)}(\sigma^{(i)}_i) = \sigma^{(i)}_i \] for \( i = 1, 2. \) For \( \beta \) large enough, any equilibrium entails sequential exits. By Proposition 1 in the main text, any equilibrium that has an interior speed choice \( \sigma^{(1,2)}_2 \) must satisfy
\[
2c_2(\sigma^{(1,2)}_2) \frac{\partial f^{(1,2)}(\sigma^{(1,2)}_1, \sigma^{(1,2)}_2)}{\partial \sigma^{(1,2)}_2} = 2 = h(\sigma^{(1,2)}_1) + \sigma^{(1,2)}_2.
\]

In the alliance including both agents, the search speed is constant and equal to 2. In particular, if there are multiple equilibria, they all yield the same alliance speed. Suppose the alliance uses a drawdown stopping boundary with drawdown size \( d \). When starting with a maximum value \( M \) and current observation \( X \), with constant speed \( \sigma \), denote the expected time till the stopping boundary is reached by \( \mathcal{T}_d(M, X) \). Using Theorem 4.1 of Pedersen and Peškir (1998), we have that
\[
\mathcal{T}_d(M, X) = \frac{(d + M - X)(d - M + X)}{4}.
\]

By the equality implied by our Proposition 1, we must have \( \sigma^{(1,2)}_2 = 2 - h(\sigma^{(1,2)}_1) \). This implies that the equilibrium drawdown size of agent 1 in the full alliance is only a function of her own speed. We denote that drawdown size by \( d^{(1,2)}_1(\sigma^{(1,2)}_1) \). Similarly, by Proposition 1, we know that \( \sigma^{(2)}_2 = 2 \) hence \( d^{(2)}_2 = \frac{2\beta}{e^2} \). Therefore, the equilibrium welfare (\( W^{eq} \)) starting
from state $(0,0)$ can be succinctly written as follows:

\[
W_{eq}(\sigma_1^{1,2}) = -\mathfrak{d}_{d_1^{1,2}}(0, 0)c_2(2 - h(\sigma_1^{1,2})) - \mathfrak{d}_{d_2^{1,2}}(0, d_1^{1,2}(\sigma_1^{1,2}))c_2(\sigma_2^{2}) + d_2^{2} \\
- \mathfrak{d}_{d_1^{1,2}}(0, 0)c_1(\sigma_1^{1,2}) + d_1^{1,2}(\sigma_1^{1,2}) \\
= -(\beta - 2)\beta - e^{-h(\sigma_1^{1,2})} - 2\sigma_1^{1,2} + e^{-\sigma_1^{1,2}} + e^{2-2\sigma_1^{1,2}}.
\]

The Pareto optimal speed then maximizes $W_{eq}(\sigma_1^{1,2})$. The first-order condition is:

\[
\frac{\partial W_{eq}(\sigma_1^{1,2})}{\partial \sigma_1^{1,2}} = -e^{-h(\sigma_1^{1,2})} - 2\sigma_1^{1,2} + e^{-\sigma_1^{1,2}} - 2e^{2-2\sigma_1^{1,2}} = 0.
\]

Concavity of $W_{eq}$ implies that

\[
e^{2-h(\sigma)}(h''(\sigma) - (h'(\sigma) + 2)^2) + e^{\sigma} + 4e^2 < 0.
\]

This condition is easily satisfied for sufficiently concave $h$, in which case the first-order condition has to hold for maximizers of $W_{eq}$.

Assume $h'(\sigma) < 1$ for all $\sigma$ so that the maximizer of $W_{eq}$ requires agent 1 to use a corner speed value. We now identify restrictions on $h$ so that both $\sigma$ and $\sigma$ are maximizers of $W_{eq}$, in addition to being equilibrium solutions. In particular, from the first-order condition,

\[
h'(\sigma) = \frac{2e^{h(\sigma)+2} + e^{h(\sigma)+\sigma} - 2e^2}{e^2} \\
h'(\sigma) = \frac{2e^{h(\sigma)+2} + e^{h(\sigma)+\sigma} - 2e^2}{e^2}.
\]

For $\sigma$ and $\sigma$ to both be maximizers, $W_{eq}(\sigma) = W_{eq}(\sigma)$, which implies that

\[
h(\sigma) = \log \left( \frac{e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} + e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma} - e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} - e^{h(\sigma)+\sigma+2\sigma} + e^{2\sigma+2}}{e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} + e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma} - e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} - e^{h(\sigma)+\sigma+2\sigma} + e^{2\sigma+2}} \right) - 2\sigma + 2.
\]

Finally, we choose $h$ so that $\sigma$ and $\sigma$ correspond to interior solutions for agent 2. Namely, we choose $h$ so that $2 - h(\sigma) \in (\sigma, \sigma)$ and $2 - h(\sigma) \in (\sigma, \sigma)$.

To summarize, as long as $h$ is sufficiently concave, and the following system is satisfied, there are two solutions that maximize the alliance’s speed and are Pareto optimal.

(i) $h(\sigma) = \log \left( \frac{e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} + e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma} - e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} - e^{h(\sigma)+\sigma+2\sigma} + e^{2\sigma+2}}{e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} + e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma} - e^{h(\sigma)+2\sigma+2} - e^{h(\sigma)+\sigma+2\sigma} + e^{2\sigma+2}} \right) - 2\sigma + 2,$

(ii) $2 - h(\sigma) \in (\sigma, \sigma),$

(iii) $2 - h(\sigma) \in (\sigma, \sigma).$
The system imposes constraints only at the end points of the speed interval. There are infinitely many viable functions $h$ (strictly positive, increasing, and sufficiently concave) that satisfy it. Each such function provides an example in which neither speed maximization nor Pareto optimality provide a unique equilibrium selection.

References

